Articles de revues sur le sujet « Europe, Western – Foreign relations – Yugoslavia »

Traditionally the phenomenon of the European integration towards South East Europe is regarded starting from the XXI century. The explanation for such a periodization are resolution of the open conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and implementation of the complex EU strategy for the region. Starting point of the majority of researches is the year of 2003 when the EU Agenda for the Western Balkans was started in Thessaloniki. The topic of EEC-Yugoslavia relations, SFRY having been first socialist country to institutionalize its trade and economic relations with Brussels, are unfairly ignored in domestic and foreign scientific literature. It is regarded solely as a chronological period of trade agreements. Nevertheless, this issue is of fundamental importance for understanding the current neighborhood of the European Union. The main thesis the author proves is that in the 1960s and 1980s as it is the case nowadays, the main imperative of Brussels' policy towards the Balkans was to prevent Moscow from increasing its influence. This led to the formation of a very specific format of relations with Belgrade and was one of the reasons why the economic crisis in Yugoslavia became extreme and its economy irreformable. In addition, at a later and structurally much more complicated stage of relations between the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the European Union the specificity and main components of relations of the Cold War period did not fundamentally change. As for the policy of so-called containment of the external actors one could see that besides Moscow, we can speak about similar attitude of the EU towards China. It makes it possible to consider the EU policy towards the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the paradigm of neoclassical realism, rather than in the paradigm of traditional liberal European integration approaches which allows us to unite neorealists elements with the specifics of internal processes, including the modernization of institutes, relations between society and state, types of political leadership.

The article reflects on the issue of the foreign policy strategy of modern Russia in the Balkans region. One of the most significant aspects of this problem is the difference in views between Russia and the West. Authors show how different interpretations of the events in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s predetermined the sense of mutual suspicion and mistrust which spread to other regions such as the post-Soviet space. Exploring differences between the Russian and the Western (Euro-Atlantic) views on the current matters, authors draw attention to fundamental differences in terminology: while the Western narrative promotes more narrow geographical and political definitions (such as the Western Balkan Six), traditional Russian experts are more inclined to wider or integral definitions such as “the Balkans” and “Central and Southeast Europe”. Meanwhile none of these terms are applicable for analysis of the current trends such as the growing transit role of the Balkans region and its embedding in the European regional security architecture. Therefore, a new definition is needed to overcome the differences in vision and better understand significant recent developments in the region. Conceptualizing major foreign policy events in Central and Southeast Europe during the last three decades (the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s), authors demonstrate the significance of differences in tools and methods between the Soviet Union and the modern Russia. Permanent need for adaptation to changing political and security context led to inconsistence in Russian Balkan policy in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Russia was able to preserve an integral vision of the region and even to elaborate new transregional constructive projects, which in right political circumstances may promote stability and become beneficial for both Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.

At the request of the editorial board of the journal Slavic World in the Third Millennium, the eldest researcher of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Leonid Ianovich Gibianskii (born 1936), recounts his life. Leonid Ianovich graduated from the Department of Southern and Western Slavs of the History Faculty of Moscow State University in 1960 and began working at the Institute in 1966, when he commenced a graduate course there. He is the prominent specialist in the history of Yugoslavia and in the problems of international relations in contemporary Central and South-Eastern Europe. The principal lines of his investigations included the history of Yugoslavia during and after World War II, the history of the formation of communist regimes in Central and South-Eastern Europe, the organization of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the study of foreign relations and the politics of the great powers in the region in the 1940s and 50s. Leonid Ianovich was one of the first Russian historians to elaborate the problem of the formation of the Soviet bloc, the history of the Cominform, and the conflict between Stalin and Tito using archive materials which became accessible to researchers from the end of 1980s. Gibianski is the author of several hundred academic works, which have been published in many countries all over the world, as well as the organiser of and a participant in a number of international projects and conferences on the Cold War. Leonid Ianovich describes his childhood, his studies at the Department of Southern and Western Slavs of the History Faculty of Moscow State University, and his work at the Institute of Slavic Studies.

The article analyses the content of doctrinal documents on the development of post-socialist states in a special sub-region in Southeast Europe – the post-Yugoslav space. The author examines the concepts of foreign policy, national security and defence. Based on the consideration of internal political development of the post-Yugoslav states separately, the evolution of relations between them within the special subregion and the process of international relations in general, three stages can be distinguished in the development of relations between Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Euro-Atlantic and European structures: 1991–1999, 1999–2014 and from 2014 to the present. During these years, a new national-state agenda was formed in each of the aforementioned countries, which at different stages reflected national versions of liberalism, conservatism, social democracy, which resonated in doctrinal documents – strategies for national security, foreign policy and defense. After constitutions were adopted in the 1990 s, and the first versions of doctrinal documents aimed at NATO and EU accession in the 2000 s, the post-Yugoslav states joined NATO and to a lesser extent the EU in 2000–2013.Thus, the intra-regional configuration of the Western Balkans has gradually changed and will probably continue to change, the conceptual vision of the worldview, political-ideological and practical dimensions in these countries has been transformed and will continue to be transformed – namely, the attitude to Europeanisation, to overcoming conflicts and conflictogenic factors. The aforementioned strategic documents make it possible to answer the question of the essence, forms and methods of foreign policy of post-Yugoslav states in the situation in the region, Europe and the world after February 24, 2022.

In contrast to the previous optimistic forecasts of the ruling elite in the late USSR and in the new Russia about how our country's relations with the West will develop positively after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist system in Eastern Europe, Russia's successful entry into the Western community; after the triumphalist sentiments in the West itself regarding the "collapse of communism", the after the victory in the cold war and the role of Russia, which has lost its role as a superpower, subordinate to the interests of the Western community, the real reality of international relations turned out to be completely different. At the turn of the century, as a result of NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia, the approach of troops and weapons of this bloc to our borders, open support in the West for separatist movements and wars on the territory of the Russian Federation, the process of disillusionment with previous illusions began. It sharply intensified after Vladimir Putin's Munich speech in 2007, Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and especially the conflict in Ukraine and the reunification of Crimea, which actually led to the beginning of a new cold war. Gradually, the ruling elites of Russia and the West began to realize that the decisive reason for the former "cold war" of 1946-1989 was not so much the notorious "communism" in the USSR and in Eastern European countries, but above all the fundamental civilizational and geopolitical differences between the West and Russia, dating back centuries, stable Russophobic sentiments of public opinion in the West. As the experience of history and modernity shows, Russia's successful domestic and international position is possible only if it preserves and strengthens the status of a great Eurasian power based on a sovereign domestic and foreign policy, a successful socio-economic course approved by the people and a wise state ideology.

The article deals with the European aspects of the US foreign policy in the 2nd half of the 20th century. It also includes studies of the transatlantic relations of the described period and the exploration of an American influence on European integration processes. It is determined that the United States has demonstrated itself as a partner of the Western governments in the post-war reconstruction and further creation of an area of US security and prosperity. At the same time, it is noted that the American presidents have differently shaped their administrations’ policies towards Europe. The greatest supporter of the European integration processes was President Eisenhower. Among other things, the US President believed that Europe would become a key ally of the United States, thus, he considered the union of Sweden, Greece, Spain and Yugoslavia as a solid foundation for building a “United States of Europe”. After Eisenhower administration, European affairs, to a lesser extent, were taken up by such Presidents as Johnson, Carter, Reagan and Clinton. Showing no personal interest, Kennedy, Nixon and Bush-Sr. were forced to support the transatlantic dialogue, understanding the inevitability of European integration and the need for the United States to cooperate with the new consolidated actor. The United States aimed to strengthen its position in the European space, moving to that purpose by using NATO mechanisms and applying the policies of American protectionism against the communist threat. The main competitor of the United States for strengthening national positions in Europe was France led by General de Gaulle, who believed that the affairs of Europe should be resolved by European governments without the American intervention. However, NATO continued to serve as a springboard for the U.S. involvement in European affairs. At the end of the 20th century, through the close links between the EU and NATO, the USA received new allies from Central and Eastern European countries. It is concluded that after the end of World War II, Europe needed an assistance that the United States willingly provided in exchange for the ability to participate in European issues, solving and partly controlling the integration processes. The study found that, despite the varying degree of the American interest in transatlantic affairs, Europe has consistently been remaining a zone of national interest for the United States.

Recognition of regional features, outlining of the contours of regions, tendency to regionalize ethnic, economic, cultural and state-administrative space, and strengthening the ideology of regionalism in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, appear as a practical and political but also as a theoretical problem which includes and combines several scientific disciplines. The phenomenon of regionalism is not contradictory although it is primarily expressed through the numerous conflicts of interests rivalry and antagonisms of political subjects. The problematic side of the phenomenon of regionalism includes the result of an extremely negative and existentially tragic experience of the several years-long disintegration of the complex Yugoslav state. During the partition and disintegration of the second Yugoslavia, there also happened the disintegration of the Serbian ethnic area Growth, support and instigation of regional tendencies occurred in the historical circumstances of secession and did not stop in the post-secession period. Particularization and segmentation of political area, as well as the disintegration of the former state, did not occur in accordance with the norms of internal and international law. Legality was late and was achieved within the transformation of power reflected in the changed territorial policy of the dominant alliance of great powers. The entire past decade was characterized by an extraordinary metamorphosis of political space. Secession trend had the territorial features which included the change of borders and had been long in the focus of the global geopolitical attention. Territories were divided and made smaller. Intensive territorial dynamics within the external silhouette of the de-stated SFR of Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of several state and quasi-state political formations. Former republics became semi-sovereign states. Dispersed and displaced Serbian ethnos was configured in the three territories: in the Republic of Serbia - from which Kosovo and Metohia were amputated and placed under the UN protectorate - in the entire Republic of Montenegro and in the Republic Srpska, located in one part of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demopolitical result of the geopolitical destruction of the Serbian ethnos was a great movement of the Serbian population from the west to the east, and its concentration in the territory of the Republic of Serbia this implied that the Serbs were expelled from their millennia-long abodes in Croatia, parts of Bosnia and from Kosmet. The geo-economic result of the same process was the devastation of the national economic strength west of the Drina and in the southern province. Economic regression occurred also in the national parent-land state. Balkan re-arrangement of the spheres of interest in the post-bipolar period was in 1995. fixed by the interest arrangement of the great powers known under the name Dayton Peace Agreement. Redistribution of the territories from the destroyed state occurred in the post-communist period with the expansion of west-civilization structures to the European east Westernization of the eastern part of Europe, or entire Europe as the other pole of the global West, could be characterized as a dual mega-regionality. Namely, the west is composed of Europe and America; on the other side, there is the global East or its hybrid variation Eurasia. With the disappearance of their common state and its framework, south Slavs found themselves in the seemingly independent, and actually client states. Western delimitation of the south Slavic area moved from the Yugoslav borders towards a wider Balkan demarcation. One could say that the revitalized notion of the Balkans became a new, in many aspects obligatory framework for regional thinking. The Balkan macroregion is further determined by the intentions to expand the European Union. One of the Euro-centric concepts, which is being experimentally employed precisely in the Balkans, is the establishment of the so-called Europe of regions in the peripheral areas. On the other hand, even though the process of the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation appears to be irreversible, the superordinate Euro-American factor does not give up the possibility of the mezzo-regional initiatives, cooperations, associations and integrations. This "middle" level of dealing with the specificities of the Yugoslav region is related to the states and nations from the former Yugoslavia, or the so-called West Balkans. Naturally, it is not the tendency to revive the silhouette of the previous state, but certainly there is a noticeable intention to achieve a regional linking of the related, now semi-sovereign territories which sometimes belonged to the same state framework. The fourth level deals with microregionalism, that is the relation between the different areas in the newly-created states. It is interesting that the regionalist discourse is mostly cherished exactly in the ethno-heterogeneous Serbian area, although other Yugoslav states also have or had regional tradition and mixed population, like, for example, Slovenia and Croatia Nevertheless, these former Yugo-republics are structured as mono-national states, so the regional policy and ideology of regionalism are still not in the first plane. Regionalism within the newly-formed states could be supplemented with the micron level implying specific sub-regionalism of the highest degree, within the larger regions in the same state. This could be illustrated with Backa, Banat and Srem inside Vojvodina, understood as the northern Serbian region, or Kosovo and Metohia in the south of Serbia, in the province with the same name. In the part of Serbia outside the provinces, similar things could be said for Belgrade with its surroundings, Macva, Podrinje, Sumadija, Raska District etc. Thus, when it comes to the present FR of Yugoslavia, all five levels of regional dynamics have a principled, but insufficiently studied significance. Mega-regional level is related to the mark denoting the global belonging to the West. Macroregional level deals with the European loyalty, that is inclusion of the FR of Yugoslavia into the continental European trends. This trans-continental and continental direction of inclusion implies a historical teleology of the relative eastern belonging to the absolute West, that is Euro-America, and the entrance into the full structure of the European Union. All the mentioned problems of recognition and characterization of the regional phenomenology in the political topography of the world are motivated by the tendency to achieve as clear as possible spatial-temporal national and state orientation The direction is related to the so-called safety dilemma of the nation and the country faced with the change of size and essence of one's own state, with the different geopolitical position and redefined foreign-policy priorities. It is also the case of the changed alliance policy, and the innovated strategy of integration into the old and new global and regional political structures. On the basis of the indicated components of geopolitical context, one could say that the phenomenon of regions and their cognate correlates {regionally regionalization and regionalism) should not be understood exclusively through the legal categories of international law and the so-called constitutional solutions, that is administrative division of the state territory. Actually in the analysis of regions and regionalism in Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia it is necessary first to discuss the pre-normative or meta-le-gal factors in the creation of the regional issue within the national and state issue, which have the form of the unsolved political problem. Meta-legality is located within the domain of the international relations and geopolitic. Meta-legal or pre-normative factors of the formation or recognition of regions and regionalisms deal with the possibility of the political constitution of the Serbian, that is Serbian / Montenegrin (still Yugoslav) society. Since the unique state area was destroyed in the four-year secession wars and there occurred significant demopolitical changes, war migrations, forceful displacements and expulsion of the population - the ethnic character of many areas was also drastically changed. At the same time, the post-secession existence of the FR of Yugoslavia could be also viewed through the optics of the state residuum. The remaining Serbia or Serbia (temporarily) without Kosovo is certainly not an equivalent for the Serbian ethnic space, nor for the entire Serbian lands. It is not even the FR of Yugoslavia, as a dual con federation of the Serbian / Montenegrin nation. Geopolitical reduction of the SFR of Yugoslavia to a residual creation of the FR of Yugoslavia was not deduced from the legality sui generis, but resulted from a conflict, the defeat of integralism and the victory of separatism, as well as from a new triumphal configuration of power. The impulse implying the statism of the collective rights from the former complex federal necessarily-multinational level was transferred to a lower mononational level. Therefore, the regionalist ideology in the post-secession reality of the residual state almost inevitably, as a tendency, nears the separatory particularism. Even the lost national state and the state entirety are openly denied within the requests for the territorization of the collective rights of various minorities. Naturally these requests do not carry the primary features of the development of democracy. On the contrary, in the majority of cases this implies the rise of parish and tribal consciousness prone to narrow-minded separation. Thus the post-secession requests for the regionalization are often just a slight rhetorical mask for real separatism. For example, they are expressed through the pseudo-national separation of Vojvodina from Serbia, as well as Montenegro from Serbia, or through the establishment of state-like entities in the territorial tissue of Serbia Alleged arguments are found in the unfinished disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia on the one hand, and in the prevention of the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia, even within the diminished Serbia That way, even in the post-secession, reduced Serbia one could easily recognize the tendencies of federalization and confederalization, even the amputation of its remaining state space. Additional arguments for the crawling secession and prolonged territorial destruction are found in the ideology of globalization and world trends of relativizing territorial integrity and state sovereignty. On the other hand, the idea about the principled insignificance of borders in Europe without borders, as well as Europe of regions, is emphasized. Thus, it is obvious that the new state and regional delimitations and demarcations are in contradiction with the vision of the trans-statal and trans-national integrity of the European continent. In Serbia itself, me problem of the restructuring of regions is determined by the inherited and unchanged triple division of its territory into the central part and two autonomous provinces in the north and south. Thus every idea for regionalization (expert, party, leader's, NGO and the like) faces the inherited, too narrow constitutional framework and easily slides to the federalization or confederalization of the Republic, and in extreme cases to the independence and sovereignty of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities. Roughly put, the tendencies for territorial separation from the Republic of Serbia still exist in several neuralgic and unstable areas or regions. In Vojvodina, the presented tendencies have the character of a meaningless internal - Serbian autonomy, autonomism, latent separatism. Authentic Serbian autonomy lost its original character long ago and deteriorated into an internal national re-statism. On the other hand, in the furthest south of Serbia, in Kosmet, the UN protectorate is established, but the region is actually occupied and thus the status of the Province is "frozen". In the three municipalities in the south of Serbia, with the relative Albanian majority, Albanian separatism smolders within the platform of the so-called east Kosovo. In the Raska region (Sandzak) there are also strong tendencies for separateness on the religious-ecclesiastical, so-called Bosniac platform, with religious solidarity, and ethnic and territorial unity of all Bosniacs. In the meta-legal or pre-normative situation - which most often denotes political and geopolitical context implying interests, power and force - the inclinations for territorial design are faced with the conflicting ideology of regionalism. Therefore, the constitutional-legal solutions of the former, present and future regions, generated within the self-created legality which does not respect meta-legal, political and geopolitical impulses regardless of how aestheticized and "humanized" they may be - at the end face the practical impossibility of realization.

With the end of the Cold War, many observers expected that international conflict would be less likely to occur and easier to manage. Given the successful resolution of the Gulf War and the European Community's (EC) efforts to develop a common foreign policy, observers expected international cooperation to manage the few conflicts that might break out. Instead, the disintegration of Yugoslavia contradicted these expectations. Rather than developing a common foreign policy, European states were divided over how to deal with Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Germany pushed for relatively quick recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, whereas other members of the EC wanted to go slower. Some observers expected Russia to fall in line with the West because of its need for investment and trade, but instead it supported Serbia. It is puzzling that Europe failed to cooperate regardless of whether greater international cooperation could have managed this conflict. How can we make sense of the international relations of Yugoslavia's demise? Since secession is not a new phenomenon, we should study previous secessionist conflicts to determine if they share certain dynamics, and we should consider applying to Yugoslavia the arguments developed to understand such conflicts.

The Balkan crisis is the result of a series of conflicts in various areas of political, economic and social life in the former Yugoslavia. Relations between the former republics show the complex character of European security. Without a sustainable development of the whole region, it is impossible to guarantee security throughout the European continent. Europe was shaken by the bloody events that marked the break-up of Yugoslavia. No one could have imagined that such violent military clashes could take place in a European country, 50 years after the end of World War II, and that hundreds of thousands of people would seek refuge throughout Europe. It was clear from the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia that the war would continue for many years and if the international community did not intervene the result would be many casualties. The United Nations, the European Union and the OSCE tried to prevent military conflicts between the nations of the former Yugoslavia, but they failed. National elites pursued a policy aimed at creating nation-states and had outside support from influential forces. To achieve this goal they were willing to pay any price. The collapse of the former Yugoslavia, in fact, meant the end of the process that had defined the development of Western Europe since the beginning of the 20th century, in the time between the two world wars. It was the beginning of nation-states. The Balkans had lagged behind in its transformation for many reasons and unlike Western and Central Europe, the Balkan states found themselves in a different wave of historical development, accompanied by conflict and chaos. The collapse of socialism had an impact on this situation, causing new economic and political conflicts. From this point of view, all the efforts of the European and international communities, aimed at controlling the situation after the break-up of Yugoslavia, had no chance of success.

The purpose of this article is to identify the principal security challenges in South Eastern Europe. The mix of challenges has changed radically since the end of the Cold War and the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in favour of non-military threats. The era of wars of religion, ideology and redrawing of state borders in the Western Balkans seems to be over. The tranquillity in the region, imposed from the outside has been buttressed by two international protectorates. The suppression of armed violence did not add up to long-term stability as the underbrush of nationalism, in- tolerance and inter-communal hatred still survives in the Balkans. The potential for interethnic conflicts and for further fragmentation in the former Yugoslavia has not yet been fully exhausted in spite of much improved interstate relations. Prominent among the non-military threats to security are organized crime, corruption, natural and ecological disasters, climate change and weak energy security. The inclusion of the entire South Eastern Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures offers the best promise. There are thus good reasons for moderately optimistic expectation that the South Eastern Europe will eventually become a region of democracy, prosperity and stability.

The current relations of the Republic of Serbia with the People?s Republic of China (hereinafter: Serbia and China) are conditioned by many political, economic, legal and social factors. The mentioned factors point to the existence of asymmetry in many aspects which, however, is not an issue that implies that the two parties can not develop good and friendly relations. In the historical and international legal sense, the relations of the two countries are characterized by the continuity of diplomatic relations established on January 2, 1955, between the then Federal People's Republic Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China. Serbia as the successor state of SFR Yugoslavia continues to treat China as one of its most important partners in international relations, which is manifested through the foreign policy course, according to which China is one of the main ?pillars? of Serbia's foreign policy alongside the European Union, Russia and the United States. The mere reference to the main ?pillars? in Serbia's foreign policy orientation indicates that China is a key player in world politics and a great power with which Serbia needs to build relations of a ?comprehensive strategic partnership?. It is not surprising, therefore, that the deepening of the Serbian-Chinese relations on a bilateral and multilateral level (especially within the UN, regional international organizations and political forums such as the 16 + 1 mechanism between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) contributed to better strategic positioning of Serbia in modern international relations.

Yugoslavia was destroyed through the concerted effort of domestic forces of the seceding republics and foreign factors, embodied by the entirety of the Western world. Although the USA undoubtedly supported the West, in the early stages of the process, they favored the preservation of Yugoslavia. The country with the leading role in the destruction of Yugoslavia was Germany. The causes of the disappearance of Yugoslavia from the political map of Europe and the world were numerous: economic, social, political, geopolitical, etc. In this article we focus on the military component, that is, the role of the Yugoslav People's Army in the destruction process. We consider various factors which brought to the situation in which the YPA proved itself utterly unsuccessful and ineffective in defending itself from destruction from the inside. We also look at the opportunities with which the YPA was presented, which it failed to seize. These choices lead the country and its citizens into a bloody civil war with countless victims and great destruction. The YPA itself was finally pilloried for its ultimately disastrous attempts to protect the state from aggressive forces within.

Due to turbulent circumstances and controversial heritage in regard to the breakup of ex-Yugoslavia, regional position of Serbia is, within academic as well as the wider public, most often observed in the context of its relations with the ?new? neighbors - the states that have emerged from the breakup of the former common country. This is in part because of constant tensions in the relations with ex-Yugoslav states, but also due to the political agenda of Western actors, which sets the framework for regional integration processes through the concept of ?Western Balkans?. Foreign policy relations of Serbia with its ?old? neighbors (most notably, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, given that Albania has a distinct status as a de facto interested party in the dispute regarding the status of Kosovo and Metohija), nonetheless, remain at least just as important element of Serbia?s regional position. It is the author?s intention to point towards determinants of the foreign policy of Serbia, as factors that work, or are visible, through relations with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. This will be observed in the context of bilateral and multilateral, formal and informal foreign policy connections and relations. The conclusion, in the form of a recommendation, is that international political dynamics in the ?Western Balkans? should not completely avert research attention away from Serbian relations with its non-Yugoslav neighbors.

Immediately after the end of the Second World War in 1945, most observers expected that under the pressure of thousands of displaced persons in Western Europe, traditional migration streams between Europe, on the one side, and the countries of North and South America and Oceania, on the other, would be revived. But soon this proved to be a misconception: not only were most of the refugees, but also a considerable part of the working population of southern Europe (mainly from Italy) and Algeria were absorbed by the rapidly expanding labour markets of the countries of North-Western Europe. When during the late Fiftees, the reconstruction period of the European countries came to an end, at first, France, Belgium and Switzerland, and later, the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria experienced rapid economic growth which was accompanied by a depletion of their traditional sources of the labour force. With the intention of stabilizing their economic expansion, the industrial countries of Europe sought to open up new supplies in the European periphery. As a consequence, labour-recruitment contracts were concluded, during the Sixties, between the North-Western European countries and the Mediterranean ones (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the countries of the Maghreb) to induce the inflow of foreign labour Migrant workers were, at that time the most important growth factor in the industrialized countries of continental Europe.

If European union means anything, it means having a common foreign policy that amounts to more than expressions of pious platitudes. Europe cannot expect anyone to take it seriously if it leaves the United States to defend its interests in the Middle East. ( Independent, 3 August 1990)

The paper considers the period of the formation of political structures and the establishment of foreign policy aims of the new state, the Russian Federation, in early 1992. The author attempts to reveal the role of the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation Andrey Koziryev in the creation of the fates of Russia and Yugoslavia, what were the most prominent features of his diplomatic career and what factors guided his choices regarding certain questions that concerned the Balkans. His main task was to reform in more than just words the old Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to build the model for peacetime Russian diplomacy. Yeltsin naively believed that Koziryev would be able to demonstrate to all that Russia is a guarantor of peace in various regions, amongst others Yugoslavia, as he was a dynamic individual with a modern outlook. Koziryev suited Europe and the United States of America as he was "their man" in the Kremlin, he had a good reputation, granted the wishes of Western partners, and reduced the dangers of an unpredictable Russia. Koziryev was widely supported because he was always ready to cooperate and to fulfil all manner of requests and orders. As such he was desperately needed by the West.

Bilateral relations between the Republic of Turkey and the individual successor states of former Yugoslavia differ, after thirty years since its dissolution, in form and in substance. While just after the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Turkey managed to establish and sustain cordial ties with such countries as, for instance, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, relations with Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro) remained tense and the two countries perceived themselves, in the best case, as traditional opponents. The basic aim of this paper is to analyse the bilateral relations of these two states and Turkish foreign policy towards Serbia, a country currently perceived as a ‘neighbour,’ despite the fact that they do not share common border. The paper argues that rapprochement of two countries, so clearly visible in several dimensions after 2002, marks a new phase in Turkey’s general foreign policy. The paper will trace the thirty-year evolution of bilateral contacts while arguing that the current positive relations have their source also in the domestic arena, both of Turkey and Serbia, which is willing to increase influence in the Western Balkans and institutionalise her international position. Thus, the two states for the first time share similar foreign policy goals. The whole analysis is theoretically anchored in the behavioural approach of the ‘middle power‘ paradigm. An author-applied qualitative content analysis is the main research technique. The main sources are official documents, selected monographs, academic articles, and analytical reports.

This article considers a development and peculiar properties of relations of the Republic of Croatia with European Union countries from the moment of this state’s international recognition on 15 January 1992 to the first Croatian president Franjo Tudjman’s death on 10 December 1999. The main attention is paid to those Western European countries, that played the most significant role in dealing with the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia and that had the most crucial place in Zagreb’s foreign policy during the first decade of Croatian independence: Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden and Vatican (however, the two last are not EU members). The attitude of these countries towards Croatia’s diplomatic goals during 1990ies and the dynamics of their relations with Croatian government, that weren’t constant, are analyzed in this article. The special attention is focused on the reasons of firm German and Austrian support for Croatia at the very beginning of its independence and their significant humanitarian aid for Croats during the war. From the other hand, there are explained reasons of skeptical and cold French and British position on Croatian question and the role of the history in Italian-Croatian relations after 1990. And, of course, Croatian problems and real obstacles in relations with Western European countries and with prospective of European integration during the presidency of Franjo Tudjman (that were really pessimistic) are also considered in this article. The newest researches of Croatian and other foreign authors on Croatian foreign policy in 1990ies were used for preparing this small research, as well as materials of foreign media, mostly Western and Croatian.

Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 288 pp., $35.00, ISBN 0-8133-2096-8. Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 230 pp., $17.95, ISBN 0-271-01958-1. Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 246 pp., $40, ISBN 0-271-01629-9. Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Monographs, 1996), 436 pp., £35.00, ISBN 0-19-829200-7. Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise, trans. Sabrina Petra Ramet (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 279 pp., £16.99, ISBN 0-415-18596-3. Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans, 2nd edn (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 2000), 243 pp., £42.50, ISBN 0-312-23084-2. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 354 pp., $30.00, ISBN 0-8133-2559-5. Richard H. Ullman, ed., The World and Yugoslavia's Wars (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 230 pp., $18.95, ISBN 0-87609-191-5. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 536 pp., $16.95, ISBN 0-8157-9513-0.

This paper addresses the question of world order by considering how Western military actions in Yugoslavia were perceived from a different cultural perspective. It traces how the NATO-led bombing campaign during March–June of 1999 affected various visions of world order that had existed in Russia before the campaign and describes the discursive change this campaign produced. The argument is made that Russia's foreign policy elites, from Westernizers to Neo-Communists and Expansionists, perceived Western goals in Yugoslavia differently from their counterparts in the West. However, they differed in their recommendations regarding Russia's response and lessons to be drawn from the Kosovo crisis. The paper also identifies several points where the different perspectives can converge. More specifically, all Russian schools of thought viewed the NATO campaign as a dangerous precedent potentially destabilizing the existing world order. They also shared the conviction that Russia should play a larger role in world affairs and that without Russia's involvement there could be no peace and stability in the Balkans and in Europe. They point to the United Nations as the only forum for debating the legitimacy of military interventions and for preventing interventions carried out without the approval of the UN.

Georgia’s European identity, often regarded as the basis of its pro-Western foreign policy, has been contested in the domestic arena by alternative agendas. While government changes are usually deemed instigators of change in this contestation, no systematic analysis has been conducted on the effect of external developments. Considering that Georgia’s relations with the West and Russia have been evolving and that the debates on European identity inherently relate to foreign policy, this article asks to what extent and how contestation within the European identity discourse changes in response to different external events. To elucidate these questions, the study unpacks European identity discourse in Georgia between 2012 and 2017 in the context of various ongoing foreign policy developments. These include developments in Georgia–European Union (EU) and Georgia–Russia relations, the war in Ukraine, and internal issues of the EU. Moreover, instead of common pro- and anti-European binary positions, identity discourse is analyzed as a combination of three identity categories via media in which each category constructs different degrees of difference with Europe. This article finds that advocates of each category interpret different foreign policy developments to reinforce, rather than challenge, their positions; thus, contestation and division in the discourse persist over time.

In the 1940s and 1950s, Western governments turned to radio as the most effective means of countering the Soviet information monopoly. U.S. and West European radio stations attempted to provide listeners with the kind of programs they might expect from their own radio stations if the latter were free of censorship. For most of these listeners in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the broadcasts were their only contact with the outside world. The importance of the foreign radio programs was confirmed not only by audience estimates, but also by the considerable efforts the Communist regimes made to jam the transmissions. Given the importance of foreign broadcasting for the political life of the Soviet bloc, it is remarkable that these broadcasts have received scant scholarly attention in the Western countries that sponsored them. The three books reviewed here help to fill that gap.

Western experts claim that the end of the Warsaw Pact and the artificial stability it provided, together with what are routinely called “traditional ethnic animosities,” are the causes of continual and inevitable clashes between states in East Central Europe. This area, a triangle formed by the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas, covers the Western border area of the former Soviet Union, and all of Poland, ex-Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, ex-Czechoslovakia and the eastern territories of Germany. This issue of Nationalities Papers is dedicated to the Hungarian ethnic minorities of East Central Europe, in part to examine the validity of the “traditional ethnic animosity” thesis. Spread among seven states, roughly three and a half to four million souls, they constitute the largest diaspora in Europe, and, in relative terms, are more numerous in states around Hungary than the ethnic Russians outside of the Russian Federation on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Abstract The paper analyzes the European Community/ European Union experience in the Western Balkans in the period from 1990 onwards in different context in order to assess different mechanisms which the European Union has gained with building the Common Foreign and Security Policy and within the Enlargement Policy in the process of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Additionally, the paper makes an assessment of the EU’s involvement in the conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the Balkans after the Stabilization and Association Process was launched in 1999. The authors argue that in the case of the military conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, when the European Community was confronted with serious and hard security issues at the very beginning of creating its Common Foreign and Security Policy and in a period of time when the region was not part of the enlargement process, the Community and the Union afterwards proved to be extremely ineffective. In the second part, through three case studies, the paper demonstrate that with the combined use of CFSP mechanisms and SAP, positive examples of the EU acting as a provider of peaceful dispute settlement in the Western Balkans have been established.

The decay of Yugoslavia since 1990 has put an end to the experiment of a state of Southern Slavs. At the same time it has destroyed the myth of a peaceful and strong Western Europe. The continent that had displayed an impressive performance of cooperation and skillful diplomatic maneuvering during the last years of the Cold War proved to be incapable of coping with the problems in its southeastern backyard. In the beginning of the conflict, the European Community assumed responsibility for negotiating cease-fires and a peace settlement for the embattled Yugoslav states. But all efforts were fruitless. In 1995, it was primarily the interference of the United States that brought about the peace treaty of Dayton for Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The article addresses the process of European integration of 5 Western Balkan states: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. After the demise of the socialism system and the collapse of Yugoslavia, all countries in the region began to more or less associate their future with the participation in the European integration project. The philosophy of "Yugoslavism" was replaced by the idea of European integration. However, achieving this goal was not easy. The region is a complex (from the perspective of ethno-confessional and territorial conflicts) space where the political and economic interests of large non-regional players intersect. These factors predetermined the varying degree of success of the Western Balkan states on their way to the EU. The article analyzes the political and economic factors affecting this process. The subject of the analysis is the evolution of the socio-economic models of the Western Balkan states, their foreign economic ties, participation in the international movement of capital, labor, as well as economic ties with Russia.

AbstractThe constitutional rules that govern how states engage with international law have profound implications for foreign affairs, yet we lack comprehensive data on the choices countries make and their motivations. We draw on an original dataset that covers 108 countries over a nearly two-hundred-year period to map countries’ foreign relations law choices and trace their evolution. We find that legal origins and colonial legacies continue to account for most foreign relations law choices. A small number of models emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe, subsequently spread through colonial channels, and usually survived decolonization. Departures from received models are rare and usually associated with major political shifts. Prominent political science accounts that emphasize how states design their foreign relations law strategically to enhance their international credibility or entrench democracy or human rights appear to have limited explanatory power over the bulk of foreign relations law today.

Zogu has resolutely defended the freedom and independence of his country. Zogu consolidated diplomatic relations with neighboring countries and the political strategy followed by him brought not only economic stability, but also protection of the territory. Seen from that prespective, the purpose of this paper is to show that the policy pursued by King Zog, influenced the establishment of peace in the country and protected the entire Balkans by not further complicating the situation and neutralizing the greedy interests and intentions of Yugoslavia for the territory of Albania, especially St. Naum. In 1924 King Zog had also a possed Yugoslavia’s intervention and intrigues. Throughout his policy, he aimed to achieve Balkan’s peace, because Zogu understanding very well that this would bring peace to Albania as well. The foreign policy led by Zog, deprived neighboring countries of any wishing conflicts. Thus the peace in Europe would have been in jeopardy as a result of threatening Balkans’s peace. Received: 7 July 2021 / Accepted: 30 August 2021 / Published: 5 September 2021

Josip Tito first met a leading British statesman, in August 1944, when he had discussions in Naples with Winston Churchill about the future of the Yugoslav resistance movements.1 After the war however the Yugoslav communist leader did not meet another leading statesman from the West until September 1952. The visitor on that occasion was Churchill's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Between the two dates there had been remarkable changes in Anglo-Yugoslav relations. In the years 1944–1948, as the world slipped towards Cold War, the British aid given to Tito's guerillas in wartime seemed to have been wasted; Yugoslavia apparently became firmly rooted in the Soviet bloc. Many now argue that Churchill ought to have supported other Yugoslav resistance groups who were supporters of the Yugoslav monarchy and, presumably, more pro-western. British support for Tito during the war, however, had logical force: Tito was popular with his countrymen and able to unite them, a capable leader who knew how to use the geography of his country against its enemies, and a man who was ultimately able to liberate Yugoslavia without large-scale Soviet assistance.2 And, in 1948, to the surprise of many in the West he proved that he was no mere Russian puppet either. He opposed attempts from Moscow to extend its influence over Yugoslav government and politics and, in June, was expelled by Stalin from the Soviet-led ‘Cominform’ Faced by economic blockade from the East, Tito turned increasingly to the West for support. In November 1951 he took a major step by accepting American military aid. As yet there were limits to his western commitment: he was still a communist, on poor terms with some of his western neighbours (especially Italy), and determined, whilst accepting western aid, to keep his distance from both power blocs. But it seemed that he could be won over securely to the West in the long-term. Recently released British files on the Eden visit reveal much about the state of Tito's relationship with the West at this time.

In the Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAS the panel discussion session "European Dialogues" took place. The subject of the meeting was "Russia and the West: When Did the Ways Diverge?" The journal presents the reports of А.B. Zubov, Dr. Sci. (History), Professor of MGIMO-University (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and N.I. Basovskaya, Dr. Sci. (History), Professor of Russian State University for the Humanities, as well as the discussion that took place. In this discussion the IMEMO staff members participated: A.G. Arbatov, Academician of RAS; V.G. Baranovskii, Academician of RAS; G.I. Machavariani; S.V. Utkin, Cand. Sci. (Political Science), as well as O.Yu. Potemkina, cand. Sci. (History), Institute of Europe RAS, and H.-W. Steinfeld, representative of Norwegian radio and television (NRK). The meeting was conducted by V.G. Baranovskii, Deputy Director of IMEMO, Academician of RAS and N.K. Arbatova, Head of Department in IMEMO, Dr. Sci. (Political Science).

Using extensive material from Russian archives, this article analyzes the problem of the Soviet leadership’s perception of the domestic and foreign policy of Yugoslavia during the years of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict that arose in 1948. The article shows how relations developed between the two countries in the first post-war years, and what requirements were made of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in the Kremlin: loyalty to Marxist theory, the idea of internationalism, and comprehensive support for the slogan of unity of all countries of “people’s democracy” led by the USSR. The article examines the process of gradual orientation towards the priority of national interests that the CPY leadership undertook and the subsequent reaction of Moscow, which accused the CPY of revisionism and nationalism. The nature of the contradictions between the two communist parties is investigated in the context of the geopolitical strategy of the USSR at that time and the regional policy of Yugoslavia. The refusal of Tito and his associates to admit the Kremlin’s accusations laid the foundation for the search for their own “authentic” model of socialism, based on “true” Marxist theory, free from the distortions of Stalinism, which was defined in Belgrade as state-bureaucratic capitalism. The gradual formation and evolution of the Yugoslav model, reforms in the economy and social sphere, and the introduction of workers’ self-government, which took place in the early 1950s, became the object of close attention and total criticism from the Soviet leadership. Moscow closely followed the foreign policy of Yugoslavia, whose main priority at that time was to preserve the country’s independence by any means. The rapprochement of Yugoslavia with the United States and other Western countries caused particular concern and irritation to the Kremlin, which believed that this would help strengthen NATO in the region and weaken the position of the Soviet bloc.

Western Europe's status and impact within the contemporary international arena is a matter of contention and debate, reflecting its often elusive and intangible nature. On the one hand, enthusiasm for the notion of a ‘European foreign policy’ and for the idea that Western Europe can play a constructive role in the world is evident both in academic analysis and in the pronouncements of West European political leaders. On the other, there is often a yawning gap between the promise or the prescription and the reality of European disunity and pluralism. One possible reason for this gap between enthusiasm and reality is that concepts fail us when the discussion turns to Western Europe's international role: the notion of ‘Europe’ or ‘Western Europe’ is often taken to be consubstantial with the European Community, and the notion of a European ‘foreign policy’ carries with it a conceptual framework which is inseparable from the state-centric view of world politics. Thus, the idea of ‘Western Europe’ as an international actor of the conventional state-like kind based on the EC leads inevitably into the analysis of European Political Co-operation as a pro to-foreign policy; it can extend into evaluation of the ‘external relations’ encompassed by the Treaty of Rome; and it may entail a consideration of the potential for further development in the security field by the European members of NATO. At its most ambitious, it might lead to the proposal that these three areas could be combined to produce an integrated, state-like policy mechanism. Although there are few who would explicitly argue that the EC is on the verge of emerging as a ‘European state’, it is the ideal type of a state-based foreign policy which lies behind much contemporary analysis of Western Europe's international status.

This article looks at how Belarus, the most affected state by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, discursively constructs cooperation with foreign countries that provide help in combating the consequences of the tragedy. It shows that different representations of foreign actors handling the prolonged consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster contribute to developing new friendships (with Japan), questioning existing cooperation (with Russia), and softening old (with Germany) and current (with Europe) conflicts in Belarus. The article makes a contribution to three debates in identity literature in constructivist International Relations: (a) identity and foreign policy; (b) the ‘voice’ and agency of the ‘Rest’; and (c) identity and difference. It is argued that when small non-Western states (help receivers) construct an ethical identity of bigger Western and non-Western states (help providers), they challenge the existing temporal and spatial identities of old strangers, enemies, and friends and create a new platform for conflict and cooperation.

Recently new problems have arisen that have complicated Russia’s foreign economic relations with foreign countries. The countries of Northern Europe were no exception. The economic situation in many countries was far from optimal. Problems with economy took place in the euro area. A significant drop in oil prices led to a slowdown in economic growth in the Russian Federation and a sharp decline of ruble exchange rate. Since 2014, various Western sanctions have emerged, followed by retaliatory sanctions from Russia. Against this background, the analysis of the dynamics of Russian economic relations with the Nordic countries is of particular interest. A sharp decline in foreign economic indicators occurred in 2015–2016. Subsequent development has shown different dynamics. On the one hand, by the end of the 2010s foreign trade with Finland and Sweden did not reach the level of 2013–2014 (primarily due to the decline in oil prices), but on the other, foreign trade indicators with Denmark and Norway were exceeded (due to Russian exports). Year 2020 brought new problems – the coronavirus pandemic and the associated restrictions on the movement of goods, services and people, as well as the rupture of production chains, which had an impact on foreign economic relations – and exacerbated the old ones: a new sharp drop in oil prices and a new depreciation of ruble. The article reveals the features of the general dynamics and commodity structure of foreign trade with each of the observed countries. The significant dependence of Russian exports, primarily on energy supplies, is considered in detail. Special attention is given to the general dynamics of foreign direct investment in Russia. The problems of modern development of Russian export and import were analyzed.

The intractable war in Yugoslavia, the breakup of Czechslovakia, the nationalist rumblings in Hungary and Romania, and manifestations of imperial and nationalist longings in Russian politics signify nationalism's enduring potency in Central and Eastern Europe. While some foreign observers worried about this potency, the new elites largely believed that liberalism in power could overcome those forces. Liberal democracy's triumph supposedly meant the end of History,inter alia,aggressive nationalism in Eastern Europe. They believed that these national liberation movements had cooperative, mutually supportive relationships that would flower after Communism ended. Nationalist discords were due to Eastern Europe's previous historical post-1914 nightmares, but the new post-1989 states would have amicable relations with their neighbors. Ostensibly, nationalism, once freed from Soviet repression, would bring an end to Soviet rule and usher in a new ‘springtime of nations.'

Recently, the volume of Chinese FDI made in Europe has reached the level of European FDI in China (now constrained by restrictions and risks). It equaled the level of FDI made by Chinese firms in the United States before they began to decline in the last two years. The Chinese economic presence in Europe is divided into three parts in terms of volume, destination, and type of acquisition: The heart of Europe is made up of the three major destinations (Germany, UK, France), where more capital-intensive investments are made, followed by other Western European countries (EU-15). New member states (NMS) that joined the EU in 2004, 2007, and 2013, and Western Balkan countries, in accession to the EU, are associated with China in the 16+1 Format (with the exception of Kosovo) and are another gateway to Europe. They receive less direct investment because of smaller market opportunities but China is building infrastructure (ports, highways, railways)—segments of the Silk Road that will bring Chinese products to the mature markets of the EU.

This article reevaluates the origins of Yugoslavia's instrumental role in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and elucidates the roots and conceptualization of Tito's strategic reorientation toward nonalignment. Yugoslav foreign policy became truly independent only after Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet fold. The article shows that Belgrade began searching for a “third way” earlier than is acknowledged in the relevant historiography. The search began when, faced with the distinct threat of a Soviet invasion in the early 1950s, Yugoslavia became all but formally incorporated into the Western alliance. Based on previously unknown or inadequately researched documents from the Yugoslav archives, the article demonstrates that Josip Broz Tito's trip to India and Burma in December 1954, particularly his first encounter with India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, played a key role in shaping Tito's principles of active peaceful coexistence and noncommitment and in transforming them into a global initiative. The article highlights the well-defined political and philosophical rationale behind the principles that became embedded in the concept of non-engagement and, later, nonalignment.

This article examines the political practices of the European Union (EU) in the Western Balkans and, in particular, the EU-Kosovo relations by adopting the revisited neo-functionalism approach to the study of EU enlargement. This research draws on the descriptive and explanatory assumptions of the approach; it not only explains the development of the EU enlargement perspective towards the region but also explores the main dynamics behind the EU’s strategy towards the region, beginning from the outbreak of the Yugoslavia War and the reflections associated with the development of the EU foreign policy realm. More specifically, the research focuses on the dynamics underlying the process of the development of Stabilization and Association Agreement with Kosovo. In the conclusion, future research directions and limitations of the revisited neo-functionalism are discussed.

Review of the collective monograph “European Socialist Regimes' Fateful Engagement with the West: National Strategies in the long 1970s”, summarizing the results of the work of the international research project “PanEur1970s”. The monograph is devoted to the process of forming national strategies of relations between the countries of the socialist camp (Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) with Western Europe in the 1970s. The monograph makes a significant contribution to the development of the discussion about the common European integration processes, the mutual influence of the political and economic systems of the West and the East, the functioning of the Eastern European political elites in the changing economic conditions of the 1970s.

Popular music is one of the cultural phenomena that has been most shared among the peoples inhabiting the territory of the former Yugoslavia; indeed, considering the persistence of a common popular music culture there even after the break up of the Yugoslav federation in 1991, there is perhaps little in cultural life that unites them more. It was in the 1950s that a Yugoslav popular music culture emerged through the development of local festivals, radio programs and a recording industry, at a time when popular music was also referred to as “dance,” “entertainment” or “light” music, and when jazz, pop and, by the end of the decade, rock and roll were the styles of it that were being listened to in Yugoslavia and around the world. However, the development of a Yugoslav popular music culture at this time was rooted not only in international cultural trends but was also shaped by the domestic and foreign policies that were pursued by the ruling Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), which was renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1952. Through its cultural, economic and foreign policies, the party sought to define Yugoslavia's position in Cold War international relations, develop a sense of Yugoslav identity among its multinational citizenry, and reconstruct and modernize a country that had suffered some of the greatest losses in Europe in the Second World War—and which had, just before it, been one of the Continent's least developed states, not only economically but also in terms of cultural infrastructure. In the cultural sphere, investments were needed immediately after the war to redress the facts that Yugoslavia had high rates of illiteracy and low rates of radio ownership by European standards, that cultural activities beyond folklore remained the purview of a small urban elite, and that it lacked musical artists, schools and instruments—with great disparities in all of these measures existing between its more developed northern areas (Slovenia, Croatia and northern Serbia) and the poorer south (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and southern Serbia). For example, with regards to radio ownership, in 1946 the number of individuals per radio ranged from 40 in Slovenia, 48 in Croatia and 91 in Serbia to 137 in Macedonia, 288 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 702 in Montenegro, with the average for all of Yugoslavia being 78.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia and the other successor states lost much of their collective strategic significance for the international community. Russia's role as a new member of the nuclear club is potentially destabilizing but does not present the overriding nuclear threat once posed by the USSR. Although Russia is attempting to reestablish its traditional roles in Eurasia, the Balkans and eastern Europe, its political importance has generally decreased commensurate with the collapse of the Soviet military machine; Russia is important economically only insofar as it is a powerful magnet for western aid and investment. While this perception of gradual marginalization, apparently shared by western diplomats, academics and journalists, may be largely accurate, it is incomplete. It overlooks Russia's potential role as a source of natural resources.

In post-Stalin Eastern Europe, international tourism occupied a paradoxical position. For practical and ideological reasons, socialist states continued to implement stringent passport regimes and strictly regulated the movement of people to and from their territories. At the same time (and for similar reasons), socialist entities were also compelled and enticed, albeit with hesitations, to allow their citizens and foreigners to temporarily move across their borders. Examining the tension between these policies and practices, this article explores how political and tourist institutions in Tito’s Yugoslavia negotiated and engaged with mobility by Yugoslav citizens and visitors, gradually leading to the country’s “open-door policy” of the 1960s. This policy—and with it, international tourism—became a trademark of sorts for Yugoslavia’s atypical socialism and, as Yugoslav officials and tourism experts often claimed, served both as a reflection of and a channel for the expression of the country’s distinct foreign policy and socioeconomic agenda. Though Yugoslavia’s engagement with global tourism was hardly unique during the Cold War, the country’s rapid transformation to a relatively successful and recognized tourist destination in the 1960s was remarkable and typically a step ahead of other socialist states. The article argues that this transformation occurred through the enaction of liberal mobility policies that intelligently intersected with the country’s foreign policy. Through this, it asserts, Yugoslavia set itself apart in many respects, particularly in terms of its mobility and tourism practices, which were, for the most part, in tune with Western standards.

Yugoslavia, once an advanced country in market reforms, was one of the least transformed countries in Eastern Europe in the nineties. Such a situation was caused by the civil war, policy of the Milosevic?s regime and international sanctions. The resistance of the ruling conservative forces made it impossible to establish an adequate reform policy. Thus, the transition stopped short halfway. The situation has radically changed only since the autumn of 2000, after Milosevic?s downfall, when after the gradual lifting of international isolation, economic and political reforms were given a new stimulus, and the country could start the process of European integration. This article is an attempt to give an overview of the transition of the Yugoslav economy in the last ten years or so. The growth rate of Yugoslavia?s GDP is compared not only with that of its neighbouring countries, i.e. other former socialist countries of South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania) but also with that of other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Commonwealth of Independent States. A particular attention is given to the role of research and development (R&D) in Yugoslavia in the nineties as compared to Croatia, Slovenia, and the United States. The structural changes in the Yugoslav economy during the past decade are analysed together with property relations as well as the issues concerning small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). At the sectoral level, it is the performance of manufacturing and agriculture that is separately explored. In relation to this, wage formation and relative wage levels in Yugoslavia?s manufacturing are viewed regarding the country?s international competitiveness and wider characteristics of globalising world economy. In analysing the role of external sources in the Yugoslav economy, the problems of foreign trade, external indebtedness, and attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) are emphasized together with the economic assistance rendered to the FRY by the European Union. Regarding the important indicator of openness, i.e. the share of exports and imports in GDP, a comparison is made between Yugoslavia, on one hand, and Croatia, Slovenia, the European Union, and the United States, on the other. The economic policy of Milosevic?s regime is contrasted with that of the new democratic government that came to power after the events in October 2000. Stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation, and institutional reform are considered giving particular attention to the experience of the member republics of the Yugoslav federation: Serbia and Montenegro. The author comes to the following conclusions: in transition countries stabilisation, liberalisation, and privatisation cannot be successful without carrying out a comprehensive, deep reform of the system of political institutions that along with creation of conditions for establishment of democracy and its strengthening also enables building of a modern and efficient market economy. This complicated and often contradictory process could come across serious obstacles if the old state and party nomenclature in power retains the command economy without planning, and under demagogical, nationalistic, and populist slogans gets involved in wars even taking the risks of being put under international isolation. However, such an outdated economic system characterised by autarchy can only temporarily exist and hinder the unravelling of market reforms in the epoch of globalisation.

The article deals with Romania’s foreign policy vectors in South-Eastern Europe regarding its membership in NATO and in the European Union. It is noted that the main foreign policy vector of Bucharest in the region is an alignment with the Republic of Moldova and a prospect of these two states uniting. The role of Romania is presented in a platform for negotiations which is the South-Eastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP), in the Three Seas Initiative, the Bucharest Nine Initiative and in the Romania –Poland– Turkey trilateral dialogue. The place of the Black Sea region in ambitions of the Romanian leadership and its significance in a strategic partnership between Romania and the Republic of Turkey are revealed. The author notes that the Balkans are not a priority vector of Romanian foreign policy, but the Western Balkan states are always present in Bucharest’s objects of attention, since here, as well as in the Black Sea region, global players are present, including Russia, a country Romania’s relations with has been in a critical condition for many years. In regards to the Romania’s relations with the Western Balkan countries, cooperation between Romania and Serbia stands out. Despite the pressure from Brussels, Romania supports Serbia in not wanting to tolerate the self-declared independence of Kosovo. Different approaches to policies of the Russian Federation are the reason behind the inconsistencies in the Romanian-Serbian relations. Romania does not possess enough recourses to lead an independent activity in the Balkans region and it mainly integrates in the policy of the European Union and the USA. Turkey pursues a policy of increasing its influence in the Balkans, with the cultural strategy of reconstruction of the Turkic world being one of the evident manifestations of the policy. The Romanian leadership abstains from any comment on this topic. Having not the same weight in world politics, Romania and Turkey на декларативном уровне demonstrate complete trust in one another and mutual understanding on a declarative level, but, according to the analysis of foreign policy platforms and partners’ particular political acts, their relations develop in the context of varying and sometimes even opposite approaches to a list of crucial international events.

The paper presents the materials of the special issue “Institutions, Networks and Trust in European–Russian relations” offering various interdisciplinary perspectives on EU–Russia relations. The positions of the authors of the special edition are analysed in the context of both Western and Russian literature on EU–Russia relations. This analysis is conducted within the framework of close to Constructivism “security community” approach that stresses the role of common interests, shared values, communications, interpersonal contacts and trust in overcoming conflicts. In this context, the emergence of new ‘dividing lines’ in Europe is considered as the result of crisis of trust and institutional crisis in EU– Russia relations. From this point of view the recent literature on the roots of European–Russian conflict, on connections between Russian domestic and foreign policy, on value-interest dilemma in Western–Russian relations, on the new Cold War/Cold Peace theory, on the structure of EU policy towards Russia and internal splits inside EU is reviewed.

The article argues that the United States entered the post-war world in a completely new role for the state, surpassed all other countries in the main indicators of strength – military, economic, technological and cultural. World wars turned them into the center of Western civilization, which opposed Soviet power, which secured significant spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and the Far East as a result of World War II. It is argued that the main areas of geopolitical rivalry between the two centers of power are the regions that are on the periphery of Eurasia: the clash line in Europe, the Middle and the Far East. Throughout the entire period of rivalry, the United States has transformed from an episodic into a constant factor in European politics, institutionalizing its presence in the Old World and building relations with Western European allies on the basis of “Atlantism”, “interdependence” and “burden sharing”. It was proved that the main task of the US administrations in the post-war period was the creation of a “power perimeter” around the zone of Soviet control, maintaining its functioning and further strengthening. First, its line ran in Europe, then in East Asia, and later was expanded to the Middle East, having adequate support with American military bases and military-political blocs. It is noted that the confrontation between the two superpowers took place including the alternation of conflict and cooperation, reflected the desire of the victors to consolidate the subordinate position of the defeated – mainly Germany and Japan – in the new system of international relations. Carrying out “containment” of the USSR, the USA actually implemented a policy of “double containment”, directed both against the potential strengthening of Germany and in order to maintain control over Western Europe as a whole. In this regard, the consolidation of “spheres of influence” of each of the parties preserved the results of the war, providing “silent cooperation” on issues of principle.

In the new, post-Cold War reality Polish foreign policy faced challenges stemming from the need to set targets that would reflect the interests of Poland, as well as take into account the changes in the international environment. Gradually, the assumptions and directions of foreign policy were rebuilt, with an aim to ensure the safety of the country in both internal and external dimension, to provide the territorial integrity, strengthen the sovereignty and create optimal conditions for the development of the state and society. After 1989, as a consequence of the concentration of efforts of Polish diplomacy on the implementation of strategic directions of foreign policy, others had a secondary meaning. Polish vital interests were located in the Euro-Atlantic area, in the immediate vicinity, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, which is why in the first place all strengths and resources were engaged there in order to implement the strategic tasks of foreign policy; the Western Balkans remained on the sidelines, in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, this did not mean the total marginalization of the post- -Yugoslav region, and the perception of the events associated with the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation as not directly, but only indirectly connected with Polish interests.