Articles de revues : « Endogenous Trade Policy »

1

Sturzenegger, Federico. « Endogenous learning and trade policy ». Economics Letters 49, n^o 4 (octobre 1995) : 429–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00714-q.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

2

Engel, Charles, et Kenneth M. Kletzer. « Trade policy under endogenous credibility ». Journal of Development Economics 36, n^o 2 (octobre 1991) : 213–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-3878(91)90033-r.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

3

Silva Junior, Geraldo Edmundo. « Brazilian endogenous trade policy : 1991-1998 ». Revista de Economia Contemporânea 15, n^o 3 (décembre 2011) : 483–511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s1415-98482011000300005.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

This paper presents an empirical contribution to the identification of Grossman-Helpman's "Protection for Sale" parameters model for Brazilian trade policy, based on robust estimations techniques, which means the use of instrumental variables in a 2SLS for Generalized Method of Moments and Limited Information Maximum Likelihood methods for weak instruments with corrections of size tests, in order to correct endogenous bias. The results suggest that the political economy of Brazil's trade policy is an outlier in international comparisons, as the identification of structural parameters for Protection for Sale model shows a low part of population represented by an interest group and low weight of the welfare function.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

4

Baldwin, Richard E., et Rikard Forslid. « Incremental trade policy and endogenous growth : ». Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 23, n^o 5-6 (avril 1999) : 797–822. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(98)00044-x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

5

Limão, Nuno, et Arvind Panagariya. « Inequality and endogenous trade policy outcomes ». Journal of International Economics 72, n^o 2 (juillet 2007) : 292–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.07.004.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

6

Krishna, Kala, et Ling Hui Tan. « Trade policy with endogenous entry revisited ». Journal of International Economics 80, n^o 2 (mars 2010) : 271–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.10.003.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

7

Mayer, Wolfgang, et Raymond G. Riezman. « Endogenous choice of trade policy instruments ». Journal of International Economics 23, n^o 3-4 (novembre 1987) : 377–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(87)90063-8.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

8

Lapham, Beverly, et Roger Ware. « A dynamic model of endogenous trade policy ». Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 34, n^o 1 (février 2001) : 225–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0008-4085.00072.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

9

Goering, Gregory E., et Michael K. Pippenger. « STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY WITH ENDOGENOUS PRODUCT DURABILITY ». International Trade Journal 16, n^o 2 (mai 2002) : 181–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08853900252901413.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

10

Konishi, Hideo, Kamal Saggi et Shlomo Weber. « Endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment ». Journal of International Economics 49, n^o 2 (décembre 1999) : 289–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(98)00066-x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

11

Rama, Mart��n. « ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY : A TIME-SERIES APPROACH ». Economics & ; Politics 6, n^o 3 (novembre 1994) : 215–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00098.x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

12

Etro, Federico. « Optimal Trade Policy under Endogenous Foreign Entry ». Economic Record 90, n^o 290 (18 mars 2014) : 282–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-4932.12108.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

13

Etro, Federico. « ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY* ». International Economic Review 52, n^o 1 (février 2011) : 63–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00619.x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

14

Damania, Richard, et Per G. Fredriksson. « Trade policy reform, endogenous lobby group formation, and environmental policy ». Journal of Economic Behavior & ; Organization 52, n^o 1 (septembre 2003) : 47–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00194-4.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

15

Whalley, John, Jun Yu et Shunming Zhang. « Trade Retaliation in a Monetary-Trade Model ». Global Economy Journal 12, n^o 1 (mars 2012) : 1850248. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/1524-5861.1701.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models, deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and retaliatory trade policy towards goods can affect these and monetary trade models show different retaliatory trade outcomes from conventional goods only models. We use a general equilibrium goods trade model, which also captures trade through time in the form of inside money as used in macro literature on one good overlapping generations models. In this model, the deficit or surplus of any country in goods trade is endogenous determined. Optimal trade policy differs from that in a conventional goods only trade model in that countries which run trade deficits in goods will have more strategic power through tariff policy (and surplus countries less) than in models with balanced trade. We calibrate such a model to China's trade with the rest of the world and explore two country tariff games using 2005 data. Results show the significant impacts on Nash outcomes of endogenizing the Chinese trade surplus in the model in this way.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

16

HERRMANN-PILLATH, CARSTEN. « Endogenous regionalism ». Journal of Institutional Economics 2, n^o 3 (13 octobre 2006) : 297–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137406000427.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

For more than a decade regionalism has been on the rise in the global economy. Based on the concept of allocative efficiency, standard trade theory regards regionalism as a form of protectionism. The paper confronts this view with an institutionalist explanation and draws on recent research on the role of specific investments into international market access, uncertainty and asymmetric information in policy coordination. A distinction between regionalism and regionalist policies is proposed. Endogenous regionalism reflects the economic forces of path-dependent comparative advantage and manifests the embeddedness of trade relations in social networks. Regionalism translates into regionalist policies via political entrepreneurship in policy networks that aims at stabilizing expectations about future market access and balancing negotiation power in a multilateral setting. Regionalism is thus presented as the standard case in global economic integration between the two extremes of unilateral liberalization and complete multilateralism.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

17

Lamberg, Juha-Antti, et Mika Skippari. « Endogenous and exogenous variables in trade agreement policy : ». Scandinavian Economic History Review 49, n^o 3 (septembre 2001) : 28–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03585522.2001.10419851.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

18

CHENG, WEN, MENG-CHUN LIU et XIAOKAI YANG. « A Ricardian Model with Endogenous Comparative Advantage and Endogenous Trade Policy Regimes ». Economic Record 76, n^o 233 (juin 2000) : 172–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2000.tb00015.x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

19

Mitra, Devashish. « Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection : A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination ». American Economic Review 89, n^o 5 (1 décembre 1999) : 1116–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.5.1116.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. Furthermore, industries with higher levels of capital stock, fewer capitalists, more inelastic demand, and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized. (JEL F10, F13)

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

20

Dutt, Pushan, et Devashish Mitra. « Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy : An Empirical Investigation ». Review of Economics and Statistics 87, n^o 1 (février 2005) : 59–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0034653053327621.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

21

Dutt, Pushan, et Devashish Mitra. « Endogenous trade policy through majority voting : an empirical investigation ». Journal of International Economics 58, n^o 1 (octobre 2002) : 107–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00162-3.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

22

Sugimoto, Yoshiaki, et Masao Nakagawa. « Endogenous trade policy : Political struggle in the growth process ». Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 22, n^o 1 (février 2011) : 12–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2010.11.001.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

23

Branch, William A., John Carlson, George W. Evans et Bruce McGough. « Monetary Policy, Endogenous Inattention and the Volatility Trade‐off ». Economic Journal 119, n^o 534 (9 décembre 2008) : 123–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02222.x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

24

Das, Satya P. « Endogenous distribution and the political economy of trade policy ». European Journal of Political Economy 17, n^o 3 (septembre 2001) : 465–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00041-6.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

25

Brancaccio, Giulia, Myrto Kalouptsidi et Theodore Papageorgiou. « Geography, Transportation, and Endogenous Trade Costs ». Econometrica 88, n^o 2 (2020) : 657–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta15455.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

In this paper, we study the role of the transportation sector in world trade. We build a spatial model that centers on the interaction of the market for (oceanic) transportation services and the market for world trade in goods. The model delivers equilibrium trade flows, as well as equilibrium trade costs (shipping prices). Using detailed data on vessel movements and shipping prices, we document novel facts about shipping patterns; we then flexibly estimate our model. We use this setup to demonstrate that the transportation sector (i) attenuates differences in the comparative advantage across countries; (ii) generates network effects in trade costs; and (iii) dampens the impact of shocks on trade flows. These three mechanisms reveal a new role for geography in international trade that was previously concealed by the frequently‐used assumption of exogenous trade costs. Finally, we illustrate how our setup can be used for policy analysis by evaluating the impact of future and existing infrastructure projects (e.g., Northwest Passage, Panama Canal).

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

26

Copeland, Brian R. « Policy Endogeneity and the Effects of Trade on the Environment ». Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 34, n^o 1 (avril 2005) : 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500001532.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

This paper reviews recent work on the implications of endogenous policy for the effects of trade on the environment and the sustainability of renewable resource stocks. A recognition that pollution policy is endogenous has had a major impact on the trade and environment literature and has reversed some of the previously established empirical findings. Work on pollution has proceeded faster than work on renewable resources. I suggest some directions for future work in this area.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

27

Toshimitsu, Tsuyoshi, et Naoto Jinji. « A Note on Strategic Trade Policy and Endogenous Quality Choice* ». Review of International Economics 16, n^o 1 (28 décembre 2007) : 173–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00729.x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

28

Devereux, Michael B., et Khang Min Lee. « Endogenous trade policy and the gains from international financial markets ». Journal of Monetary Economics 43, n^o 1 (février 1999) : 35–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(98)00048-8.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

29

Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Allison Carnegie et Nikhar Gaikwad. « Economic Crises and Trade Policy Competition ». British Journal of Political Science 48, n^o 3 (30 juin 2016) : 713–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123416000132.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

How do crises affect trade policy? This article reconciles starkly diverging accounts in the literature by showing that economic adversity generates endogenous incentives not only for protection, but also for liberalization. It first formally develops the mechanisms by which two features of shocks –intensityandduration– influence the resources and political strategies of distressed firms. The central insight is that policy adjustments to resuscitate afflicted industries typically generate ‘knock-on’ effects on the profitability and political maneuverings of other firms in the economy. The study incorporates these countervailing pressures in its analysis of trade policy competition. In the wake of crises, protection initially increases when affected firms lobby for assistance, but then decreases as industries run low on resources to expend on lobbying and as firms in other industries mobilize to counter-lobby. The theoretical predictions are tested using sub-national and cross-national data, and real-world illustrations are presented to highlight the mechanisms driving the results.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

30

Montoro, Carlos. « OIL SHOCKS AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY ». Macroeconomic Dynamics 16, n^o 2 (5 janvier 2012) : 240–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100510000106.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

This paper studies how monetary policy should react to oil shocks in a microfounded model with staggered price-setting and oil as an input in a CES production function. In particular, we extend Benigno and Woodford [Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (6) (2005), 1–52] to obtain a second-order approximation to the expected utility of the representative household when the steady state is distorted and the economy is hit by oil price shocks. The main result is that oil price shocks generate an endogenous trade-off between inflation and output stabilization when oil has low substitutability in production. We also find, in contrast to Benigno and Woodford, that this trade-off is reduced, but not eliminated, when we get rid of the effects of monopolistic distortions in the steady state. Moreover, the size of the endogenous “cost-push” shock generated by fluctuations in the oil price increases when it is more difficult to substitute other factors for oil.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

31

Sampaolesi, Alejandro. « Optimal Environmental Policy under Endogenous Terms of Trade and Economic Growth ». Theoretical Economics Letters 04, n^o 07 (2014) : 608–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2014.47076.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

32

Zhou, Dongsheng, Barbara J. Spencer et Ilan Vertinsky. « Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs ». Journal of International Economics 56, n^o 1 (janvier 2002) : 205–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00118-0.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

33

Tsai, Shoou-Rong, Pan-Long Tsai et Yungho Weng. « Endogenous strategic trade policy : The case of the third market model ». International Review of Economics & ; Finance 58 (novembre 2018) : 676–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2018.07.007.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

34

Collie, David R. « Endogenous timing in trade policy games : Should governments use countervailing duties ? » Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130, n^o 1 (mars 1994) : 191–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02706016.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

35

Lee, Ki‐Dong, Kangsik Choi et DongJoon Lee. « Endogenous vertical structure and trade policy in an import‐competing market ». Managerial and Decision Economics 41, n^o 8 (13 juillet 2020) : 1431–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.3193.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

36

Wong, Woan Foong. « The Round Trip Effect : Endogenous Transport Costs and International Trade ». American Economic Journal : Applied Economics 14, n^o 4 (1 octobre 2022) : 127–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20190721.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Container ships travel between a fixed set of origins and destinations in round trips, inducing a negative correlation in their freight rates. I study the implications of this round trip effect on international trade and trade policy. I identify this effect and develop an instrument using it to estimate the impact of transport costs on trade. I simulate counterfactual import tariff increases in a quantitative model and quantify the importance of endogenizing transport costs with respect to this effect: an exogenous transport costs model predicts a trade balance improvement from protectionist policies, while the round trip model finds the opposite. (JEL D22, F13, F14, L92, R41)

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

37

Alonso-Carrera, Jaime, et Timothy Kam. « ANATOMIZING INCOMPLETE-MARKETS SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES : POLICY TRADE-OFFS AND EQUILIBRIUM DETERMINACY ». Macroeconomic Dynamics 20, n^o 4 (5 mai 2015) : 1022–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100514000728.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

We propose a simple incomplete-markets small-open-economy model that is amenable to analytical dissection of its policy-relevant mechanisms. In contrast to its complete-markets limit, the equilibrium real exchange rate is irreducible from the incomplete-markets equilibrium. Market incompleteness exacerbates the domestic-inflation and output-gap monetary-policy trade-off in two ways: its steepness and its resulting endogenous cost-push to the trade-off. The latter depends on an equilibrium combination of structural shocks and on agents' beliefs of future events. Thus, in comparison to its complete-markets and closed-economy limits, standard Taylor-type rules are less capable of inducing determinate rational expectations equilibrium in our environment. Despite the larger policy trade-off under incomplete markets, simple policies that also respond to exchange-rate growth are able to manage expectations that drive the endogenous cost-push term. However, policies that respond directly to expectations may turn out to exacerbate the cost-push trade-off further, and thus, to be more likely to fuel self-fulfilling multiple or unstable equilibria.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

38

Dong, Yan, et John Whalley. « Model Structure and the Combined Welfare and Trade Effects of China's Trade Related Policies ». Global Economy Journal 10, n^o 4 (décembre 2010) : 1850210. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1642.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Because China’s economic structure is different from that in OECD countries, using conventional neo-classical competitive trade models to analyze the welfare and trade impacts of trade related policy change can be misleading. In particular, both the exchange rate regime and output and pricing policies of state owned enterprises (SOE’s) will have effects on trade and welfare which differ from a classical competitive model. This paper present a numerical model that captures the combined and interactive effects of three policy elements in prototype form of tariffs, policy towards SOEs in the industrial sector, and an exchange rate regime supporting large trade surpluses and additions to foreign reserves. The model has non neutral monetary features, endogenous trade imbalances and average product pricing of labor in goods. We do not claim it to be fully representative of modern China, but it does go some way beyond simple competitive models used elsewhere and points to different conclusions of policy impact. We calibrate our model to 2006 data, and then evaluate the impacts both singly and in combination of: tariff liberalization, a move to more freely floating exchange rates, and SOE enterprise reform. Results show that large differences in policy have a different impact relative to a classical competitive model. SOE reform and a freely floating Chinese exchange rate have more impact on China’s welfare than tariff liberalization. Policies of RMB appreciation and increasing China’s money stock reduce China’s trade surplus. In the traditional competitive model, trade liberalization impacts both imports and exports, while in our central case model, with endogenously determined trade surplus, trade liberalization has little effect on exports. Most of the policy impact is on imports and the trade surplus. SOE reform of China’s manufacturing sector significantly decreases production of China’s manufacturing sector and increases production in China’s other sectors.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

39

Spreen, Thomas H. « Price Endogenous Mathematical Programming Models and Trade Analysis ». Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 38, n^o 2 (août 2006) : 249–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800022276.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Takayama and Judge introduced the price endogenous mathematical programming model as an alternative to the traditional econometric approach to sector-level policy analysis. McCarl and Spreen provided a review of price endogenous mathematical programming models. In that paper, they showed how price endogeneity can be introduced into a standard firm-level linear programming model. The introduction of price endogeneity allows expansion of the firm-level specification to a market-level analysis. At the time of publication of McCarl and Spreen, however, the application of price endogenous mathematical programming models was limited by the availability of software packages that could directly solve such models. The typical application used linear supply and/or demand relationships, which resulted in a quadratic programming (QP) specification. The advent of MINOS in the 1980s and then its incorporation into GAMS has lifted the computation constraint. In the present day, numerous price endogenous models have been developed. I can lay claim to six such models.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

40

Cho, Sumi, Sang‐Ho Lee et Xoan T. Hoang. « Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy : An endogenous timing game and its policy implications ». Australian Economic Papers 58, n^o 4 (14 novembre 2019) : 480–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.12164.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

41

Svensson, Peter. « Strategic Trade Policy and Endogenous R&D?Subsidies : An Empirical Study ». Kyklos 51, n^o 2 (mai 1998) : 259–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00048.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

42

Lanclos, D. Kent, et Thomas W. Hertel. « Endogenous Product Differentiation and Trade Policy : Implications for the U.S. Food Industry ». American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, n^o 3 (août 1995) : 591–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1243227.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

43

Acharya, Ram C. « Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium : An interaction of redistribution rule, trade openness, and labor market condition ». Economics & ; Politics 30, n^o 3 (26 février 2018) : 423–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12110.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

44

Magee, Christopher. « Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation : an application to the free-rider problem ». Journal of International Economics 57, n^o 2 (août 2002) : 449–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00146-5.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

45

WANG, YA-CHIN, et LEONARD F. S. WANG. « STRATEGIC TRADE AND DELEGATED COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY CHOICE : IS EXPORT POLICY NEEDED ? » Pacific Economic Review 16, n^o 4 (octobre 2011) : 489–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2011.00559.x.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

46

Moon, Soojae. « The Losses from Trade Restrictions : Policy Dynamics with Firm Selection and Endogenous Markup ». Review of International Economics 23, n^o 1 (28 octobre 2014) : 86–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/roie.12160.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

47

Kuusela, Olli-Pekka, et Jussi Lintunen. « A Cap-and-Trade Commitment Policy with Allowance Banking ». Environmental and Resource Economics 75, n^o 3 (19 décembre 2019) : 421–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00395-y.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

AbstractWe examine the planner’s dynamic regulation problem in an emission trading system (ETS) with allowance banking. The planner sets the emissions cap for the next period after the current period allowance market has cleared, but before knowing the next period’s abatement cost realization. This creates a time consistency problem when banking is possible. We examine two policies to overcome the consistency problem: a commitment solution and the Markov perfect solution. We show that the endogenous price floor generated by the banking demand becomes an integral feature of the two policies. Hence, they can be best described as hybrid policies that combine elements from emissions taxes and tradable allowances. This reveals new welfare implications that have an influence on instrument choice in the traditional prices versus quantities setup. We compare the expected welfare outcomes of four different policy instruments: the commitment policy, the Markov policy, a Pigouvian tax, and a no-banking ETS. We show that allowing banking can yield welfare gains compared to tax and quantity regulation, with or without commitment.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

48

Ullah, Rafid, et Bakhtiar Khan. « Empirical Investigation of Fiscal, Monetary and Trade Policies Impact on Economic Growth of Pakistan ». Academic Journal of Social Sciences (AJSS ) 5, n^o 1 (26 mars 2021) : 54–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.54692/ajss.2021.05011386.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

Sustainable economic growth and development is undoubtly, one of the most challenging issue nowadays, in the developing countries, particularly in Pakistan. Therefore, economists mainly focus on the importance of the fiscal, monetary and trade policies in escalating economic growth. This study investigate empirically the impact of fiscal, monetary and trade policies on economic growth of Pakistan, employing ARDL bounds test approach. From an evaluation of the overall analysis and results, it is concluded that, on fiscal policy variables side, development expenditure have positive and significant effect, while, current expenditure have also significant but negative effect on economic growth. On monetary policy variable side, money supply have also positive and significant effect on economic growth. Finally, on trade policy variable side, trade openness have positive and significant effect on economic growth. The results of this study confirm the finding of most previous study, since the advent of the endogenous growth theory and new trade theory. The study suggest that the level of fiscal policy variables, development expenditure could be effectual while current expenditure has been detrimental to economic growth. In the same way, on monetary policy variable side the level of money supply could also be effectual in an augmenting economy. Finally, the level of trade policy variable, trade openness could be effectual in managing economic growth.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

49

Lee, Ki-Dong, Kangsik Choi et DongJoon Lee. « Endogenous Vertical Structure and Trade Policy in an Import-competing Market with Fulfilled Expectations ». International Economy 23 (2020) : 67–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5652/internationaleconomy/ie2020.23.10.kl.

Texte intégral

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

50

Bazzana, Davide. « HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS AND ENDOGENOUS FLUCTUATIONS IN THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR FRAMEWORK ». Macroeconomic Dynamics 24, n^o 2 (1 juin 2018) : 327–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100518000251.

Texte intégral

Résumé :

This paper proposes a financial accelerator framework to study the effects of heterogeneous and bounded rational expectations on macroeconomic dynamics. The paper examines the fluctuations effects departing from the rational expectations hypothesis in order to understand if there are significant implications on macroeconomic volatility and policy prescriptions. The findings suggest that macroeconomic stability and inflation dynamics depend on the chosen set of forecasting rules, as well as on the monetary policy adopted. The model shows that no monetary policy is able to quickly stabilize the system, as some fluctuations persist. Central banks face a trade-off between macro-volatility and speed of convergence to the steady state. This result offers some ground for fiscal policies aiming to prompt system stability. In addition, the analysis reveals a counterintuitive result confirming the “less-is-more” effect: increasing the decision-making and computational abilities of the agents may not lead the system to converge to the preferable steady state.

Styles APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

Articles de revues sur le sujet « Endogenous Trade Policy »

Créez une référence correcte selon les styles APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard et plusieurs autres