Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Failed states – Yugoslavia »

The Weimar Constitution of 1919 and the St Vitus Day Constitution of 1921 were quite different in many aspects. Their comparison is nevertheless of interest not only because it shows some influences of the older one to the younger, but also for the fact that it displays the line of developments of the two countries - Germany and Yugoslavia. If considered from the standpoint of parliamentary government, territorial organization of the two states and some other features the analysis of the respective constitutional developments leads to several conclusions. The two constitutions had their initial shortcomings, but those did not belong to the same area of constitutional law. In Germany they concerned the horizontal separation of powers, whereas in Yugoslavia they belonged to the vertical division of power. Both constitutions under survey ended up in dictatorships. In both countries, attempts were made in the course of history to remedy the initial shortcomings or constructive errors of the two constitutions. In Germany such attempts were successful, which on the contrary was not the case in Yugoslavia. Germany therefore became a well-functioning liberal democracy, while Yugoslavia failed and disappeared.

With the end of the Cold War, many observers expected that international conflict would be less likely to occur and easier to manage. Given the successful resolution of the Gulf War and the European Community's (EC) efforts to develop a common foreign policy, observers expected international cooperation to manage the few conflicts that might break out. Instead, the disintegration of Yugoslavia contradicted these expectations. Rather than developing a common foreign policy, European states were divided over how to deal with Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Germany pushed for relatively quick recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, whereas other members of the EC wanted to go slower. Some observers expected Russia to fall in line with the West because of its need for investment and trade, but instead it supported Serbia. It is puzzling that Europe failed to cooperate regardless of whether greater international cooperation could have managed this conflict. How can we make sense of the international relations of Yugoslavia's demise? Since secession is not a new phenomenon, we should study previous secessionist conflicts to determine if they share certain dynamics, and we should consider applying to Yugoslavia the arguments developed to understand such conflicts.

The United Nations ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda had primacy over national judicial agents for crimes committed in these countries during the most notorious civil wars and genocide of the 1990s. The UN Charter granted the Security Council the right to establish a tribunal for Yugoslavia in the context of ongoing civil war and against the will of recalcitrant national agents. The Council used that same right to punish individuals responsible for a genocide that it failed earlier to prevent in Rwanda. In both cases the Council delegated a portion of its coercive title to independent tribunal agents, thereby overriding the default locus of punishment in the world order: sovereign states.

This paper will analyze France’s attempted foreign policy strategy in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe during the 1960s, beginning with the various positions of de Gaulle’s France and Tito’s Yugoslavia and the numerous similarities in how the two countries’ diplomacy functioned. In both countries, the course of foreign policy was determined according to the authoritarian characteristics of their systems and of their central figure–the president. Both countries were also interested in transcending the Cold War division of Europe, and they based their strategies on attempts to marginalize the United States and pacify the Soviet regime. De Gaulle’s attempt at a détente, which Yugoslavia was very sympathetic toward and had also committed itself to similar goals, failed due to unrealistic illusions of overcoming this bipolarity by forging a middle way between the two opposing Cold War blocs. Faced with an overestimation of their own influence, along with the Warsaw Pact’s aggression toward Czechoslovakia, Moscow’s complete lack of interest in pacification, and the US’s unwillingness to withdraw, end of de Gaulle’s attempts at détente, in which Yugoslavia would play an important role, came to an end. Nevertheless, similar European and global policy goals brought France and Yugoslavia closer together, and this established the principles on which a cooling down period in the mid-1970s became possible.

The Balkan crisis is the result of a series of conflicts in various areas of political, economic and social life in the former Yugoslavia. Relations between the former republics show the complex character of European security. Without a sustainable development of the whole region, it is impossible to guarantee security throughout the European continent. Europe was shaken by the bloody events that marked the break-up of Yugoslavia. No one could have imagined that such violent military clashes could take place in a European country, 50 years after the end of World War II, and that hundreds of thousands of people would seek refuge throughout Europe. It was clear from the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia that the war would continue for many years and if the international community did not intervene the result would be many casualties. The United Nations, the European Union and the OSCE tried to prevent military conflicts between the nations of the former Yugoslavia, but they failed. National elites pursued a policy aimed at creating nation-states and had outside support from influential forces. To achieve this goal they were willing to pay any price. The collapse of the former Yugoslavia, in fact, meant the end of the process that had defined the development of Western Europe since the beginning of the 20th century, in the time between the two world wars. It was the beginning of nation-states. The Balkans had lagged behind in its transformation for many reasons and unlike Western and Central Europe, the Balkan states found themselves in a different wave of historical development, accompanied by conflict and chaos. The collapse of socialism had an impact on this situation, causing new economic and political conflicts. From this point of view, all the efforts of the European and international communities, aimed at controlling the situation after the break-up of Yugoslavia, had no chance of success.

The development of democracy in the successor states of Yugoslavia illustrates the whole range of differences among these states: from Slovenia which is considered most advanced and consolidated, over Croatia which is on its way to become a consolidated democratic state, to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia which are seen as still very fragile zones for democracy to take roots in. While scholars refer to these latter cases as to failed or unconsolidated democracies, this article argues against the common theoretical framework and calls for the use of different theoretical and methodological tools to measure the (un)success of these states. For this purpose this article discusses the main (internal) features and weaknesses of these democracies and points at a number of external factors and internal objective circumstances, which (unintentionally) hinder the process of democratization.

The relationship between national jurisdictions and the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda raises many problems. One of them concerns the surrender of indicted war criminals from national jurisdictions to the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Several obstacles stand in the way of effective surrender to the Ad Hoc Tribunals. This contribution focuses on the legal obstacles that may be encountered in this respect. By means of the case of the failed surrender of Ntakirutimana from the United States to the Rwanda Tribunal, it will be demonstrated that legal assistance to the Ad Hoc Tribunals is of a fundamental different nature than legal assistance offered to foreign tribunals.

After the end of the First World War, some countries in the Balkans remained dissatisfied with the status quo achieved with the Versailles system of peace treaties. The Albanian movement for territorial and ethnic Albania failed to fully realize - Kosovo and Metohija remained in the Royal Yugoslavia, established in 1918, which emerged from the First World War as a victorious state. The large Albanian population is a serious problem for the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. One of the culprits, according to some researchers, is Belgrade's own political circles in the interwar period. Nationally, culturally, economically and politically, the Albanians in this period are in the worst position of any other national minority in the royal Yugoslavia. Here are a few examples to support the above. In the period between the two world wars, the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia did not have a single school in their mother tongue, nor did it have a single cultural, educational or economic association. Dissatisfaction among Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija is growing with the policy of colonizing the Serb population from other parts of the country. This policy of repression against the Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija provoked his numerous emigration to Albania. Much of the progressive emigration, in the person of Hassan Prishtina, Bedri Peyani, Ibrahim Gjakova and others, is extremely hostile to the Yugoslav state. This was cleverly used by the Albanian and Italian governments to break up Yugoslavia years later. In this regard, it is very important for Italian intelligence to engage Kosovo emigration in order to achieve full Italian control over Albania and weaken Yugoslavia's position in the south. With the impending new military confrontation on the international field, which would undoubtedly affect this region of Europe as well, Albanians see a real opportunity to achieve their national goals. Undoubtedly, the Albanian territory is also included in the geostrategic plans of the major countries for conducting military operations in the Balkans and implementing their further plans. In this regard, Italy's goal of making Albania a bridgehead in the Balkans for control of the Straits and the Middle East is to support the aspirations of Albanian nationalists after their long struggle to create a state that unites all Albanians. The status quo of the Balkans, reached by the Versailles system of peace treaties, was destroyed in the course of the Second World War. From all the Balkan states Albania was the first to experience the new order of Hitler and Mussolini and with their help accomplished its national program, precisely с the unification of the Albanian people and establishment of an Albanian identity in the Balkans. With the capitulation of Yugoslavia on April 7, 1941, a new territorial situation was created for the Axis forces and their satellite allies. The partition of Yugoslavia is one of the conditions for the realization of the „New Order“ in Southeast Europe. Convinced that the time was coming when, with the help of Italy and Germany, Kosovo and Metohija, western Macedonia, the eastern regions of Montenegro, etc. would enter Albania's borders, the Kosovo Committee with leading figures of Albanian nationalism, such as Bedri Pejani, Rexhep Mitrovica, Ibrahim Gjakova and Rexhep Krasniqi, have elevated political concepts for ethnic and territorial Albania familiar from the interwar period. In these years „Greater Albania” was a wartime creature, which did not get international recognition. The end of the war also put to rest the idea of a national unification of the Albanian people. The Albanian state again had its boundaries established after the end of the World War I; a large part of the Albanian population was left outside of these borders.

After the Second World War, a large number of members of the fascist regime of the Kingdom of Albania found refuge in Italy, Turkey and the countries of Western Europe, where they continued to politically act. The leading political options in exile - Balli Kombetar, Zogists and pro-Italian National Independent Bloc, decided to cooperate with each other, so they have formed the Albanian National Committee in 1946. The turning point for the Albanian extreme emigration in the West is Operation Valuable, by which the United States and Great Britain sought to overthrow the Communist regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania. Although the operation failed, strong ties were forged between US and British intelligence and Albanian nacionalist emigration, which were further intensified in the 1960s. Xhafer Deva, who was dedicated to act on the annexation of Kosovo and Metohija to Albania, immigrated to the United States in 1956 and established cooperation with the CIA. Albanian emigration in the West applied different methods in politics towards Kosovo and Metohija. Some organizations, such as Xhafer Deva's Third Prizren League, have focused on lobbying Western intelligence. The Bali Kombetar Independent, headquatered in Rome, paid particular attention to working with Albanian high school and student youth in Kosovo and Metohija. The Alliance of Kosovo, formed in 1949, was engaged in subtle methods of involving Albanian nationalists in Yugoslav state structures, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav People's Army, and educational and health institutions in Kosovo and Metohija. Albanian emigration was also involved in violent demonstrations in Kosovo and Metohija in 1968, and cooperated on this issue with the Communist regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania.

The Republic of Kosovo is one of the newest states in the world. Separated from a former communist federation – Yugoslavia and occupied for over a decade by Serbia, it turned out to be free after a systematic destruction and with great consequences in all respects, including the environment. And of course, being a new state, made Republic of Kosovo to inherit many problems, which were very difficult to solve, while the environmental issues did not even come into the agenda ever to be discussed, which should not have been done as it was. In other words, having many major problems, the environmental issue as to the international community that has governed Kosovo for more than a decade, as well as for Kosovo's institutions itself, has never become an issue of importance to be discussed nor to be protected. Almost same happened in every country, which was under the international community protection, as for them it is the importance of security rather than environment protection in a country, where they are serving and far from their home country. Even after some positive developments in Kosovo's environmental legislation, by adopting the law on environmental protection, by creating a state agency for environmental protection, by creating environmental directorates in municipalities, etc., which developments and steps failed to become successful, because they lacked their implementation in practice, and cases like this were also in Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.. ..

The history of the Second World War in Yugoslavia was for a long time the preserve of the Communist regime led by Marshal Tito. It was written by those who had battled hard to come out on top of the many-sided war fought across the territory of that Balkan state after the Axis Powers had destroyed it in 1941, just before Hitler's invasion of the USSR. It was an ideological and ethnic war under occupation by rival enemy powers and armies, between many insurgents, armed bands and militias, for the survival of one group, for the elimination of another, for belief in this or that ideology, for a return to an imagined past within the Nazi New Order, or for the reconstruction of a new Yugoslavia on the side of the Allies. In fact, many wars were fought alongside, and under cover of, the Great War waged by the Allies against Hitler's New Order which, in Yugoslavia at least, turned out to be a “new disorder.” Most surviving participants have since told their stories; most archival sources are now available. This book uses them, as well as the works of historians in several languages, to understand what actually happened on the ground. The book poses more questions than it provides answers, as the author attempts a synoptic and chronological analysis of the confused yet interrelated struggles fought in 1941-5, during the short but tragic period of Hitler's failed “New Order,” over the territory that was no longer the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and not yet the Federal Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia, but that is now definitely “former Yugoslavia.”

This chapter explores the causes, conduct, and consequences of the understudied American covert operations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It first explains why these cases were selected. Next, the chapter describes the collective context and objectives of these missions. Third, it asks why the Truman and Eisenhower administrations opted for covert — rather than overt — conduct. The chapter then offers a comparative historical analysis of three cases: Albania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Yugoslavia. It considers why the United States intervened in the first two cases, but not in Yugoslavia, even though all were communist regimes. The case studies also address the reasons the missions in Albania and Ukraine failed, and discusses the pros and cons of covert conduct. Finally, the chapter concludes by drawing out the theoretical lessons of these cases.

This chapter traces the tactics used by the art Slovenian collective, Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK), specifically the art section, Irwin and the music group, Laibach, to criticise the socialist state of Yugoslavia. The chapter offers a brief overview of the political climate at the time leading up to and during the Yugoslavian wars (1980s and ‘90s). Closely analysed is NSK’s use of ambiguity and parody to hold a mirror up to authoritarianism and Irwin’s appropriation of early Russian avant-garde motifs to criticise socialist-realism and the State’s ‘misuse’ of art. As protection against retaliation by the state, NSK never prescribed their intentions, so audiences and viewers needed to bring their own context and perspective to events. Once Slovenia left the Yugoslavian Federation to enter into free-market capitalism, NSKs tactics seemed far less potent, flowing neatly into a 1980s western art context (a moment in history) that embraced ambivalence and indeterminacy. As an approach that hides a work’s political intent, allowing its viewers to have their own political views affirmed, it is argued that such a tactic fails to shake the political aesthetic. [181]

The forced displacement of people was one of the most significant social consequences of the wars (1991-1995) which followed the dissolution of communist Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and particularly Serbia, has been widely affected by this process. Studies show that over 650,000 people (mostly from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia) were forcibly displaced to Serbia. This chapter explores how the state and different religious communities responded to the forced displacement of populations in Serbia (1991-1996). It focuses on the responses of the state, through the work of the Commissariat for Refugees, as well as case studies of three faith-based humanitarian organisations, namely Philanthropy, Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA), and Bread of Life. The research methods used for the purposes of this chapter include content analysis and a series of semi-structured interviews. The chapter concludes that the Serbian state failed to recognise the potential of faithhumanitarian organisations, even though these organisations were key actors in helping the population in need.