Thèses sur le sujet « Financial Fraud. Corporate Governance. Agency Theory »

Literature review. Theoretical framework and hypotheses: agency theory and conflict of interests, financial statement fraud and corporate governance. Sample and data. Methodology. Results. Conclusions and limitations.

Purpose: Understand different needs for accountability and governance among financial firms,based on environmental and structural factors. Design/methodology/approach: By using disciplinary reports published by SFSA the interpretation of corporate governance regulation will be studied. Findings: The study identified important corporate governance factors which can be explained and understood by analyzing through the multiple-theory. Complex environmental aspects, such as regulations and multiple stakeholders, demands for extensive internal and external controls. However, the aspect of knowledge does not seem to be fully explained by previous studies. Originality/value: The result could be a contribution to further discussions on how regulations can develop. Moreover, the result can add empirical data to further develop the multiple-theory.

The 2008-2009 global financial crisis resulting in some banks collapsing has raised questions about the corporate governance of financial institutions. Some bank managers lack an understanding of the role of corporate governance in preventing bank failures. In this multiple case study, data were collected through interviews and triangulated with annual reports to explore the strategies some bank managers need to improve their understanding of the role of corporate governance in preventing bank failures in Zimbabwe. The 7 study participants were purposefully recruited from a larger population of 19 bank managers responsible for corporate governance and compliance operating in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2015. This study was grounded in the concept of corporate governance using the agency theory. The central research question explored strategies bank managers can employ to improve their understanding of the role of corporate governance in preventing bank failures in Zimbabwe. The transcribed interviews were coded to generate themes and validated through member checking. Four themes emerged from the research: the need for improvement on compliance to corporate governance policies and regulations, recruitment of qualified and competent directors who should be independent non executive in majority, risk management and internal control, and training, education, and awareness of best practices. This study may have a positive social impact in that a stable and profitable banking environment creates and sustains employment and results in an improvement in the individuals' standard of living.

There is a paucity of evidence into why boards such as Centro fail despite meeting normative financial governance standards. Drawing on Agency and organisational behavioural theories this mixed-method study involved developing and applying in the field a psychometrically robust measure of director financial literacy (DFL) and interviewing directors to investigate how they develop and apply this capability to financial monitoring. Findings verified that, generally, directors lack the requisite baseline DFL for financial monitoring and challenged the prevailing view that skill-based board diversity is a critical antecedent for effective board performance. Importantly, this study identifies practical strategies for strengthening DFL.

Frequent incidences of bank failures in Nigeria resulting in enormous losses of investments and jobs have raised questions about the level of banks' compliance with the code of corporate governance. This single exploratory case study shifted attention from the banks to the regulators of banks in Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), to find out the problems they may be encountering in getting the banks to be fully compliant. Purposeful sampling was used to select 25 senior participants who were directly involved with the monitoring of banks from CBN. The agency theory served as the conceptual framework. The sources of data were semistructured interviews and focus group interviews. The use of member checking and triangulation improved the credibility of the data. Thematic analysis was used in data analysis. Findings showed that the CBN might have identified the shortcomings in their supervision processes and have put measures in place to ensure full compliance. Some of the measures included recruitment of skilled IT personnel to conduct monthly e-examinations of the books of banks, application of steep penalties for noncompliance, the reduction of percentage holding by investors, and continuous training of the staff. Full implementation and continuous evaluation of these measures should make the issue of bank distresses and the attendant loss of depositors' funds and means of livelihood outdated. This will result in positive social change by increasing public confidence in the banks resulting in a growth in the economic activities, more job creation, and greater wealth creation for shareholders.

Corporate governance is a highly discussed topic in financial circles. Recent corporate failures have triggered regulatory reforms where the internal audit was given a stronger position. However, this regulatory evolution also brought challenges to internal audit activity. The growing demands and pressure from stakeholders have placed internal auditors in a difficult position of having to serve several stakeholders and sometimes inconsistent ones with different agendas. That is why the aim of this thesis was to examine how regulations have impacted the internal audit within financial institutions with a special focus on internal auditors’ relations with their stakeholders. In order to achieve the aims of this study, qualitative interviews were conducted as they were considered most suitable in order to uncover a deeper meaning and significance regarding the topic. The findings in this study indicate that internal auditing activity within financial institutions faces a multitude of challenges. Beyond having to deal with traditional duties, these institutions now have to incorporate mandatory audits from regulators within their scope of practise as well. This steers them in a direction where they have to satisfy the needs of yet another stakeholder.

Cette thèse, sous forme de trois articles, tente d’expliquer le déclin des bourses organisées au profit de nouvelles plateformes de transaction, à la lumière des récents changements de gouvernance et réglementaires. Les deux premiers articles évaluent l’influence de quatre types d’actionnariat (flottant, courtiers, investisseurs financiers et actionnaires stratégiques) sur la performance de l’entreprise. Il existe une corrélation positive de la performance avec l’actionnariat institutionnel,et négative avec le flottant et avec les investisseurs stratégiques. Le deuxième article –six études de cas– valide ces résultats. L’analyse plus détaillée des actionnaires stratégiques montre que ceux-ci créent de la valeur quand ils sont fondateurs; la détruisent quand ils sont des dirigeants salariés; et augmentent la volatilité des performances de l’entreprise dans les cas de prise de contrôle avortée par un concurrent.Le troisième article analyse l’effet conjugué des changements réglementaires et technologiques. A travers une approche par comparaisons de moyennes, il apparait que les marchés exposés à la déréglementation souffrent plus de la concurrence des plateformes électroniques que les autres bourses.Cette thèse introduit deux nouveaux concepts: le «principal quasi-agent» (un actionnaire qui réduit la valeur de son investissement en raison de ses conflits d’intérêt) et l’«effet adjuvant» (ou comment la réglementation démultiplie les effets concurrentiels permis par les avancées technologiques)
This dissertation consists of three articles, examining the performance of demutualized securities exchanges from 2000 to 2011, in view of changes in governance and regulation. The first part is an empirical study of the influence of each type of shareholder (financial investor, broker, strategic or widely-held shares). The results show that fragmented owner ship is correlated with lower performance and investment managers’ presence with higher performance; strategic investors are on balance detrimental to shareholder value. The second article looks at the same exchanges individually, through case studies. The findings of the first article are validated.However,a closer look at strategic investors shows three outcomes : when they consist of founders, they increase shareholder value; when they are employed managers,they decrease it; and when the strategic investor is a competitor, the target company’s performance becomes more volatile. The third article looks at the combination of technology and regulation.Through mean comparisons and a difference-in-differences approach, this section shows that recent market deregulation has allowed high-tech start-ups to challenge the dominance of the established exchanges, just like previous coincidences of regulatory and technological change resulted in significant market up heavals: the disappearance of London’s jobbers following Big Bang and the Eurocurrency market displacing New York as a major center for dollar borrowing and lending. This dissertation introduces two new concepts: “quasi-agent principals”(shareholders who destroy value in their investment as a result of their conflicts of interest) and the “adjuvant effect” (when the combined effect of regulation and technology is a multiple of the effects of each)

Dans cette thèse, nous nous proposons d’examiner plusieurs théories modernes de financed’entreprise. L’objectif est d’étudier les résultats suggérés par les études récentes sur des sujets tels que les politiques de dividendes, les problèmes d’agence, ou encore le financement des entreprises, et testés sur des organisations modernes. Dans cette optique, nous étudions plus particulièrement les firmes qui étaient cotées à Paris au début du XXème siècle.Tout d’abord, nous avons concentré cette étude sur le contexte général de la théorie d’agence, et tenté d’examiner si ce modèle pouvait être appliqué aux firmes de la période précédant la première guerre mondiale. Nous montrons ainsi que c’était le cas. Certains éléments mis en lumière par des études récentes sur ces firmes montrent que ce qui est aujourd’hui appelé « problèmes d’agence » constituait déjà un risque majeur pour elles. De surcroît, les écrits contemporains de ces entreprises du début du XXème siècle ou avant avaient parfaitement identifié ces problèmes comme étant majeurs pour elles mais aussi pour les investisseurs potentiels prêts à participer à leur financement. Dans ce contexte général d’asymétrie d’information et des « problèmes d’agence » potentiellement sévères en résultant, nous nous interrogeons également sur le financement de l’innovation et donc sur la contribution des marchés financiers à leur croissance. Nous montrons que les firmes innovantes de l’époque (soit les firmes de la 2nde Révolution Industrielle) bénéficiaient d’un soutien mitigé de la part des marchés-actions parisiens. Si l’on mesure ce soutien potentiel par le Q de Tobin, ces entreprises de la 2nde RI bénéficiaient de conditions avantageuses quant à leur financement. Au contraire, s’il est mesuré par le taux de dividende, ce soutien est beaucoup moins clair.Les entreprises ayant déjà trouvé un financement devaient ensuite rémunérer leurs actionnaires : elles devaient en particulier leur distribuer des dividendes. Les dernières parties de cette thèse étudient ainsi les politiques de dividendes mises en place par les firmes de la place de Paris au début du XXème siècle. Nous étudions d’abord les politiques de dividendes effectivement mises en place et montrons que ces dividendes étaient payés dans le but de diminuer les coûts d’agence, et en particulier dans le but de réduire les coûts de speculative monitoring. Dans un deuxième temps, nous comparons ces politiques réelles à celles fixées dans le cadre d’une règle statutaire de distribution des profits, qui déterminait l’allocation d’un certain montant de ces profits aux actionnaires. Cette comparaison pourrait permettre d’estimer si et à quel point ceux qui « contrôlaient » la firme suivaient strictement cette règle, et s’ils n’utilisaient pas les exceptions possibles à celle-ci pour en extraire des bénéfices privés au détriment des actionnaires extérieurs et minoritaires. Nous montrons qu’ils allouaient une part des profits cohérente avec celle qui était attendue en moyenne par tous les actionnaires. Si plusieurs interprétations de ce phénomène sont possibles, une explication pourrait résider dans le fait que la règle statutaire constituait un bon moyen de limiter les conflits entre ceux des actionnaires qui contrôlaient la firme et les autres
This thesis offers to explore several modern corporate finance theories in a historical context. The rationale behind is to assess whether the findings recently suggested about topics like corporate dividend policies, agency issues, or firm financing, and tested on very modern corporations could be applicable to an earlier and different context. To do so, we examine the companies listed on Paris stock markets at the turn of the 20th century.First focusing on the general agency framework, we examine whether this model could be atplay within pre-WWI companies. We do find that this was the case. Specific features highlighted by recent studies about earlier corporations indeed provide support for the fact that the today-called “agency” issues were already critical to them. Further, contemporary authors did identify these issues as particularly salient for companies but also for the investors potentially willing to participate in their emergence. In this general context of high asymmetry of information and of resulting critical “agency” conflicts, the financing of innovation and thus the contribution of financial markets to growth are questioned. In particular, we show that the innovative firms of the time (the ones operating in 2nd-IR sectors) benefitted from a mixed support from Paris stock markets. Measuring potential favourable financing conditions by a higher Tobin’s Q, we find that 2nd-IR companies did benefit from a sort of help from these markets in financing their growth. On the contrary, measuring it by the dividend yield provides a less clear result.The firms already financed had to compensate their shareholders for the risk they took. They thus had to pay dividends out. The last parts of this thesis examine the dividend policies implemented by Paris-listed firms at the turn of the 20th century. Focusing first on the ones actually implemented, we provide further support for the agency explanation of dividends, notably showing that these dividends were mostly paid to decrease one specific type of agency costs, speculative monitoring ones. Second, we compare these actual payout policies with the ones fixed in a statutory rule of profit allocation, which committed to the distribution of a certain percentage of profits to shareholders. Doing so could help to assess whether firm controllers strictly followed this statutory rule and did not take advantage of the potential and allowed deviations from it to extract as many benefits as they could at the expense of outsiders and minority shareholders. We show that they did allocate a percentage of profits consistent with the one expected in average by all shareholders. Although several interpretations could be made of this result, it could be explained by the fact the statutory rule was a good way to mitigate conflicts between firm controllers and outsiders

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This study has as its theme the role of the Internal Audit Function (IAF) in the corporate governance system (CGS) in financial institutions, or simply banks, operating in Brazil. The FAI is an evaluation mechanism of procedures, policies and processes that acts from the operating environment of an organization. Based on this, the objective of this study was to investigate why and how the FAI was incorporated into the SGC and the consequences generated for both. The qualitative study, of exploratory and descriptive nature, used a multitheoretical approach, applying the agency theory and institutional theory. By this approach we tried to use the relationship between the need for monitoring to achieve organizational efficiency and the structural impact of the pressures of the external environment in defining the role and positioning of the FAI in the GSC. A semi-structured interview, used as data collection method, was applied to ten audit employees of five large banks, besides three people connected to the Board of Directors on banks. The study made the following findings: i) the FAI was incorporated into the SGC because the complexity derived from the evolution of the banking business made it difficult to monitoring banks by the principal and the regulator; ii) three factors worked in an interrelated way as drivers of this merger: the evolution of the banking business, the regulation and the convergence of assumptions and practices; and iii) the organizational repositioning resulted in consequences on the scope of the FAI work, the intensification of conflicts for the maintenance of independence, the perception of FAI value by CGS and the training process for internal auditors. The study had as main contributions to the CGS: the revelation of the potential of FAI to generate inputs to monitoring, by acting as its extension in the complex banking operating environment; and the proposed use of FAI as resources to generate inputs to strategic decisions. For FAI, the study suggests that, to be consolidated as governance mechanism, it needs to qualify its staff and develop methodologically to deliver consistent information to decision-making by GSC.
Este estudo tem como tema o papel da Função de Auditoria Interna (FAI) no sistema de governança corporativa (SGC) de instituições financeiras, ou simplesmente bancos, atuando no Brasil. A FAI é um mecanismo de avaliação de políticas, procedimentos e processos que age a partir do ambiente operacional de uma organização. Baseando-se nisso, o objetivo do trabalho foi investigar porquê e como a FAI foi incorporada ao SGC, e as consequências geradas para ambos. O estudo qualitativo, de natureza exploratória e descritiva, utilizou uma abordagem multiteórica, aplicando a teoria da agência e a teoria institucional. Pela abordagem buscou-se utilizar a relação entre à necessidade de monitoramento para atingir a eficiência organizacional e o impacto estruturante das pressões do ambiente externo na definição do papel e do posicionamento da FAI no SGC. A entrevista semiestruturada, utilizada como método de coleta de dados, foi aplicada a dez funcionários de auditoria de cinco bancos de grande porte, além de três indivíduos ligados ao Conselho de Administração em bancos. O estudo apresentou as seguintes conclusões: i) a FAI foi incorporada ao SGC porque a complexidade derivada da evolução do negócio bancário dificultou o monitoramento dos bancos por parte do principal e do regulador; ii) três fatores atuaram de forma inter-relacionada como direcionadores dessa incorporação: a própria evolução do negócio bancário, a regulação e a convergência de premissas e práticas; e iii) o reposicionamento organizacional resultou em consequências quanto ao escopo do trabalho da FAI, à intensificação dos conflitos para a manutenção da independência, à percepção de valor agregado pela FAI ao SGC e ao processo de capacitação dos auditores internos. O estudo apresentou como principais contribuições ao SGC: a revelação do potencial da FAI para gerar insumos para o monitoramento ao atuar como sua extensão no complexo ambiente operacional bancário; e a proposta de utilização da FAI como recursos para gerar insumos às decisões estratégicas. Quanto à FAI, o estudo sugere que, para que se consolide como mecanismo de governança, necessita qualificar seu quadro funcional e se desenvolver metodologicamente para entregar informações condizentes à tomada de decisão pelo SGC.

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O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o mercado de capitais, a governança corporativa e as disposições das empresas mineiras e gaúchas, de médio e grande porte, a abrir o capital. Para tanto, utilizaremos o modelo logit sobre os bancos de dados originais de duas relevantes pesquisas: FIEMG et al. (2007) e FIERGS et al. (2008). Em especial, buscaremos determinar se as práticas de governança corporativa, adotadas pelas empresas, aumentam sua disposição em abrir o capital. Chegamos à conclusão de que a adoção de práticas de governança corporativa pelas empresas de capital fechado não é suficiente para determinar quais são as empresas com maior disposição à abertura de capital. No entanto, verificamos que a variável grau de compartilhamento de poder, elemento determinante de governança corporativa, encontra-se extremamente relacionada com esta disposição.
The goal of this study is to analyze the stock markets, the corporative governance and the likelihood of mining industries of Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, of medium and large dimension, of opening capital. For such, we will use the logit model of the original data bank from two relevant researches; FIEMG et al (2007) and FIERGS et al (2008). In special, we will attempt to determine if practicing corporative governance, adopted by these firms, increases its likelihood in opening capital. We have come upon the conclusion that adopting corporative governance by firms of closed capital is not sufficient to determine which industries are more susceptible to opening capital. However, we have verified that the degree of power sharing, determining element in corporative governance, finds itself extremely related to this likelihood.

The Price of Honour is a case study, supported with teaching notes, which describes the events and circumstances surrounding the implosion of one of Portugal’s most systemically important banks - Banco Espírito Santo (BES). The case focuses on BES’s corporate governance and how the Espírito Santo family’s tight control of the bank led to its exploitation. Although the situation caught the attention of the bank’s supervisors, their untimely actions could not prevent BES’s financial health from crumbling only two months after a rights issue. With little leeway, the supervisors put forward a resolution which dramatically ended the bank’s centennial legacy.

Corporate governance has been a hot bed for scholars from diverse disciplines. Managers whose interests are not congruent with that of shareholders‟ do not have the incentive to maximize shareholder value. Agency theory implicitly assumes corporations as arenas of the principal-agent conflict. On the other hand, organizational perspectives maintain that firms differ in their adopted corporate governance level depending on the environmental contingencies in which they operate. This study develops a contingency framework by synthesizing agency theory and organization theory. The aims of this study are to examine the effect of firm level contingencies on corporate governance and examine the moderating impact of firm level contingencies on the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance in the Ethiopian non-financial share companies. Data were collected from public and private sources for 42 companies covering the period 2009-2013. For the first time overall corporate governance index is constructed from board structure, ownership structure, and disclosure and transparency. By specifying fixed effect regression models the study accounts for the presence of unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, a moderation fixed effect model is specified for the corporate governance-performance relationship. Results show that firms choose their corporate governance in response to contexts in which they operate. High-risk firms have good corporate governance. Corporate governance is enhanced if the largest owner is government or bank. Findings show not only the positive influence of corporate governance on financial performance but also the positive effect of corporate governance on financial performance is enhanced where there are high agency problems. Firm growth, firm level risk and identity of the largest shareholder moderate the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance. The study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that firms endogenously choose their corporate governance and the effect of corporate governance on performance depends on firm level contingencies. For practice, the positive link between corporate governance and financial performance informs us that instituting and enforcing corporate governance should be taken seriously. Areas that require priority include the legal frameworks and their enforcement, additional corporate governance standards, strong financial market particularly a stock market. Future research can build on the limitations of the study. For instance, researchers can increase the sample size, compare industries or perform cross-country studies.
Business Management
DBL

The objective of this study is to examine the association between goodwill and governance structures – specifically, potential agency conflicts and internal and external board monitoring mechanisms – over a four-year period (2004-2007). To do this, I perform two distinct analyses to test (1) whether governance structures appear to be determinants of aggregate goodwill, and (2) whether governance structures appear to moderate investors’ perceptions of aggregate goodwill. I then extend these tests to a sample of U.S. merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions where I calculate a more refined measure of residual goodwill and re-perform the tests using this alternative goodwill measure. I find that potential agency conflicts are associated with both goodwill and residual goodwill, whereas monitoring mechanisms appear to have little measureable association with either of the goodwill measures. In addition, I provide evidence that investors perceive goodwill balances less favorably when agency conflicts are high and limited evidence that their perceptions of goodwill improve when external monitoring is strong. Based on these findings, I conclude that governance structures should be considered when evaluating goodwill. My results also suggest that previous findings based on residual goodwill may need to be reevaluated. Specifically, my analyses highlight an important distinction between the purchase price and consideration elements of residual goodwill, and I propose future avenues of research which may be used to investigate this important distinction further.

Corporate governance is considered to have significant implications for the growth prospects of an economy. Well-formulated corporate governance mechanisms are regarded as important not only in reducing risk for investors, but also in protecting shareholders’ value as well as in improving and enhancing a firm’s performance. However, corporate governance mechanisms do vary between countries, as each country is unique in its political, economic, legal, culture and social contexts. Each country has its own corporate governance regulations with respect to various aspects of corporate management, which come under public domain. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also has its own corporate governance rules introduced in 2010. The results of the study reported here evaluate the consequences of compliance with different components of the rules by UAE firms. The conclusions of the study lead to some recommendations to the UAE regulatory authorities. The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent of compliance with various components of corporate governance rules of 2010 and their relationship between corporate governance practices and performance of financial and non-financial firms and conventional and Islamic banks in the context of the UAE. The study investigated the impact of the implementation of 2010 corporate governance rules and the extent of changes to corporate governance practices two years later (in 2012). During this period, firms that operated in the UAE were experiencing the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its aftermath.

Com o presente estudo procurou-se (i) analisar se e como a política de compensação é utilizada enquanto mecanismo de mitigação do conflito de agência potencialmente existente entre a Portugal Ventures (o quarto maior operador de capital de risco em Portugal) e os promotores das empresas em análise, (ii) bem como examinar se outros mecanismos (nomeadamente, a sindicância e o faseamento inicial dos investimentos, direitos de voto e veto, direitos de nomeação de representantes para o Conselho de Administração /Gerência, direitos especiais sobre dividendos, preferência na liquidação e obrigação de recompra) seriam também utilizados. Do exame aos dados obtidos, conclui-se fundamentalmente que: (i) O direito de veto constitui o mecanismo mais transversal e mais utilizado pela Portugal Ventures (e parceiros de sindicato), ao invés da preferência na liquidação e da consagração de direitos especiais sobre os dividendos. (ii) As participações mais recentes (i.e. com menos de seis anos) e embrionárias tendem a concentrar um maior número de casos com evidência do uso dos mecanismos de mitigação do conflito de agência. (iii) O uso da política de compensação mostra-se pouco relevante. Nos poucos casos em que a compensação do promotor vai mais além do que um salário/ fee fixo mensal, é dado ênfase ao bónus e à partilha de mais-valias no desinvestimento, sendo praticamente insignificante o uso de stock options.
The goal of this paper is (i) to assess if and how compensation is used as a mechanism to mitigate the agency conflict between Portugal Ventures (the fourth largest venture capital operator in Portugal) and entrepreneurs of the companies analyzed, and (ii) to examine whether other mechanisms (e.g., the syndication and the staging of the investment, voting and veto rights, the right to hold board seats, special rights over dividends, liquidation rights, redemption (put) rights) would also be used. Our main findings were: (i) Veto right is the more transversal and most used mechanism by Portugal Ventures (and syndicate partners), as opposed to liquidation rights and special rights over dividends. (ii) Recent (i.e. with less than six years old) and early stage financings tend to concentrate a larger number of cases with evidence of the use of mechanisms to mitigate the agency conflict. (iii) The use of the compensation policy seems irrelevant. In the few cases where the compensation of the entrepreneur goes further than a salary / fixed monthly fee, emphasis is given to the bonus plans and the ratchet, being practically insignificant the use of stock options.

The relevance or irrelevance of dividend payments has been the topic of much discussion for the past eight decades. The primary objective of this study was to determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the (JSE). Dividend Policy and the Agency Theory underpinned the study. Secondary data of sampled listed financial companies for the period 2005-2016 was sourced from IRESS database. Data was analysed using EViews version 9. The results revealed that the presence of institutional ownership resolves the asymmetry information problems, and, reduces the need to pay dividends. The results also revealed that 54.69% of JSE listed companies under the financials’ services sector practise dividend decisions. The results further revealed that the dividend payout ratio is positively correlated with ROE and LEV, and negatively correlated INST, DIRS and FOREIGN variables. The results confirmed the existence of agency problems on listed financial services companies.
Ukubaluleka okanye ukungabaluleki kokuhlawula izahlulo bekusoloko kusisihloko sengxoxo kumashumi asibhozo eminyaka edluleyo. Injongo ephambili yesi sifundo yayikukufumanisa ulwalamano phakathi komgaqo nkqubo wezahlulelo neengxaki zobumeli (ubuarhente) beenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho nezidweliswe kwiJohannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Izisekelo zesi sifundo nguMgaqo Nkqubo Wezahlulo (Dividend Policy) neNgcingane Yobumeli (Agency Theory). Iqela lesibini ledatha yeenkampani ezidwelisiweyo kwiminyaka ye-2005– 2016 yafunyanwa kwiqula leedatha elaziwa ngokuba yi-IRESS database. Idatha yahlalutywa ngokusebenzisa isixhobo sohlalutyo iEViews version 9. Iziphumo zadiza ukuba ubukho babanini kwiziko loshishino buyazisombulula iingxaki zonxibelelwano olungalingani kakuhle kwaye kuyasicutha isidingo sokuhlawula izahlulo. Kwakhona, iziphumo zadiza ukuba ama-54.69% eenkampani ezidweliswe kwiJSE, phantsi kodidi lweenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho, enza izigqibo zezahlulo. Iziphumo zaphinda zadiza ukuba intlawulo yezahlulo ihambelana kakuhle neenqobo zeROE neLEV, kanti azihambelani neenqobo zeINST, ezeDIRS kunye nekuthiwa ziFOREIGN. Ezi ziphumo zangqina ukuba kukho iingxaki zobumeli/ubuarhente kwiinkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho
Bonnete le go se be bonnete ga ditefelo tša letseno e bile hlogo ya ditherišano tše dintši mo mo dingwagasome tše seswai tša go feta. Nepo ya motheo ya thuto ye ke go ela kamano gare ga pholisi le mathata a dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša Matlotlo tšeo di lego lenaneong la Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Pholisi ya Ditseno le Teori ya Etšensi ke motheo wa thuto ye. Datha ya magareng ya dikhamphani tša mašeleng tšeo di lego lenaneong la paka ya 2005–2016 e be e hwetšagala go tšwa go lenaneo la datha la IRESS. Datha e sekasekilwe go šomišwa EViews version 9. Dipoelo di utullotše gore go ba gona ga bong ka gare ga sehlongwa go rarolla mathata a tshedimošo ya go se lekalekane, le go fokotša nyakego ya go lefa mašokotšo. Dipoelo le tšona di tšweleditše go re diperesente tše 54.69 tša dikhamphani tšeo di lego lenaneong la JSE ka fase ga ditirelo tša sekgao sa go phethagatša diphetho tša mašokotšo. Dipoelo di tšwetša pele go utulla go re ditekanyetšo tša ditefelo tša mašokotšo du sepelelana gabotse le ROE le LEV, le go sepelelana gannyane le INST, DIRS le FOREIGN. Dipoelo di netefatša go ba gona ga mathata a Etšensi ao a ngwadilwego lenaneong la dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša mašeleng
Abstracts in English, Zulu, Sepedi
Business Management
M. Com. (Business Management)

Dissertação de mestrado em Finanças
Existem poucos dados estatísticos sobre situações de fraude no mundo. Na Europa esta temática é escassa se não mesmo nula. As empresas que manipulam as suas contas e se vêm publicamente expostas e discribilizadas perante accionistas, investidores e consumidores têm pouca margem para recuperar as perdas em que incorrem. Cabe aos analistas e ao mercado procurar uma solução possível para aqueles que ultrapassaram a barreira institucional. Estudos diversos sugerem que a grande aposta destas empresas passa pela reestruturação do sistema de controlo interno nomeadamente pela substituição dos membros executivos por entidades exteriores à empresa e pela aplicação de mecanismos de governação possíveis de ser valorizados pelos investidores após o acto de fraude. Com a presente dissertação pretendo analisar se a aplicação desses mecanismos de controlo será suficiente para recuperar a credibilidade financeira das empresas e para a sua reinserção no mercado de acordo com os Modelos Institucionais de Supervisão Financeira na Europa. Através de uma amostra de 44 empresas devidamente identificadas nos Mercados de Valores Mobiliários Europeus e alvo de multas por ilegalidades cometidas a nível financeiro, verifiquei que as mesmas tinham uma governação pobre nos anos anteriores ao ano de fraude. A gestão das empresas cabia apenas a elementos internos, as reuniões de auditoria eram escassas ou nulas, a existência de membros externos do conselho de administração era quase inexistente. No entanto e recorridos 3 anos após o ano de fraude os resultados comprovam que as deficiências internas, os problemas de agência, o pouco alcance das leis corporativas, o regime de propriedade concentrada, os benefícios privados de controlo e o domínio das famílias no comando das empresas são apenas alguns dos obstáculos a ultrapassar num continente agarrado a tradições e jogos de poder que só poderá vencer quando abrir as suas portas ao mercado globalizante.
Worldwide statistical data on corporate fraud is scarce. In Europe this subject is under researched if not neglected at all. Companies that manipulate their accounts and face public exposure and discredit from shareholders, investors and consumers do not have much margin to salvage incurred losses. Analysts and the market have the responsibility to find possible solutions for those who crossed over the institutional barrier. Several studies suggest that these companies prioritise their internal control system, namely by replacing executive decision makers with external entities and by applying corporate governance mechanisms that are themselves prone to be valued by investors following the fraudulent act. This dissertation aims to analyse if the application of these mechanisms is enough to regain financial credibility and as such re-insert companies back into the market in line with the European Institutional Models for Financial Supervision. Using a sample of 44 companies listed on European Stock Markets that were fined for illegal financial actions, this study reveals that those firms had poor governance structures in the years prior to the fraud act. Their management duties were covered by internal staff only, auditing meetings were rare or inexistent, external directors were hardly appointed. Nevertheless, and 3 years after the fraud year, the results confirm that the internal governance inefficiencies of these firms, the agency problems, the narrowness of the corporate laws, the concentrated ownership, the private benefits of control and the leadership taken by families in the company are some of the obstacles that need to be challenged in a continent still tied to traditions and power games that will only be overruled if it opens its doors to the globalised market.