Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Coordination of decisions »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Coordination of decisions"
Turlakova, S., et B. Lohvinenko. « Features of Management in the System of Coordination of Decisions at the Enterprises ». Economic Herald of the Donbas, no 2 (64) (2021) : 151–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.12958/1817-3772-2021-2(64)-151-155.
Texte intégralLohvinenko, Bohdan. « Modeling the process of horizontal coordination of decisions at enterprises based on a reflexive approach ». Economy of Industry 4, no 96 (25 novembre 2021) : 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/econindustry2021.04.081.
Texte intégralMcCain, Roger A., et Richard Hamilton. « Coordination games, anti-coordination games, and imitative learning ». Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37, no 1 (février 2014) : 90–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x13001799.
Texte intégralLogvinenko, B. « Economic Mechanism of Coordination of Decisions in the System of Reflexive Management at the Enterprises ». Economic Herald of the Donbas, no 3 (65) (2021) : 155–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.12958/1817-3772-2021-3(65)-155-161.
Texte intégralMulesa, Oksana, Yurii Bilak, Yevhenii Kykyna et Dmytro Ferens. « Development of decision approval rules in multichannel decision-making systems ». Technology audit and production reserves 6, no 2(62) (7 décembre 2021) : 6–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.15587/2706-5448.2021.244665.
Texte intégralEL-GHAMRAWY, SALLY M., et ALI I. ELDESOUKY. « AN AGENT DECISION SUPPORT MODULE BASED ON GRANULAR ROUGH MODEL ». International Journal of Information Technology & ; Decision Making 11, no 04 (juillet 2012) : 793–820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219622012500216.
Texte intégralXu, Yang, Yulin Zhang et Ming Liu. « Multiagent Based Decentralized Traffic Light Control for Large Urban Transportation System ». Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2014 (2014) : 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/104349.
Texte intégralMa, Ke, Hong Yan, Yusen Ye, Dao Zhou et Dongce Ma. « Critical Decision-Making Issues in Disaster Relief Supply Management : A Review ». Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2022 (4 juillet 2022) : 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/1105839.
Texte intégralLeitner, Stephan, et Friederike Wall. « Multiobjective Decision Making Policies and Coordination Mechanisms in Hierarchical Organizations : Results of an Agent-Based Simulation ». Scientific World Journal 2014 (2014) : 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/875146.
Texte intégralRamazi, Pouria, James Riehl et Ming Cao. « Networks of conforming or nonconforming individuals tend to reach satisfactory decisions ». Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no 46 (31 octobre 2016) : 12985–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1610244113.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "Coordination of decisions"
Çapar, İsmail. « Coordination of inventory and transportation decisions in a two-stage supply chain ». Diss., Mississippi State : Mississippi State University, 2007. http://library.msstate.edu/etd/show.asp?etd=etd-09242007-085706.
Texte intégralKilani, Meriam. « Multiple product-project decisions coordination support : application to oil and gas development projects ». Electronic Thesis or Diss., université Paris-Saclay, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023UPAST027.
Texte intégralThe major challenge addressed in this research concerns the coordination of the multiple interdependent decisions that must be made during the project, either technical, financial, or contractual. Interdependence means that making one decision without considering the impacts for other decisions may imply some underperformance, or even dead ends, iterations, and rework.To overcome this challenge, a more adaptable multi-decision-making process has been proposed, consisting of three blocks: 1/ modeling the decision network and formulating the multi-decision problem; 2/ structuring the problem to propose relevant and plausible scenarios assembled from elementary decision alternatives; 3/ solving the problem by selecting and recommending scenarios.Building the multi-decision-making process is based on multiple possibilities for each block. The decision-maker selects from a set of possible choices to adapt the decision-making process to the precise context.For block #1, we have first articulated the need to build a global decision network that models the decisions under study and the interdependencies they may have with other decisions. We have then argued that graphs and matrices can be used to fulfill this need. Both methods allow to include all decisions and interdependencies of the decision network in one single model, each of them having its advantages and drawbacks, with a kind of complementarity.Then, to formulate the local multi-decision problem, two interactions-based clustering approaches are proposed: the top-down approach (considering decision interdependencies) and the bottom-up approach (with an additional due date-based grouping of decisions). Both help to delineate the focus of decision makers on a specific set of decisions, since considering the whole network of decisions at the same time can be challenging.In block #2, to structure the problem, two matrix-based and one graph-based methods have been proposed. These methods offer the possibility to generate possible scenarios considering compatibility and performance criteria, either sequentially (morphological analysis), simultaneously (QFD), or with a hybrid way (graph exploration). For the two matrix-based methods, an algorithm was proposed to facilitate the identification of plausible scenarios. As for the graph-based method, a lighter heuristic can be applied on live during a decision meeting.Finally, to solve the problem in block #3, several MCDA methods have been listed for evaluating and selecting a recommended scenario: absolute compensatory methods, relative pairwise comparison methods, and relative comparison to reference point methods.According to industrial actors, such a process could improve coordination mechanisms between the major decisions of their projects. Even though decisions were interdependent, they were not often considered as such, and our proposed process permits (according to them) to have a better vision of the decisions to be made together and of the consequences of the choices. A fictitious case study, inspired by real past projects, was used to illustrate the proposed multi-decision coordination process.We are convinced that our research will provide a solid basis for further studies on the coordination of multiple interdependent decisions in complex projects, although there are academic and industrial perspectives that need to be tackled
Zoumpoulis, Spyridon Ilias. « Networks, decisions, and outcomes : coordination with local information and the value of temporal data for learning influence networks ». Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/91100.
Texte intégralCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 173-177).
We study decision making by networked entities and the interplay between networks and outcomes under two different contexts: in the first part of the thesis, we study how strategic agents that share local information coordinate; in the second part of the thesis, we quantify the gain of having access to temporally richer data for learning of influence networks. In the first part of the thesis, we study the role of local information channels in enabling coordination among strategic agents. Building on the standard finite-player global games framework, we show that the set of equilibria of a coordination game is highly sensitive to how information is locally shared among agents. In particular, we show that the coordination game has multiple equilibria if there exists a collection of agents such that (i) they do not share a common signal with any agent outside of that collection; and (ii) their information sets form an increasing sequence of nested sets, referred to as a filtration. Our characterization thus extends the results on the uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibria in global games beyond the well-known case in which agents have access to purely private or public signals. We then provide a characterization of how the extent of equilibrium multiplicity is determined by the extent to which subsets of agents have access to common information: we show that the size of the set of equilibrium strategies is increasing with the extent of variability in the size of the subsets of agents who observe the same signal. We study the set of equilibria in large coordination games, showing that as the number of agents grows, the game exhibits multiple equilibria if and only if a non-vanishing fraction of the agents have access to the same signal. We finally consider an application of our framework in which the noisy signals are interpreted to be the idiosyncratic signals of the agents, which are exchanged through a communication network. In the second part of the thesis, we quantify the gain in the speed of learning of parametric models of influence, due to having access to richer temporal information. We infer local influence relations between networked entities from data on outcomes and assess the value of temporal data by characterizing the speed of learning under three different types of available data: knowing the set of entities who take a particular action; knowing the order in which the entities take an action; and knowing the times of the actions. We propose a parametric model of influence which captures directed pairwise interactions and formulate different variations of the learning problem. We use the Fisher information, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, and sample complexity as measures for the speed of learning. We provide theoretical guarantees on the sample complexity for correct learning based on sets, sequences, and times. The asymptotic gain of having access to richer temporal data for the speed of learning is thus quantified in terms of the gap between the derived asymptotic requirements under different data modes. We also evaluate the practical value of learning with richer temporal data, by comparing learning with sets, sequences, and times given actual observational data. Experiments on both synthetic and real data, including data on mobile app installation behavior, and EEG data from epileptic seizure events, quantify the improvement in learning due to richer temporal data, and show that the proposed methodology recovers the underlying network well.
by Spyridon Ilias Zoumpoulis.
Ph. D.
Zylbersztejn, Adam. « Information, institutions et efficacité : essais en économie expérimentale ». Thesis, Paris 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA010015/document.
Texte intégralChapters 1 and 2 revisit the Beard and Beil (1994) two-player coordination game with two Nash equilibria: one Pareto-efficient, the other is Pareto-inefficient and involves a weakly dominated strategy. Existing experiments using this game robustly show that suboptimal outcomes arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects doubt that the offer players will seek to maximize their own payoff (ii) these doubts are, in some instances, justified. In Chapter l, we report on new experiments investigating whether the inequality in payoffs between players, maintained in most lab implementations 0 this game, may explain such behavior. Our data clearly show that the failure to maximize personal payoffs, as well as the fear that others might act this way, do not stem from inequality aversion. This result is robust to: varying saliency of decisions, repetition-based learning and cultural differences between France and Pol and. Then, we assess whether information about the interaction partner helps eliminate inefficiency in this game. Our treatments involve three information ¬enhancing mechanisms: repetition and two kinds of individual signals, messages from partner or observation of his past choices. Repetition-based learning increases the frequencies of the most efficient outcome and the most costly strategic mismatch. Moreover, it is superseded b, individual signals. Like previous empirical studies, we report that signals provide a screening of partners' intentions that reduces the frequency of strategic mismatches. Unlike these studies, we find that the transmission of information between partners, either via messages or observation, does not suffice to significantly increase the overall efficiency of outcomes. This happens mostly because additional information does not restrain the use of the dominated action. Therefore, this chapter identifies important limitations of cheap-talk communication -- a mechanism generally considered by economists as a useful means to improve the efficiency of economic interactions. It suggests that in the absence of a pronounced link between one's words and actions, institutions involving communication may well happen to be insufficient for this purpose. This issue is addressed in Chapter 2 where we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can improve the performance of pre-play communication regarding the coordination of strategies and the efficiency of outcomes. As an addition to the classical cheap-¬talk communication protocol utilized in Chapter l, we ask ail players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before entering the lab. Three principle results emerge with commitment-via-the-oath: (1) efficient coordination increases by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages are significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increases
Pentina, Iryna. « Performance Implications of Multi-Channel Strategic Decisions by Incumbent Retailers : The Role of Order of Entry and Degree of Inter-Channel Coordination ». Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc6065/.
Texte intégralPentina, Iryna Hasty Ronald W. « Performance implications of multi-channel strategic decisions by incumbent retailers the role of order of entry and degree of inter-channel coordination / ». [Denton, Tex.] : University of North Texas, 2008. http://digital.library.unt.edu/permalink/meta-dc-6065.
Texte intégralNourjou, Reza. « GIS-based Intelligent Assistant Agent for Supporting Decisions of Incident Commander in Disaster Response ». 京都大学 (Kyoto University), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/188867.
Texte intégralGrevet, Jean-Louis M. « Decision aiding and coordination in decision-making organizations ». Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14670.
Texte intégralJohansson, Alexander. « Strategic Decision-Making in Platoon Coordination ». Licentiate thesis, KTH, Reglerteknik, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-275670.
Texte intégralUnder de kommande decennierna förväntas efterfrågan på transport av varor och passagerare mångfaldigas, vilket innebär att behovet av hållbara transportlösningar är brådskande. En lovande lösning är konvojkörning, som visar stor potential att minska bränsleförbrukningen och driftskostnaderna för lastbilar. För att utnyttja fördelarna med konvojkörning till fullo behöver lastbilar koordineras för att effektivt mötas och bilda konvojer. Den här avhandlingen behandlar koordinering av lastbilar som kan bilda konvojer på transporthubbar, där vissa lastbilar måste vänta på andra lastbilar för att bilda konvojer, och det finns en belöning för konvojkörning och en kostnad för att vänta. Tre bidrag som behandlar konvojkoordinering presenteras i den här avhandlingen. Det första bidraget behandlar koordinering av lastbilar med förutbestämda rutter i ett transportnätverk med deterministiska eller stokastiska restider. Lastbilarna ägs av konkurrerande transportföretag, och varje lastbil beslutar om sina väntetider på hubbarna längs med sin rutt för att optimera sin driftskostnad. Vi antar att lastbilar bildar en konvoj om de avgår från en hubb och kör in på vägen samtidigt. Den strategiska interaktionen mellan lastbilar när de koordinerar för konvojbildning modelleras med icke-kooperativ spelteori, och vi betraktar Nashjämvikt som lösningskoncept när lastbilarna beslutar om sina väntetider i början av sina resor. I fallet med stokastiska restider utvecklar vi även lösningar där lastbilarna tillåts uppdatera sina väntetider längs med sina resor. I en simuleringsstudie över det svenska transportnätverket visas att när lastbilarna tillåts uppdatera sina väntetider uppnås en konjovkörningsgrad på 60%. I det andra bidraget utreds modeller för att dela på vinsten från konvojkörning. Fördelarna med konvojkörning är inte lika för alla lastbilar i en konvoj; vanligtvis är fördelen större för följarlastbilarna än för ledarlastbilen. Således kan incitamenten för transportföretag att samarbeta i form av konvojkörning vara låga om inte vinsterna från konvojkörning delas. Baserat på vinstdelningsmodeller formulerar vi konvojkoordineringsspel. I en simulering av en transporthubb utvärderar vi utfallet från konvojkoordinationsspelen. Det visar sig att den totala vinsten som uppnås när lastbilarna försöker maximera sina egna vinster, men vinsten från konvojkörning jämnas ut helt bland konvojmedlemmar, är nästan lika hög som när varje lastbil försöker att maximera den totala vinsten i systemet. I det sista bidraget studeras ett koordineringsproblem där lastbilar anländer till en transporthubb enligt en stokastisk ankomstprocess. Lastbilarna delar inte förhandsinformation om sina ankomster; detta kan vara känslig information att dela. En koordinator bestämmer, baserat på den statistiska sannolikhetsfördelningen av ankomster, när lastbilarna på transporthubben ska släppas iväg i form av en konvoj. Under antagandet att ankomsterna är statistiskt oberoende och likafördelade, visar vi att det är optimalt att släppa iväg lastbilarna från transporthubben i form av en konvoj när antalet lastbilar överskrider en viss tröskel. Detta bidrag visar att enkla och dynamiska koordineringsmetoder kan erhålla en hög vinst från konvojkörning, även under hög osäkerhet och begränsad förhandsinformation.
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QC 20200609
Allars, M. N. « Coordination and administrative discretion ». Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371505.
Texte intégralLivres sur le sujet "Coordination of decisions"
Lewis, Edgar L. Cooperative coordination of production and harvesting decisions. Washington, D.C : United States Dept. of Agriculture, Rural Development, 2004.
Trouver le texte intégralLewis, Edgar L. Cooperative coordination of production and harvesting decisions. [Washington, D.C.] : U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Rural Development, [Rural Business- Cooperative Service, 2004.
Trouver le texte intégralPerry, Motty. The optimal timing of procurement decisions and patent allocations. Jerusalem : Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1997.
Trouver le texte intégralOffice, United States Government Accountability. Environmental indicators : Better coordination is needed to develop environmental indicator sets that inform decisions : report to congressional requesters. Washington, D.C : U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004.
Trouver le texte intégralBicchieri, Cristina. Rationality and coordination. Cambridge [England] : Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Trouver le texte intégralOffice, General Accounting. Watershed management : Better coordination of data collection efforts needed to support key decisions : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives. Washington, D.C. (P.O. Box 37050, Washington 20013) : U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004.
Trouver le texte intégralKim, Steven H. Learning and coordination : Enhancing agent performance through distributed decision making. Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic, 1994.
Trouver le texte intégralKim, Steven H. Learning and Coordination : Enhancing Agent Performance through Distributed Decision Making. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 1994.
Trouver le texte intégralSupply chain coordination mechanisms : New approaches for collaborative planning. Heidelberg : Springer, 2010.
Trouver le texte intégralHart, Oliver D. On the design of hierarchies : Coordination versus specialization. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Coordination of decisions"
Takahashi, Shingo, Kyoichi Kijima et Ryo Sato. « Coordination Principles of Satisficing Decisions ». Dans Applied General Systems Research on Organizations, 37–60. Tokyo : Springer Japan, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-53949-0_2.
Texte intégralSerfaty, Daniel, Elliot E. Entin et Joan H. Johnston. « Team coordination training. » Dans Making decisions under stress : Implications for individual and team training., 221–45. Washington : American Psychological Association, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10278-008.
Texte intégralTrigo, Paulo, Anders Jonsson et Helder Coelho. « Coordination with Collective and Individual Decisions ». Dans Advances in Artificial Intelligence - IBERAMIA-SBIA 2006, 37–47. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11874850_8.
Texte intégralMunier, Bertrand. « Risk Attitudes Appraisal and Cognitive Coordination in Decentralized Decision Systems ». Dans Aiding Decisions with Multiple Criteria, 357–77. Boston, MA : Springer US, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0843-4_16.
Texte intégralAdamson, Seabron, Drake Hernandez et Herb Rakebrand. « Coordination of Gas and Electricity Transmission Investment Decisions ». Dans Lecture Notes in Energy, 475–89. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47929-9_16.
Texte intégralSchweitzer, Frank. « Coordination of Decisions in a Spatial Model of Brownian Agents ». Dans The Complex Dynamics of Economic Interaction, 303–18. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17045-4_18.
Texte intégralChan, L. M. A., Z. J. Max Shen, David Simchi-Levi et Julie L. Swann. « Coordination of Pricing and Inventory Decisions : A Survey and Classification ». Dans International Series in Operations Research & ; Management Science, 335–92. Boston, MA : Springer US, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-7953-5_9.
Texte intégralEreshko, Felix, et Vladimir Budzko. « Coordination of Models for Describing and Making Agro-Technological Decisions ». Dans Information Systems and Design, 78–89. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95494-9_7.
Texte intégralInderfurth, Karl. « Optimal Coordination of Manufacturing and Remanufacturing Decisions in Case of Product Substitution ». Dans Operations Research Proceedings 2001, 135–39. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50282-8_17.
Texte intégralLeitner, Stephan, et Doris A. Behrens. « On the Robustness of Coordination Mechanisms for Investment Decisions Involving ‘Incompetent’ Agents ». Dans Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 191–203. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00912-4_15.
Texte intégralActes de conférences sur le sujet "Coordination of decisions"
Allison, James T., Michael Kokkolaras et Panos Y. Papalambros. « Optimal Partitioning and Coordination Decisions in Decomposition-Based Design Optimization ». Dans ASME 2007 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. ASMEDC, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2007-34698.
Texte intégralShao, Xiao-Feng. « Coordination of Pricing Decisions in Multiple-Product Supply Chains ». Dans 2008 4th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wicom.2008.1581.
Texte intégralOuazene, Yassine, Farouk Yalaoui, Russel Kelly et Tayeb Idjeraoui. « Coordination and optimization of dynamic pricing and production decisions ». Dans 2017 IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (SSCI). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ssci.2017.8285252.
Texte intégralSoria, Nicolás F., Mitchell K. Colby, Irem Y. Tumer, Christopher Hoyle et Kagan Tumer. « Design of Complex Engineering Systems Using Multiagent Coordination ». Dans ASME 2016 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2016-59570.
Texte intégralEllenbeck, Jan, Christian Hartmann et Lars Berlemann. « Decentralized inter-cell interference coordination by autonomous spectral reuse decisions ». Dans 2008 European Wireless Conference (EW). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ew.2008.4623915.
Texte intégralPiyavsky, Semen, et Denis Kiselev. « Modeling, Optimization and Coordination of Decisions in a Smart City ». Dans 2019 XXI International Conference Complex Systems : Control and Modeling Problems (CSCMP). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cscmp45713.2019.8976707.
Texte intégralStockar, Stephanie, Cristian Rostiti, Marcello Canova et Michael Prucka. « A Model Predictive Approach for the Coordination of Powertrain Control Systems ». Dans ASME 2019 Dynamic Systems and Control Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/dscc2019-9146.
Texte intégralZhong, Yu, et Lingyun Wei. « Coordination of Pricing Decisions in a Cloud Computing Service Supply Chain ». Dans the 8th International Conference. New York, New York, USA : ACM Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3157754.3157776.
Texte intégralDay, Christopher, Thomas Brennan, Hiromal Premachandra, James Sturdevant et Darcy Bullock. « Analysis of Peer Intersection Data for Arterial Traffic Signal Coordination Decisions ». Dans Automated Traffic Signal Performance Measure Workshop. Purdue University, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284316046.
Texte intégralJin, Chen, et Wang Xiao-li. « Optimal decisions and capacity coordination with joint contract in service supply chain ». Dans 2013 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2013.6586331.
Texte intégralRapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Coordination of decisions"
Powell, Andrew, et Matteo Bobba. Multilateral Intermediation of Foreign Aid : What is the Trade-Off for Donor Countries ? Inter-American Development Bank, décembre 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010877.
Texte intégralDaniellou, François. Taking account of human and organisational factors in planning and designing a high risk system. Fondation pour une culture de sécurité industrielle, juillet 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.57071/381ynz.
Texte intégralAppleyard, Bruce, Jonathan Stanton et Chris Allen. Toward a Guide for Smart Mobility Corridors : Frameworks and Tools for Measuring, Understanding, and Realizing Transportation Land Use Coordination. Mineta Transportation Institue, décembre 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31979/mti.2020.1805.
Texte intégralLevin, Simon A., Naomi E. Leonard et Iain D. Couzin. Coordination and Collective Decision Making. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, juillet 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1007105.
Texte intégralAlessandro, Martín, Carlos Santiso et Mariano Lafuente. The Role of the Center of Government : A Literature Review. Inter-American Development Bank, septembre 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0009130.
Texte intégralGrevet, Jean-Louis M., et Alexander H. Levis. Coordination in Organizations with Decision Support Systems. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, juillet 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada197951.
Texte intégralLevis, Alexander H. Adaptive Decision Making and Coordination in Variable Structure Organizations. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, janvier 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada303555.
Texte intégralLevis, Alexander H. Adaptive Decision Making and Coordination in Variable Structure Organizations. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, août 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada311629.
Texte intégralGuerra, Flávia, Alex Caldera-Ortega, Daniel Tagle Zamora, Gorka Zubicaray, Acoyani Adame, Michael Roll et Lucas Turmena. TUC City Profile : León, Mexico. United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), novembre 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.53324/gjss3214.
Texte intégralShoham, Yoav. Control Coordination of Multiple Agents Through Decision Theoretic and Economic Methods. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, février 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada412242.
Texte intégral