Articles de revues sur le sujet « EU. Financial governance. Organized interests »

The Eurozone crisis exposed the incompleteness of the Economic and Monetary Union’s governance framework thereby prompting the promotion of a multitude of reform packages and proposals. This simultaneously induced conflict among EU governments on both design and content of such reforms. In case of the financial transaction tax (FTT) proposal, which failed to garner consensus among member governments, it illustrates Ireland’s disapproval clashing with favorable German and French stances. While these governments aligned on the necessity to reform, the process of harmonizing EU financial governance proved rather difficult. In analyzing governments’ variation of reform support or opposition, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed. This is considerably conducive in directing academic attention to the role of two explanatory variables, domestic material interests and value-based ideas, in shaping governments’ reform positions. This article encompasses a comprehensive comparative account of domestic preference formation and responsiveness of three EU governments (France, Germany and Ireland), in the case study of the FTT, and demonstrates that the two societal dynamics are prone to have played a role in shaping financial reform controversies. By building on and contributing to Eurozone crisis literature, this approach seems appropriate in analyzing financial governance reform due to the crisis’ domestic impact resulting in increased public salience, issue politicization and an advanced role of elected politicians.

Most European Union policies directly affect cities, but their role in formulating these policies is insufficient. Therefore, cities are undertaking para-diplomacy and lobbying at the EU level independently of national governments. They use the opportunities offered by the EU, namely multilevel governance system and the European Commission’s policy of openness and deliberation. The article presents an analysis of the patterns and strategies of representation of cities’ interests at the EU level, their adaptation to the requirements of the EU interests intermediation system, as well as the motivations for undertaking lobbying. It is argued that cities follow two main channels of interests representation: permanent representations with direct lobbying in Brussels and activity in European city networks. Two types of motivations behind lobbying can be distinguished: regulatory mobilization and financial mobilization. Their relations with EU institutions are subject to advanced institutionalization.

The current financial crisis has vividly demonstrated that due to the incentives of bank shareholders to take excessive risks on behalf of other stakeholders and society, banking governance based exclusively on shareholder interests results in systemically fragile banks and financial instability. The key challenge is to establish a bank governance framework in which financial institutions begin to perform their central function of serving and supporting long-term economic development. The recent change in the bank resolution mechanism legislation for banks in the EU from a bail-out to a bail-in approach that creates a new group of bank stakeholders with strong incentives to oppose excessive risk-taking – uninsured debtholders – can be seen as an opportunity to enact substantial change in bank governance.

AbstractEU agencies have mushroomed in recent years and new agencies, such as those in the financial arena, can have far-reaching quasi-regulatory and supervisory powers. These developments raise fundamental questions as to their constitutional standing, the delegation of powers and how to wrestle the challenges of independence and accountability. This paper considers ESMA, the most ambitious new financial sector agency. It examines ESMA's governance and accountability mechanisms and makes normative proposals to better balance the competing supranational and national interests within it. Such refinements should also be implemented in conjunction with additional accountability requirements, particularly a greater role for the European Parliament. This reshaping is vital to guarantee ESMA's autonomy and legitimacy.

Abstract This article examines the evolution of the EU ‘redistributive’ policies in the (post-) crisis EU era. By reviewing the EU cohesion policy, the financial assistance mechanisms, the new economic governance measures and the potentials of attributing the EU fiscal capacity, it aims to conceptualize the notion of solidarity as redistribution as this has evolved by reason of the crisis. The article argues that by virtue of the diverging economies, interests and preferences of the Member States, reciprocal or ‘effects-based solidarity’ is the only type of solidarity that has been exhibited among the Member States during the crisis. It, further, shows how the principle of solidarity has not lived up to its potential in the present crisis context, but it has instead been cropped up in sharply different ways in the rhetorics and communications of political parties of all hues across the Union.

The author analyses how big business interests groups influence the both EU legislative and policy making process, and by doing so how they distort pluralistic concept of public policy networking at the supranational level of governance. The enormous financial resources available to multinational corporations provide them the use of 'front group' strategy or the 'third party' strategy, manipulative public relations tactics, and an insider position in the European Commission's consultative fora, which all lead to exclusion of grass root groups. The author concludes that big business influence on the EU decision-makers will have negative effects on democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions, and he thinks that an efficient institutional control over lobbying activities in Brussels is needed.

The article presents an assessment of the impact of adverse environmental factors on corporate governance in the Russian banking sector. The specifics of national banking corporate governance are revealed. It is concluded that it is necessary to use built-in adaptation mechanisms in the corporate governance system of the banking sector. The main threats from the external environment related to the impact of the package of US and EU sanctions on the financial system of the Russian Federation are identified. Possible ways of using corporate governance tools to smooth out negative influences and reduce the degree of risk in the banking sector are considered. A proactive approach and a focus on maintaining a balance of interests of all interested groups are proposed as the main vectors for the development of corporate governance in the banking sector.

The experience of public finance management in the EU in the framework of tightly controlled coordination of medium-term fiscal policy and the single monetary policy of the European Monetary Union (EMU) indicates that Strategic Public Finance Governance (SPFG) should be distinguished from the strategy for reforming the public finance management system within the established approaches of Public Finance Management (PFM) as general from special. The Strategic Public Finance Governance Mission (SPFG) is seen as enhancing the government’s financial capacity to respond in a timely and adequate manner to global challenges and threats through coordinated and targeted participation in relevant international activities and programs that correlate with the solution of certain global problems. The mission also includes expanding the fiscal space for public financial support of national sustainable development priorities that meet national interests, the criteria of national security in general and economic, financial, fiscal in particular. This involves the use of both domestic and borrowed (from other countries, international organizations, etc.) financial resources. Nowadays, the PFM approach covers mainly the general government sector. Strategic Public Finance Governance (SPFG) should cover the public sector as a whole. In our opinion, this is the main direction of further European integration reform of the public finance management system in Ukraine.

The collapses of several US-businesses like those of Enron and Worldcom and a number of scandals in the EU – in the recent past that of Parmalat – have strongly affected public confidence in the operation and governance of large entities trading their shares in organized capital markets. The European Commission reacted by issuing the Action Plan on Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU on 21 May 2003. The Action Plan contains measures which the Commission wants to implement over the short term (until 2005), medium term (until 2008) and long term (until 2010). The key issues set up in the Action Plan concern corporate governance, capital maintenance, recapitalization as well as decreasing capital, groups of companies, international corporate restructuring and the introduction of a new legal form of incorporation. The fact that the big rating agencies have begun to rate the corporate governance performances of major companies, can well be seen as a further indicator that good corporate governance has an important concern for managers, shareholders and for policy makers. As part of the Action Plan, the Commission has recently launched consultations on board responsibilities and improving financial and corporate governance information, on directors’ remuneration and on the role of (independent) non-executive or supervisory directors. In the light of these recent consultations and the results of the public consultation on the Action Plan, this Article offers an overview and assessment of the corporate governance measures planned at Community level.

Greenhouse gas emission reduction and decarbonization goals drive citizens’ interests in alternative fuel vehicles and have created fast-growing demands on alternative fuels. While governments are promoting the transition to alternative fuel vehicles, the lack of refueling and recharging infrastructure for the vehicles is a key barrier to the adoption. At the same time, the public sector cannot solely provide needed alternative fueling infrastructure due to limited financial resources. Consequently, governments in the U.S. have been working on facilitating the private sector’s investment in alternative fueling infrastructure. The most common approach was financial incentive programs and policies, but the U.S. also promotes self-organized collaborative governance of alternative fuels across sectors at the local level. This paper asks whether these two approaches stimulate the private sector’s engagement in providing alternative fueling infrastructure. This study uses the case of the Clean Cities program that targets the reduction in petroleum usage, adoption of alternative fuels and creation of self-governance at the local level. Local private businesses, local government agencies and non-profit organizations voluntarily participate in the local transition to alternative fuels. Therefore, this governance aims at facilitating more sustainable actions and business choices in the private sector. This paper tests the hypotheses of whether the local self-governance of Clean Cities increases privately-owned alternative fueling infrastructure using panel fixed-effects Poisson regression models. Based on the data of counties in 12 states from 2004 to 2015, the results of empirical analysis suggest that both self-governance and financial incentive programs are effective in increasing the engagement of private actors in providing alternative fueling infrastructure.

Corporate reporting and governance are interlinked: Accounting and reporting inventions created the modern company, and without the modern company there is no entity from which to report. Due to its raison d’etre, reporting remained finance-centered, to protect financial capital providers. From the 1970’s, the question of the interests of ‘stakeholders’ emerged, with attempts of ‘social reporting’, ‘corporate social responsibility’, ‘environmental’, and ‘social and environmental’ and finally ‘integrated’ accounting and reporting. These trends are reflected also in the European Union legal framework, both in regulation of especially financial intermediaries and the ‘non-financial’ reporting. This article is based on an extensive literature review, research conducted in the Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART) project, and socio-legal and economic empirical research based conceptual analysis of the impact of these reporting systems and their relationship to financial accounting and reporting. The result of the research is that sustainability is reduced to focus on institutional investors and other members in the investment supply chain, and climate change issues only, and new regulatory solutions are required. Based on the most recent developments in EU law and in European jurisdictions, possible paths forward are envisaged to encourage sustainability in reporting and assurance, and through that, in governance. As an outcome a set of regulatory reform proposals are given based on the SMART recommendations.

AbstractHarmonizing corporate governance systems can potentially level the playing field for businesses, as it would increase financial and economic interconnections, including market integration, between countries. Although harmonization at the regional level such as the EU seems challenging because systems are so diverse, the reverse is the case at the national level. A critical issue in the harmonization effort is whether to adopt the “comply or explain” approach or the mandatory compliance approach. Although mandatory compliance is necessary in certain circumstances, particularly in cases of corporate pseudo-reporting that occasions corporate failures, the predominant approach involves “comply or explain”. Given competing interests in the business community, the inclination for flexibility and the regulatory authority's disposition for an oversight function, this article argues that a hybrid approach should be followed, which will internalize the merits of both the “comply or explain” and mandatory compliance approaches while eschewing their disadvantages.

The purpose of the analysis is to demonstrate, in the historical perspective covering the period between 2000 and 2014, the series of modernisation efforts, undertaken within the European Union, which aimed at increasing the rationality of economic and social processes occurring in the single European market. The assumption was that a thorough examination of the current process of EU reforms would allow for the identification of sources of the modernisation crisis. The adopted research hypothesis assumes that the present modernisation crisis is a consequence of the weakness of European governance and insufficient adaptation of the EU policy instruments to the constantly changing political and economic challenges, such as globalisation, territorial expansion and the global financial crisis. Effective modernisation of the European Union is hindered by the manner of implementation of EU’s tasks and objectives at the national level (based on the open method of coordination) and challenged by the interstate competition escalating within the EU in times of economic downturn and arising from the divergent interpretations of national interests. The present modernisation crisis manifests itself in the failure to comply with the adopted economic and social development strategies and the threat of regressive changes.

Corporate governance encompasses a multidisciplinary approach, which includes the internal and external factors that affect the interests of a company’s stakeholders. The Greek corporate governance framework of listed companies has initially been established in accordance with EU regulation and soft law recommendations, in order to enhance board accountability and transparency, empower shareholders’ activism and promote financial disclosure. In that regard, it has recently been reformed by the provisions of Law 4706/2020, aiming mainly: to empower the strategic and supervisory role of the board of directors, by introducing a clear description of the obligations of non-executive and independent non-executive directors and by including the establishment of an “adequacy (internal fit-and-proper) policy” for the appointment of board members. Accordingly, two new compulsory committees are added, the nomination and the remuneration committee, which should entirely be composed by non-executive members and are invested with an advisory role in determining the remuneration policy and proposing board candidates. Furthermore, the adoption of a Corporate Governance Code is rendered substantial for all listed companies. These provisions illustrate specifically the reform of the internal corporate governance structures, which should be implemented having regard to the general principles of transparency and proportionality

The Lisbon Treaty gave the European Parliament extensive new powers and its consent is now required for the vast majority of EU international agreements. At the same time, national parliaments—and even regional ones—are increasingly asserting their powers over areas of European governance that were traditionally dominated by the executive. Exerting influence and conducting oversight is time-consuming, however. Particularly at the EU-level parliaments cannot influence or scrutinise every policy dossier with equal rigour. A key factor directing parliamentary attention seems to be the ‘politicisation’ of an issue. In other words, the amount of contestation and attention given to a particular issue seems to affect parliamentary activity. This thematic issue seeks to assess <em>how</em> politicisation affects the role parliaments play within the system of EU governance. In particular, the contributions aim to answer the over-arching question of whether politicisation has an impact on how parliaments seek to influence policy-making and hold the EU executives to account. Furthermore, we raise the question of whether and how politicisation affects the role of parliaments as arenas for contestation and communication of different political interests. Jointly, the findings provide the empirical foundations for a more comprehensive debate regarding the democratic implications of politicisation. Politicisation puts pressure on parliaments to act, but parliamentarians themselves may also find it in their interest to instigate contestation. This thematic issue addresses these questions by shedding light on both the European Parliament and national parliaments and examines different policy-fields reaching from climate change and trade, to financial affairs and the Common Fisheries Policy.

The main focus of this article is the role of organized civil society in facilitating citizen engagement in Central and East European new EU member states after the EU accession and the recent economic crises. Using international comparative methodologies and data this article analyses democratic processes in the new member states focussing on the changes in strengths and weaknesses of citizen engagement. It shows the ways in which the post-enlargement process, especially the economic crisis affected the ability of CEE citizens — both directly, and via civil society organisations and trade unions — to be active participants of the multilevel governance processes. It finds that one of the key remaining gaps of the democratization process remains the relative weakness of state—citizens relationship. The impact of the economic crisis on the CEE countries was significant, in particular in regard to financial viability of organised civil society. However, economic crisis also acted as an important mobilization factor, and in all countries under study, civic participation, enabled by civil society and trade unions increased. New initiatives — in particular those tackling corruption and party campaign finance, saw NGOs focussing their advocacy efforts towards the government as well as actively mobilizing and engaging citizens. Across the CEE region, we are seeing gradual social learning, internalization of new norms and emergence of new identities — active citizens engaged with (and if necessary in opposition to) the state — directly (public mobilization and protests) and via organized civil society.

The financial and eurozone crises highlighted the inadequacy of the original governance structures of the eurozone. In response, a range of reforms were launched, including the creation of a European banking union. In practice, some elements of the banking union were delayed by division among member states and the breakdown of the Franco-German motor, such as the question of the operationalization of the single resolution mechanism and fund or the deposit insurance scheme. In addition, eurozone governance—which would once have been regarded as a technocratic issue—became increasingly politicized. The aim of this article is to study the extent to which the banking union was scrutinized by parliament and to what degree this reflects material interests and ideas. For this purpose, it focuses on salience (i.e., how much attention the issue received) and polarization (i.e., the divergence of positions). The analysis of the resolutions and debates of the German Bundestag and French Assemblée Nationale, i.e., the parliaments of two key states in EU decision-making on banking union, finds that the German government was indeed closely scrutinized, whereas the French government was relatively unconstrained.

The European Union (EU) aspires to become a global climate power. Climate neutrality became the guiding principle, the goal, and the pillar of the EU’s external policy after the Green Deal endorsement. The Green Deal is internationalized through a system of external policy instruments, including financial, trade and investment mechanisms, carbon border adjustment and emission trading, agreements with other countries, development support, and promotion of the EU’s regulation and standards through cooperation in international institutions. The normative documents and proposals on the key initiatives have been put forward, and the formats and plans for implementation are being discussed and defined. In this context, it is important to analyze the EU’s initiatives for internationalization of green transformation goals and to identify risks and opportunities related to their implementation. This article reviews the array of external policy instruments and initiatives deployed by the EU: the new trade policy of “open strategic autonomy” and the initiative on trade and sustainable development in the World Trade Organization (WTO); the framework for the screening of foreign direct investments and the taxonomy of environmentally sustainable investment and economic activity; new approaches to energy security and the building of global energy markets, including norms and standards for hydrogen markets; and the new neighbourhood policy, including the new strategy for Central Asia and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. Given the initial stage of the initiative’s implementation, the study focuses on the adopted documents and planned actions. The author assesses the potential impact of climate policy internationalization instruments on EU-Russia economic cooperation and on EU leadership in shaping global climate governance. The author asserts that a number of instruments bear risks for the Russian Federation’s economic projects and proposes recommendations for abating them. With regard to global governance, the EU’s commitment to integrate climate goals into the global agenda may serve as a bridge for inclusive governance. At the same time, the EU’s determination to impose its priorities through carrot and stick incentives, including through economic measures, on partners not sharing the EU’s approach may be destructive. The author concludes that the EU’s capacity to build constructive engagement with partners will be a test of the EU’s real leadership. Given that the Green Deal’s external dimension is intended not only to promote EU priorities and values, but also to advance the global public good, controversies arise with regard to the instruments, not the goals. Thus, it is in the interests of Russia, as well as other partners directly affected, not to oppose the export of the EU’s climate policy, but to cooperate to mitigate unintended consequences of its deployment and to shape inclusive global governance.

Following the fall of Gaddafi, Libya has fallen apart, and this vast and resource-rich country with around 1,800 km coastline to the southern side of the central Mediterranean has become a failed state. The crisis stemming from Libya has significant impact on the EU: Not only for irregular migration but also due to its security, economic and geopolitical importance to EU. Despite this multifaceted significance, EU Libya poli- cies have been focusing on the migration dimension of the crisis and making use of non-functioning Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions as the primary policy tool. That is why the EU missed the oppor- tunity to solve the crisis from an early age and has been sidelined with the escalating conflict. In the absence of EU, rival international actors took over the Libya dossier and started to shape the developments per their interests. If the EU does not take lessons from previous mistakes, it will soon lose its influence over Libya, which might turn out to be quite detrimental for its interests. As this is a multifaceted and multi-dimensional web of relations, the policy paper at hand focuses explicitly on the “migration” dimension and makes infer- ences based on this narrower scope. Interest Groups (IGs) are prominent actors in the migration dimension of the Libya crisis. This policy paper depicts that there are at least 738 IGs concerned with European or global level migration & asylum policies, and they have had hundreds of interactions with members of the EU Commission and Parliament. IGs have been spending money, energy and other resources to influence the EU policies in this field. However, up to now, just like EU Libya policies, their efforts on migration-related problems stemming from Libya has failed. Following a comprehensive description of the current status of migration dimension of EU Libya policies together with the role of various IGs, this policy brief examines the causes of (in)effectiveness of IGs’ efforts in influencing EU policies. It argues that public salience, internal security concerns of the member states and highly politicised nature of the migration issue makes it difficult for IGs to be influence. Irregular migration is not a matter on its own; it is a consequence of a causal link. In solving the issue, the EU needs a multifaceted approach, which considers IGs an integral partner and utilises IGs soft power, knowledge and expertise to increase the EU’s leverage. The policy paper at hand recommends EU and IGs to develop a partnership model which requires coordi- nation and assistance in Libya matters, without damaging the neutral interlocutor position of the IGs. This new model foresees IG support in handling IDPs, refugees/irregular migrants, training and monitoring of the Libyan officials, or in reporting about the humanitarian aspects. Requires EU to utilise IGs in addressing the sources of grievances between local ethnic, tribal and religious groups, or facilitating the truth-seeking ven- tures and repairing the relations between rival groups. IGs can support EU policies by providing mentorship to sovereign economic, financial, auditing institutions or misfunctioning judiciary, public health or education institutions. EU should benefit from IGs in the prevention of radicalisation/extremism, as well. For the sake of preventing the emergence of several and conflicting member state Libya policies, EU su- pranational bodies should lead to the process vis á vis overall EU interests. To save IGs from the complex power-sharing structure, European External Action Service should undertake the one single coordinator role with IGs. EU officials should encourage or —if need be— stipulate Libyan authorities to cooperate with IGs in their operations for Libya. EU may consider using military CSDP operations or EU battlegroup to protect the peace process from spoilers or destructive foreign meddling or defend the governing institutions from the impact of various militia groups and enforce the arms embargo. EU should also activate a competent sanctions policy against the spoilers of the process. Another crucial task for the EU will be the construction of a unified and reliable security apparatus. IGs can build the support that the EU requires on the ground. EU requirements overlap with IGs interests; they both need to construct a thriving society, inclusive politics, and good governance, which will make Libya a hard-to-find neighbour/ally to the EU.

Review of recent literature on adaptation to climate change and general literature on policy processes shows that there are a large number of barriers that hamper the development and implementation of climate change adaptation strategies. To reduce and manage the number of barriers and combine both streams of literature, we propose seven clusters of barriers to adaptation. Little is known, however, about the relative importance of these barriers to climate change adaptation policies and practices. An online survey was conducted between March 2010 and July 2010 among 264 scientists, policymakers, and private actors from different sectors and levels who are involved in climate change adaptation projects and programmes in the Netherlands. The survey aimed to gather their experiences with, and perceptions of, the barriers identified in the literature and encountered in their daily work. Both climate-related and non-climate-related barriers were included in the survey. Data were subjected to both qualitative and quantitative analysis. A survey feedback workshop was organized to discuss the results with several of the survey respondents. Results of this study revealed that respondents considered conflicting timescales as the most important cluster of barriers to adaptation. Other highly ranked barriers include conflicting interests; lack of financial resources; unclear division of tasks and responsibilities; uncertain societal costs and future benefits; and fragmentation within and between scales of governance. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrated that scales matter in understanding the barriers to adaptation: actors from lowlevels of governance seem to consider the barriers as more severe than actors from high levels of governance.

According to the EC estimates presented in November 2018, the so-called VAT gap amounted to approximately EUR 150 billion with organized crime groups largely responsible for its creation. Therefore, it is not surprising that states, while protecting their economic interests, are implementing new measures aimed at detecting and preventing tax crime. Poland is also pursuing this type of activity, and a number of innovative measures in the field of tax law have been introduced over the last few years. One such solution is the automatic system of analysing transaction data from financial institutions (System Teleinformatyczny Izby Rozliczeniowej, STIR). The way this system works – combining the collection of enormous sets of personal data including sensitive information with confidential analytics and composing reports for tax authorities and law enforcement purposes – must raise doubts as to its compliance with human rights standards. In terms of its operation, STIR resembles electronic surveillance systems in other EU Member States; the difference is that, instead of capturing telecommunications data, it aggregates bulk amounts of information on financial transactions. The purpose of this article is to discuss the regulations that establish the legal framework of STIR and to present recommendations on how to ensure its compliance with the privacy and data protection model functioning in the EU. Special attention will be paid to assessing the proportionality and quality of legal safeguards implemented to limit the risk of abuse of power according to standards established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Conclusions drawn from this analysis are not only important from the perspective of the Polish legislature but are also relevant to other countries and EU institutions implementing systems similar to STIR that are interested in developing cooperation between Member States in the area of combatting tax fraud. Right to privacy, tax fraud, transaction network analysis, automated decision-making, VAT gap.

"Soft power" is the ability to change someone else's values, ideas, interests. Successful use of soft power leads to a change in attitudes and behavior. "Soft power" can be seen as managing the mass consciousness by indirect means that do not encounter conscious resistance. "Soft power" resources belong to civil society networks. Following the British referendum on June 23, 2016, the EU's global power of influence diminished. Traditionally, the European Union is seen as a stable center of material wealth, high social status, social optimism and justice, spiritual and physical comfort. However, as a rule, they forget about the fact that there is no permanent dependence between subjective well-being and changes in economic conditions of life. Until now, European optimists are pushing European integration as the only effective answer to the challenges of globalization, while European pessimists have said that federal Europe would be too centralized, inflexible and wasteful. The European Union is not so much a generator of European peace, as its result. The EU has emerged as a unique conglomerate of democratic states. This is not a federation or collective bargaining agreement, and it is not a classic nation-state, and most importantly not an empire with a metropolis at its center. It is an experimental form of peace-based integration as a norm. Instead, the empire is usually a centralized militarized state, the possession of which is a conglomerate of national territories of subjugated peoples. The EU is a social institution that implements collective action based on democratic approval and consent to their adoption. Despite governance weaknesses, the EU remains an important layer of capital regulation in the face of three global crises: the financial, environmental and security crises

Corporate law reveals its democratic background when it comes to the general meetings of shareholders, finding, on both sides of the Atlantic, its most tangible expression in the “one share, one vote” principle. While, in the political landscape, the “one person, one vote” standard is absolute dogma and weighting votes according to people’s preferences and interests has never proved feasible, in the corporate scenario the one share, one vote principle is constantly challenged by the incentives of companies and their shareholders to shape corporate rights according to specific needs. In this respect, some legislators (specifically in France and Italy) have provided mechanisms that allow more loyal shareholders to increase their voting power. Tenured voting (or time-phased voting rights) should be analyzed in light of the modern corporate governance debate, which calls for a stronger role for long-term investors. However, the other side of the coin should be considered: the increase in voting rights broadens the range of control-enhancing mechanisms, although specific sunset clauses (whether provided for by law or voluntarily opted in by companies) may restore the one share, one vote rule. The analysis suggests that the mechanism based on tenured voting is more transparent and potentially less stable than other common control-enhancing mechanisms and deserves to be considered in the debate. At the EU level, the possibility left to the Member States of weighting shareholders’ voting power according to their long-term interests, leads to legislative fragmentation across Europe. Specifically, in Italy, the adoption of tenured voting coupled with a tradition of ownership concentration sharply empowers controlling shareholders. At the same time, European takeover regulation plays an exogenous role in indirectly selecting the companies that adopt time-phased voting rights. The final result is completely mistrusted, as tenured voting rights disappoint their expectations and are rarely used to meet a true need of long termism. The paper describes the paradox that emerges when tenured voting rights interact with the core principles of the EU financial market law system, and it offers various ways to alleviate this difficult coexistence.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explain the origins and evolution of auditing and control by linking the changes in the manner in which the audits were conducted with the changes in the institutional function and development of the English East India Company (EIC). Design/methodology/approach Using Sunder’s contract theory of a firm as an interpretive framework, this paper introduces to the debate material documenting the evolution of the auditing practice during a period of 40 years using the single case of the EIC. Findings Auditing in the EIC evolved from a simple adjudication on allowable expenditures to ex post verification of transactions, and from using volunteers to paid auditors. Initially, the company was organized into a series of separate, terminable stocks, and simple verification by volunteer auditors chosen from among the shareholders was sufficient to secure the latter’s interests. When the increasing number, size, and complexity of transactions by the EIC rendered the adjudication approach insufficient, ex post verification of financial transactions was added. With a clearer separation between ownership and control at the time of the introduction of permanent joint stock, the audit function assumed a more professional form. Originality/value This paper contributes to the research on the early modern period at a time of the formation and rapid development of the first joint-stock organization. It offers a dynamic picture of the evolution of control and auditing as a response to the growth of business, organizations, and the attendant challenges of governance.

The author of the article has outlined the problem of finding the most optimal model of the state for of government, because the necessary condition for stable development of society and effective functioning of the state is to ensure the balance between national interests and the interests of the population of regions and territorial communities. The preconditions, political history and periods of the formation of decentralized power in most European medieval states, scientific positions of national and foreign legal scholars on the expediency of implementing decentralization have been analyzed. It has been found out that the vast majority of Western European countries abdicate the unitary state model by introducing decentralization. The leading idea of reforming is to move the center of solving local issues to the local and, in particular regional level that is achieved by optimizing relations between different levels of territorial organization of power. National traditions, formation and functioning of public agencie in the past, specific features of administrative and territorial structure of the state, existence of autonomous territories, multiethnic population have a significant influence on the formation of the constitutional system on the basis of decentralization in the EU countries. The positive experience Poland, France, Italy, Latvia, Germany and Denmark has been studied. The author has theoretically substantiated that the principle of decentralization has been successfully implemented in the practice of the European Union countries. It has been indicated that the prerequisite for the successful implementation of decentralization processes to create an effective model of governance within the system of decentralized government of Ukraine is: the establishment of the rule of law principle; recognition and guarantees of local self-government; equal legal protection of all forms of ownership; democratic and effective electoral legislation; independence, efficiency, accessibility and transparency of the judicial system, functioning of administrative justice institutions; perfect budget process and high financial discipline; availability of adequate social standards; developed public sector and stable tendency towards its development.

Abstract In the era of globalization, the problem of money laundering is becoming increasingly widespread because the existence of this crime involves many factors that cross national boundaries. The problem of money laundering is the dark side of globalization. Handling money laundering cannot be solved quickly and easily, but it takes time, commitment, political will, and support from all parties: national governments, communities, and multilateral cooperation. Learning from South Korea, Indonesia and the international community, for example, requires bureaucratic reform based on a more efficient structure by upholding the spirit of 'Good Governance' and 'Check and Balance' which is expected to encourage all elements of the nation to work together to solve corruption at a practical level. In addition, the judiciary must be consistent and responsible in enforcing the rule of law in a professional and impartial manner. The key to law enforcement lies in synergistic cooperation between the police, prosecutors, and the judiciary. At the global level, effective global governance is very important for eradicating corruption and money laundering. Multilateral cooperation needs to be improved and made effective in handling issues related to transnational organized crimes, such as corruption and money laundering. Seeing the very detrimental impact of the practice of money laundering globally, especially the effect that can damage the country's economic resilience, of course, effective efforts are needed to eradicate its development. Some things that can be suggested to eradicate money laundering practices are as follows: (1) Good coordination between sectors and between domestic departments in implementing anti-money laundering regulations and policies issued by the government. (2) Improvements in the cultural aspects of law enforcement and government officials, as well as financial and banking institutions are also very much needed to reduce opportunities for bribery committed by money laundering actors. (3) It is necessary to have a minimum standard that is acceptable at the international level regarding anti-money laundering, both in financial and banking regulations, corporate law and legal aid between countries. A standard international law must be made so that it becomes a benchmark for countries in the world. (4) A strong commitment is needed from the governments of countries in the world to eradicate money laundering practices, thereby facilitating bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the framework of supranational institutions to combat money laundering globally. With the existence of a united global community to eradicate money laundering, the interests of certain countries that could hinder the process of implementing the eradication of money laundering can be suppressed.

Since 2017 in the EU, companies with more than 500 staff must be required to report on environmental, social, human rights, corporate governance, combating corruption and bribery, the prospects of innovation development and other information of interest to the public. Such data can have as financial, as well as non-financial nature. In addition, the audit occupies a special place in the reporting system of developed countries. Audit not only ensures the credibility of integrated reporting, but also provides clarification on its compilation. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the conceptual provisions of the formation and development of integrated reporting in Ukraine, taking into account the current world trends, national needs and possibilities of IT technologies. Research methods. The methods and techniques of scientific knowledge are used to formulate the hypothesis of the study and its proof. In particular, The method of induction, deduction and abstraction is used to study the past achievements of the domestic scientific school of accounting for improving the information provision of the management of the national economy and forecasting the development of expanded (integrated) reporting in Ukraine. A systematic analysis of the construction and organization of integrated reporting in Ukraine and the world has been carried out. Due to the simulation using the axiomatic and hypothetical method, the principles and conceptual provisions of developing the accounting and reporting system in the agrarian sector of economy are proposed. Research results. It was found that the dynamics of the number of forms of statistical observation in Ukraine has a stable negative tendency. Problems of unreliability of reporting information in agriculture were revealed. The changes in the legislation related to introduction of integrated reporting in Ukraine were analyzed. According to authors, decentralization as a catalyst for information requests will form a new basis for developing a reporting system. The prospects of integrated reporting on sustainable development of agrarian enterprises of Ukraine were estimated. A specific benchmark for the development of integrated reporting in the agrarian sector can be the Global Strategy for Agricultural and Rural Statistics Development of the United Nations and FAO. The conceptual provisions of the development of the accounting and reporting system of the agrarian sector were proposed. The emphasis is on the role of auditors and consulting companies in the development of integrated reporting. It was proved that the domestic accounting science is able to simulate and conceptually, methodologically and methodically to ensure the development of modern accounting and information system in Ukraine. It is important to take into account the following principles: queries - opportunities; world trends - national interests; behavioral basis - capabilities of IT technologies; regulatory factors - entrepreneurial initiative, etc.

Purpose. The aim of the article is identification and critical analysis of problems and substantiation on their basis of perspectives, instruments and mechanisms of rural development of Ukraine on the basis of improvement of institutional and innovative policy of the state, with achievement of economic security and sustainable multifunctional development of rural areas, regions, territorial communities and subjects of business activity in the context of European integration and convergence to the standards of the European Union. Methodology of research. The methodological basis of the study is the theoretical development of domestic and foreign scientists on the problem, legislative and regulatory materials of Ukraine and the EU. In the course of the research, general scientific and special methods are used, namely: monographic, analytical, abstract and logical and other methods – to summarize the results of the literary review on the problem under study, to substantiate the directions of rural development research, and to write programs for promoting rural development. Findings. It is substantiated that rural territory is a complex and multifunctional natural, social and economic, production and economic structure, characterized by a set of peculiarities inherent in it, namely: the area of land; landscape features; the number of people living and their type of employment; the number, species diversity of flora and fauna; volumes and structure of production; development of social and industrial infrastructure and other features. It is found that the format of the approach to the definition of the concept of “rural area” has changed significantly, in which it is not only the concept of space, where agriculture and forestry occupied a major share, but also the understanding that it is a place that has had considerable human, natural, cultural and social capital. It is determined that the territorial model of rural development, unlike other models, provides two parallel variants of development: the focus on the development of agrarian and agro-industrial sectors as drivers. This model recognizes the importance of local institutions (private and public) both in developing the directions of development and in the management and implementation of development programs. It is substantiated that, it is advisable to create appropriate regional development agencies to ensure the planned regulation of this process in order to make effective use of the territorial-resource potential of the rural territories of the region. It is proved that the activation of rural development is provided mainly on the basis of the implementation of the applied principles of agricultural policy related to institutional and innovative, sectoral and territorial stimulation, which facilitates the transition to sustainable development. Originality. The priority methodology for the study of rural development is defined, which includes the construction of a logarithm when writing a program for rural restoration and development. The structure of the regional public agency for rural development of Podillia is substantiated, which envisages the following functional departments: strategic management of rural development; formation of competent population; transfer of innovative technologies (products); design, which develops different types of innovation and investment projects for the sectoral and territorial economy. Practical value. It is determined that the common agricultural policy of the European Union is aimed at: balanced development of economic, social and environmental spheres; multifunctional development of rural areas; transition to principles of rational use of nature; protection of interests of rural population and formation of economic mechanism of development of rural territories in the system of social and economic security of the state. It is established that within the territorial development model, the importance of local institutions has been found to be complemented by the need for effective coordination between the different levels of governance of this policy, starting with EU policy, which is manifested through financial support and establishing a system of rules and guidelines, and further to national, regional and local levels. This combination contributes to the success of rural development policy, which has made multi-level governance one of the key features of rural development policy. Key words: rural areas; communities; strategy; institutional and innovation development; economic security; EU standards.

It has become an overused, indeed dated, cliché to claim that the European Union (EU) is at a crossroads. Today it is more common, and perhaps also more accurate, to argue that the EU faces an existential crisis. This is not just an academic opinion, but the language that is increasingly present in the EU’s political, policy and strategic documents. The changing, indeed deteriorating, domestic, regional and global security environment, which has openly put the very existence of the EU at risk, has consequently increased demands for a genuine and robust EU common security and defence policy (CSDP). The latter is not a recent invention. It has a long history, with many ups and downs, not unlike the process of European integration, in which concerns about national sovereignty and related national comprehensive, if too often parochial, priorities have been struggling to match normative ambitions, and solemn declarations that have been developed in response to the actual growing security concerns. How have the EU and its Member States coped with the Scylla of national sovereigntist defence priorities and the Charybdis of the objective needs of supranational cooperation in the dire straits of the CSDP? What are the current most acute security challenges? What can or should be done to improve the CSDP and are there grounds for pessimism or optimism with a view to its future development? These are the questions that this special issue of Contemporary Military Challenges, dedicated to the CSDP, explores across five articles written by legal, international, social and security science academics, as well as security and defence experts. The picture these articles have painted is a mixed one. Modest optimism in terms of the progress of the CSDP mechanisms is combined with chagrin related to missed opportunities, too often due to the culture of non-compliance, and concerns related to the changes taking place in the overall global model of governance. The latter are particularly addressed in the article penned by Senčar. He persuasively demonstrates how, in the course of the last 20 years, the European post-Cold War consensus and mindset, embedded in the Kantian ideals of liberal democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights and solidarity in and between the states has gradually, but almost without notice, given way to a Hobbesian, strategic and competitive world order, primed by national sovereigntist interests. However, due to technological progress, the collapse of the post-Cold War consensus and the resulting change in paradigm possesses new, as yet still unexplored security threats, which will affect nothing as much as our minds. As Senčar powerfully demonstrates, contemporary and, in particular, future warfare will be directed against our heads, featuring a paramount cognitive dimension. It is for this reason that the EU and its Member States must invest in the cognitive aspects of the CSDP, in particular with an eye on the leading revisionist power, Russia. However, to do so the EU must be in possession of the necessary and appropriate competencies, backed by a sufficient national political will. The remaining four articles are thus dedicated to the examination of this issue. The article by Katarina Vatovec comes across as the most optimistic. She traces the process of the ‘communitarization’ of the EU’s defence policies and identifies the required socio-political grounds for strengthening this process in the future. In her view, communitarization, which has traditionally stood for bringing a particular policy field from an intergovernmental to a supranational pillar, subject to an ordinary legislative procedure based on qualified majority voting, can be gradually introduced through the presence of a sufficient political will resulting from actual experience, successfully implemented policy initiatives, and growing awareness of the increasing security threats. While according to this author the future of the European Defence Union remains in the hands of the Member States and intergovernmental cooperation, following the important breakthrough with the Treaty of Lisbon, a number of institutional, legal, policy, soft-law and financial measures have intensified the functioning of EU defence policy and, simultaneously, driven it in the direction of further communitarization. The article by Dick Zandee partakes of a similar normative premise. He believes that the CSDP is faced with the dilemma of making a breakthrough or simply continuing to muddle through. For him the answer is unequivocal. What is needed is a breakthrough, which would contribute to closing the gap between rhetorical commitments and action. A concrete opportunity for that is presented by the Strategic Compass. This is envisaged as a concrete, ambitious and actionable tool that should provide tangible direction for the EU’s role in security and defence over the next five or ten years. To meet this goal, according to Zandee, nothing is required more than realism. The article thus concludes by laying down eight concrete and realistic actions by which the EU could break out of its current status quo in the CSDP and turn itself into a truly global power before it is too late. Aleksandra Koziol’s contribution, quite fittingly, complements Zandee’s contribution by putting some empirical flesh on the normative agenda. She describes the EU’s current security and defence engagement in Europe and abroad, the major challenges that it poses, and the actual capacity of the EU to address them. This remains relatively weak and sometimes questionable for a variety of political, organizational, financial and sometimes also ad hoc reasons. The latter are currently the most explicit in form of the Covid-9 pandemic, which has importantly hampered, as the author demonstrates, the European Commission’s ambition of assuming the role of a geopolitical commission. In the author’s opinion it is decisive for the future development of the CSDP that the EU simultaneously builds on the civilian and the military side of the CSDP and develops its capacities for early warnings, early actions and a rapid response. Finally, the article by Jelena Juvan, after describing the historical evolution of the CSDP in the context of European integration, looks into the future of CDSP, paying special attention to the role of small Member States, such as Slovenia, in it. The author notes that size matters, and that the development of supranational security and defence structures could especially work to the advantage of the small Member States. Their capacity to shape the development of the CSDP is, however, limited, unless they invest in specialization and cooperation, and also prudently seize the opportunity when presiding over the Council of the EU in their mediating and to an extent also agenda-setting role. While time will tell how Slovenia is going to use its opportunity as the head of the Council of the EU, the article insists that, especially for small Member States with limited human and financial resources, setting the CSDP priorities matter most. When these are set and the agreements entered into, they must also be delivered upon. In the opposite case a culture of non-compliance prevails, which effectively leaves the CSDP as only a half-built house. In conclusion, the five reviewed articles contained in this volume yet again confirm Kintis’ impression that the field of the CSDP, more than any other EU policy field, is torn between ambition and paralysis. This results, in particular, from the discrepancy between the ever-changing security and defence challenges brought about by an increasingly dynamic global environment, and the actual EU capacity to address them that is, in turn, dependent on the national political will. The articles contained in this volume express their concerns with the slow progress of the CSDP, but they also try to overcome it by putting forward some new proposals or, at least, by raising the right questions. Eventually, however, the CSDP can only make a real, qualitative and required step forward when a consensus on the legal and political nature of the EU is formed. As long as the latter stays in its current, sui-generis, hybrid form, the CSDP will remain stuck between ‘ambition and paralyzis’. The operationalization of the CSDP and its actual functional character thus first requires the addressing of the constitutional question of the nature, object and purpose of the European Union itself.

The main reasons for climate change which are explained in this article are as follows: -Climate pollution by gases with CO2 emission and Greenhouse Effect; Climate contamination of viruses with viruses from nature by animals or glaciers when thawing or produced in Laboratories; Induced Climate Change due to meteorological weapons with high intensity radio waves to produce rains, hurricanes and possible induction of earthquakes; Climate pollution by radiation due wars with irreversible consequences in the climate and Nuclear Winter; Climate Change due the explosion of missiles and atomic weapons in the oceans; Climate Change due the natural cyclical phases of the Earth affected by the cyclical variations of the Earth's magnetic field lines which can be affected by the severe cyclical activity of the sun due storms and sunspot because of the combustion that occurs inside the Sun which is due to the gravitational instabilities produced by the planets of the solar system, asteroids or the Comet Planet; Climate Change due to the invading Comet Planet into the solar system that affects with its gravitational field to the sun with solar storms and the planets with variation of the magnetic field lines affecting the climate, earthquakes and activation of volcanoes and indeed with the entry of many meteors and asteroids to the Earth; Climate change due to the Arm of God Allah explaining all the above reasons being more evident in times of Tribulation. The specific methods and devices of the control and manipulation of the population (inclusive to induce to the concupiscence) in times of new world order (Universal Big Brother Program for the control of human in the Earth) and possible Tribulation are explained in this article: Surveillance programs with all technological devices and networks used by humans systematic methods of persuasive manipulation and indoctrination used by some zombie humans and dark; Through the subjugation of employees and humans (inclusive children teaching them how to manipulate in the same style of the zombies); By enterprises or dark groups so that employees make manipulation games with details (investing work time to play like children) receiving bribes, money or labor benefits or with possible retaliation if they do not obey; Surveillance programs in living and working places with covert technological cameras, coincidence games, activities, plans and events programmed in sequence (inclusive pyrotechnic sounds in sequence); Covert numbers and words (in identification documents, cards, car plates, devices used by humans); Encrypted, hidden codes or small phrases and numbers not visible to the naked eye concealed in objects; Covert words in the speech of zombie humans and from multimedia and channels of traditional technological devices through movies, programs and even newscasts and inclusive to speak in code with the humans who know the surveillance programs and worst using in those channels and programs derogatory words against the Nazarenes (in the style of Nazism with the Jews) in complicity of close acquaintances, zombies and dark who participate profiting from the system for the vile metal; By means of an epidemic and viruses produced in laboratories creating epidemics and chaos in the Earth for the reduction and control of the population; Through strict restrictions and reduction of freedoms; Confinement with subsequent compulsory vaccination to be able to access human rights such as the right to work and the right to travel (with the cover-up of the respective organizations responsibles for it: OIT OMT), without responsibility of the authorities in charge of vaccination worldwide (OMS) for the short or long term counterproductive effects of the vaccinated population due to the risk with the liquid of the vaccines by interfering with the DNA and RNA of the population; Possible marking and elimination of many humans (possibility of control of the pulmonary alveoly or induction controlled of diseases or pain due a virus by means of chips introduced in humans); Control of humans by the introduction of liquid and solid chips in humans (liquid crystals that crystallize in the organism and settle in neurons and receive ultrasonic waves of very low frequency) (possibly inserted from vaccines in global epidemiological programs for population control or invasive medical examination when this is not necessary as a figurative example of review of a patient with a sore in the mouth and introduction of the whole hand in the throat or prostate examination or specific injections to certain objective humans or Nazarenes who have opened the matrix of the darks and the elite that controls the humans in the Earth) in times of epidemic in medical examinations and treatments in hospitals (false medical negligence with breach of the medical oath of the use of Medicine for human good). The possible liquid and solid chips introduced into the human being can be used for mind reading (telepath) and thought induction (double direction: sending and receiving messages in the style of Stephen Hawking and the style of the technology already used in sending probes into space and to the moon) and possible human marking with surveillance program and the possible creation of zombie humans. Humans who have the mind reader chip installed can speak without speaking (the dumb speak playing like the miracles of Jesus Christ). It is possible to detect if the humans who have the mental reading chip installed have psychological alterations without going to a doctor. It is possible to know if humans are good or bad without seeing their actions and without going to a priest. In this way, human beings with the chip installed can be sanctioned before they do somewhat wrong (simply because it is known to be thinking). This can be used to know the fidelity to a political guideline or direction (this is known by the strong rumor in communist countries that already have the technology to detect the fidelity to the political party and possibly this is through this chip installed in the human being and mind reading). The inserted chip can also perform thought induction: this is possibly the apocalyptic mark mentioned in the apocalypse because many humans will perform sins or concupiscence induced and not naturally. Then, this will most probably activate the Wrath of God, the seals, and the trumpets of the apocalypse. It surprises me that actually the OMS wants to bring the vaccination program to Africa when in Africa there are not many dead by the epidemy (possibly for the control and reduction of the population will be in all the Earth). Afterward, the OMS mentioned that wants to insert a manufacturing center of vaccines in many countries and inclusive vigilance programs (possibly for the control and reduction of the population will be effective at the local level). But, what the OMS needs to mention is that it is necessary to eliminate the laboratories of virus creation and not create more vaccine laboratories. Humans do not want more vaccine and injections and laboratories for the creation of vaccines but the elimination of virus laboratories which are most probably used for for the control and reduction of the population: thus, the reason for spreading a virus created in a laboratoy across the Earth is evident: population reduction and control of humanity in preparation for a global elite program (new world order or program 2030 for the control of the dark and of the elite; Connection of covert surveillance cameras (in living and working places) with channels of traditional technological devices through movies, programs and even newscasts (including newscasts that usually make signs of dumb and deaf to those who have already discovered them) used by the dark with the respective programs and in addition, to monitor and tracing to verify the induction to concupiscence through mental reading (chips in humans) and surveillance cameras on line in the best style of James Bond espionage movies (including control of faces, pupils, irises, reflections, details and diseases); Games of judgments of sin against humans and Nazarenes (playing at being gods) and also profiting from the vile metal through the system and contributing to the persecution of the Nazarenes; Fake judgments of sin against humans and Nazarenes because many of these sins have been induced with technology due the possible induction of thoughts by the liquid cristal settle in neurons and have not been natural (dark inducing sin through technology and playing gods to induce evil and destruction of intimacy and privacy even in the mind of the human being); Retaliation to those who report the surveillance and manipulation programs and marking of humans for mind reading (telepathy) and thought induction (making them sick sending to the hospitals or removing them); Digital identification plan and digital money to do digital control and avoid conflict and protests of marked and Nazarenes in surveillance programs who discover that there is no privacy in their documents and inclusive in theirs mind (telepathy: mind reading and thought induction: artificial intelligence): it surprises that EU mention that has a digital plan for europeans for digital control on line. But, before the epidemy, Europe and the world advanced a lot in technology and the data of humans are digitally in hospitals and institutes that humans need. After, the EU mentions artificial intelligence for human beings. Then and in vaccination and epidemy time, it is possible that the digital control is a new digital control with artifitial intelligence and with possible chips installed in the human being (possibly already installed in many human beings); Games of events and coincidences to cause accidents or conflicts in the life of marked, target or Nazarenes (change games of victim to accused by companies that regulate the order with subsequent rectification of the game made by the same companies when the Nazarenes claim); Games of recognition of the identity of human beings (in the style of the movie Unknown) by enterprises and service stations which are necessary for the daily movement of human beings creating conflicts of manipulation and stress in the marked or Nazarenes Salary payment games (payment of wages with dinners and game of check payment) creating manipulation conflicts and stress in the life of marked, target or Nazarenes Programmed plans of theft and scams of enterprises and humans even knowing of the surveillance cameras for the control of the marked, target or Nazarenes. Then, there is severe control of human beings in their daily activities to verify the follow-up of the matrix and darks that plan situations of concupiscence in the human being. Besides, this is occurring in coincidence with an accelerated new world order program and possible tribulation times and possibly already with the installation of the apocalyptic mark (possible chips introduced in the human being for mind reading and thought induction to induce concupiscence) in humans mentioned in the apocalypse for dark control of humans. The global forms of the severe manipulation and population control in times of new world order and Tribulation are explained in this article are as follows: By increasing taxes; Through armed conflicts and wars create discord, wars and chaos between countries (often bordering countries with the same origins and with the same culture: Russia and Ukraine: war motivated by US OTAN EU): To later usurp its resources (oil energy resource: US Iraq Kuwait); To later control them politically and economically (US Iraq Kuwait) and when these power or developed countries cannot control or usurp their resources, they begin to block them economically (Russia in the war between Russia and Ukraine where besides developed countries influence in the war by printing additional money to use for the war causing imbalance and global economic crisis instead of looking for ways to avoid it) in order to cause chaos and economic crisis with the knowledge and complicity of the world organizations responsible (OEA ONU) and make the population believe that the cause of the economic crisis is the government in power. However, some countries have resisted these blockades (Cuba Venezuela Nicaragua Russia China) and managed to show that it is possible to have governments independent of the control of these powers or countries that believe they own the Earth; To put rulers (governing) of interest in the same countries in conflict; To control them using the pretext of placing military bases in the countries in conflict (NATO OTAN: military bases in some European countries, US military bases: in some South American countries and some countries of Europe). In addition, this is preferable to reduce military bases in other countries and reduction of nuclear weapons, and use the financial resources for the reduction of inequity and poverty on the Earth. Thus, the organizations responsible for the proliferation of nuclear weapons (OIEA) have played an ineffective and passive (cover-up) role, which has caused the risk of a third nuclear world war to be imminent); Through the war against terror: however and actually, this is a false speech used to point to countries that oppose the control or directive of the powers and that have a culture or political structure different from that of the powers and later make conflict and war to later control them or usurp their resources (some Arab and Muslim countries, for example, US, Irak, Lybia and blaming an entire country for terrorism and occupying for years (Afganistán)). In this way and actually, some countries have developed nuclear weapons (North Korea, Iran) to protect themselves in some way and thus, the same thing does not happen to them as to the countries mentioned above (Irak, Lybia) and that have been destroyed with the false discourse of the war against terror. In this way, the best thing is to have good relations with all the countries of the Earth which are again summed in the Bible [1] in a message: Love your brother (all human beings) as yourself! (Mt.22-39) (and not to go around the Earth pointing out terrorists to any country that opposes its guidelines). Therefore, it is possible to reduce the economic resources for the war against terror which can be used to reduce poverty and inequity in human beings; Through the war against drugs: there are many other substances and products consumed by humans that can be harmful to health and that are allowed and have not become a vice (when something is forbidden: this increases the interest in obtaining it explained from the beginning of creation in Genesis [1]: an apple from the tree of good and evil in the garden of Eden: Adam and Eve). In addition, many countries have allowed the use of certain types of drugs for medical purposes (Uruguay, Bolivia) where drug use has gone unnoticed in these countries; Through religión: with a structure of religion that tries to control the population through a guideline and speeches that obey the Vatican and the actual governments of each country (which is evident when there are countries such as Nicaragua that do not follow a guideline of the church and the elite and then, the religion surprisingly actively intervenes in politics): the conclusion is reached and to which many humans have reached, that religion is a power most actually used (along with political and economic power); Through political power by means of the false argument used by politicians to reduce inequity and poverty: where a large amount of resources and money have been allocated to the political powers and rulers of many countries for centuries by the respective organizations responsable (FMI BM) without any results and in many countries poverty and inequity have increased. Besides, the bureaucracy is a structure of order and rules of management and administration used within the governments of each country that contribute to the inefficiency and manipulation of the required procedures in human life that ultimately affect the life of each human being when they require formalities that end up being complicated and time-consuming. Then, this power structure in politics, economics, and religion for the control of the population is ineffective and obeys the interests of the dark who control humans on the Earth, and is used ineffectively by the rulers (governing) of the countries who come to power precisely with the false discourse of reducing poverty and inequity; Through the pretext of climate change: severe climate change due to the emission of CO2 and the greenhouse effect is a complete fallacy. The world organizations involved with the climate (ONU) try to make humanity believe that this is the reason for the severe climatic changes that the human being has experienced on the Earth to obtain economic resources and avoid mentioning God in control of the Earth and course the climate and to avoid mentioning the Omnipotence of God [1] in the control of the Earth and the climate: the severe climate change is frequently due to solar storms and variations in the magnetic field lines of the Earth because of gravitational variations in the solar system or due to the entry of an asteroid or Comet Planet what is controlled and all the Universe by God. Therefore, the climate change is controlled by the Eternal God (wich is explained in the Bibles with a lot of examples with Moses, Josue, Hezekiah) and thus, this is better to use the resources and money for so-called climate change to reduce poverty and inequity in the Earth and increase equity in humans: Human Beings must not believe everything said by the organizations and individuals that control the humans in the Earth and that obey the directions imposed within the matrix triangle of control of the Earth; Through the sport by means of the persuasive manipulation of observers or attendees at sporting events through commercials programs, commentators (hidden words and numbers in speech), players participating in the match: with gestures or sequence of plays, numbers, words or details in the players uniform, referees (make decisión of plays in favor of a team purposely: false bad arbitration) or leading organizers committing sports corruption not applying the rules or discriminating players (Serbian, Russian and Belarusian tennis players at tennis competitions due to some tennis organizations) or teams (Russian sports clubs and inclusive the Russian national team due FIFA decision) at convenience. Besides, when there are countries in conflict or war: instead of uniting the countries in conflict by means of the sport, the respective organizations (FIFA UEFA) discriminate and increase the conflict: discriminating and not allowing the participation of tennis players (including top tennis players), Football Countries and Sport Clubs in international competitions for reasons of restrictions due to the epidemic, conflict or war (including countries that organized previous World Cups: Russia) where the interest, quality and love for this sport has increased and that must be used to unite human beings and countries and not to not allow them to participate: which increases the division and conflict between countries or humans: This is important to highlight and value the position of the ATP for deciding that the ATP does not agree that athletes from certain countries (Russia and Belarus) cannot participate in international tournaments stating that this is against the principles of merit and non-discrimination: then, this is tremendously criticizable that the organization responsible of Football (FIFA UEFA) participates in armed conflicts or war with discriminatory decisions in Football, increasing the war by not allowing countries in conflict to participate in World Cup of Football: FIFA slogan of no to racism and some form of discrimination is a complete farce and used for convenience and interest (in the same style of all the other organizations (mainly ONU, OEA, FMI, BM, VATICAN) that control humans and that in 2000 years of the coming of the Envoy of God have not been able to solve iniquity and poverty), discrimination that has been evident in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine: Football is the main sport in the Earth and it is the one that can unite human beings the most and should be used as a source of union and not división; Through education: where this is used by many countries to induce and manipulate their inhabitants in a certain political direction through the dissemination of knowledge and even the textbooks of the students: many underdeveloped countries have increased illiteracy and degradation in education because this favors the politicians of the country's government: having an ignorant people who do not see what they do with the country's money and who cannot criticize them: the greatness of peoples depends on the education that gives the independence of individuals who are the ones that make the country advance; Through world organizations to control countries: ONU, OEA, Vatican, OTAN, UE: many countries have to obey the guidelines of these organizations, which often do not respond to the needs of the citizens of each country: many institutions in the countries must obey the organizations (the Vatican for the religion) in a rigid way, which is often not in accordance with the situation of the country's citizens, who often need new variants or guidelines (some organizations can cause chaos, conflict or war as for example the war of Russia with Ucrania where the possible annexation of Ucrania to the OTAN and UE is one of the reasons for the war between these two countries. Therefore, there would be no war between these two countries where without those organizations); Through world organizations of espionage (CIA, FBI, KGB, Gestapo, SS): employing persuasive interference in the countries and rulers of some undeveloped countries (some South America and Center America countries and some European, Asia and Africa countries) with the objective of the power countries of control, manipulate or destabilize countries and inclusive simple humans (using the personal data of thousands of people around the world). Through the control and intervention of the Creator God Allah which is necessary and essential in times of Tribulation at the time timely (Holy Bible: Apoc. 6 Apoc. 8:6 Apoc. 5 Apoc. 7 Apoc. 21) due to everything mentioned in this scientific research respect to the control and manipulation of the population (regarding the increase of inequity, discord, and evil among humans) which is not following the guideline given by the envoy of God 2000 years ago: Jesus Christ. Keywords: God, Allah, Jesuchrist, Bible, Creator, Education, Climate change, Population Control, Climate Pollution, Gases CO2, Greenhouse Effect, Epidemic, Viruses, Laboratory, Zombies, Dark, Elite, new world order, OMS, ONU, OEA, Vatican, OTAN, UE, FMI, BM, OIT, OMT, Meteorological weapons, Haarp, Sura, Wars, Sport, Religion, Radiation, Nuclear Winter, Sun, Magnetic field lines, Storms, Asteroids, Comet Planet, Volcanoes, Climate Catastrophies, Tribulation, Taxes, Terror, Drugs, Organizations, Inequity, Poverty, Manipulation, Indoctrination, Technological Devices, Covert technological devices, networks, Newscasts, Surveillance programs, Big Brother Program, Digital Identification Plan, Digital Money, Covert numbers and covert words, Encrypted, Hidden codes or small phrases not visible to the naked eye, Covert words in the speech of zombie humans in multimedia and traditional technological devices, Nazism, Jews, Coincidence games, Activities, Plans, Events Programmed in sequence, Pyrotechnic sounds in sequence, Games of events and coincidences to cause accidents or conflicts, Games of judgments of sin against humans and Nazarenes, Games of recognition of the identity of human beings, Unknown, Companies, Service stations, Salary payment games, Programmed plans of theft and scams of companies and enterprises, Retaliation, Marking, Reduction, False medical negligence, Medical oath, Medicine, Liquid and solid chips in humans, Liquid crystals, Neurons, Ultrasonic waves, Vaccines, Global epidemiological programs, Matrix, Dark, Elite, Mind Reading, Telepath, Thought induction, Apocalipse, Wrath of God.

The quality of democracy in our economy depends on the governance of capital, but Europeans are still deprived of real voice over their retirement money: the single biggest source of capital in the 21st century. This paper outlines three major problems facing EU pensions: precarious retirement, escalating inequality, and mounting climate damage. These problems start with the places where we work, the institutions that control our retirement savings, and the votes on shares that come with them. The central argument is that pensions will only be sustainable once they are democratically, prudently, and loyally governed. First, member states have wide experience with co-determination in capital funds, which can inform the basis of minimum standards in EU law for ‘pension fund democracy’. Second, a growing number of investment rules draw upon Member States’ fiduciary duties and standards for prudence or care; but, these do not yet codify the requirement that beneficiaries’ environmental, social, and governance preferences are followed. Third, votes on shares - bought with pension fund assets - are still being cast by banks and asset managers who manage ‘other people’s money’. This is a serious problem because banks and asset managers have interests that systematically conflict with the ultimate investors: they vote in companies on other people’s money and, at the same time, sell financial products (e.g., pensions) to those companies. The problems are soluble with careful amendments to existing policy that ensure elected representatives of pension beneficiaries are the sole determinants of voting policies, with prudence and no conflicts of interest. A draft EU Directive, based upon emerging best practice, is proposed.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to explore the underlying assumption that macroeconomic factors (legal, cultural, social, financial and/or economic) might support or constrain countries’ decisions to timely and fully transpose the Directive 2014/95/EU (EUD) on non-financial information disclosure. Design/methodology/approach The research design relies mainly on exploratory factors analysis, regression techniques (linear, logistic and multinomial) and additional robustness and sensitivity tests, all performed to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of the results. Findings The results reveal that the directive’s transposition process is driven more by regulatory and social legitimisation forces than by economic and financial pressures. Stronger governance and weaker interests’ protection ensure appropriate compliance with new regulations, while highly educated countries express openness towards developing accounting systems that enhance information transparency. Practical implications The results are useful for practitioners currently engaged in the directive’s implementation process, academics interested in challenging debates concerning this topic and regulatory bodies to better support its full enactment. Originality/value This paper approaches the newsworthy topic of non-financial information disclosure settled by the EUD and marks an essential step towards harmonising non-financial reporting across Europe. It enriches the scientific literature through the first empirical analysis that sheds light on its explanatory drivers.

The article examines the evolution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the aftermath of COVID-19 and compares the current crisis with the previous one (the financial crisis of 2008–2013). It does so by looking at the way interests, ideas and institutions have evolved over the last decade. It looks at the possible changes in European economic governance in the light of three different models of European integration. The goal is not only to describe the differences between the two periods of crisis but also to understand the amplitude of those changes. In the actor-centred ‘institutionalism’ approach of this article, particular attention is paid to conflicts and tensions including inside the EU institutions. This allow for the elements of continuity and rupture to be highlighted and for speculation on the possibility of a new paradigm emerging.

2020, the year that the world was engulfed by the Covid-19 pandemic, was also the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Italy. The China-Italy comprehensive strategic partnership plays an important role in deepening China-EU cooperation, advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, and building a community with a shared future for humanity. China-Italy relations should be studied within the analytical framework of strategic partnership which has gained traction in China’s foreign policy narrative. Beijing’s pursuit of strategic partnerships aims at forging stable and enduring relations that are driven by common interests in a world of proliferating challenges and geopolitical uncertainties. While making steady progress, the partnership is also facing multi-dimensional challenges. China and Italy should strengthen strategic dialogue to build mutual trust and constantly improve their institutionalized cooperation. Economically, they should work out broader areas for collaboration and better manage their competition to achieve win-win results. At the level of people-to-people exchange, mutual understanding and trust should be enhanced to eliminate misconception and prejudice. At the regional level, the China-EU-Italy trilateral relationship should be consolidated to shield bilateral cooperation from the volatility of China-EU relations. In the global arena, China and Italy should also step up efforts to catalyze international financial reforms and address global challenges such as climate change, economic governance, and global public health emergencies by improving policy coordination and aligning global strategies.

The article deals with the constitutional and legal regulation of the right of municipal property in member countries of the EU. It is noted that the constitutions of the Member States mostly ignore the concept of ownership of local self-government. At the same time, the constitutions reinforce the issue of material and financial basis. As a rule, the translation from the languages ​​of the member countries of the EU into English uses the notion of «municipal property», «local government property» or «public property». In the constitutions of the member countries of the EU, the principle of financial and financial autonomy, guarantees of local self-government are found. The legal basis of municipal property rights is also determined by the local government law, and sometimes by a municipal property law and local acts. The municipal property laws set out the basic principles of municipal property management. It is noted that the management is in the interest of the population of the municipality and with the care of «good governance». It is stated that the existence of a special law on the property of local self-government does not solve all issues of systematization of legislation in this area. It is summarized that in the study of the conceptual apparatus in the sphere of municipal (communal) property, the essence of this right is of fundamental importance. In the legislation of these countries there are both concepts: «municipal» and «communal property». These concepts should be regarded as synonymous and for the convenience of designating this form of ownership in the EU Member States, it is permissible to apply the concept of «municipal property». Examples of application of both concepts in constitutional legal acts are given. The article concludes that, regardless of the subject of the right of municipal property, democratic states provide guarantees for the management of municipal property for the benefit of the community; attention is paid to objects that are in permanent exploitation by residents of communes. The author note the direct link between the powers of local governments, the interests and needs of the community and municipal property. Functional delineation of municipal property by local governments influences the decision to acquire, multiply and dispose of them. Local government real estate management in these countries draws attention to the object of management, goals and main purpose, basic decision-making principles, etc.

The variable “EU identity frame” is used to analyze the content of European identity. An EU frame establishes an understanding of the EU as a certain kind of community (e.g., political community, common market, community with political values). Identity frames are indicated by statements on general objectives, norms and/or historic aspects of the EU. For example, the frame that addresses the EU as a currency union is characterized by the objective to be economically strong and competitive and to uphold the norm of fiscal stability. The variable is usually combined with the coding of the evaluation of an identity frame as support for the EU as a specific kind of community or its rejection. Since one media piece can entail several EU identity frames, addressed by different speakers, EU identity frames have been taken as the coding unit in content analyses. Field of application/theoretical foundation: The variable “EU identity frame” is used in comparative research on the construction of collective European identity in media outlets (Lichtenstein, 2016; Lichtenstein & Eilders, 2015, 2019). Identity is understood as a sense of belonging and togetherness. It is analyzed in the context of conflicts and crises within the EU, when identity should provide a basis for the legitimacy of EU governance and transnational solidarity. Differences in the framing of European identity between countries indicate conflicts that are related to different political and economic objectives or a different understanding of European values and culture. In contrast, a shared understanding of European identity between countries provides orientation for political decisions. In its theoretical foundation, the coding of EU frames has some parallels to the coding of thematic frames on conflict events in research on horizontal transnationalization of the public sphere. References/combination with other methods of data collection: The framing of European identity can also be analyzed with surveys in media effect studies. Example study: Lichtenstein & Eilders (2019) Information on Lichtenstein & Eilders, 2019 Authors: Dennis Lichtenstein, Christiane Eilders Research question/research interest: Conflicts in the framing of European identity between countries during the Euro crisis Object of analysis: Weekly quality papers from Germany, France, and the UK Timeframe of analysis: 2011–2014 Information about variable Variable name/definition: EU Frame „Grundlegend für diese Variable ist die Frage, was Europa ist oder sein soll. Hier wird erhoben, welche Idee von Europa in einer Aussage aktualisiert wird. Diese Idee kann direkt vom Sprecher ausgedrückt werden und zwar entweder durch ein direktes oder indirektes Zitat oder durch die Beschreibung einer aktiven Handlung des Sprechers, die Qualitäten einer Meinungsäußerung aufweist. Außerdem kann eine Europaidee durch das Verhältnis zwischen Europa und einem BZO (Bezugsobjekt) aufgezeigt werden. Hier zeigt sich die Konsistenz des BZO zu der Europaidee: Die Beziehung zwischen dem BZO und der Europaidee kann in einem konformen oder in einem konflikthaften Verhältnis stehen. Z.B. ist die Aussage, „die Türkei passt nicht zum europäischen Wertegefüge“ auf die Idee von Europa als Wertgemeinschaft bezogen und nur in diesem Verständnis wird hier ein konflikthaftes Verhältnis zur Türkei behauptet.“ (Lichtentenstein, 2014) This variable is related to the question of what Europe is or should be according to a speaker’s statement. This idea of Europe can be expressed directly by the speaker, either by a direct or indirect quotation, or by the description of an active action of the speaker that has qualities of an expression of opinion. An idea of Europe can be expressed through the relationship between Europe and a BZO (reference object). Here the consistency of the BZO to the idea of Europe is evident: the relationship between the BZO and the idea of Europe can be either conformist or conflictual. For example, the statement that "Turkey does not fit to the European values" refers to Europe as a community of values, and it is only in this understanding that a conflictual relationship with Turkey is asserted here. EU frames Coded EU sub frames Political integration: EU as a federation Strongly politically integrated community Community with a common constitution Political integration: EU as a confederation Loosely connected community of sovereign nation states Community of states with equal power Market regulations: EU as an authority for market regulations Market intervention by the EU Community with a common economic, finance and tax law Economic solidarity between states with strong and weak economies European social policy European environmental and energy policy Market regulations: EU as a free market EU as a market in competition with other big players EU as a free trade area with competition and labor migration Finance policy: Economic growth Investments for economic growth in the EU and in crisis countries Financial solidarity Finance policy: Finance stability Financial stability in the Euro zone Austerity politics to foster budged discipline in EU countries Common political values Democracy as a European value Peace as a European value Solidarity with other EU countries Rule of law Currency Union Euro zone as an economically strong and competitive currency union Fiscal stability in the Eurozone Cultural community Common European history and mythology EU countries connected by religion Education and arts Diversity of cultures in Europa and encounters with people from different European cultures Community with a common foreign policy Common engagement and interests in foreign policy Common military and defense policy EU as a geographic entity Legitimate EU borders equals the borders of the European continent Level of analysis: EU frame Scale level: Nominal Reliability: Krippendorff’s Alpha = .75 References Lichtenstein, D. & Eilders, C. (2019). Lost in uncertainty. How the Euro crisis affected European identity constructions in national media discourses. International Communication Gazette, 81(6–8), 602–622.

In recent years, we have witnessed the emergence of a number of concepts and ideas that relate to a new way of understanding the business world.After the historical focus of top management on the concepts of profit, satisfying shareholder interest and a short-term rather than a long-term approach, the new paradigm sees sustainability as the central focus in the strategic formulation of companies. It is no longer about making money or creating value, but about how this is done in a sustainable way, taking a long-term view and considering the interests of the different stakeholders that interact with the company.In this sense, the concept of shared value, developed by Professor Porter, seems to us to be very relevant, which, in summary, concludes by stating that economic value can be created creating social value at the same time.There are many terms, concepts and approaches which, although they may give rise to a certain amount of terminological confusion (acronyms such as CSR, ESG, SRI, for example), are frequently used in the press and in the business world. In terms of concepts, the circular economy, and its growing importance, and the global and cross-cutting nature of the ideas and issues addressed, are also faithfully reflected in the changes that are taking place in the way business is understood.On the other hand, there is a clear and growing interest, not only in the academic world, but also from companies, investors and the various providers of analysis, rankings and opinions, on sustainability that make this issue a hot topic.In Exponential Education we understand, first of all, that when we talk about sustainability, this should be considered from a triple perspective: the economic, environmental and social.The first perspective is usually taken for granted, given that, when talking about companies, their management, investors and asset managers, among others, understand that, without economic and financial sustainability, companies would not be viable.That is why, in our view, the focus when talking about sustainability is on environmental and social sustainability. There are perspectives, increasingly taken up by more and more institutions, and especially by large investment funds and asset managers, that add the governance pillar, proposing an innovative way of analysing and selecting investments based on the ESG concept. Moreover, it seems clear to many experts that the ESG approach enables, as research has shown, superior financial performance, higher revenue growth, improved margins, greater operational efficiency and lower cost of capital. Besides, more and more investment funds and asset managers, as well as individual investors, are demanding greater investment in assets with an ESG approach.From another perspective, the pressure from regulators, both national and transnational, and their concern about non-financial information, has led to a large number of far-reaching legislative changes, for example in the European Union.The European Union, for example, has published the taxonomy related to environmental aspects. The taxonomy related to social aspects and governance is still pending, although the latter aspect is fairly well regulated in the corporate governance regulations of the different countries.We also highlight all the EU initiatives in the field of sustainable finance and their influence, both from the perspective of bond issues, known as green bonds, aimed at financing environmentally friendly projects, as well as companies' own investment projects, with a clear change in the destination of their investments.Another aspect that we underline, from a business management perspective, is the growing importance of the different stakeholders that relate to the company, their identification and prioritisation, the commitments made to them and the fulfilment of these commitments, which will have a significant influence on corporate reputation and the consequent reputational risk.For all these reasons, Exponential Education has developed a research vocation in the field of sustainability and ESG philosophy, which is reflected in the monographic issue that we present with ASEPELT and sponsor with the unconditional support of IASE.It is a publication with a wide thematic variety, eminently transversal and with a great geographical and cultural diversity. The approach is from a scientific perspective subject to blind peer review, as an indexed journal.The monograph covers, among others, issues related to the environment, decarbonisation and environmental sustainability, the circular economy and the transition to it, green bonds, impact investing, renewable energy and the ecological footprint, gender diversity and women's empowerment, the role of venture capital in clean sectors, or the ESG model and financial performance.The monograph, with a clear international vocation, will be distributed on five continents with the support of ASEPELT and IASE.Exponential Education would like to thank all those who have contributed with their articles and opinions to this monograph, and we pledge to continue along the path of quality academic research.

Photo by Ishan @seefromthesky on Unsplash ABSTRACT A strike to highlight the plight facing contract doctors which has been proposed has received mixed reactions from those within the profession and the public. This unprecedented nationwide proposal has the potential to cause real-world effects, posing an ethical dilemma. Although strikes are common, especially in high-income countries, these industrial actions by doctors in Malaysia are almost unheard of. Reviewing available evidence from various perspectives is therefore imperative to update the profession and the complexity of invoking this important human right. INTRODUCTION Contract doctors in Malaysia held a strike on July 26, 2021. COVID-19 cases are increasing in Malaysia. In June, daily cases ranged between 4,000 to 8,000 despite various public health measures. The R naught, which indicates the infectiousness of COVID-19, remains unchanged. During the pandemic, health care workers (HCWs) have been widely celebrated, resulting in a renewed appreciation of the risks that they face.[1] The pandemic has exposed flawed governance in the public healthcare system, particularly surrounding the employment of contract doctors. Contract doctors in Malaysia are doctors who have completed their medical training, as well as two years of internship, and have subsequently been appointed as medical officers for another two years. Contract doctors are not permanently appointed, and the system did not allow extensions after the two years nor does it offer any opportunity to specialize.[2] Last week, Parliament did decide to offer a two-year extension but that did not hold off the impending strike.[3] In 2016, the Ministry of Health introduced a contract system to place medical graduates in internship positions at government healthcare facilities across the country rather than placing them in permanent posts in the Public Service Department. Social media chronicles the issues that doctors in Malaysia faced. However, tensions culminated when and contract doctors called for a strike which ended up taking place in late July 2021. BACKGROUND Over the past decade, HCW strikes have arisen mostly over wages, work hours, and administrative and financial factors.[4] In 2012, the British Medical Association organized a single “day of action” by boycotting non-urgent care as a response to government pension reforms.[5] In Ireland, doctors went on strike for a day in 2013 to protest the austerity measures implemented by the EU in response to the global economic crisis. It involved a dispute over long working hours (100 hours per week) which violated EU employment laws and more importantly put patients’ lives at risk.[6] The strike resulted in the cancellation of 15,000 hospital appointments, but emergencies services were continued. Other major strikes have been organized in the UK to negotiate better pay for HCWs in general and junior doctors’ contracts specifically.[7] During the COVID-19 pandemic, various strikes have also been organized in Hong Kong, the US, and Bolivia due to various pitfalls in managing the pandemic.[8] A recent strike in August 2020 by South Korean junior doctors and medical students was organized to protest a proposed medical reform plan which did not address wage stagnation and unfair labor practices.[9] These demands are somewhat similar to the proposed strike by contract doctors in Malaysia. As each national health system operates within a different setting, these strikes should be examined in detail to understand the degree of self-interest involved versus concerns for patient’s welfare. l. The Malaysia Strike An anonymous group planned the current strike in Malaysia. The group used social media, garnering the attention of various key stakeholders including doctors, patients, government, and medical councils.[10] The organizers of the strike referred to their planned actions as a hartal. (Although historically a hartal involved a total shutdown of workplaces, offices, shops, and other establishments as a form of civil disobedience, the Malaysian contract doctors pledged no disturbance to healthcare working hours or services and intend a walk-out that is symbolic and reflective of a strike.)[11] The call to action mainly involved showing support for the contract doctors with pictures and placards. The doctors also planned the walk-out.[12] Despite earlier employment, contract medical doctors face many inequalities as opposed to their permanent colleagues. These include differences in basic salary, provisions of leave, and government loans despite doing the same job. The system disadvantages contract doctors offering little to no job security and limited career progression. Furthermore, reports in 2020 showed that close to 4,000 doctors’ contracts were expected to expire by May 2022, leaving their futures uncertain.[13] Some will likely be offered an additional two years as the government faces pressure from the workers. Between December 2016 and May 2021, a total of 23,077 contract doctors were reportedly appointed as medical officers, with only 789 receiving permanent positions.[14] It has been suggested that they are appointed into permanent positions based on merit but the criteria for the appointments remain unclear. Those who fail to acquire a permanent position inevitably seek employment elsewhere. During the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been numerous calls for the government to absorb contract doctors into the public service as permanent staff with normal benefits. This is important considering a Malaysian study that revealed that during the pandemic over 50 percent of medical personnel feel burned out while on duty.[15] This effort might be side-lined as the government prioritizes curbing the pandemic. As these issues remain neglected, the call for a strike should be viewed as a cry for help to reignite the discussions about these issues. ll. Right to strike The right to strike is recognized as a fundamental human right by the UN and the EU.[16] Most European countries also protect the right to strike in their national constitutions.[17] In the US, the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 prohibited healthcare workers of non-profit hospitals to form unions and engage in collective bargaining. But this exclusion was repealed in 1947 and replaced with the requirement of a 10-day advanced written notice prior to any strike action.[18] Similarly, Malaysia also recognizes the right to dispute over labor matters, either on an individual or collective basis. The Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1967[19] describes a strike as: “the cessation of work by a body of workers acting in combination, or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common understanding of a number of workers to continue to work or to accept employment, and includes any act or omission by a body of workers acting in combination or under a common understanding, which is intended to or does result in any limitation, restriction, reduction or cessation of or dilatoriness in the performance or execution of the whole or any part of the duties connected with their employment” According to the same act, only members of a registered trade union may legally participate in a strike with prior registration from the Director-General of Trade Unions.[20] Under Section 43 of the IRA, any strike by essential services (including healthcare) requires prior notice of 42 days to their employer.[21] Upon receiving the notice, the employer is responsible for reporting the particulars to the Director-General of Industrial Relations to allow a “cooling-off” period and appropriate action. Employees are also protected from termination if permitted by the Director-General and strike is legalized. The Malaysian contract healthcare workers’ strike was announced and transparent. Unfortunately, even after legalization, there is fear that the government may charge those participating in the legalized strike.[22] The police have announced they will pursue participants in the strike.[23] Even the Ministry of Health has issued a warning stating that those participating in the strike may face disciplinary actions from the ministry. However, applying these laws while ignoring the underlying issues may not bode well for the COVID-19 healthcare crisis. lll. Effects of a Strike on Health Care There is often an assumption that doctors’ strikes would unavoidably cause significant harm to patients. However, a systematic review examining several strikes involving physicians reported that patient mortality remained the same or fell during the industrial action.[24] A study after the 2012 British Medical Association strike has even shown that there were fewer in-hospital deaths on the day, both among elective and emergency populations, although neither difference was significant.[25] Similarly, a recent study in Kenya showed declines in facility-based mortality during strike months.[26] Other studies have shown no obvious changes in overall mortality during strikes by HCWs.[27] There is only one report of increased mortality associated with a strike in South Africa[28] in which all the doctors in the Limpopo province stopped providing any treatment to their patients for 20 consecutive days. During this time, only one hospital continued providing services to a population of 5.5 million people. Even though their data is incomplete, authors from this study found that the number of emergency room visits decreased during the strike, but the risks of mortality in the hospital for these patients increased by 67 percent.[29] However, the study compared the strike period to a randomly selected 20-day period in May rather than comparing an average of data taken from similar dates over previous years. This could greatly influence variations between expected annual hospital mortality possibly due to extremes in weather that may exacerbate pre-existing conditions such as heart failure during warmer months or selecting months with a higher incidence of viral illness such as influenza. Importantly, all strikes ensured that emergency services were continued, at least to the degree that is generally offered on weekends. Furthermore, many doctors still provide usual services to patients despite a proclaimed strike. For example, during the 2012 BMA strike, less than one-tenth of doctors were estimated to be participating in the strike.[30] Emergency care may even improve during strikes, especially those involving junior doctors who are replaced by more senior doctors.[31] The cancellation of elective surgeries may also increase the number of doctors available to treat emergency patients. Furthermore, the cancellation of elective surgery is likely to be responsible for transient decreases in mortality. Doctors also may get more rest during strike periods. Although doctor strikes do not seem to increase patient mortality, they can disrupt delivery of healthcare.[32] Disruptions in delivery of service from prolonged strikes can result in decline of in-patient admissions and outpatient service utilization, as suggested during strikes in the UK in 2016.[33] When emergency services were affected during the last strike in April, regular service was also significantly affected. Additionally, people might need to seek alternative sources of care from the private sector and face increased costs of care. HCWs themselves may feel guilty and demotivated because of the strikes. The public health system may also lose trust as a result of service disruption caused by high recurrence of strikes. During the COVID-19 pandemic, as the healthcare system remains stretched, the potential adverse effects resulting from doctor strikes remain uncertain and potentially disruptive. In the UK, it is an offence to “willfully and maliciously…endanger human life or cause serious bodily injury.”[34] Likewise, the General Medical Council (GMC) also requires doctors to ensure that patients are not harmed or put at risk by industrial action. In the US, the American Medical Association code of ethics prohibits strikes by physicians as a bargaining tactic, while allowing some other forms of collective bargaining.[35] However, the American College of Physicians prohibits all forms of work stoppages, even when undertaken for necessary changes to the healthcare system. Similarly, the Delhi Medical Council in India issued a statement that “under no circumstances doctors should resort to strike as the same puts patient care in serious jeopardy.”[36] On the other hand, the positions taken by the Malaysian Medical Council (MMC) and Malaysian Medical Association (MMA) on doctors’ strikes are less clear when compared to their Western counterparts. The MMC, in their recently updated Code of Professional Conduct 2019, states that “the public reputation of the medical profession requires that every member should observe proper standards of personal behavior, not only in his professional activities but at all times.” Strikes may lead to imprisonment and disciplinary actions by MMC for those involved. Similarly, the MMA Code of Medical Ethics published in 2002 states that doctors must “make sure that your personal beliefs do not prejudice your patients' care.”[37] The MMA which is traditionally meant to represent the voices of doctors in Malaysia, may hold a more moderate position on strikes. Although HCW strikes are not explicitly mentioned in either professional body’s code of conduct and ethics, the consensus is that doctors should not do anything that will harm patients and they must maintain the proper standard of behaviors. These statements seem too general and do not represent the complexity of why and how a strike could take place. Therefore, it has been suggested that doctors and medical organizations should develop a new consensus on issues pertaining to medical professional’s social contract with society while considering the need to uphold the integrity of the profession. Experts in law, ethics, and medicine have long debated whether and when HCW strikes can be justified. If a strike is not expected to result in patient harm it is perhaps acceptable.[38] Although these debates have centered on the potential risks that strikes carry for patients, these actions also pose risks for HCWs as they may damage morale and reputation.[39] Most fundamentally, strikes raise questions about what healthcare workers owe society and what society owes them. For strikes to be morally permissible and ethical, it is suggested that they must fulfil these three criteria:[40] a. Strikes should be proportionate, e., they ‘should not inflict disproportionate harm on patients’, and hospitals should as a minimum ‘continue to provide at least such critical services as emergency care.’ b. Strikes should have a reasonable hope of success, at least not totally futile however tough the political rhetoric is. c. Strikes should be treated as a last resort: ‘all less disruptive alternatives to a strike action must have been tried and failed’, including where appropriate ‘advocacy, dissent and even disobedience’. The current strike does not fulfil the criteria mentioned. As Malaysia is still burdened with a high number of COVID-19 cases, a considerable absence of doctors from work will disrupt health services across the country. Second, since the strike organizer is not unionized, it would be difficult to negotiate better terms of contract and career paths. Third, there are ongoing talks with MMA representing the fraternity and the current government, but the time is running out for the government to establish a proper long-term solution for these contract doctors. One may argue that since the doctors’ contracts will end in a few months with no proper pathways for specialization, now is the time to strike. However, the HCW right to strike should be invoked only legally and appropriately after all other options have failed. CONCLUSION The strike in Malaysia has begun since the drafting of this paper. Doctors involved assure that there will not be any risk to patients, arguing that the strike is “symbolic”.[41] Although an organized strike remains a legal form of industrial action, a strike by HCWs in Malaysia poses various unprecedented challenges and ethical dilemmas, especially during the pandemic. The anonymous and uncoordinated strike without support from the appropriate labor unions may only spark futile discussions without affirmative actions. It should not have taken a pandemic or a strike to force the government to confront the issues at hand. It is imperative that active measures be taken to urgently address the underlying issues relating to contract physicians. As COVID-19 continues to affect thousands of people, a prompt reassessment is warranted regarding the treatment of HCWs, and the value placed on health care. [1] Ministry of Health (MOH) Malaysia, “Current situation of COVID-19 in Malaysia.” http://covid-19.moh.gov.my/terkini (accessed Jul. 01, 2021). [2] “Future of 4,000 young doctors who are contract medical officers uncertain,” New Straits Times - November 26, 2020. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2020/11/644563/future-4000-young-doctors-who-are-contract-medical-officers-uncertain [3] “Malaysia doctors strike, parliament meets as COVID strain shows,” Al Jazeera, July 26, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/26/malaysia-doctors-strike-parliament-meets-as-covid-strains-grow [4] R. Essex and S. M. Weldon, “Health Care Worker Strikes and the Covid Pandemic,” N. Engl. J. Med., vol. 384, no. 24, p. e93, Jun. 2021, doi: 10.1056/NEJMp2103327; G. Russo et al., “Health workers’ strikes in low-income countries: the available evidence,” Bull. World Health Organ., vol. 97, no. 7, pp. 460-467H, Jul. 2019, doi: 10.2471/BLT.18.225755. [5] M. Ruiz, A. Bottle, and P. Aylin, “A retrospective study of the impact of the doctors’ strike in England on 21 June 2012,” J. R. Soc. Med., vol. 106, no. 9, pp. 362–369, 2013, doi: 10.1177/0141076813490685. [6] E. Quinn, “Irish Doctors Strike to Protest Work Hours Amid Austerity,” The Wall Street Journal, 2013. https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-headline-available-1381217911?tesla=y (accessed Jun. 29, 2021). [7] “NHS workers back strike action in pay row by 2-to-1 margin,” The Guardian, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/sep/18/nhs-workers-strike-pay-unison-england (accessed Jun. 29, 2021); M. Limb, “Thousands of junior doctors march against new contract,” BMJ, p. h5572, Oct. 2015, doi: 10.1136/bmj.h5572. [8] J. Parry, “China coronavirus: Hong Kong health staff strike to demand border closure as city records first death,” BMJ, vol. 368, no. February, p. m454, Feb. 2020, doi: 10.1136/bmj.m454; “MultiCare healthcare workers strike, urging need for more PPEs, staff support,” Q13 FOX, 2020. https://www.q13fox.com/news/health-care-workers-strike-urging-need-for-ppes-risks-on-patient-safety (accessed Jun. 29, 2021); “Bolivia healthcare workers launch strike in COVID-hit region,” Al Jazeera, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/9/bolivia-healthcare-workers-strike-covid-hit-region (accessed Jun. 29, 2021). [9] K. Arin, “Why are Korean doctors striking?” The Korea Herald, 2020. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200811000941 (accessed Jun. 29, 2021). [10] “Hartal Doktor Kontrak,” Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/hartaldoktorkontrak. [11] “Hartal,” Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/hartal (accessed Jun. 29, 2021). [12] “Hartal Doktor Kontrak,” Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/hartaldoktorkontrak. [13] R. Anand, “Underpaid and overworked, Malaysia’s contract doctors’ revolt amid Covid-19 surge,” The Straits Times, 2021. [14] Anand. [15] N. S. Roslan, M. S. B. Yusoff, A. R. Asrenee, and K. Morgan, “Burnout prevalence and its associated factors among Malaysian healthcare workers during covid-19 pandemic: An embedded mixed-method study,” Healthc., vol. 9, no. 1, 2021, doi: 10.3390/healthcare9010090. [16] Maina Kiai, “Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association,” 2016. [Online]. Available: http://freeassembly.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/A.71.385_E.pdf. [17] ETUI contributors, Strike rules in the EU27 and beyond. The European Trade Union Institute. ETUI, 2007. [18] National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Act. 1935, pp. 151–169. [19] Ministry of Human Resources, Industrial Relations Act 1967 (Act 177), no. October. 2015, pp. 1–76. [20] Article 10 of the Federal Constitution states that all citizens have the right to form associations including registered trade or labor unions. A secret ballot with two-third majority will suffice to call for a strike required for submission to the DGTU within 7 days as stated in Section 25(A) of the Trade Union Act 1959. [21] Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia, Guidelines on Strikes, Pickets and Lockouts in Malaysia. Putrajaya, 2011. [22] Ordinance Emergency which was declared in Malaysia since 12 January 2021. Under the Ordinance Emergency, the king or authorized personnel may, as deemed necessary, demand any resources. [23] “Malaysia doctors strike, parliament meets as COVID strain shows,” Al Jazeera, July 26, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/26/malaysia-doctors-strike-parliament-meets-as-covid-strains-grow [24] S. A. Cunningham, K. Mitchell, K. M. Venkat Narayan, and S. Yusuf, “Doctors’ strikes and mortality: A review,” Soc. Sci. Med., vol. 67, no. 11, pp. 1784–1788, Dec. 2008, doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.09.044. [25] M. Ruiz, A. Bottle, and P. Aylin, “A retrospective study of the impact of the doctors’ strike in England on 21 June 2012,” J. R. Soc. Med., vol. 106, no. 9, pp. 362–369, 2013, doi: 10.1177/0141076813490685. [26] G. K. Kaguthi, V. Nduba, and M. B. Adam, “The impact of the nurses’, doctors’ and clinical officer strikes on mortality in four health facilities in Kenya,” BMC Health Serv. Res., vol. 20, no. 1, p. 469, Dec. 2020, doi: 10.1186/s12913-020-05337-9. [27] G. Ong’ayo et al., “Effect of strikes by health workers on mortality between 2010 and 2016 in Kilifi, Kenya: a population-based cohort analysis,” Lancet Glob. Heal., vol. 7, no. 7, pp. e961–e967, Jul. 2019, doi: 10.1016/S2214-109X (19)30188-3. [28] M. M. Z. U. Bhuiyan and A. Machowski, “Impact of 20-day strike in Polokwane Hospital (18 August - 6 September 2010),” South African Med. J., vol. 102, no. 9, p. 755, Aug. 2012, doi: 10.7196/SAMJ.6045. [29] M. M. Z. U. Bhuiyan and A. Machowski, “Impact of 20-day strike in Polokwane Hospital (18 August - 6 September 2010),” South African Med. J., vol. 102, no. 9, p. 755, Aug. 2012, doi: 10.7196/SAMJ.6045. [30] M. Ruiz, A. Bottle, and P. Aylin, “A retrospective study of the impact of the doctors’ strike in England on 21 June 2012,” J. R. Soc. Med., vol. 106, no. 9, pp. 362–369, 2013, doi: 10.1177/0141076813490685. [31] D. Metcalfe, R. Chowdhury, and A. Salim, “What are the consequences when doctors strike?” BMJ, vol. 351, no. November, pp. 1–4, 2015, doi: 10.1136/bmj.h6231. [32] D. Waithaka et al., “Prolonged health worker strikes in Kenya- perspectives and experiences of frontline health managers and local communities in Kilifi County,” Int. J. Equity Health, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1–15, 2020, doi: 10.1186/s12939-020-1131-y. [33] The study has shown that there were 9.1% reduction in admissions and around 6% fewer emergency cases and outpatient appointments than expected. An additional 52% increase in expected outpatient appointments cancelations were made by hospitals during that period. D. Furnivall, A. Bottle, and P. Aylin, “Retrospective analysis of the national impact of industrial action by English junior doctors in 2016,” BMJ Open, vol. 8, no. 1, p. e019319, Jan. 2018, doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2017-019319. [34] D. Metcalfe, R. Chowdhury, and A. Salim, “What are the consequences when doctors strike?” BMJ, vol. 351, no. November, pp. 1–4, 2015, doi: 10.1136/bmj.h6231. [35] R. Essex and S. M. Weldon, “Health Care Worker Strikes and the Covid Pandemic,” N. Engl. J. Med., vol. 384, no. 24, p. e93, Jun. 2021, doi: 10.1056/NEJMp2103327. [36] M. Selemogo, “Criteria for a just strike action by medical doctors,” Indian J. Med. Ethics, vol. 346, no. 21, pp. 1609–1615, Jan. 2014, doi: 10.20529/IJME.2014.010. [37] Malaysian Medical Association, “Malaysian Medical Association Official Website.” https://mma.org.my (accessed Jun. 29, 2021). [38] M. Toynbee, A. A. J. Al-Diwani, J. Clacey, and M. R. Broome, “Should junior doctors strike?” J. Med. Ethics, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 167–170, Mar. 2016, doi: 10.1136/medethics-2015-103310. [39] R. Essex and S. M. Weldon, “Health Care Worker Strikes and the Covid Pandemic,” N. Engl. J. Med., vol. 384, no. 24, p. e93, Jun. 2021, doi: 10.1056/NEJMp2103327. [40] M. Selemogo, “Criteria for a just strike action by medical doctors,” Indian J. Med. Ethics, vol. 346, no. 21, pp. 1609–1615, Jan. 2014, doi: 10.20529/IJME.2014.010; A. J. Roberts, “A framework for assessing the ethics of doctors’ strikes,” J. Med. Ethics, vol. 42, no. 11, pp. 698–700, Nov. 2016, doi: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103395. [41] “Malaysia doctors strike, parliament meets as COVID strain shows,” Al Jazeera, July 26, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/26/malaysia-doctors-strike-parliament-meets-as-covid-strains-grow

There is an old Danish fable that says that the Devil was watching when God created the earth, and that, as the creation progressed, he became increasingly agitated over the wondrous achievements he was made to witness. At the end of it all, the Devil turned to God, and said, ‘Now, watch this.’ He created Iceland. It’s a vision of the country that resembles my own. I have always thought of Iceland as the island apart. The place that came last in the earth’s construction, whoever the engineer, and so remains forever distant. Perhaps that’s because, for me, Iceland is a home far from home. It is the country that I am from, and the place to which I am always tending—in my reading, my travels, and my thoughts. But since we left when I was ten, I am only ever in Iceland for mere glimpses of the Devil’s work, and always leave wanting more, some kind of deeper involvement. Perhaps all of his temptations are like that. Iceland’s is an inverted landscape, stuck like a plug on the roof of the Earth, revealing all the violence and destruction of the layers beneath. The island expands as the tectonic plates beneath it move. It grows by ten centimetres a year, but in two different directions—one towards the States, and the other towards Europe. I have noticed something similar happening to me. Each year, the fissure is a little wider. I come to be more like a visitor, and less like the one returning to his birthplace. I last visited in February just gone, to see whether Iceland was still drifting away from me and, indeed, from the rest of the world. I was doing research in Germany, and set aside an extra week for Reykjavík, to visit friends and family, and to see whether things were really as bad as they appeared to be from Brisbane, where I have lived for most of my life. I had read countless bleak reports of financial ruin and social unrest, and yet I couldn’t suppress the thought that Iceland was probably just being Iceland. The same country that had fought three wars over cod; that offered asylum to Bobby Fischer when no-one else would take him; and that allowed Yoko Ono to occupy a small island near Reykjavík with a peace sculpture made of light. Wasn’t it always the country stuck out on its own, with a people who claimed their independent spirit, and self-reliance, as their most-prized values? No doubt, things were bad. But did Iceland really mean to tie itself closer to Europe as a way out of the economic crisis? And what would this mean for its much-cherished sense of apartness? I spent a week of clear, cold days talking to those who made up my Iceland. They all told me what I most wanted to hear—that nothing much had changed since the financial collapse in 2008. Yes, the value of the currency had halved, and this made it harder to travel abroad. Yes, there was some unemployment now, whereas before there had been none. And, certainly, those who had over-extended on their mortgages were struggling to keep their homes. But wasn’t this the case everywhere? If it wasn’t for Icesave, they said, no-one would spare a thought for Iceland. They were referring to the disastrous internet bank, a wing of the National Bank of Iceland, which had captured and then lost billions in British and Dutch savings. The result was an earthquake in the nation’s financial sector, which in recent years had come to challenge fishing and hot springs as the nation’s chief source of wealth. In a couple of months in late 2008, this sector all but disappeared, or was nationalised as part of the Icelandic government’s scrambling efforts to salvage the economy. Meanwhile, the British and Dutch governments insisted on their citizens’ interests, and issued such a wealth of abuse towards Iceland that the country must have wondered whether it wasn’t still seen, in some quarters, as the Devil’s work. At one point, the National Bank—my bank in Iceland—was even listed by the British as a terrorist organization. I asked whether people were angry with the entrepreneurs who caused all this trouble, the bankers behind Icesave, and so on. The reply was that they were all still in London. ‘They wouldn’t dare show their faces in Reykjavík.’ Well, that was new, I thought. It sounded like a different kind of anger, much more bitter than the usual, fisherman’s jealous awareness of his neighbours’ harvests. Different, too, from the gossip, a national addiction which nevertheless always struck me as being rather homely and forgiving. In Iceland, just about everyone is related, and the thirty or so bankers who have caused the nation’s bankruptcy are well-known to all. But somehow they have gone too far, and their exile is suspended only by their appearances in the newspapers, the law courts, or on the satirical T-shirts sold in main street Laugavegur. There, too, you saw the other side of the currency collapse. The place was buzzing with tourists, unusual at this dark time of year. Iceland was half-price, they had been told, and it was true—anything made locally was affordable, for so long unthinkable in Iceland. This was a country that had always prided itself on being hopelessly expensive. So perhaps what was being lost in the local value of the economy would be recouped through the waves of extra tourists? Certainly, the sudden cheapness of Iceland had affected my decision to come, and to stay in a hotel downtown rather than with friends. On my last full day, a Saturday, I joined my namesake Kári for a drive into the country. For a while, our conversation was taken up with the crisis: the President, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, had recently declined to sign a bill that ensured that Iceland repaid its debts to the British and Dutch governments. His refusal meant a referendum on the bill in the coming March. No-one doubted that the nation would say no. The terms were unfair. And yet it was felt that Iceland’s entry into the EU, and its adoption of the Euro in place of the failed krónur, were conditional on its acceptance of the blame apportioned by international investors, and Britain in particular. Britain, one recalled, was the enemy in the Cod Wars, when Iceland had last entered the international press. Iceland had won that war. Why not this one, as well? That Iceland should suddenly need the forgiveness and assistance of its neighbours was no surprise to them. The Danes and others had long been warning Icelandic bankers that the finance sector was massively over-leveraged and bound for failure at the first sign of trouble in the international economy. I remember being in Iceland at the time of these warnings, in May 2007. It was Eurovision Song Contest month, and there was great local consternation at Iceland’s dismal showing that year. Amid the outpouring of Eurovision grief, and accusations against the rest of Europe that it was block-voting small countries like Iceland out of the contest, the dire economic warnings from the Danes seemed small news. ‘They just didn’t like the útrásarvíkingar,’ said Kári. That is, the Danes were simply upset that their former colonial children had produced offspring of their own who were capable of taking over shops, football clubs, and even banks in main streets of Copenhagen, Amsterdam and London. With interests as glamorous as West Ham United, Hamleys, and Karen Millen, it is not surprising that the útrásarvíkingar, or ‘Viking raiders’, were fast attaining the status of national heroes. Today, it’s a term of abuse rather than pride. The entrepreneurs are exiled in the countries they once sought to raid, and the modern Viking achievement, rather like the one a thousand years before, is a victim of negative press. All that raiding suddenly seems vain and greedy, and the ships that bore the raiders—private jets that for a while were a common sight over the skies of Reykjavík—have found new homes in foreign lands. The Danes were right about the Icelandic economy, just as they’d been right about the Devil’s landscaping efforts. But hundreds of years of colonial rule and only six decades of independence made it difficult for the Icelanders to listen. To curtail the flight of the new Vikings went against the Icelandic project, which from the very beginning was about independence. A thousand years before, in the 870s, Iceland had been a refuge. The medieval stories—known collectively as the sagas—tell us that the island was settled by Norwegian chieftains who were driven out of the fjordlands of their ancestors by the ruthless King Harald the Fair-Haired, who demanded total control of Norway. They refused to humble themselves before the king, and instead took the risk of a new life on a remote, inhospitable island. Icelandic independence, which was lost in the 1260s, was only regained in full in 1944, after Denmark had fallen under German occupation. Ten years later, with the war over and Iceland in the full stride of its independence, Denmark began returning the medieval Icelandic manuscripts that it had acquired during the colonial era. At that point, says the common wisdom, Icelanders forgave the Danes for centuries of poor governance. Although the strict commercial laws of the colonial period had made it all but impossible for Icelanders to rise out of economic hardship, the Danes had, at least, given the sagas back. National sovereignty was returned, and so too the literature that dated back to the time the country had last stood on its own. But, most powerfully, being Icelandic meant being independent of one’s immediate neighbours. Halldór Laxness, the nation’s Nobel Laureate, would satirize this national characteristic in his most enduring masterpiece, Sjálfstætt fólk, or Independent People. It is also what the dominant political party of the independence period, Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn, The Independence Party, has long treasured as a political ideal. To be Icelandic means being free of interference. And in a country of independent people, who would want to stop the bankers on their raids into Europe? Or, for that matter, who was now going to admit that it was time to join Europe instead of emphasizing one’s apartness from it? Kári and I turned off the south road out of Reykjavík and climbed into the heath. From here, the wounds of the country’s geological past still dominated the surface of the land. Little wonder that Jules Verne claimed that the journey to the centre of the world began on Snæfellsnes, a peninsula of volcanoes, lava, and ice caps on a long arm of land that extends desperately from the west of the island, as if forever in hope of reaching America, or at the very least Greenland. It was from Snæfellsnes that Eirík the Red began his Viking voyages westwards, and from where his famous son Leif would reach Vínland, the Land of Vines, most probably Newfoundland. Eight hundred years later, during the worst of the nation’s hardships—when the famines and natural disasters of the late eighteenth century reduced the nation almost to extinction—thousands of Icelanders followed in Leif’s footsteps, across the ‘whale road’, as the Vikings called it, to Canada, and mainly Winnipeg, where they recreated Iceland in an environment arguably even more hostile than the one they’d left. At least there weren’t any volcanoes in Winnipeg. In Iceland, you could never escape the feeling that the world was still evolving, and that the Devil’s work was ongoing. Even the national Assembly was established on one of the island’s most visible outward signs of the deep rift beneath—where a lake had cracked off the heath around it, which now surrounded it as a scar-scape of broken rocks and torn cliffs. The Almannagjá, or People’s Gorge, which is the most dramatic part of the rift, stands, or rather falls apart, as the ultimate symbol of Icelandic national unity. That is Iceland, an island on the edge of Europe, and forever on the edge of itself, too, a place where unity is defined by constant points of separation, not only in the landscape as it crunches itself apart and pushes through at the weak points, but also in a persistently small social world—the population is only 320,000—that is so closely related that it has had little choice but to emphasise the differences that do exist. After a slow drive through the low hills near Thingvellir, we reached the national park, and followed the dirt roads down to the lake. It’s an exclusive place for summerhouses, many of which now seem to stand as reminders of the excesses of the past ten years: the haphazardly-constructed huts that once made the summerhouse experience a bit of an adventure were replaced by two-storey buildings with satellite dishes, spa baths, and the ubiquitous black Range Rovers parked outside—the latter are now known as ‘Game Overs’. Like so much that has been sold off to pay the debts, the luxury houses seem ‘very 2007,’ the local term for anything unsustainable. But even the opulent summerhouses of the Viking raiders don’t diminish the landscape of Thingvellir, and a lake that was frozen from the shore to about fifty metres out. At the shoreline, lapping water had crystallized into blue, translucent ice-waves that formed in lines of dark and light water. Then we left the black beach for the site of the old Assembly. It was a place that had witnessed many encounters, not least the love matches that were formed when young Icelanders returned from their Viking raids and visits to the courts of Scandinavia, Scotland, Ireland, and England. On this particular day, though, the site was occupied by only five Dutchmen in bright, orange coats. They were throwing stones into Öxará, the river that runs off the heath into the Thingvellir lake, and looked up guiltily as we passed. I’m not sure what they felt bad about—throwing stones in the river was surely the most natural thing to do. On my last night, I barely slept. The Saturday night street noise was too much, and my thoughts were taken with the ever-apart Iceland, and with the anticipation of my returning to Brisbane the next day. Reykjavík the party town certainly hadn’t changed with the financial crisis, and nor had my mixed feelings about living so far away. The broken glass and obscenities of a night out didn’t ease until 5am, when it was time for me to board the Flybus to Keflavík Airport. I made my way through the screams and drunken stumblers, and into the quiet of the dark bus, where, in the back, I could just make out the five Dutchmen who, the day before, Kári and I had seen at Thingvellir, and who were now fast asleep and emitting a perfume of vodka and tobacco smoke that made it all the way to the front. It had all seemed too familiar not to be true—the relentless Icelandic optimism around its independence, the sense that it would always be an up-and-down sort of a place anyway, and the jagged volcanoes and lava fields that formed the distant shadows of the half-hour drive to the airport. The people, like the landscape, were fixed on separation, and I doubted that the difficulties with Europe would force them in any other direction. And I, too, was on my way back, as uncertain as ever about Iceland and my place in it. I returned to the clinging heat and my own separation from home, which, as before, I also recognized as my homecoming to Brisbane. Isn’t that in the nature of split affinities, to always be nearly there but never quite there? In the weeks since my return, the Icelanders have voted by referendum to reject the deal made for the repayment of the Icesave debts, and a fresh round of negotiations with the British and Dutch governments begins. For the time being, Iceland retains its right to independence, at least as expressed by the right to sidestep the consequences of its unhappy raids into Europe. Pinning down the Devil, it seems, is just as hard as ever.