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1
Decaluwé, Bernard. « Le système monétaire européen : Où en sommes-nous ? » Études internationales 12, no 3 (12 avril 2005) : 445–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/701232ar.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The decisions of the Council of Europe on December 5"', 1978, that would lead to the establishment of the European Monetary System, raise a multitude of questions. Among these, the creation of a European currency unit, the ECU, and the announcement of the establishment in the near future of a European Monetary Fund, the E.M.F., are the most symbolic decisions in terms of public opinion as well as the most important in their economic and political implications. In this article, we will show that the development of the ECU and the creation of a E.M.F. with substantial decisional autonomy are the two conditions necessary for strengthening the European monetary union.
2
Majone, Giandomenico. « Public policymaking and its analysis at National and European Levels ». Studia z Polityki Publicznej, no 2(6) (1 juin 2015) : 9–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/kszpp.2015.2.1.
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The author describes the specific features of public policy process at the European Unionlevel and its differences related to policy-making at national level. He underlines, amongother things that the policy agenda in the European Union is being shaped differently.At the national level the agenda is under greater influence of politicians who are closelyinterconnected with voters. At the European Union level the technocratic (not directlyelected) European Commission has a monopoly of legislative initiative. Furthermore, atthe European level feasibility studies – as an element of the pre-decision stage in publicpolicy-making – tend to be ignored. In nation-states we can see such analyses as a resultof competition taking place between those who rule and their political opposition. Atthe European Union level it is not the case. The author points out that these mechanisms would have been beneficial for the EU member states. They would have haltedthe implementation of decisions which ran the excessive risk. He has also in mind thedecision related to the introduction of the monetary union. In his opinion, this decisionwas made without a proper feasibility analysis (costs and profits). Basically, the decisionon a common currency was made on political rather than substantive grounds. A largenumber of experts were against the idea as they perceived serious risks involved in it.The supporters of greater European integration ignored the fact that the monetary uniondeprived nation-states of many factors that affected the economic development in a positive way. The point is that they were under influence of “total optimism” expecting only good results of the monetary union. The mechanisms of crisis management, including exitscenario from the monetary union, or methods of supporting those members who needfinancial aid, have not been even created. Furthermore, the evaluation of the monetaryunion was not properly carried out as it was based on the assessment of the process (forexample, smooth introduction of euro notes and coins or phasing out of the nationalcurrencies in 2002) and not of its results
3
Degner, Hanno, et Dirk Leuffen. « Crises and Responsiveness : Analysing German Preference Formation During the Eurozone Crisis ». Political Studies Review 18, no 4 (31 juillet 2019) : 491–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929919864902.
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Do crises increase governmental responsiveness to citizens’ policy demands in the European Union? Building on the responsiveness literature, we challenge the claim that well-organized business interests determine governmental preferences in times of crisis. We argue instead, that vote-seeking governments rather account for citizens’ policy demands, given particularly high levels of saliency and public attention prevalent during crises. To test our theory, we analyse the formation of German governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union reforms during the Eurozone Crisis. We use novel data from the ‘EMUChoices’ project, public opinion polls as well as newspaper articles and trace the development of the German government’s positioning on reforms such as the new Eurozone bailout fund or the tightening of fiscal governance rules. Our analyses show that the German government, despite intensive lobbying efforts by banks and industry associations, responded rather closely to the demands of the public. On a normative ground, this finding highlights that input legitimacy in European Union decision-making is stronger than oftentimes assumed, at least at the level of governmental preference formation in times of crises.
4
MARCHENKO, Sergii. « Strategic public finance governance : European integration course, international trends, national peculiarities ». Fìnansi Ukraïni 2022, no 1 (9 mai 2022) : 7–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.33763/finukr2022.01.007.
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The experience of public finance management in the EU in the framework of tightly controlled coordination of medium-term fiscal policy and the single monetary policy of the European Monetary Union (EMU) indicates that Strategic Public Finance Governance (SPFG) should be distinguished from the strategy for reforming the public finance management system within the established approaches of Public Finance Management (PFM) as general from special. The Strategic Public Finance Governance Mission (SPFG) is seen as enhancing the government’s financial capacity to respond in a timely and adequate manner to global challenges and threats through coordinated and targeted participation in relevant international activities and programs that correlate with the solution of certain global problems. The mission also includes expanding the fiscal space for public financial support of national sustainable development priorities that meet national interests, the criteria of national security in general and economic, financial, fiscal in particular. This involves the use of both domestic and borrowed (from other countries, international organizations, etc.) financial resources. Nowadays, the PFM approach covers mainly the general government sector. Strategic Public Finance Governance (SPFG) should cover the public sector as a whole. In our opinion, this is the main direction of further European integration reform of the public finance management system in Ukraine.
5
Fjelstul, Joshua C. « Explaining public opinion on the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact during the European sovereign debt crisis ». European Union Politics 23, no 2 (4 mars 2022) : 192–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14651165221075940.
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The EU reformed the regulatory rules of the Eurozone in response to the European sovereign debt crisis, empowering the EU to more effectively enforce the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which is designed to prevent debt crises. Given recent empirical evidence that the EU’s willingness to enforce EU law depends on public opinion, under what conditions will EU residents view SGP enforcement as an effective way of tackling the crisis? I theorize how individuals will evaluate SGP enforcement and test my theory’s predictions using cross-national survey data from all Eurozone member states and Bayesian multi-level models. I find that respondents’ preferences over SGP enforcement depend on the interaction of their political support for the European Economic and Monetary Union and their member state’s noncompliance with the SGP criteria. Public buy-in for SGP enforcement is lower precisely when enforcement is most important.
6
Kotliński, Kamil. « Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union as an Instrument of Fiscal Policy Coordination in the European Union ». Oeconomia Copernicana 4, no 2 (30 juin 2013) : 5–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/oec.2013.010.
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The aim of this study is to assess the Treaty on Stability, Coordinationand Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union as an instrument fiscalpolicy coordination and identify some of the consequences that potentially carriesits use. All EU-members conduct independent fiscal policies, regardless of whetherthey are members of the euro zone or not. It is now known that one of the immediatecauses of the crisis in part the euro zone countries was permanent crossingfiscal convergence criteria as a result of an erroneous and irresponsible fiscalpolicy. Used so far forms of coordination of fiscal policies were too weak to preventthe destabilization of the Member States' public finances. The crisis has becomethe impetus for build deeper integration in the area of fiscal policy. Treaty onStability, Coordination and Management, called briefly Fiscal Compact or TSCG,is another instrument of fiscal policy coordination in the European Union. In largepart it is a repetition and a little evolution of the Stability and Growth Pact. Thisstudy indicated some disadvantages of the Fiscal Compact, what has the potentialto lead to its inefficiency. These are: reference to the structural balance, which isa relatively small transparency budgetary rule for the public opinion and becauseof the existence of several competing methods for its calculation; the Treaty providesfor the possibility of "extraordinary circumstances" and does not specify theterm balanced budget, which is a softening of fiscal discipline and opens opportunitiesfor political bargaining; financial penalties imposed on overdebt governmentswill not improve their situation. The Treaty on Stability, Management and Coordination does not constitute a breakthrough in the coordination of fiscal policiesin the European Union.
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Dudzik, Iwona, et Irena Brukwicka. « Potential benefits and risks from Poland’s accession to the euro area ». VUZF Review 7, no 1 (28 mars 2022) : 169–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.38188/2534-9228.22.1.17.
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This paper reviews the selected issues related to the potential benefits and risks of Poland’s accession to the euro area. Poland has joined the European Union in 2004. Being a member of the Economic and Monetary Union, Poland was obliged to adopt the euro as its currency, but the date of the above currency introduction was not specified. Poland’s joining the euro area is often discussed in political and economic debates. Such debates benefit primarily from politics and ideology, and the economic issues, associating possible benefits and risks resulting from Poland’s accession to the euro area. The opponents of the common currency deal with issues related to the financial crisis in the territory of the euro zone counties. According to the study conducted in 2010 by the Public Opinion Research Center, it was observed that the number of Poles supporting Poland’s accession to the euro area was decreasing. The survey conducted by CBOS in 2017 showed that the number of respondents who were against Poland’s accession to the euro area was 72%. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the basic benefits and costs that result from the adoption of the common currency by Poland.
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Kouba, Luděk, Michal Mádr, Danuše Nerudová et Petr Rozmahel. « Policy Autonomy, Coordination or Harmonization in the Persistently Heterogeneous European Union ? » DANUBE : Law and Economics Review 7, no 1 (1 mars 2016) : 53–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/danb-2016-0004.
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Abstract Within the context of the continuing integration process in Europe, this paper addresses the question of whether policies in the EU should head towards autonomy, coordination or harmonization. Taking the path dependence effect into account, it is the authors’ opinion that Europe has gone too far in its integration process to be able to continue with policies being fully under the competences of individual member countries. However, the habitual question still arises: does fiscal policy need to be harmonized to a level comparable to monetary policy as these two policies, necessarily, complement each other? This paper argues that it does not. There are three main arguments discussed. Firstly, the authors build on the theory of fiscal federalism. Secondly, there are significantly different regimes of welfare states and extents of social policies among European countries, which strongly determine the character of public finance. And thirdly, the tax systems across Europe are also highly divergent, with many features of continuing tax competition.
9
G. Panagopoulos, Athanasios. « Euro Zone Budget and its Effects on the European and Monetary Union (EMU) Integration ». International Journal of Business Administration 11, no 3 (21 mai 2020) : 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/ijba.v11n3p83.
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The implemention of a monetary union in Europe, to take full benefit of the Single Market’s potential benefits, has not up till now delivered the expected outcomes. On the contrary, the euro area has been afflicted by many difficulties, including weak growth, unemployment, and inequality. Many blame the euro’s malfunctioning design, and especially its inability to promote economic convergence and provide amendment and stabilization mechanisms. The latter view prevailed when shaping the austerity policies imposed on the countries more affected by the financial and sovereign debt crises, intensifying an economic recession with dramatic social consequences. Citizens’ distrust in the European Union’s institutions grew, along with support for nationalistic political forces opposing the European integration project. Some of EMU’s needed reforms will both promote convergence, and help smooth economic activity and maintain citizens’ wellbeing when crises occur. The creation of an autonomous budget for the euro zone was mentioned in a European Commission discussion paper on the future of the EU. This is an eminently political matter, very sensitive to domestic public opinions. In fact, the existence of a budget for the euro zone, in recognition of the fact that this subset of EU countries has specific needs, distinct from those of other non-EMU members, would translate into a situation requiring the design of different budgets within the EU. Such issue is at the heart of the intense debate between holders of different views concerning the future of the EU and of the euro zone, especially in what concerns the question of which of these geometries will in the future be the engine for further economic and political integration in Europe. This paper assesses one of the main deficiencies of the euro’s governance model – lack of automatic stabilization – and discusses proposals to overcome it.
10
Fontan, Clement, et Sabine Saurugger. « Between a Rock and a Hard Place : Preference Formation in France During the Eurozone Crisis ». Political Studies Review 18, no 4 (3 septembre 2019) : 507–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929919868600.
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This article analyses the causal factors underlying the formation of French preferences during the Eurozone crisis solving process (2008–2017). Going beyond the clear distinction between national preference formation and interstate bargaining of liberal intergovernmentalism, this article combines new intergovernmentalism, political economy and feedback loops to study the horizontal linkages between different actors included in the process of domestic preference formation. Based on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Choices dataset, which includes semi-structured interviews conducted with French policy-makers involved in the European Union negotiations at the highest level, we will concentrate on French preference formation in four negotiations at the European Union level: the 3 May 2010 agreement on bilateral loans to Greece, the initial capitalisation amount of the European Stability Mechanism, the negotiations on the legal nature of the ‘debt-brake’ included in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance and the reverse qualified majority voting procedure. The article shows that confidential and restricted administrative networks played a central role in reducing the uncertainty stemming from the fragile financial positions of the hypertrophied domestic banking system. At the same time, French negotiators find themselves between a rock and a hard place during negotiations at the European Union level, not crossing the red line fixed by Germany, on the one hand, and ensuring that policy solutions are compatible with governmental political stance and domestic economic interests, on the other hand. Contrary to recent research pointing out to the increasing influence of domestic public opinion on national preference formation, however, feedback loops between the outcome of the crisis solving process and French politics and policies had very little impact.
11
Lekka, Anastasia Chr. « How Memoranda of Understanding Have Affected EU Democratic Institutions in Southern EU Countries ». International Journal of Social Science Research 5, no 2 (10 août 2017) : 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ijssr.v5i2.11692.
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The recent recession having emerged in 2007 has been the worst economic downturn since the time of Great Depression of 1929 in USA and spread across the European continent. In many European countries this led to severe sovereign debt crisis beginning in 2010 and was followed by implementation of austerity measures with significant impact on public, social and employment sector. Those tough austerity measures resulted in structural reforms of welfare and labor market especially in Southern EU countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy representing the most prominent examples. These policies were imposed to a large extend through the so called “Troika” which was an interaction between internal EU and external Organizations, like the European Union, the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund respectively.Citizens realize that their national economic institutions are no longer responsible for the decision making on major social and economic policies, on economic and welfare policies, on privatization and sale of public assets. Consequently, citizens tend to question if this constrained democracy deserves further support. This is enhanced by the fact that National Parliaments no longer develop policies but rather align with policies dictated by the above stated Institutions and are forced to accept such deals without asking the opinion of citizens. Nevertheless the EU intends to promote civil society participation in decision making and program policies applied. This contradiction needs to be analyzed in order to determine if there is a democratic deficit in EU member states.
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Kaasik, Peeter. « Kuulujuttudest Nõukogude Eestis partei ja julgeoleku meelsusaruannete põhjal 1944–1953 [Abstract : On rumours described in Communist Party and state security organ reports in Soviet Estonia in 1944–1953] ». Ajalooline Ajakiri. The Estonian Historical Journal, no 1 (18 novembre 2018) : 67–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/aa.2018.1.03.
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Abstract: On rumours described in Communist Party and state security organ reports in Soviet Estonia in 1944–1953
The Soviet Union was characterised by total control over the expressions of opinion of its citizens. For this reason, public opinion was to a great extent expressed as rumours. The Soviet regime, in turn, treated rumours as anti-Soviet phenomena, on the one hand, because they contradicted official propaganda, and on the other hand because they also very directly hindered the implementation of Sovietisation and the ability of agitators to explain the advantages of the new regime. Thus rumours had to be combatted.
This article does not examine rumours in Soviet society as a broader, separate phenomenon, rather it analyses how they were reflected in the period after the Second World War in state security organ and Communist Party reports, and how the effects and extent of the rumours of that time can be assessed.
The reports of Communist Party organisers at the rural municipality level are used first and foremost in this article. These organisers were in close personal contact with rumours or heard them from their confidants. The state security organs used their network of secret agents to monitor people’s attitudes (including gathering rumours). Reports from local departments to the ESSR People’s Commissariat (Ministry as of 1946) for State Security, and reports from the latter to Moscow have also been used for this article. The attitude reports did not deal separately with gathering and analysing rumours, but rumours were presented together with other negative manifestations.
The article focuses on four different categories of rumours for the purpose of illustration, assessing their effect primarily through the viewpoint of the Soviet regime. The first category comprises rumours that accompanied Soviet economic reforms. The article highlights the monetary reform of 1947 how alongside a short-lived period of panic buying, this reform also led to deepening mistrust of the entire Soviet economic model, including the longevity of the new rouble currency. The second category comprises rumours based on fear, in other words, rumours of an impending mass deportation that gripped people with fear for years. In direct connection with this, the Eighth Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee in 1950, which was the culmination of the campaign to expose bourgeois nationalists, is also presented as an example. Rumours emanating from the Plenum made the concept of the ‘enemy of the people’ even more abstract and obscure. This all ultimately started hindering Sovietisation more broadly, because people awaited another deportation for years with their suitcases packed. The third category is that of rumours associated with hope, in other words, the persistent rumours of the imminent outbreak of war and Estonia’s liberation in connection with that war. The hope that the Soviet regime would prove to be a ‘temporary disruption’ was particularly negative in the eyes of the authorities. The disruptive effect of such rumours on the implementation of collectivisation was highlighted in the reports. The fourth category of rumours was somewhat exceptional, namely rumours directly fabricated by the state, with an aim to firmly establish the image of the enemy. The anti-Semitic campaign of 1953 is presented as an illustration of this category. The final example is an extraordinary event that lays claim to universality, in other words, the death of Jossif Stalin in 1953. It marked the end of an era and it remained unsurpassed in the Soviet Union in terms of the variety of rumours connected to it.
Summing up what was presented in the attitude reports, regardless of their at times rather ideologised content and their avoidance of giving the prevailing situation a general assessment (which was expressed by the fact that anti-Soviet manifestations were as a rule presented as isolated incidents), these reports are very important sources for comprehending the
fears and expectations of the inhabitants of Soviet Estonia of that time. Different rumours also genuinely illustrate the difficulties that the Soviet regime had to face in carrying out Sovietisation.
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Mutar Mahdi AL- SULTANI, Hanaa. « GEOGRAPHY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO DECISION- MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY(RUSSIA AND UKRAINE MODEL) ((RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF GEOGRAPHY WITH OTHER SCIENCES)) ». RIMAK International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 4, no 6 (1 novembre 2022) : 432–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.47832/2717-8293.20.26.
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Geography is the science that studies all natural and human phenomena in one place Geography studies the natural factors that affected the land inhabited by man, Describes human populations in terms of their relationship to the environment Political geography is the study of political units and their problems from the point of view of geography, The survey studies the relief and climate areas that affect the conditions of states and the phenomena in them. As for the political decision, it is very measure that the state takes to prevent any interference in the affairs of its society, and the political decision is formulated in a thoughtful way to solve a specific problem or crisis that passes in the country The process of making and implementing decisions goes through multiple stages، starting with the preparatory stage, identifying the variables related to the problem to be studied, then choosing the goal and drawing the strategy (identifying alternatives)،then comes the decision-making stage،i.e. translating the decision into practical reality through actions، activities and work programs, Responsibility for the decision-making process is borne by a group of official and nonofficial bodies، the official bodies the constitution, then the legislative and executive authorities As for the unofficial bodies ، they include political parties, pressure groups، and public opinion،for political decisions to be correct, they must serve the public interest, be built on scientific foundation، and take in to account the objective circumstances..objective circumstances. Ukraine experienced a state of internal crises after the dissolution of the Soviet Union، as crises became represented by the dissolution of parliament and re-elections،which are frequent and accelerating events ،As the international Monetary Fund provided aid to reform the economic conditions of Ukraine after the transitional period it passed through،Ukraine became the coveted country and an open field for occupation by powerful countries. This is due to the weakness of Ukrainian politics. Ukraine distinguished location, which made it control the center of land and sea transportation between Asia and Europe،Russia decided that it was difficult to leave Ukraine to the west so Russia intervened militarily under the transfer from the Russian parliament on 28\2\2014 to protect Russian minorities and maintain influence in the city of Sevastopol, which is the last base in Crimea, The motive of the attack was to protect the region from the interference of other countries، to realize the dream of Russian to get on ports in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, and to save world trade routes where Russia's ships have been frozen for months in the Arctic annually. Russia made the decision to attack Ukraine، and the first thing it started was the bombing of the Donbas region، which is located in eastern Ukraine، which is characterized by its mineral wealth and the presence of coal mines ، and thus Russia worked to create a state of paralysis in the airports located in eastern and northern Ukraine. Keywords: Geography, Foreign Policy, Russia and Ukraine
14
Sandholtz, Wayne. « Choosing union : monetary politics and Maastricht ». International Organization 47, no 1 (1993) : 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300004690.
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At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.
15
Aglietto, Michel, et Christian Ghymers. « Monetary Integration in Europe : Introduction ». Recherches économiques de Louvain 59, no 1-2 (1993) : 21–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800044237.
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Before undertaking the essential synthesis of the assembled contributions on European monetary integration, it seemed necessary, in the light of recent developments, to introduce this special number by a brief commentary on the conditions for the realisation of a viable monetary union.On the eve of the symbolic date of “Europe 1992”, the monetary events of September 1992 are a timely reminder that a “Community of currencies”, which by suppressing the final source of national divisions will bring about the single market, requires the strict respect of the preconditions. However, the latter appear to be far from being secure; an opinion apparently shared by the markets whose recent somersaults have illuminated two essential principles. Firstly, the necessity for the convergence of economic performances and policies as an anchor for monetary union; and secondly, the validity of the “incompatibility theory”. The latter referring to the unstable character of a European Monetary System (EMS) based on: perfect capital mobility; fixed exchange rates; and the absence of tangible progress on monetary cooperation or a firm political engagement towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), such as the faultless ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht.
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Bräuninger, Thomas. « Fiscal constitutionalism in the economic and Monetary Union ». International Journal of Organization Theory & ; Behavior 7, no 4 (mars 2004) : 530–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijotb-07-04-2004-b003.
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Begg, Iain, et David Green. « Banking supervision in Europe and economic and monetary union ». Journal of European Public Policy 3, no 3 (septembre 1996) : 381–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501769608407040.
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Pietryka, Ilona. « The process of nominal and real convergence under the conditions of monetary integration ». Equilibrium 3, no 2 (31 décembre 2009) : 51–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/equil.2009.020.
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The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union is the next stage of monetary integration. Due to differentiation between Member States of the European Union, expenses and profits of participation in Eurosystem are not spread similarly. The first part of this paper reviews the fulfillment of nominal Maastricht criteria (stability of public finances, prices, exchange rate and interest rates). The second part presents the state of real convergence between countries either belonging to or aspiring to European Economic and Monetary Union (flexibility of prices and salaries, mobility of means of production, integration of financial markets, openness of economy, diversification of production and consumption and similarity of economic disorders). Analyses are based on available statistical data and scientific research.
19
Cameron, David R. « Economic and monetary union : underlying imperatives and third-stage dilemmas ». Journal of European Public Policy 4, no 3 (septembre 1997) : 455–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501769780000101.
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Tsibulina, A. N. « EСONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION : CORRECTION ОF FAILURES ». MGIMO Review of International Relations, no 4(31) (28 août 2013) : 113–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2013-4-31-113-118.
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The articles deals with the initial design failures of the European and Monetary Union which could have lead to the current sovereign debt crisis of some of its member-states. It touches upon issues such as the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, economic imbalances and situation with the public finances within the EU. The EU makes efforts to implement new initiatives which could prevent the euro area from future crises while debates remain on the best possible options. These initiatives imply not only deepening of economic integration but also of a political one. Under these circumstances reaching a consensus in EU- 27 becomes quite a challenging process and different groupings of countries might appear and this can even more complicate decision-making and functioning of the EU. While the outcome of the reforms is still to be seen in the future, some macroeconomic indicators show that real adjustment process has started in the periphery countries due to urgent measures taken at the EU level. Nonetheless the latter ones have not yet generated what is necessary for a sustained way out of the crisis.
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Kapteyn, P. J. G. « EMU and Central Bank : Chances Missed ». European Constitutional Law Review 1, no 1 (12 octobre 2004) : 123–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019605001239.
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Both the EU- and the EC-Treaties refer in prominent places to the establishment of economic and monetary union (Articles 2 EU and EC). This union is mentioned as one of the principal means of achieving the Union's and the Community's economic and social objectives. Such a prominent place is not allotted it in the Constitution. In its effort to separate the basic provisions from the other provisions in the treaties, the Convention decided to retain only the European Union's objectives in the actual constitutional part. The concrete activities pertaining to the economic and monetary union, as well as its ‘guiding principles’ of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments were relegated to Part III that deals with the Union's policies.
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Teică, Ramona Andreea. « Analysis of the Public Debt Sustainability in the Economic and Monetary Union ». Procedia Economics and Finance 3 (2012) : 1081–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s2212-5671(12)00277-8.
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Albuquerque Matos, Nuno. « Judicialization of Economic and Monetary Union : between a rock and a soft place ? » Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, no 65 (23 septembre 2021) : 73–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ced-65-2021pp73-106.
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The European Central Bank has been active since the sovereign debt crisis that struck European Union Member States by putting in place several asset-purchasing programmes such as Outright Monetary Transactions and Public Sector Purchase Programme. As much as these decisions have proven the pivotal importance of this institution within the monetary union, they have also spurred controversy on potentially having exceeded the competences attributed to the Union. The german federal constitutional court heard challenges to both and requested the Court of Justice to decide on their validity within the framework of a preliminary ruling. The decision of the former court to declare the Public Sector Purchase Programme ultra vires —in this way countering the preliminary ruling decision— as well as its argumentation could produce many institutional consequences to both the European Central Bank and Court of Justice of the European Union. Finally, it has shown the limits of European Union integration and will inevitably propel discussions on which way to go in the future: it is time for this discussion to come out from courtrooms into the public sphere.
Received: 11 November 2020Accepted: 26 May 2021
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Herzog, Bodo. « Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court (2 BvR 859/15) on the Public Sector Purchase Programme of the ECB : An Interdisciplinary Analysis ». European Public Law 27, Issue 4 (1 décembre 2021) : 653–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2021032.
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On 5 May 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany announced in a momentous ruling that the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB) exceeds European Union (EU) competences. This decision initiated a lively debate in law and economics all over Europe. This article provides a unique interdisciplinary reading of the ruling in order to clarify the line of argument. Considering a cross-disciplinary view enlightens the understanding of the historic judgment. Ultra-Vires, European Court of Justice, German Federal Constitutional Court, Public Sector Purchase Programme, European Central Bank, Monetary vs. Economic Policy, Economic and Monetary Union
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Anderton, R., R. Barrell et J. W. In't Veld. « Macro Economic Convergence in Europe ». National Institute Economic Review 138 (novembre 1991) : 51–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002795019113800105.
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Economic convergence within the EMS member states is a precondition for further moves to economic and monetary integration. The Delors Report has set out a path toward EMU in three stages, where transition to the next stage depends on some degree of convergence being achieved in the previous stage. In October 1990, the European Council in Rome agreed that ‘in order to move on to the second phase (of economic and monetary union), further satisfactory and lasting progress toward real and monetary convergence will have to be achieved’ (Press communique, European Council, Rome, 28 October 1990). The draft treaty text for the Maastricht summit states that before the start of the second phase in January 1994, the council shall assess the progress made with regard to economic and monetary convergence, and in particular with regard to price stability and balanced public finances.
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Wroński, Marcin. « Eurozone ten years after the crisis. Structural weaknesses, implemented reforms and the future of the reform process ». Przegląd Europejski, no 3.20 (1 septembre 2020) : 79–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/1641-2478pe.3.20.5.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article discusses the structural weaknesses of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), key reforms introduced after the financial crisis and the most important proposals of further EMU reforms present in the public debate. Reforms introduced during the last decade should be deemed to have positive results, however the EMU reform process has not yet been finished. Its successful completion depends on an agreement between Germany and France, which is hindered by conflicting economic interests and by different views on economic policy. The main purpose of this article is to demonstrate how public policy makers attempt to respond to the structural weakness of the Economic and Monetary Union and to identify the key factors, which impede an agreement between France and Germany
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Perkins, Andrew James. « The Legal and Economic Questions posed by the German Constitutional Court’s decision in the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case ». ATHENS JOURNAL OF LAW 7, no 3 (1 juillet 2021) : 399–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajl.7-3-7.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper seeks to explore the PSPP decision of the German Constitutional Court and its effect on the monetary policy decisions taken by central banks. It begins by exploring the decision and its effect in Germany, together with its wider implications for the European Monetary Union before moving onto consider the standard of review that should be applied by the Courts when they are required to review central banks actions. Conclusions are reached to show that any standard of review should be limited because of the unique economic and political circumstances in which central bank decision making takes place. Keywords: Central Banking; Judicial Review; Proportionality; European Law; European Monetary Union.
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Galtsina, Daria A. « Media and Public Opinion on E-Government in the Eurasian Economic Union ». Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Language and Literature 13, no 2 (2016) : 149–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu09.2016.214.
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Menguy, Séverine. « ADVANTAGES OF FOLLOWING A GOLDEN RULE IN A MONETARY UNION ». Macroeconomic Dynamics 21, no 2 (13 octobre 2015) : 279–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100515000462.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The European sovereign debt crisis has revived the debate about appropriate fiscal rules in the European Economic and Monetary Union. Whereas the Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact make no distinction between public consumption and investment expenditure, the aim of the current paper is to analyze the implications of the adoption of the Golden rule in a monetary union, distinguishing between the two types of public expenditure. With the help of a macroeconomic model, we show that introducing a Golden rule and smoothing public investment expenditure would be welfare-improving, and mostly for countries where taxation rates and the productivity of public investment are highest, and for the most closed countries. It would also be the most beneficial for countries where the monetary transmission parameter, the propensity to consume, and the price elasticity of supply are weakest, whereas supply-side distortions are the strongest.
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Vinokurov, E. « Eurasian Economic Union : A sober look ». Voprosy Ekonomiki, no 12 (20 décembre 2016) : 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2016-12-43-60.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The paper appraises current progress in establishing the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Although the progress has slowed down after the initial rapid advancement, the Union is better viewed not as an exception from the general rules of regional economic integration but rather as one of the functioning customs unions with its successes and stumbling blocs. The paper reviews the state of Eurasian institutions, the establishment of the single market of goods and services, the situation with mutual trade and investment flows among the member states, the ongoing work on the liquidation/unification of non-tariff barriers, the problems of the efficient coordination of macroeconomic policies, progress towards establishing an EAEU network of free trade areas with partners around the world, the state of the common labor market, and the dynamics of public opinion on Eurasian integration in the five member states.
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Palokangas, Tapio. « Inflationary Financing of Government Expenditure in an Endogenous Growth Model ». German Economic Review 4, no 1 (1 février 2003) : 121–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00075.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract This paper analyses the role of inflation in economies with endogenous growth and congestion in public services. Optimal policy rules are derived for public services and investment. The other findings are as follows. Monetary policy should maximize economic growth. The more inefficient the public sector is, the higher the growth-maximizing inflation rate is. If a currency union accepts a new member with an inefficient public sector, this will boost inflation in the union and decrease growth and welfare in all member economies of the union.
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Pinder, John. « The European Community, the Rule of Law and Representative Government : The Significance of the Intergovernmental Conferences ». Government and Opposition 26, no 2 (1 avril 1991) : 199–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1991.tb01133.x.
Texte intégralRésumé :
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES ON ECONOMIC and monetary union and on political union will have consequences for economic efficiency and for political power within the European Community. Both will be important for the future of Europe. But the focus of this article is somewhat different: the implications for the rule of law and representative government. Only somewhat different, because the rule of law and representative government provide the most secure framework for economic efficiency and political power. But more significant, because they not only provide that framework but also embody fundamental political values.
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Halmai, Péter. « Resilience in Focus : Certain Mechanisms of the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union ». Pénzügyi Szemle = Public Finance Quarterly 66, no 1 (2021) : 7–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.35551/pfq_2021_1_1.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The economic resilience - the flexibility of the economy and also the capability of resistance to shocks - is a central category of European reform processes. It contains proactive and reactive dimension, as well as the necessity of adaptation to the new circumstances. The study examines the basic dimensions of resilience: vulnerability factors, shock absorption and the ability to recover, and finds that the efficiency of the interactions and synergy of the deep integration system is determined by the interconnected mechanisms of convergence and resilience. Approaching resilience may show a new direction to national economic policies. With the increase of resilience of certain member states, the structural reforms at national level could decrease (reduce) the expense of the anti-cyclical (national fiscal or common monetary) policies in stabilizing of the Eurozone’s economies.
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Nkwatoh, Louis S. « Does ECOWAS Macroeconomic Convergence Criteria Satisfy an Optimum Currency Area ? » Journal of Economics and Management Sciences 1, no 2 (29 août 2018) : p61. http://dx.doi.org/10.30560/jems.v1n2p61.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries have expressed their desire to establish a monetary union by the year 2020 based on six macroeconomic convergence criteria. The desire is predicated on a series of strategies and various treaties ratified and signed by various ECOWAS Heads of governments and Central Banks’ Governors with more emphasis on the Maastricht-type set of convergence criteria that must be satisfied by all member countries before they ascend to the envisaged monetary union. Even though the convergence criteria may guarantee macroeconomic stability in a regional grouping, critics assert that the convergence criteria are insufficient and inconsequential to the formation of monetary union. The objective of this study is to ascertain whether ECOWAS countries have met all the macroeconomic convergence criteria making them fit for a monetary union. The analyses indicate that no ECOWAS country has met all the convergence criteria at a given point in time implying that the level of macroeconomic convergence in the region still remains inadequate relative to the set targets. However, WAEMU sub-set economies have met three of the criteria -public debts to GDP Ratio, deficits including grants, annual percentage inflation rate. The simple reason is that WAEMU is an existing monetary union with a common stabilization policy.
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Misztal, Piotr. « Public Debt and Economic Growth in the European Union. Empirical Investigation ». WSEAS TRANSACTIONS ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 18 (5 janvier 2021) : 199–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.37394/23207.2021.18.21.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The relatively high sizes of public debts in many of the world's member states have led to frequentdebates concerning the influence of public debt on economic growth. Analyzing economic literature it can beseen, that theoretical and empirical considerations on this topic are divided into three main parties. The firstpart of analyzes is the work of the Keynesians, which emphasizes that the budget deficit as well as the publicdebt positively affects the economic development of the country, mainly through the impact of the budgetexpenditure multiplier. The opposite view on budget deficits and public debt is represented by the neoclassicalschool, who argue that the budget deficit and public debt can have negative impact on economic growth.Conversely, proponents of the Ricardian equivalence concept believe that budget deficits and public debt areneutral for economic growth. These three mentioned above approaches to the budget deficit and public debtproblem have led to many debates at home and abroad about the importance of budget deficit and public debt inthe process of economic growth and economic development of the country. The main objective of the study isto determine the impact of the foreign debt and home debt on economic activity of the country, based on theexample of the 27 member countries of the European Union (without United Kingdom) in the period 2006-2017. The statistics came from the European Statistical Office (Eurostat) and International Monetary Funddatabase (World Economic Outlook).
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ANDERSON, CHRISTOPHER J. « When in Doubt, Use Proxies ». Comparative Political Studies 31, no 5 (octobre 1998) : 569–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414098031005002.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article argues that citizens employ proxies rooted in attitudes about domestic politics when responding to survey questions about the European integration process. It develops a model of public opinion toward European integration based on attitudes toward the political system, the incumbent government, and establishment parties. With the help of data from Eurobarometer 34.0, the study tests political and economic models of public support for membership in the European Union in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. The analyses show that system and establishment party support are the most powerful determinants of support for membership in the European Union. The results also suggest that the relationship between economic factors and support previously reported in research on public opinion toward European integration is likely to be mediated by domestic political attitudes.
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Howarth, David, et Lucia Quaglia. « Failing forward in Economic and Monetary Union : explaining weak Eurozone financial support mechanisms ». Journal of European Public Policy 28, no 10 (19 juillet 2021) : 1555–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1954060.
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Spicka, Mark E. « Selling the Economic Miracle : Public-Opinion Research, Economic Reconstruction, and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957 ». German Politics and Society 20, no 1 (1 mars 2002) : 49–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/104503002782385462.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Perhaps the most remarkable development in the Federal Republicof Germany since World War II has been the creation of its stabledemocracy. Already by the second half of the 1950s, political commentatorsproclaimed that “Bonn is not Weimar.” Whereas theWeimar Republic faced the proliferation of splinter parties, the riseof extremist parties, and the fragmentation of support for liberal andconservative parties—conditions that led to its ultimate collapse—theFederal Republic witnessed the blossoming of moderate, broadbasedparties.1 By the end of the 1950s the Christian DemocraticUnion/Christian Social Union (CDU), Social Democratic Party(SPD) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) had formed the basis of astable party system that would continue through the 1980s.
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Troitiño, David Ramiro. « The Current Economic Crisis of the EU : Genesis, Analysis and Solutions ». Baltic Journal of European Studies 3, no 1 (1 juin 2013) : 6–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/bjes-2013-0002.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThe article approaches the current economic crisis from an historical perspective, analyzing the building of the monetary integration and the common currency. The process is explained through pointing out its effects on the European integration and outlining the positive and negative consequences of the introduction of a common currency in the European Union. The investigation continues with a general outlook of the current situation of the countries which were more affected by the current crisis-Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus. What all these countries have in common is the necessity of extra funding in a context of austerity, plus some national particularities. The author proposes an expansion in the public spending as the only reliable way to stimulate European economies in the crisis. As the introduction of the euro meant the end of the monetary independence for the Member States, an innovative solution is proposed-the creation of an Economic Government in the union in order to transfer funds from wealthier states to the countries in trouble. It is presented as a necessity for the states in crisis, a necessity for the wealthier states, and a must for the European Union.
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Mamadou, Dr N’DIAYE, et Dr SANOGO Boubacar. « Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth in the Countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) ». International Journal of Economics and Financial Research, no 81 (6 février 2022) : 15–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.32861/ijefr.81.15.22.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article focuses on the relationship between certain fiscal policy instruments and economic growth in the countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Our growth model was estimated using the "Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in a system" dynamic panel over the period 1990-2020. The results obtained show that total public revenue excluding grants, total expenditure, external public debt, the active population, and credits to the economy over GDP positively and significantly influence the GDP growth rate. On the other hand, an inflationary environment and poor quality of the Institutions negatively and significantly affect the rate of GDP growth. By way of economic policy implications, the WAEMU countries should reduce the distortions associated with taxation in order to maintain a fairly substantial level of resources and gradually break away from external forms of financing. Finally, financial development must be promoted so that companies can obtain more loans from banks.
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Khokhlov, I. « Supranational Developments in the European Union : Changeable Balance of the Public Opinion ». World Economy and International Relations, no 3 (2014) : 60–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-3-60-73.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article is devoted to the consideration of socio-cultural state of the European community during the period of crisis and mass manifestations of protest. In spite of the current instability in the world the EC continues to maintain its “acquis” (the composition of the membership, single currency etc.). This article contains a periodization that reflects tendencies in the trends of public opinion under the influence of internal and external factors. Countries are ranked according to the level of their social and economic development, which allowed to analyze the dependence of public opinion in support of the EC upon the state of the economy. For instance, in the Mediterranean countries that use to be “euroenthusiasts” the level of support became lower than the average for the EC.
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Krivorotko, Yuri, et Alla Vysotskaya. « Public-Private Cooperation in the Eurasian Economic Union : Lessons for Belarus ». Socialiniai tyrimai 38, no 2 (18 décembre 2015) : 43–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/st.2015.23016.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Key success factors of public-private cooperation management in the Eurasian Economic Union countries are revealed in the paper. Key success factors of public- private cooperation (PPC) have been structured as follows: legislative base and the regulatory environment, partner relationship, risk management. The paper concludes that full presence of key success factors of PPC may significantly improve its functioning and efficiency. The study provides a methodological base that underpins PPC management by emphasizing partner interaction and relevant procedures and structures. Recommendations for PPC development in Belarus on the basis of public- private management experiences in some post-Soviet countries are presented.
The research methodology is based on the approaches of Rockart, Boynton, Zmud, Hardcastle, Edwards to key success factors of PPC, as well as on those proposed by Mouraviev, Kakabadse, Bazhenov from the Eurasian Economic Union, in empirical studies - opinion of experts, PPC project managers survey. Statistical data from official sources, the State Statistics Committee, Ministry of Economics, public private partnership centers in Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus, databases, etc. were also used.
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Shcherbakova, Tatyana I. « Formation of a New Economic Model in the Post-Stalinist Soviet Union ». Economic History 17, no 3 (11 octobre 2021) : 227–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.15507/2409-630x.054.017.202103.227-236.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Introduction. The article is devoted to the change of economic model in the post-Stalinist USSR. It considers measures through which this model was implemented, its consequences, features and social results are distinguished. Materials and Methods. The results of research are based on statistic of the USSR State Bank and analytical reports of experts published in the issues of edition “On the pages of archival funds of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation”. The author examines the dynamic and problems of money circulation, the social and economic contradictions generated by them. Results. The transition to the inflationary model began with a political course to reject from limiting population monetary income. In 1953–1970, in various forms, the monetary incomes of citizens, including the rural population, low-income, socially unprotected, were significantly increased. These measures led to negative processes in money circulation, to which experts of the State Bank drew the attention of the country’s leadership for a long period. Among them there were: the monetary growth, outpacing the growth in the production of consumer goods and the possibilities of goods turnover; the growth of public deposits in savings bank reflecting unmet demand for consumer goods; the use of public deposits to maintain the solvency of the country’s budget; increasing of the emission. Discussions. The inflationary economic model, implemented in a centralized planning system, had visible features. First, inflation in this model was not accompanied with price increases; secondly, the emission of money was the base for raising the standard of living of the population; thirdly, in this model the social stratification between ordinary citizens and the elite was intensified; fourthly, with transit to the inflationary model the shadow economy got the development. Conclusion. The transition in the USSR to an inflationary economic model improved standards of living in the USSR but predetermined the inevitable economic crisis in the foreseeable future with a high probability of the destruction of socialism.
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Nicolaides, Phedon. « An Assessment of the Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany On the Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme of the European Central Bank ». Legal Issues of Economic Integration 47, Issue 3 (1 août 2020) : 267–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/leie2020016.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) of Germany has invented a new and impossible test of proportionality to declare as ultra vires the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Weiss. Instead of understanding proportionality as the least interventionist means of achieving a certain policy objective, it defines it as the balancing between conflicting policy objectives which in this case are monetary and economic policy. This is not the concept used by the Court of Justice. This definition of proportionality is intended as a substitute for the principle of conferral and whether the European Central Bank (ECB) encroached on economic policy. However, if monetary policy is to be effective, it must impact economic policy. Had the ECB attempted to balance monetary and economic policy effects, it would have infringed Article 127(1) TFEU that requires that the support of economic policy by the ECB is without prejudice to price stability which is the objective of monetary policy. The Federal Constitutional Court did not appreciate the significance of the fact that the ECB buys public bonds from private investors and that the interjection of private investors deprives Member States from the ability to sell unlimited amounts of bonds at prices that would enable them to run indefinite budget deficits. Monetary policy, economic policy, proportionality, ECB, public sector asset purchase programme
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Szőcs, Csongor-Ernő. « Public Attitudes towards Monetary Integration in Seven New Member States of the EU ». Politics in Central Europe 11, no 1 (1 avril 2015) : 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pce-2015-0006.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract Existing work on euro support has provided insights into the dynamics of preferences, but most of these studies focus on older member states that already form an integral part of the Eurozone. This article inquires into public attitudes towards monetary integration in new member states of the EU: Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Focusing on the cross-sectional variation of preferences, it applies multilevel logit regression to test three perspectives – economic, conceptual and political – using individual-level survey data and NUTS-2 regional statistical data from seven countries for 2013. One of its novel findings is that beliefs such as the one that European Monetary Union (EMU) adherence will cause a spiral in economic inflation are powerful disincentives to euro support in these countries.
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Clements, Ben, Kyriaki Nanou et José Real-Dato. « Economic crisis and party responsiveness on the left–right dimension in the European Union ». Party Politics 24, no 1 (13 novembre 2017) : 52–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068817736757.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The economic crisis within the European Union has had a significant impact on domestic politics in the member states, affecting the links between parties and citizens and accentuating the tensions parties face between governing responsibility and being responsive to public opinion. This article examines whether parties in EU countries have shifted their left–right ideological positions during the current crisis and whether such shifts are a direct response to the pressures of wider economic conditions or are more affected by changes in the preferences of the median voter. Party-based and citizen-based data are examined between 2002 and 2015, encompassing both the precrisis and crisis periods. The main findings are that the economic crisis has made parties less responsive to public opinion on the left–right dimension, and this effect is more pronounced for parties that have been in government.
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Maes, Ivo, et Sabine Péters. « Niels Thygesen : An Academic in the Making of European Monetary Union ». HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, no 1 (mars 2021) : 97–129. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/spe2020-001005.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Niels Thygesen (born 1934) played for nearly five decades an influential role as a policy orientated academic, especially in the process of economic and monetary integration in Europe. He is especially known as a member of the Delors Committee and as the first Chair of the European Fiscal Board. As part of a re-search program on collecting memories, this paper publishes the results of several interviews with him. His early life offers insightful observations on the develop-ment of the economics profession in the postwar years (he was close to Nobel Prize laureates as Franco Modigliani and Milton Friedman). Thygesen's involvement with the process of European monetary integration really started in 1974 with his membership of the Marjolin Committee (which provided an assessment of the failure of the 1970 Werner Report). Since then he has been involved in a multitude of committees and initiatives, like the OPTICA groups, the All Saints Day Manifes-to, the Committee for Monetary Union in Europe (an initiative of Giscard and Schmidt) and the Euro50 Group.
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Baran, Bernadeta. « Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy Coordination Rules in the Monetary Union ». Equilibrium 7, no 3 (30 septembre 2012) : 73–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/equil.2012.020.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Stability and Growth Pact is the main rule-based framework for the coordination of national fiscal policies in the economic and monetary union (EMU). It was established to safeguard sound public finances, an important requirement for EMU to function properly. Member states had a lot of determination before setting up a monetary union (nominal criteria were a condition to adopt common currency). In the next years, coordination of fiscal policy was not so successful. In many countries, revenues were temporarily boosted by tax-rich activity, while they didn’t restrict their expenditures. In most countries fiscal policy was pro-cyclical (not anti-cyclical) and they didn’t achieve their MTO. Financial crisis has sharpened budgetary problems in member states and showed the weakness of coordination rules.
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Wilsher, Daniel. « Ready to Do Whatever it Takes ? The Legal Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Economic Crisis ». Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 15 (2013) : 503–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/152888713809813512.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractTo complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits, the Maastricht Treaty gave the European Central Bank (ECB) a narrow remit to focus on price stability. Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was unclear that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. The neoliberal orthodoxy at the heart of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) held that moral hazard and inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary financing’. Following monetary union, markets under-priced risks and encouraged bubbles, but, with the onset of the crisis, sentiment overshot the other way, starving credit from banks and later sovereigns. With bailout funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns became illiquid. ECB officials reluctantly concluded that an uncontrolled sovereign default would threaten the continuation of monetary union. The ECB was thus forced de facto to expand its mandate, first to help banks and, later, to help sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. Ultimately this was successful in restoring confidence, but the ECB remained uncomfortable with its role. It has continued to stress its legal limitations and has pressed for reformed governance to enforce fiscal discipline. The economic case for a lender of last resort in a crisis was always strong, but brings with it a worsening moral hazard problem that may invite leaders to avoid the deeper political changes necessary to rebalance the Eurozone.
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Wilsher, Daniel. « Ready to Do Whatever it Takes ? The Legal Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Economic Crisis ». Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 15 (2013) : 503–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1528887000003141.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract To complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits, the Maastricht Treaty gave the European Central Bank (ECB) a narrow remit to focus on price stability. Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was unclear that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. The neoliberal orthodoxy at the heart of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) held that moral hazard and inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary financing’. Following monetary union, markets under-priced risks and encouraged bubbles, but, with the onset of the crisis, sentiment overshot the other way, starving credit from banks and later sovereigns. With bailout funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns became illiquid. ECB officials reluctantly concluded that an uncontrolled sovereign default would threaten the continuation of monetary union. The ECB was thus forced de facto to expand its mandate, first to help banks and, later, to help sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. Ultimately this was successful in restoring confidence, but the ECB remained uncomfortable with its role. It has continued to stress its legal limitations and has pressed for reformed governance to enforce fiscal discipline. The economic case for a lender of last resort in a crisis was always strong, but brings with it a worsening moral hazard problem that may invite leaders to avoid the deeper political changes necessary to rebalance the Eurozone.