Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Dynamic economics »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Dynamic economics"
Stantcheva, Stefanie. « Dynamic Taxation ». Annual Review of Economics 12, no 1 (2 août 2020) : 801–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-100119-013035.
Texte intégralSent, Esther-Mirjam. « Enginering Dynamic Economics ». History of Political Economy 29, suppl_1 (1 janvier 1997) : 41–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-1997-suppl_1009.
Texte intégralRosen, Sherwin. « Dynamic Animal Economics ». American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69, no 3 (août 1987) : 547–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1241690.
Texte intégralBaranzini, Mauro L. « Methods of dynamic economics ». Journal of Economic Behavior & ; Organization 10, no 2 (septembre 1988) : 248–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(88)90049-2.
Texte intégralKapoor, Madhavi, et Vijita Aggarwal. « Tracing the economics behind dynamic capabilities theory ». International Journal of Innovation Science 12, no 2 (4 mai 2020) : 187–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijis-05-2019-0050.
Texte intégralWilen, James E. « Economics of Spatial‐Dynamic Processes ». American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89, no 5 (décembre 2007) : 1134–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01074.x.
Texte intégralStern, Nicholas. « Towards a dynamic public economics ». Journal of Public Economics 86, no 3 (décembre 2002) : 335–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00192-x.
Texte intégralBrock, William A., Anastasios Xepapadeas et Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos. « Optimal agglomerations in dynamic economics ». Journal of Mathematical Economics 53 (août 2014) : 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.04.005.
Texte intégralWirl, Franz. « Dynamic policy games in economics ». European Journal of Political Economy 6, no 1 (août 1990) : 143–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(90)90042-h.
Texte intégralByrne, Patrick. « ECOLOGY, ECONOMY AND REDEMPTION AS DYNAMIC : THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JANE JACOBS AND BERNARD LONERGAN ». Worldviews : Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology 7, no 1-2 (2003) : 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853503321916192.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "Dynamic economics"
Monticini, Andrea. « Dynamic economics ». Thesis, University of Exeter, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.535908.
Texte intégralIshii, Yuhta. « Essays in Dynamic Games ». Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11474.
Texte intégralEconomics
Wolf, Holger C. « Essays on dynamic economics ». Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13213.
Texte intégralEyigungor, Burcu. « Essays in dynamic economics ». Diss., Restricted to subscribing institutions, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1432786291&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=1564&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Texte intégralClements, Michael P. « Cointegration and dynamic econometric modelling ». Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.334980.
Texte intégralSteinbach, Max Rudibert. « Essays on dynamic macroeconomics ». Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/86196.
Texte intégralENGLISH ABSTRACT: In the first essay of this thesis, a medium scale DSGE model is developed and estimated for the South African economy. When used for forecasting, the model is found to outperform private sector economists when forecasting CPI inflation, GDP growth and the policy rate over certain horizons. In the second essay, the benchmark DSGE model is extended to include the yield on South African 10-year government bonds. The model is then used to decompose the 10-year yield spread into (1) the structural shocks that contributed to its evolution during the inflation targeting regime of the South African Reserve Bank, as well as (2) an expected yield and a term premium. In addition, it is found that changes in the South African term premium may predict future real economic activity. Finally, the need for DSGE models to take account of financial frictions became apparent during the recent global financial crisis. As a result, the final essay incorporates a stylised banking sector into the benchmark DSGE model described above. The optimal response of the South African Reserve Bank to financial shocks is then analysed within the context of this structural model.
Sung, Joo-Ho. « Dynamic programming approaches to pension funding ». Thesis, City University London, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.361860.
Texte intégralLamba, Rohit. « Essays in dynamic mechanism design ». Thesis, Princeton University, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3626800.
Texte intégralQuestions of design in real economic situations are often dynamic. Managerial compensation, repeated auctions, and taxation are good examples. These demand the economic theory of mechanism design to be adept to changing underlying environments and evolving information. Adjusting existing static results to the dynamic models and introducing new ones is thus what the doctor orders. This collection of essays is a contribution to the theory and applications of dynamic mechanism design.
Chapter 1 asks the question: when can efficient institutions be made self enforcing? To answer it, the setting of bargaining with two sided asymmetric information is chosen– a buyer has a hidden valuation for a good and a seller can produce the good at a hidden cost, both of which can change over time. The essay provides necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in this bilateral trading problem. In the process of establishing this result, a new notion of budget balance is introduced that allows the budget to be balanced dynamically, borrowing from the future but in a bounded fashion. Through a set of simple examples the comparative statics of the underlying economics forces of discounting and level of asymmetric information are explored.
In chapter 2, a dynamic and history dependent version of the payoff equivalence result is established. It provides an equivalence class of all mechanisms that are incentive compatible. Given two mechanisms that implement the same allocation, expected utility of an agent after any history in one must differ from the other through a history dependent constant. This result is then exploited to unify a host of existing results in efficient dynamic mechanism design. In particular a mechanism, and necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the implementation of the efficient allocation in a general N-player dynamic mechanism design problem under participation constraints and budget balance.
Finally, in chapter 3 (coauthored with Marco Battaglini), we explore the applicability and limitations of the first-order approach in solving dynamic contracting models, and the nature of contracts when local constraints are not sufficient to characterize the optimum. A dynamic principal-agent model in which the agent's types are serially correlated forms the backbone of the analysis. It is shown that the first-order approach is violated in general environments; when the time horizon is long enough and serial correlation is sufficiently high, global incentive compatibility constraints generically bind. By fully characterizing a simple two period example, we uncover a number of interesting features of the optimal contract that cannot be observed in special environments in which the standard approach works. Finally, we show that even in complex environments, approximately optimal allocations can be easily characterized by focusing on a class of contracts in which the allocation is forced to be monotonic.
Krichel, Thomas. « Growth and fiscal policy in dynamic optimising models ». Thesis, University of Surrey, 1999. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/844562/.
Texte intégralKwon, Suehyun. « Essays in dynamic contracting ». Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72933.
Texte intégralCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis examines three models of dynamic contracting. The first model is a model of dynamic moral hazard with partially persistent states, and the second model considers relational contracts when the states are partially persistent. The last model studies preference for delegation with learning. In the first chapter, the costly unobservable action of the agent produces a good outcome with some probability, and the probability of the good outcome corresponds to the state. The states are unobservable and follow an irreducible Markov chain with positive persistence. The chapter finds that an informational rent arises in this environment. The second best contract resembles a tenure system: the agent is paid nothing during the probationary period, and once he is paid, the principal never takes his outside option again. The second best contract becomes stationary after the agent is tenured. For discount factors close to one, the principal can approximate his first best payoff with review contracts. The second chapter studies relational contracts with partially persistent states, where the distribution of the state depends on the previous state. When the states are observable, the optimal contracts can be stationary, and the self-enforcement leads to the dynamic enforcement constraint as with i.i.d. states. The chapter then applies the results to study the implications for the markets where the principal and the agent can be matched with new partners. The third chapter studies preference for delegation when there is a possibility of learning before taking an action. The optimal action depends on the unobservable state. After the principal chooses the manager, one of the agents may receive a private signal about the world. The agent decides whether to disclose the signal to the manager, and the manager chooses an action. In an equilibrium, the agents' communication strategies depend on the manager's prior. The principal prefers a manager with some difference in prior belief to a manager with the same prior.
by Suehyun Kwon.
Ph.D.
Livres sur le sujet "Dynamic economics"
Fusari, Angelo. A New Economics for Modern Dynamic Economies. 1 Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2016. : Routledge, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315459134.
Texte intégralHaunschmied, Josef, Vladimir M. Veliov et Stefan Wrzaczek, dir. Dynamic Games in Economics. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0.
Texte intégralRichard, Hicks John. Methods of dynamic economics. Oxford : Clarendon, 1985.
Trouver le texte intégral1947-, Dana Rose-Anne, dir. Dynamic programming in economics. Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.
Trouver le texte intégralRichard, Hicks John. Methods of dynamic economics. Oxford : Clarendon, 1987.
Trouver le texte intégralRichard, Hicks John. Methods of dynamic economics. Oxford [Oxfordshire] : Clarendon Press, 1985.
Trouver le texte intégralDynamic economic theory. New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Trouver le texte intégralDynamic economic theory. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Trouver le texte intégralSimonovits, András. Mathematical Methods in Dynamic Economics. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230513532.
Texte intégralMoser, Elke, Willi Semmler, Gernot Tragler et Vladimir M. Veliov, dir. Dynamic Optimization in Environmental Economics. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54086-8.
Texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Dynamic economics"
Schwarz, Peter M. « Dynamic efficiency ». Dans Energy Economics, 65–93. 2e éd. London : Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003163190-5.
Texte intégralCory, Gerald A. « The Dynamic Algorithms of Social Behavior ». Dans Economic Biology and Behavioral Economics, 40–46. London : Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003303190-5.
Texte intégralNishimura, Kiyohiko G., et Hiroyuki Ozaki. « Dynamic Programming ». Dans Economics of Pessimism and Optimism, 113–21. Tokyo : Springer Japan, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55903-0_7.
Texte intégralSimonovits, András. « Dynamic Programming ». Dans Mathematical Methods in Dynamic Economics, 157–73. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230513532_8.
Texte intégralZhang, Wei-Bin. « Mathematical Aspects of Dynamic Systems ». Dans Synergetic Economics, 15–47. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75909-3_3.
Texte intégralTan, Kim Heng. « Welfare economics of austerity in open economies ». Dans Fiscal Policy in Dynamic Economies, 215–27. First Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2016. | : Routledge, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315542843-11.
Texte intégralLong, Ngo Van. « Resource Economics ». Dans Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, 673–701. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_15.
Texte intégralLong, Ngo Van. « Resource Economics ». Dans Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, 1–29. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27335-8_15-1.
Texte intégralSengupta, Jati K. « Dynamic Systems in Economics ». Dans Applied Mathematics for Economics, 86–139. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2845-9_3.
Texte intégralDadkhah, Kamran. « Dynamic Optimization ». Dans Foundations of Mathematical and Computational Economics, 377–406. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13748-8_14.
Texte intégralActes de conférences sur le sujet "Dynamic economics"
Melnikas, Borisas. « CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN ECONOMICS ENGINEERING : ECONOMIC GROWTH, DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT, AND TECHNOLOGICAL BREAK-THROUGHS ». Dans Contemporary Issues in Business, Management and Economics Engineering. Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/cibmee.2019.007.
Texte intégralBimpikis, Kosts, Shayan Ehsani et Mohamed Mostagir. « Designing Dynamic Contests ». Dans EC '15 : ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA : ACM, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764473.
Texte intégralZhang, Nandi, Marvin A. Sirbu et Jon M. Peha. « The Economics of Multi-Network Access ». Dans 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/dyspan.2019.8935674.
Texte intégralAkbarpour, Mohammad, Shengwu Li et Shayan Oveis Gharan. « Dynamic matching market design ». Dans EC '14 : ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA : ACM, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602887.
Texte intégralCohen, Maxime C., Ilan Lobel et Renato Paes Leme. « Feature-based Dynamic Pricing ». Dans EC '16 : ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA : ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940728.
Texte intégralFriedman, Eric, Christos-Alexandros Psomas et Shai Vardi. « Controlled Dynamic Fair Division ». Dans EC '17 : ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA : ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085123.
Texte intégral« Dynamic Management Control System of Engineering Cost ». Dans 2020 Conference on Economics and Management. Scholar Publishing Group, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.38007/proceedings.0000476.
Texte intégralManshadi, Vahideh, Rad Niazadeh et Scott Rodilitz. « Fair Dynamic Rationing ». Dans EC '21 : The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA : ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467554.
Texte intégralKanoria, Yash. « Dynamic Spatial Matching ». Dans EC '22 : The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA : ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538278.
Texte intégralIchihashi, Shota. « Dynamic Privacy Choices ». Dans EC '20 : The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA : ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399493.
Texte intégralRapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Dynamic economics"
Соловйов, В. М., et К. В. Соловйова. Кількісні методи оцінки складності в прогнозуванні соціально-економічних систем. Видавець Ткачук О.В., 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.31812/0564/1333.
Texte intégralCaballero, Ricardo, et Eduardo M. R. A. Engel. Dynamic (S,s) Economies. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, juin 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3734.
Texte intégralKiv, A., V. Soloviev et K. Solovieva. Multiscaling of information complexity measures. Брама-Україна, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.31812/0564/1298.
Texte intégralHansen, Lars Peter, et Thomas Sargent. Recursive Linear Models of Dynamic Economies. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, octobre 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3479.
Texte intégralAcemoglu, Daron, et Martin Kaae Jensen. Robust Comparative Statics in Large Dynamic Economies. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, juin 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18178.
Texte intégralMuelaner, Jody Emlyn. Electric Road Systems for Dynamic Charging. SAE International, mars 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4271/epr2022007.
Texte intégralDupas, Pascaline, Alicia Sasser Modestino, Muriel Niederle, Justin Wolfers et The Seminar Dynamics Collective. Gender and the Dynamics of Economics Seminars. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, février 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28494.
Texte intégralTsai, Jerry, et Jessica Wachter. Pricing Long-Lived Securities in Dynamic Endowment Economies. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, mai 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24641.
Texte intégralСоловйов, В. М., et О. С. Лук’янчук. Фолксономія соціально-економічних об’єктів в складних мережах засобами CorrRank. Брама-Україна, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.31812/0564/1307.
Texte intégralChang, Roberto, Humberto Martínez et Andrés Velasco. Pandemics, Incentives, and Economic Policy : A Dynamic Model. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, avril 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28636.
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