Thèses sur le sujet « Europe – Foreign relations – Africa, Sub-Saharan »

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009.<br>Europe and Africa share a long history that is characterized both by oppression and development. The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is a particularly important aspect of EU development cooperation policy. The developmental history between the EU and Africa started with the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, which were replaced by the Lomé Convention. Unfortunately, the favourable terms and preferential access for the ACP countries to Europe failed and the Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000. As a result of a WTO-waiver, the discriminatory non-reciprocal trade preferences, which were previously enjoyed under the Lomé Convention, continued until December 2007. The Cotonou Agreement points out that these trade preferences will be replaced by joint WTOcompatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). During the EPA negotiations, the EU preferred to negotiate on a regional basis instead of negotiating with the ACP as a whole or with individual countries. Consequently, Sub-Saharan Africa formed two negotiation groups; the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA group and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA group, represented by the five Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, together with Mozambique and Angola. Although Southern Africa is the region that leads the continent; from an economic perspective, the Southern African states show considerable disparities. Due to the economic differences between South Africa and the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), the interests of the individual SACU countries are diverse and often contradictory, which resulted in complicated EPA negotiations. However, maintaining a favourable long-term trading relationship with the EU is of great importance to the economic and political well-being of the SADC, since the EU is the main trading partner of most African countries. By December 2007, an interim EPA (IEPA) was initialled by the BLNS countries as a result of the pressure to fall back to the unfavourable Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Due to the bilateral Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) that is in force between South Africa and the EU, South Africa was not negatively influenced by the expiry of the WTO-waiver. The EPA will have a negative impact on regional integration within SADC and will promote distinction within the regional economic communities. Duty free, quota free access was offered to the BLNS countries, but the EU did not extend this offer to South Africa because of the developmental status of the country and the pre-existing TDCA. Consequently, South Africa will be required to export at higher prices and will experience increased competition within the region. The downside of the removal of import tariffs for the BLNS countries is that government revenues will decrease, which might result in income losses and will accentuate poverty. The standstill-clause of the IEPA prevents the SACU countries from diversifying economically and from developing new industries. The Most- Favoured Nation clause primarily impacts negatively on South Africa, since it prevents South Africa from negotiating freely with other countries such as Brazil and China. Furthermore, the strict intellectual property rules of the IEPA undermine access to knowledge and hereby fail to support innovation. The content of a chapter on liberalization of services, that will be included in the full EPA, is still being negotiated. Liberalization of services might lead to more foreign investments in the BLNS countries, as a result of which the quality of services will increase, leading to better education, infrastructure and more job opportunities. However, foreign companies will gain power at the expense of African governments and companies. South Africa is the main supplier of services in the BLNS countries and will therefore be confronted with economic losses when the services sector is liberalized. From an economic nationalist perspective, the EU included numerous provisions in the IEPA that were not necessary for WTO compatibility. However, the EU is aware of the importance of trade agreements for the BLNS countries and found itself in the position to do so to fulfil its own interests. By making use of the expiry date of the WTO waiver; the IEPA was initialled by the BLNS countries within a relatively short period of time. South Africa, in its own national interests, opposed the provisions of the IEPA, which has led to the negotiations deadlock. Because of the economic power and negotiating tactics of the EU and the selfinterested attitude of South Africa in this respect, regional integration is undermined and the poorest countries are once again the worst off. Although Economic Partnership Agreements have to be established, the partnership-pillar is, in my opinion, hard to find.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Africa’s rising international profile and geopolitical significance as well as the continent’s relatively ‘under-exploited markets’ have been pull factors for many emerging economies. Globally, the developing and emerging economies of the world for the first time captured more than half of all global FDI in 2011. Changes in the global investment regime are a clear indication of the changing dynamics in the global economy. Since India and China’s FDI liberalisation processes began to gather steam in the 1990s, they have been amongst the most aggressive of the emerging economy investors. This study appraises the role of the government in facilitating investment by Indian and Chinese firms abroad, specifically Sub-Saharan Africa. The study analyses the motivations for such outward foreign direct invest flows, the sectoral trends, and the entry mode differences of Indian and Chinese firms’ investments in Sub-Saharan African markets. Yet, there is a lack of studies that focus on both Indian and Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing from theoretical constructs from political economy, International business /economics and International Political Economy - a framework is provided to assess the influence of these investments. The methodology is interpretive and qualitative and draws largely on secondary material from international organisations, government agencies, academic literature and the media. The study finds that the role of New Delhi and Beijing in facilitating and financing outward investments is strategic and pragmatic. These policies greatly influence firms, and the locations and types of their investments. South-South cooperation provides India and China with a framework for long-term political and economic investments and development cooperation with African states. India and China’s engagements in Sub-Saharan Africa share similar and dissimilar forms and motivations for FDI. Markets and resources are primary motivations for these two countries’ firms to invest in the region. India and China’s growing commercial activities in Sub-Saharan Africa provide the region with opportunities for further international market integration and development.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Afrika se ontluikende internasionale profiel en geopolitieke belang tesame met die vasteland se relatief ‘onderbenutte’ markte is ’n trekfaktor vir baie ontluikende ekonomieë. Terwyl vloeie uit buitelandse direkte investering (BDI) na Afrika, wat ’n hoogtepunt in 2008 bereik het, in 2010 steeds afgeneem het, was die ontwikkelende en ontluikende ekonomieë van die wêreld vir die eerste keer in besit van meer as die helfte van alle wêreldwye BDI in 2011. Veranderings in die internasionale beleggingsregime is ’n duidelike aanduiding van die veranderende dinamika in die wêreldekonomie. Sedert Indië en China se liberaliseringsprosesse met betrekking tot BDI in die 1990’s begin ontwikkel het, is hulle van die aggressiefste beleggers onder opkomende ekonomieë. Die gebrek aan streekstudies wat op Indiese en Chinese beleggings fokus, verg egter verdere aandag. Die doel van die studie is om die rol van die regering in die fasilitering van Indiese en Chinese maatskappye om in die buiteland te belê te ontleed. Die fokus val veral op Afrika suid van die Sahara, en op die motiverings vir hierdie BDI-vloeie, die sektortendense en wyse van toetreding van Indiese en Chinese maatskappye se beleggings in Afrikamarkte. Bestande uit teortiese konstakke uit internasionale sakestudie, internasionale politieke ekonomie en politieke ekonomie, word ‘n raamwerk waarin die invloed van hierdie beleggings op wat assesseer word is interpritiet en kwalitatiet en stan op sekondêre materiaal en data van regeringsagentskappe, akademiese literatuur en die media. Die gebruik van ’n veelsoortige teoretiese raamwerk wat ekonomiese en politieke beleggingsverskynsels uitbeeld, illustreer die versoenbaarheid van politiek, ekonomie en sakegebaseerde akademiese gebiede en die moontlikheid om grondliggende uitkomste uitkomste vir navorsing oor beleggingstendense en -strategieë in ontluikende ekonomieë te bied. Die studie bevind dat die rol van New Delhi en Beijing in die fasilitering en finansiering van buitelandse beleggings strategiese en pragmaties is, en dat beleide maatskappye grootliks beïnvloed ten opsigte van waar hulle belê en watter soort beleggings hulle maak. Verder, verskaf Suid–Suid-samewerking, ‘n raamwerk vir verbintenis langtermyn- politieke en ekonomiese beleggings en ontwikkelingsamewerking met Afrikastate. Indië en China se betrokkenheid in Afrika toon ooreenstemmende en verskillende vorme en motiverings vir BDI, en markte en hulpbronne is primêre motiverings vir hierdie twee lande se maatskappye in die streek te belê.

The current scholarly literature on the international mediation of armed conflicts predominantly draws on a rationalist-materialist perspective. This perspective suggests that the ticket to mediation success is the material manipulation of the bargaining environment by third parties with a high degree of economic and military resources. In this dissertation I argue against those that highlight material power when explaining outcomes of international mediation processes. Indeed, this dissertation shows that legitimacy, far more than capacity, determines outcomes of mediation. The reason why legitimacy matters so much is that if a mediator has legitimacy, it can continue to look for a mutual satisfactory outcome and try to pull the conflict parties towards compliance, but if a mediator loses legitimacy, no amount of material resources will prove sufficient in mediating the conflict. In other words, material capacity in the form of economic and military resources may be useful to successfully mediate a conflict, but it is rarely sufficient. Through scrutinising international mediation processes in civil wars in Africa, I develop a theory that explains how mediators are effective because of a high degree of legitimacy rather than military or economic capacity. More specifically, I show how legitimacy matters through comparing the effectiveness of African and non-African third parties. African third parties are typically referred to as ineffective because of a low degree of economic and military capacity. However, African third parties are effective in mediating civil wars in Africa because of a high degree of legitimacy, which is a result of a strong conviction within the African society of states that African mediation is the most desirable type of mediation in conflicts in Africa. Drawing on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program supplemented with unique data, which together cover all mediation efforts in Africa between 1960 and 2012, I find quantitative evidence supporting the effectiveness of African third parties. Compared to non-African third parties, African third parties are far more likely to conclude peace agreements and these peace agreements are more likely to be durable. Two case studies, in which several mediation efforts in civil wars in Sudan are examined, further probe the causal mechanisms that I put forward to explain the effectiveness of African mediation. While I do not claim causal generalisability on the basis of these two case studies, the mediation efforts in Sudan nevertheless suggest that third party legitimacy is central to mediation success. This is the first systematic study that compares African and non-African mediation efforts. Theoretically, this study deviates from much of the literature that solely puts forward rationalist-materialist explanations of mediation success. By bringing legitimacy to the forefront, this dissertation overcomes key limitations in the current mediation literature, in which material sources of power are emphasised and social structures are ignored.

Study project (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The African Growth and Opportunity Act was signed into law in May 2000 to allow qualifying SSA countries to export eligible products duty free to the US. The act is a non-reciprocal "agreement" designed solely by the US, with the objective of promoting increased trade and investment between the US and SSA. The US insist that trade will lead to development on the African continent if SSA countries liberalise their markets and become integrated into the global economy. The theory behind trade liberalisation is that it promotes allocative efficiency by exploiting comparative advantage. I however argue that trade liberalisation can realise its potential only if the US start dismantling the protectionist barriers that have been described in this report. The AGOA does reduce tariff barriers for a number of African products. However new non-tariff barriers have been erected which are less transparent, but just as effective as tariff barriers. The report documents the significance of existing trade barriers that seek to protect the US industries from harm, and evaluates the problems that are created in spite of the intentions of the AGOA. A number of specific issues that will be significant for the future outcomes of the Act were also dealt with. These included: the anti-dumping steel duties, US Farm Bill, NEPAD and the textiles and apparel debate. The problems found with the AGOA included: • Protectionism that is sector specific, involving the cases of the antidumping steel duties and the Farm Bill. • The unfavourable terms of trade associated with the Act, caused by the non-negotiable, non-reciprocal and temporary nature of the AGOA. • The eligibility conditions of the Act, which serve to bind African countries to the rules of the World Trade Organisation and exclude some countries on the African continent from obtaining benefits. • Internal reform problems within the SSA countries involving government departments, infrastructure and the macroeconomic environment. The evidence over the short time since it was enacted reveals that the SSA countries will not gain much from the extended trade benefits of the AGOA, unless their capacity to produce and supply the US market is enhanced. Furthermore, most of the AGOA benefits have gone to oil exporting countries and SA, who is the only non-oil country benefiting from a number of sectors at present. The Act has failed to increase trade flows from eligible countries to the US, as most of the SSA countries are not at the economic development to take advantage of the preferences that have been provided under the AGOA. Furthermore the liberalisation of many of the African economies has not been reciprocated by the US. The actions of many interest groups in the US indicate that they are "yes" to free trade but "not" at the expense of jobs and profits. This is evident, as the AGOA provides no exceptions to any of the US retaliatory measures and the fact that interest groups in the US influence many of the product decisions when domestic market share is threatened. One of the positive outcomes of the AGOA is the joint US Africa Trade and Economic Co-operation Forum that will provide future avenues for beneficial US-Africa trade relations.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: geen opsomming

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.<br>Includes bibliography<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The Japanese-African aid relationship has evolved since World War Two. The majority of studies on Japan’s role in Africa have focused on the economic aspect, while Japan’s aid relationship with Africa remains a relatively underexplored area of enquiry. This thesis aims to contribute to the study of Japanese-African relations by focusing on the role of aid in Japan’s involvement with the continent. The research question focuses on the evolution of Japan’s aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa and the factors that have shaped this relationship. The study is qualitative and exploratory in nature and makes use mostly of secondary sources. Theoretically, the study analyses the aid relationship with reference to three sources of motivation for the provision of aid, namely economic, political and moral rationales. The findings of this study highlight the fact that, before 1990, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa was motivated by all three rationales. From an economic perspective, aid served as security for resources from Africa especially after the oil crisis of 1973. From a political perspective, Japan’s aid relationship served a number of objectives that changed over time. The study highlights these changes, suggesting that, from a political perspective, Japan’s aid in respect of Africa initially served to play a critical role in the Western camp in its anti-communist struggle on the continent. It was also used to curb criticism directed at Japan by African countries for its pro-Pretoria policy. After 1990, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa from political perspective served Japan’s ambition to be recognised as a political power, most importantly to receive the support from Africa that would allow Japan to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. From an economic perspective, it served to secure strategic natural resources for Japan that would sustain its growing economy and help to achieve its ambition of attaining global economic supremacy. From a moral perspective, the aid relationship served to promote a development path for Africa similar to that experienced in Japan’s Asian neighbourhood. Japan’s aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa can be explained from a realist perspective, since the country’s national interests played a key role in the distribution of aid in this region. It has been important for Japan to maintain its momentum regarding global economic prominence and influence and for it to try to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By distributing aid to Africa, it has hoped to improve its chances of achieving its economic ambition and importantly its elevation to the Security Council. The study thus suggests that political ambitions have been the primary motivating factor in the distribution of aid in sub-Saharan Africa. The areas for further investigation, as highlighted by the findings of this study, are as follows: Japan’s aid relationship with Africa remains a relatively new area of inquiry and more research could therefore be done given the available data. The study also highlights the political perspective as the primary motivating factor for Japan’s aid relationship with Africa. This served Japan’s ambitions of being recognised as a global political player that would find its greatest expression in securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council with the assistance of African nations. Future studies could investigate whether Japan has managed to achieve its global political ambition and whether African countries played a significant role in this process. Finally, future studies could study the effectiveness of the TICAD process and whether Japan’s non-Western approach to development remains a popular model.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die hulpverhouding tussen Japan en Afrika het sedert die Tweede Wêreldoorlog ontvou. Die studie van Japan se rol in Afrika het tot dusver grootliks op die ekonomiese aspek gekonsentreer, terwyl Japan se hulpverlening aan Afrika’n betreklik onderontginde studieveld bly. Hierdie tesis wil tot die studie van Japan-Afrika-betrekkinge bydra deur op Japan se hulpverlening aan die vasteland te konsentreer. Die navorsingsvraag handel oor die ontwikkeling van Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika suid van die Sahara, en die faktore wat hierdie verhouding gevorm het. Die studiemetodologie is kwalitatief en verkennend, en maak hoofsaaklik van sekondêre bronne gebruik. Wat teorie betref, ontleed die studie die hulpverhouding aan die hand van drie motiverings vir hulpverlening, naamlik ekonomiese, politieke en morele beweegredes. Die studieresultate toon dat Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika voor 1990 deur ál drie bogenoemde beweegredes aangevuur is. Uit ’n ekonomiese hoek het hulp as sekuriteit vir hulpbronne uit Afrika gedien, veral ná die oliekrisis van 1973. Uit ’n politieke hoek het Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika ’n aantal oogmerke help bevorder wat mettertyd verander het. Die studie beklemtoon hierdie veranderinge, en doen aan die hand dat, wat politiek betref, Japan se hulpverlening aan Afrika aanvanklik belangrik was in die Westerse kamp se stryd teen kommunisme op die Afrikavasteland. Dit is ook gebruik om Afrika-kritiek op Japan se pro-Pretoria-beleid te smoor. Ná 1990 het die hulpverhouding met Afrika Japan op politieke gebied help naam maak en veral Afrikasteun help werf om ’n permanente setel vir Japan in die Veiligheidsraad te bekom. Uit ’n ekonomiese hoek het dit as waarborg gedien vir strategiese natuurlike hulpbronne wat Japan se groeiende ekonomie kon ondersteun en tot sy strewe na wêreldwye ekonomiese heerskappy kon bydra. Uit ’n morele perspektief wou Japan Afrika ’n soortgelyke ontwikkelingsroete as dié van Japan se Asiatiese bure laat inslaan. Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika suid van die Sahara kan aan die hand van die realistiese perspektief verklaar word, aangesien die land se nasionale belange ’n kernrol in die verspreiding van hulp na hierdie streek gespeel het. Vir Japan was dit belangrik om sy stukrag in die strewe na wêreldwye ekonomiese statuur en invloed te behou en ’n permanente setel in die Veiligheidsraad te probeer bekom. Deur hulp aan Afrika te verleen, het Japan gehoop om sy kanse op sukses in sy ekonomiese strewes en veral ook sy verheffing tot die Veiligheidsraad te verbeter. Die studie gee dus te kenne dat politieke ambisies die hoofbeweegrede was vir hulpverlening aan Afrika suid van die Sahara. Gebiede vir verdere navorsing wat uit die bevindinge van hierdie studie spruit, is soos volg: Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika bly ’n betreklik nuwe studieveld met min beskikbare data, dus is verdere navorsing daaroor nodig. Meer bepaald beklemtoon die studie die politieke perspektief as hoofbeweegrede vir Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika: Dit het Japan as internasionale politieke speler help vestig, en Afrikalande sou Japan uiteindelik help om die gesogte permanente setel in die Veiligheidsraad te bekom. Toekomstige studies kan verken of Japan in sy internasionale politieke strewe geslaag het en watter rol Afrikalande daarin gespeel het. Laastens kan verdere studies ook ondersoek instel na die TIKAO-proses en of Japan se nie-Westerse benadering tot ontwikkeling ’n gewilde model bly.

Thesis (MTech (Business))--Peninsula Technikon, Cape Town, 2002<br>South Africa has long been a part of the region although it may be a new comer to some institutions established. One of the reasons why SADC was established was to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. The latter has since its first democratic elections been integrated into the region of South African Development Community which comprises of 14 members. South Africa commands an economy three times the size of all SADC economies. It is believed that the economic spread effects from integration with the South African economy will act as an engine of growth in the region. The effect of South Africa's economic dominant role on other SADC member states is a concern. The study seeks to determine the extent to which South Africa can be of assistance to other member States given its own internal problems such a unemployment and poverty. South Africa has a major role to play in terms of stabilising the region and given the expectations from the international community. It has vested interest in the region as it exports more than it imports from the region. The region has potential for investment opportunities and that is made impossible by political instability and political intolerance in the region. The SADC is faced with a serious question whether a member state can enter in the internal affairs of another member state whose internal activities adversely affect the economy of that particular country and that of other member states.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study aims to understand the motivations underlying the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating on the African continent as well as the way in which institutional contexts – the physical and legal environments – shape their behaviours and/or modes of entry into local industries. Understanding the strategic motives of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Africa as well as the extent to which they implement those motives on the ground and the way in which they respond to local laws is crucial for assessing the medium- to long-term impacts of their activities on the welfare of African populations and forests. This dissertation relies on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm to understand the motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises as well as on new institutional theory to study the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises into local industries. This research is based on two case studies: Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As far as data collection is concerned, it relied on secondary sources of data such as scholarly articles and books; official documents and legislation; and newspaper articles. This study also drew on primary sources of data, which consisted of documents obtained during the fieldwork such as contracts between Chinese agricultural enterprises and African governments, official documents from Chinese agricultural enterprises as well as semi-structured interviews. Thirty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted with various stakeholders – including managers of Chinese agricultural enterprises, employees of these enterprises, farmers, officials from ministries of agriculture and researchers – in Mozambique and the DRC between April to June 2011. The data collected were analysed with the help of the qualitative analysis software: atlas.ti. The preliminary results collected and analysed in this study suggest that the motivations of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC are: 1) to acquire farmlands in order to grow food crops and sell them mainly in local markets; 2) to supply agricultural commodities – cash and food crops – for Chinese markets; and 3) to provide agricultural aid by introducing new varieties of crops imported from China and offering training to farmers, students and technicians. However, the provision of agricultural aid is a secondary motivation of Chinese agricultural enterprises. The motivations informing the activities of Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in Mozambique and the DRC are globally consistent with China‟s foreign policy as these enterprises primarily aim to better position themselves in local markets and to access agricultural commodities for the benefit of Chinese markets. Furthermore, the preliminary results of this study also indicate that the institutional contexts in Mozambique and the DRC appear to affect the behaviours and/or modes of entry of Chinese agricultural enterprises into local industries. As such, the poor provision of infrastructure in rural areas appears to delay further investments by Chinese agricultural enterprises. Also, the complex process of gaining access to land and the weak regulatory capacity in the monitoring and implementation of the land laws appear to hinder investments by Chinese agricultural enterprises and in some instances lead to the cancellation of investments. In the specific case of the DRC, the weak enforcement of land titles appears to discourage further investments. The unfavourable institutional context depicted above has prompted Chinese agricultural enterprises operating in the DRC to adopt new models of business revolving around less risky or smaller agricultural projects.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie ontleed die motiewe van Chinese landbou-ondernemings werksaam op die Afrika-vasteland, asook hoe die institusionele konteks, te wete die fisiese en wetlike raamwerke, sulke ondernemings se werkverrigtinge en/of toetreewyses tot plaaslike industrieë beïnvloed. 'n Begrip van wat die strategiese motiewe van Chinese landbou-ondernemings is, hoe hulle daardie motiewe op voetsoolvlak implementeer, en hoe hulle aan landswette gehoor gee, is noodsaaklik om die middel- tot lang-termyn impakte wat die ondernemings op die welstand van Afrika bevolkinge en op woudgebiede het, te peil. Hierdie studie maak gebruik van Dunning se eklektiese paradigma om Chinese landbou-ondernemings se motiewe te ontleed. Dit pas ook die nieu-institusionele teorie toe om die werksaamhede en marktoetredes van die ondernemings na te spoor. Die navorsing is op twee gevallestudies gebaseer: Mosambiek en die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK). Dit het van sekondêre bronne soos vakwetenskaplike referate en boeke; amptelike dokumentasie en wetsakte; en persartikels gebruik gemaak. Die studie het ook primêre databronne gebruik. Laasgenoemde bestaan uit dokumentasie wat deur die loop van die veldnavorsing ingesamel is, onder meer kontrakte tussen Chinese landbou-ondernemings en Afrika staatslui; amptelike dokumentasie van Chinese landbou-ondernemings; en semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude. Daar is met verskeie belangegroepe in Mosambiek en die DRK - soos die bestuurders van Chinese landbou-ondernemings en hul werknemers, boere, landbou-amptenare en navorsers – onderhoude gevoer. In geheel is 32 semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude in die periode April – Junie 2011 gevoer. Die data is met behulp van die kwalitatiewe ontledingsprogrammatuur atlas.ti ontleed. Die voorlopige bevindinge en ontledings stel voor dat die volgende motiewe die werksaamhede van Chinese landbou-ondernemings in Mosambiek en die DRK bepaal: 1) om landerye te bekom om sodoende kos aan te kweek en dit veral aan plaaslike markte te verkoop; 2) om landbouware, te wete kontant en kos, aan Chinese markte te voorsien; 3) om hulpverlening te verskaf deur die bekendstelling van nuwe tipes gewasse uit China, en deur die opleiding van boere, studente en tegnici. Die verskaffing van hulpverlening in die landbou bedryf is egter van sekondêre belang vir Chinese landbou-ondernemings. Die motiewe van Chinese landbou-ondernemings werksaam in Mosambiek en die DRK strook met China se oorhoofse buitelandse beleid omdat hierdie ondernemings primêr daarop uit is om hulself beter in plaaslike markte te posisioneer en om tot die voordeel van Chinese markte landbouware te bekom. Voorts, die voorlopige bevindinge dui ook aan dat die institusionele kontekste in Mosambiek en die DRK die werksaamhede en/of die toetrede van Chinese landbou-ondernemings in plaaslike industrieë beïnvloed. Swak infrastruktuur in landelike gebiede blyk meer beleggings deur Chinese landbou-ondernemings te striem. Die ingewikkelde proses om grond te bekom en gebrekkigheid in die regulering, monitering en implementering van landbouwette blyk ook Chinese beleggings te kortwiek, en in sommige gevalle lei dit tot die opskorting van beleggings. In die geval van die DRK, wil dit voorkom asof gebrekkige afdwinging van grondaktes verdere belegging ontmoedig. Die ongunstige institutionele konteks wat hier geskets is, het Chinese landbou-ondernemings werksaam in die DRK aangemoedig om nuwe sakemodelle toe te pas, wat belegging in kleiner landbou projekte of met minder risiko's, beteken.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study investigates both the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) that was signed into US law in May 2000 and the subsequent US Farm Bill, signed in May 2002. AGOA is a temporary, non-negotiated, non-reciprocal law by the USA to allow dutyfree and quota-free access to almost all products produced in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Many people in SSA are dependant on agriculture to provide employment and livelihood. In the agricultural sector The Farm Bill is a unilateral law by the USA granting enormous subsidies to its farmers for a wide variety of products. It is the purpose of this study to investigate both these laws and to determine whether or not the Farm Bill undermines the objectives of AGOA. AGOA was studied and the real reasons for US interest in SSA determined. The main reason found for the inception of AGOA was US interest in the oil resources of SSA as well as other commodities like precious metals and textiles. The USA is also interested in SSA to find new markets for its own products as it can produce far more food and fibre than it can utilise in its domestic market. The study investigated the potential benefits of AGOA for SSA as well as the real benefits that were realised in the first two and a half years since its inception. It was found in the study that the real benefits were far less than the potential benefits and several reasons are offered for this phenomenon. The trade data between the USA and SSA was analysed to determine the effect of AGOA on trade and the major products traded. It was found that by far the largest product group was in the petroleum sector. The Farm Bill was investigated to determine the provisions of the Bill, the products involved and the conditions for subsidy payments. The payments include direct payments, counter-cyclical payments and marketing loan gains or loan deficiency payments. The detail of the calculation methods for the payments and a sample calculation of the subsidies are given, other provisions of the Farm Bill that apply to specific commodities like sugar and dairy products are also listed as these are important commodities for SSA. The Farm Bill was investigated in terms of AGOA and it was found in the study that the Farm Bill does indeed undermine the objectives of AGOA by reducing commodity prices. Both AGOA and the Farm Bill were further investigated in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to determine their consistency with the rules of the WTO. It was found that AGOA is consistent with the WTO rules, but the subsidies of the Farm Bill are trade distorting and therefore not consistent with these rules. There is a WTO limit set for the US support programmes and it is expected that the payments would exceed the limit during times of low commodity prices.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie studie word beide die 'African Growth and Opportunity Act' (AGOA) wat in Mei 2000 deel van die Amerikaanse wetgewing geword het sowel as die daaropvolgende 'US Farm Bill' wat in Mei 2002 goedgekeur is, ondersoek. AGOA is 'n tydelike, eensydige, nie-wederkerige wet deur Amerika wat tariefvrye en kwotavrye toegang tot die Amerikaanse mark toelaat vir bykans alle produkte wat in Afrika Suid van die Sahara (SSA) geproduseer word. Baie mense in SSA is afhanklik van landbou vir werk om vir hulle families te kan sorg. Dit is juis in die landbousektor waar Amerika die 'Farm Bill' as eensydige wet goedgekeur het wat enorme landbousubsidies vir 'n wye reeks produkte aan sy boere toeken. Die doel van die studie is om beide hierdie wette te ondersoek en vas te stel of die 'Farm Bill' die doelwitte van AGOA ondermyn, al dan nie. AGOA is eerste ondersoek en die werklike redes vir Amerika se belangstelling in SSA is bepaal. Daar is bevind dat die hoofrede vir die ontstaan van AGOA die strategiese belangstelling van Amerika in SSA se olie en ander kommoditeite soos edelmetale en tekstiele is. Amerika stel ook belang in SSA om nuwe markte te vind vir sy eie produkte omdat Amerika baie meer voedsel en vesel kan produseer as wat sy plaaslike mark kan absorbeer. Die studie het die potensiele voordele van AGOA vir SSA asook die werklike voordele wat in die eerste twee en 'n half jaar gerealiseer het, ondersoek. Die studie het getoon dat die werklike voordele baie minder as die potensiele voordele was en verskeie redes word vir die verskynsel aangevoer. Die handelsdata tussen Amerika en SSA is ondersoek om die effek van AGOA op handel asook die hoofhandelsprodukte vas te stel. Die data het getoon dat by verre die grootste produkgroep wat verhandel is, olie en verwante petroleumprodukte is. Die 'Farm Bill' is ondersoek om die bepalings van die wet vas te stel, watter produkte betrokke is en onder watter voorwaardes subsidiebetalings van toepassing is. Hierdie betalings sluit direkte betalings aan boere, wederkerige betalings en bemarkingslenings in. Die detail van die berekeningsmetodes van die verskillende dele van die subsidies asook 'n voorbeeld-berekening word getoon. Ander bepalings van die wetgewing wat van toepassing is op spesifieke kommoditeite soos suiker en suiwel word ook gelys omdat hierdie produkte baie belangrik vir SSA is. Die 'Farm Bill' is ook met betrekking tot AGOA ondersoek en daar is getoon dat die 'Farm Bill' inderdaad die doelwitte van AGOA ondermyn deur die pryse van kommoditeite te laat daal. Beide AGOA en die 'Farm Bill' is verder ondersoek in die konteks van die Wereldhandelsorganisasie (WHO) om vas te stel of elkeen van hierdie wette voldoen aan die handelsreels van die WHO. Daar is bevind dat AGOA wel voldoen aan die WHO reels, maar dat die subsidies van die 'Farm Bill' handel verwring en daarom nie voldoen aan die vereistes van die WHO nie. Daar bestaan 'n WHO-beperking vir Amerika op die hoeveelheid ondersteuning wat aan die boere toegestaan mag word en daar word verwag dat die beperking oorskry kan word in tye van lae kommoditeitspryse.

Thesis (MPhil (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006.<br>Since the end of the Cold War, China has displayed a reinvigorated interest in the African continent. There are differing viewpoints as to whether China’s increasing involvement in Africa is beneficial to the African continent, or whether there are negative consequences. This assignment attempts to answer this question by exploring the nature of China’s political, economic, and aid relationships with the African continent, by highlighting examples from four countries: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Sudan. China’s interests in Africa are motivated primarily by economics and diplomacy. In other words, Africa is important to China as a vast source of resources to feed its growing manufacturing base, as well as a source of energy security. In addition, China sees Africa as an important destination for its affordable manufactured goods. China’s interests in Africa, however, are not only confined to economics, but extend to diplomacy as well. China is attempting to position itself as an important power in the international system and, in so doing, promote its own views and policies within international multilateral organisations. Africa plays an important role in this regard, particularly in institutions with ‘one-country, one vote’ arrangements. Thus, China attempts to court African governments in order to secure access to Africa’s vast resources, as well as to garner support for its policies in the international arena. After an in-depth examination of the evidence, it is concluded that China’s engagement with Africa is based on strategic political and economic considerations and fits within a Realist explanatory framework. It is therefore contended that China’s presence on the African continent presents both opportunities as well as threats, although African governments need to be pro-active in order to exploit the potential opportunities. Furthermore, it is concluded that the negative consequences of China’s involvement in Africa are not only attributable to China’s behaviour in Africa, but some of the blame should also be shifted to corrupt African governments and elites who operate within a framework of neo-patrimonial politics which exacerbates corruption and mal-governance on the continent. Such behaviour stalls efforts emanating from ‘responsible’ African leaders to promote good governance and democracy on the continent, for example through institutions such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) and the African Union (AU).

The principal aim of the Lisbon Treaty is to address the pre-Lisbon concerns about the coherence of EU action. In this regard, coherence is the simple litmus test for EU external action in the post-Lisbon era. This thesis investigates the coherence of EU external action towards Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the post-Lisbon era in light of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and the introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service with the aim of enhancing coherence in EU external action. The principle of coherence governs the interaction between various policy strands of EU external action (horizontal coherence). The importance of coherence is linked to visibility and efficiency based on the effective use of EU resources, as well as to the credibility of the Union. This thesis concentrates on coherence in the interaction between EU policies towards SSA using the key EU policies towards the region namely development policy, trade policy, the CFSP and the CSDP. The regional context facilitates the analysis of the different strands of external action policies where, despite of or perhaps due to the Treaty of Lisbon, the different instruments of EU foreign policy and lines of competence demarcation between their institutions are still mired in complexity. Although the focus is on coherence, the specialised regional focus of the thesis also facilitates a broader understanding of the nuances in the implementation of EU external relations law and EU external policies in different contexts especially in the post-Lisbon era. Using Mali as a case study, the thesis submits that while it can be argued that policy coherence for development (which is a key requirement in EU external action towards SSA) cannot be certainly determined, Mali clearly illustrates incoherence vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options in EU external action towards SSA. The thesis also discussed the limits and prospects of coherence in EU external action despite the changes made at Lisbon.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2005.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study sets out to analyse the trade performance of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to determine the lessons that can be learnt from it strengths and weaknesses with the purpose to assist future trade negotiations - and specifically the current free trade negotiations between the United States of America (USA) and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). A short overview of AGOA's content is given with specific reference to the many rules and regulations governing the arrangement. AGOA's trade performance over the past four years is analysed by country and sector to determine the main recipients of its benefits with specific attention to the performance of SACU countries. AGOA's strengths and opportunities are discussed by looking at the impact that AGOA had on investment and job creation in Southern Africa. The study takes a closer look at new markets that benefited from AGOA and how well SACU made use of the non-reciprocal nature of AGOA by looking at the trade balance with the USA. The weaknesses of AGOA are analysed by looking at its nature - the fact that it is a nonnegotiated arrangement with benefits that can be terminated at any point. The failure of AGOA to address non-tariff barriers is discussed by looking at the impact of subsidies, quotas, threat of anti-dumping actions and its restrictive rules and regulations. The unsustainability of the substantial growth that the clothing and textile industries experienced under AGOA is considered by looking at the Multi-Fibre Agreement and the impact that its termination had up to now on especially SACU countries. The analysis of AGOA's trade performance highlighted the fact that only a few countries and products benefited from AGOA. The study deliberates AGOA's failure to liberalise Southern Africa's exports. The knowledge gained by analysing AGOA, its trade performance with specifically SACU, and its strengths and weaknesses are applied by looking at the current US free trade proposal with SACU. The study looks at the motivations for the free trade agreement from both a US and SACU point of view and continues to analyse the content of the proposed agreement. The analysis includes the various problem areas within the proposed agreement as well as the potential benefits that such an agreement can bring about. The study concludes with a summary of the lessons learnt from AGOA and how they apply to the proposed US free trade agreement as well as future trade negotiations.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie poog om die resultate van die "African Growth and Opportunity Act" (AGOA) oor die afgelope vier jaar te ontleed met die doel om die sterk en swakpunte van die handelsverdrag te beklemtoon as basis vir toekomstige handelsooreenkomste. Daar word spesifiek verwys na die handelsooreenkoms wat tans beding word tussen die Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) en die "South African Customs Union" (SACU). Die studie gee 'n kort opsomming van die inhoud van AGOA met spesifieke verwysing na die verskeie reëls en regulasies wat die ooreenkoms onderskryf. Die resultate van die afgelope vier jaar word ontleed per land en sektor om vas te stel watter lande en produkte die meeste voordeel getrek het onder AGOA. Weereens word daar spesifiek na SACU se resultate verwys. AGOA se sterkpunte word bespreek deur na die impak te kyk op investering en werkskepping in Suider Afrika. Die studie kyk na nuwe marksgeleenthede wat voordeel getrek het onder AGOA. Daar word ook gekyk hoe goed SACU van die nie-wederkerige natuur van AGOA gebruik gemaak het deur te verwys na die handelsbalans tussen SACU en die VSA. Die swakpunte van AGOA word bespreek deur te kyk na AGOA se inherente kenmerke, byvoorbeeld dat die "ooreenkoms" nie onderhandel is nie en dat voordele te enige tyd opgeskort mag word. Daar word ook gekyk na AGOA se gebrek om nie-tarief gedrewe handelsstruikelblokke in die vorm van subsidies, kwotas, die bedreiging van aksies teen handelsstorting en die impak van die vele reëls en regulasies aan te spreek. Die onvolhoubaarheid van groei binne die tekstiel en kledingsbedryf (wat merkbare sukses onder AGOA bereik het) as gevolg van die terminasie van die "Multi-Fibre Agreement" word bespreek - met spesifieke verwysing na die impak op Suider Afrika. Die analise van AGOA se handelsresultate het uitgewys dat slegs 'n handjie-vol lande en produkte by AGOA baat gevind het. Die studie oorweeg die moontlike redes wat gelei het tot hierdie verskynsel. Die kennis wat opgedoen is deur na AGOA se handelsresultate te kyk, asook sy sterk- en swakpunte te ontleed, word aangewend deur na die huidige VS handelsooreenkoms met SACU the kyk. Die studie oorweeg die motiverings vir so 'n handelsooreenkoms van beide 'n VS en SACU oogpunt en maak ook 'n ontleding van die inhoud van die ooreenkoms. Die ontleding kyk nie net na die verskeie probleme wat na vore kom nie maar ook na die voordele wat SACU te beurt kan val as gevolg van die oorkoms. Die studie sluit af deur 'n opsomming te maak van die lesse wat geleer is deur die ontleding van AGOA en hoe dit van toepassing is op die huidige VS ooreenkoms asook toekomstige ooreenkomste.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2006.<br>The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in May 2000 by President Clinton to allow sub-Saharan countries to export designated products duty-free into the US. AGOA is a temporary measure that is non-reciprocal and not negotiated by the participating parties. The initiative was launched to liberalise the markets of developing countries on the road to become integrated in the global economy. The initial success of AGOA was limited, with only a few countries making use of AGOA to increase their exports into the US markets. Problems encountered were high levels of protectionism from the US and the existence of technical trade barriers (including sanitary measures in agriculture) and nontariff barriers (including quotas). African countries are using shipment as the main transport for exports, and the US barred transshipment due to corruption that occurred in the past. The AGOA also made provision for 'special provisions' measures to enable AGOA eligible countries to export apparel and textile to the US. The export of apparel was very successful until the Multifibre Agreement expired in 2005, leading to relocation of apparel factories to lower cost bases. The real beneficiaries from AGOA are oil-exporting countries that make up more than 90% of total AGOA benefits. South Africa is the only country who succeeded in diversified AGOA exports. AGOA has been supplemented by AGOA II (extending the product range) and AGOA III (extending the expiry date to 2015). After the EU-SA Free Trade Agreement has been concluded in 1999, the US started with FTA negotiations with the South African Customs Union (SACU) to improve the exposure of US products to the SACU market and to decrease the trade deficit. However, the agenda of the FTA negotiations included second generation issues of intellectual property rights, trade in services, investment and government procurement. The SACU negotiators learnt some lessons from the EU-SA FTA and progress was slow. The extension of AGOA to 2015 saw a decrease in the urgency of striking a SACU-US FTA. Negotiations slowed down and the decision was made in April 2006 to conduct talks on a lower level. This breathing time can be used by the SACU negotiators to develop an aggressive offensive strategy for future negotiations, and to build competency against the efficient and offensive US negotiators. The US-SACU FTA must still be pursued to ensure that the benefits of AGOA are locked in. It will be beneficial for SACU if the different needs for all the SACU countries are addressed and the negotiations are done in incremental steps .

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2007.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The SACU bloc, which accounts for one-half of the subcontinent's GDP, is the largest market for the US exports in SSA (Langton, January 2005). Wide differences exist among the economies of SACU - while SA has developed a significant manufacturing and industrial capacity, the other countries remain dependent on agriculture and mineral extraction. The grouping is dominated by SA, which accounts for 87% of the population, and 93% of the GDP of the customs area. SACU member states had a combined real GDP of $201bn in 2003. Services made up 65% of SA Trade in 2003 and had become a major player. In 2003, SACU was the 32nd largest trading partner of the US with two-way trade equivalent \ $7.3bn. Merchandise imports from SACU totaled $5.6bn in 2003, a 17.3% increase from 2002 and a 126% increase from 1996. They were composed of minerals such as platinum, diamonds, and titanium, textiles and apparel, vehicles, and automotive parts. Major US exports to the region include aircraft, vehicles, computers, and construction and agricultural equipment. Services trade between the US and SA has increased dramatically for both countries, with US exports increasing 154% and service imports from SA increasing by 383% respectively since 1992. The stock of US FDI in SA totaled $3.9bn in 2003 and was centered around manufacturing chemicals and services. The main economic objective of FTAs is to reduce trade barriers between member countries and liberalize trade and investment rules (Kanoute, November 2005). This improves market access which is the key to foreign export earnings and investment. But market access is a door that swings both ways, opening local markets to a flood of imports. This can undermine domestic production and employment, and thus exacerbate poverty. Some US civil society organizations have expressed concern that a SACU FTA could have negative consequences for poor Southern Africans, citing potential adjustment costs for import-competing farmers, poor enforcement of labour rights, privatization of utilities, and increased restrictions on importing generic drugs to treat HIV/AIDS (Langton, January 2005). The proposed FTA is ambitious, especially given the tight deadline and the broad range of topics on the negotiating table (Zunckel, Tralac). These include not only tariffs on goods, as is traditional in trade talks, but the wider global economic panoply of agriculture, rules of origin intellectual property, trade in services, investment, government procurement, trade remedies, labour, environmental standards and trade dispute settlement. The US gains reciprocity by gaining improved access to the SACU market than it currently enjoys under AGOA. The IP and "TRIPS plus" provisions are of particular concern to consumers (www.tralac.org.) Ongoing developments at the multilateral level bode against the advisability of entering into binding bilateral agreements with less favourable provisions on essential medicines. Foreign investment could lead to greater industrialization within SACU and competition within local industry, boosting efficiency. But safeguards and industrial policy must be utilized effectively to protect the region's developmental goals. Reliance on domestic courts as the forum of first instance (and state-to-state dispute settlements should those fail) is preferable, as it allows greater possibilities of defending the public interest of SACU citizens over investors' interests (Langton, January 2005). Reaching consensus on negotiating strategy in SACU is no easy feat. Formal negotiations began in June 2003, but talks have made little progress over the past years. The interests of the five different countries, at differing stages of development, have to be reconciled (Draper. 2004). No doubt SA, with its diverse array of interests relative to its BLNS partners in the customs union, will drive this. SACU negotiators, in common with those in many developing countries, have great difficulty in understanding, let alone mobilizing, their services sectors. Hence they have adopted a defensive posture, favouring liberalization only in those (few) sub-sectors that are well understood. SACU has formally accepted an offer made by the US to progress a so-called trade and investment cooperation agreement (TICA). Prior negotiation will be needed among SACU countries, who clearly have an interest in coordinating its negotiation with other US bilateral negotiating partners (Whalley & Leith, December 2003).

This thesis analyses French foreign policy towards former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1960. Particular emphasis is given to informal relations, predominating in this policy. Although the countries gained independence, they remained under French influence and control for another three decades. France achieved this through skillful combination of formal and informal instruments, which are described in the thesis. Furthermore, the work deals with factors that predetermined the development of the new African policy and examines its goals and changes of instruments stemming from changes of international and domestic context. The thesis concludes with a case study specifically illustrating the development of relations between France and Gabon.

Au cours des 15 dernières années, la relation sino-africaine a profondément modifié le continent africain que de nombreux gouvernements occidentaux avaient abandonné. L'Afrique centrale possède de nombreuses matières premières notamment du pétrole, du cuivre, du cobalt et du minerai de fer. Beaucoup, y compris certains africains, soupçonnent ce qu'ils considèrent comme une prise de terre néocoloniale, dans laquelle l’état chinois illustré à travers ses 2200 entreprises, extraient des minéraux en contrepartie d'infrastructures. Néanmoins, il y a un consensus que la présence chinoise a surtout bénéficié à l'Afrique. Quelques chiffres illustrent le changement. En 2000, le commerce entre la Chine et l'Afrique était de seulement 10 milliards de dollars. En 2014, cela a augmenté de plus de 20 fois à 220 milliards de dollars, selon l'Initiative de recherche en Afrique de la Chine à l'École d'études internationales. Un intérêt qui se traduit par la présence d’acteurs chinois, publics et privés, de plus en plus nombreux, précisément dans les investissements directs (stocks de 10 à 45 milliards de dollars), selon les sources.Pourtant, il y a une inquiétude quant à la montée de l'influence chinoise. Plusieurs dirigeants politiques sont préoccupés par le fait que l'Afrique est passée récemment au déficit commercial avec la Chine. Les gouvernements africains contractent tellement de dette envers la Chine qu’ils pourraient occasionner une dépendance économique conditionnant l’avenir de leurs pays. Ma recherche explore l’incidence de la Chine sur le développement économique des pays d’ASS. Il s’agit de montrer comment les pays d’Afrique centrale notamment de la CEMAC qui accusent un retard comparé à d’autres régions d’ASS doivent se servir des changements complexes de l'économie chinoise pour doper leur croissance économique, dynamiser leur développement et attirer les investisseurs étrangers, créateurs d’emploi et acteur majeur de la dynamisation et de l’industrialisation des territoires. Nous avons analysé et comparé le choix du mode de localisation des IDE greenfield chinois et français en Afrique centrale. Nos résultats montrent le rôle décisif du potentiel marchand principal moteur des stratégies d’internationalisation des firmes chinoises en Afrique centrale<br>Over the past 15 years, the Sino-African relationship has profoundly changed the African continent, which many Western governments have abandoned. Central Africa has many commodities including oil, copper, cobalt and iron ore. Many, including some African, suspect what they consider to be a neo-colonial landholding, in which the Chinese state illustrated through its 2,200 companies, extract minerals in return for infrastructure.Nevertheless, there is a consensus that the Chinese presence has mainly benefited Africa. A few figures illustrate the change. In 2000, trade between China and Africa was only $ 10 billion. By 2014, this has increased more than 20 times to $ 220 billion, according to the China Africa Research Initiative at the School of International Studies. An interest that is reflected by the presence of Chinese actors, public and private, more and more numerous, precisely in the direct investments (stocks of 10 to 45 billion dollars), according to the sources.Yet there is anxiety about the rise of Chinese influence. Several political leaders are concerned that Africa has recently shifted to the trade deficit with China. African governments are so indebted to China that they could cause economic dependence on the future of their countries.My research explores the impact of China on the economic development of SSA countries. The aim is to show how the countries of Central Africa, notably CEMAC, which lag behind other regions of SSA must use the complex changes in the Chinese economy to boost their economic growth and boost their development and attract foreign investors, job creators and a major player in the dynamization and industrialization of territories. We analyzed and compared the choice of the mode of location of Chinese and French greenfield IDEs in Central Africa. Our results show the decisive role of the main trading potential driving the strategies of internationalization of Chinese firms in Central Africa

Defence date: 14 December 1990<br>Examining Board: Prof. Philippe C. Schmitter (directèur) ; Prof. Susan Strange ; Prof. Edmond Jouve ; Prof. Anna Maria Gentile<br>PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

Barely twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the international political system has experienced an unanticipated shift from a United States (US) led unipolar global order to a new order marked by its fresh wave of multiple competitors (Prys 2009:137). The global burden on the US had reciprocally inspired the appearance of a range of actors: regional (middle) powers such as Brazil, China, India and Russia; European Union (EU); South Africa and Nigeria. Consequently, an increasing level of expectation has been imposed on regional powers to provide the right leadership direction capable of promoting international stability and paving the way for development in these regions. In the light of the above, this thesis examines the implication of the hegemonic stability theory in understanding the power dynamics within Africa. In essence, the study specifically seeks to operationalize the concept of regional hegemony by drawing on insights from a comparative foreign policy study of African regional powers with emphasis on Nigeria and South Africa. Using largely qualitative and secondary data supplemented with primary data, the study examines the underlying assertions of a possible hegemonic influence of both countries and, thus, addresses the dearth of literature on regional power and leadership dynamics - particularly in Africa. Since the celebrated entry of South Africa into the African democratic arena, the resultant implication of this has been a change in the power, leadership and economic equations in Africa. From a theoretical projection of hegemonic stability theory, this study concludes that there is undeniable linkage between the foreign policies of Nigeria and South Africa and their hegemonic ambitions in the continent. However, by extrapolating the hegemonic stability theory at a regional level of analysis, the study finds very little empirical evidence to suggest the application of the theory at the regional level. While Nigeria and South Africa have been called upon repeatedly to play hegemonic roles within the continent, the study shows that both countries lack the conditions to effectively play such roles within a continent with major historical, internal and external constraints that puncture the possibility of a hegemonic influence. In short, hegemonic claim in Africa is mere (un)official rhetoric and lacks substance.<br>Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

M.A. (Political Studies)<br>Sub-Saharan African governments have long expressed their support for increased intra-African trade, but official statistics show that this type of trade. remains Iess than 5% of the total. The continued emphasis on establishing supranational organisations to direct regional trade Iiberalisation through. phased tariff reductions is symptomatic of the strategies dominating most. deliberations on regional integration. Despite the continuing proliferation of multilateral treaties, protocols and resolutions concerned with promoting regional trade, intra-African exchange has stagnated. Recorded barter in Africa's major sub-regional communities has not significantly increased between the late 1970's and today (Barad, 1990: 102). The reason for this absence of progress in the promotion of intra-African trade is most clearly expressed in the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing its worst economic crisis to date. According to Williams (1993: 5-6) this crisis is manifested in foreign .debt, poverty and trade.deficits. These conditions are the result of the following: deteriorating terms of external trade, the rise in debt-servicing obligations relative to both export earnings and gross domestic product, climatic conditions such as drought, civil wars and regional disputes, the lack of infrastructure and the overvaluation of African currencies, government and privatesector corruption, and the inability of African states to respond to the oil crisis of 1979-1980. Naldi (1989: 2) adds the neglect of the agricultural sector, unfeasible . industrial programmes, and wasteful prestige projects as factors contributing to the economic crisis. African states have of necessity turned to the industrial nations of the First World for their image and development, since these communities have the technology and finances fundamental to development. This may be themain reason that 95% of all African trade occurs outside the African continent However, African leaders. have long recognised the need for closer regional ties as a way of overcoming the fragmentation of the continent, one of the major constraints on economic development. Ndulo (1992: 17) claims that the economic integration of Africa was the centr8llheme of the 1980 Lagos ?Ian of Action and numerous other high-level statements and reports on African policy and development strategy. Economic integration is perceived by many African states as the ultimate type of regional economic collaboration, and as a promising vehicle for enhancing economic and social development, This idea is reinforced by the relative success of integration in Western Europe and through the United States-Canadian Free Trade Agreement.

The Post-colonial era trade relations between Europe and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries has been regulated by a number of economic cooperation agreements, namely the Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou Conventions to the current Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that had recently been concluded in the ECOWAS and SADC sub regions respectively. The EPAs negotiations have been marred with challenges particularly in Africa; with many countries having responded by not signing Interim EPAs and Nigeria has also stated they will not be concluding the EPA. Nigeria and South Africa have responded to the current negotiations in differing ways nonetheless their responses were somewhat similar. This study will attempt to understand and systematically explain Nigeria’s and South Africa’s positions on the EPAs negotiations process. In order to gain the understanding the study investigates whether EPAs negotiations stalled due to the influence and/or responses of Nigeria and South Africa? The factors involved in the negotiations that may explain the responses. What consequences the principle of reciprocity has on the responses Nigeria and South Africa? This research is going to be desk research using process tracing to systematically analyse the development of the negotiations between the EC and ACP countries particular attention being afforded to Africa and the resulting responses by Nigeria and South Africa. Some of the findings are that in the case of South Africa the principle of reciprocity was not a major factor in shaping South Africa’s responses to the negotiations, whereas the opposite holds true for Nigeria. Regional integration played a major part in the case of Nigeria.<br>MT2016

Thesis (Ph.D. (International Relations))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, 2016<br>This thesis examines the efforts of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to promote regional integration between 1980 and 2015 in the areas of trade and security. The conceptual framework provides a focused review of general and specific literature on two key concepts of regional integration: divergence, and convergence. Throughout the thesis, the core focus is on the divergence and convergence of COMESA and SADC. The thesis articulates two analytical frameworks: the neoclassical economics approach, and the neoclassical realist approach. A historical account focuses on the history of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) of 1981 that evolved into COMESA by 1993. A history of Southern Africa’s Frontline States (FLS), which evolved into the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, and later into SADC in 1992, is then provided. The thesis discusses apartheid South Africa’s involvement in the Eastern and Southern African regions. The thesis provides a discussion on the debate on the rationalisation processes of these two organisations: COMESA and SADC, between 1991 and 1997. The thesis next expands on the regionalisation processes of COMESA and SADC between 2008 and 2015. The main actors and factors assessed involve South Africa’s market-led regional approach, its regional developmental role and its economic impact on both regions since it joined SADC in 1994. The thesis expands on the two main regional integration approaches adopted by the COMESA–EAC (East African Community)–SADC Tripartite bloc (created in 2008) of variable geometry and trade liberalisation, as it moved towards its Tripartite Free Trade Area that was signed in June 2015. The thesis also provides definitions and assumptions of two new theories deployed to strengthen the research: i) neoclassical economic regional integration, and ii) neorealist security convergence, which are applied in the thesis. The thesis thus expands on how COMESA and SADC (as both institution and member states) manage multiple memberships. A central argument of the thesis is that multiple memberships have become a stumbling block for convergence. In furtherance of this argument, the thesis explains the benefits of regional integration schemes. Therefore assessed, is how developing countries are likely to be better served by “North–South” than by “South–South” free trade agreements. The analysis is expanded by a discussion of economic convergence in the neoclassical economic approach of open trade in regional trade agreements within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) – whose five members all belong to SADC - with the presence of a regional hegemonic state: South Africa. To further expand the concept of regionalism to encompass security cooperation, the thesis finally assesses COMESA and SADC’s managing of regional security since the 2008 Tripartite Agreement, by employing the concept of regional security complexes.<br>MT2017