Thèses sur le sujet « European Union countries – Foreign relations – Treaties »

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2001.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis examines the democratisation of South Africa's foreign trade policy, by evaluating the negotiations surrounding the establishment of a free trade area between South Africa and the European Union (EU). Democracy here is defined as a form of government that rests on three components namely, public participation in and public debate over policy formulation and a governing elite that is responsive to the needs of the majority of the population. The thesis firstly outlines the process of negotiation itself, looking at the developments that shaped the years of talks. It examines the nature of the final agreement, called the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA). It focuses on the Co-operation Agreements that were concluded, South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention and the details of the free trade agreement. It finds that although the negotiations took very long to complete and the EU proved to be a tough negotiator, there are a number of opportunities for South Africans in the TDCA. In the second section the internal process in developing a South African negotiating mandate is examined. This is done to conclude whether or not South Africa's foreign trade policy is being formulated in a democratic manner. However, first of all the question why the democratisation of foreign trade policy formulation is important is addressed. Two possible theories are advanced. Firstly, globalisation has forced countries to lure foreign direct investment (FDI) as a matter of urgency. Seeing as FDI is mostly tied up with western nations that prefer democracies, states are opting to democratise. The focus is to a large extent on satisfying international actors. Or alternatively, the very survival of the nascent democracy today depends on the consultative nature of domestic economic and international economic policy formulation. This is not a question of choice with an external focus, but rather a matter of urgency with purely an internal focus. Four actors in foreign policy formulation, namely parliament, government, the bureaucracy and civil society, are examined in order to understand whether they had access to the process and whether these institutions themselves have been democratised since 1994. The thesis finds that the process was to a large extent democratic in nature. However, the thesis also finds that no matter how democratic policy formulation is in South Africa, the options for policy are limited by a number of international elements. These include globalisation, regional trading blocs like the European Union, and international organisations like the World Trade Organisation.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die tesis evalueer die demokratisering van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse handelsbeleid deur die onderhandelingsproses tussen die Europese Unie (EU) en Suid-Afrika rakende die sluiting van 'n vryhandelsooreenkoms te ontleed. Demokrasie word in die tesis definieer as 'n tipe regering wat rus op drie komponente, naamlik deelname in en debat oor beleidsformulering en 'n regerende elite wat die behoeftes van die meerderheid van die burgers in ag neem in beleidsformulering. Eerstens omskryf die tesis die gebeure wat die onderhandelingsproses beïnvloed het. Die finale ooreenkoms word oorweeg teen die agtergrond van die samewerkingsooreenkomste wat tussen die partye gesluit is, Suid-Afrika se gedeeltelike deelname aan die Lomé Konfensie en die vryhandelsooreenkoms. Die gevolgtrekking word bereik dat ten spyte van die feit dat die onderhandelings oor 'n hele aantal jare gestek het, en alhoewel die EU 'n uitgeslape onderhandelaar was, die orreenkoms talle geleenthede vir Suid-Afrikaners skep. In die tweede instansie word die interne proses wat tot Suid-Afrika se onderhandelingsmandaat gelei het, ondersoek. Dit is gedoen om vas te stel of die beleid op 'n demokratiese manier geformuleer is. Daar word egter eers bepaal waarom die demokratisering van buitelandse handelsbeleid belangrik is. Twee moontlike teorie word geformuleer. Die eerste stel dit dat globalisering lande forseer om direkte buitelandse beleggings aan te lok. Siende dat buitelandse beleggings van westerlike state afkomstig is, wat verkies om met demokratiese state sake te doen, word ontwikkelende lande as te ware geforseer om veral hulle buitelandse beleidsformulering te demokratiseer. In die alternatief kan dit betoog word dat die voortbestaan van die demokrasie self afhang van 'n ekonomiese beleidsformulering wat beide binnelandse en internasionale prosesse insluit. Dit is nie 'n kwessie van keuse met 'n eksterne fokus nie, maar 'n noodsaaklikheid met 'n interne fokus. Vier groeperinge wat buitelandse beleidsformulering beïnvloed word ondersoek, naamlik die Parlament, the regering, die burokrasie en die burgerlike samelewing, om vas te stelof hierdie instansies toegang tot die proses gehad het en of hierdie instansies self sedert 1994 gedemokratiseer is. Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat al is die formulering van buitelandse beleid hoé demokraties, word die moontlikehede vir beleidsformulering beperk deur globalisering, streeksorganisasies soos die EU, en internasionale organisasies soos the Wêreld Handelsorganisasie. Vir Chris, Gitti, Thomas en my ouers, sonder wie hierdie nooit klaar sou gekom het nie. Baie dankie ook aan Prof Philip Nel vir sy hulp, leiding en ondersteuning.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In October 1999 South Africa and the European Union (EU) signed a free trade agreement, the Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA), which came into effect on 1 January 2000. The TDCA was developed to enhance bilateral trade, economic-, political- and social cooperation and consists of three components - the creation of a Free Trade Area between South-Africa and the EU, EU financial aid to South Africa through the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD), and project aid. However, the EU, in an effort to secure the best possible deal for itself, often behave in its own interests (through the manipulation of the Wine and Spirits Agreement) during the negotiations for the TDCA. The goal of this study was to establish what exactly trademarks are, and what implications the EU's protection of intellectual property rights on wine and spirits trademarks will have on i) the South African wine industry, ii) whether South Africa could have exercised another option, iii) whether this action has created a precedent with which the EU can, in future, again force South Africa or any of its other developing trade partners to make concessions, and iv) who gains the most from the TDCA. The concludes that the EU, through the manipulation of the Wine and Spirits Agreement, left South Africa with no choice by to concede the use of the contested trademarks - something that has already taken its toll on the South African wine industry - in order to save the TDCA. This action created a precedent that the EU will, in future, again be in a position to threaten developing countries with the termination of an agreement should they fail to comply with its demands. Finally, the conclusion is made that even though the TDCA was created to assist South Africa with its reintegration into the world market, it will ultimately be the EU that benefits most from the agreement.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Suid-Afrika en die Europese Unie (EU) het in Oktober 1999 In vryehandelsooreenkoms, die Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) onderteken, wat op 1 Januarie 2000 in werking getree het. Die TDCA is ontwerp om bilaterale handel-, ekonomiese-, politieke- en sosiale samewerking te bevorder en bestaan uit drie komponente, naamlik die skep van 'n vryehandelgebied tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika; finansiele steun deur die EU aan Suid-Afrika onder die European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) en projekhulp. Die EU het egter dikwels in eiebelang opgetree (deur middel van die manipulasie van die Wyn- en Spiritus Ooreenkoms) tydens die onderhandelingsproses in 'n poging om die beste moontlike ooreenkoms vir homself te beding. Die doel van hierdie studie was om te bepaal wat presies handelsmerke is, en watter implikasies die EU se beskerming van intellektuele eiendomsregte aangaande wyn- en spiritushandelsmerke op i) die Suid-Afrikaanse wynbedryf sal he, ii) of Suid-Afrika 'n ander opsie kon uitoefen, iii) of hierdie aksie In presedent geskep het waarmee die EU Suid-Afrika of enige van sy ander ontwikkelende handelsvennote in die toekoms weer sal kan dwing om toegewings te maak, en iv) wie die meeste baat vind by die TDCA. Die studie het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die EU deur die manipulasie van die Wyn- en Spiritus Ooreenkoms aan Suid-Afrika geen keuse gegee het nie as om die gebruik van die betwiste handelsmerke op te se - iets wat reeds die Suid-Afrikaanse wynbedryf geknou het - in 'n poging om die TDCA te behou. Hierdie optrede skep 'n presedent dat die EU voortaan in onderhandelings met ander ontwikkelende state weer kan dreig om die hele ooreenkoms te verongeluk indien daar nie aan sy eise voldoen word nie. In die laaste instansie is daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat, alhoewel die TDCA daarop gemik was om Suid-Afrika te help met sy herintegrasie tot die wereldmark, dit uiteindelik die EU is wat die meeste daarby gaan baat.

In the last few decades the European Union (EU) and its members have emphasized the importance of human rights and the need to improve human rights conditions in Third World countries. In this research project, I attempted to find out whether the European Union and its members practice what they preach by giving precedence to countries that respect human rights through their Official Development Assistance (ODA) program. Furthermore, I tried to analyze whether European integration occurs at the foreign policy level through aid allocation. Based on the literatures on political conditionality and on the relationship between human rights and foreign aid allocation, I expected that all EU members promote principles of good governance by rewarding countries that protect the human rights of their citizens. I conducted a cross-sectional time-series selection model over all recipients of ODA for each of the twelve members for which I have data, the European Commission, and the aggregate EU disbursements from 1979 to 1998.

Since 1973, the European Union has been expanding its borders from its six founding members - West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium, to include all of Western Europe and parts of Scandinavia by 1995. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, the EU made a difficult but beneficial choice of paving the road for the Eastern and Central European (ECE) to become EU members. However, there was a need for the EU to determine the goals and guidelines that would format the transition of these former communist states into productive members of the EU. This paper will analyze the evolution of these guidelines - formally outlined by the Copenhagen Criteria - that set the precedent for these states to become members. The main issue of this paper will take these criteria a few steps forward, comparing states that were given membership based on the criteria and those who have been established by the EU as at least "potential EU members" but have not been deemed as satisfying these criteria enough to become candidates or full members. Both qualitatively and quantitatively, the comparisions of the 2004 and 2007 new EU members and other states of the Western Balkans and Turkey will be conducted to determine if the political and economic guidelines established by Copenhagen are the only guidelines being met, or if areas such as cultural values and "Europeanness" are also contributing to membership levels.

This research analyses development cooperation between the European Union (EU) and South Africa with the objective of determining which between the two entities, ultimately benefits more out of this arrangement The research goes beyond the altruistic reasons offered by the EU as the rationale for development cooperation to investigate whether South Africa's development is actually being promoted by this cooperation. Further, the research investigates whether there is also EU self-interest that informs this development cooperation. This research is conceptualised within the development aid debate framework. The research argues that this development cooperation is important to South Africa even though its impact is in real terms has not been extensive due to a number of factors. It further contends that there are EU political, security and economic interests amongst others that are being promoted by this development cooperation. The research concludes by asserting that this development cooperation promotes the mutual interests of the EU and South Africa. This conclusion challenges the paradigms of the debate on development aid which is premised in black and white terms of development aid promoting either donor or recipient interests.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2004.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: One of the most notable features of the relations between the European Union and SADC is the current reconfiguration of their trading architecture as encapsulated in the Cotonou Agreement. Such a process of change can be shown to have inevitably been the result of policy shifts, which are salient characteristics of a global political economy, whose ontology is embedded theoretically in neo-liberalism. Nevertheless, any process of change in the structure of global trading relations has the logical outcome of systemically imposing either challenges or opportunities, and in some cases both, on the participants of that structure. This study represents a scholarly attempt at creating a lucid and descriptive embodiment of the challenges and opportunities involved for SADC in the negotiation and implementation of a Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (REPA) with the European Union. These challenges and opportunities, obligatory within a REPA framework are theoretically pronounced in as far as they shape the political economy of regional integration in SADe. The process of negotiating such a multifaceted agreement with a sophisticated partner, calls for institutional and negotiating capacity. Undoubtedly, such capacity is beyond the membership of SADe. The point is also emphasized that the process of trade liberalization, ingrained in a REPA will create a complex and difficult interface with the current SADC initiatives underway to deepen regional integration. Tellingly, these would contradict the cautious developmental and bottom up approach taken by SADC in its drive for regional integration. Conversely, this study concedes that a REPA with the EU holds a number of novel opportunities for SADC because such a process would provide scope for the fundamental restructuring of the SADC economies. The competitive pressures through decreased levels of protection within a REPA can create an upward convergence of low performing industries in the region. These, amongst others are important aspects if the political economy of SADC is to move into a virtuous cycle of deeper integration and ultimate insertion in the global economy.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Een van die mees opvallende kenmerke van verhoudinge tussen die Europese Unie (EU) en Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap (SAOG) is die huidige rekonjigurasie van handelsbetrekkinge, soos vervat in die Cotonou Ooreenkoms. Hierdie proses is die onafwendbare gevolg van beleidsveranderinge in die internasionale politieke ekonomie, met 'n. ontologie wat teoreties in neo-liberalisme gewortel is. Sodanige veranderinge in die struktuur van internasionale handelsverhoudinge. bied uitdagings sowel as geleenthede, en soms beide, aan deelnemers van sodanige struktuur. Hierdie studie is 'n akademiese poging om 'n helder en deskriptiewe blik te werp op die uitdagings en geleenthede vir die SAOG met betrekking tot die onderhandeling en implimentering van die Regionale Ekonomiese Venootskapsooreenkoms (REVO) met die EU Hierdie uitdagings en geleenthede, wat verpligtend is binne die REVO struktuur, is teoreties belangrik in soverre as wat dit die politeke ekonomie van regionale integrasie in SADC beinvloed. Die onderhandelingsproses van so 'n komplekse dokument met gesofistikeerde vennote vereis intitusionele en onderhandelingskapasiteit. Hierdie kapasiteit is nie in SAOG te vinde nie. Die punt word ook benadruk dat die proses van handelsliberalisering, wat deel uitmaak van REVO, botsend kan wees met SAOG inisiatiewe om regionale integrasie te versterk. In essensie sal dit die huiwerige ontwikkelings en 'onder na ba' benadering, wat die SAOG tans volg, weerspreek. Aan die ander kant, gee die studie toe dat 'n REVO met die EU 'n hele aantal voordele inhou, aangesien so 'n proses momentum kan voorsien vir verreikende herstrukturering van SAOG ekonomieë. Die kompeterende druk a.g. v. 'n afname in beskermingsvlakke onder die REVO, kan lei tot 'n opwaartse neiging onder tradisionele swakpresterende nywerhede in die streek. Hierdie is onder andere belangrike aspekte wat SADC in gedagte moet hou, ten einde deel te word van die deugsame kringloop van dieper integrasie, en uiteindelike deelwording van die internasionale ekonomie.

Patterns of domestic political contestation in international affairs often see the centre aligned against both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. This is observable in a range of issues, from democracy promotion, intervention, international law, European integration, free trade, globalization and the creation of international regimes. Why centre-periphery ideological competition occurs is an interesting puzzle, given the challenge it offers to the idea that partisanship is an inherently left-right phenomenon. Yet the role of the political centre in foreign policy has not been subjected to systematic analysis. This thesis studies the nature and effects of the foreign policy position of the political centre. It argues that the centre is distinguished from left and right by its embrace of distinct elements of liberal ideology. The liberal view of international politics differs in thee important respects from its socialist and conservative competitors: It is particular, rather than pluralist, when it comes to questions of sovereignty and international legitimacy; it views interdependence, rather than independence, as a natural and desirable condition of the international; and it views deterrence, rather than diplomacy, as the best means of achieving security. To test the validity of this thesis I discuss the role of ideology in explaining variation in relations between four Euratlantic states (Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) and the United States during the Cold War. This is a hard case given the intensity of global threat at the time. The thesis tests the claim that the strength of Euratlantic-American relations is a function of the relative influence of the political centre at the time. To do this it outlines a mixed-methods research design that combines in-depth case studies with a quantitative analysis of Euratlantic-US relations. The results from both elements confirm the validity of the theoretical proposition.

This thesis has attempted to provide an analysis of two legal instruments
the Cotonou Agreement and the AGOA. Specific attention was directed to these instruments impact on trade between the European Union and the United States, respectively, and beneficiary African countries.

The main purpose of this paper was to explore the role economic partnership agreements play in regional integration. The whole paper was premised on identifying the nature of economic partnership agreements that is conceived as a free trade arrangement. Therefore the paper discussed the feasibility of the reciprocal principle between the European Union and ACP countries, and further indicated that there is no need to implement the principle of reciprocity at present. The paper also discovered that, due to the fact that unequal trade relations between the EU and the ACP countries still exist, the implementation of the EPAs is most likely to generate the complementary but non-competitive trade relations between the EU and the ACP countries. Such a situation could result in the ACP countries over-independence on the EU's market. ACP countries are not expecting to such integration. In addition the paper ascertains that the EPAs themselves could contain the intrinsic negative impacts such as discrimination against the third countries on regional integration.

The dissertation is about the impact of the European Union (EU) on the foreign policy of a candidate in the pre-accession period. More specifically, the research analyses the factors and processes that intervene between the EU power to generate change in Turkish foreign policy and Turkish national compliance with the EU conditions between 1997 and 2005 by way of analysing three cases: Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus issue, Greek-Turkish bilateral problems in the Aegean Sea; and Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis the launch of the ESDP. Main question the research addresses is “why does a candidate choose to comply (or fail to comply) with the EU conditions in foreign policy?” In other words: “How (through what mechanisms) does the EU generate compliance with the EU conditions in foreign policy?” The dissertation approaches these questions through the perspective of the Europeanization literature and its conditionality school drawing on the Rational Choice Institutionalism. In accordance with this rationalist account, main argument the doctoral research intends to prove is that “the EU’s adaptational pressure on Turkey (operationalized as a function of clear/attainable membership perspective and credible conditionality policy) is a necessary yet not a sufficient condition for domestic compliance in foreign policy if the cost of compliance is high for the target government. In this respect, domestic actors’ strategic calculation is the ultimate determinant of the compliance degrees at the domestic level. In order to prove this core hypothesis, the research used theory testing process-tracing, longitudinal comparison of cases, counter-factual reasoning and the use of a control case. The evidence for testing the argument comes from the measurement of conditionality (measured as the linkage between a given foreign policy condition and membership-related reward) and domestic compliance (measured as foreign policy output ranging from rhetorical to behavioural change) through the content analysis of primary documents. This analysis is complemented with 33 semi-structured elite interviews. The dissertation by proving that the EU’s transformative power in foreign policy works through the cost and benefit calculation of the ruling party and by elaborating on the conditions under which the EU can interfere with this rational calculus (hence modify the opportunity structure for the target government), advances our understanding of the EU’s transformative power and contributes to the Accession Europeanization literature in general. Furthermore, the study provides additional empirical as well as theoretical in-depth case knowledge to the available literature on the Europeanization of Turkey and Turkish foreign policy.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Overall the conclusions drawn about South Africa’s negotiating style and tactics were arrived at by analysing a number of reports (that closely followed the evolution of the negotiations) and then paralleling this case study’s findings with the conjectures made by the theoretical frameworks (i.e. works by Putnam, Zartmann and Churchmann) about how negotiations proceed. In the final analysis, the findings of this case are intended to provide insight for the south about how to approach any future trade negotiations with the North (or more specifically with the EU).

On 10 May 1994 the European Union offeredSouth Africa a package of measures to ... send a strong political signal to the incoming govemment and to the South African population, thus proving its firm determination to support the transition towards democracy and its willingness to contribute to the reconstruction and economic development of South Africa after the elections. This package consisted of two parts: 1. A series of short term implementations to take place with immediate effect to help South Africa's development and transition, and 2. An offer to negotiate a comprehensive long-term relationship with South Africa should the new government so request. South Africa accepted the European Union's offer to negotiate a long-term relationship, and in response requested membership of the structure governing the Union's relations with the rest of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and some countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, namely the Lomé Convention. Due to various incompatibilities South Africa was not allowed to join this organisation. In its place the European Union offered to negotiate an agreement with South Africa that would lead to a Free Trade Area. This agreement was in keeping with the rules as laid down by the World Trade Organisation. It envisaged the lowering of tariffs and trade barriers between the Union and South Africa over a period not exceeding 12 years, allowing for asymmetry in terms of time constraints in implementation only. South Africa saw this type of agreement as inconsistent with the desire expressed by the European Union to support the countries development and the integration of the Southern African region. In its place South Africa proposed a new concept in trade agreement, this concept, known as the Trade and Development Agreement, embodied both trade liberalisation and support for development. This agreement would introduce a new paradigm of thought to govern trade between developed countries and developing countries within the World Trade Organisation's rules. This paper explores the events that unfolded in these negotiations. It attempts to discover whether, in the current global environment, it is possible, or beneficial, for the developed world to act in an altruistic manner towards another state in order to assist its development.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2000.
The Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) will create competitive challenges, threats and opportunities, driving out less efficient performers while bolstering more efficient enterprises and industries. This is in line with the general principles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which promotes the reduction of trade barriers in order to liberate trade on a global basis. This dynamic process of adjustments will continue throughout the implementation of the European Union - South Africa Free Trade Agreement ( EU-SA FTA) which is the main component of the TDCA. The European Union (EU) has historically been Southern Africa's most important trading partner. The main reason why South Africa entered into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU was to enhance exports to South Africa's largest export market, attract higher levels of investment from the EU, and gradually expose the South African industry to competition to ensure that it is restructured to become globally competitive. Since 1910 South Africa has been part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which also comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BlNS). The EU-SA FTA will accordingly impact on trade relations between South Africa, the EU and the BLNS countries. Not only will SACU face increased competition from cheaper EU imports, but BLNS countries will also face reduced income from the common revenue pool. South Africa will have to remove a higher level of tariffs from a greater volume of imports than is the case for the EU. For the BLNS, the relative adjustment effort is even greater. The BLNS will have to adjust to the elimination of tariffs on 30% of goods currently imported from the EU, while the TDCA will bring about no improvement in their current terms of access to the EU market. The BLNS products currently exported to the EU which are most likely to be affected by the EU-SA FTA are: clothing (Lesotho), preserved fish and flowers (Namibia), and grapefruit, processed pineapples, corned fruit and grapes (Swaziland). These products are under threat from South African products which can, as a result of the FTA, be exported to the EU at reduced tariffs. BLNS products which could be affected as a result of cheaper EU imports are: grain (Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho), chicken production (Swaziland), sugar (Swaziland), beef (Namibia and Botswana), and the small wheat-farming sector in Namibia and Botswana. The EU-SA FTA is further likely to have a substantial impact on South Africa's exports to the EU. The total increase in exports as a result of the FTA is estimated between 1.3% and 1.4% of the 1996 value of South Africa's exports to the EU. The main drive will come from industrial products which are less protected than agricultural products. The South African government, further, concluded that the negative effects of the direct costs to SACU would be outweighed, in the long term, by the dynamic and geopolitical benefits of an FTA with the EU. The signal that the South African government has given with signing the TDCA with the EU indicates that the Southern African economy should restructure itself to become internationally competitive. This is the only way to survive in a global trade arena which is under WTO principles becoming increasïngly more liberated.

This assessment of European Union foreign policy towards the South Caucasus shows that while the EU has developed a coherent transport policy since 1992, paradoxically, it has had no corresponding coherent conflict resolution policy for this region. The fact that the EU deepened transport cooperation without a mediation policy in an area with a multiplicity of protracted conflicts is a puzzle. Although the EU eventually added mediation to its policy during the Russia-Georgia armed conflict in 2008, it was unable to facilitate a political solution. The research examines what has been the nature of EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. The dissertation argues that incoherence in conflict resolution policy has been consequent upon two causal factors: (i) preferences of the EU member states conditioned by their historical experience with Russia, and (ii) institutional framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). By contrast, with functional approach, the three dominant factors that have enabled coherence in transport cooperation are (i) legislative alignment, (ii) common transport area, including technical assistance for transit development, and (iii) restrictive measures. Examination of these two areas of EU foreign policy, shows a discrepancy, demonstrating its inconsistent nature. The theoretical framework of realism and liberal intergovernmentalism, is applied to empirically grounded EU foreign policy analysis. Adopting a case study methodology, this work examines the EU's policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, with special focus on Georgia between 1992 and 2014. The research combines social science methods of literature review, document analysis and expert interviews.

“What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?” These were two of the central questions put by the Laeken Declaration, adopted by the European Council in December 2001. The Declaration offered the beginning of an answer, pointing out the direction for future policy developments, and for the institutional reform underpinning them: “The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs…A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework.” At the same time, the Laeken Declaration pointed out some more specific questions concerning the institutional innovations required to enhance the coherence of European foreign policy and to reinforce the synergy between the High Representative for CFSP and the relevant Commissioners within the RELEX family. With a view to a better distribution of competences between the EU and Member States, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, the text mentioned the development of a European foreign and defence policy first, and referred more particularly to the scope for updating the ‘Petersberg’ tasks of crisis management, a policy domain that would take a pivotal place in the consolidation of ESDP and CFSP at large. This Declaration marks the beginning of the process of regime reform that covers the last three years of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union. This evolution, and the innovations that it has brought about in institutional and normative terms, are the subjects of this thesis.

The Convention on the future of Europe, set up by the Laeken Declaration, represented an important stage in the pan-European debate on the objectives, values, means and decision-making tools of CFSP. The US-led intervention in Iraq in March 2003 marked a new ‘critical juncture’ in the development of the conceptual and institutional bases of CFSP. As it was the case in the past, following major policy failures in the course of the Balkan wars, Member States sought to mend the rift that divided them in the run up to the Iraq war. In so doing, Member States agreed on a significant degree of institutional reform in the context of the Convention and of the subsequent Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). The creation of the new position of a double-hatted Foreign Minister, as well as the envisaged rationalisation and consolidation of the instruments at his/her disposal, including a new European External Action Service (EAS), is a primary achievement in this perspective. On the defence side, a new formula of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ among willing and able Member States has been included in the Treaty Establishing the European Constitution (Constitutional Treaty), with a view to them undertaking more binding commitments in the field of defence, and fulfilling more demanding missions. Right at the time when the Iraq crisis was sending shockwaves across the political and institutional structures of the Union, and of CFSP in particular, the first ESDP civilian mission were launched, soon followed by small military operations. The unprecedented deployment of civilian and military personnel under EU flag in as many as 13 missions between 2002 and 2005 could be achieved thanks to the development of a new layer of policy-makign and crisis-management bodies in Brussels. The launch of successive ESDP operations turned out to be a powerful catalyst for the further expansion and consolidation of this bureaucratic framework and of the conceptual dimension of CFSP/ESDP. Most importantly, these and other dimensions of institutional and operational progress should be set in a new, overarching normative and political framework provided by the European Security Strategy (ESS).

Needless to say, institutional innovations are stalled following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda of May/June 2005. With a view to the evolution of the CFSP regime, however, I argue in this thesis that the institutional reforms envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty are largely consistent with the unfolding normative and bureaucratic features of the regime. As illustrated in the course of my research, the institutional, bureaucratic and normative dimensions of the regime appear to strengthen one another, thereby fostering regime deepening. From this standpoint, therefore, the stalemate of institutional reform does slow down the reform of the international regime of CFSP but does not seem to alter the direction of its evolution and entail its stagnation, or even dismantling. On the contrary, I maintain that the dynamics of regime change that I detect will lead to stronger, endogenous and exogenous demands for institutional reform, whose shapes and priorities are to a large extent already included in the Constitutional treaty. This vantage point paves the way to identifying the trends underlying the evolution of the regime, but does not lead to endorsing a teleological reading of regime reform. As made clear in what follows, CFSP largely remains a matter of international cooperation with a strong (although not exclusive) inter-governmental component. As such, this international regime could still suffer serious, and potentially irreversible, blows, were some EU Member States to openly depart from its normative coordinates and dismiss its institutional or bureaucratic instances. While this scenario cannot be ruled out, I argue in this thesis that this does not seem the way forward. The institutional and normative indicators that I detect and review point consistently towards a ‘deepening’ of the regime, and closer cooperation among Member States. In other words, it is not a matter of excluding the possibility of disruptions in the evolution of the CFSP regime, but to improve the understanding of regime dynamics so as to draw a distinction between long-term trends and conjunctural crises that, so far, have not undermined the incremental consolidation of CFSP/ESDP.

Central to this research is the analysis of the institutional and normative features of the CFSP regime at EU level. The focus lies on the (increasing) difference that institutions and norms make to inter-governmental policy-making under CFSP, in the inter-play with national actors. The purpose of my research is therefore threefold. First, I investigate the functioning and development of the bureaucratic structures underpinning the CFSP regime, since their establishment in 2000/2001 up to 2005. This theoretically informed review will allow me to highlight the distinctive procedural and normative features of CFSP policy-making and, subsequently, to assess their influence on the successive stages of reform. Second, I track and interpret the unprecedented processes by which innovations have been introduced (or envisaged) at the institutional and normative level of the regime, with a focus on the Convention on the future of Europe and on the drafting of the European Security Strategy. Third, I assess the institutional and normative output of this dense stage of reform, with respect both to the ‘internal’ coherence and the deepening of the regime, and to the ‘external’ projection of the EU as an international actor in the making.

On the whole, I assume that a significant, multidimensional transition of the CFSP regime is underway. The bureaucratic framework enabling inter-governmental cooperation encourages patterned behaviour, which progressively generates shared norms and standards of appropriateness, affecting the definition of national interests. In terms of decision-making, debate and deliberation increasingly complement negotiation within Brussels-based CFSP bodies. Looking at the direction of institutional and policy evolution, the logic of ‘sharing’ tasks, decisions and resources across different (European and national) levels of governance prevails, thereby strengthening the relevance of ‘path-dependency’ and of the ‘ratchet effect’ in enhancing inter-governmental cooperation as well as regime reform.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The EU’s notable transformation over the past five decades is obviously an event of modern state concepts. However, the EU’s matter of concern has placed too much emphasis on economic and trade issues, while its capability and power have achieved remarkable growth with far-reaching ramifications in both economic and political affairs. This also means that studies of the EU foreign policy have hardly reached North East Asia because of geographical limit between them, the EU’s weak institutional capacity and vestige of the Cold War. Therefore the EU and the Korean Peninsula did not have chance to build a critical relationship. This time could be defined as ‘standstill’ between Europe and the Korean Peninsula or ‘quiet diplomacy’. 1993 marked a turning-point in relations between the EU and the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, European countries have launched the Maastricht Treaty since they had signed in 1992. The Treaty implies the EU’s more strengthened international role in the political and economic area in accordance with its increased capability and reinforced power. Secondly, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993 and then the Korean Peninsula was compelled to face a political crisis. Since the EU took unofficial Humanitarian Aids for North Korea in 1994-1995, KEDO and the EU in 1997 agreed to the terms and conditions of the accession to KEDO of its nuclear regulatory body. This was the first challenge of the EU political engagement of the Korean Peninsula question. In the context, this research seeks to answer the question of “What are the EU priorities in its strategy for Korean Peninsula?” that includes broadly the EU’s regional strategy for North East Asia in line with its foreign policy agenda. To tell the conclusion, the EU’s intervention to North Korea was firstly encouraged in dimension of economic interests through vitalization of international trade after the Korean Peninsula would be reunified. The EU considered that Asian nuclear market is an important factor in order to build nuclear technical standard as well as to obtain commercial interests although the European nuclear firms did not obtain chance enough to construct for North Korea nuclear facilities construction. The EU’s political incentives for political change-seeking in North East Asia must also be considered. Actually, the EU diplomatically opened the door of Pyongyang and led the isolated regime to a channel that communicates with international community although the EU did not take a seat at Six-Party Talks to engage itself in the Korean Peninsula question. As a result, the EU could increase the image of a ‘peaceful mediator’ or an ‘honest blocker’ in the term of ‘reputation’ through engagement continued for the Korean Peninsula Crisis. The EU’s foreign policy has been partly successful in context that Europe succeeds in promoting its existence as a global actor. Therefore, its foreign policy would gradually be reinforced to bolster the EU’s credibility and influence in the Korean Peninsula. The EU’s role is surely reduced in the Korean Peninsula issues with the termination of the KEDO project. However, the EU’s role is expected to be performed in different ways under its confidence and capability. The EU’s next engagement depends on where its new incentives will be, and then its question will be how to realize them in accordance with its institutional conditions and actual capacity.
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This study analyses the possible impact of the European Union (EU) on the development of the relations between business interest groups and the government in Turkey, more precisely on the interventions of the business interest groups in domestic policy-making. Hence it deals with the links between the progress of the relationship between Turkey and the EU and the development of domestic interest group activity in Turkey.

The progress of Turkey’s relations with the EU enhanced the visibility of the Turkish Peak Business Organizations (PBOs) in representing Turkish business interests in Brussels. Moreover, the evolution of the activities of the PBOs, provides a broader understanding of the developments of the general characteristics of the relations between the government and business interest groups in Turkey. Hence the investigation focuses on the major Turkish PBOs.

We examine the relations of Turkish PBOs with the EU, essentially, on the basis of the observation of their transnational actions within the EU as well as their participation in financial and technical assistance programmes of the EU and in the joint institutional structures of the association regime between Turkey and the EU. By analysing these two dimensions we assess the repercussions of the socialization of the Turkish PBOs on their strategies of action in dealing with European Affairs, on discourses they adopted regarding domestic policy-making and on their organizational structure and policy agenda.

We elaborate our topic with reference to the Europeanization concept, which covers the examination of the consequences of the European governance on national systems. Through the Europeanization concept we observe the correlation between the progress of the Turkey-EU relations and the ongoing process of change in the patterns of interventions of the Turkish business interest groups in domestic policy-making.

Doctorat en sciences politiques
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This item is only available in print in the UCF Libraries. If this is your Honors Thesis, you can help us make it available online for use by researchers around the world by following the instructions on the distribution consent form at http://library.ucf.edu/Systems/DigitalInitiatives/DigitalCollections/InternetDistributionConsentAgreementForm.pdf You may also contact the project coordinator, Kerri Bottorff, at kerri.bottorff@ucf.edu for more information.
Bachelors
Business Administration
Finance

Thesis (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As the Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) creates competitive challenges and opportunities, labour and capital will seek the highest returns, dri ving out less efficient performances while bolstering more efficient enterprises and industries. This dynamic process of adjustments will continue throughout the implementation of this agreement. The South African government sees the agreement with the European Union as a step towards restructuring the country's economy and making it part of the rapidly changing world economy. This policy view of the South African government will result in those sectors of the economy that are not internationally competitive, receiving no support from government. Consequently these sectors will decrease in time. Of the three agricultural profiles studied, fresh fruit (deciduous fruit) will benefit the most from the TDCA. The most obvious effect the agreement will have on the sector is the saving on customs duties payable on exports to the EU. An estimate on 1997 trade figures revealed that in the short term the deciduous fruit industry will save approximately RI00 million. Over the implementation period of 10 years, the industry will save about Rl billion. After that, savings amounting to approximately R125 million per annum should be possible. The canned fruit sector is an export-driven industry that exports about 90 per cent of its products, 50 per cent of which is exported to the EU. The export tariffs to the EU are very high. As non-EU member, South Africa is the biggest provider of canned fruit to the EU. Some analyses revealed that the total savings in tariffs for the first year of implementation will be R25 million. The industry stands to save approximately R100 million over the implementation period. At the EU's request, South Africa agreed to negotiate a separate Wine and Spirits Agreement. The EU believes that South Africa's continued use of certain "geographical indications" or terms is in breach of Article 23 of the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. The quotas granted by the EU on wine and sparkling wine cover 79 per cent of South African exports to the EU. South Africa granted the EU a 0.26 million litre quota for sparkling wine and a 1 million-litre quota for bottled wine. SA will phase out the use of the terms "port", "sherry", "grappa", ouzo", "korn" , "jagertee" and "pacharan" over agreed time periods. The issue will be taken to the WTO for a ruling in this regard. The EU has agreed to grant SA a duty-free tariff quota for wine but has suspended the tariff quota until the Wine and Spirits agreement has been signed. The EU will also provide financial assistance of 15 million ECU to help restructure the SA wine and spirits sector. The South African agricultural industry should take note of the constantly changing international marketing environment. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed with the European Union opens up new markets and enhances existing ones that must be exploited. It is imperative that every role player should evaluate the level of competitiveness of his or her enterprise. Thus the message is very clear: Agricultural production with an international trading view is the only sustainable road to follow.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Soos die Handel, Ontwikkelings en Samewerkingsooreenkoms kompeterende geleenthede en uitdagings skep, sal arbeid en kapitaal verskuif na die hoogste opbrengste beskikbaar. In hierdie proses sal daar wegbeweeg word van onvoldoende prestasies en sal effektiewe ondememings en industriee floreer. Hierdie dinarniese proses van herstruktuering sal voortduur regdeur die implementeringsperiode van hierdie handelsooreenkoms. Die Suid Afrikaanse regering beskou die ooreenkoms met die Europese Unie as 'n belangrike stap in die proses om die land se ekonomie te herstrukltureer en so deel te maak van die vinnig veranderende wereld ekonomie. Hierdie regerings beleid sal daartoe lei dat sektore wat nie intemasionaal mededingend is nie, geen ondersteuning vanaf die regering sal ontvang nie. Met tyd sal hierdie sektore verdwyn. Van die drie landbousektore wat bestudeer is, sal vars vrugte (sagte vrugte) die meeste voordeel trek uit die ooreenkoms. Die besparing van aksynsbelasting op die uitvoere na die Europese Unie is die mees kenmerkendste voordeel vir die sektor. 'n Beraming gebaseer op 1997 handels syfers toon 'n jaarlikse besparing van plus minus R100 miljoen. Deur die hele implementeringsperiode, sal die besparing plus minus Rl biljoen beloop. Na afloop van die implementeringsperiode, sal jaarlikse besparing van plus minus R125 miljoen moontlik wees. Die inmaak vrugte sektor is 'n uitvoer gedrewe industrie wat gemiddeld 90 persent van hul prod uk uitvoer. Van hierdie uitvoere is 50 persent bestem vir die Europese Unie. Die uitvoertariewe na die Europese Unie is baie hoog. As nie-lidland, is Suid Afrika die grootste verskaffer van geblikte vrugte aan die Europese Unie. Beramings voorsien dat die sektor 'n totale besparing vir die eerste jaar van implemetering van plus minus R25 miljoen kan beloop. Die industrie kan soveel as R100 rniljoen oor die implementeringsperiode bespaar. Op die Europese Unie se versoek, het Suid Afrika ingestem om 'n afsonderlike Wyn en Spiritualie ooreenkoms te onderhandel. Die Europese Unie beweer dat Suid Afrika se gebruik van sekere "geografiese aanduidings" of terme, In verbreking is van Artikel 23 van die Handelsverwante Aspekte van die Intellektuele Eiendomsregte Ooreenkoms. Wyn en vonkelwyn kwotas wat deur die Europese Unie aan Suid Afrika toegestaan is, beloop 79 persent van die uitvoere na die Europese Unie. Suid Afrika het die Europese Unie In kwota van 0.26 miljoen liter vir vonkelwyn en 1 miljoen kwota vir gebottelde wyn toegestaan. Voorts sal Suid Afrika die terme "port", "sherry", "grappa", "ouzo", "kom" , "jagertee" and "pacharan" met die ooreengekome peri odes uitfaseer. Die aspek sal egter na die WHO geneem word vir In finale beslissing. Die Europese Unie het ooreengekom om aan Suid Afrika In tarief vrye kwota vir wyn toe te staan, maar het dit opgehef tot tyd en wyl die Wyn en Spiritualie ooreenkoms onderteken is. Die Europese Unie sal ook finansiele ondersteuning van 15 miljoen ECU skenk om die Suid Afrikaanse Wyn en Spiritualiee industrie te help hestruktureer. Suid Afrikaanse Landbou sal notisie moet neem van die konstante verandering in die intemasionale bemarkingsomgewing. Die Vrye Handelsooreenkoms wat geteken is met die Europese Unie, open nuwe markte en sal bestaande markte bevorder. Hierdie geleenthede moet benut word. Dit is baie belangrik dat elke rolspeler sy vlak van kompeterende vermoe moet evalueer, om so sy eie siening oor die ooreenkoms te kan uitspreek. Hieruit is die boodskap dus baie duidelik: Landbou produksie met In intemasionale handels uitkyk, is die enigste volhoubare pad om te volg.

Since 2009, the European Union has faced the worst economic crisis of its history. Due to the devastating impact of the Eurozone crisis on their economies, European countries realized the need to deepen the integration. Without a fiscal union, the Monetary Union would always be prone to economic crises. However, the efforts to reinforce the Union’s economy have been hampered by the UK due to its obsession with national sovereignty and lack of European ideals. In opposing further integration, the UK officials have started to speak out about the probability of leaving the EU. The purpose of this paper is to present benefits and challenges of Britain’s EU membership and to assess the consequences of leaving the Union both for the UK and for the EU. This study utilizes Power Transition theory to analyze British impact on European integration. With the perspective of this theory, the UK is defined as a dissatisfied partner. By applying the conflict– cooperation model of Brian Efird, Jacek Kugler and Gaspare Genna, the effect of the UK’s dissatisfaction is empirically portrayed. The empirical findings of the conflict– integration model clearly show that Britain’s dissatisfaction has a negative impact on European integration and jeopardizes the future of the Union. Power Transitions analysis indicates that the UK would become an insignificant actor in the international system and lose the opportunity for the Union’s leadership if it leaves the EU. On the other hand, although Britain’s departure would be a significant loss in terms of capability, economic coherence is more important for the EU. Without enough commitment for the Union, increasing the level of integration with the UK would raise the probability of conflict with the integration process in the future.

The EU’s Trade Relations with China (1975-2008):

A Linkage Power at Work?

(Summary)

The central aim of this thesis is to improve our understanding of the EU’s power, in particular in its external trade relations/negotiations. Our hypothesis is that the EU is a distinctive kind of linkage power, defined as an actor relying on linkage as a crucial modus operandi in its external relations. We explored how, to what extent and in which distinctive ways the EU is such a linkage power.

Our analysis was based on three logically interrelated concepts – power resources, linkage and linkage power. Linkage refers to a leveraging strategy, with an aim of packaging relevant power resources, so as to increase leverage in bargaining, or more generally attain a policy objective. I identified seven types of linkages that the EU used: political-economic issue linkage, economic-economic issue linkage, conditionality, contextual linkage, linkage with a third party, cognitive linkage and synergistic linkage. Linkage can hardly work without proper power resources. The latter, as Dahl (1970) defined, refers to all the resources-opportunities, acts, objects etc – that an actor can exploit in order to affect the behaviour of another. So, linkage is a bridge between power resources and impacts – meaning affecting or changing the behaviour of another party. By putting linkage and power together, we created a new term – “linkage power”, referring to a power based on linkages. The EU, the US, China or any other power can all be such labelled, though these actors may diverge in power resources, linkage strategies and the variables affecting linkage effectiveness. When applying such an analytical framework to the EU, we gave particular attention to the implications of the EU’s sui generis nature on its linkage power.

Our case study is the EU’s trade relations with China (1975-2008), which were punctuated by two critical historical junctures – the Tian’anmen Square Incident in 1989 and the EU-China Textile Crisis in 2005. In 1975, The EEC’s successful strategy by linking political issues (Europe-China balancing the Soviet Union and recognising China’s sovereignty over Taiwan) with economic issues (signing the EEC-China Trade Agreement) played a crucial role in securing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EEC and China. Different types of linkages were then applied to the EEC’s negotiations with Beijing on the 1978 Trade Agreement and the 1979 textile agreement, which effectively prompted the Chinese side to agree to the EU’s terms.

Immediately after the 1989 Tian’anmen Square Incident, the EC imposed economic sanctions with an aim of coercing China to accept Western world’s human rights conditions. This linkage did not last long or pay off due to divergent political and economic interests among the Member States and the EC’s institutional handicaps (foreign policy competence was largely in the hands of Member States, collective foreign policy action was non-binding), and soon de-linked.

Having realised that confrontational approach did not work well, the EC/EU and its Member States started to change their China policies in 1993-95. The period of 1993-2004 witnessed the EC/EU’s power through partnership. The strategic partnership was seen as a complex of different pairs of issue linkages, ranging from political-strategic issues to economic and human rights issues. The partnership, once established, had fostered new linkages and consolidated old ones. China’s WTO accession was seen as a once-in-a-century opportunity for the EU to exercise linkage through conditionality, so as to extract market access concessions from the Chinese side. Moreover, by linking with China could the European Commission garnered international support for advancing the Galileo project within the Union and ward off some of the US pressure in 2003.

The Year 2005 was singled out since an unprecedented trade row on textiles broke out, confronting the EU against China’s export prowess resulting from globalisation and China’s WTO accession. Linkages were used as a predominant strategy to help the EU to persuade and press the Chinese side firstly accept voluntary export restrictions and then share the burden of allowing the blocked textiles in European ports to be released. In 2006-08, the trade deficit problem emerged, coupled with a series political spats between Europe (France and Germany) and Beijing on the Tibet issue. As the EU-China honeymoon was over, the Commission toughened its approach towards China. Although linkage was again used to redress the trade deficit, its effects were not satisfactory, as the EU power resources were eroded.

Our conclusions are (1) linkage is a crucial modus operandi in the EU’s internal bargain and its external relations with China; (2) Linkage was generally effective vis-à-vis China, but with variations, either over time or across different linkage types; (3) The EU is a sui generis linkage power, resulting from its institutional characteristics and heterogeneity of interests among the Commission and Member States. We find that the EU’s increased institutionalisation (both regional and bilateral) and competences generally facilitated its use of linkage strategies. The EU’s sui generis structure and its internal interest divergences have mixed implications on its linkage effectiveness. On one hand, the EU’s linkage power was weakened accordingly. But on the other, the Commission could tactically make use of some Member State government’s row with Beijing and advance its own economic agenda (such as the EU-China High-level Economic and Trade Dialogue, HED). Moreover, our research also confirmed Andrew Moravcsik’s argument that issue linkage is more easily made within an issue-area than across issue-areas. But we differ from him on the reason behind that. We find that this was largely attributable to the EU’s pillar structure and competence divisions.

The theoretical contributions include: (1) Linkage power provides a distinctive prism to look into the EU’s concrete strategies in internal bargains, and external commercial negotiations. Linkage serves as a crucial strategy for the EU to handle its relations with a far-abroad country like China, including establishing diplomatic relations, negotiating trade deals, forging strategic partnerships and holding high-level dialogue. (2) Giving some insights to the EU’s actorness. We find that the EU, though institutionally not a unitary actor, was somehow able to present its power to the extent like a sovereign state on some occasions using linkage strategies. (3) Contributing to the understanding of the EU’s means to spread its governance model. We find that the EU’s norm-setting goals have often been achieved through non-normative ways – such as interest exchange and trade-off, and other deliberate ways of persuasion and even coercion, mainly based on linkage. (4) Shedding light on the interactions between the Commission and the Member State governments and on the Commission’s autonomy in external trade relations.

Two future directions of research have been identified: (1) comparative studies: the EU’s linkage practices vis-à-vis the US, Russia and middle powers, or other actors’ linkage strategies vis-à-vis China; (2) post-Lisbon linkage strategies used by the EU.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009.
Europe and Africa share a long history that is characterized both by oppression and development. The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is a particularly important aspect of EU development cooperation policy. The developmental history between the EU and Africa started with the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, which were replaced by the Lomé Convention. Unfortunately, the favourable terms and preferential access for the ACP countries to Europe failed and the Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000. As a result of a WTO-waiver, the discriminatory non-reciprocal trade preferences, which were previously enjoyed under the Lomé Convention, continued until December 2007. The Cotonou Agreement points out that these trade preferences will be replaced by joint WTOcompatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). During the EPA negotiations, the EU preferred to negotiate on a regional basis instead of negotiating with the ACP as a whole or with individual countries. Consequently, Sub-Saharan Africa formed two negotiation groups; the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA group and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA group, represented by the five Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, together with Mozambique and Angola. Although Southern Africa is the region that leads the continent; from an economic perspective, the Southern African states show considerable disparities. Due to the economic differences between South Africa and the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), the interests of the individual SACU countries are diverse and often contradictory, which resulted in complicated EPA negotiations. However, maintaining a favourable long-term trading relationship with the EU is of great importance to the economic and political well-being of the SADC, since the EU is the main trading partner of most African countries. By December 2007, an interim EPA (IEPA) was initialled by the BLNS countries as a result of the pressure to fall back to the unfavourable Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Due to the bilateral Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) that is in force between South Africa and the EU, South Africa was not negatively influenced by the expiry of the WTO-waiver. The EPA will have a negative impact on regional integration within SADC and will promote distinction within the regional economic communities. Duty free, quota free access was offered to the BLNS countries, but the EU did not extend this offer to South Africa because of the developmental status of the country and the pre-existing TDCA. Consequently, South Africa will be required to export at higher prices and will experience increased competition within the region. The downside of the removal of import tariffs for the BLNS countries is that government revenues will decrease, which might result in income losses and will accentuate poverty. The standstill-clause of the IEPA prevents the SACU countries from diversifying economically and from developing new industries. The Most- Favoured Nation clause primarily impacts negatively on South Africa, since it prevents South Africa from negotiating freely with other countries such as Brazil and China. Furthermore, the strict intellectual property rules of the IEPA undermine access to knowledge and hereby fail to support innovation. The content of a chapter on liberalization of services, that will be included in the full EPA, is still being negotiated. Liberalization of services might lead to more foreign investments in the BLNS countries, as a result of which the quality of services will increase, leading to better education, infrastructure and more job opportunities. However, foreign companies will gain power at the expense of African governments and companies. South Africa is the main supplier of services in the BLNS countries and will therefore be confronted with economic losses when the services sector is liberalized. From an economic nationalist perspective, the EU included numerous provisions in the IEPA that were not necessary for WTO compatibility. However, the EU is aware of the importance of trade agreements for the BLNS countries and found itself in the position to do so to fulfil its own interests. By making use of the expiry date of the WTO waiver; the IEPA was initialled by the BLNS countries within a relatively short period of time. South Africa, in its own national interests, opposed the provisions of the IEPA, which has led to the negotiations deadlock. Because of the economic power and negotiating tactics of the EU and the selfinterested attitude of South Africa in this respect, regional integration is undermined and the poorest countries are once again the worst off. Although Economic Partnership Agreements have to be established, the partnership-pillar is, in my opinion, hard to find.

Partant du constat de la constitution de la promotion de la démocratie comme enjeu des relations internationales et de politique étrangère, la présente recherche s’interroge sur les politiques menées en la matière par l’Union européenne dans le cadre des relations avec ses voisins méditerranéens, particulièrement le Maroc et la Tunisie. L’analyse se concentre sur l’Instrument européen pour la démocratie et les droits de l’homme, sur la période 2007-2012.

L’objectif est de comprendre et d’expliquer les pratiques des différents groupes d’acteurs impliqués dans ces politiques, au sein de la Commission (DG Relex/SEAE, DG Devco, délégations) et du Parlement (sous-commission DROI).

La position défendue est la suivante :les pratiques européennes de promotion de la démocratie au Maroc et en Tunisie sont fonction de l’identité des groupes institutionnels qui les mettent en œuvre. Pour chaque groupe institutionnel, peuvent être mis en évidence des normes, intérêts et ressources qui contribuent à défendre et renforcer l’identité institutionnelle. Dès lors, des pratiques qui peuvent paraître incohérentes au premier abord (pourquoi agir au Maroc et pas en Tunisie ?pourquoi créer l’IEDDH et, parallèlement, évincer l’objectif de promotion de la démocratie de la coopération bilatérale avec la Tunisie ?) prennent tout leur sens lorsqu’on parvient à restituer la fonction sociale qu’elles assurent.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 1999.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis deals with the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between the European Union and the Republic of South Africa, which was concluded in October 1999. In particular, the agreement is analysed in the light of the negotiating process between the parties, the contents of the agreement, the applicability of WTO law and the compatibility of the agreement with it and the Port and Sherry Agreement. Since the EU emphasised its aim to commence economic and development cooperation with other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on a reciprocal basis during the negotiations for a successor of the Lomé Convention, the TDCA between the EU and South Africa had to be seen as a "pilot project" for future cooperation agreements between countries at different levels of development. The TDCA between the EU and South Africa is therefore not only very important for the two concerned parties, but could serve as an example for further negotiations between the EU and other ACP countries. Thus the purpose of this thesis is to examine the TDCA between the EU and South Africa from a wider global perspective. The thesis is divided into six Chapters: The first Chapter provides an introduction to the circumstances under which the negotiations between the EU and South Africa commenced. It deals briefly with the economic situation in South Africa during the apartheid era and presents reasons why the parties wanted to enter into bilateral negotiations. The introductory part furthermore presents an overview of the contents of the thesis. The second chapter contains a detailed description of the negotiating process that took place between the parties and shows why it took 43 months and 21 rounds of negotiations to reach a deal. South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention and the conclusion of separate agreements such as the Wine and Spirits Agreement, are also analysed. Chapter three presents the various components of the TOCA and illustrates what the negotiators achieved. This chapter on the TOCA concludes with an evaluation of the Agreement and shows the potential benefits to South Africa and the EU. Since the Agreement had to satisfy international rules, the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and TradelWorld Trade Organisation (GATTIWTO) were of major importance. The EC Treaty, however, does not contain any provision that indicates whether, or how, an international agreement like the GATTIWTO penetrates the Community legal order. In Chapter four, accordingly, questions are raised regarding the extent to which the bilateral agreement between South Africa and the EU was influenced by the GATTIWTO provisions and how these rules were incorporated into the agreement. Furthermore, since the parties agreed on the establishment of a free trade area, this chapter deals with the question of in how far the TOCA is in line with Article XXIV GATT. In addition to the GATT provisions, the TOCA is also affected by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Therefore Chapter five deals with TRIPs in connection with the TOCA. The use of the terms "Port" and "Sherry" as the major stumbling block to the conclusion of the TOCA is analysed more closely. The final part, namely Chapter six, provides a summary of the results of the investigation. Furthermore, a conclusion is provided with regard to the question of whether the TOeA can be seen as an example for further trade relations between the EU and other ACP countries.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis is gerig op die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms (TDGA) tussen die Europese Unie (EU) en die Republiek van Suid Afrika wat in Oktober 1999 gesluit is. Die ooreenkoms word veral in die lig van die onderhandelingsproses tussen die partye, die inhoud van die ooreenkoms, die toepaslikheid van Wêreldhandelsorganisasiereg en die versoenbaarheid daarvan met die ooreenkoms en die Port en Sjerrie-ooreenkoms ontleed. Aangesien die EU sy oogmerk van wederkerige ekonomiese en ontwikkelings-gerigte samewerking met ander lande in Afrika en die Karibiese en Stille Oseaan-Eilande gedurende die onderhandelings vir 'n opvolger van die Lomé Konvensie beklemtoon het, moes die ooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika as 'n "loodsprojek" vir toekomstige samewerkingsooreenkomste tussen lande wat op verskillende vlakke van onwikkeling is, gesien word. Die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika is dus nie net baie belangrik vir die betrokke partye nie, maar dit kan ook as 'n voorbeeld vir verdere onderhandelings tussen die EU en lande van Afrika en die Karibiese- en Stille Oseaan-Eilande dien. Die doel van dié tesis is om die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewekingsooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika vanuit 'n meer globale perspektief te beskou. Die tesis is in ses Hoofstukke ingedeel: Die eerste hoofstuk bied 'n inleiding tot die omstandighede waaronder die onderhandelings tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika begin het. Dit behandel die Suid- Afrikaanse ekonomiese situasie onder apartheid kortliks en toon hoekom die partye tweesydige onderhandelings wou aanknoop. Verder bied die inleidende deel 'n oorsig oor die inhoud van die tesis. Die tweede hoofstuk bevat 'n gedetailleerde beskrywing van die onderhandelingsproses wat tussen die partye plaasgevind het en toon aan waarom dit drie-en-veertig maande geduur het en een-en-twintig onderhandelingsrondtes gekos het om die saak te beklink. Suid-Afrika se gedeeltelike toetrede tot die Lomé Konvensie en die sluit van aparte ooreenkomste soos die Port- en Sjerrieooreenkoms word ook ontleed. Die daaropvolgende hoofstuk bespreek die verskillende komponente van die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms en toon wat die onderhandelaars bereik het. Hierdie hoofstuk oor die Ooreenkoms sluit af met 'n evaluering daarvan en dui die potensiële voordele van die Ooreenkoms vir Suid- Afrika en die EU aan. Aangesien die Ooreenkoms internasionale reëls moes tevrede stel, was die voorskrifte van die Algemene Ooreenkoms oor Tariewe en Handel (GATT) van uiterste belang. Die EG-verdrag bevat egter geen voorskrif wat aandui óf, of hoé, 'n internasionale ooreenkoms soos GATTNVTO die regsorde van die Europese Gemeenskap binnedring nie. Die vraag oor in hoeverre die tweesydige ooreenkoms tussen Suid-Afrika en die EU deur die GATTIWTO voorskrifte beïnvloed is, en oor hoe hierdie reëls in die ooreenkoms opgeneem is, word dus in Hoofstuk vier aangeraak. Aangesien die partye ooreengekom het om 'n vrye handeisarea tot stand te bring, behandel hierdie hoofstuk ook die vraag oor in hoeverre die TOGA met Artikel XXIV GATT strook. Tesame met die GATT-voorskrifte word die TOGA ook deur die Ooreenkoms ten opsigte van Handelsverwante Aspekte van Intellektuele Eiendomsreg (TRIPs) geraak. Hoofstuk vyf behandel daarom hierdie aspek ten opsigte van die TOGA. Die gebruik van die terme "Port" en "Sjerrie" as die vernaamste struikelblok tot die sluiting van die TOG-ooreenkoms word ook deegliker ontleed. Die laaste gedeelte, naamlik Hoofstuk ses, bied 'n opsomming van die resultate van die ondersoek. Verder word 'n gevolgtrekking voorsien ten opsigte van vraag of die TOGA as 'n voorbeeld vir verdere handelsverwantskappe tussen die EU en ander lande in Afrika en die Karibiese en Stille Oseaan-eilande beskou kan word.

The aim of the thesis is to further explore the relationship between economic integration and firm mobility and investment, both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective, with the objective of drawing conclusions on how government policy can be used to strengthen the positive impact of integration on investment, which is crucial in moving and maintaining countries at the forefront of the technology frontier and accelerating economic growth in a world of rapid technical change and high mobility of ideas, goods, services, capital and labor.

The first chapter aims to bring together the literature on economic integration, firm mobility and investment. It contains two sections: one dedicated to the literature on FDI and the second covering the literature on firm entry and exit, economic performance and economic and business regulation.

In the second chapter I examine the relationship between the Single Market and FDI both in an intra-EU context and from outside the EU. The empirical results show that the impact of the Single Market on FDI differs substantially from one country to another. This finding may be due to the functioning of institutions.

The third chapter studies the relationship between the level of external trade protection put into place by a Regional Integration Agreement(RIA)and the option of a firm from outside the RIA block to serve the RIA market through FDI rather than exports. I find that the level of external trade protection put in place by the RIA depends on the RIA country's capacity to benefit from FDI spillovers, the magnitude of set-up costs of building a plant in the RIA and on the amount of external trade protection erected by the country from outside the reigonal block with respect to the RIA.

The fourth chapter studies how the firm entry and exit process is affected by product market reforms and regulations and impact macroeconomic performance. The results show that an increase in deregulation will lead to a rise in firm entry and exit. This in turn will especially affect macroeconomic performance as measured by output growth and labor productivity growth. The analysis done at the sector level shows that results can differ substantially across industries, which implies that deregulation policies should be conducted at the sector level, rather than at the global macroeconomic level.
Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie
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This case-study establishes the influences of power-knowledge relationships on capacity-building for sustainability in the European Union Funded ‘Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme’ (EU Programme). It aims to capture the lessons learned for capacitybuilding to support nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast. The EU Programme aimed to achieve economic and social development of previously disadvantaged communities through nature-based tourism enterprises, and to develop capacity of local authorities and communities to support environmental management. The study discusses common trends in thematic categories emerging from the research data, and contextualises research findings in a broader development landscape. This study indicates that power-knowledge relations were reflected in the EU Programme’s development ideology by an exclusionary development approach, which lacked a participatory ethos. This exclusionary approach did not support an enabling environment for capacity-building. This development approach, guiding the programme conceptualization, design and implementation processes, resulted in a programme with unrealistic objectives, time-frames and resource allocations; a programme resisted by provincial and local government. The study provides a causal link between participation, programme relevance, programme ownership, commitment of stakeholders, effective management and capacity-building for sustainable programme implementation. The study argues that the underlying motivation for the exclusionary EU development ideology in the programme is driven by a risk management strategy. This approach allows the EU to hold power in the development process, whereas, an inclusionary participative development methodology would require a more in-depth negotiation with stakeholders, thereby requiring the EU to relinquish existing levels of power and control. This may increase the risk of an unexpected programme design outcome and associated exposure to financial risk. It may also have a significant financial effect on donor countries' consultancies and consultants currently driving the development industry. This study recommends an interactive-participative methodology for programme design and implementation, if an enabling environment for capacity-building is to be created. In addition, all programme stakeholders must share contractual accountability for programme outcomes. This requires a paradigm shift in the EU development ideology to an inclusionary methodology. However, this research suggests that the current EU development approach will not voluntarily change. I, therefore, argue that South Africa needs to develop a legislative framework that will guide donor-funded development programme methodology, to support an enabling environment for capacity-building.