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1
Tan, Shaolin. « Proximity inheritance explains the evolution of cooperation under natural selection and mutation ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 286, no 1902 (mai 2019) : 20190690. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0690.
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In this paper, a mechanism called proximity inheritance is introduced in the birth–death process of a networked population involving the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Different from the traditional birth–death process, in the proposed model, players are distributed in a spatial space and offspring is distributed in the neighbourhood of its parents. That is, offspring inherits not only the strategy but also the proximity of its parents. In this coevolutionary game model, a cooperative neighbourhood gives more neighbouring cooperative offspring and a defective neighbourhood gives more neighbouring defective offspring, leading to positive feedback among cooperative interactions. It is shown that with the help of proximity inheritance, natural selection will favour cooperation over defection under various conditions, even in the presence of mutation. Furthermore, the coevolutionary dynamics could lead to self-organized substantial network clustering, which promotes an assortment of cooperative interactions. This study provides a new insight into the evolutionary mechanism of cooperation in the absence of social attributions such as reputation and punishment.
2
Xiao, Erte, et Howard Kunreuther. « Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas ». Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no 4 (5 janvier 2015) : 670–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002714564426.
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Molho, Catherine, Daniel Balliet et Junhui Wu. « Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas ». Games 10, no 1 (24 février 2019) : 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010012.
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Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.
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Quan, Ji, Huiting Guo et Xianjia Wang. « Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game ». Journal of Statistical Mechanics : Theory and Experiment 2022, no 7 (1 juillet 2022) : 073402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/ac7a28.
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Abstract The historical behavior of a defector in a group is usually considered in the determination of the intensity of the punishment to be applied to the defector. Because exclusion is a more severe form of punishment, we introduce a conditional punishment that allows punishers to choose between traditional punishment and exclusion. The specific form of punishment is chosen to fit the specific reputation of the defector. A good reputation garners a traditional milder punishment, such as a fine, whereas a bad reputation merits exclusion. The historical behaviors of the individuals in a group are recorded to evaluate their reputations. Those whose reputations fall below a designated threshold are regarded as bad. We study the effects of reputation thresholds, fines, enhancement factors, and exclusion costs on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games. Simulations show that higher thresholds are more conducive to the evolution of cooperation. An extremely small enhancement factor can induce individuals to cooperate when the threshold is relatively high. Cooperation also appears with smaller enhancement factors for higher fines or lower exclusion costs. These results may expand our understanding of how these two strategies of punishment promote cooperation.
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Gintis, Herbert, et Ernst Fehr. « The social structure of cooperation and punishment ». Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no 1 (31 janvier 2012) : 28–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000914.
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AbstractThe standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
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Cason, Timothy N., et Lata Gangadharan. « Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment ». Experimental Economics 18, no 1 (12 février 2014) : 66–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9393-0.
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Bosma, Esmee, et Vincent Buskens. « Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel ». Mens en maatschappij 95, no 1 (1 mars 2020) : 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/mem2020.1.003.bosm.
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Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.
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Santos, Miguel dos, Daniel J. Rankin et Claus Wedekind. « The evolution of punishment through reputation ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 278, no 1704 (18 août 2010) : 371–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.1275.
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Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been sufficiently explored yet in order to explain the evolution of costly punishment. Here, we first show analytically that punishment can lead to long-term benefits if it influences one's reputation and thereby makes the punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions. Then, in computer simulations, we incorporate up to 40 more complex strategies that use different kinds of reputations (e.g. from generous actions), or strategies that not only include punitive behaviours directed towards defectors but also towards cooperators for example. Our findings demonstrate that punishment can directly evolve through a simple reputation system. We conclude that reputation is crucial for the evolution of punishment by making a punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions, and that experiments investigating the beneficial effects of punishment in humans should include reputation as an explicit feature.
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Kamijo, Y., T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi et Y. Funaki. « Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas : Comparison of centralized punishment institutions ». Games and Economic Behavior 84 (mars 2014) : 180–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002.
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Duca, Stefano, et Heinrich H. Nax. « Groups and scores : the decline of cooperation ». Journal of The Royal Society Interface 15, no 144 (juillet 2018) : 20180158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0158.
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Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain cooperation in two-player prisoner's dilemmas and donation games. However, these prior studies focused on pairwise interactions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more general group interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores, proposing and testing several scoring rules that could apply to multi-player prisoners' dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady decline of cooperation for every tested scoring mechanism. All scoring systems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that the positive results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-player prisoner's dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.
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Suzuki, Shinsuke, et Eizo Akiyama. « Reputation and the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 272, no 1570 (21 juin 2005) : 1373–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2005.3072.
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The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas has been of considerable concern in various fields such as sociobiology, economics and sociology. It might be that, in the real world, reputation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. Recently, studies that have addressed indirect reciprocity have revealed that cooperation can evolve through reputation, even though pairs of individuals interact only a few times. To our knowledge, most indirect reciprocity models have presumed dyadic interaction; no studies have attempted analysis of the evolution of cooperation in large communities where the effect of reputation is included. We investigate the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups in which the reputation of individuals affects the decision-making process. This paper presents the following: (i) cooperation can evolve in a four-person case, (ii) the evolution of cooperation becomes difficult as group size increases, even if the effect of reputation is included, and (iii) three kinds of final social states exist. In medium-sized communities, cooperative species can coexist in a stable manner with betrayal species.
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Macfarlan, Shane J., et Henry F. Lyle. « Multiple reputation domains and cooperative behaviour in two Latin American communities ». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 370, no 1683 (5 décembre 2015) : 20150009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0009.
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Reputations are a ubiquitous feature of human social life, and a large literature has been dedicated to explaining the relationship between prosocial reputations and cooperation in social dilemmas. However, humans form reputations in domains other than prosociality, such as economic competency that could affect cooperation. To date, no research has evaluated the relative effects of multiple reputation domains on cooperation. To bridge this gap, we analyse how prosocial and competency reputations affect cooperation in two Latin American communities (Bwa Mawego, Dominica, and Pucucanchita, Peru) across a number of social contexts (Dominica: labour contracting, labour exchange and conjugal partnership formation; Peru: agricultural and health advice network size). First, we examine the behavioural correlates of prosocial and competency reputations. Following, we analyse whether prosocial, competency, or both reputation domains explain the flow of cooperative benefits within the two communities. Our analyses suggest that (i) although some behaviours affect both reputation domains simultaneously, each reputation domain has a unique behavioural signature; and (ii) competency reputations affect cooperation across a greater number of social contexts compared to prosocial reputations. Results are contextualized with reference to the social markets in which behaviour is embedded and a call for greater theory development is stressed.
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Uchida, Satoshi, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada et Tatsuya Sasaki. « Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory ». Games 10, no 1 (21 février 2019) : 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010011.
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Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment, have been exploited as effective mechanisms. So far, mechanisms that enable peer punishment to function as a solution to the social dilemma remain unclear. In this paper, we propose a theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory. Prospect theory models human beings as agents that estimate small probabilities and loss of profit as greater than they actually are; thus, those agents feel that punishments are more frequent and harsher than they really are. We show that this kind of cognitive distortion makes players decide to cooperate to avoid being punished and that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values.
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Gächter, Simon. « In the lab and the field : Punishment is rare in equilibrium ». Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no 1 (31 janvier 2012) : 26–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11001415.
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AbstractI argue that field (experimental) studies on (costly) peer punishment in social dilemmas face the problem that in equilibrium punishment will be rare and therefore may be hard to observe in the field. I also argue that the behavioral logic uncovered by lab experiments is not fundamentally different from the behavioral logic of cooperation in the field.
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Ge, Erhao, Yuan Chen, Jiajia Wu et Ruth Mace. « Large-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment ». Royal Society Open Science 6, no 8 (août 2019) : 190991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.190991.
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Reputational considerations favour cooperation and thus we expect less cooperation in larger communities where people are less well known to each other. Some argue that institutions are, therefore, necessary to coordinate large-scale cooperation, including moralizing religions that promote cooperation through the fear of divine punishment. Here, we use community size as a proxy for reputational concerns, and test whether people in small, stable communities are more cooperative than people in large, less stable communities in both religious and non-religious contexts. We conducted a donation game on a large naturalistic sample of 501 people in 17 communities, with varying religions or none, ranging from small villages to large cities in northwestern China. We found that more money was donated by those in small, stable communities, where reputation should be more salient. Religious practice was also associated with higher donations, but fear of divine punishment was not. In a second game on the same sample, decisions were private, giving donors the opportunity to cheat. We found that donors to religious institutions were not less likely to cheat, and community size was not important in this game. Results from the donation game suggest donations to both religious and non-religious institutions are being motivated by reputational considerations, and results from both games suggest fear of divine punishment is not important. This chimes with other studies suggesting social benefits rather than fear of punishment may be the more salient motive for cooperative behaviour in real-world settings.
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Fang, Yinhai, Tina P. Benko, Matjaž Perc, Haiyan Xu et Qingmei Tan. « Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game ». Proceedings of the Royal Society A : Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 475, no 2227 (juillet 2019) : 20190349. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2019.0349.
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We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.
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Guala, Francesco. « Reciprocity : Weak or strong ? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate ». Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no 1 (31 janvier 2012) : 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000069.
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AbstractEconomists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a “narrow” and a “wide” reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in “real-world” situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation “in the wild.” In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing.
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Schlaepfer, Alain. « The emergence and selection of reputation systems that drive cooperative behaviour ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 285, no 1886 (5 septembre 2018) : 20181508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.1508.
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Reputational concerns are believed to play a crucial role in explaining cooperative behaviour among non-kin humans. Individuals cooperate to avoid a negative social image, if being branded as defector reduces pay-offs from future interactions. Similarly, individuals sanction defectors to gain a reputation as punisher, prompting future co-players to cooperate. But reputation can only effectively support cooperation if a sufficient number of individuals condition their strategies on their co-players' reputation, and if a sufficient number of group members are willing to record and transmit the relevant information about past actions. Using computer simulations, this paper argues that starting from a pool of non-cooperative individuals, a reputation system based on punishment is likely to emerge and to be the driver of the initial evolution of cooperative behaviour. However, once cooperation is established in a group, it will be sustained mainly through a reputation mechanism based on cooperative actions.
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Qian, Jun, Xiao Sun, Ziyang Wang et Yueting Chai. « Negative Feedback Punishment Approach Helps Sanctioning Institutions Achieve Stable, Time-Saving and Low-Cost Performances ». Mathematics 10, no 15 (8 août 2022) : 2823. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math10152823.
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Sanctioning institutions widely exist in human society. Although these institutions play an important role in the management of social affairs, sanctions are often seen to be costly in terms of both time and money. To enable sanctioning institutions to develop effective sanctions, we propose a negative feedback punishment approach for these institutions that combines the feedback control principle and the negative correlation principle. In the negative feedback punishment approach, the punishment intensity imposed on the group is negatively correlated with the current group cooperation proportion. Through evolutionary simulation and theoretical analysis, we found that the negative feedback punishment approach facilitates more stable, time-saving and low-cost performance by sanctioning institutions than other punishment methods. This work offers a feasible solution for sanctioning institutions to solve social dilemmas and provides a possible theoretical starting point for investigating effective pool punishment measures.
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Sasaki, Tatsuya, et Satoshi Uchida. « The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 280, no 1752 (7 février 2013) : 20122498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2498.
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The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, ‘second-order’ freeriders). We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion in which a punishing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even if it is costly and stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship, repeated interaction, reputation or group selection. Instead, only a limited number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-order freeriders from eroding the social immune system.
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Yang, Chun-Lei, Boyu Zhang, Gary Charness, Cong Li et Jaimie W. Lien. « Endogenous rewards promote cooperation ». Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no 40 (17 septembre 2018) : 9968–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1808241115.
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Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a fundamental objective in the social and biological sciences. Although providing a punishment option to community members in the public goods game (PGG) has been shown to effectively promote cooperation, this has some serious disadvantages; these include destruction of a society’s physical resources as well as its overall social capital. A more efficient approach may be to instead employ a reward mechanism. We propose an endogenous reward mechanism that taxes the gross income of each round’s PGG play and assigns the amount to a fund; each player then decides how to distribute his or her share of the fund as rewards to other members of the community. Our mechanism successfully reverses the decay trend and achieves a high level of contribution with budget-balanced rewards that require no external funding, an important condition for practical implementation. Simulations based on type-specific estimations indicate that the payoff-based conditional cooperation model explains the observed treatment effects well.
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Roos, Patrick, Michele Gelfand, Dana Nau et Ryan Carr. « High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 281, no 1776 (7 février 2014) : 20132661. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.2661.
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As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a structured population model and show that high strength-of-ties and low mobility are critical for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Only in such settings of high social-structural constraint are punishers able to induce self-interested agents toward cooperation, making responsible 3PP ultimately beneficial to individuals as well as the collective. Our results illuminate the conditions under which 3PP is evolutionarily adaptive in populations. Responsible 3PP can evolve and induce cooperation in cases where other mechanisms alone fail to do so.
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Schroeder, K. B., D. Nettle et R. McElreath. « Interactions between personality and institutions in cooperative behaviour in humans ». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 370, no 1683 (5 décembre 2015) : 20150011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0011.
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Laboratory attempts to identify relationships between personality and cooperative behaviour in humans have generated inconsistent results. This may partially stem from different practices in psychology and economics laboratories, with both hypothetical players and incentives typical only in the former. Another possible cause is insufficient consideration of the contexts within which social dilemmas occur. Real social dilemmas are often governed by institutions that change the payoff structure via rewards and punishments. However, such ‘strong situations’ will not necessarily suppress the effects of personality. On the contrary, they may affect some personalities differentially. Extraversion and neuroticism, reflecting variation in reward and punishment sensitivity, should predict modification of cooperative behaviour following changes to the payoff structure. We investigate interactions between personality and a punishment situation via two versions of a public goods game. We find that, even in a strong situation, personality matters and, moreover, it is related to strategic shifts in cooperation. Extraversion is associated with a shift from free-riding to cooperation in the presence of punishment, agreeableness is associated with initially higher contributions regardless of game, and, contrary to our predictions, neuroticism is associated with lower contributions regardless of game. Results should lead to new hypotheses that relate variation in biological functioning to individual differences in cooperative behaviour and that consider three-way interactions among personality, institutional context and sociocultural background.
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Loukopoulos, Peter, Daniel Eek, Tommy Garling et Satoshi Fujii. « Palatable Punishment in Real-World Social Dilemmas ? Punishing Others to Increase Cooperation Among the Unpunished1 ». Journal of Applied Social Psychology 36, no 5 (mai 2006) : 1274–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00042.x.
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Smaldino, Paul E., et Mark Lubell. « Institutions and Cooperation in an Ecology of Games ». Artificial Life 20, no 2 (avril 2014) : 207–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/artl_a_00126.
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Social dilemmas have long been studied formally as cooperation games that pit individual gains against those of the group. In the real world, individuals face an ecology of games where they play many such games simultaneously, often with overlapping co-players. Here, we study an agent-based model of an ecology of public goods games and compare the effectiveness of two institutional mechanisms for promoting cooperation: a simple institution of limited group size (capacity constraints) and a reputational institution based on observed behavior. Reputation is shown to allow much higher relative payoffs for cooperators than do capacity constraints, but only if (1) the rate of reputational information flow is fast enough relative to the rate of social mobility, and (2) cooperators are relatively common in the population. When these conditions are not met, capacity constraints are more effective at protecting the interests of cooperators. Because of the simplicity of the limited-group-size rule, capacity constraints can also generate social organization, which promotes cooperation much more quickly than can reputation. Our results are discussed in terms of both normative prescriptions and evolutionary theory regarding institutions that regulate cooperation. More broadly, the ecology-of-games approach developed here provides an adaptable modeling framework for studying a wide variety of problems in the social sciences.
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Li, Xiaopeng, Shiwen Sun et Chengyi Xia. « Reputation-based adaptive adjustment of link weight among individuals promotes the cooperation in spatial social dilemmas ». Applied Mathematics and Computation 361 (novembre 2019) : 810–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2019.06.038.
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White, Stephan. « The Evolution of Morality ». PARADIGMI, no 1 (mai 2012) : 173–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2012-001010.
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It seems clear that cooperation when cheating would go undetected - for example, in many-person prisoner's dilemmas or "tragedy of the commons" cases - is a precondition of the functioning of modern social institutions. Such cooperation seems difficult to explain in evolutionary terms, however, since those who are disposed to cheat seem to enjoy a systematic advantage relative to those who are not. Further- more, the appeal to mechanisms for the detection and punishment of noncooperation, since those mechanisms themselves presuppose cooperation, merely pushes the problem one step back. In this paper I argue that morality plays an ineliminable role in the explanation of the forms of cooperation in question. Moreover, I provide a schema for the evolution of morality in the face of the advantages that those disposed to cheat apparently enjoy.
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Kiyonari, Toko, et Pat Barclay. « Cooperation in social dilemmas : Free riding may be thwarted by second-order reward rather than by punishment. » Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95, no 4 (2008) : 826–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0011381.
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Henrich, Joseph, et Michael Muthukrishna. « The Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation ». Annual Review of Psychology 72, no 1 (4 janvier 2021) : 207–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-081920-042106.
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Humans are an ultrasocial species. This sociality, however, cannot be fully explained by the canonical approaches found in evolutionary biology, psychology, or economics. Understanding our unique social psychology requires accounting not only for the breadth and intensity of human cooperation but also for the variation found across societies, over history, and among behavioral domains. Here, we introduce an expanded evolutionary approach that considers how genetic and cultural evolution, and their interaction, may have shaped both the reliably developing features of our minds and the well-documented differences in cultural psychologies around the globe. We review the major evolutionary mechanisms that have been proposed to explain human cooperation, including kinship, reciprocity, reputation, signaling, and punishment; we discuss key culture–gene coevolutionary hypotheses, such as those surrounding self-domestication and norm psychology; and we consider the role of religions and marriage systems. Empirically, we synthesize experimental and observational evidence from studies of children and adults from diverse societies with research among nonhuman primates.
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Eriksson, Kimmo, Per A. Andersson et Pontus Strimling. « When is it appropriate to reprimand a norm violation ? The roles of anger, behavioral consequences, violation severity, and social distance ». Judgment and Decision Making 12, no 4 (juillet 2017) : 396–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500006264.
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AbstractExperiments on economic games typically fail to find positive reputational effects of using peer punishment of selfish behavior in social dilemmas. Theorists had expected positive reputational effects because of the potentially beneficial consequences that punishment may have on norm violators’ behavior. Going beyond the game-theoretic paradigm, we used vignettes to study how various social factors influence approval ratings of a peer who reprimands a violator of a group-beneficial norm. We found that ratings declined when punishers showed anger, and this effect was mediated by perceived aggressiveness. Thus the same emotions that motivate peer punishers may make them come across as aggressive, to the detriment of their reputation. However, the negative effect of showing anger disappeared when the norm violation was sufficiently severe. Ratings of punishers were also influenced by social distance, such that it is less appropriate for a stranger than a friend to reprimand a violator. In sum, peer punisher ratings were very high for a friend reprimanding a severe norm violation, but particularly poor for a stranger showing anger at a mild norm violation. We found no effect on ratings of whether the reprimand had the beneficial consequence of changing the violator’s behavior. Our findings provide insight into how peer punishers can avoid negative reputational effects. They also point to the importance of going beyond economic games when studying peer punishment.
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Berger, Ulrich, et Hannelore De Silva. « Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information ». PLOS ONE 16, no 6 (15 juin 2021) : e0253344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253344.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Deterrence, a defender’s avoidance of a challenger’s attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain credibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both the source and the costs of obtaining information on reputation. Even for small information costs successful deterrence is never evolutionarily stable. Here we use game-theoretic modelling and agent-based simulations to resolve this puzzle and to clarify under which conditions deterrence can nevertheless evolve and when it is bound to fail. Paradoxically, rich information on defenders’ past actions leads to a breakdown of deterrence, while with only minimal information deterrence can be highly successful. We argue that reputation-based deterrence sheds light on phenomena such as costly punishment and fairness, and might serve as a possible explanation for the evolution of informal property rights.
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Battu, Balaraju, et Narayanan Srinivasan. « Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games ». Royal Society Open Science 7, no 5 (mai 2020) : 191567. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.191567.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and prestige. We propose and model a repeated public good game with heterogeneous conditional cooperators where an agent's donation in a public goods game depends on comparing the number of donations in the population in the previous round and with the agent's arbitrary chosen conditional cooperative criterion. Such individuals imitate the social behaviour of role models based on their payoffs and prestige. The dependence is modelled by two population-level parameters: affinity towards payoff and affinity towards prestige . These affinities influence the degree to which agents value the payoff and prestige of role models. Agents update their conditional strategies by considering both parameters. The simulations in this study show that high levels of cooperation are established in a population consisting of heterogeneous conditional cooperators for a certain range of affinity parameters in repeated public good games. The results show that social value (prestige) is important in establishing cooperation.
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Arai, Sakura, John Tooby et Leda Cosmides. « Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners ». PLOS ONE 17, no 4 (19 avril 2022) : e0267153. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0267153.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate motivations to reciprocate and punish accordingly. These estimates should reflect default assumptions about relational mobility: the probability that individuals in one’s social world will have the opportunity to form relationships with new partners. This prior probability can be updated by cues present in the immediate situation one is facing. The resulting estimate of a partner’s outside options should serve as input to motivational systems regulating reciprocity: Higher estimates should down-regulate the use of sanctions to prevent defection by a current partner, and up-regulate efforts to attract better cooperative partners by curating one’s own reputation and monitoring that of others. We tested this hypothesis using a Trust Game with Punishment (TGP), which provides continuous measures of reciprocity, defection, and punishment in response to defection. We measured each participant’s perception of relational mobility in their real-world social ecology and experimentally varied a cue to partner switching. Moreover, the study was conducted in the US (n = 519) and Japan (n = 520): societies that are high versus low in relational mobility. Across conditions and societies, higher perceptions of relational mobility were associated with increased reciprocity and decreased punishment: i.e., those who thought that others have many opportunities to find new partners reciprocated more and punished less. The situational cue to partner switching was detected, but relational mobility in one’s real social world regulated motivations to reciprocate and punish, even in the experimental setting. The current research provides evidence that motivational systems are designed to estimate varying degrees of partner choice in one’s social ecology and regulate reciprocal behaviors accordingly.
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Chowdhury, Sayantan Nag, Srilena Kundu, Matjaž Perc et Dibakar Ghosh. « Complex evolutionary dynamics due to punishment and free space in ecological multigames ». Proceedings of the Royal Society A : Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 477, no 2252 (août 2021) : 20210397. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2021.0397.
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The concurrence of ecological and evolutionary processes often arises as an integral part of various biological and social systems. We here study eco-evolutionary dynamics by adopting two paradigmatic metaphors of social dilemmas with contrasting outcomes. We use the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games as the backbone of the proposed mathematical model. Since cooperation is a costly proposition in the face of the Darwinian theory of evolution, we go beyond the traditional framework by introducing punishment as an additional strategy. Punishers bare an additional cost from their own resources to try and discourage or prohibit free-riding from selfish defectors. Our model also incorporates the ecological signature of free space, which has an altruistic-like impact because it allows others to replicate and potentially thrive. We show that the consideration of these factors has broad implications for better understanding the emergent complex evolutionary dynamics. In particular, we report the simultaneous presence of different subpopulations through the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, and we determine various stationary points using traditional game-theoretic concepts and stability analysis.
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Selterman, Dylan. « Altruistic Punishment in the Classroom : An Update on the Tragedy of the Commons Extra Credit Question ». Teaching of Psychology 46, no 2 (1 mars 2019) : 153–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0098628319834208.
Texte intégralRésumé :
A world-famous classroom exercise gives students the choice between 2 points (the communal option) or 6 points (the overconsumption option) of extra credit toward an assignment in their course, but if more than 10% choose 6 points, no one receives any points. In the current variation, students ( N = 795) were also given a third option—to sacrifice their own potential points to take away points from another randomly selected student who chose 6 points. Across seven course sections, 19 students chose this option based on the concept of “altruistic punishment,” with many expressing concern about the entire class losing points. Most students had a positive attitude toward the exercise, viewing that it helped them understand new material and increased their interest in psychology, believing that psychology can help solve social problems. This exercise effectively demonstrates group cooperation dilemmas.
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Okada, Isamu. « Two ways to overcome the three social dilemmas of indirect reciprocity ». Scientific Reports 10, no 1 (8 octobre 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-73564-5.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract Indirect reciprocity is one of the main principles of evolving cooperation in a social dilemma situation. In reciprocity, a positive score is given to cooperative behaviour while a negative score is given to non-cooperative behaviour, and the dilemma is resolved by selectively cooperating only with those with positive scores. However, many studies have shown that non-cooperation with those who have not cooperated also downgrades one's reputation; they have called this situation the scoring dilemma. To address this dilemma, the notion of justified punishments has been considered. The notion of justified punishment allows good individuals who defect against bad co-players to keep their standing. Despite numerous studies on justified punishment, it is unknown whether this solution leads to a new type of dilemma because reputations may be downgraded when the intent of punishment is not correctly communicated. The dilemma of punishment has so far been rarely analysed, and thus, the complete solution of the mechanism for evolving cooperation using the principle of indirect reciprocity has not been found yet. Here, we identify sufficient conditions to overcome each of the three dilemmas including the dilemma of punishment to maintain stable cooperation by using the framework of evolutionary game theory. This condition includes the principle of detecting free riders, which resolves the social dilemma, the principle of justification, which resolves the scoring dilemma, and the principle of generosity, which resolves the dilemma of punishment. A norm that satisfies these principles can stably maintain social cooperation. Our insights may offer a general assessment principle that applies to a wide range of subjects, from individual actions to national decisions.
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Samu, Flóra, et Károly Takács. « Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation : cross-checking and social bonding ». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 376, no 1838 (4 octobre 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0302.
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Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of gossip under such a conflict of interest. One is the possibility of voluntary checks of received evaluative information from different sources and the other is social bonding between the sender and the receiver. We tested the efficiency of cross-checking and social bonding in a laboratory experiment where subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma with gossip interactions. Although individuals had confidence in gossip in both conditions, we found that, overall, neither the opportunities for cross-checking nor bonding were able to maintain cooperation. Meanwhile, strong competition for reputation increased cooperation when individuals' payoffs depended greatly on their position relative to their rivals. Our results suggest that intense competition for reputation facilitates gossip functioning as an informal device promoting cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
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Wei, Xiang, Peng Xu, Shuiting Du, Guanghui Yan et Huayan Pei. « Reputational preference-based payoff punishment promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemmas ». European Physical Journal B 94, no 10 (octobre 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00212-w.
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Podder, Shirsendu, Simone Righi et Francesca Pancotto. « Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game ». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 376, no 1838 (4 octobre 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0293.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the ‘Loner’ strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator–defector–loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment—where defectors punish cooperators—causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social norms that allow agents to condition their behaviour to the reputation of their peers. We benchmark this with respect both to the standard optional public goods game and to the variant where all types of punishment are allowed. We find that a social norm imposing a more moderate reputational penalty for opting out than for defecting increases cooperation. When, besides reputation, punishment is also possible, the two mechanisms work synergically under all social norms that do not assign to loners a strictly worse reputation than to defectors. Under this latter set-up, the high levels of cooperation are sustained by conditional strategies, which largely reduce the use of pro-social punishment and almost completely eliminate anti-social punishment. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
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Alfimtsev, A. N., S. A. Sakulin, V. E. Bolshakov, N. V. Bykov, M. S. Tovarnov et N. S. Vlasova. « Method for solving social dilemmas based on multi-agent learning and reputation ». Neurocomputers 1 (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.18127/j19998554-202201-01.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Many real-world problems contain social dilemmas that express contradictions between individual and public interests. Such tasks can be solved using deep multi-agent learning. This article focuses on reputation-based social dilemma solving and multi-agent reinforcement learning. Target of the work is the development of a method for solving social dilemmas based on deep multi-agent reinforcement learning. A method for solving social dilemmas based on deep multi-agent reinforcement learning is proposed. The difference between the method and the known analogs is based on the use of the agent's reputation as a part of the reward function. Reputation, in turn, depends on the degree of cooperation of an agent with other agents. The software implementation of the method is done in Python using the open library Pytorch. The effectiveness of the method was assessed on the basis of comparison with methods for solving social dilemmas without taking into account cooperation between agents. The results of the work can be used to create software for unmanned vehicles of the city's transport system. A balance between collective and individual interests by solving social dilemmas in a “smart city” can be achieved through the application of the method proposed in the article.
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Pei, Huayan, et Guanghui Yan. « Punishment and reputation based partner switching promotes cooperation in social networks ». Europhysics Letters, 2 décembre 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/aca824.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract To investigate the cooperation dynamics caused by coevolution of game strategy and social contacts, we propose a behavioral punishment and reputation based partner switching mechanism, in which individuals are allowed to sever unwanted partnerships and establish new ones with next-nearest neighbors having high reputations. Simulation results show that cooperation is significantly promoted under the proposed mechanism. Under greater temptation to defect or in denser networks, social partners changing needs to be adequately frequent to support the spread of cooperative behavior. For a given average degree〈k〉or temptation to defect b, a critical value for time scale ratio W can be observed, above which cooperators occupy the whole population. Our results show that the structural dynamics facilitates the emergence of an underlying heterogeneous network, which provides a favorable network topology for cooperation to prevail under strategy dynamics.
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Santos, Fernando, Jorge Pacheco et Francisco Santos. « Social Norms of Cooperation With Costly Reputation Building ». Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 32, no 1 (26 avril 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11582.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Social norms regulate actions in artificial societies, steering collective behavior towards desirable states. In real societies, social norms can solve cooperation dilemmas, constituting a key ingredient in systems of indirect reciprocity: reputations of agents are assigned following social norms that identify their actions as good or bad. This, in turn, implies that agents can discriminate between the different actions of others and that the behaviors of each agent are known to the population at large. This is only possible if the agents report their interactions. Reporting constitutes, this way, a fundamental ingredient of indirect reciprocity, as in its absence cooperation in a multiagent system may collapse. Yet, in most studies to date, reporting is assumed to be cost-free, which collides with many life situations, where reporting can easily incur a cost (costly reputation building). Here we develop a new model of indirect reciprocity that allows reputation building to be costly. We show that only two norms can sustain cooperation under costly reputation building, a feature that requires agents to be able to anticipate the reporting intentions of their opponents, depending sensitively on both the cost of reporting and the accuracy level of reporting anticipation.
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Molho, Catherine, et Junhui Wu. « Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences ». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 376, no 1838 (4 octobre 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0289.
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Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that humans use multiple tactics to intervene against offences—including confrontation, gossip and ostracism—which have unique benefits and costs. Here, we draw a distinction between direct punishment tactics (i.e. physical and verbal confrontation) and indirect reputation-based tactics (i.e. gossip and ostracism). Based on this distinction, we sketch the common and unique social functions that different tactics are tailored to serve and describe information-processing mechanisms that potentially underlie decisions concerning how to intervene against offences. We propose that decision rules guiding direct and indirect tactics should weigh information about the benefits of changing others' behaviour versus the costs of potential retaliation. Based on a synthesis of existing evidence, we highlight the role of situational, relational and emotional factors in motivating distinct punishment tactics. We suggest that delineating between direct and indirect tactics can inform debates about the prevalence and functions of punishment and the reputational consequences of third-party intervention against offences. We emphasize the need to study how people use reputation-based tactics for partner recalibration and partner choice, within interdependent relationships and social networks, and in daily life situations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.
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Zhang, Lei, Yan Jin, Lin Xia, Bibo Xu et Syed Mohamad Syed Abdullah. « The Effects of Social Distance and Asymmetric Reward and Punishment on Individual Cooperative Behavior in Dilemma Situations ». Frontiers in Psychology 13 (19 avril 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.816168.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The behavior decisions in social dilemmas are highlighted in sociological, economic, and social psychological studies. Across two studies, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is used as a basic paradigm to explore the effects of social distance and asymmetric reward and punishment on an individual’s cooperative behavior. Experiment 1 (N = 80) used a 2 (social distance: intimacy vs. strangeness) × 2 (symmetry of rewards: symmetric rewards vs. asymmetric rewards) within-subject design and demonstrated that when there were only two options, namely, cooperation and defection, cooperative behavior was influenced by social distance and symmetry of rewards, respectively, and the interaction was not significant. Experiment 2 (N = 80) used a 2 (social distance: intimacy vs. strangeness) × 2 (symmetry of punishment: symmetric punishment vs. asymmetric punishment) within-subject design and showed that the cooperative behavior of participants decreased when the punishment option was added, and the two levels of symmetry and asymmetry were set. Specifically, compared with the symmetric punishment group, the asymmetric punishment group was more likely to choose a defection strategy and less likely to use a punishment strategy. Moreover, there was a marginal interaction effect between social distance and symmetry of punishment, and symmetry of punishment was a significant mediator in the relationship between social distance and individual cooperation. Specifically, asymmetric punishment reduced only the cooperation rate (CR) between participants and their friends. In conclusion, in dilemma situations, asymmetric reward did not influence individual cooperative behavior at different social distances, while asymmetric punishment did, because the sense of loss was more likely to awaken an individual’s social comparison motives.
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Murase, Yohsuke, Minjae Kim et Seung Ki Baek. « Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations ». Scientific Reports 12, no 1 (10 janvier 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-04033-w.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation. Although it has been a common practice to represent reputations by binary values, either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, such a dichotomy is a crude approximation considering the complexity of reality. In this work, we studied norms with three different reputations, i.e., ‘good’, ‘neutral’, and ‘bad’. Through massive supercomputing for handling more than thirty billion possibilities, we fully identified which norms achieve cooperation and possess evolutionary stability against behavioural mutants. By systematically categorizing all these norms according to their behaviours, we found similarities and dissimilarities to their binary-reputation counterpart, the leading eight. We obtained four rules that should be satisfied by the successful norms, and the behaviour of the leading eight can be understood as a special case of these rules. A couple of norms that show counter-intuitive behaviours are also presented. We believe the findings are also useful for designing successful norms with more general reputation systems.
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Wang, Guocheng, Qi Su et Long Wang. « Evolution of cooperation with joint liability ». Journal of The Royal Society Interface 19, no 188 (mars 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2022.0082.
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‘Personal responsibility’, one of the basic principles of social governance, requires one to be accountable for what one does. However, personal responsibility is far from the only norm ruling human interactions, especially in social and economic activities. In many collective communities such as among enterprise colleagues and family members, one’s personal interests are often bound to others’—once one member breaks the rule, a group of people have to bear the punishment or sanction. Such a mechanism is termed ‘joint liability’. Although many real-world cases have evidenced that joint liability can help to maintain collective collaboration, a deep and systematic theoretical analysis on how and when it promotes cooperation remains lacking. Here, we use evolutionary game theory to model an interacting system with joint liability, where one’s losing credit could deteriorate the reputation of the whole group. We provide the analytical condition to predict when cooperation evolves and analytically prove that in the presence of punishment, being jointly liable greatly promotes cooperation. Our work stresses that joint liability is of great significance in promoting current economic prosperity.
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Santos, Fernando, Jorge Pacheco et Francisco Santos. « Indirect Reciprocity and Costly Assessment in Multiagent Systems ». Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 32, no 1 (29 avril 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v32i1.12148.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Social norms can help solving cooperation dilemmas, constituting a key ingredient in systems of indirect reciprocity (IR). Under IR, agents are associated with different reputations, whose attribution depends on socially adopted norms that judge behaviors as good or bad. While the pros and cons of having a certain public image depend on how agents learn to discriminate between reputations, the mechanisms incentivizing agents to report the outcome of their interactions remain unclear, especially when reporting involves a cost (costly reputation building). Here we develop a new model---inspired in evolutionary game theory---and show that two social norms can sustain high levels of cooperation, even if reputation building is costly. For that, agents must be able to anticipate the reporting intentions of their opponents. Cooperation depends sensitively on both the cost of reporting and the accuracy level of reporting anticipation.
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Mieth, Laura, Axel Buchner et Raoul Bell. « Cognitive load decreases cooperation and moral punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option ». Scientific Reports 11, no 1 (décembre 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-04217-4.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThe present study serves to test whether cooperation and moral punishment are affected by cognitive load. Dual-process theories postulate that moral behavior is intuitive which leads to the prediction that cooperation and moral punishment should remain unaffected or may even increase when cognitive load is induced by a secondary task. However, it has also been proposed that cognitive control and deliberation are necessary to choose an economically costly but morally justified option. A third perspective implies that the effects of cognitive load may depend on the specific processes involved in social dilemmas. In the present study, participants played a simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a punishment option. First, both players decided to cooperate or defect. Then they had the opportunity to punish the partners. In the cognitive-load group, cognitive load was induced by a continuous tone classification task while the no-load group had no distractor task. Under cognitive load, cooperation and moral punishment decreased in comparison to the no-load condition. By contrast, hypocritical and antisocial punishment were not influenced by the dual-task manipulation. Increased cognitive load was associated with a bias to punish the partners irrespective of the outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, suggesting that punishment was applied less purposefully in the cognitive-load condition. The present findings are thus in line with the idea that the availability of cognitive resources does not always have a suppressive effect on moral behaviors, but can have facilitating effects on cooperation and moral punishment.
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Van Lange, Paul A. M., et David G. Rand. « Human Cooperation and the Crises of Climate Change, COVID-19, and Misinformation ». Annual Review of Psychology 73, no 1 (2 août 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-020821-110044.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Contemporary society is facing many social dilemmas—including climate change, COVID-19, and misinformation—characterized by a conflict between short-term self-interest and longer-term collective interest. The climate crisis requires paying costs today to benefit distant others (and oneself) in the future. The COVID-19 crisis requires the less vulnerable to pay costs to benefit the more vulnerable in the face of great uncertainty. The misinformation crisis requires investing effort to assess truth and abstain from spreading attractive falsehoods. Addressing these crises requires an understanding of human cooperation. To that end, we present ( a) an overview of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation, including mechanisms based on similarity and interaction; ( b) a discussion of how reputation can incentivize cooperation via conditional cooperation and signaling; and ( c) a review of social preferences that undergird the proximate psychology of cooperation, including positive regard for others, parochialism, and egalitarianism. We discuss the three focal crises facing our society through the lens of cooperation, emphasizing how cooperation research can inform our efforts to address them. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 73 is January 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
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Gou, Zhiqiang, et Ya Li. « Prisoner’s dilemma game model Based on historical strategy information ». Scientific Reports 13, no 1 (2 janvier 2023). http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-26890-9.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractIn many dilemmas, decisions are determined not by a single factor, but by multiple ones, including memory, reputation, reward and punishment. In recent years, how to design a mechanism to promote cooperation has become a research hot-spot. However, most of the previous studies mainly consider the historical benefits of the game, and pay less attention to the stability of the strategy (the frequency of strategy changes in the length of memory) and the proportion of memory in decision-making. The decision-making process of group evolution involves the influence of memory information on cooperative evolution in multi round games. It makes up for the lack of stability factors and weights in previous studies. Based on the above factors, a new strategy update rule is proposed to study the influence of the stability of historical strategy information on the evolution of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma game, and the influence of memory weight on cooperation is considered. The stability of the current strategy is measured by the strategy in historical memory (the number of times the strategy in memory is continuous and consistent with the current strategy), which can determine the probability of an individual learning the neighbor strategy next time. Numerical simulation shows that an appropriate increase in the length of historical memory is more conducive to the emergence of cooperation, and the greater the weight of historical strategy information is, the more conducive to promoting cooperation, which shows that historical strategy information is still the main factor in decision-making. This study will help us understand the cooperative evolution of many real systems, such as nature, biology, society and so on, and effectively design reasonable mechanisms to promote cooperation.