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1
Finke, Daniel, et Annika Herbel. « Coalition Politics and Parliamentary Oversight in the European Union ». Government and Opposition 53, no 3 (19 septembre 2016) : 388–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.28.
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According to the literature, parliamentary scrutiny is either used by the opposition to control the government or by a coalition partner to control the leading minister. Yet, neither the opposition alone nor individual governing parties alone can muster a parliamentary majority to adopt recommendations, resolutions or statements. Therefore, we ask which parties coalesce in co-sponsoring such joint position papers on European Union policy proposals and why. Tying in with the existing literature, we offer three explanations. Firstly, position papers are co-sponsored by so-called ‘policy coalitions’, a group of parties that hold similar preferences on the policy under discussion. Secondly, governing parties form coalitions which support their minister’s position vis-à-vis his or her international partners in Brussels. Thirdly, party groups co-sponsor position papers to counterbalance the leading minister’s deviation from the floor median.On the empirical side, we study the statements issued by committees of the Finnish Eduskunta and recommendations adopted by committees of the German Bundestag over a period of 10 years. Though having similarly strong parliaments, the two countries are characterized by very different types of coalition governments. These differences are mirrored in the observed co-sponsorship patterns.
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Peritz, Lauren. « Obstructing integration : Domestic politics and the European Court of Justice ». European Union Politics 19, no 3 (10 avril 2018) : 427–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116518766258.
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Do legal rulings from the Court of Justice promote European economic integration? This article examines lawsuits where governments are found guilty of breaching their commitment to the common market. In these cases, governments are required to adopt reforms which, correctly applied, should promote intra-European trade. Using a novel dataset of trade-liberalizing rulings, I show that although they do prompt some increases in trade, the effect is contingent on domestic politics. When the defendant government has many political constraints, both institutional and partisan, it is less likely to expand its trade with the European Union. Domestic politics obstructs the policy reforms—and active enforcement—necessary to deepen economic integration. The findings highlight obstacles to the completion of the single market and limitations of the court.
3
Hagemann, Sara, Sara B. Hobolt et Christopher Wratil. « Government Responsiveness in the European Union : Evidence From Council Voting ». Comparative Political Studies 50, no 6 (12 janvier 2016) : 850–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414015621077.
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Are governments responsive to public preferences when legislating in international organizations? This article demonstrates that governments respond to domestic public opinion even when acting at the international level. Specifically, we examine conflict in the European Union’s primary legislative body, the Council of the European Union (EU). We argue that domestic electoral incentives compel governments to react to public opinion. Analyzing a unique data set on all legislative decisions adopted in the Council since 1999, we show that governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that extend the level and scope of EU authority when their domestic electorates are skeptical about the EU. We also find that governments are more responsive when the issue of European integration is salient in domestic party politics. Our findings demonstrate that governments can use the international stage to signal their responsiveness to public concerns and that such signals resonate in the domestic political debate.
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Abreu, Joana Covelo de. « Digital Single Market under EU political and constitutional calling : European electronic agenda’s impact on interoperability solutions ». UNIO – EU Law Journal 3, no 1 (2 janvier 2017) : 130–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.21814/unio.3.1.13.
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Digital Single Market is the new political goal that promotes the creation of digital solutions to support the European Union’s evolution. It is believed to be one means by which the EU can attract investments from new IT tools’ economic agents. For that purpose, the European Unionsettled various interoperability measures so that both Member States and European institutions were able to set the example on how digital tools are important and one of Union’s goals. In this particular setting, the European Union engaged the ISA2 programme to promote interoperability solutions for Public Administrations, citizens and companies which aimed to bring more transparency to those relationships established between Public Administrations (both functional and organic European administrations) and common citizens and companies. In the medium run, interoperability solutions will provide the European Union with an e-Administration (electronic administration) which visible face will be an e-Government (electronic government) phenomenon. However, to avoid the European Union facing a degeneration based on excessive use of electronic realities, principles of proportionality, equality and non-discrimination must be used as testing principles to all measures the Digital Single Market aims to implement. In fact, a wide dissemination of IT tools in other constitutional areas – such as the definition of a democratic system and the public interest guaranteed by politics (steaming from this new equation a e-Politics) – can lead to a dangerous path, compromising society as we know it, its constitutional setting and democratic principle as they are being developed.
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van Os, Jim, et Jan Neeleman. « European Union government legislation affecting psychiatric practice ». Psychiatric Bulletin 18, no 7 (juillet 1994) : 390–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/pb.18.7.390.
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Although the process of psychiatric reform is taking place across Europe, national political, economic and historical factors determine to a large extent the manner and pace of its implementation as well as its final shape. The degree of centralisation of health care systems and the degree of prominence of primary care affect how efficiently change can be achieved. Various forms of professional resistance may, in different degrees in European countries, hamper the implementation of community care. The widely varying contexts in which psychiatric reform takes place throughout Europe, should provide a fertile area for future comparative research.
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Spahiu, Irma. « Government Transparency in Albania and the Role of the European Union ». European Public Law 21, Issue 1 (1 février 2015) : 109–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2015006.
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The recognition of transparency as an essential element of good governance is very important for new democracies because it leads to greater public support for their governments' economic and political decisions. This has been clearly understood by the countries in the Western Balkans which following the fall of communism entered a path of rapid democratization struggling to be opened and transparent. This paper explores transparency and open government in Albania looking at how the Albanian legal administrative framework and practices guarantee the principle of transparency in decision-making and the role the EU in complying with this principle. It introduces the concept of 'transparency through integration' as a model which encapsulates the transparency developments in Albania and Western Balkans and looks at how transparency can be transformed from a principle of good governance to a legalistic instrument holding a place in the hierarchy of legal norms. This research focuses on how transparency becomes part of a policy paradigm which can transform a country's politics from secretive and authoritarian to transparent and democratic. In addition, it suggests that the EU has a role to play as a transformative power to induce positive reforms and improve transparency in the decision-making in Albania.
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ANDERSON, CHRISTOPHER J. « When in Doubt, Use Proxies ». Comparative Political Studies 31, no 5 (octobre 1998) : 569–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414098031005002.
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This article argues that citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to survey questions about the European integration process. It develops a model of public opinion toward European integration based on attitudes toward the political system, the incumbent government, and establishment parties. With the help of data from Eurobarometer 34.0, the study tests political and economic models of public support for membership in the European Union in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. The analyses show that system and establishment party support are the most powerful determinants of support for membership in the European Union. The results also suggest that the relationship between economic factors and support previously reported in research on public opinion toward European integration is likely to be mediated by domestic political attitudes.
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Johansson, Karl Magnus, Fredrik Langdal et Göran von Sydow. « The Domestic Politics of European Union Presidencies : The Case of Sweden ». Government and Opposition 47, no 2 (2012) : 206–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01359.x.
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AbstractThis article aims to start filling a gap in contemporary research on the rotating EU presidencies. In particular, the article pays attention to the role played by domestic factors in the development and fate of EU presidencies. What is the level of conflict between the government and the opposition during EU presidencies? This question is central for us and we address it through an in-depth analysis of one single case, Sweden, through a comparative examination of the role that domestic politics played in the Swedish EU presidencies of 2001 and 2009. In conjunction with our four main explanations for the varying degrees of political conflict during EU presidencies we present four hypotheses that could be advanced in the comparative study of EU presidencies.
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Meyer, Brett. « Learning to Love the Government ». World Politics 68, no 3 (18 mai 2016) : 538–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887116000058.
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One counterintuitive variation in wage-setting regulation is that countries with the highest labor standards and strongest labor movements are among the least likely to set a statutory minimum wage. This, the author argues, is due largely to trade union opposition. Trade unions oppose the minimum wage when they face minimal low-wage competition, which is affected by the political institutions regulating industrial action, collective agreements, and employment, as well as by the skill and wage levels of their members. When political institutions effectively regulate low-wage competition, unions oppose the minimum wage. When political institutions are less favorable toward unions, there may be a cleavage between high- and low-wage unions in their minimum wage preferences. The argument is illustrated with case studies of the UK, Germany, and Sweden. The author demonstrates how the regulation of low-wage competition affects unions’ minimum wage preferences by exploiting the following labor market institutional shocks: the Conservatives’ labor law reforms in the UK, the Hartz labor market reforms in Germany, and the European Court of Justice's Laval ruling in Sweden. The importance of union preferences for minimum wage adoption is also shown by how trade union confederation preferences influenced the position of the Labour Party in the UK and the Social Democratic Party in Germany.
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Gregor, Jiří. « Political Budget Cycles in the European Union ». Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis 64, no 2 (2016) : 595–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.11118/actaun201664020595.
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This paper provides research on the theme of the political budget cycles. The goal is to find out whether or not the government tries to manipulate the state budget and its components for the purpose of re-election across the countries of the European Union. In order to verify this theory a dynamic panel data model was used. The results were significant, but only if predetermined elections were not counted into the estimations. In that case, the theory of the political budget cycles could be accepted as valid for the EU countries. The main driving force of the political budget cycles across the countries of the European Union is fluctuation of the government expenditures. During the election year, the government expenditures are higher, and a year after the election, government expenditures are lower. This is reflected into the state budget balance.
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Wardana, Adhi. « UPAYA PEMERINTAH TURKI UNTUK BERGABUNG DENGAN UNI EROPA ». Global Political Studies Journal 1, no 2 (31 octobre 2017) : 107–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.34010/gpsjournal.v1i2.2015.
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The European Union is an inter-governmental organization whose members are European countries. Since July 1, 2013 already has 28 member countries, many countries of the European region who want to join the European Union, one of which is Turkish, the extent to which the Turkish government's efforts to join the European Union? This study aims to determine the extent of the Turkish Government Efforts To Join The European Union (2004-2008). To be able to Turkey joining the European Union must meet the Copenhagen criteria which consists of the political criteria, economic and acquis, Turkey must conform to all the regulations of the European Union so researchers try to analyze from the effort, constraints, and prospects for Turkey to join the European Union. This type of research is a qualitative research method used is descriptive analysis techniques. aims to describe the facts related to the problem under study. Most of the data that is collected through library research, online data retrieval, and documentation, data were then analyzed with a theoretical approach to dealing with International Relations. The results showed that the Turkish government has made progress in meeting the criteria candidates are awarded by the European Union, Turkey showed promising economic growth, recorded during the year 2004-2008 Turkish economic growth averaged 7%. Turkey managed to adopt new chapters in the Acquis criteria, although there are many other chapters that have not adapted to the European Union, in the political aspects of the Turkish government has been working hard to solve the problem of ham with the Kurds, Armenia and Cyprus, but in line with the efforts that have been The Turkish government in its application, there are still many obstacles that eventually make Turkey's accession to EU membership back hampered..
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Pinelli, Cesare. « The Discourses on Post-National Governance and the Democratic Deicit Absent an EU Government ». European Constitutional Law Review 9, no 2 (23 août 2013) : 177–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019612001101.
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The enduring joint decision trap in the absence of European government – Postnational constitutionalism – The dismissal of politics – Accountability of government before parliament at the core of representative democracy – Internalising the benefits and of externalising the disadvantages of staying together in the Union possible as long as political accountability is not ensured in the EU system – Breathing political life into the EU through constitutional practice without formal Treaty amendment – A time-frame for approval of treaty amendments – EP and the election of Commission president
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Brusis, Martin. « The Instrumental Use of European Union Conditionality : Regionalization in the Czech Republic and Slovakia ». East European Politics and Societies : and Cultures 19, no 2 (mai 2005) : 291–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325404272063.
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Numerous Central and Eastern European countries have restructured their regional level of public administration in the context of their accession to the European Union. Focusing on the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the article studies how the EU has influenced the institutionalization of regions and regional self-government. Regionalization may have been driven mainly by EU conditionality or, as a competing explanation suggests, more by domestic factors. The article argues that the EU altered the opportunity structure faced by domestic actors but that its role was more complementary than decisive. Czech and Slovak governments instrumentalized a perceived EU conditionality to promote their own political objectives. These findings demonstrate that a top-down concept of conditionality lends itself to fallacies and should be substantiated by reconstructing the domestic politics of Europeanization.
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SADOWSKA-WIECIECH, Elżbieta. « Eurosceptycyzm w doktrynie partii konserwatywnej ». Politeja 14, no 1(46) (31 décembre 2017) : 5–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.14.2017.46.01.
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Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party
Membership in European Union has become one of the most crucial and controversial issues in British politics in recent years. Eurosceptics from United Kingdom Independent Party were exhorting to leave the EU and more and more British people had supported them. David Cameron who was leading the government since 2010 had to express a conservative view on the matter. He had announced his plan to renegotiate the terms of EU membership and hold a referendum on the results, asking British people to vote for what he thought the only right choice – staying in European Union. But not all Tories shared that belief. This article examines the issue of Euroscepticism in Conservative Party analyzing its doctrinal as well as political origins and its influence on the government.
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İbrahim qızı Cəfərli, Ramilə. « Mechanisms for Cooperation of the European Union ». SCIENTIFIC WORK 15, no 2 (9 mars 2021) : 84–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.36719/2663-4619/63/84-87.
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The article deals with mechanisms for cooperation of the European Union with nations considered from the scientific point of' view. The author analyzes the details of the European Union technical assistance program for CIS couintries, its aims and positions in the frame of TACIS. Each candidate country that intends to get European Union membership has to follow the common principle and standards. But sometimes in addition to the membership obligations EU member states attitude to the candidate countries may playe great role to get the final result. The article analyzes different European countries attitude to Turkey’s membership as one of the barriers that Turkey faces in the frame of Turkey integration policy to EU. This is explained by the complexity of project co-ordination between the countries in the region, and the economic and political systems in transition countries. Thus, the desire of the commission to use the TACIS program as a tool for regional co-operation and the settlement of existing conflicts corresponds to the existing reality. İn this context, the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan is a clear example of TACIS programs. The expansion of the Armenian TACIS program to Nagorno-Karabakh has been denied by the European Union as it has no consensus by the Azerbaijani government. Key words: European Union, South Caucasus, Central Asia, cooperation mechanisms, economy, politics
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Featherstone, Kevin, et Dimitris Papadimitriou. « Manipulating Rules, Contesting Solutions : Europeanization and the Politics of Restructuring Olympic Airways ». Government and Opposition 42, no 1 (2007) : 46–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00212.x.
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AbstractIn recent years much debate has been generated over the reshaping of the European airline industry and the restructuring of many of the heavily indebted national flag-carriers across the European Union. The European Commission has sought to orchestrate this reform process by the gradual break up of monopolies in air travel and its associated services and a much tighter policing of state aid practices. The EU's liberalizing agenda in air transport, however, has met with strong domestic opposition in the member states. Nowhere else has the resistance to reform been stronger than in Greece, where for a decade successive attempts to restructure or privatize Olympic Airways have yielded very limited success. By focusing, in particular, on the initiative of the Greek government in 2003 to create a new ‘Olympic Airlines’, the article examines how domestic pressures prompted the Greek government to shift away from cooperation with the Commission and invite conflict. The Greek government lost an ECJ case and both Athens and the Commission were left with a sub-optimal outcome. By linking the narrative to the conceptual literature on Europeanization and compliance, the article addresses a number of themes including: the contestation of European competition rules and the ability of national governments to manipulate them, policy entrepreneurship and complex problem-solving, as well as the Commission's role as a stimulus, but potentially also an obstacle to domestic reform.
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Epstein, Rachel, et Martin Rhodes. « From governance to government : Banking union, capital markets union and the new EU ». Competition & ; Change 22, no 2 (15 janvier 2018) : 205–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1024529417753017.
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European banking union and Capital markets union have emerged as two of the key pillars of European integration since the post-2008 financial crisis. Neither were anticipated prior to the financial crisis, nor was the rapidity of their construction. Both imply the same critical shifts in Europe’s institutional political economy. The first relocates national oversight and authority to supranational institutions (a political shift), while the second increases the power and responsibility of market actors by reducing national controls (an economic shift). If banking union aims to break the hold of national governments over banking entities to foster a less fragmented and more efficient European union banking market, capital markets union aims to remove national-level impediments to a single market for capital in which jurisdictional differences are minimized, investor freedoms maximized and business gains access to a greater range of financial resources.
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Steunenberg, Bernard, et Mark Rhinard. « The transposition of European law in EU member states : between process and politics ». European Political Science Review 2, no 3 (novembre 2010) : 495–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773910000196.
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This paper illuminates a critical stage of the implementation of European law: the transposition of European Union (EU) directives. Directives must be transposed into national policies in order to give effect to European law, yet most national authorities experience considerable transposition difficulties. For this reason, the study of transposition has become a focal point within the broader research agenda on non-compliance in the European Union. Highlighting several popular explanatory variables but noting the sometimes contradictory results that follow from empirical testing, this paper outlines an approach that views transposition as a process taking place largely within ministerial agencies rather than across government systems. By using variables related to these domestic processes in our empirical analysis, the paper shows how such an approach can help to explain the way in which member states transpose EU directives.
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Sandholtz, Wayne. « Choosing union : monetary politics and Maastricht ». International Organization 47, no 1 (1993) : 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300004690.
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At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.
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Erne, Roland, et Markus Blaser. « Direct democracy and trade union action ». Transfer : European Review of Labour and Research 24, no 2 (8 avril 2018) : 217–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1024258918764079.
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Until recently, the political influence of trade unions primarily relied on ties to labour-friendly political parties. Since the 1990s, however, party-union relations have deteriorated, forcing unions to consider complementary political strategies. This article reviews different direct democratic instruments at local, national and EU levels. We distinguish popular consultations initiated by government from above from citizens’ initiatives initiated from below and discuss corresponding trade union experiences in Germany, Italy, Ireland, Slovenia and Switzerland. We also analyse the successful right2water European Citizens Initiative (ECI) of the European Federation of Public Service Unions and the failed fair transport ECI of the European Transport Workers’ Federation at EU level. Whereas unions have successfully used direct democratic instruments to (i) defend social achievements or (ii) as a lever to extract policy concessions, direct democracy is also challenging. Successful direct democratic campaigns require unions that are able to mobilise their own rank-and-file and to inspire larger sections of society.
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ASPINWALL, MARK. « Government Preferences on European Integration : An Empirical Test of Five Theories ». British Journal of Political Science 37, no 1 (13 décembre 2006) : 89–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123407000051.
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This essay examines the causes of government support for European integration. It evaluates several competing theories, both material and ideological. Two dependent variables are examined: government support for European integration in Council of Ministers decisions, and in the 1997 Amsterdam intergovernmental conference. There appear to be sharp differences between the two decision-making fora in the efficacy of predictive variables. In the Council of Ministers, left–right political ideology and financial transfers from the European Union to member states provide the best explanations. In the Amsterdam conference, experience in the Second World War and financial transfers provide the best explanations. This research extends our understanding of why governments choose co-operation within the European Union. It also extends our understanding of the relationship between ideology and integration preferences. Ideology matters not just to parties, but also to governments, which represent both territorial interests and ideologies. There appears to be a linear relationship, whereby left governments are more supportive of integration than right governments.
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Mair, Peter, et Jacques Thomassen. « Political representation and government in the European Union ». Journal of European Public Policy 17, no 1 (janvier 2010) : 20–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760903465132.
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Târlea, Silvana, Stefanie Bailer, Hanno Degner, Lisa M. Dellmuth, Dirk Leuffen, Magnus Lundgren, Jonas Tallberg et Fabio Wasserfallen. « Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform ». European Union Politics 20, no 1 (8 janvier 2019) : 24–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116518814336.
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This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of European Union member governments’ preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015 suggests that countries’ financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our understanding of preference formation in the European Union and the viability of future EMU reform.
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Keating, M. « The Invention of Regions : Political Restructuring and Territorial Government in Western Europe ». Environment and Planning C : Government and Policy 15, no 4 (décembre 1997) : 383–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c150383.
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Regionalism has come back to prominence, as the political, economic, cultural, and social meaning of space is changing in contemporary Europe. In some ways, politics, economics, and public policies are deterritorializing; but at the same time and in other ways, there is a reterritorialization of economic, political, and governmental activity. The ‘new regionalism’ is the product of this decomposition and recomposition of the territorial framework of public life, consequent on changes in the state, the market, and the international context. Functional needs, institutional restructuring, and political mobilization all play a role. Regionalism must now be placed in the context of the international market and the European Union, as well as the nation-state.
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Sato, Mai. « Politics of International Advocacy Against the Death Penalty : Governments as Anti–Death Penalty Crusaders ». International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 11, no 3 (1 septembre 2022) : 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.2471.
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Two-thirds of the countries worldwide have moved away from the death penalty in law or in practice, with global and regional organisations as well as individual governments working towards universal abolition. This article critically examines the narratives of these abolitionist governments that have abolished the death penalty in their country and have adopted the role of ‘moral crusaders’ (Becker 1963) in pursuit of global abolition. In 2018, the Australian Government, while being surrounded by retentionist states in Asia, joined the anti–death penalty enterprise along with the European Union, the United Kingdom and Norway. Using the concepts of ‘moral crusader’ (Becker 1963) and ‘performativity’ (Butler 1993), this article argues that advocacy must be acted on repeatedly for governments to be anti–death penalty advocates. Otherwise, these government efforts serve political ends in appearance but are simply a self-serving form of advocacy in practice.
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Strezhneva, M. « Structuring of Political Space in European Union (the end) ». World Economy and International Relations, no 1 (2010) : 61–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2010-1-61-72.
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Emergence of the EU political system led to the denationalization of its economic space. This political system can be characterized as a democratic one. Yet through European elections, the European citizens do not elect the government acting at the supranational level. It is not them, but the European political class, who determines the integration agenda. The article exposes а linkage between changing parameters of political democracy in the EU member states and transition from centralized national governance to a multilevel one (MLG), accompanied by development of new governance modes. Participatory democracy serves in the EU as an important supplement for representative democracy. Privileged partners (such as Switzerland or Norway) are allowed to participate in the MLG. Yet representatives of the transnational European civil society or governments of those states, which are not full EU members, are not admitted to the decision-making stage.
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Van Hecke, Steven. « Do Transnational Party Federations Matter ? (... and Why Should We Care?) ». Journal of Contemporary European Research 6, no 3 (22 août 2010) : 395–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v6i3.198.
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Compared to national political parties, transnational party federations (often known as Europarties) play little role in the European Union (EU). They have no government-making power, and national party politics continue to dominate European Parliament elections. The literature therefore focuses primarily on national political parties operating within the EU framework and on supranational party groups in the European Parliament. In contrast, this review article examines what transnational party federations are and what they do within the context of EU governance, in addition to and reconsidering them in light of recent developments in the EU. By analysing party politics at the transnational level, this article bridges the gap in the literature between research that focuses on the national level and research that focuses on the supranational level. The key conclusion is that transnational party federations do matter, but in a manner different from that of national political parties and supranational party groups. Because transnational party federations offer partisan linkages between different EU institutions, they influence politics and policy-making, in addition to contributing to the increasing politicisation of the EU polity.
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Judge, David. « The British Government, European Union and EC Institutional Reform ». Political Quarterly 57, no 3 (juillet 1986) : 321–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923x.1986.tb00725.x.
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TAYLOR, KEITH. « EUROPEAN UNION : THE CHALLENGE FOR LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT ». Political Quarterly 66, no 1 (janvier 1995) : 74–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923x.1995.tb00454.x.
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Del Sarto, Raffaella A., et Nathalie Tocci. « Italy's politics without policy : Balancing Atlanticism and Europeanism in the Middle East ». Modern Italy 13, no 2 (mai 2008) : 135–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532940801962033.
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Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.
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Donnelly, Shawn. « German Politics and Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Eurozone Budget ». Politics and Governance 9, no 2 (27 mai 2021) : 230–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3928.
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This article examines selected political party positions on a Eurozone budget and fiscal transfers between 2018 and 2021. It posits that German government positions on common European debt and fiscal policy have undergone a significant but fragile shift. It must contend with continued domestic hostility before it can be said to be a lasting realignment. A great deal with depend less on the Social Democratic Party that is largely responsible for bringing it about with the support of German Greens, and more on the willingness of the Christian Democratic Union, their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union and the German voting public to adopt a more interventionist fiscal policy as well, generating shared commitments to economic policy at home and in Europe. That has not happened yet.
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Grzeszczak, Robert. « Europeanisation of Polish Law Following Poland’s Accession to the European Union ». Studia Iuridica 71 (20 novembre 2017) : 61–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0010.5814.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article concerns primarily the effects of the membership of the European Union on national (Polish) law and, to a limited extent, on the political system of a state. The conclusions presented in the article are of universal value. Although the article deals with Polish affairs, the principles, tendencies and consequences identified are typical of the relationship state – the EU, both before and after accession, regardless of the state concerned. It should be, however, noted that the path to membership and the membership itself are different in each case. The practice of the Polish membership of the European Union, its systemic dimension and the changes in the national legal system (Europeanisation) do not differ significantly than in the case of other Member States. Europeanisation of Polish law, politics, economy, culture and society has been in progress since the 1990s. One can differentiate between two stages of Europeanisation: before and after Poland’s EU accession, each characterised by different conditions. Over time, this process, on the whole, has been undergoing numerous changes but it has never weakened in importance. Poland faces issues such as poor legitimation of integration processes, supremacy of the government over the parliament, passivity of parliamentary committees in controlling the government and EU institutions in the decision making process, as well as dilution of responsibility for decisions taken within the EU. The process of Europeanisation relies mostly on direct application of the standards of EU law in the national legal system, implementation of directives into national law and harmonisation or standardisation of national legal solutions so that they comply with the EU framework. It is also reception of a common, European (Union) axiology.
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Börzel, Tanja A. « Multilevel governance or multilevel government ? » British Journal of Politics and International Relations 22, no 4 (20 août 2020) : 776–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148120939872.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The commentary returns to the beginning of the career of multilevel governance as a distinct perspective on the European Union and European integration. At the time, multilevel governance allowed a generation of students to overcome the stylised debates between Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Neofunctionalism on how to best capture the ‘nature of the beast’. At the same time, multilevel governance still privileged the role of public authorities over economic and societal actors. While subsequent studies broadened the focus to include the social partners or public interest groups, Hooghe and Marks have retained their public authority bias. The commentary argues that the focus on multilevel government rather than multilevel governance has increased the scope or applicability of Hooghe and Marks’ approach, both within the European Union and beyond. At the same time, the government bias has prevented the multilevel governance approach from unlocking its full explanatory potential.
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Yılmaz, Hakan. « Democratization from above in Response to the International Context : Turkey, 1945–1950 ». New Perspectives on Turkey 17 (1997) : 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0896634600002739.
Texte intégralRésumé :
On 6 March 1995 the EU-Turkey Association Council took a decision regarding the inauguration of a customs union between the EU and Turkey, following the pattern set out in the Ankara Agreement of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1970. The Council's decision received the European Parliament's assent on 13 December 1995, enabling it to enter into force on 1 January 1996. Following the Association Council's customs union decision, the Turkish government has launched a series of democratizing and liberalizing reforms. It is apparent that the tactical goal of the Turkish government for initiating the reforms has been to persuade the European Parliament to give its consent to the Association Council's customs union decision. The government's strategic goal, on the other hand, has been to fulfill the necessary political conditions, such as those formulated in the June 1993 Copenhagen meeting of the European Council, of Turkey's qualification for full membership in the EU.
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Kapony, Elisabeth. « Dilemmas about the protection the core values in the European Union ». International Journal of Business & ; Technology 6, no 1 (1 novembre 2017) : 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.33107/ijbte.2017.6.1.07.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The European integration was primarily about economic cooperation, but the European Union’s role in protecting the core values in its Member States. EU values were first mentioned in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, and since the Amsterdam Treaty the community law has a sufficiently precise description of this values, which should be respected not only by countries aspiring to the EU but also by the Member States themselves. The Lisbon Treaty defines EU values; however, nowadays the EU has to face the phenomenon when some government apparently violate these values. In recent years, defiance of core EU principles by the Polish and Hungarian governments is turning into a political debate. The European Commission has taken legal action against both governments, and the European Parliament supports this course. This short paper would like to address what the European institutions can do in these cases. Is the current treaty of the EU effective to address these phenomena?
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Benz, Arthur. « The European Union’s Trap of Constitutional Politics : From the Convention Towards the Failure of the Treaty of Lisbon ». Constitutional Forum / Forum constitutionnel 17, no 1, 2 & 3 (11 juillet 2011) : 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.21991/c92h3w.
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In a national referendum held on 12 June 2008, 53.4 percent of Irish citizens voted “no” to the Treaty of Lisbon. As its provisions require ratification by all member states, the Irish vote marks a further setback for attempts at consti- tutional reform of the European Union (EU). The Lisbon reform treaty, officially entitled the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on Euro- pean Union and the Treaty establishing the Eu- ropean Community,1 was signed by the prime ministers and presidents of EU member states in December 2007. It was the result of a pro- cess set in motion by the European Council in a meeting held in Laeken, Belgium in December 2001. Intended to make the “ever closer union” more democratic, and to facilitate the adjust- ment of European institutions to the new po- litical situation brought on by the accession to the EU of Central and Eastern European states, the “Laeken Council” issued a declaration trig- gering efforts to constitutionalize the European Union. To this end, a reform process was ini- tiated involving a body called the Convention on the Future of Europe (Convention), made up of European and member state government representatives and parliamentarians.2 This re- form process resulted in the recommendation in 2003 of a draft Treaty Establishing a Constitu- tion for Europe (Constitutional Treaty),3 which was subsequently approved by the Intergovern- mental Conference and the European Council in Rome in October 2004. Despite several mem- ber states ratifying the Constitutional Treaty, it was rejected by popular referenda in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005. At that time, and in view of the obvious risks to ratifi- cation in some other member states, the process of constitutionalization ground to a halt.
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Scharpf, Fritz W. « Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity ». European Political Science Review 1, no 2 (juillet 2009) : 173–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773909000204.
Texte intégralRésumé :
To be at the same time effective and liberal, governments must normally be able to count on voluntary compliance – which, in turn, depends on the support of socially shared legitimacy beliefs. In Western constitutional democracies, such beliefs are derived from the distinct, but coexistent traditions of ‘republican’ and ‘liberal’ political philosophy. Judged by these criteria, the European Union – when considered by itself – appears as a thoroughly liberal polity which, however, lacks all republican credentials. But this view (which seems to structure the debates about the ‘European democratic deficit’) ignores the multilevel nature of the European polity, where the compliance of citizens is requested, and needs to be legitimated, by member states, whereas the Union appears as a ‘government of governments’, which is entirely dependent on the voluntary compliance of its member states. What matters primarily, therefore, is the compliance–legitimacy relationship between the Union and its member states – which, however, is normatively constrained by the basic compliance–legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituents. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, member governments could, and should, be able to assume political responsibility for European policies in which they had a voice, and to justify them in ‘communicative discourses’ in the national public space. That is not necessarily so for ‘non-political’ policy choices imposed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). By enforcing its ‘liberal’ programme of liberalization and deregulation, the ECJ may presently be undermining the ‘republican’ bases of member-state legitimacy. Where that is the case, open non-compliance is a present danger, and political controls of judicial legislation may be called for.
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Martynov, Andrii. « The political system of European Union after European Parliament Election of 2019 ». European Historical Studies, no 14 (2019) : 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2019.14.15-30.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The politics of the European Union are different from other organizations and states due to the unique nature of the EU. The common institutions mix the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the EU. The EU treaties declare the EU to be based on representative democracy and direct elections take place to the European Parliament. The Parliament, together with the European Council, works for the legislative arm of the EU. The Council is composed of national governments thus representing the intergovernmental nature of the European Union. The central theme of this research is the influence of the European Union Political system the Results of May 2019 European Parliament Election. The EU supranational legislature plays an important role as a producer of legal norms in the process of European integration and parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the EU executive. The European Parliament, as a representative institution of the European Union, helps to overcome the stereotypical notions of a “Brussels bureaucracy” that limits the sovereignty of EU member states. The European Parliament is a political field of interaction between European optimists and European skeptics. The new composition of the European Parliament presents political forces focused on a different vision of the strategy and tactics of the European integration process. European federalists in the “European People’s Party” and “European Socialists and Democrats” consider the strategic prospect of creating a confederate “United States of Europe”. The Brexit withdrawal from the EU could help the federalists win over European skeptics. Critics of the supranational project of European integration do not have a majority in the new composition of the European Parliament. But they are widely represented in many national parliaments of EU Member States. The conflicting interaction between European liberals and far-right populists is the political backdrop for much debate in the European Parliament. The result of this process is the medium term development vector of the European Union.
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Kayser, Ina. « Change for Entrepreneurial Chances ? » International Journal of E-Entrepreneurship and Innovation 2, no 1 (janvier 2011) : 46–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jeei.2011010104.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Electronic government provides multifarious opportunities for entrepreneurs regarding public-private sector partnerships and the exploitation of administrative benefits. The occurrence of entrepreneurial opportunities is influenced by many distinct intrinsic and external factors. This paper examines the opportunities that occur for entrepreneurs through the electronic implementation of public services across the European Union until the years 2020 and 2040, respectively. The development of the European Union is currently at the crossroads of economic and political stagnation. Building on two scenario analyses, the author thereby accounts for economic and political factors of different possible trajectories of the European Union, analyzing the corresponding state of e-government implementation and deducing implications for entrepreneurial opportunity occurrence. All scenarios show different opportunities emerging from the distinct states of e-government across Europe; these opportunities depend, nonetheless, on the specific market needs and value creation capabilities determined by each scenario presented.
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Avdagic, Sabina. « Partisanship, political constraints, and employment protection reforms in an era of austerity ». European Political Science Review 5, no 3 (2 octobre 2012) : 431–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773912000197.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Why do some governments adopt unpopular reforms entailing far-reaching liberalization of the labor market, while others opt only for marginal adjustments or even regulatory reforms? This paper explains the likelihood of different types of reforms as an effect of different constellations of government partisanship and veto players. Combining the ‘blame avoidance’ and ‘veto players’ logics of politics, I argue that veto players have either a constraining or enabling effect depending on the partisan orientation of government. Liberalization is most likely to be adopted either by right parties facing few veto players, or by left parties in contexts with a high degree of power sharing. Regulatory reforms are most likely when left governments enjoy strong power concentration, but marginal regulation may also be adopted under external pressure by right governments facing many veto players. An analysis of employment protection reforms in 24 European Union countries during 1990–2007 supports the argument that the effect of political constraints and opportunities on the choice of reforms is shaped by partisan differences.
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Katulski, Jakub. « Liberalna czy nieliberalna ? Percepcja izraelskiej demokracji przez Unię Europejską ». Kultura i Edukacja 135, no 1 (31 mars 2022) : 219–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/kie.2022.01.11.
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Liberal democracy perspective dominates the perception of actors and partners in the foreign relations of European Union. This stems from the declared fundamental values of the Union: respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. This also influences the judgment of Israel, who connected to the EU with cooperation but also criticised for its attitude towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Liberal democracies not only allow their citizens to exercise their right to vote but also guarantee a degree of protection from the state to all political life participants, maintain plurality, respect religious, ethnic and other minorities. Israel presents itself as a liberal democracy, therefore it seems important to verify if this view is shared by the European Union. The Union, member states and politicians in their documents or during the debates judge such aspects of Israeli politics as the occupation of West Bank, Golan Heights and East Jerusalem, settlements in the occupied territories, policies towards minorities, non-government organizations, oftentimes taking a critical stance towards Israeli actions. This may indicate that, despite Israel being a close political and economical partner, it still does not comply with the fundamental values and leaves something to be desired.
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Manow, Philip, et Holger Döring. « Electoral and Mechanical Causes of Divided Government in the European Union ». Comparative Political Studies 41, no 10 (21 août 2007) : 1349–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414007304674.
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Voters who participate in elections to the European Parliament (EP) apparently use these elections to punish their domestic governing parties. Many students of the EU therefore claim that the party—political composition of the Parliament should systematically differ from that of the EU Council. This study shows that opposed majorities between council and parliament may have other than simply electoral causes. The logic of domestic government formation works against the representation of more extreme and EU-skeptic parties in the Council, whereas voters in EP elections vote more often for these parties. The different locations of Council and Parliament are therefore caused by two effects: a mechanical effect—relevant for the composition of the Council—when national votes are translated into office and an electoral effect in European elections. The article discusses the implications of this finding for our understanding of the political system of the EU and of its democratic legitimacy.
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Lightfoot, Simon. « An Employment Union for Europe ? The Role of the Swedish Government ». Politics 17, no 2 (mai 1997) : 109–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00041.
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The Swedish Government's proposal for an ‘Employment Union’ to offset the potential increases in unemployment caused by moves towards Economic and Monetary Union, has put the problem of unemployment at the top of the agenda of the current Intergovernmental Conference. Domestic political pressures coupled with a belief that the EU offers the potential for a solution to this problem, were key factors behind the decision to table an amendment Forging links with other European social democratic parties to generate support for the proposal, the Swedish Social Democrats need the proposal to succeed for both domestic political ends and to safeguard the future of the European project.
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Willumsen, David M. « The Council’s REACH ? National governments’ influence in the European Parliament ». European Union Politics 19, no 4 (9 juillet 2018) : 663–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116518783305.
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The presence of cross-institutional partisan links between the Council and the European Parliament is a key feature of bicameral law-making in the European Union. However, assessing the conditions under which national parties can and do influence ‘their’ Members of the European Parliament is complicated by a lack of measurements of the national interest at stake. Analysing the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals regulation, this article shows that national parties represented in the Council only seek to influence ‘their’ Members of the European Parliament when the national interest at stake is sufficiently large and, more importantly, when a legislative deal has been struck. These findings have implications for our understanding of legislative politics in the European Union and the relationship between Members of the European Parliament, European Parliamentary Groups and the Council.
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Forsyth, Murray. « The nature of multi‐level government : Analysing the European Union ». West European Politics 22, no 1 (janvier 1999) : 195–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402389908425295.
Texte intégral
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Troitiño, David Ramiro, et Archil Chochia. « Winston Churchill And The European Union ». Baltic Journal of Law & ; Politics 8, no 1 (1 juin 2015) : 55–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2015-0011.
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Abstract Given Winston Churchill’s influence and achievement as a writer, historian, adventurer, soldier, artist, and politician, his participation in the European integration process is crucial to understanding the entire scope of the project in its origins. Churchill was a fundamental voice promoting the Franco-British Union, a promoter of the European Communities, and an active participant of the Congress of Europe, embryo of the Council of Europe. This article analyzes Churchill’s view of European integration through his political speeches, in particular those delivered in Zurich and in The Hague, his ideas about the League of Nations and the United Nations, his understanding of the British Empire, and the special relations between the UK and the USA. His participation in the process of uniting Europe in its early stages provides us with essential information about the original plans for the creation of a united Europe and understanding the traditional British approach to the EU, including the current position of the conservative government led by Cameron.
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Kovalevych, L. « Policy of the states of the European Union against sessesionism ». Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Geography, no 64 (2016) : 74–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2721.2016.64.13.
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The role of domestic policy in solving of inter-regional conflicts and counteracting secessionist processes are disclosed in the article. A mixed populatіon in any area can live either in peaceful coexistence and political stability or in violent conflicts. This is mostly dependent on the internal ethnic policy. Variety of the government’s reactions to the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in some regions are explored; among which the approval of separatist demands, the advancement of conditions of underprivileged minorities, adoption of “asymmetric federalism”, allowance for minorities to participate in politіcal debate through parliamentary voting, referendums, etc., establishment of a confederation with only limited links between countries are distinguished. Another way to solve regional conflicts is to create a “multinational federation.” The main features of the state policy of the European Union’s countries which have regions with high potential secessionist conflict are analyzed. The necessities of a balanced domestic policy of the government to prevent the escalation of internal contradictions are emphasized. The influence of the form of government on minimizing of inter-regional conflicts is investigating. After correlating data about current regional conflicts and the forms of government of the hosting countries, it was found that the form of government (from unitary to federalism) is not the only decisive factor for solving of regional conflicts. However, taking into account the historical, cultural, linguistic, economic factors, it is important to understand that political mechanisms can give an initial impulse, the first impetus to resolve the conflicts. Therefore, political factors are some of the key one in regularizing of secessionism. Moreover, examples of the successful resolution of regional conflіcts by particular European states are considered. Experience of an effective resolving of regional conflicts in western European countries showed that in all the cases (Switzerland, Germany, Spain and Great Britain) the mechanisms of the institution of parliamentarism and solving of the language issue were used. The geographic decentralization policy of the supreme power (Germany) and legitimization of government decisions through referendums (Switzerland) are equally effective.
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Wood, Luke. « The Bureaucratic Politics of Germany’s First Greek Bailout Package ». German Politics and Society 34, no 1 (1 mars 2016) : 26–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2016.340102.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The bureaucratic politics of the German decision to bailout Greece reveal that policy proposals from the Office of the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Finance to cope with the crisis in Greece stood to benefit those specific ministries. Centered on a national/supranational cleavage, policy debates in the second Angela Merkel government revolved around whether the European Union should be delegated more power in terms of broader Eurozone macroeconomic governance. Angela Merkel rejected broader treaty revisions insisting on strict adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact and the large-scale participation of the IMF. Conversely, Federal Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble opposed IMF involvement and advocated for increased EU competency including support for the French proposal to institutionalize the Eurogroup. The policy positions of these two organizational actors remained deeply conditioned by organizational interests, rather than partisan or ideological divides over conceptions of “European Unity.”
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Leška, Dušan. « The Europeanisation of Slovak Political Parties ». Slovak Journal of Political Sciences 15, no 1 (1 janvier 2015) : 31–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sjps-2015-0003.
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Abstract The aim of the study is to analyse the Europeanisation of Slovak political parties in the various stages of the transition and transformation of the political system of Slovakia before and after the entry into the European Union. Methodologically, the paper is based on the concept of Ladrech, who divided five areas of research to suit the study of the impact of the Europeanisation on political parties and their politics. Visible can be changes in political programmes, organisational changes, a formula of party competition, relations between parties and government, relations beyond the national party system (a new look at transnational cooperation between political parties). Our research proved that the Europeanisation has been visible at all stages of development, with varying degrees of intensity and in various forms since the signing of the association agreement with the European Union. Its effect was important already in the stage of the society transition when it helped the return of Slovakia on the path of democratic development. In the two stages of development, Europeanisation created an individual line of cleavage of political parties, affected the rivalry of political parties, and thus a party system model. Unambiguously, it was reflected in political programmes of all parties, and an important role was played by the incorporation of political parties in the European political parties, by their cooperation and coordination of their policies. The election in the European Parliament was an important turning point in completion of programme orientations of political parties.
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Kisielewski, Tadeusz. « Federalist Plans in Central and Eastern Europe and the Question of the Baltic States in the Context of Polish Politics During World War II ». Lithuanian Historical Studies 9, no 1 (30 novembre 2004) : 19–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25386565-00901002.
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This paper deals with federalist plans of Central and Eastern Europe during World War II. The Polish government in exile and its Czechoslovak counterpart actively participated in the implementation of such plans. A Central- and Eastern European federation was to be an eventual alternative to Stalin’s plans of Europe’s Sovietization and to Hitler’s ‘New Europe’. For some time these federalist plans were supported by Great Britain and the United States. Besides, in British and American circles there were also other models for creating a European regional union. On 11 November 1940 Poland and Czechoslovakia managed to sign a declaration on the formation of a federation. However, soon disagreements concerning attitudes towards the Soviet Union as well as over Lithuania’s place in the federation arose.