Thèses sur le sujet « European Union countries – Foreign economic relations – Africa, North »

This research analyses development cooperation between the European Union (EU) and South Africa with the objective of determining which between the two entities, ultimately benefits more out of this arrangement The research goes beyond the altruistic reasons offered by the EU as the rationale for development cooperation to investigate whether South Africa's development is actually being promoted by this cooperation. Further, the research investigates whether there is also EU self-interest that informs this development cooperation. This research is conceptualised within the development aid debate framework. The research argues that this development cooperation is important to South Africa even though its impact is in real terms has not been extensive due to a number of factors. It further contends that there are EU political, security and economic interests amongst others that are being promoted by this development cooperation. The research concludes by asserting that this development cooperation promotes the mutual interests of the EU and South Africa. This conclusion challenges the paradigms of the debate on development aid which is premised in black and white terms of development aid promoting either donor or recipient interests.

On 10 May 1994 the European Union offeredSouth Africa a package of measures to ... send a strong political signal to the incoming govemment and to the South African population, thus proving its firm determination to support the transition towards democracy and its willingness to contribute to the reconstruction and economic development of South Africa after the elections. This package consisted of two parts: 1. A series of short term implementations to take place with immediate effect to help South Africa's development and transition, and 2. An offer to negotiate a comprehensive long-term relationship with South Africa should the new government so request. South Africa accepted the European Union's offer to negotiate a long-term relationship, and in response requested membership of the structure governing the Union's relations with the rest of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and some countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, namely the Lomé Convention. Due to various incompatibilities South Africa was not allowed to join this organisation. In its place the European Union offered to negotiate an agreement with South Africa that would lead to a Free Trade Area. This agreement was in keeping with the rules as laid down by the World Trade Organisation. It envisaged the lowering of tariffs and trade barriers between the Union and South Africa over a period not exceeding 12 years, allowing for asymmetry in terms of time constraints in implementation only. South Africa saw this type of agreement as inconsistent with the desire expressed by the European Union to support the countries development and the integration of the Southern African region. In its place South Africa proposed a new concept in trade agreement, this concept, known as the Trade and Development Agreement, embodied both trade liberalisation and support for development. This agreement would introduce a new paradigm of thought to govern trade between developed countries and developing countries within the World Trade Organisation's rules. This paper explores the events that unfolded in these negotiations. It attempts to discover whether, in the current global environment, it is possible, or beneficial, for the developed world to act in an altruistic manner towards another state in order to assist its development.

This thesis has attempted to provide an analysis of two legal instruments
the Cotonou Agreement and the AGOA. Specific attention was directed to these instruments impact on trade between the European Union and the United States, respectively, and beneficiary African countries.

The main purpose of this paper was to explore the role economic partnership agreements play in regional integration. The whole paper was premised on identifying the nature of economic partnership agreements that is conceived as a free trade arrangement. Therefore the paper discussed the feasibility of the reciprocal principle between the European Union and ACP countries, and further indicated that there is no need to implement the principle of reciprocity at present. The paper also discovered that, due to the fact that unequal trade relations between the EU and the ACP countries still exist, the implementation of the EPAs is most likely to generate the complementary but non-competitive trade relations between the EU and the ACP countries. Such a situation could result in the ACP countries over-independence on the EU's market. ACP countries are not expecting to such integration. In addition the paper ascertains that the EPAs themselves could contain the intrinsic negative impacts such as discrimination against the third countries on regional integration.

Overall the conclusions drawn about South Africa’s negotiating style and tactics were arrived at by analysing a number of reports (that closely followed the evolution of the negotiations) and then paralleling this case study’s findings with the conjectures made by the theoretical frameworks (i.e. works by Putnam, Zartmann and Churchmann) about how negotiations proceed. In the final analysis, the findings of this case are intended to provide insight for the south about how to approach any future trade negotiations with the North (or more specifically with the EU).

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2000.
The Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) will create competitive challenges, threats and opportunities, driving out less efficient performers while bolstering more efficient enterprises and industries. This is in line with the general principles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which promotes the reduction of trade barriers in order to liberate trade on a global basis. This dynamic process of adjustments will continue throughout the implementation of the European Union - South Africa Free Trade Agreement ( EU-SA FTA) which is the main component of the TDCA. The European Union (EU) has historically been Southern Africa's most important trading partner. The main reason why South Africa entered into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU was to enhance exports to South Africa's largest export market, attract higher levels of investment from the EU, and gradually expose the South African industry to competition to ensure that it is restructured to become globally competitive. Since 1910 South Africa has been part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which also comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BlNS). The EU-SA FTA will accordingly impact on trade relations between South Africa, the EU and the BLNS countries. Not only will SACU face increased competition from cheaper EU imports, but BLNS countries will also face reduced income from the common revenue pool. South Africa will have to remove a higher level of tariffs from a greater volume of imports than is the case for the EU. For the BLNS, the relative adjustment effort is even greater. The BLNS will have to adjust to the elimination of tariffs on 30% of goods currently imported from the EU, while the TDCA will bring about no improvement in their current terms of access to the EU market. The BLNS products currently exported to the EU which are most likely to be affected by the EU-SA FTA are: clothing (Lesotho), preserved fish and flowers (Namibia), and grapefruit, processed pineapples, corned fruit and grapes (Swaziland). These products are under threat from South African products which can, as a result of the FTA, be exported to the EU at reduced tariffs. BLNS products which could be affected as a result of cheaper EU imports are: grain (Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho), chicken production (Swaziland), sugar (Swaziland), beef (Namibia and Botswana), and the small wheat-farming sector in Namibia and Botswana. The EU-SA FTA is further likely to have a substantial impact on South Africa's exports to the EU. The total increase in exports as a result of the FTA is estimated between 1.3% and 1.4% of the 1996 value of South Africa's exports to the EU. The main drive will come from industrial products which are less protected than agricultural products. The South African government, further, concluded that the negative effects of the direct costs to SACU would be outweighed, in the long term, by the dynamic and geopolitical benefits of an FTA with the EU. The signal that the South African government has given with signing the TDCA with the EU indicates that the Southern African economy should restructure itself to become internationally competitive. This is the only way to survive in a global trade arena which is under WTO principles becoming increasïngly more liberated.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2001.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis examines the democratisation of South Africa's foreign trade policy, by evaluating the negotiations surrounding the establishment of a free trade area between South Africa and the European Union (EU). Democracy here is defined as a form of government that rests on three components namely, public participation in and public debate over policy formulation and a governing elite that is responsive to the needs of the majority of the population. The thesis firstly outlines the process of negotiation itself, looking at the developments that shaped the years of talks. It examines the nature of the final agreement, called the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA). It focuses on the Co-operation Agreements that were concluded, South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention and the details of the free trade agreement. It finds that although the negotiations took very long to complete and the EU proved to be a tough negotiator, there are a number of opportunities for South Africans in the TDCA. In the second section the internal process in developing a South African negotiating mandate is examined. This is done to conclude whether or not South Africa's foreign trade policy is being formulated in a democratic manner. However, first of all the question why the democratisation of foreign trade policy formulation is important is addressed. Two possible theories are advanced. Firstly, globalisation has forced countries to lure foreign direct investment (FDI) as a matter of urgency. Seeing as FDI is mostly tied up with western nations that prefer democracies, states are opting to democratise. The focus is to a large extent on satisfying international actors. Or alternatively, the very survival of the nascent democracy today depends on the consultative nature of domestic economic and international economic policy formulation. This is not a question of choice with an external focus, but rather a matter of urgency with purely an internal focus. Four actors in foreign policy formulation, namely parliament, government, the bureaucracy and civil society, are examined in order to understand whether they had access to the process and whether these institutions themselves have been democratised since 1994. The thesis finds that the process was to a large extent democratic in nature. However, the thesis also finds that no matter how democratic policy formulation is in South Africa, the options for policy are limited by a number of international elements. These include globalisation, regional trading blocs like the European Union, and international organisations like the World Trade Organisation.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die tesis evalueer die demokratisering van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse handelsbeleid deur die onderhandelingsproses tussen die Europese Unie (EU) en Suid-Afrika rakende die sluiting van 'n vryhandelsooreenkoms te ontleed. Demokrasie word in die tesis definieer as 'n tipe regering wat rus op drie komponente, naamlik deelname in en debat oor beleidsformulering en 'n regerende elite wat die behoeftes van die meerderheid van die burgers in ag neem in beleidsformulering. Eerstens omskryf die tesis die gebeure wat die onderhandelingsproses beïnvloed het. Die finale ooreenkoms word oorweeg teen die agtergrond van die samewerkingsooreenkomste wat tussen die partye gesluit is, Suid-Afrika se gedeeltelike deelname aan die Lomé Konfensie en die vryhandelsooreenkoms. Die gevolgtrekking word bereik dat ten spyte van die feit dat die onderhandelings oor 'n hele aantal jare gestek het, en alhoewel die EU 'n uitgeslape onderhandelaar was, die orreenkoms talle geleenthede vir Suid-Afrikaners skep. In die tweede instansie word die interne proses wat tot Suid-Afrika se onderhandelingsmandaat gelei het, ondersoek. Dit is gedoen om vas te stel of die beleid op 'n demokratiese manier geformuleer is. Daar word egter eers bepaal waarom die demokratisering van buitelandse handelsbeleid belangrik is. Twee moontlike teorie word geformuleer. Die eerste stel dit dat globalisering lande forseer om direkte buitelandse beleggings aan te lok. Siende dat buitelandse beleggings van westerlike state afkomstig is, wat verkies om met demokratiese state sake te doen, word ontwikkelende lande as te ware geforseer om veral hulle buitelandse beleidsformulering te demokratiseer. In die alternatief kan dit betoog word dat die voortbestaan van die demokrasie self afhang van 'n ekonomiese beleidsformulering wat beide binnelandse en internasionale prosesse insluit. Dit is nie 'n kwessie van keuse met 'n eksterne fokus nie, maar 'n noodsaaklikheid met 'n interne fokus. Vier groeperinge wat buitelandse beleidsformulering beïnvloed word ondersoek, naamlik die Parlament, the regering, die burokrasie en die burgerlike samelewing, om vas te stelof hierdie instansies toegang tot die proses gehad het en of hierdie instansies self sedert 1994 gedemokratiseer is. Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat al is die formulering van buitelandse beleid hoé demokraties, word die moontlikehede vir beleidsformulering beperk deur globalisering, streeksorganisasies soos die EU, en internasionale organisasies soos the Wêreld Handelsorganisasie. Vir Chris, Gitti, Thomas en my ouers, sonder wie hierdie nooit klaar sou gekom het nie. Baie dankie ook aan Prof Philip Nel vir sy hulp, leiding en ondersteuning.

Thesis (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As the Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) creates competitive challenges and opportunities, labour and capital will seek the highest returns, dri ving out less efficient performances while bolstering more efficient enterprises and industries. This dynamic process of adjustments will continue throughout the implementation of this agreement. The South African government sees the agreement with the European Union as a step towards restructuring the country's economy and making it part of the rapidly changing world economy. This policy view of the South African government will result in those sectors of the economy that are not internationally competitive, receiving no support from government. Consequently these sectors will decrease in time. Of the three agricultural profiles studied, fresh fruit (deciduous fruit) will benefit the most from the TDCA. The most obvious effect the agreement will have on the sector is the saving on customs duties payable on exports to the EU. An estimate on 1997 trade figures revealed that in the short term the deciduous fruit industry will save approximately RI00 million. Over the implementation period of 10 years, the industry will save about Rl billion. After that, savings amounting to approximately R125 million per annum should be possible. The canned fruit sector is an export-driven industry that exports about 90 per cent of its products, 50 per cent of which is exported to the EU. The export tariffs to the EU are very high. As non-EU member, South Africa is the biggest provider of canned fruit to the EU. Some analyses revealed that the total savings in tariffs for the first year of implementation will be R25 million. The industry stands to save approximately R100 million over the implementation period. At the EU's request, South Africa agreed to negotiate a separate Wine and Spirits Agreement. The EU believes that South Africa's continued use of certain "geographical indications" or terms is in breach of Article 23 of the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. The quotas granted by the EU on wine and sparkling wine cover 79 per cent of South African exports to the EU. South Africa granted the EU a 0.26 million litre quota for sparkling wine and a 1 million-litre quota for bottled wine. SA will phase out the use of the terms "port", "sherry", "grappa", ouzo", "korn" , "jagertee" and "pacharan" over agreed time periods. The issue will be taken to the WTO for a ruling in this regard. The EU has agreed to grant SA a duty-free tariff quota for wine but has suspended the tariff quota until the Wine and Spirits agreement has been signed. The EU will also provide financial assistance of 15 million ECU to help restructure the SA wine and spirits sector. The South African agricultural industry should take note of the constantly changing international marketing environment. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed with the European Union opens up new markets and enhances existing ones that must be exploited. It is imperative that every role player should evaluate the level of competitiveness of his or her enterprise. Thus the message is very clear: Agricultural production with an international trading view is the only sustainable road to follow.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Soos die Handel, Ontwikkelings en Samewerkingsooreenkoms kompeterende geleenthede en uitdagings skep, sal arbeid en kapitaal verskuif na die hoogste opbrengste beskikbaar. In hierdie proses sal daar wegbeweeg word van onvoldoende prestasies en sal effektiewe ondememings en industriee floreer. Hierdie dinarniese proses van herstruktuering sal voortduur regdeur die implementeringsperiode van hierdie handelsooreenkoms. Die Suid Afrikaanse regering beskou die ooreenkoms met die Europese Unie as 'n belangrike stap in die proses om die land se ekonomie te herstrukltureer en so deel te maak van die vinnig veranderende wereld ekonomie. Hierdie regerings beleid sal daartoe lei dat sektore wat nie intemasionaal mededingend is nie, geen ondersteuning vanaf die regering sal ontvang nie. Met tyd sal hierdie sektore verdwyn. Van die drie landbousektore wat bestudeer is, sal vars vrugte (sagte vrugte) die meeste voordeel trek uit die ooreenkoms. Die besparing van aksynsbelasting op die uitvoere na die Europese Unie is die mees kenmerkendste voordeel vir die sektor. 'n Beraming gebaseer op 1997 handels syfers toon 'n jaarlikse besparing van plus minus R100 miljoen. Deur die hele implementeringsperiode, sal die besparing plus minus Rl biljoen beloop. Na afloop van die implementeringsperiode, sal jaarlikse besparing van plus minus R125 miljoen moontlik wees. Die inmaak vrugte sektor is 'n uitvoer gedrewe industrie wat gemiddeld 90 persent van hul prod uk uitvoer. Van hierdie uitvoere is 50 persent bestem vir die Europese Unie. Die uitvoertariewe na die Europese Unie is baie hoog. As nie-lidland, is Suid Afrika die grootste verskaffer van geblikte vrugte aan die Europese Unie. Beramings voorsien dat die sektor 'n totale besparing vir die eerste jaar van implemetering van plus minus R25 miljoen kan beloop. Die industrie kan soveel as R100 rniljoen oor die implementeringsperiode bespaar. Op die Europese Unie se versoek, het Suid Afrika ingestem om 'n afsonderlike Wyn en Spiritualie ooreenkoms te onderhandel. Die Europese Unie beweer dat Suid Afrika se gebruik van sekere "geografiese aanduidings" of terme, In verbreking is van Artikel 23 van die Handelsverwante Aspekte van die Intellektuele Eiendomsregte Ooreenkoms. Wyn en vonkelwyn kwotas wat deur die Europese Unie aan Suid Afrika toegestaan is, beloop 79 persent van die uitvoere na die Europese Unie. Suid Afrika het die Europese Unie In kwota van 0.26 miljoen liter vir vonkelwyn en 1 miljoen kwota vir gebottelde wyn toegestaan. Voorts sal Suid Afrika die terme "port", "sherry", "grappa", "ouzo", "kom" , "jagertee" and "pacharan" met die ooreengekome peri odes uitfaseer. Die aspek sal egter na die WHO geneem word vir In finale beslissing. Die Europese Unie het ooreengekom om aan Suid Afrika In tarief vrye kwota vir wyn toe te staan, maar het dit opgehef tot tyd en wyl die Wyn en Spiritualie ooreenkoms onderteken is. Die Europese Unie sal ook finansiele ondersteuning van 15 miljoen ECU skenk om die Suid Afrikaanse Wyn en Spiritualiee industrie te help hestruktureer. Suid Afrikaanse Landbou sal notisie moet neem van die konstante verandering in die intemasionale bemarkingsomgewing. Die Vrye Handelsooreenkoms wat geteken is met die Europese Unie, open nuwe markte en sal bestaande markte bevorder. Hierdie geleenthede moet benut word. Dit is baie belangrik dat elke rolspeler sy vlak van kompeterende vermoe moet evalueer, om so sy eie siening oor die ooreenkoms te kan uitspreek. Hieruit is die boodskap dus baie duidelik: Landbou produksie met In intemasionale handels uitkyk, is die enigste volhoubare pad om te volg.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009.
Europe and Africa share a long history that is characterized both by oppression and development. The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is a particularly important aspect of EU development cooperation policy. The developmental history between the EU and Africa started with the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, which were replaced by the Lomé Convention. Unfortunately, the favourable terms and preferential access for the ACP countries to Europe failed and the Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000. As a result of a WTO-waiver, the discriminatory non-reciprocal trade preferences, which were previously enjoyed under the Lomé Convention, continued until December 2007. The Cotonou Agreement points out that these trade preferences will be replaced by joint WTOcompatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). During the EPA negotiations, the EU preferred to negotiate on a regional basis instead of negotiating with the ACP as a whole or with individual countries. Consequently, Sub-Saharan Africa formed two negotiation groups; the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA group and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA group, represented by the five Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, together with Mozambique and Angola. Although Southern Africa is the region that leads the continent; from an economic perspective, the Southern African states show considerable disparities. Due to the economic differences between South Africa and the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), the interests of the individual SACU countries are diverse and often contradictory, which resulted in complicated EPA negotiations. However, maintaining a favourable long-term trading relationship with the EU is of great importance to the economic and political well-being of the SADC, since the EU is the main trading partner of most African countries. By December 2007, an interim EPA (IEPA) was initialled by the BLNS countries as a result of the pressure to fall back to the unfavourable Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Due to the bilateral Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) that is in force between South Africa and the EU, South Africa was not negatively influenced by the expiry of the WTO-waiver. The EPA will have a negative impact on regional integration within SADC and will promote distinction within the regional economic communities. Duty free, quota free access was offered to the BLNS countries, but the EU did not extend this offer to South Africa because of the developmental status of the country and the pre-existing TDCA. Consequently, South Africa will be required to export at higher prices and will experience increased competition within the region. The downside of the removal of import tariffs for the BLNS countries is that government revenues will decrease, which might result in income losses and will accentuate poverty. The standstill-clause of the IEPA prevents the SACU countries from diversifying economically and from developing new industries. The Most- Favoured Nation clause primarily impacts negatively on South Africa, since it prevents South Africa from negotiating freely with other countries such as Brazil and China. Furthermore, the strict intellectual property rules of the IEPA undermine access to knowledge and hereby fail to support innovation. The content of a chapter on liberalization of services, that will be included in the full EPA, is still being negotiated. Liberalization of services might lead to more foreign investments in the BLNS countries, as a result of which the quality of services will increase, leading to better education, infrastructure and more job opportunities. However, foreign companies will gain power at the expense of African governments and companies. South Africa is the main supplier of services in the BLNS countries and will therefore be confronted with economic losses when the services sector is liberalized. From an economic nationalist perspective, the EU included numerous provisions in the IEPA that were not necessary for WTO compatibility. However, the EU is aware of the importance of trade agreements for the BLNS countries and found itself in the position to do so to fulfil its own interests. By making use of the expiry date of the WTO waiver; the IEPA was initialled by the BLNS countries within a relatively short period of time. South Africa, in its own national interests, opposed the provisions of the IEPA, which has led to the negotiations deadlock. Because of the economic power and negotiating tactics of the EU and the selfinterested attitude of South Africa in this respect, regional integration is undermined and the poorest countries are once again the worst off. Although Economic Partnership Agreements have to be established, the partnership-pillar is, in my opinion, hard to find.

Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 1999.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis deals with the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between the European Union and the Republic of South Africa, which was concluded in October 1999. In particular, the agreement is analysed in the light of the negotiating process between the parties, the contents of the agreement, the applicability of WTO law and the compatibility of the agreement with it and the Port and Sherry Agreement. Since the EU emphasised its aim to commence economic and development cooperation with other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on a reciprocal basis during the negotiations for a successor of the Lomé Convention, the TDCA between the EU and South Africa had to be seen as a "pilot project" for future cooperation agreements between countries at different levels of development. The TDCA between the EU and South Africa is therefore not only very important for the two concerned parties, but could serve as an example for further negotiations between the EU and other ACP countries. Thus the purpose of this thesis is to examine the TDCA between the EU and South Africa from a wider global perspective. The thesis is divided into six Chapters: The first Chapter provides an introduction to the circumstances under which the negotiations between the EU and South Africa commenced. It deals briefly with the economic situation in South Africa during the apartheid era and presents reasons why the parties wanted to enter into bilateral negotiations. The introductory part furthermore presents an overview of the contents of the thesis. The second chapter contains a detailed description of the negotiating process that took place between the parties and shows why it took 43 months and 21 rounds of negotiations to reach a deal. South Africa's partial accession to the Lomé Convention and the conclusion of separate agreements such as the Wine and Spirits Agreement, are also analysed. Chapter three presents the various components of the TOCA and illustrates what the negotiators achieved. This chapter on the TOCA concludes with an evaluation of the Agreement and shows the potential benefits to South Africa and the EU. Since the Agreement had to satisfy international rules, the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and TradelWorld Trade Organisation (GATTIWTO) were of major importance. The EC Treaty, however, does not contain any provision that indicates whether, or how, an international agreement like the GATTIWTO penetrates the Community legal order. In Chapter four, accordingly, questions are raised regarding the extent to which the bilateral agreement between South Africa and the EU was influenced by the GATTIWTO provisions and how these rules were incorporated into the agreement. Furthermore, since the parties agreed on the establishment of a free trade area, this chapter deals with the question of in how far the TOCA is in line with Article XXIV GATT. In addition to the GATT provisions, the TOCA is also affected by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). Therefore Chapter five deals with TRIPs in connection with the TOCA. The use of the terms "Port" and "Sherry" as the major stumbling block to the conclusion of the TOCA is analysed more closely. The final part, namely Chapter six, provides a summary of the results of the investigation. Furthermore, a conclusion is provided with regard to the question of whether the TOeA can be seen as an example for further trade relations between the EU and other ACP countries.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis is gerig op die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms (TDGA) tussen die Europese Unie (EU) en die Republiek van Suid Afrika wat in Oktober 1999 gesluit is. Die ooreenkoms word veral in die lig van die onderhandelingsproses tussen die partye, die inhoud van die ooreenkoms, die toepaslikheid van Wêreldhandelsorganisasiereg en die versoenbaarheid daarvan met die ooreenkoms en die Port en Sjerrie-ooreenkoms ontleed. Aangesien die EU sy oogmerk van wederkerige ekonomiese en ontwikkelings-gerigte samewerking met ander lande in Afrika en die Karibiese en Stille Oseaan-Eilande gedurende die onderhandelings vir 'n opvolger van die Lomé Konvensie beklemtoon het, moes die ooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika as 'n "loodsprojek" vir toekomstige samewerkingsooreenkomste tussen lande wat op verskillende vlakke van onwikkeling is, gesien word. Die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika is dus nie net baie belangrik vir die betrokke partye nie, maar dit kan ook as 'n voorbeeld vir verdere onderhandelings tussen die EU en lande van Afrika en die Karibiese- en Stille Oseaan-Eilande dien. Die doel van dié tesis is om die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewekingsooreenkoms tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika vanuit 'n meer globale perspektief te beskou. Die tesis is in ses Hoofstukke ingedeel: Die eerste hoofstuk bied 'n inleiding tot die omstandighede waaronder die onderhandelings tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika begin het. Dit behandel die Suid- Afrikaanse ekonomiese situasie onder apartheid kortliks en toon hoekom die partye tweesydige onderhandelings wou aanknoop. Verder bied die inleidende deel 'n oorsig oor die inhoud van die tesis. Die tweede hoofstuk bevat 'n gedetailleerde beskrywing van die onderhandelingsproses wat tussen die partye plaasgevind het en toon aan waarom dit drie-en-veertig maande geduur het en een-en-twintig onderhandelingsrondtes gekos het om die saak te beklink. Suid-Afrika se gedeeltelike toetrede tot die Lomé Konvensie en die sluit van aparte ooreenkomste soos die Port- en Sjerrieooreenkoms word ook ontleed. Die daaropvolgende hoofstuk bespreek die verskillende komponente van die Handels-, Ontwikkelings- en Samewerkingsooreenkoms en toon wat die onderhandelaars bereik het. Hierdie hoofstuk oor die Ooreenkoms sluit af met 'n evaluering daarvan en dui die potensiële voordele van die Ooreenkoms vir Suid- Afrika en die EU aan. Aangesien die Ooreenkoms internasionale reëls moes tevrede stel, was die voorskrifte van die Algemene Ooreenkoms oor Tariewe en Handel (GATT) van uiterste belang. Die EG-verdrag bevat egter geen voorskrif wat aandui óf, of hoé, 'n internasionale ooreenkoms soos GATTNVTO die regsorde van die Europese Gemeenskap binnedring nie. Die vraag oor in hoeverre die tweesydige ooreenkoms tussen Suid-Afrika en die EU deur die GATTIWTO voorskrifte beïnvloed is, en oor hoe hierdie reëls in die ooreenkoms opgeneem is, word dus in Hoofstuk vier aangeraak. Aangesien die partye ooreengekom het om 'n vrye handeisarea tot stand te bring, behandel hierdie hoofstuk ook die vraag oor in hoeverre die TOGA met Artikel XXIV GATT strook. Tesame met die GATT-voorskrifte word die TOGA ook deur die Ooreenkoms ten opsigte van Handelsverwante Aspekte van Intellektuele Eiendomsreg (TRIPs) geraak. Hoofstuk vyf behandel daarom hierdie aspek ten opsigte van die TOGA. Die gebruik van die terme "Port" en "Sjerrie" as die vernaamste struikelblok tot die sluiting van die TOG-ooreenkoms word ook deegliker ontleed. Die laaste gedeelte, naamlik Hoofstuk ses, bied 'n opsomming van die resultate van die ondersoek. Verder word 'n gevolgtrekking voorsien ten opsigte van vraag of die TOGA as 'n voorbeeld vir verdere handelsverwantskappe tussen die EU en ander lande in Afrika en die Karibiese en Stille Oseaan-eilande beskou kan word.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In October 1999 South Africa and the European Union (EU) signed a free trade agreement, the Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA), which came into effect on 1 January 2000. The TDCA was developed to enhance bilateral trade, economic-, political- and social cooperation and consists of three components - the creation of a Free Trade Area between South-Africa and the EU, EU financial aid to South Africa through the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD), and project aid. However, the EU, in an effort to secure the best possible deal for itself, often behave in its own interests (through the manipulation of the Wine and Spirits Agreement) during the negotiations for the TDCA. The goal of this study was to establish what exactly trademarks are, and what implications the EU's protection of intellectual property rights on wine and spirits trademarks will have on i) the South African wine industry, ii) whether South Africa could have exercised another option, iii) whether this action has created a precedent with which the EU can, in future, again force South Africa or any of its other developing trade partners to make concessions, and iv) who gains the most from the TDCA. The concludes that the EU, through the manipulation of the Wine and Spirits Agreement, left South Africa with no choice by to concede the use of the contested trademarks - something that has already taken its toll on the South African wine industry - in order to save the TDCA. This action created a precedent that the EU will, in future, again be in a position to threaten developing countries with the termination of an agreement should they fail to comply with its demands. Finally, the conclusion is made that even though the TDCA was created to assist South Africa with its reintegration into the world market, it will ultimately be the EU that benefits most from the agreement.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Suid-Afrika en die Europese Unie (EU) het in Oktober 1999 In vryehandelsooreenkoms, die Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) onderteken, wat op 1 Januarie 2000 in werking getree het. Die TDCA is ontwerp om bilaterale handel-, ekonomiese-, politieke- en sosiale samewerking te bevorder en bestaan uit drie komponente, naamlik die skep van 'n vryehandelgebied tussen die EU en Suid-Afrika; finansiele steun deur die EU aan Suid-Afrika onder die European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) en projekhulp. Die EU het egter dikwels in eiebelang opgetree (deur middel van die manipulasie van die Wyn- en Spiritus Ooreenkoms) tydens die onderhandelingsproses in 'n poging om die beste moontlike ooreenkoms vir homself te beding. Die doel van hierdie studie was om te bepaal wat presies handelsmerke is, en watter implikasies die EU se beskerming van intellektuele eiendomsregte aangaande wyn- en spiritushandelsmerke op i) die Suid-Afrikaanse wynbedryf sal he, ii) of Suid-Afrika 'n ander opsie kon uitoefen, iii) of hierdie aksie In presedent geskep het waarmee die EU Suid-Afrika of enige van sy ander ontwikkelende handelsvennote in die toekoms weer sal kan dwing om toegewings te maak, en iv) wie die meeste baat vind by die TDCA. Die studie het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die EU deur die manipulasie van die Wyn- en Spiritus Ooreenkoms aan Suid-Afrika geen keuse gegee het nie as om die gebruik van die betwiste handelsmerke op te se - iets wat reeds die Suid-Afrikaanse wynbedryf geknou het - in 'n poging om die TDCA te behou. Hierdie optrede skep 'n presedent dat die EU voortaan in onderhandelings met ander ontwikkelende state weer kan dreig om die hele ooreenkoms te verongeluk indien daar nie aan sy eise voldoen word nie. In die laaste instansie is daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat, alhoewel die TDCA daarop gemik was om Suid-Afrika te help met sy herintegrasie tot die wereldmark, dit uiteindelik die EU is wat die meeste daarby gaan baat.

This case-study establishes the influences of power-knowledge relationships on capacity-building for sustainability in the European Union Funded ‘Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Pilot Programme’ (EU Programme). It aims to capture the lessons learned for capacitybuilding to support nature-based tourism initiatives on the Wild Coast. The EU Programme aimed to achieve economic and social development of previously disadvantaged communities through nature-based tourism enterprises, and to develop capacity of local authorities and communities to support environmental management. The study discusses common trends in thematic categories emerging from the research data, and contextualises research findings in a broader development landscape. This study indicates that power-knowledge relations were reflected in the EU Programme’s development ideology by an exclusionary development approach, which lacked a participatory ethos. This exclusionary approach did not support an enabling environment for capacity-building. This development approach, guiding the programme conceptualization, design and implementation processes, resulted in a programme with unrealistic objectives, time-frames and resource allocations; a programme resisted by provincial and local government. The study provides a causal link between participation, programme relevance, programme ownership, commitment of stakeholders, effective management and capacity-building for sustainable programme implementation. The study argues that the underlying motivation for the exclusionary EU development ideology in the programme is driven by a risk management strategy. This approach allows the EU to hold power in the development process, whereas, an inclusionary participative development methodology would require a more in-depth negotiation with stakeholders, thereby requiring the EU to relinquish existing levels of power and control. This may increase the risk of an unexpected programme design outcome and associated exposure to financial risk. It may also have a significant financial effect on donor countries' consultancies and consultants currently driving the development industry. This study recommends an interactive-participative methodology for programme design and implementation, if an enabling environment for capacity-building is to be created. In addition, all programme stakeholders must share contractual accountability for programme outcomes. This requires a paradigm shift in the EU development ideology to an inclusionary methodology. However, this research suggests that the current EU development approach will not voluntarily change. I, therefore, argue that South Africa needs to develop a legislative framework that will guide donor-funded development programme methodology, to support an enabling environment for capacity-building.

Defence date: 21 January 1993
Examining Board: Prof. Roberto Barsotti (Università di Firenze) ; Renaud Dehousse (European University Institute, supervisor) ; Prof. Francis Snyder (European University Institute) ; Prof. Antonio Tizzano (Università di Roma) ; Prof. Joseph H.H. Weiler (Harward Law School)
First made available online: 2 August 2016

Defence date: 12 June 2014
Examining Board: Professor Pascal Vennesson, S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (previously European University Institute), Supervisor Professor Ulrich Krotz, European University Institute Professor Stephan Klingebiel, German Development Institute Professor Ann Fitz-Gerald, Cranfield University.
In recent years, international donors have steadily increased their focus on fragile states, defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as “those failing to provide basic services to poor people because they are unwilling or unable to do so”. An indication of this shift is the nature of the policies promoted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, which encourages bilateral donors that work with fragile states to adopt a whole-of-government approach, i.e. to develop cross-departmental cooperation between defence, diplomacy and development administrations. The question as to why some bilateral donors implement such integrated approaches to confront challenges in fragile states, while others only do so marginally or not at all still remains. Neither the existing literatures on security or development cultures nor the current securitization theories are able to explain the different levels and patterns of implementation of these specific OECD/DAC recommendations. In this thesis, I use the concept of “the organization of hypocrisy” to understand the complex relationship, and often the discrepancy, that exists between “talk” and “action” in the policy attempts to link security and development. Donor organizations are routinely confronted with the security and development demands of various actors. They need to act to produce results, and include such activities as contributing to UN peacekeeping missions to increase the country in question’s chances for development, or deciding who should be the beneficiaries of aid without fostering conflict. Producing these desired outcomes is not always possible however. Consequently, donor organizations “talk” about coherence, but are unable to “act” coherently and therefore to adapt their strategies and their policies. I compare France, Germany, the UK and the EU as donors – in particular in their roles in North and South Sudan, but also in selected West African countries – in an attempt to understand which factors favour a higher level of “action” with regard to the security-development nexus. I argue that bureaucracies cannot be studied in isolation from their complex and often inconsistent environment. The ability of the diplomacy, defence and development sectors to integrate their administrations and policies depends on the consistency of their environment and on their institutional ability to collectively find an acceptable convention that is capable of balancing development, diplomacy and defence norms. Protecting the normative aims of development policy is the key to achieving a higher level of integration in some OECD/DAC donor countries as well as to cultivating the formation of synergies between security and development policies.

M.Comm.
This study will quantify the economic impact of the FTA negotiated between SA and the EU. Two simulations are undertaken. The first simulation focus on the bi-lateral elimination of import tariffs between SA and the EU on non-agricultural products (industrial products). The second simulation considers the bi-lateral elimination of import tariffs on non-agricultural and agricultural products between SA and the EU. The quantitative analysis can only handle a limited number of arguments of the FTA. Notably, financial assistance, development, and social and cultural co-operation are examples of issues that will not be dealt with in a quantitative manner in this study. The goal of this study is to undertake an empirical analysis of the free trade agreement (FTA) between South Africa (SA) and the European Union (EU) using an applied equilibrium model.

This study analysed the intricacies of trade flows imbibed in the EU-SA TDCA. It assessed the trade creation and trade diversion effects of this bilateral trade agreement – using the top 10 selected commodity exports. This follows the report on the Harmonised System (HS) at the 2-digit codes. A Gravity Model Approach on bilateral trade flows is grounded on panel data models for the period 2000-2017 between South Africa as exporter country and the twenty EU countries (EU-20) as importer country-block out of the twenty-eight countries (EU-28). The study reports that the EU-SA TDCA enhanced significant trade expansion and trade creation effects. Mixed results for GDPs and GDPPKs for both South Africa and the EU countries were reported, but the overall results showed that the bilateral agreement do affect South African commodity exports more negatively, albeit with few positive effects from the EU countries in particular. Besides, ICTSA does have a negative effect on commodity exports, while the South African REER has the positive effect on export models. Lastly, the distance as a proxy of transportation costs negatively affects South Africa’s exports, while common colonial relationship and English as common official language have both a positive effect on exports. The findings imply that trade policies should focus on adequate telecommunication tools, alongside fair trade practices allowing South Africa to integrate with the global market, promote economic growth as well as enhance competitive advantage in most sectoral trades.
Business Management
M. Com. (Business Management (International Business and Finance))