Bibliographies thématiques / Formation de coalition

Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Formation de coalition »

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Publié le 25 mai 2024

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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Formation de coalition"

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Rahwan, Talal, Tomasz Michalak, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jacek Sroka, Michael Wooldridge et Nicholas Jennings. « Constrained Coalition Formation ». Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 25, no 1 (4 août 2011) : 719–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7888.

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The conventional model of coalition formation considers every possible subset of agents as a potential coalition. However, in many real-world applications, there are inherent constraints on feasible coalitions: for instance, certain agents may be prohibited from being in the same coalition, or the coalition structure may be required to consist of coalitions of the same size. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of constrained coalition formation (CCF). We propose a general framework for this problem, and identify an important class of CCF settings, where the constraints specify which groups of agents should/should not work together. We describe a procedure that transforms such constraints into a structured input that allows coalition formation algorithms to identify, without any redundant computations, all the feasible coalitions. We then use this procedure to develop an algorithm for generating an optimal (welfare-maximizing) constrained coalition structure, and show that it outperforms existing state-of-the-art approaches by several orders of magnitude.
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Dutta, Bhaskar, et Hannu Vartiainen. « Coalition formation and history dependence ». Theoretical Economics 15, no 1 (2020) : 159–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2947.

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Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance, by Harsanyi and Ray and Vohra, have typically been based on the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional “moves” in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these solution concepts can yield unreasonable predictions. Dutta and Vohra restricted coalitions to hold common, history‐independent expectations that incorporate optimality regarding the continuation path. This paper extends the Dutta–Vohra analysis by allowing for history‐dependent expectations. The paper provides characterization results for two solution concepts that correspond to two versions of optimality. It demonstrates the power of history dependence by establishing nonemptyness results for all finite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The paper also provides partial comparisons of the solution concepts to other solutions.
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GOLDER, SONA NADENICHEK. « Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies ». British Journal of Political Science 36, no 2 (9 mars 2006) : 193–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123406000123.

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Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.
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CURRARINI, SERGIO, et MARCO A. MARINI. « COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES ». International Game Theory Review 08, no 01 (mars 2006) : 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000813.

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This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2003). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs of the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions.
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Singhal, Shiksha, et Veeraruna Kavitha. « Coalition Formation Resource Sharing Games in Networks ». ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 49, no 3 (22 mars 2022) : 57–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3529113.3529132.

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Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several players (willing to cooperate) and a possible adamant player (unwilling to cooperate) involved in resource-sharing. Here, the strategy of a player is the set of players with whom it wants to form a coalition. Given a strategy profile, an appropriate partition of coalitions is formed; players in each coalition maximize their collective utilities leading to a non-cooperative resource-sharing game among the coalitions, the (unique) utilities at the resulting equilibrium are shared via Shapley-value; these shares define the utilities of players for the given strategy profile in the coalition-formation game. We also consider the utilitarian solution to derive the price of anarchy.
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OWEN, GUILLERMO. « ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS ». International Game Theory Review 10, no 04 (décembre 2008) : 461–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908002047.

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We develop a model of coalition formation based on personal proximities among the players of an n-person game. Several examples are worked out in detail, showing that certain coalitions are much more stable than others, and/or much more likely to form than others. We also consider the dynamics of such coalition-formation. By a numerical example, we show that small changes in the initial conditions can lead to very different results in the coalitions formed in a given game.
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BEJAN, CAMELIA, et JUAN CAMILO GÓMEZ. « USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION ». International Game Theory Review 14, no 01 (mars 2012) : 1250004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500041.

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This work uses the defining principles of the core solution concept to determine not only payoffs but also coalition formation. Given a cooperative transferable utility (TU) game, we propose two noncooperative procedures that in equilibrium deliver a natural and nonempty core extension, the aspiration core, together with the supporting coalitions it implies. As expected, if the cooperative game is balanced, the grand coalition forms. However, if the core is empty, other coalitions arise. Following the aspiration literature, not only partitions but also overlapping coalition configurations are allowed. Our procedures interpret this fact in different ways. The first game allows players to participate with a fraction of their time in more than one coalition, while the second assigns probabilities to the formation of potentially overlapping coalitions. We use the strong Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concepts.
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Shi, Yuanyuan, Gang Zhu, Siyu Lin, Jianwen Ding et Shengfeng Xu. « Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Interference Management in Femtocell Networks ». Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2015 (2015) : 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/767649.

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Dense deployment of femtocells can cause serious intra-tier interference in femtocell networks. In this paper, a new cooperative interference management approach which allows the femtocell user equipment (FUE) to merge into cooperative groups, that is, coalitions, for the uplink transmissions in a femtocell network is proposed, so as to reduce the intra-tier interference and improve the system performance. Taking into account the power cost for cooperation, we claim that all the FUEs are impossible to merge together, and we formulate the proposed cooperative problem as a coalitional game in partition form with an externality due to the interference between the formed coalitions. To get the solution, a novel distributed coalition formation algorithm that takes advantage of the characteristics of femtocell network and allows the FUEs to interact and individually decide on which coalitions to participate in is proposed. Furthermore, we analyze the convergence and stability of the proposed algorithm. Simulations are conducted to illustrate the behavior and the performance of the proposed coalition formation algorithm among FUEs. Results show that the proposed algorithm can improve the system performance with much lower complexity than some previously proposed coalition formation algorithms.
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MARTIN, LANNY W., et RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON. « The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation ». American Political Science Review 104, no 3 (août 2010) : 503–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000213.

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Previous research on coalition politics has found an “incumbency advantage” in government formation, but it has provided no clear explanation as to why this advantage exists. We classify existing theories as either preference-based or institutions-based explanations for why incumbent coalitions might be likely to form again, and we integrate these explanations into a coherent theoretical argument. We also claim that it is possible, to some extent, to distinguish these explanations empirically by taking into account the “historical context” of coalition bargaining. Using a comprehensive new data set on coalition bargaining in Europe, we show that coalitions, in general, are more likely to form if the parties comprising them have worked together in the recent past, and that incumbent coalitions are more likely to re-form if partners have not experienced a severe public conflict while in office together or suffered a recent setback at the polls. The incumbency advantage disappears completely if partners have become mired in conflict or have lost legislative seats (even after accounting for the impact of seat share on coalition size). Moreover, in certain circumstances, institutional rules that grant incumbents an advantage in coalition bargaining greatly enhance their ability to remain in office.
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Kong, XiangLong, XiangRong Tong et YingJie Wang. « Min- k -Cut Coalition Structure Generation on Trust-Utility Relationship Graph ». Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (14 avril 2021) : 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8834879.

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Trust relationships have an important effect on coalition formation. In many real scenarios, agents usually cooperate with others in their trusted social networks to form coalitions. Therefore, the trust value between agents should constrain the utility of forming coalitions when cooperating. At the same time, most studies ignore the impact of the number of coalitions in coalition structure. In this paper, the coalition formation of trust-utility relationship in social networks is researched. Each node represents an agent, and the trust-utility networks that connect the agents constrain coalition formation. To solve the task assignment problem, this paper proposes a greedy algorithm which is based on the edge contraction. Under the premise of ensuring the agent’s individually rationality, this algorithm simulates the formation process of coalitions between agents through continuous edge contraction and constrains the number of forming coalitions to k to solve the problem of coalition structure. Finally, the simulation results show that our algorithm has great scalability because of the ability of solving the coalition structure on a large-scale agent set. It can meet the growing demand for data intensive applications in the Internet of things and artificial intelligence era. The quality of the solution is much higher than other algorithms, and the running time is negligible.
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Thèses sur le sujet "Formation de coalition"

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Winschel, Evguenia. « Essays on coalition formation ». [S.l. : s.n.], 2007. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-20457.

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Hojnacki, Marie Elizabeth. « Coalition formation among organized interests / ». The Ohio State University, 1994. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487856906261803.

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Barton, Levi L. « Agent-Organized Network Coalition Formation ». DigitalCommons@USU, 2008. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/206.

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This thesis presents work based on modeling multi-agent coalition formation in an agent organized network. Agents choose which agents to connect with in the network. Tasks are periodically introduced into the network. Each task is defined by a set of skills that agents must fill. Agents form a coalition to complete a task by either joining an existing coalition a network neighbor belongs to, or by proposing a new coalition for a task no agents have proposed a coalition for. We introduce task patience and strategic task selection and show that they improve the number of successful coalitions agents form. We also introduce new methods of choosing agents to connect to in the network and compare the performance of these and existing methods.
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Bäck, Hanna. « Explaining coalitions evidence and lessons from studying coalition formation in Swedish local government / ». Uppsala : Uppsala Universitet, 2003. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/53332399.html.

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DeJong, Paul. « COALITION FORMATION IN MULTI-AGENT UAV SYSTEMS ». Master's thesis, University of Central Florida, 2005. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/2712.

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Coalitions are collections of agents that join together to solve a common problem that either cannot be solved individually or can be solved more efficiently as a group. Each individual agent has capabilities that can benefit the group when working together as a coalition. Typically, individual capabilities are joined together in an additive way when forming a coalition. This work will introduce a new operator that is used when combining capabilities, and suggest that the behavior of the operator is contextual, depending on the nature of the capability itself. This work considers six different capabilities of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) and determines the nature of the new operator in the context of each capability as coalitions (squadrons) of UAVs are formed. Coalitions are formed using three different search algorithms, both with and without heuristics: Depth-First, Depth-First Iterative Deepening, and Genetic Algorithm (GA). The effectiveness of each algorithm is evaluated. Multi agent-based UAV simulation software was developed and used to test the ideas presented. In addition to coalition formation, the software aims to address additional multi-agent issues such as agent identity, mutability, and communication as applied to UAV systems, in a realistic simulated environment. Social potential fields provide a means of modeling a clustering attractive force at the same time as a collision-avoiding repulsive force, and are used by the simulation to maintain aircraft position relative to other UAVs.
M.S.Cp.E.
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Engineering and Computer Science
Computer Engineering
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Khan, Majid Ali. « Coalition formation and teamwork in embodied agents ». Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2007. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/2711.

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Embodied agents are agents acting in the physical world, such as persons, robots, unmanned air or ground vehicles and so on. These types of agents are subject to spatio-temporal constraints, which do not exist for agents acting in a virtual environment. The movement of embodied agents is limited by obstacles and maximum velocity, while their communication is limited by the transmission range of their wireless devices. This dissertation presents contributions to the techniques of coalition formation and teamwork coordination for embodied agents. We considered embodied agents in three different settings, each of them representative of a class of practical applications. First, we study coalition formation in the one dimensional world of vehicles driving on a highway. We assume that vehicles can communicate over short distances and carry agents which can advise the driver on convoy formation decisions. We introduce techniques which allow vehicles to influence the speed of the convoys, and show that this yields convoys which have a higher utility for the participating vehicles. Second, we address the problem of coalition formation in the two dimensional world. The application we consider is a disaster response scenario. The agents are forming coalitions through a multi-issue negotiation with spatio-temporal components where the coalitions maintain a set of commitments towards participating agents. Finally, we discuss a scenario where embodied agents form coalitions to optimally address dynamic, non-deterministic, spatio-temporal tasks. The application we consider is firefighters acting in a disaster struck city.
Ph.D.
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Engineering and Computer Science
Computer Engineering PhD
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Pycia, Marek. « Essays on economic design and coalition formation ». Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/34513.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis consists of three essays on economic design and coalition formation. The first chapter studies the stability of many-to-one matching, such as matching between students and colleges or interns and hospitals. Complementarities and peer effects are inherent in many such matching situations. The chapter provides the first sufficient condition for stability that may be used to study matching with complementarities and peer effects. The condition offered is shown to be also necessary for stability in some matching problems. The second chapter provides a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in coalition formation such as the formation of clubs, partnerships, firms, business alliances, and jurisdictions voting on public goods. The condition is formulated for settings in which agents first form coalitions and then each coalition realizes a payoff profile from the set of available alternatives via a mechanism. In particular, there exists a core coalition structure if the payoffs are determined in the Tullock rent-seeking game or Nash bargaining. The core might be empty if the payoffs are determined by the Kalai-Smorodinsky or Shapley bargaining solutions.
(cont.) The chapter also determines the class of linear sharing rules and regular Pareto-optimal mechanisms for which there are core coalition structures. The third chapter studies the multidimensional screening problem of a profit-maximizing monopolistic seller of goods with multiple indivisible attributes. The buyer's utility is buyer's private information and is linear in the probabilities of obtaining the attributes. The chapter solves the seller's problem for an arbitrary number of attributes when there are two types of buyers, adding a new simple example to the few known examples of solved multidimensional screening problems. When there is a continuum of buyer types, the chapter shows that generically the seller wants to sell goods with some of the attributes partly damaged, stochastic, or leased on restrictive terms. The often-studied simple bundling strategies are shown to be generically suboptimal.
by Marek Pycia.
Ph.D.
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Karos, Dominik [Verfasser]. « Power, Control, and Coalition Formation / Dominik Karos ». Aachen : Shaker, 2013. http://d-nb.info/1050344871/34.

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Dang, Viet Dung. « Coalition formation and operation in virtual organisations ». Thesis, University of Southampton, 2004. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/260239/.

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The concept of Virtual Organisations (VOs) or Virtual Enterprises (VEs) is rapidly emerging as an important topic in many areas of computing including e-commerce, grid computing and the semantic Web. One reason for this interest is that VOs provide a means of bringing together a number of autonomous stakeholders in a dynamic fashion in order to address a specific problem or niche. These agents then work together for some period of time and then disband when it is deemed appropriate to do so. There are, however, many technical, social and economic issues associated with this VO lifecycle (i.e. creation, operation, maintenance and dissolution) that need to be addressed before VOs can be considered to be practicable. While previous technical work on VOs has concentrated on providing tools to support different aspects of the VO lifecycle, comparatively little work has focused on the mechanisms for automated VO creation, operation and maintenance. To address this shortcoming, this research aims to study and design mechanisms for the VO creation, operation and maintenance phases. In this thesis, our approach is to use combinatorial auctions and coalition formation mechanisms. In particular, novel algorithms for clearing multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions have been developed as a means of tackling VO creation and one part of VO maintenance. A novel algorithm for coalition structure generation has also been developed to address VO operation and another part of VO maintenance.
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Lee, Daesik. « Essays on coalition formation under asymmetric information ». Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/53567.

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We consider the applicability of the Revelation Principle under the possibility of collusive behavior among players in some Bayesian framework. In doing this, since the coalition formation itself suffers information asymmetry problems, we assume that the coalition is formed if the colluding parties can successfully find some coalitional mechanism whose outcome is a set of messages in the original mechanism. Recently Cremer [1986] proposes a coalitional mechanism in the framework of the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism. We assume that the agents successfully collude if they can find coalitional a mechanism such that (i) coalitional mechanism is incentive-compatible and (ii) the payoff of this mechanism is strictly Pareto-improving in terms of the agent’s expected utility. Our analysis is undertaken in a one principal/two agent framework. We first ünd that the Revelation Principle is still applicable in the pure adverse selection model. We then extend this result to a model with both adverse selection and moral hazard aspects. Finally, we consider a three-tier principal/supervisor/agent hierarchical organization, as in Tirole (1986). We explicitly present the coalitional mechanism as a side-contract between the supervisor and the agent. We apply the previous result of applicability of the Revelation Principle and characterize the coalition-proof mechanism. We find that the principal can design an optimal collusion free contract with some additional cost by specifying proper individual and coalitional incentive-compatibility conditions and individual rationality conditions. Moreover, we find that the results of Tirole (1986)’s paper hinge on the fact that he considers only “hard,” verifiable, information.
Ph. D.
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Livres sur le sujet "Formation de coalition"

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Bolduc, Nathalie. Les facteurs influençant la formation des coalitions. Québec : Université Laval, Laboratoire d'études politiques et administratives, 1992.

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Murnighan, John Keith. Organizational coalition formation : Process, consequences and dominant coalitions. [Urbana, Ill.] : College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1985.

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Ad M.A. van Deemen. Coalition formation and social choice. Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.

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Greenberg, Joseph. Coalition formation with eligibility. Toronto, Ont : Department of Economics, York University, 1989.

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Holler, Manfred J., et Guillermo Owen, dir. Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Boston, MA : Springer US, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1.

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van Deemen, M. A. Coalition Formation and Social Choice. Boston, MA : Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0.

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Acemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in political games. Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Acemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in political games. Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.

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Acemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in non-democracies. Cambridge, MA : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2009.

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Evans, Robert A. Value, consistency and random coalition formation. Cambridge : University of Cambridge, Department of AppliedEconomics, 1992.

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Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Formation de coalition"

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Bernhard, Laurent, et Hanspeter Kriesi. « Coalition Formation ». Dans Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns, 54–68. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230343214_4.

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Bernhard, Laurent. « Coalition Formation ». Dans Campaign Strategy in Direct Democracy, 102–23. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137011343_5.

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Bimonte, Giovanna. « Restricted Coalition Formation ». Dans New Economic Windows, 137–46. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05185-7_8.

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Chalkiadakis, Georgios, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis et Nicholas R. Jennings. « Overlapping Coalition Formation ». Dans Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 307–21. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_37.

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van Deemen, M. A. « Coalition Preferences ». Dans Coalition Formation and Social Choice, 149–86. Boston, MA : Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0_6.

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Takahashi, Shingo, Kyoichi Kijima et Ryo Sato. « Coalition Formation by Organizations ». Dans Applied General Systems Research on Organizations, 115–30. Tokyo : Springer Japan, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-53949-0_6.

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Rapoport, Anatol. « Theories of Coalition Formation ». Dans Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour, 369–81. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7840-0_20.

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Fiaschi, Davide, et Pier Mario Pacini. « Growth and Coalition Formation ». Dans Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 171–88. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27296-8_12.

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Ştefuriuc, Irina. « Coalition Formation — The Process ». Dans Government Formation in Multi-Level Settings, 100–132. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137300744_7.

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Rapoport, Anatol. « Theories of Coalition Formation ». Dans Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour, 383–93. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230377769_20.

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Actes de conférences sur le sujet "Formation de coalition"

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Mamakos, Michail, et Georgios Chalkiadakis. « Probability Bounds for Overlapping Coalition Formation ». Dans Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/47.

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In this work, we provide novel methods which benefit from obtained probability bounds for assessing the ability of teams of agents to accomplish coalitional tasks. To this end, our first method is based on an improvement of the Paley-Zygmund inequality, while the second and the third ones are devised based on manipulations of the two-sided Chebyshev’s inequality and the Hoeffding’s inequality, respectively. Agents have no knowledge of the amount of resources others possess; and hold private Bayesian beliefs regarding the potential resource investment of every other agent. Our methods allow agents to demand that certain confidence levels are reached, regarding the resource contributions of the various coalitions. In order to tackle real-world scenarios, we allow agents to form overlapping coalitions, so that one can simultaneously be part of a number of coalitions. We thus present a protocol for iterated overlapping coalition formation (OCF), through which agents can complete tasks that grant them utility. Agents lie on a social network and their distance affects their likelihood of cooperation towards the completion of a task. We confirm our methods’ effectiveness by testing them on both a random graph of 300 nodes and a real-world social network of 4039 nodes.
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Kerkmann, Anna Maria, et Jörg Rothe. « Altruism in Coalition Formation Games ». Dans Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/49.

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Nguyen et al. [2016] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents’ utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation games in general, considering also the friends in other coalitions. Comparing the two models, we argue that excluding some friends from the altruistic behavior of an agent is a major disadvantage that comes with the restriction to hedonic games. After introducing our model, we additionally study some common stability notions and provide a computational analysis of the associated verification and existence problems.
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Taguelmimt, Redha, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder et Tuomas Sandholm. « Optimal Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Solution Space Representation ». Dans Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/35.

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Coalition formation is a central approach for multiagent coordination. A crucial part of coalition formation that is extensively studied in AI is coalition structure generation: partitioning agents into coalitions to maximize overall value. In this paper, we propose a novel method for coalition structure generation by introducing a compact and efficient representation of coalition structures. Our representation partitions the solution space into smaller, more manageable subspaces that gather structures containing coalitions of specific sizes. Our proposed method combines two new algorithms, one which leverages our compact representation and a branch-and-bound technique to generate optimal coalition structures, and another that utilizes a preprocessing phase to identify the most promising sets of coalitions to evaluate. Additionally, we show how parts of the solution space can be gathered into groups to avoid their redundant evaluation and we investigate the computational gain that is achieved by avoiding that redundant processing. Through this approach, our algorithm is able to prune the solution space more efficiently. Our results show that the proposed algorithm is superior to prior state-of-the-art methods in generating optimal coalition structures under several value distributions.
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Bistaffa, Filippo, et Alessandro Farinelli. « A COP Model for Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (Extended Abstract) ». Dans Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/783.

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We focus on Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (GCCF), a widely studied subproblem of coalition formation where the set of valid coalitions is constrained by a graph. We propose COP-GCCF, a novel approach that models GCCF as a COP. We then solve such COP with a highly-parallel GPU implementation of Bucket Elimination, which is able to exploit the high constraint tightness of COP-GCCF. Results on realistic graphs, i.e., a crawl of the Twitter social graph, show that our approach outperforms state of the art algorithms (i.e., DyCE and IDP G ) by at least one order of magnitude, both in terms of runtime and memory.
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Boongasame, Laor. « Preference coalition formation algorithm for buyer coalition ». Dans 2012 International Joint Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering (JCSSE). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jcsse.2012.6261956.

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Ji, Xi, Quan Liu, Wenjun Xu et Duzhong Zhang. « Complexity Optimization for Cooperative Sensing Using Coalition Games ». Dans ASME 2014 International Manufacturing Science and Engineering Conference collocated with the JSME 2014 International Conference on Materials and Processing and the 42nd North American Manufacturing Research Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/msec2014-4078.

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Cognitive radio is a far effective method to solve the problem of limited spectrum resources in the wireless communication in cloud manufacturing, involved in kinds of networks. Cooperative spectrum sensing, as a research hotspot in cognitive radio, can improve the sensing quality in cognitive radio networks, but it will also bring in extra cost when forming coalitions and conduct cooperative spectrum sensing. Although CSS based on coalition formation games can significantly conquer this problem by improving the sensing quality and at the same time reducing extra cost, it is much too complex with many nodes. In this paper, we analyze the complexity of the proposed coalition formation (CF) algorithm, and then present an enhanced Selecting SUs and Coalition Formation (SSCF) algorithm where coalition formation and cooperative spectrum sensing is carried out with SUs selected before. In addition, it is shown that SSCF can lower the complexity of CF by reducing the number of nodes for coalition formation while hardly bringing down the sensing quality of CF with at most 0.5% decrease of utility in common case and at average 3% increase of that.
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Chalkiadakis, Georgios, Evangelos Markakis et Craig Boutilier. « Coalition formation under uncertainty ». Dans the 6th international joint conference. New York, New York, USA : ACM Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329203.

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Sujit, P. B., J. M. George et R. W. Beard. « Multiple UAV coalition formation ». Dans 2008 American Control Conference (ACC '08). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acc.2008.4586788.

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Shuling Di. « Strategy of agent coalition formation based on outstanding coalition ». Dans 2010 2nd International Conference on Computer Engineering and Technology. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccet.2010.5485666.

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Blankenburg, Bastian, Rajdeep K. Dash, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Matthias Klusch et Nicholas R. Jennings. « Trusted kernel-based coalition formation ». Dans the fourth international joint conference. New York, New York, USA : ACM Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1082473.1082623.

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Rapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Formation de coalition"

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Battaglini, Marco. Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, mars 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25664.

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Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov et Konstantin Sonin. Coalition Formation in Political Games. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, décembre 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12749.

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Burger, Nicholas, et Charles Kolstad. Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, novembre 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15543.

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Ortiz, Charles L., Regis Vincent, Eric Hsu, Bruno Dutertre et Barbara Grosz. Incremental Negotiation and Coalition Formation for Resource-Bounded Agents. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, janvier 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada421724.

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Irwin, Douglas. Antebellum Tariff Politics : Coalition Formation and Shifting Regional Interests. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, avril 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12161.

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Soh, Leen-Kiat. A Negotiation-Based Coalition Formation Model for Agents with Incomplete Information and Time Constraints. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, janvier 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada461997.

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Schuster, Christian. Strategies to Professionalize the Civil Service : Lessons from the Dominican Republic. Inter-American Development Bank, septembre 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010594.

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Drawing on a case study of recent reforms in the Dominican Republic, this technical note derives lessons about strategies to professionalize the civil service. As in other countries with less professionalized civil services, the Dominican Republic's political economy is biased against reform: promises of public employment tend to be important to successful electoral mobilization. Nonetheless, passage of a new public service law and its partial implementation were achieved. The case study finds that the construction of a broad societal coalition demanding reform may account for this puzzle. For legislative approval, alliance formation extended to not only traditional reform allies, such as the international community, NGOs, business associations, the media, progressive governing legislators and a politically influential minister, but also novel allies, including opposition parties. Reform implementation was fostered by the periodic and well-publicized societal monitoring of an achievable set of reform objectives aligned with the strategic priorities of the Ministry of Public Administration. As a result, political incentives were tilted towards legal reform passage and incremental compliance in civil service subsystems such as organizational structures, information systems and training not perceived as threatening to core electoral mobilization interests, yet not in more politically contentious subsystems, such as recruitment and selection. The case study underscores the desirability of constructing broad societal coalitions to enable civil service professionalization particularly in contexts where potential societal veto actors with vested interests, such as public sector unions, are largely absent. It also underscores the continued weight of political economy constraints in conditioning the subsystems in which civil service reform implementation may be achieved.
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Dannenberg, Astrid, Andreas Lange et Bodo Sturm. On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, mai 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15967.

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Bonvecchi, Alejandro. The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America : The Case of Argentina. Inter-American Development Bank, mai 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010935.

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This paper investigates the political economy of fiscal reform activism in Argentina since the late 1980s. Between 1988 and 2008, tax legislation was changed 83 times, fiscal federal rules 14 times, and budgetary institutions sixteen times. Tax and budgetary reforms moved from centralizing revenue sources and spending authority in the federal government to mild decentralization lately. Fiscal federal rules combined centralization of revenues and management in the federal government with short-term compensations for the provinces. This paper contends that reform activism can be explained by the recurrence of economic and policy shocks while reform patterns may be accounted for as consequences of the decreasing political integration of national parties in a polity whose decisionmaking rules encourage the formation of oversized coalitions. The decrease in political integration weakened the national party leaderships ability to coordinate intergovernmental bargaining, and strengthened the local bosses and factions needed to form oversized coalitions.
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