Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Employee ownership – France »

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview of the research on employee ownership. What does the scientific literature reveal about advantages and disadvantages? What can be learned from different models used in Italy, France, Mondragon (Spain), UK and US with many employee-owned firms in contrast to Denmark.Design/methodology/approachA structured review of the literature on employee. The paper identifies different mechanisms leading to effects on productivity, job stability, distribution, investment etc., and reviews the empirical evidence. The main barriers and drivers are identified and different models for employee ownership in Italy, France, Mondragon (Spain), UK and US are reviewed to identify potential models for a country like Denmark with few employee-owned firms.FindingsThe article gives an overview over the theoretical predictions and the main empirical evidence of the effects of employee ownership. The pros are greater employee identification with the firm and increased productivity reinforced by increased participation. Employee-owned firms have more equal distribution of wages and more stable employment, and they have greater mutual control between employees and fewer middle managers. The motivation effects may be smaller for large firms and lack of capital may lead to lower levels of investments and capital per employee.Originality/valueComprehensive and updated literature review on the effects and successful formats of employee ownership to identify models for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.

Approximately 220 of the 700 firms whose stock was traded on the main French markets had an employee stock ownership plan at the end of the year 2000. Average ownership was 3.7%. Employee ownership can be implemented for many reasons, and the relationship between ESOPs and performance still remains unclear. The purpose of this research is thus to determine how employee ownership can affect corporate performance and risk in France. This study improves upon previous work by using ownership, performance and risk variables, as well as control variables (sector, size, debt, growth), applied to a large sample of French firms. Cross-sectional regressions show some positive links between the presence of ESOPs and some financial performance measures, such as the return on equity and the return on investments. Links between ESOPs and risk variables are more complicated. The presence of ESOPs reduces the return on equity variability, but the more employee ownership there is the more the beta coefficient increases. This result seems to show that investors tend to consider firms with ESOPs to be more risky, even if their profitability is more stable. Within the limitations of these results, we propose a general model introducing the concept of social capital.

France has a one of the longest- and best-established employee financial participation system in the world with 3.5 million employee-owners, the largest number of employee-owners of any European country (EFES, 2019). It has also been the first country in 1967 to have compulsory profit-sharing schemes in firms employing 50 or more. The PACTE law (action plan for the growth and transformation of companies) has been promulgated in France in 2019. The PACTE law introduces new measures that support employee financial participation through profit-sharing, gainsharing and employee ownership and, second, employee participation in decision-making through labor representation in corporate governance and social dialogue. First, gainsharing and profit-sharing bonuses are promoted in small businesses by decreasing the social tax. Second, the law introduces developments relating to the representation of employee shareholders and employees, first in corporate governance and, second, in the supervisory boards of company savings funds (CSF). The objective of this paper is to present the new measures of the PACTE law that will affect the development of employee financial participation.

Drawing on qualitative research and longitudinal data on two Mondragon multinational cooperatives, the authors examine the multinational expansion of these co-ops and the diffusion of the cooperative model’s employment practices to their subsidiaries in Brazil, China, Slovakia, France, and Poland. The results show that international expansion can radically transform the organizational architecture of co-ops and exacerbate dilemmas about how to put their hallmark values into practice. Moreover, the findings reveal a fragmented and inconsistent introduction of the cooperative model overseas. Work organization practices are homogeneous across the various sites, whereas job security, training, and pay equity practices are not. Core cooperative practices (i.e., employee participation in ownership, profit sharing, and general management) have not been implemented in any foreign operation. The study illustrates how market influences, institutions, and macro- and micro-politics shape the transfer of employment practices.

Introduction: Enasidenib is approved for the treatment of patients with relapsed/refractory (R/R) acute myeloid leukemia (AML) with an isocitrate dehydrogenase-2 mutation (mIDH2+) in the USA. To compare the relative effectiveness of enasidenib with standard of care (SoC) in terms of overall survival (OS) among patients with mIDH2+ R/R AML who are ineligible for hematopoietic cell transplantation (HCT), a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis was performed using data from the phase 1/2 AG221-C-001 single-arm trial and a real-world chart review study of patients from France (France chart review [FCR] study) and historical data from the AML Study Group (AMLSG) database. Methods: Individual patient data (IPD) were obtained from the phase 1/2 AG221-C-001 trial for enasidenib (100 mg/day) and from the FCR study and AMLSG database for SoC. Data from the FCR study and AMLSG database were combined to create a single pooled SoC group. Based on clinician feedback and data availability, 6 clinically important covariates (history of HCT before baseline, age, number of prior lines of AML therapy at baseline, cytogenetic risk at baseline, history of myelodysplastic syndromes [MDS], Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group performance status) were used for propensity score calculation and matching. Patients from the 2 groups were matched using nearest neighbor 1:1 matching with a caliper of 0.2 standard deviations (SDs) of the logit transform of the propensity score. A comparison of means, SDs, and standardized mean differences (SMDs) between treatment groups was conducted for each covariate to assess the balance between the pre- and post-match populations. Hazard ratios (HRs) were estimated using doubly robust Cox proportional hazard models that adjusted for the aforementioned covariates. Sensitivity analyses were conducted using alternative matching algorithms, weighting methods, and covariates. Additional sensitivity analyses excluding patients with early events (landmark analyses) were conducted. Results: Before matching, considerable differences existed between the enasidenib (N = 195) and SoC (N = 258) groups (i.e. SMDs > 0.10 were observed for nearly all covariates), and OS was numerically in favor of enasidenib (HR 0.82, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.66-1.01). After matching, the enasidenib and SoC groups (N = 144 per group) were mostly well balanced (SMDs for all covariates except for prior MDS were < 0.10), and enasidenib was associated with significantly longer OS than SoC (HR 0.61, 95% CI 0.47-0.80). The median OS was 8.8 months (95% CI 7.5-10.7) for enasidenib and 4.4 months (95% CI 3.5-6.1) for SoC (Figure). Sensitivity analyses (i.e., analyses using alternative matching algorithms, weighting methods and covariates, and landmark analyses) delivered results consistent with the primary analysis. Conclusions: The results of this study suggest that enasidenib may prolong survival compared with SoC for patients with mIDH2+ R/R AML who are ineligible for HCT. The incorporation of 2 separate data sources (i.e. the FCR study and AMLSG database) into a combined SoC group increases the generalizability and robustness of these findings. Additional studies should aim to validate these findings using data sources from other countries and assess the comparative efficacy of enasidenib with SoC for other clinically important outcomes. Disclosures De Botton: Syros: Consultancy; Servier: Consultancy; Janssen: Consultancy; Daiichi: Consultancy; AbbVie: Consultancy; Agios: Consultancy, Research Funding; Celgene Corporation: Consultancy, Speakers Bureau; Forma: Consultancy, Research Funding; Novartis: Consultancy; Pfizer: Consultancy; Pierre Fabre: Consultancy; Bayer: Consultancy; Astellas: Consultancy. Brandwein:Roche: Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Pfizer: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Novartis: Consultancy, Honoraria; Jazz Pharma: Consultancy, Honoraria; Otsuka: Honoraria. Stein:Agios: Consultancy, Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Daiichi Sankyo, Inc.: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Bioline: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Genentech: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Novartis: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; PTC Therapeutics: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Syros: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Astellas Pharma US, Inc: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Celgene Corporation: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees. Wei:Celgene: Honoraria, Research Funding; Walter and Eliza Hall Institute: Other: former employee, Patents & Royalties: receives a fraction of its royalty stream related to venetoclax; Genentech: Honoraria; Amgen: Honoraria, Research Funding; Pfizer: Honoraria; Servier: Honoraria, Research Funding; Macrogenics: Honoraria; AbbVie: Honoraria, Research Funding; Novartis: Honoraria, Research Funding; Astellas: former employee, Honoraria; AstraZeneca: Honoraria, Research Funding; Janssen: Honoraria. Weber:Celgene Corporation: Research Funding. Pigneux:Roche: Honoraria; Pfizer: Honoraria; Daichi: Honoraria; Amgen: Honoraria; Jazz: Honoraria; Astellas: Honoraria; Abbvie: Honoraria; F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd: Honoraria; Novartis: Honoraria. Boissel:NOVARTIS: Consultancy. Paschka:Pfizer: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Speakers Bureau; Sunesis: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; BMS: Other: Travel expenses, Speakers Bureau; Amgen: Other: Travel expenses; Novartis: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Other: Travel expenses, Speakers Bureau; Abbvie: Other: Travel expenses; Takeda: Other: Travel expenses; Astellas: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Agios: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Janssen: Other: Travel expenses; Jazz: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Speakers Bureau; Otsuka: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees; Astex: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Travel expenses; Celgene: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Other: Travel expenses, Speakers Bureau. Döhner:Daiichi: Honoraria; Jazz: Honoraria; Novartis: Honoraria; Celgene: Honoraria; Janssen: Honoraria; CTI Biopharma: Consultancy, Honoraria. Nehme:Celgene Corporation: Employment, Equity Ownership. Frattini:Celgene Corporation: Employment, Equity Ownership. Marion-Gallois:Celgene Corporation: Employment. Wang:Celgene International: Employment, Equity Ownership. Cameron:Cornerstone Research Group: Employment, Equity Ownership. Siddiqui:Celgene: Consultancy; Cornerstone Research Group: Employment. Qadeer:Cornerstone Research Group: Employment; Celgene Corporation: Consultancy. Döhner:Pfizer: Research Funding; Roche: Consultancy, Honoraria; AbbVie: Consultancy, Honoraria; Novartis: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Bristol Myers Swuibb: Research Funding; Astex: Consultancy, Honoraria; Arog: Research Funding; Astellas: Consultancy, Honoraria; Celgene Corporation: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Jazz: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding; Janssen: Consultancy, Honoraria; Seattle Genetics: Consultancy, Honoraria; Agios: Consultancy, Honoraria; Amgen: Consultancy, Honoraria, Research Funding.

Purpose This study aims at providing a proof of the factors associated with sustainability assurance demand by French companies. Design/methodology/approach This research used panel data methodology. Findings The study results demonstrate that institutional ownership and the presence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee within the management board have an effect on the demand for sustainability assurance. The results also reveal that three types of stakeholders (employees, environment and customers) positively affect the demand of voluntary sustainability assurance. Originality/value The paper provides a preliminary proof on the effects of the governance of corporation and pressure of some groups of stakeholders on the voluntary demand of sustainability assurance in France.

Tout d'abord, cette recherche examine le capitalisme partagé, le développement théorique et historique de la participation des salariés, et les droits de propriété. Deuxièmement, la thèse analyse empirique sur les perspectives de l'actionnariat salarié. Premièrement, la période du 19ème siècle jusqu'au début du 21ème siècle en Allemagne est recherchée. Nous essayons de répondre à la question : "Est-ce que les décideurs politiques en Allemagne veulent créer une société de propriétaires ?" Au cours de la recherche, nous montrons l'hypothèse "L'actionnariat salarié est un critère des pères fondateurs de l'Allemagne afin de stabiliser Allemagne socio-économique après la Seconde guerre mondiale. Supporté bien évidemment par une étude qualitative de recherches d'archives historiques. En Allemagne, il est évident que les pères fondateurs ont poursuivis "Wohlstand für Alle" à travers les actions des citoyens. Deuxièmement, cette recherche examine la relation entre l'actionnariat salarié et le WACC. La thèse analyse le conflit entre les parties prenantes internes et externes, qui est représenté par le cours des actions d'une entreprise en supposant un marché efficace. Nous émettons l'hypothèse : «Un pourcentage plus élevé d'actions détenues par les salariés provoque un WACC inférieur" Ceci est confirmé par un modèle de régression quantitative fixe de panneau d'effet dans le cas de l'indice Société des Bourses Françaises 120 et l'indice 500 de Standard & Poor
Firstly, this research examines shared capitalism, the theoretical and historical development of employee participation, and ownership rights. Secondly, the thesis analyzes empirically perspectives on employee stock ownership. First, the period from the 19th century until the beginning of the 21st century in Germany is researched. We attempt to answer the question: "Did policy makers in Germany want to create a society of owners?" During the research we prove the hypothesis "Employee ownership was a criterion of Germany's founding fathers in order to stabilize Germany socio-economically after the Second World War." We confirm it through a qualitative study of historical archive researches. In Germany, there is clear evidence that founding fathers pursued "Wohlstand für Alle" through citizen's shares. Second, this research examines the relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. The thesis analyzes the conflict between internal and external stakeholders, which is represented through a company's stock price assuming an efficient market. We hypothesize: "A higher percentage of shares held by employees causes a lower WACC." This is confirmed through a quantitative fixed effect panel regression model in the case of the Société des Bourses Françaises 120 index and Standard & Poor's 500 index

L’Actionnariat Salarié (AS) est une composante de rémunération qui permet de relier le patrimoine personnel du salarié à celui de l’entreprise. Il assure leur représentation dans le conseil d’administration, ce qui génère des effets sur plusieurs niveaux : individuel, organisationnel et macroéconomique. Ce travail doctoral examine les effets de l’AS sur les pratiques de comptabilité et audit en France, pays où l’AS est le plus développé en Europe. Le premier chapitre introduit les plans d’AS et les autres plans de participation des salariés en France et dans le monde. Le second chapitre étudie les coûts d’agence et les honoraires d’audit. Il montre une relation en U inversé entre l’AS et ces deux variables, indiquant que l’AS a un double effet : l’alignement des intérêts et l’enracinement des dirigeants. Le troisième chapitre montre que l’AS rassure les parties prenantes sur l’indépendance de l’auditeur. Il permet notamment aux dirigeants de profiter des bénéfices liés à un double engagement (audit et non-audit) et d’acquérir plus de services non-audits. Le quatrième chapitre révèle que la gestion des résultats par les managers en France, à travers les accruals discrétionnaires, est plutôt utilisée de manière opportuniste. L’étude démontre aussi que l’AS réduit la manipulation opportuniste des résultats et le taux d’opportunisme des accruals. Le dernier chapitre présente une conclusion de la thèse et synthétise les résultats, les contributions et les limites de la recherche. Cette thèse de doctorat contribue à la littérature sur la gouvernance d’entreprise, en examinant l’effet de l’AS sur les coûts d’agence à travers divers prismes
Employee Share Ownership (ESO) refers to a compensation practice through which an employee’s wealth is directly tied to their companies’. It provides their representation in the board of directors and has several effects on the individual, corporate and macroeconomic levels. This doctoral thesis discusses the effects of employee ownership on accounting and audit practices in France, the country that has the most developed ESO in Europe. The first chapter provides a general introduction to ESO schemes and other shared capitalism arrangements in France and in the world. The second chapter focuses on agency costs and audit fees, and finds a negative U-shaped relationship between ESO and both variables. It indicates that ESO aligns the interests of employees with those of shareholders, but also acts as a managerial entrenchment mechanism. The third chapter finds that ESO reassures the company’s stakeholders about the auditor’s independence and allows managers to benefit from their auditor’s joint-engagement benefits by purchasing more non-audit services. The fourth chapter studies earnings management through discretionary accruals and reveals that earnings management in France is rather used opportunistically by managers. It also finds that ESO helps decreasing the manipulation of earnings and reduces the opportunism of the discretionary accruals. The final chapter summarizes the thesis’ results and presents its contributions and limitations. This doctorate dissertation contributes to research on corporate governance by studying ESO’s effect on agency costs from several perspectives

L'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension des enjeux de l'épargne salariale pour les politiques de rémunérations dans les entreprises en France. Une mise en perspective historique et théorique permet d'abord d'identifier les motivations conduisant les entreprises à développer un dispositif alliant l'intéressement et le PEE. Ensuite, nous explicitons à travers une modélisation théorique de type « Principal-Agent » les caractéristiques d'un contrat associant l'intéressement à un PEE. Les prédictions théoriques qui en découlent sont enfin validées par une étude empirique sur des données individuelles d'entreprises et de salariés. A partir d'une estimation par appariement sur le score de propension, les résultats révèlent que les entreprises qui intègrent à leurs politiques de rémunérations un dispositif alliant l'intéressement et le PEE versent en moyenne des salaires de base plus faibles, compensés par le versement d'une prime d'intéressement. Par ailleurs, celui-ci s'accompagne d'un impact positif et significatif sur le profit mais d'un effet non significatif sur la productivité du travail des entreprises. Il existe néanmoins une corrélation positive entre la mise en œuvre du dispositif et la productivité du travail pouvant avoir pour origine un effet de sélection. Ces travaux nous invitent à défendre la thèse selon laquelle l'instauration par les entreprises d'un dispositif alliant le partage du profit et le PEE vise non seulement des effets d'incitation mais aussi des objectifs de maîtrise des coûts salariaux. Au-delà, lorsque le PEE donne lieu à la constitution de l'actionnariat salarié, il permet aux entreprises de poursuivre des objectifs de stabilisation du capital
This dissertation aims at shedding a new light on the analysis of the effects of profit sharing and employee ownership plan on wages practices in France. We firstly purpose a survey of the theoretical foundations of profit sharing and employee ownership plan. By considering institutional and macroeconomic changes in France since 1980, we secondly develop an historical analysis of the financial participation. In this context, we argue that a system based on both profit sharing and employee ownership plan is not only designed as an effort incentive scheme but also as a risk transfer device. We thirdly develop a Principal-Agent model to determine the optimal characteristics of a contract based on both profit sharing and employee ownership plan. Our hypothesis is then tested on an original matched employer-employee database concerning French firms. Using a Propensity Score Matching method which allows controlling for potential selection bias, we show that such a contract has no significant impact on the labour productivity but a positive one on the firm's benefit. We finally find a negative impact on the employee's base wage but no significant effect on the total earnings

Cette thèse a pour objectif de démêler la nature de la relation entre " actionnariat salarié " et " création de valeur ", dans le cadre de la gouvernance actionnariale et partenariale. Les principaux résultats dégagés montrent que la relation entre " actionnariat salarié " et " création de valeur actionnariale " est curvilinéaire prenant la forme de U-inversé : elle est positive pour des niveaux faibles d'actionnariat salarié et négative si le pourcentage de droits de vote revenant aux salariés dépasse 3%. Aussi, un effet positif de l' " actionnariat salarié " sur la " part de la valeur créée allouée aux salariés " est constaté, et ce uniquement pour un actionnariat salarié significatif. Au dessous du taux de 3%, le pourcentage du capital et le pourcentage des droits de vote détenus par les salariés ne montrent aucune influence significative. Quant à l'étude de l'influence de certains mécanismes de contrôle sur la relation étudiée, les principaux résultats dégagés se résument comme suit : Au-delà du seuil stratégique légal de 33%, la concentration du capital semble avoir un effet de modération positif sur la relation actionnariat salarié - création de valeur actionnariale et la relation actionnariat salarié - part de la valeur créée allouée aux salariés. La propriété managériale, si elle dépasse le seuil stratégique légal de 33%, semble modérer négativement la relation actionnariat salarié - création de valeur actionnariale et positivement la relation actionnariat salarié - part de la valeur créée allouée aux salariés. La participation de salariés actionnaires au conseil modère négativement la relation entre " actionnariat salarié " et " création de valeur actionnariale " ; alors qu'elle modère positivement la relation entre " actionnariat salarié " et " part de la valeur créée allouée aux salariés ".

L'idée de base des contrats incitatifs est celle de la réalisation d'intérêts communs provoquant des changements dans le comportement des salariés et l'amélioration de la performance de l'entreprise. Les résultats et les succès de l'entreprise dépendent également du climat des relations professionnelles. Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de cette thèse est de contribuer à la compréhension de la participation financière (l'intéressement et l'actionnariat salarié) et ses liens avec les conflits à partir de données d'entreprises françaises. La recherche sur ces deux thèmes est d'une importance pratique et novatrice. Tout d'abord, il existe au sein de l'entreprise une multitude de types de conflits. Nous nous intéressons principalement aux conflits collectifs. Ensuite, la plupart des études sur les conflits collectifs se concentre uniquement sur les grèves, en ignorant les autres formes d'actions collectives, et très peu d'études font le lien avec les systèmes d'incitations collectives au sein de l'entreprise. Ainsi, ce travail se décompose en quatre études empiriques. La première vise à analyser les différentes formes de conflits au sein de l'entreprise. La deuxième analyse l'effet de la participation financière sur les conflits collectifs. La troisième étude s'intéresse à l'impact de la négociation et de la participation financière sur la résolution des conflits collectifs. Enfin, la dernière examine la performance des entreprises en fonction de la participation financière et des conflits collectifs. Nos recherches reposent sur des outils d'analyse multidimensionnelle et économétriques. L'approche multidimensionnelle fait appel à l'Analyse des Correspondances Multiples et à la Classification Hiérarchique Ascendante.L'approche économétrique fait usage de méthodes d'estimations classiques (OLS,Probit Simple, Probit Multinomial, Probit Ordonné), de modèles à sélection (Heckman), et des techniques d'estimations de modèles récursifs à équations simultanées traitant ainsi les problèmes d'endogénéité et la mixture (quantitative et qualitative) des variables dépendantes (Roodman, Conditional Mixed Process)
The basic idea of incentive contracts is that of achieving common interests causing changes in the behavior of employees and improving firm performance.The firms' outputs and success also depend on the industrial relation climate. In this context, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding offinancial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership) and its links with the conflicts using data on French firms. Research on these topics isinnovative and highly recommended. First, there exists within the firm a multitude of types of conflicts. We are primarily concerned with collective conflicts. Most of studies on collective conflicts focuses only on strikes, ignoring other forms of collective actions. Very few studies make the link between collective incentive schemes and collective conflicts. Thus, this work is dividedinto four empirical studies. The first one analyzes the different forms of conflicts within the firm. The second one analyzes the effect of financial participation on collective conflicts. The third study focuses on the impact of bargaining and financial participation on the resolution of collective conflicts. The last one examines firm's performance based on financial participation and collective conflicts. Our research is based on multidimensional analysis and econometric tools. The multidimensional approach uses the Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering. The econometric approach usesclassical estimation methods (OLS, Probit, Mutinomial Probit, Ordered Pobit),selection models (Heckman), and methods estimating simultaneous and recursive equations, treating the endogeneity problems and the mixture (quantitative and qualitative) of the dependent variables (Roodman, Conditional Mixed Process)

Le rôle des salariés dans le fonctionnement des entreprises trouve appui sur l’alinéa 8du Préambule de la Constitution de 1946 : « tout travailleur participe, par l’intermédiaire de ses délégués, à la détermination collective des conditions de travail ainsi qu’à la gestion des entreprises. ». La participation des salariés a pourtant été lente à s’imposer. La crise économique a révélé l’importance de leur association aux décisions sociétales. Les politiques publiques ont tenté de rééquilibrer les forces en présence afin de circonscrire les effets du capitalisme. Des lois successives ont accru les pouvoirs des salariés et des institutions représentatives du personnel dans l’entreprise pour en faire de véritables acteurs dans la gestion de celle-ci. Le paysage législatif révèle la volonté du législateur de faire de l’entreprise une démocratie dans laquelle toutes les parties doivent s’exprimer. Toutefois, que le salarié soit traité comme un associé ou un administrateur, salariés et entrepreneurs demeurent distincts
The role of the employees in the management of the companies is based on paragraph 8 ofthe preamble of the Constitution of 1946 : « Every employee participates, through one of its delegates, to the collective determination of the working conditions as well as the company management. » The implementation of the employees’ participation has however been slow. The economic crisis has revealed the importance of the employees’ association in corporate decisions. Public politics have tried to rebalance current forces in order to circumscribe the effects of the capitalism. Successive laws have increased the powers of employees and of the representative institutions of the personnel in the company so that they could become real actors in the management of the company. The legislative landscape reveals the intention of the legislator to design the company as a democracy in which all the parties shall express themselves. However, regardless of whether the employee is a shareholder or an administrator, employees and entrepreneurs remain distinct

Defence date: 17 January 1991
Examining board: Prof. Raymond Barre, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (I.E.P.) ; Prof. Jean-Claude Chouraqui, I.E.P., I.U.E. ; Prof. Jean-Paul Fitoussi (Sup. Ext.), I.E.P., I.U.E. ; Prof. Felix R. Fitzroy, University of St. Andrews, Scotland ; Prof. Mario D. Nuti (superviseur), I.U.E.
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

Employee ownership is an important element to develop employees' sense of belonging to their company and to unite them around strategic objectives. This kind of involvement reflects the internal cohesion and pride that unite employees with their company. Aware of the development of employee ownership and in anticipation of the deep implications of this practice in France, this study proposes to examine the impact of employee ownership on work attitudes. We conducted a questionnaire-based survey among employees of the SBF 250. The collected responses were then analyzed by a structural equation method. The results indicated that direct employee ownership helps to significantly reduce intention to leave. Similarly, organizational commitment and job satisfaction correlate positively and significantly with the granting of shares to employees.