Bibliographies thématiques / Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas

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Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas »

Auteur : Grafiati
Publié le 9 mars 2023
Mis à jour le 10 mars 2023

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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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Tan, Shaolin. « Proximity inheritance explains the evolution of cooperation under natural selection and mutation ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 286, no 1902 (mai 2019) : 20190690. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0690.

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In this paper, a mechanism called proximity inheritance is introduced in the birth–death process of a networked population involving the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Different from the traditional birth–death process, in the proposed model, players are distributed in a spatial space and offspring is distributed in the neighbourhood of its parents. That is, offspring inherits not only the strategy but also the proximity of its parents. In this coevolutionary game model, a cooperative neighbourhood gives more neighbouring cooperative offspring and a defective neighbourhood gives more neighbouring defective offspring, leading to positive feedback among cooperative interactions. It is shown that with the help of proximity inheritance, natural selection will favour cooperation over defection under various conditions, even in the presence of mutation. Furthermore, the coevolutionary dynamics could lead to self-organized substantial network clustering, which promotes an assortment of cooperative interactions. This study provides a new insight into the evolutionary mechanism of cooperation in the absence of social attributions such as reputation and punishment.
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Xiao, Erte, et Howard Kunreuther. « Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas ». Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no 4 (5 janvier 2015) : 670–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002714564426.

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Molho, Catherine, Daniel Balliet et Junhui Wu. « Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas ». Games 10, no 1 (24 février 2019) : 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010012.

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Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies involving online real-time interactions in dyads (N = 246) and four-person groups (N = 371), we manipulate power by varying individuals’ ability to distribute resources in a dictator game, and measure punishment, gossip, and cooperative behaviors in a multi-round public goods game. Findings largely replicate previous research showing that punishment and gossip opportunities increase contributions to public goods in four-person groups. However, we find no support for the hypotheses that power directly affects cooperation or the use of punishment and gossip to promote cooperation. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the influence of hierarchy and power on cooperation within dyads and groups.
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Quan, Ji, Huiting Guo et Xianjia Wang. « Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game ». Journal of Statistical Mechanics : Theory and Experiment 2022, no 7 (1 juillet 2022) : 073402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/ac7a28.

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Abstract The historical behavior of a defector in a group is usually considered in the determination of the intensity of the punishment to be applied to the defector. Because exclusion is a more severe form of punishment, we introduce a conditional punishment that allows punishers to choose between traditional punishment and exclusion. The specific form of punishment is chosen to fit the specific reputation of the defector. A good reputation garners a traditional milder punishment, such as a fine, whereas a bad reputation merits exclusion. The historical behaviors of the individuals in a group are recorded to evaluate their reputations. Those whose reputations fall below a designated threshold are regarded as bad. We study the effects of reputation thresholds, fines, enhancement factors, and exclusion costs on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games. Simulations show that higher thresholds are more conducive to the evolution of cooperation. An extremely small enhancement factor can induce individuals to cooperate when the threshold is relatively high. Cooperation also appears with smaller enhancement factors for higher fines or lower exclusion costs. These results may expand our understanding of how these two strategies of punishment promote cooperation.
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Gintis, Herbert, et Ernst Fehr. « The social structure of cooperation and punishment ». Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no 1 (31 janvier 2012) : 28–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000914.

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AbstractThe standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
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Cason, Timothy N., et Lata Gangadharan. « Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment ». Experimental Economics 18, no 1 (12 février 2014) : 66–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9393-0.

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Bosma, Esmee, et Vincent Buskens. « Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel ». Mens en maatschappij 95, no 1 (1 mars 2020) : 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/mem2020.1.003.bosm.

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Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on cooperation and on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public goods games with punishing possibilities?’ Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their cooperation and punishment behaviour. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation. We do not find an effect of trust on punishment. Further suggestions are provided for future research on how individual motivations still might affect behaviour in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.
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Santos, Miguel dos, Daniel J. Rankin et Claus Wedekind. « The evolution of punishment through reputation ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 278, no 1704 (18 août 2010) : 371–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.1275.

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Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been sufficiently explored yet in order to explain the evolution of costly punishment. Here, we first show analytically that punishment can lead to long-term benefits if it influences one's reputation and thereby makes the punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions. Then, in computer simulations, we incorporate up to 40 more complex strategies that use different kinds of reputations (e.g. from generous actions), or strategies that not only include punitive behaviours directed towards defectors but also towards cooperators for example. Our findings demonstrate that punishment can directly evolve through a simple reputation system. We conclude that reputation is crucial for the evolution of punishment by making a punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions, and that experiments investigating the beneficial effects of punishment in humans should include reputation as an explicit feature.
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Kamijo, Y., T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi et Y. Funaki. « Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas : Comparison of centralized punishment institutions ». Games and Economic Behavior 84 (mars 2014) : 180–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002.

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Duca, Stefano, et Heinrich H. Nax. « Groups and scores : the decline of cooperation ». Journal of The Royal Society Interface 15, no 144 (juillet 2018) : 20180158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0158.

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Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain cooperation in two-player prisoner's dilemmas and donation games. However, these prior studies focused on pairwise interactions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more general group interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores, proposing and testing several scoring rules that could apply to multi-player prisoners' dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady decline of cooperation for every tested scoring mechanism. All scoring systems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that the positive results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-player prisoner's dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.
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Thèses sur le sujet "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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BATISTONI, TOMMASO. « Essays on Cooperation : Scales of Interactions, Competition, Punishment ». Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/183610.

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Cooperation is evolutionarily puzzling, as it benefits others but it is individually costly. In order to explain how it can emerge and be maintained over time, therefore, a mechanism is needed for cooperation to be under positive selection. In this dissertation, tree behavioural experiments try to deepen our understanding of three well known mechanisms previously established in the literature: indirect reciprocity, between-group competition and peer-punishment. Chapter 1 expands our understanding of reputation-based indirect reciprocity as a mechanism to sustain cooperation in large groups. It explores under which conditions allowing for multiple scales of (group) interactions undermines or enables group cooperation at the larger scale via reputation-based rewards. Chapter 2 focuses on the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative behaviour. By adopting a dual-system perspective on the decision-making process and starting from the recent literature on the Social Heuristic Hypothesis, it investigates how cooperation triggered via between-group competition spills over to contexts where cooperation is not incentivized and, crucially, across group boundaries. Chapter 3 investigates the extent that prosocial third-party punishment is carried out to signal trustworthiness to potential future social partners. In particular, mirroring previous studies on the emergence of competitive altruism under partner choice, it disentangles the effect of mere observability with the effect of partner choice on the rates of punishing decisions.
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Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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Putterman, Louis. « When Punishment Supports Cooperation ». Dans Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas, 17–33. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0002.

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Nosenzo, Daniele, et Martin R. Sefton. « Promoting Cooperation ». Dans Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas, 87–114. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0006.

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Balliet, Daniel, et Paul A. M. Van Lange. « How (and When) Reward and Punishment Promote Cooperation ». Dans Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas, 34–51. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0003.

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« Cooperation and Reputation in Dynamic Networks ». Dans Computational Approaches to Studying the Co-evolution of Networks and Behavior in Social Dilemmas, 47–79. Chichester, UK : John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118762912.ch3.

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Rauhut, Heiko, et Fabian Winter. « Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment ». Dans Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, sous la direction de Ben Jann et Wojtek Przepiorka. Berlin, Boston : De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-012.

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Miltenburg, Nynke van, Vincent Buskens et Werner Raub. « Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas : The Role of Noise ». Dans Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, sous la direction de Ben Jann et Wojtek Przepiorka. Berlin, Boston : De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-016.

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Jann, Ben, et Elisabeth Coutts. « Social Status and Peer-Punishment : Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments ». Dans Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, sous la direction de Ben Jann et Wojtek Przepiorka. Berlin, Boston : De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-013.

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Snijders, Chris, Marcin Bober et Uwe Matzat. « Online Reputation in eBay Auctions : Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers ». Dans Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, sous la direction de Ben Jann et Wojtek Przepiorka. Berlin, Boston : De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-020.

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Flache, Andreas, Dieko Bakker, Michael Mäs et Jacob Dijkstra. « The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward ? » Dans Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, sous la direction de Ben Jann et Wojtek Przepiorka. Berlin, Boston : De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-014.

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Actes de conférences sur le sujet "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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Tebeanu, Ana voichita, et George florian Macarie. « ADDRESSING ETHICAL VALUES IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE. AN ESSAY ». Dans eLSE 2018. Carol I National Defence University Publishing House, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.12753/2066-026x-18-156.

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Teaching ethical aspects in the social sciences has always been a challenge, both for the professors and students involved. Ethical values and dilemmas can be presented through educational movies, examples from clinical, organizational or pedagogical practice, or even through personal disclosures offered with 'pros' and 'cons' arguments. In the past few years we took over this challenge, when conducting classes and seminaries at the disciplines "Educational Psychology" and "Foundations of Pedagogy" with first and second year students enrolled in the Teachers' Training Module, at the University "POLITEHNICA" of Bucharest. Several themes for applications (e.g., designing and conducting a social experiment; naive subjects; cooperation and empathy; obedience and authority; manipulation of external variables in a social context, e.g. a laboratory or a classroom) tackled the concept of how the moral values develop from childhood and adolescence through adulthood. For their exemplification we chose from time to time to present the series of experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram. In this classical, yet impossible to repeat nowadays experiment, he concluded that people- from various walks of life- obey either out of fear or out of a desire to appear cooperative, even when acting against their own better judgment, moral values and desires. Discussing with the students about the results of this experiment left us, almost every time, with a controversial state- students divided themselves into 'those who obey' vs. 'rebels', with some of them situating in between ("obeyed but blames themselves') (exactly as the participants in the original experiments!) In the long run, due to this extraordinary reaction we had from our students, these applications used for educational purpose became more complex. Thus, we translated a topic for an essay used by us in a Master of Bioethics program in the USA (2014-2015) and we reframed it for educational purpose. The topic refers to "Death and dying" and presents 6 types of killing which are legally sanctioned in the United States, including, for example, killing in self-defence or the capital punishment. The initial task we had in the Master program was, leaving legality aside and focusing only on morality, to rank each six of the categories in order--most immoral (#1) to least immoral (#6) according to our personal values. In doing so, we were also asked to provide a moral argument to justifying our ranking. Also, we were told that for the purposes of this essay, religious or legal arguments are not acceptable. This essay presents in extenso a personal exemplification of a possible ranking of these categories, the results of the exercise performed with the students, and proposes furthermore an educational framework- ready to be used by them. Thus, we hope to offer a relevant and actual application for teaching ethical issues in an university setting, which goes beyond a mere description of theoretical concepts and provides ethical tools for understanding the social life.
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Rapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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Xiao, Erte, et Howard Kunreuther. Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, octobre 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18458.

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