Thèses sur le sujet « France – International relations – Israel »

Boston University. University Professors Program Senior theses.<br>PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.<br>2031-01-02

Defence date: 14 December 2007<br>Examining Board: Prof. Bertrand Badie, (IEP Paris and CERI) ; Prof. Martin Beck, (GIGA Institute of Middle East Studies) ; Prof. Friedrich Kratochwil, (EUI) ; Prof. Pascal Vennesson, (EUI)<br>PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses<br>Palestine between 1998 and 2005. Special attention is also drawn to the period of Sharon’s mandate and the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2001-2005). The thesis has two main objectives. The first is to draw a clearer picture of the ways in which French and German foreign policy towards Israel- Palestine has been socially constructed. The second is to better understand the reasons why France and Germany, key powers at the heart of the EU, did not furnish the efforts required in order to broker a peace deal in the Middle East that lived up to their own - as well as the EU’s - rhetoric and official 'dedication' to the conflict. First, I consider the respective processes of foreign policy making in France and Germany. After examining bilateral relations between France, Germany, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, I shed some light on the evolution of French and German national ‘positions’ and identify those who have played an important role in shaping this process. Subsequently, I propose to evaluate how foreign policy makers and leaders eventually take decisions. I therefore highlight major domestic and external sources of influence, and study how foreign policy makers prioritise among conflicting interests and such influential factors. Finally, I suggest in what respect these actors gave, or failed to give, their national diplomacy a vision, a strategy and solid boundaries within which to work. At first sight, it might be said that the dominant role of the United States in the Middle East, combined with internal divisions in Europe, in large part explain the weakness of France, Germany and the EU in the Middle East diplomatic arena between 1998 and 2005. However, my research also specifically tests the hypothesis that the collective memory of the Holocaust, its contemporary use and its cultural domestic meaning, in both France and Germany, have been central and even decisive in the elaboration of their respective positions. The set of norms and values linked to collective memory and shared by key decision-makers has constituted a major paralysing factor. In other words, a sense of historical responsibility and of Israeli 'exceptionalism' has developed in France and Germany. This has shaped the perception of the conflict and prevented both countries, and the EU itself, from playing a more pro-active role in the peace negotiations. From a theoretical perspective, this research contributes to foreign policy analysis in the field of International Relations. In addition, the focus on the social construction of a particular foreign policy clearly places this research in the constructivist tradition. However, the thesis is not primarily designed as an argument in favour or against a particular approach. Neither is the conflict merely a ‘case-study’, aimed at highlighting the weaknesses of any pre-conceived theoretical concepts or tools. The objective is to demonstrate the ways in which a particular set of norms and values, both in France and in Germany, may exert a decisive influence at various stages of the foreign policy making process.

Ensemble de neuf études relevant du droit constitutionnel, de l'histoire des idées politiques, du droit international public et des relations internationales, ayant pour l'objet l'analyse des rapports qu'entretiennent, dans ces diverses disciplines, le droit et la politique. Inventaire des conditions politiques de la production et du fonctionnement des mécanismes et des principes juridiques relatifs à l'exercice du pouvoir politique étatique, notamment pendant la Révolution Française (processus constituant de 1793, nouveau droit des relations internationales, fêtes révolutionnaires et culte de l'être suprême, utopie et droit politique chez Saint-Just). Analyse de la place des facteurs juridiques dans la détermination et la conduite des politiques étrangères (Ve République Française, Iran actuel, Israël et Palestine). Etude du phénomène de la juridicisation du politique (importance croissante de la justice constitutionnelle et de la protection, dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe, des droits fondamentaux de l'homme ; analyse d'un projet doctrinal de création d'une cour suprême de justice en 1936).

Ce travail se propose d'étudier les relations franco-égyptiennes, dans une période (1956-1970) ou le conflit israelo-arabe et la guerre d'Algérie ont eu un impact décisif sur l'évolution des relations entre les deux pays. A cette époque l'engagement de l'Egypte nasserienne dans la voie de l'arabisme et de la décolonisation, a fait que l'Egypte fut visée par la campagne de Suez (1956). Campagne qui a marqué la rupture d'une grande présence économique et culturelle de la France dans le monde arabe. Onze ans plus tard, la guerre des six jours (1967) allait marquer une rupture entre la France et Israe͏̈l et un grand retour de la France dans le monde arabe et particulièrement dans les domaines économiques et culturels. Avec la fin de la guerre d'Algérie, commence une nouvelle politique arabe de la France qui percevait l'Egypte comme un partenaire indispensable pour exercer une influence au sein du monde arabe<br>This work intend to explain french-egyptian relations during the period (1956-1970), when the israeli-arabic conflict and algerian ward had a decisive impact on the evolution of relations between the two countries. At that time commitment of nasserian egypt for arabism and decolonisation put Egypt as the aim of the campaign of Suez (1956), that emphasized the end of the historical economic and cultural presence of France in the arab world. And so on eleven years later in the six days war (1967) which made a breack in the israeli french relations at the same time it showed a great retourn of France in the arab world especially in the economic and cultural. Fields at the end of algerian war, a new arab policy of France which perceived Egypte as an essential partner to exert an influence within the arab world

The US-Israel relationship reached a critical, institutionalizing juncture during the 1980s. Measurable in qualitative and quantitative terms, the Reagan administration had a transformative impact on bilateral ties, institutionalizing ad hoc forms of cooperation while modifying prevailing discourse to recognize Israel as an 'ally' and a 'strategic asset' in the Cold War. New bureaucratic agreements were signed, bilateral working groups formed and joint military exercises held throughout a decade that capped a long familiarization process between societies and political elites in the two countries. By the end of the 1980s, many of the bureaucratic frameworks that today still govern the US-Israeli relationship were institutionalized, as were those elements of preferential treatment commonly cited as proof for the 'special' or 'unique' nature of US-Israel ties. This study focusses on the institutional and bureaucratic dimensions of US support for Israel, examining the changing rationalizations for this support and the way this relates to the salient theme of a mutual struggle for influence and leverage over the policies of the other. Drawing on recently declassified documents, complimented with high-level interviews and other materials, the research answers three interrelated questions as to 'why' this institutionalization process was carried out, 'how' it would materialize and 'what effects' these processes would have on future US policy towards Israel and the Middle East. While predicated on an effort to enhance US leverage over Israel, the study argues that the institutionalization of the relationship would formalize interdependence between the two countries, consolidating a 'policy straitjacket' that has constrained presidential freedom of action towards both Israel and the broader Middle East. This has furthered the US's 'entrapment' in a quasi-exclusivist relationship with Israel that has enhanced a process of 'Israelization' of US approaches and viewpoints on Middle East developments, harming US influence while transforming the US into an active participant and major obstacle to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the broader stabilization of the Middle East.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007.<br>Thesis Advisor(s): Wirtz, James ; Freeman, Michael E. "December 2007." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 24, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-59). Also available in print.

This thesis addresses the question: how do individuals in a conflict society engage in peaceful dispute resolution through mediation? It provides a close look at Israeli society, in which people face daily conflicts. These include confrontations on many levels: the national, such as wars and terror attacks; the social, such as ethnic, religious and economic tensions; and the personal level, whereby the number of lawyers and legal claims per capita are among the highest in the world. The magnitude, pervasiveness, and often existential nature of these conflicts have led sociologists to label Israel a ‘conflict society’.   Mediation practice came into this society and challenged the existing ethos and norms by proposing a discourse of dialogue and cooperation. The thesis focuses on the meeting point that mediation engenders between narratives of conflict, which have developed in this environment, and the mediation processes, which set out to achieve a collaborative discourse and mutual recognition.   The fieldwork, forming the core of the thesis, consists of the observation of supervised mediation processes of civil disputes in two leading mediation centres, and interviews with professionals and key figures in the discipline. The wide variety of voices of a broad range of interviewees and many different parties provide for rich, qualitative data.   The use of the narrative‐ethnographic approach in observing mediation processes helps identify key themes in participantsʹ  narratives. The subsequent analysis leads to the insight that these mediation processes reflect, in a subtle way, the narratives, beliefs and needs of individuals in a conflict society. The findings from this study indicate that perceptions of life in a conflict society are clearly manifested through mediation processes. These place obstacles and inhibit the attainment of agreements. Yet, surprisingly, some of the findings also demonstrate an aversion to conflict and a well‐expressed desire to maintain communication and to achieve peaceful resolution.

This research questions whether Israel and Palestine should be divided into two states. Viewed through the International Relations (IR) theories of Realism and Liberalism, the ‘Two-State’ solution is the orthodox policy for Israel and Palestine. But Israelis and Palestinians are interspersed and share many of the same resources making it difficult to create two states. So, this research critiques the aforementioned IR theories which underpin the ‘Two-State’ solution. The conclusion reached is that there ought to be new thinking on how to resolve the Israel-Palestine issue.

Les objectifs de la présente thèse se situent sur trois plans: empirique, méthodologique et théorique. Au niveau empirique, le but recherché consiste à étudier aussi précisément que possible et de manière dépassionnée le militantisme, en France, lié au conflit israélopalestinien. Pour ce faire, un travail de terrain rigoureux a été réalisé au sein même des sphères pro-israélienne et pro-palestinienne. Ce travail permet d'apporter une vision critique sur des représentations communément admises comme celle d'un affrontement entre un « lobby sioniste» et un {{ lobby pro-arabe» ou celle d'une {{ importation du conflit israélopalestinien }} sur le territoire national. Au niveau méthodologique, la recherche réalisée aspire à décloisonner les disciplines en utilisant des méthodes de sociologie - notamment l'observation de phénomènes sociaux restreints comme des manifestations - pour mener une réflexion s'insérant dans un cadre de Relations Internationales. Enfin, au niveau théorique, il s'agit de s'interroger sur la pertinence de l'opposition traditionnelle entre réalisme et transnationalisme. Les militants étudiés sont en effet des acteurs transnationaux mais des "des acteurs transnationaux paradoxaux" dans la mesure où leur militantisme est construit et s'articule autour de l'Etat.

This dissertation seeks to expand our understanding of variation in foreign policy. Although we have a series of large, extant literatures dealing with the sources of foreign policy, there has been less attention paid over the last decade to understanding why states change their behavior. At the same time, the thesis argues that foreign policy change is best understood as a result of the role of individual decision-makers and the role that emotion plays in their foreign policy calculations.<br>Foreign policy depends on the decisions made by individual leaders. The type of individual thus determines the specific policy. Here individuals are categorized as ideological or adaptable. Ideological individuals are more rigid in their belief structures, are more likely to select policies that fit with their extant understandings of the world and the position of their state in it, and more likely to rely on the emotional or affective appeal an object or issue holds for them. Adaptable leaders are more flexible, not tied to specific ideologies or reliant on emotion to guide their thinking, and thus more likely to choose or learn ideas that best respond to changing environmental conditions. At the same time, how a state's decision-making institutions are structured tells us how likely it is that an individual's own predilections matter. In polities where decision-making is centralized (e.g., in the office of the prime minister), individuals have greater leeway to put their ideas (whether based on their ideological outlooks or shifting environmental circumstances) into practice, while in de-centralized polities other actors constrain the leader from autonomous decision-making. In such cases, it is likely that an individual's ideas will conform to those of the constraining actors. Finally, the role of ideas is taken into consideration, as the dominant national ideas about foreign policy regarding a specific issue-area help us better understand the context in which individuals make (or change) foreign policy.<br>This model is tested against alternate explanations---systemic imperatives, Constructivism, public opinion, poliheuristic theory, and prospect theory---in two case studies: the Israeli decision to pursue and sign the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the 2002 decision by the Islamist government in Turkey to actively lobby for membership in the European Union. Both foreign policies represent significant variation, and both provide important theoretical and empirical puzzles for scholars.

In the past five years J Street, a pro-peace, pro-Israel Israel Lobby, has grown to challenge AIPAC’s dominance in lobbying Congress to support Israel. Although still small in comparison to AIPAC, J Street has become influential in opening up dialogue among American Jews on what it means to be pro-Israel in today’s world. By openly criticizing conservative Israeli policy J Street has created an environment where liberal American Jews can support both Israel and a two state solution with a Palestinian state. This paper examines American Jewish activism and the rise of AIPAC as the predominant Israel Lobby. It then argues that over the years AIPAC has supported expansionist Likud Party policy and has undermined Labor Party peace attempts. It has viciously attacked any person or organization critical of conservative Israeli policy. This paper then investigates opinion polls of American Jews and finds that, contrary to AIPAC, the majority of Jewish Americans are liberal and support a two state solution similar to J Street’s position. It then examines how J Street overcame an onslaught of attacks from conservative Jewish organizations. It argues that J Street has been successful because it has remained moderate in its policy stances and has been effective in countering attacks from conservative Jewish organizations while gaining the support of many mainstream American Jews who are frustrated with AIPAC’s policy.

This study is titled Role of Small States in International Relations: Comparative Analysis of the Czech Republic and Israel and its main purpose is to analyze a typical small state's behavior in the international arena on the examples of the Czech and Israeli foreign policy. It is divided into four respective sections -- a theoretical framework, historical background, and the two case studies, and it strives to answer a foundational question whether the Czech Republic and Israel can be considered small players in international relations based on the theoretical definition of the notion of a small state as well as the countries' current foreign policy approaches and tools.

The United States and Israel share a special relationship, but this has not always been the case. The cultivation of this alliance took many years and was done at the hands of various Presidents. While in most cases the Executive Office and State Department have shares a close relationship, in the case of Israel policy the two factions have butted heads considerably. This article argues that it has been Presidents alone who have created the policy towards Israel that set up for the special relationship the U.S. and Israel share today.

This thesis explores native resistance to settler colonialism through its focus on the ’48 Palestinians (also known as the Palestinian citizens of Israel). It innovatively brings together postcolonial theory and settler colonial studies to explore the racialised, ethnicised, gendered and sexualised dimensions of settler colonial violence, how these shape native modalities of resistance and subordination, and the ways in which the transnational is imbricated within these processes. The thesis undertakes two case studies – on the Palestinian Bedouin struggle for land rights and on the Palestinian queer movement – drawing upon archival research, other primary texts and ethnographic exploration. The case studies are interrogated in relation to the liberal-nationalist framework that dominates ’48 Palestinian discourse and resistance. The thesis radically critiques the frameworks of ethnocracy, ethnonationalism and minority studies that have been most prevalent in earlier research on ’48 Palestinians. Instead, this study builds on an understanding of resistance as diagnostic of power (Abu-Lughod 1990). It argues that the resistance of Palestinians in Israel is diagnostic of the structure of Israel as a liberal settler state, and unfolds in relation to the liminal positionality of ’48 Palestinians between (semi)liberal citizenship and colonial subjecthood. It further argues that the subjectivities and modalities of resistance of ’48 Palestinians are shaped through the racialising logics of settler colonialism, and the intersectionalities of these logics with ethnicity, gender and sexuality. Through the focus in the two case studies on indigeneity (and the fetishisation of the indigenous subject as premodern) and LGBT rights (and the folding of queer subjects into modernity), the thesis further suggests that the resistance of ’48 Palestinians is also shaped in complex and ambivalent ways by their ongoing encounters with the liberal frameworks of multiculturalism and human rights. The case studies illuminate that while these frameworks can serve as vehicles for empowerment, they can also reproduce the racialising logics of settler colonialism and further its entrenchment. This means that ’48 Palestinians constantly (re)negotiate their identities, their struggles and their political agendas within multiple circuits of power. The ambivalence of the encounter with the liberal settler state, as inclusionary and exclusionary, and human rights, as empowering and oppressive, produces native resistance to settler colonialism to be shaped and reshaped by competing political projects and hybrid modalities of resistance that include practices of self-essentialising, Bhabian notions of resistance as subversion, and a Fanonian politics of rejection as both pedagogy and a political imperative. The thesis concludes that the mobilisation of a more radical vision of decolonisation requires transcendence of both liberal settler colonialism and the liberal politics of human rights.

Despite seemingly discriminatory practices at the border directed towards US citizens, no formal academic work has been conducted on the subject. This study is the first of its kind, which examines the phenomenon of the denying and banning of US citizens from the external Israeli border crossings. It draws upon the cases of 110 US citizens who have been banned or denied from the external Israeli border crossings from 1987-2015. This study finds that denial is often associated with Palestinian Americans, Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, Black Americans and Americans who personally identify as activists or are considered by border officials to be so. It argues that Israel’s actions at their border crossings have become increasingly standardized over time through practices of “stealth authoritarianism” that create the veneer of due process in the execution of a denial or ban and lead to difficulties pursuing redress. Finally, this study puts forth how this practice fits within the broader context of Israeli policies regarding the subjugation of Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel proper as well as individuals suspected of being activists working towards Palestinian liberation. Ultimately, this study hopes to lay a multi-disciplinary groundwork for understanding the implications of the denial and banning of US citizens at the external Israeli border crossings for those who wish to pursue the topic in the future.

Mêlant une approche juridique, politique et historique, cette étude explore la condition internationale du président de la Vème République française à partir de son identification et de sa reconnaissance en tant que chef d’Etat mais aussi à travers le statut privilégié que lui confère le droit international. Elle aborde également la politique extérieure déployée par les présidents de la Vème République à la lumière de leurs fonctions régaliennes de chefs de la diplomatie et des armées françaises ainsi que par l’intermédiaire de celles dont ils ont hérité de l’histoire ou encore de leur rôle dans la construction européenne<br>This study, which combines the judicial, political and historical approaches, focuses on the international status of the president of the V Republic in France, based not only on him being identified and recognized as the Head of State but also on the priviliged status granted by international law. It also deals with the foreign policy adopted by the presidents of the V Republic, examined through their regalian functions as heads of diplomacy and the armed forces, their titles inherited from past history or their role in the making of Europe

This multi-disciplinary research project explores the religious and cultural foundations within the “master commemorative narratives” that frame Israeli and Iranian political discourse. In articulating their grievances against one another, Israeli and Iranian leaders express the tensions between religion, nationalism, and modernity in their own societies. The theoretical and methodological approach of this dissertation is constructivist-interpretivist. The concept of “master commemorative narratives” is adapted from Yael Zerubavel’s study of ritualized remembrance in Israeli political culture, and applied to both Israeli and Iranian foreign policy. Israel’s master commemorative narrative draws heavily upon the language of the Hebrew Bible, situating foreign policy discourse within a paradigm of covenantal patrimony, exile, and return, despite the unrelenting hostility of eternal enemies and “the nations.” Iran’s master commemorative narrative expresses Iranian suspicion of foreign encroachment and interference, and of the internal corruption that they engender, sacralizing resistance to the forces of evil in the figurative language and myths of pre-Islamic tradition and of Shi‘a Islam. Using a constructivist-interpretive methodological approach, this research offers a unique interpretive analysis of the parallels between these narratives, where they intersect, and where they come into conflict. It highlights both the broad appeal and the diverse challenges to the components of these “master” narratives within Israeli and Iranian politics and society. The conclusion of this study explains the ways in which the recognition of religious and cultural conflicts through the optic of master commemorative narratives can complement the perspectives of other theoretical approaches and challenge the conventions of Security Studies. It also suggests some of the potential practical applications of this research in devising more effective international diplomacy.

This thesis problematises the bases of soft power, that is, causal mechanisms connecting the agent (A) and the subject (B) of a power relationship. As the literature review reveals, their underspecification by neoliberal IR scholars, the leading proponents of the soft power concept, has caused a great deal of scholarly confusion over such questions as how to clearly differentiate between hard and soft power, how attraction (soft power’s primary mechanism) works and what roles structural and relational forces play in hard/soft power. In an effort to ascertain the bases, I address this issue not from the viewpoint of A’s policies or resources, like do IR neoliberal scholars, but in terms of B’s psychological perception of A. Employing social psychological accounts, I argue that attraction can be produced in three distinct ways, namely 1) through B’s identification with A (“emotional” attraction), 2) via B’s appreciation of A’s competence/knowledge in a particular field (“rational” attraction) and 3) by means of the activation of B’s internalised values which contextually prescribe B to act in A’s favour (“social” attraction). Importantly, depending upon the way attraction is produced, it is peculiar in a number of characteristics, the main of which are power scope, weight and durability. Insights from social psychology also show that unlike soft power, hard power requires not only B’s relevant perception of the A-B relationship (as coercive or rewarding), but also A’s capability to actualise a threat of punishment and/or a promise of reward. I argue this difference can be fairly treated as definitional rather than empirical, which implies that coercion and reward necessarily have both relational and structural dimensions, whereas for attraction, a structural one alone suffices, while a relational one may or may not be present. Having explicated the soft power bases, I illustrate each of them using three “most likely” case studies, namely Serbia’s policies towards Russia (emotional attraction), Kazakhstan’s approach to relations with the EU (rational attraction) and Germany’s policies vis-à-vis Israel (social attraction).

The 1648 landmark signing of the Westphalian Treaties which famously implemented the principle of cuius regio, eius religio has, for International Relations (IR), meant that relatively little attention has been paid to religion as an influential force in international relations. A “turn to religion” amongst a growing body of IR scholars, fueled by post-Cold War studies and empirical events, has sought to change this by placing religion within the study of IR. With a view of adding to this debate, this thesis examines the role of religion in Israeli, Iranian and Saudi Arabian foreign policy during the respective leaderships of Menachem Begin (1977-84), Ayatollah Khomeini (1979-89) and Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1975-1995). It does so by drawing on extensive primary material, including private and public discourse of the leaders in question, as well as existing literature from, primarily, Middle East Studies and Religious Studies. The thesis argues, and shows with reference to its empirical findings, that the leaders’religious beliefs shaped their respective world-views and, by extension, their foreign policy doctrines and foreign policy outcomes. Moreover, it shows that religion played an important role in legitimizing the leaders themselves as well as their respective foreign policies. In this context, the thesis furthermore shows that, for the foreign policy leaders, religion assumed distinct meanings which were seemingly shaped according the context in which they operated. Importantly, the thesis argues, this does not uncritically support the long-standing assumption in IR scholarship that religion is epiphenomal, and/or a tool of instrumentalisation. With reference to Constructivist literature and a dynamic definition of religion developed for this project, the thesis rather explains that the malleable nature of religion can and does interact with variables like material security to shape, and sometimes drive, conceptualisations of national interest and foreign policy outcomes. The project concludes that religion’s role is multi-faceted, and, more to it, that the foreign policies of Khomeini’s Iran, Begin’s Israel and Fahd’s Saudi Arabia cannot be fully understood without it.

Il y a une trentaine d'annees est apparu en droit international prive ce que la doctrine appelle une crise du conflit de lois. Ce concept exprime, d'une part, l'apparition de regles de rattachement a caractere materiel et de regles de droit international prive materiel, d'autre part le developpement d'une methode de conflit nouvelle, qualifiée par les auteurs americains de "fonctionnaliste", qui se traduit en france par la multiplication des lois de police et par la prise en compte des lois de police etrangeres en dehors du jeu des regles de rattachement. La présente thèse a pour objet d'etudier, sous un angle comparatif et historique, le phenomene de la crise du conflit de lois a propos des problemes de droit applicable survenant dans les litiges portant sur la validite de dispositions contractuelles. La comparaison du droit francais avec le droit international prive americain revele que, quoique de prime abord tres different, les deux droits fournissent des solutions pratiques semblables<br>About thirty years ago, a so-called crisis of the conflict of laws appeared. This concept expresses, on one hand, the apparition of "rattaching rules of material character" and of material rules of international private law, on the other hand, the development of a new method of conflict, called "functionnalism" by the american scholars, which is revealed in France by the multiplication of "lois de police" and by the taking into account of foreign "lois de police" in a way not related to the rattaching rules. The hereby thesis is aimed at studying, from a comparative and historical point of view, the phenomenon of the crisis of the conflict of laws in the litigation relating to problems of law applicable raising in contracts validity issues. The comparison of french law with american international private law shows that, although prima facie very different, the two systems of laws provide for similar solutions

This paper will analyze the variations in presidential policy towards the state of Israel. The main objective is to assess why and how presidents have differed since the Truman presidency. The presidents observed have a certain degree of variation and this variation has little to do with party identification. The foreign policy was mainly crafted to respond to communist expansion, the development of terrorism, pressure from American Jews, and the president’s personal connection with people of the Jewish faith.

This study analyses the evolution of France's relations with Iraq since 1958. It seeks to understand the motivations behind French government, state and private sector interests in Iraq. This is done in the dual context of France's economic rivalry with other western powers in the Middle East, and the Iraqi state's attempts to follow an independent foreign policy while using its oil revenues to rapidly industrialise and arm itself. The text first charts France's rivalry with Britain in the ex-Ottoman empire and its fears of Anglo-American domination of oil supplies. It then demonstrates that while France's early links with Israel continued under President De Gaulle, by the mid sixties they had been eclipsed by the commercial importance of trade with Arab states. The core text then focuses on France's relationship with Iraq since 1958, the year in which new governments came to power in both states. Despite the 1972 nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum company, in which France had a 25% stake, French politicians and businessmen nevertheless gained favourable access to oil supplies, greatly increasing their exports of defence and high technology products, including a nuclear reactor, to Iraq during the seventies. The Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) intensified both bilateral trade links and the indebtedness of Iraq to France. By the mid-eighties what become a de-facto alliance generated severe problems for France's middle eastern policies, particularly towards Iran. The central themes of the study are the processes of foreign policy formation in France, and the extent and impact of economic interests underlying policy making. The thesis argues that substantial state ownership in France's oil, defence and aeronautical industries, coupled with the common interests and interpretations of a relatively homogeneous and interconnected corps of businessmen, politicians and civil servants, helps explain the continuity of French policy in the region. This is seen to be true despite the change of government (from Gaullist to Socialist) in France in May 1981.

France has always refused to recognise the legal existence of minorities on its territory. It is a sociological fact that many groups of minorities live in France and the gap between this reality and French law seems to be at the source of growing tensions. This study proposes to analyses the degree which international law can contribute to the evolution of France's position with regards to its minority groups. Since the end of the cold war, there have been significant developments of the international instruments relating to the rights of minorities. This fact notwithstanding, these instruments do not appear to have a direct impact on the French situation. An approach consisting of the development of the cultural fights, with the broader system of human rights, could contribute to augmenting the respect and protection of inter-states identities without challenging the universalist tradition to which France is particularly attached.

With the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center buildings, the intersection of religious ideals in war has been at the forefront of the American discussion on war and conflict. The New York attacks were followed by the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in October of 2001 in an attempt to destroy the religious government of the Taliban and capture the Islamic terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, and then followed by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, both in an attempt to fight terrorism and religious extremism. In both instances, American forces became embroiled in counterinsurgency operations against insurgent fighters who identified themselves in terms of religion and ethnicity. More recently, all of the regional and nuclear powers are engaged in conflicts against insurgents identified as religious in some form. The purpose of this research is to present tactical and strategic policies that can be implemented when ethno-religious violence occurs in and around religious sites, ensuring that operations at these sites will contribute to successful mitigation of violence in the wider conflict. Based on concepts from classical and contemporary counterinsurgency thought, a set of variables that contributes to successful counterinsurgency operations at religious sites was selected in order to understand successes and failures at previous operations. The results from these comparative studies were then used to develop a theoretical framework that contributes to successful counterinsurgency operations at religious sites. The comparative studies chosen for this research includes four cases from India, with the finding then applied to case studies from Thailand, and Israel. Like India, Thailand and Israel are facing insurgent movements that identify themselves along various ethnic, religious, and national constructs. The findings clearly show that there is a set of operational variables that apply to counterinsurgency operations at religious sites and contribute to tactical and strategic success. Conclusions are drawn that success or failure of counterinsurgency operations at religious sites is not solely tied to a military versus law enforcement approach to the conflict. Contrary to this theory, it is how the operation is carried out, rather than how the counterinsurgents are formed, that contributes to a successful operation.

This dissertation shows that and explains why two European Union (EU) Member States, namely France and the United Kingdom (UK), differ in the degree of internalisation of political conditionality. The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part assesses the degree of internalisation of political conditionality. Following a three-fold measurement framework, the thesis examines French and British policies, legal documents and behaviour. The analysis of behaviour concentrates on four cases of EU aid sanctions: Madagascar 2009, Mozambique 2009, Nicaragua 2008 and Zimbabwe 2002. France and the UK differ significantly. France has not officially endorsed political conditionality, generally does not insert human rights clauses in its developing agreements, and is recurrently among the donors which take a soft stance in response to recipient governments’ abuses. The UK has adopted a fully-fledged policy requiring partner governments to respect human rights and basic democratic principles, has consistently included human rights clauses in its development agreements and often belongs to the group of hardliners in favour of the application of aid sanctions. The second part of the dissertation explains these differences. Given the complexities of aid decision-making, the thesis adopts an “analytic eclectic” approach and tests four alternative hypotheses derived from realism, international constructivism, liberalism and sociological institutionalism. The examination of the cases studies and more than 100 interviews with diplomats, aid officials and representatives from nongovernmental organisations show that the higher accountability of aid decisionmakers and social pressure by like-minded donors (in particular Nordic countries) have played the most significant role in generating deeper internalisation of political conditionality by the UK. While organisational cultures cannot explain the extent of internalisation of political conditionality, their differences are helpful to understand the characteristics of the cases when political conditionality is applied more reluctantly. Evidence is not sufficient to confirm the hypotheses based on material interests, Commonwealth influence and aid modalities.

Local authorities play a key role in European Union (EU) governance. They are no longer simply ‘passive receivers’ of EU policy, but proactively engage at the European level. This active engagement includes participation in local government transnational networking (LGTN), an activity which sees local authorities form links with their counterparts in other countries. The contemporary prevalence of LGTN presents an interesting empirical puzzle. Local authorities lack the formal competence to engage beyond their territories. Furthermore, since the financial crisis councils’ budgets have been restricted. Why, then, are local authorities participating in LGTN when they lack both the formal competence and the financial resources? This thesis tackles this puzzle. In particular it explores three broad questions relating to LGTN: - What is the extent of LGTN? - Why do local authorities participate? - What determines effective participation? By focusing on the local authorities within transnational networks, this thesis makes an empirical contribution to knowledge and informs a body of literature which has until now overlooked the perceptions of local actors in EU governance. It further informs conceptual debates surrounding multi-level governance and local level Europeanization. This focus is achieved through a cross-national analysis of 14 local authorities in south-east England and northern France, and adopting a qualitative empirical approach which draws data from semi-structured interviews, document analysis and participant observation. The findings show that LGTN continues to be a prevalent phenomenon and is therefore an important feature of the EU’s multi-level system of governance. However, engagement is not uniform. While all local authorities are involved, variation is present in the number of links councils engage in, the type of networks they target and their motivations for participation. In all cases, however, engagement in LGTN is driven by a rationalist logic, as councils seek to achieve individual pre-determined strategic aims and improve their relative positions. A number of local and external factors are shown to impact how effectively councils engage in LGTN and, ultimately, explains why the process of local level Europeanization is marked by differentiation rather than convergence.

L'objet de ce travail est d'examiner dans le systeme juridique francais, les consequences de la decentralisation de l'administration territoriale sur l'organisation interne des relations internationales. A la difference de l'etat federal ou regional, dans l'etat unitaire francais, les collectivites territoriales sont ecartees d'une participation autonome aux rapports mettant en presence des autorites publiques nationales et leurs homologues etrangeres. Sur ces relations s'exerce le monopole des autorites centrales et cela independamment de la qualite de la partie etrangere. Le developpement des activites internationales des collectivites territoriales remet en cause l'organisation centralisee des competences a caractere international. L'incursion du local dans l'international s'effectue dans deux directions. L'association a la politique etrangere de l'etat par la representation parlementaire et de maniere particuliere par les mecanismes prevus par les statuts des collectivites ultra-marines ou en vertu de pratiques administratives. Le developpement de relations directes avec des partenaires etrangers reconnu par le droit international issu des organisations regionales europeennes et par le droit interne avec la loi d'orientation sur l'administration territoriale du 6 fevrier 1992. Toutefois des obstacles juridiques s'opposent a une complete transposition de la decentralisation interne sur le plan international. L'impossibilite d'un acces direct des collectivites territoriales au cadre juridique des relations interetatiques, le controle de l'etat dans l'application des engagements internationaux permettent de pallier les risques d'une fragmentation de la politique exterieure mais traduisent aussi la persistance d'obstacles<br>The purpose of this work is to analyse, within the french legal system, the decentration effects on the international relations national organisation. At the opposite of the federal and regional state, local authorities in the french one cannot establish direct relations with foreign governmental administrations, in regard with the centralisation of international relations. Nevertheless, this diplomatic centralisation is more and more undermined by the numerous international activities of local authorities. The local govvernment entrance into international order is operating in two directions. First through the association in foreing policy matters with national governments thanks to local authorities parliamentary representation and through special mechanisms for the overseas territories or by administrative practice in general cases. Then trough the relations with foreign partners which is granted and supported by the european intergovernmental organisation and the statute law of february 6th 1992. Byt a complete international relations decentralisation is still prohibited by the unitary system

This study is concerned with the concept of internationalisation as a tool for disadvantaged minorities to affect change in their situation. This phenomenon has been studied widely with respect to authoritarian regimes and later on with liberal Western democracies. The current study has focussed on the state of Israel and the situation of its Palestinian Arab minority to investigate the origins and purposes of internationalisation, the extent to which these efforts have achieved the objectives that were set, and whether this process is in any sense capable of achieving them. The analysis shows that the internationalisation process whereby the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel sought to reclaim their rights by invoking the support of the international community has emerged in the 1950s. It came to be perceived as necessary because internal legal and political processes were understood to be insufficient to achieve any redress for their grievances. The Arab leadership in Israel articulates internationalisation as a strategy designed to invoke the norms of democracy to question the conduct of successive Israeli governments, and counter the narrative offered by them on the world stage. The internationalisation strategy is seen to undergo a profound transformation from public memoranda, to civil and legal advocacy by invoking international conventions and treaties and finally to personal diplomacy. The results show that it is not a zero sum game; it is an especially effective method in different ways and with varying degrees of success. It created an extension of the critique of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to its Palestinian minority. Using the international law in the modality of legal advocacy to compel the Israeli state to adhere to the commitments it had made by acceding to an international convention, proved more effective than mere political pressure. Another factors such as the nature of the claims, geopolitical circumstances, global momentum, and domestic politics are crucial as well for the success of the internationalisation. Yet, Israel’s response varied in particular cases to minimise external critics, and its respect for the international law was uttered by utilitarian justification to protect its reputation. The application of the social constructivist boomerang-spiral model to the process of internationalisation is deemed to be a particularly effective instrument to explore both the potential and the limits of the process of compelling the Israeli state to conform to internationally supported norms. The results of this study demonstrate that the construction of the state’s identity as a Jewish and concerns over national security are potentially in conflict with the egalitarian democratic norms that it claims to be governed by. The implications of these two elements for the operation of the Israeli state has resulted in a failure to fully integrate its Arab citizens. The Nation-State Law of 2018 reinforces the legal and systematic discrimination against the Palestinians in Israel and explains why internationalisation has not been successful. 443 It is the first comprehensive investigation into a selected series of case studies that document international appeals made by Israel’s Arab elite due to three chronological periods: 1948-1979, 1992- 2013 and 2015 onwards. On a theoretical level, it is the first time that the spiral model has been tested in the context of Israel and its Arab minority. This can serve as a strategic information source for Arab MKs, NGOs and Israeli decision makers.

This thesis examines an important but understudied phenomenon in international politics: the role of amity in foreign policy. The core research question is "how have American friendships for specified others been made possible?" Drawing on the logic of securitization, this thesis employs Aristotle's notion of character friends as Other Selves and Judith Butler's concept of performativity to elaborate an international process of friendship or amitization. In doing so, the thesis employs critical discourse analysis of presidential rhetoric and popular culture to elucidate the process through which discourses of similarity become naturalized frames of reference within the conduct of foreign policy. It argues that friendship emerges when a state comes to see itself in an other and that this similarity (re)produces a certain form of state identity that enables and forecloses certain policy options vis-à-vis friends. Friendship manifests in a habitual, or naturalized, disposition to treat friends better than others. As such, it can account for how certain policies and postures, such as uncritical and often unconditional support for subjects positioned as "friends," have come to be pursued as common sense. Amitization is illustrated by assessing three case studies: the Anglo-American "special relationship;" the US-Israel "unbreakable bond;" and America's membership of "the Atlantic Community." Specifically, the thesis similarly demonstrates the ways in which amity accounts for how supererogatory commitments such as vast financial assistance, diplomatic support, information sharing, security guarantees and concern for the welfare of these specified others have come to be seen as unquestionably legitimate policies in the broader trajectory of American foreign policy. Amity matters and the practices of amitization are inseparable from intelligible foreign policy.

The Twenty-First Century has seen increasing support for far-right authoritarian policies across Europe, particularly in France. This paper identifies and explains the connection between the rising power of France’s far-right, populist party and the pervasive sentiments of Islamophobia through an examination of major theories, anxiety-producing events, and reactionary legal actions in France pertaining to the oppression of Muslims. It begins with an analysis of France’s colonial history and its lasting implications concerning the legitimacy of anti-Muslim rhetoric. Next, the paper analyzes the usage of terrorism as a framed threat by far-right politicians to promote authoritarian agendas. It then examines France’s unwillingness and inability to integrate Muslim immigrants into French society, predicated off of major threat perceptions associated with Muslims and Islam. Finally, the paper offers an understanding of how the greatest threat to France is not the electoral success of the Front National, but the historical implications concerning the increasingly normalized nature of policies supported by the FN.

Apres plus de 30 ans des independances, l'afrique noire reste le theatre de multiples conflits. Ces derniers sont interessants aussi bien par leur nombre, la diversite de leurs origines et surtout celles des acteurs. Ainsi que les bases juridiques qu'ils ont avancees. Et si dans les premieres annees, les raisons de ses operations militaires etaient axees sur la sauvegarde des etats, cette preoccupation est abandonnee. Aujourd'hui, la tendance est plutot en faveur des interventions dites d'humanite, dont l'objectif est de courir au secours des civils. Ressortissants ou non des etats intervenants, se trouvant en danger de mort dans une zone de trouble. Aujourd'hui, la pratique inove avec la militarisation de l'action humanitaire<br>After more than thirthy years of independence, the black african continent remains the stage of many conflits. These conflicts are interesting not only because the are numerous, but also because the have various causes and differents actors involved, who have laid down the legal grounds for the african societies. If in the first years of the conflicts, protecting the states were the man concern for military operations, this concern has been underminded. Nowadays, we are moving toward a humanitarian aid which aims at securing civilians and nationals of certain countries cas well as non nationals being threantened for their life in troubled areas. Today, there is a new pratice : militarisation of humanitariand aid

This study is an analysis of the changes to the institutions and doctrines of French development aid between 1998 and 2002, and specifically the reforms announced by Prime Minister Jospin in February 1998. This includes analysis of institutional reorganisation and of new policy doctrines. The study considers the implications of these changes for the relations between France and former French colonies of sub- Saharan Africa, including detailed analysis of the aid relationship between France and Cote d’Ivoire. Using qualitative data, especially personally conducted interviews in Paris and Côte d’Ivoire and analysis of official documents, this is the first major study of these reforms that puts them into historical and theoretical perspective. It thereby contributes to the wider debate over continuity and change both in French aid policy and in France’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa. It also furthers understanding of the mechanisms and dynamics of reform within French state administration. This study compares French development aid policy and institutional architecture from the 1960s up to the mid 1990s with the new institutions and policies put in place in the 1998–2002 period. Chapter 1 looks at the creation of French aid policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s and considers its imperial origins. Chapter 2 examines French aid from 1960 to 1995 and places it in the context of the global politics of development aid and the policies of other donors, in order to highlight the specificities of the French case. The French reaction to the emergence of the structural adjustment and later good governance agendas is considered. Chapter 3 examines the content of the reforms put in place by Jospin and associated changes in the 1998–2002 period, including the reactions of officials and critics. Chapter 4 is a case study of the changes made to the aid relationship between France and Cote d’Ivoire and the effects of instability in Côte d’Ivoire on French policy. The impact on French policy of the growing role of multilateral donors in Côte d’Ivoire is also considered. Chapter 5 examines the evolutions in French doctrine which have run in parallel to the Jospin reforms, looking at French attitudes to major development issues, particularly the relationship between the state and the market. French development aid is part of the long-term continuities of French foreign policy, and especially France’s desire to demonstrate the universal validity of its cultural and political achievements. In this study French aid is analysed as an extension of these foreign policy aims within the specific post-colonial relations with sub-Saharan Africa. French aid has helped to maintain a protected environment within which the French have sought not only to support close political allies, but also to reproduce a “model” of society and politics. This study asks whether the French can continue to use aid in this way in the light of the Jospin reforms and the events of the 1998–2002 period. This study asks whether the changes of this period can be seen as a convergence between French aid and the policies, practices and norms of other aid donors. To this end, the notion of an aid donor “regime” is used. This helps to show that reform of French policy occurs in a context of interaction with other aid donors, and to show how that interaction affects French policy

Thesis (M. A. (International Politics)) --University of Limpopo, 2017<br>Many Western and Central African countries were colonised by France from the early 17th century until the early 1960s. However, Africa has continued to be the private hunting ground for France in the post-independence period. This is because France still needs African resources, particularly its oil. In fact, Africa holds a strategic position for French foreign policy. Therefore, when France gave independence to its African colonies, it did not really mean it was completely disengaging from Africa. In essence, a package was imposed on Francophone African countries which tied them to the revitalised African states to preserve French colonial status. Moreover, France‟s heavy involvement in African countries has earned it a perception of being a police officer of the continent. Within this premise, due to protracted conflicts in French African countries, Francophone Africans bank their hope on France to assist in offering just and lasting solutions to the complex challenges facing their countries. This should be understood within the context that France maintained a significant colonial empire in the continent for almost a century and a half. Nevertheless, France attempts to uphold hegemonic foothold in Francophone Africa through political, economic and cultural connections while the security of Africans is threatened. With this in mind, this study critiques the French foreign policy towards Africa and it uses Ivory Coast and Central African Republic as case studies. These two countries are chosen given their recent conflicts and their assistance in critiquing the French position in African complex challenges. This study also adopted the use of document review and interviews to generate data.

Cette thèse se donne pour objet d'étudier l'attitude des responsables français face au problème de l'unité allemande de 1945 à 1955. Ces dates correspondent aux dix années au cours desquelles Paris chercha une solution pour l’Allemagne avant que sa partie occidentale ne soit fermement intégrée à l'occident. Notre étude est faite principalement à partir des sources du ministère des affaires étrangères : celles-ci permettent de mettre en lumière l'attitude subtile des décideurs français face à la délicate question allemande. On peut ainsi constater que toute la réflexion sur le problème de l'unité allemande est directement liée à la question des rapports avec l'union soviétique. Ainsi en est-il à l'issue de la guerre : le morcellement de l’Allemagne ne risque-t-il pas de favoriser la mainmise soviétique sur toute l’Europe ? La reconstitution d'un état allemand centralisé représente cependant aussi une menace pour la France. . . Après 1949, l'urgence est d'ancrer à l'Occident le nouvel état ouest-allemand. La perspective de la réunification apparait dangereuse à divers titres : on craint d'une part qu'elle ne se fasse au profit exclusif du bloc soviétique, aggravant ainsi la guerre froide, d'autre part qu'elle ne perturbe l'équilibre au sein de l’Europe en faveur d'une Allemagne réunie et neutralisée. Les "droits réservés" que Paris détient sur l’Allemagne depuis les accords de Potsdam, et ce en lien avec les soviets, représentent une garantie essentielle et non dénuée d'ambiguïté pour la diplomatie française : celle que la réunification ne se fera pas sans l'accord de la France<br>This thesis' purpose is to study the attitude of French leaders toward the problem of German unity from 1945 to 1955. These dates correspond to the ten years during which Paris sought a solution for Germany, before its western part was firmly integrated to the west. Our study derives from the sources of the ministry of foreign affairs. They allow to disclose the subtle attitude of French leaders towards the delicate German issue. One may therefore observe that the whole thought about the problem of German unity is directly linked to the issue of the relations with the Soviet Union. At the end of the war the following problems arise: is German partition not likely to favor soviet seizure of all Europe? The restoration of centralized German state, however, does also represent a threat to France. . . After 1949 the most urgent thing is to root the new West German state to the west. The reunification prospect seems dangerous on several accounts. On the one hand it is feared that it would be achieved to the exclusive advantage of the soviet bloc, thus aggravating the cold war. On the other hand it is feared that it would disrupt the balance of power within Europe in favor of a neutralized reunited Germany. The "reserved rights" which Paris holds over Germany (in connection with the soviets) since the Potsdam agreement represent an essential guarantee (which is not devoid of ambiguity) to the French diplomacy i. E that reunification will not be made without France’s agreement

Les relations internationales entre la france et la libye sont des relations humaines, politiques et economiques depuis plusieurs siecles. La france a conclu plusieurs accords avec la grande-bretagne et l'italie concernant la libye et l'afrique. Ces accords ont modifie les frontieres ou divise le peuple. Apres la deuxieme guerre mondiale, la france se trouve en confrontation avec le nationalisme arabe, elle n'a pas souhaite l'independance de la libye, alors qu'elle occupe son territoire du sud. Apres que la libye a obtenu son independance en 1951 grace aux nations-unies, la france a conclu des traites d'amities et de bon voisinage ainsi que des accords culturels et economiques en 1955. En 1969, apres la revolution libyenne, le nouveau regime a rompu avec les pays anglo-saxons, et modifie sa politique etrangere avec la france. Mais la politique etrangere libyenne en afrique surtout au tchad a mis les deux pays et leurs relations en difficulte. Le changement de la politique francaise avec l'arrivee des socialistes a modifie la strategie francaise en afrique et envers la libye. La guerre du gofle et les changements de la politique des pays de l'est a montre a la libye, l'importance des relations franco-libyennes dans le monde, au sein de la cee, au sein du conseil de securite des nations-unies. La libye est donc retournee vers la france pour consolider leurs amities, mais l'affaire de l'avion dc10 d'uta, a porte un coup dur a la libye surtout apres la declaration du president mitterrand sur la responsabilite libyenne dans cette affaire, et l'inculpation des dignitaires libyens par la justice francaise<br>Relations between france and libya from the 17th century. France, great-britain and italy had concluded many treaties concerning libya and africa. After the second world war, france didn't like libya's independence because of the interests in algeria and the south of libya which sje had occupied. In 1951, after libya had gained independence, france immediately concluded frienxiship, economic and cultural treaties with libya. However libya already had long links with the anglo-saxon world. The first of september 1969, after kadhafi had taken power in libya, he broke relations with the u. S. A. U. K. France replaced them, and concluded many agreements with libyan new government. Libya developed a world-wide new revolutionary foreign policy particularly in africa, for example assisting liberation movements, economic help to countries and to the unified arabics and africans against colonialism and neo-colonialism. Meanwhile, these new libyan policies were not accepted by france and other western countries. As a result of this, france intervened against libyan policy in africa by force or other ways. In particular, when libya wanted to get uranium from niger or south-africa. The gulf war and the change of policies in eastern europe made kadhafi change his position with france. President mitterand's declaration regarding the explosion of civil airphane of uta will make the relations between them more difficult despite their recent efforts to improve their relations

The purpose of this study is to further examine the populist wave that has struck the West, with specific regards to France and Germany. The growing anti-immigrant sentiment, the discontent with “establishment” politics, and fear-mongering tactics has given rise to far-right political parties such as the National Front and the Alternative for Germany. These political parties prove threatening to the democratic institutions in place, for they wish to limit the liberties of those who seem too different. Through delving into the core values of these countries and specific events revolving around foreigners, I explain how xenophobic ideology has been allowed to permeate through France and Germany’s society and has increased the legitimacy of political leaders like Marine Le Pen and Frauke Petry.

Malgré la fin de la colonisation dans les années 1960 en Afrique, la France est demeurée présente sur le continent par le biais de plusieurs accords et conventions signés avec ses anciennes colonies afin d’établir des coopérations dans plusieurs domaines (économique, monétaire, politique, culturel, défense). Grâce à une politique militaire particulière, la France intervient militairement dans plusieurs conflits civils en Afrique subsaharienne. Dans le même temps, elle se refuse parfois à intervenir dans d’autres. La problématique de cette recherche est d’expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles la France intervient militairement dans certains conflits civils en Afrique subsaharienne et pourquoi elle se refuse à intervenir dans d’autres. Pour résoudre cette énigme, cette thèse développe la théorie de la cohabitation ou la théorie cohabitationniste basée sur le principe transactionnel de la délégation du pouvoir développé par les néo-institutionnalistes du choix rationnel qui vise à évaluer la performance démocratique des régimes politiques. Cette théorie, composée de deux modèles, affirme qu’à cause des contraintes institutionnelles et politiques qui naissent durant les périodes de cohabitation, il est difficile pour un gouvernement français d’initier une intervention militaire en Afrique subsaharienne. Cette situation, propre aux régimes semi-présidentiels, explique certains refus de la France à intervenir militairement dans certains conflits civils. Par contre, en période de gouvernement unifié, il est plus aisé de déclencher une intervention militaire puisqu’il y a une cohérence et une concordance des politiques gouvernementale et présidentielle. De façon empirique, nous avons démontré que le refus de la France à intervenir en Côte d’Ivoire en 1999 après le coup d’État militaire, en République Centrafricaine après les mutineries de 1998 et 2001, était en substance lié au conflit institutionnel engendré par la troisième cohabitation (1997 – 2002). Durant cette période, nous avons noté qu’en dépit du fait que plusieurs questions écrites aient été envoyées au gouvernement par des parlementaires français pour connaitre l’attitude de la France par rapport à ces instabilités politiques, l’option d’une intervention militaire n’a pas été retenue. En revanche, après les élections présidentielles des 21 avril et 5 mai 2002 et les élections législatives des 9 et 16 juin 2002, la France a amorcé une nouvelle ère de gouvernement unifié. C’est durant cette période que le gouvernement français a pu initier l’Opération Licorne en envoyant des troupes armées en Côte d’Ivoire en 2002 et l’Opération Boali en 2003 en République Centrafricaine.<br>Malgré la fin de la colonisation dans les années 1960 en Afrique, la France est demeurée présente sur le continent par le biais de plusieurs accords et conventions signés avec ses anciennes colonies afin d’établir des coopérations dans plusieurs domaines (économique, monétaire, politique, culturel, défense). Grâce à une politique militaire particulière, la France intervient militairement dans plusieurs conflits civils en Afrique subsaharienne. Dans le même temps, elle se refuse parfois à intervenir dans d’autres. La problématique de cette recherche est d’expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles la France intervient militairement dans certains conflits civils en Afrique subsaharienne et pourquoi elle se refuse à intervenir dans d’autres. Pour résoudre cette énigme, cette thèse développe la théorie de la cohabitation ou la théorie cohabitationniste basée sur le principe transactionnel de la délégation du pouvoir développé par les néo-institutionnalistes du choix rationnel qui vise à évaluer la performance démocratique des régimes politiques. Cette théorie, composée de deux modèles, affirme qu’à cause des contraintes institutionnelles et politiques qui naissent durant les périodes de cohabitation, il est difficile pour un gouvernement français d’initier une intervention militaire en Afrique subsaharienne. Cette situation, propre aux régimes semi-présidentiels, explique certains refus de la France à intervenir militairement dans certains conflits civils. Par contre, en période de gouvernement unifié, il est plus aisé de déclencher une intervention militaire puisqu’il y a une cohérence et une concordance des politiques gouvernementale et présidentielle. De façon empirique, nous avons démontré que le refus de la France à intervenir en Côte d’Ivoire en 1999 après le coup d’État militaire, en République Centrafricaine après les mutineries de 1998 et 2001, était en substance lié au conflit institutionnel engendré par la troisième cohabitation (1997 – 2002). Durant cette période, nous avons noté qu’en dépit du fait que plusieurs questions écrites aient été envoyées au gouvernement par des parlementaires français pour connaitre l’attitude de la France par rapport à ces instabilités politiques, l’option d’une intervention militaire n’a pas été retenue. En revanche, après les élections présidentielles des 21 avril et 5 mai 2002 et les élections législatives des 9 et 16 juin 2002, la France a amorcé une nouvelle ère de gouvernement unifié. C’est durant cette période que le gouvernement français a pu initier l’Opération Licorne en envoyant des troupes armées en Côte d’Ivoire en 2002 et l’Opération Boali en 2003 en République Centrafricaine.<br>Despite the end of colonization in the 1960s in Africa, France remained present on the continent through several agreements and conventions signed with its former colonies in order to establish cooperation in several fields (economic, monetary, political, cultural, defense). Thanks to a particular military policy, France intervenes militarily in several civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, it sometimes refuses to intervene in others. The problematic of this research is to explain the reasons why France intervenes militarily in certain civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and why it refuses to intervene in others. To solve this enigma, this thesis develops the theory of cohabitation or cohabitationist theory based on the transactional principle of the delegation of power developed by the neoinstitutionalist rational choice that aims to assess the democratic performance of political regimes. This theory, composed of two models, states that because of the institutional and political constraints that arise during periods of cohabitation, it is difficult for a French government to initiate a military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. This situation, peculiar to the semi-presidential regimes, explains France's refusal to intervene militarily in certain civil conflicts. On the other hand, in times of unified government, it is easier to trigger a military intervention since there is a coherence and a concordance of government and presidential policies. Empirically, we have shown that the refusal of France to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999 after the military coup and in the Central African Republic after the mutinies of 1998 and 2001, was in essence linked to the institutional conflict engendered by the third cohabitation (1997 - 2002). During this period, we noted that despite the fact that several written questions were sent to the government by French parliamentarians to know the attitude of France with regard to these political instabilities, the option of a military intervention was not selected. On the other hand, after the presidential elections of 21 April and 5 May 2002 and the legislative elections of 9 and 16 June 2002, France has entered a new era of unified government. It was during this period that the French government was able to initiate Operation Licorne by sending armed troops to Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 and Operation Boali in 2003 to the Central African Republic.<br>Despite the end of colonization in the 1960s in Africa, France remained present on the continent through several agreements and conventions signed with its former colonies in order to establish cooperation in several fields (economic, monetary, political, cultural, defense). Thanks to a particular military policy, France intervenes militarily in several civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, it sometimes refuses to intervene in others. The problematic of this research is to explain the reasons why France intervenes militarily in certain civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and why it refuses to intervene in others. To solve this enigma, this thesis develops the theory of cohabitation or cohabitationist theory based on the transactional principle of the delegation of power developed by the neoinstitutionalist rational choice that aims to assess the democratic performance of political regimes. This theory, composed of two models, states that because of the institutional and political constraints that arise during periods of cohabitation, it is difficult for a French government to initiate a military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. This situation, peculiar to the semi-presidential regimes, explains France's refusal to intervene militarily in certain civil conflicts. On the other hand, in times of unified government, it is easier to trigger a military intervention since there is a coherence and a concordance of government and presidential policies. Empirically, we have shown that the refusal of France to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999 after the military coup and in the Central African Republic after the mutinies of 1998 and 2001, was in essence linked to the institutional conflict engendered by the third cohabitation (1997 - 2002). During this period, we noted that despite the fact that several written questions were sent to the government by French parliamentarians to know the attitude of France with regard to these political instabilities, the option of a military intervention was not selected. On the other hand, after the presidential elections of 21 April and 5 May 2002 and the legislative elections of 9 and 16 June 2002, France has entered a new era of unified government. It was during this period that the French government was able to initiate Operation Licorne by sending armed troops to Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 and Operation Boali in 2003 to the Central African Republic.

In 1986, Quebec adopted the Act to amend the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of Arbitration and thereby established a new and modern regime for contractual arbitration. The new regime includes provisions to facilitate execution in Quebec of arbitral awards rendered outside the province.<br>This thesis deals with certain aspects of the new regime, comparing it with the well-established French law of arbitration, which has abundant caselaw covering both domestic and international arbitration. Emphasis is placed on the manner in which Quebec courts have applied the new arbitration law in comparison with French judicial practice.<br>The first part of the thesis deals with domestic arbitration, focussing on contractual and jurisdictional issues. This is done through an examination of the arbitration agreement, the arbitration procedure, the award, as well as the execution of the award and remedies to set it aside.<br>International arbitration is treated in the second part. The definition of international arbitration, the validity and autonomy of the arbitration agreement, the choice of law relating to the procedure and the dispute itself are reviewed, as is the execution of foreign awards--that is, those rendered outside Quebec or rendered in Quebec but in the context of an international dispute.