Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Cooperation in »

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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Cooperation in"

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Melbinger, Anna, Jonas Cremer et Erwin Frey. « The emergence of cooperation from a single mutant during microbial life cycles ». Journal of The Royal Society Interface 12, no 108 (juillet 2015) : 20150171. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2015.0171.

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Cooperative behaviour is widespread in nature, even though cooperating individuals always run the risk of being exploited by free-riders. Population structure effectively promotes cooperation given that a threshold in the level of cooperation was already reached. However, the question how cooperation can emerge from a single mutant, which cannot rely on a benefit provided by other cooperators, is still puzzling. Here, we investigate this question for a well-defined but generic situation based on typical life cycles of microbial populations where individuals regularly form new colonies followed by growth phases. We analyse two evolutionary mechanisms favouring cooperative behaviour and study their strength depending on the inoculation size and the length of a life cycle. In particular, we find that population bottlenecks followed by exponential growth phases strongly increase the survival and fixation probabilities of a single cooperator in a free-riding population.
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Tang, Zhipeng, Anfeng Liu, Zhetao Li, Young-june Choi, Hiroo Sekiya et Jie Li. « A Trust-Based Model for Security Cooperating in Vehicular Cloud Computing ». Mobile Information Systems 2016 (2016) : 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/9083608.

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VCC is a computing paradigm which consists of vehicles cooperating with each other to realize a lot of practical applications, such as delivering packages. Security cooperation is a fundamental research topic in Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC). Because of the existence of malicious vehicles, the security cooperation has become a challenging issue in VCC. In this paper, a trust-based model for security cooperating, named DBTEC, is proposed to promote vehicles’ security cooperation in VCC. DBTEC combines the indirect trust estimation in Public board and the direct trust estimation in Private board to compute the trust value of vehicles when choosing cooperative partners; a trustworthy cooperation path generating scheme is proposed to ensure the safety of cooperation and increase the cooperation completion rates in VCC. Extensive experiments show that our scheme improves the overall cooperation completion rates by 6~7%.
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Obermaier, Robert, et Andreas Busch. « The impact of different types of interorganizational co-operation on shareholder value – the case of Germany ». Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no 4 (2009) : 542–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i4sip5.

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This event study analyses stock market reactions of 621 adhoc notifications announcing interorganizational cooperative agreements issued by stock listed German firms between 1999 and 2007. Besides testing the general relationship between ad hoc notifications of interorganizational cooperations and stock market response this study is the first one analyzing different institutional types of cooperational agreements for the German stock market. The announcement cooperational agreements results in significant positive mean abnormal returns. Surprisingly, announcements of contractual partnerships yield the highest abnormal returns compared to alternative forms combined with equity stakes. Obviously, shareholders do not necessarily relate better control of interorganizational cooperation to ownership.
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Cahour, Beatrice, et Pascal Salembier. « Cooperation and cooperator modeling ». Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) 5, no 2-3 (1996) : 285–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00133660.

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Bruger, Eric, et Christopher Waters. « Sharing the sandbox : Evolutionary mechanisms that maintain bacterial cooperation ». F1000Research 4 (23 décembre 2015) : 1504. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.7363.1.

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Microbes are now known to participate in an extensive repertoire of cooperative behaviors such as biofilm formation, production of extracellular public-goods, group motility, and higher-ordered multicellular structures. A fundamental question is how these cooperative tasks are maintained in the face of non-cooperating defector cells. Recently, a number of molecular mechanisms including facultative participation, spatial sorting, and policing have been discovered to stabilize cooperation. Often these different mechanisms work in concert to reinforce cooperation. In this review, we describe bacterial cooperation and the current understanding of the molecular mechanisms that maintain it.
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dos Santos, Miguel, et Stuart A. West. « The coevolution of cooperation and cognition in humans ». Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 285, no 1879 (30 mai 2018) : 20180723. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.0723.

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Cooperative behaviours in archaic hunter–gatherers could have been maintained partly due to the gains from cooperation being shared with kin. However, the question arises as to how cooperation was maintained after early humans transitioned to larger groups of unrelated individuals. We hypothesize that after cooperation had evolved via benefits to kin, the consecutive evolution of cognition increased the returns from cooperating, to the point where benefits to self were sufficient for cooperation to remain stable when group size increased and relatedness decreased. We investigate the theoretical plausibility of this hypothesis, with both analytical modelling and simulations. We examine situations where cognition either (i) increases the benefits of cooperation, (ii) leads to synergistic benefits between cognitively enhanced cooperators, (iii) allows the exploitation of less intelligent partners, and (iv) the combination of these effects. We find that cooperation and cognition can coevolve—cooperation initially evolves, favouring enhanced cognition, which favours enhanced cooperation, and stabilizes cooperation against a drop in relatedness. These results suggest that enhanced cognition could have transformed the nature of cooperative dilemmas faced by early humans, thereby explaining the maintenance of cooperation between unrelated partners.
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Shu, Sheng, Li Min Jia et Ben Wu Nie. « Research on Mechanism between Government and Enterprise under BT Turnkey Model : A Cooperative Game Model ». Advanced Materials Research 971-973 (juin 2014) : 2372–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.971-973.2372.

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According to the basic theories of project management, this paper analyses the condition in a situation that government and enterprise enter into cooperation under non-completely benefit. With cooperation mechanism under non-completely benefit's subject, this paper explains respectively cooperative course mechanism, utility shifts the mechanism and consult the mechanism. We use the game model to analyze cooperative course mechanism, utility shifts the mechanism and consult the mechanism. The game model has explained the interests relation under the condition of cooperating with government and enterprise. Under this kind of state, the cooperation is the win-win to both sides. This cooperation mechanism can solve effectively the problem of risk sharing on the project.
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Watt, Helen. « Complicity or Justified Cooperation in Evil ? » National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 21, no 2 (2021) : 209–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ncbq202121222.

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Cooperation in wrongdoing is an everyday matter for all of us, though we need to discern when such cooperation is morally excluded as constituting formal cooperation, as opposed to material (unintended) cooperation whether justified or otherwise. In this paper, I offer examples of formal cooperation such as referral of patients for certain procedures where the cooperating doctor intends an intrinsically wrongful plan of action on the part of the patient and a medical colleague. I also consider a case of formal cooperation where the cooperator intends a choice on the part of another person that is not intrinsically wrong, but wrong in the circumstances because the person believes it will cause serious uncompensated harm.
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McAuliffe, Katherine, Richard Wrangham, Luke Glowacki et Andrew F. Russell. « When cooperation begets cooperation : the role of key individuals in galvanizing support ». Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences 370, no 1683 (5 décembre 2015) : 20150012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0012.

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Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors ( key individuals ) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in—and provide testable hypotheses of—two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuals vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation?
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Zhao, Xing Hong, Liang Zhao et Jie Xu. « Review of Groups-Robot Cooperation System Research Basing on Swarm Intelligence ». Applied Mechanics and Materials 80-81 (juillet 2011) : 1350–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.80-81.1350.

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Swarm intelligence has been the new method to resolve traditional structure optimization problem. Group cooperative system composed by individual robots will complete task which individual robot cannot do by coordinating each other and cooperating mutually. From worldwide advances in the researches of groups-robot cooperation system and typical groups-robot cooperation system, we can see meta trends of researches into groups-robot cooperation system and difficulties restrict development and translation to utility system of groups-robot cooperation system. The future coming burning issue will be how to build up the groups-robot cooperation system of higher robustness and adaptability in the face of the true environment with characteristics of unstructured and dynamic.
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Thèses sur le sujet "Cooperation in"

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Tashkandy, Anas Saleh. « Cooperation among university libraries in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries : proposals for effective cooperative programmes ». Thesis, Loughborough University, 1992. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/7206.

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The aim of this research is to examine the current situation of university libraries in the GCC countries identifying the problems and difficulties being faced by them and suggest means and ways by which an effective library cooperation may solve these problems. A general description of library cooperation is given, including that in developing countries and in the Arab world. Apart from literature sources the material for this research was obtained by questionnaire, personal visits to university libraries and some related research institutions in the countries concerned and by some personal observations and experience. The development of library and information services in general in the CCC countries is examined, but particularly various features of university libraries, from administration to user services. University library resources, technical services, and existing cooperative activities are also discussed in detail. There are some major issues which are related to library cooperation such as financial resources, adequacy of library collections, collection development practices, uniform standards of technical processing of library materials, availability of bibliographical apparatus and experienced professional manpower. The analysis of these issues brought out factors which should motivate individual libraries to engage in a library cooperation and resource sharing network. There is no practical or well organised resource sharing programme among university libraries in the GCC countries, even the existing marginal activities are not satisfactory to all university libraries concerned. This is mainly due to the absence of a well organised central agency which should take the lead to implement a well developed cooperative model for library cooperation in the region. The various professional meetings which have been organised at a regional level emphasised the importance of establishing effective cooperative links among university libraries in the Gulf region, but little implementation of these proposals have resulted so far. With the current political situation in the Gulf region and with the limitation on financial resources, the need for effective library cooperation is emphasised now more than ever before. Therefore, this research makes some practical recommendations emphasising the need for a central agency responsible for library cooperation programmes and proposing a model for an effective resource sharing network among university libraries in the GCC countries in the hope of improving the existing situation.
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Luistro, Jonsson Marijane. « Cooperating for Sustainability : Experiments on Uncertainty, Conditional Cooperation and Inequality ». Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Institutionen för Marknadsföring och strategi, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-2335.

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In recent years, the call for business actors to be part of collaborations addressing sustainable development has become more common. There is a consensus that no single sector alone can solve the environmental problems and poverty conditions challenging humanity. However, it is not clear if these cross-sector collaborations thrive when disasters can strike any time and when some actors are richer than others. Through a series of experiments involving threshold public goods games with stochastic shocks, this dissertation contains three related papers exploring different facets of the persistence of cooperation. The experiments were conducted in Sweden, the Philippines and South Africa, countries with varying disaster risk exposures and income structures. Cooperation in the face of disaster explores the effects of different types of uncertainties on cooperation, particularly when there is a risk for repeated disasters (i.e. losses resulting from inadequate cooperation). The results show that cooperation persists when we do not know when disasters may strike (i.e. timing), as well as when there are uncertainties on what is required to avoid the disaster (i.e. threshold) and which losses will be incurred (i.e. impact). Conditional cooperation and disaster uncertainty explores the mechanism behind the persistence of cooperation, as it investigates if conditionality continues to prevail in the face of disaster. The findings show that conditionality and free-riding attenuates while unconditional cooperation accelerates. Cooperating in an unequal and uncertain world explores what happens when inequality enters the picture. The findings reveal that cooperation remains the same when there is inequality and increases in the presence of uncertainty. The effect of uncertainty is stronger than inequality, with high unconditional cooperation and low freeriding.

Diss. Stockholm :  Stockholm School of Economics, 2015

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Chen, Hongxin. « Cooperative performance : factors affecting the performance of international technological cooperation ». Thesis, University of Manchester, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.488313.

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Berndtsson, Mikael. « Active capability support for cooperation strategies in cooperative information systems ». Thesis, University of Exeter, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.244974.

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Lin, Guan-Yu Laffey James M. « The effects of cooperation scripts and technology implementation on cooperative learning ». Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/5969.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007.
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on December 27, 2007) Includes bibliographical references.
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Hanley, James E. « The role of non-cooperative games in the evolution of cooperation / ». view abstract or download file of text, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9986740.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2000.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-123). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Pommerenke, Kay. « Cooperation with rivals / ». Diss., Digital Dissertations Database. Restricted to UC campuses, 2005. http://uclibs.org/PID/11984.

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Riewe, Gerhard. « Institutions in cooperation ». Diss., Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2013. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-162518.

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Rosenberg, Duska. « Design for cooperation ». Thesis, Brunel University, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.385800.

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Harris, Alexander Nicholas Edward. « Preferences and cooperation ». Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2019. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/287933.

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Chapter 1: Evolution of reciprocator preferences when agents can pay for information. A benchmark result in the evolutionary games literature is that a preference for reciprocity will evolve if preferences are observable (at zero cost), since reciprocators can cooperate with each other rather than with materialists, thereby achieving a fitness advantage. I investigate how a preference for reciprocity evolves if individuals can observe an opponent's preferences only by bearing a fitness cost. My main result applies when observing an opponent's type is cheap, but cooperating only gives a modest fitness advantage or the preference for reciprocity is intense. In this case, a preference for reciprocity cannot evolve from a small starting share in the mix of preferences, even if discovering an opponent's preferences is arbitrarily cheap. This is in sharp contrast to the benchmark result. Chapter 2: A theory of conditional cooperation on networks (with Julien Gagnon) Chapter 2 is a study of reciprocity on social networks. We model a group of connected agents who play a one-shot public good game. Some players are materialists and others are reciprocators. We characterise the maximal Nash equilibrium (ME) of this game for any network and a broad class of reciprocal preferences. At the ME, a novel concept, the q-linked set, fully determines the set of players who contribute. We show that influential players are those connected to players who are sufficiently interconnected, but not too much. Finally, we study the decision of a planner faced with an uncertain type profile who designs the network to maximise expected contributions. The ex ante optimal network comprises isolated cliques of degree k*, with k* decreasing with the incidence of materialists. We discuss an important application of our results: the workplace. Chapter 3: Ideological games Chapter 3 is a theory of ideology. I define a preference type to be a set of first-order preferences over the outcomes of a `game of life', together with a set of (`meta-') preferences over all players' first-order preferences. Players can influence each other's preferences via costly investment: if player A invests and B does not, B's preferences becomes those of A. Players may invest for instrumental reasons (i.e. to achieve better outcomes in the game of life) or `ideological' reasons (i.e. they want their opponents to have the same preferences they do). I characterise `strongly ideological', `weakly ideological' and `pragmatic' types. Weakly ideological types wish to preserve their own type, as do strongly ideological types, who also seek to convert others. A pragmatic player, in contrast, is willing to have her type changed if her new type would prefer the resulting equilibrium of the game of life to the status quo. I show that if two players of different ideological types meet, there is an equilibrium investment profile with lower aggregate welfare than the no-invest profile. If at least one type is strongly ideological, there is a unique such equilibrium. Finally, a `perfectly ideological' type is a strongly ideological type which, if held by all players, results in the best outcome of the game of life as judged by that type. If a perfectly ideological player plays a pragmatic player, aggregate welfare is always greater than in the no-invest profile.
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Livres sur le sujet "Cooperation in"

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Mareš, Milan. Fuzzy cooperative games : Cooperation with vague expectations. Heidelberg : Physica-Verlag, 2001.

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Tuomela, Raimo. Cooperation. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0.

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Marker, Sherry. Cooperation. New York : Rosen Pub. Group, 1991.

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Riehecky, Janet. Cooperation. Elgin, Ill : Child's World, 1990.

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Riehecky, Janet. Cooperation. Mankato, Minn : Capstone Press, 2005.

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Pryor, Kimberley Jane. Cooperation. New York : Marshall Cavendish Benchmark, 2008.

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Raatma, Lucia. Cooperation. Mankato, Minn : Bridgestone Books, 2000.

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Figueiredo, Osorio Santana. Cooperativa Rural Gabrielense Ltda. : 50 anos na história : as Charqueadas Gabrielenses. São Gabriel : CORUGAL, 1985.

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Amri, A. B. M. Al. The Gulf Cooperation Council : Integration or cooperation. Salford : University of Salford, 1989.

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Kumar, Lal Chand. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation : Eurasian security through cooperation. Kolkata : Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 2010.

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Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Cooperation in"

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Cooperation and Cooperative Game Theory ». Dans Cooperation, 195–211. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_7.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Introducing Social Action and Cooperation ». Dans Cooperation, 1–25. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_1.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Cooperation and the Dilemma of Collective Action ». Dans Cooperation, 256–97. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_10.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Rational Cooperation and Collective Reasons ». Dans Cooperation, 298–340. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_11.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Long-Term Cooperation ». Dans Cooperation, 341–67. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_12.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Conclusion ». Dans Cooperation, 368–79. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_13.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Collective and Joint Goals ». Dans Cooperation, 26–71. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_2.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Cooperative Joint Action ». Dans Cooperation, 72–107. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_3.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Cooperation and Collective Goals ». Dans Cooperation, 108–40. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_4.

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Tuomela, Raimo. « Cooperation, Practical Reasoning, and Communication ». Dans Cooperation, 141–64. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9594-0_5.

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Actes de conférences sur le sujet "Cooperation in"

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Li, Guoxin, et Deepak Mishra. « Cooperative NOMA Networks : User Cooperation or Relay Cooperation ? » Dans ICC 2020 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc40277.2020.9148973.

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Raewf, Manaf, Yazen Mahmood et Ali Jaafar. « The Influencing Factors on the Employees' Cooperation of Private Sector ». Dans 3rd International Conference on Administrative & Financial Sciences. Cihan University - Erbil, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24086/afs2020/paper.139.

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This paper focuses on the importance of the employees' cooperation at any workplace, and how the cooperation effects on making a successful or failure organization by examining the relationship between the influencing factors and employees' cooperation, providing recommendations for organization managers, and presenting a theoretical background of the influencing factors and employees' cooperation. The statistical package for social science (SPSS) was used to analyze the data which are obtained from the distributed questioner for 30 employees of Alen Company in Erbil. The researchers conclude that the existence of the team spirit and cooperative leadership help in implementing a cooperative management by the staff even if it is in certain level, and they recommend to the need of strengthening the power and facilities of staff in the term of managing and authority and increasing the cooperative behavior among the staff and the management in term of issues that relate to organization's management.
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Flormann, Maximilian, et Roman Henze. « Graph based Cooperation Strategies for Automated Vehicles in Mixed Traffic ». Dans 2024 Stuttgart International Symposium. 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA, United States : SAE International, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.4271/2024-01-2982.

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<div class="section abstract"><div class="htmlview paragraph">In the context of urban smart mobility, vehicles have to communicate with each other, surrounding infrastructure, and other traffic participants. By using Vehicle2X communication, it is possible to exchange the vehicles’ position, driving dynamics data, or driving intention. This concept yields the use for cooperative driving in urban environments. Based on current V2X-communication standards, a methodology for cooperative driving of automated vehicles in mixed traffic scenarios is presented. Initially, all communication participants communicate their dynamic data and planned trajectory, based on which a prioritization is calculated. Therefore, a decentralized cooperation algorithm is introduced. The approach of this algorithm is that every traffic scenario is translatable to a directed graph, based in which a solution for the cooperation problem is computed via an optimization algorithm. This solution is either computed decentralized by various traffic participants, who share and compare their solutions in order to get an optimal one, or centralized by a single computation unit, such as smart infrastructure systems. The cooperation participants negotiate the cooperative driving maneuver via a chain like validation approach, since the communication protocol does not require any handshake by design. Finally, all cooperation participants carry out the optimized and negotiated cooperative driving maneuver. The presented algorithm is validated in a multi-vehicle simulation. Different optimization heuristics are compared, ranging from traditional approaches to machine learning algorithms. The methods' behavior with regard to increasing model complexities is evaluated based on a representative catalogue of scenarios. Finally, the algorithm is validated in a real world proving ground test. These validations show that the introduced methodology provides significantly more efficient cooperation strategies compared to traditional, infrastructure-controlled approaches. Additionally, the presented approach is conflict-free by design.</div></div>
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Chen, Yiling, Biaoshuai Tao et Fang-Yi Yu. « Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions ». Dans Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/15.

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When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where heterogeneous agents make binary participation decisions on contributing their endowments, and the public project succeeds when it has enough contributions. We prove it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a cooperative Nash equilibrium such that the project succeeds. We demonstrate that the decision problem becomes easy if agents are homogeneous enough. We then propose two algorithms to help cooperation in the game. Our first algorithm adds an external investment to the public project, and our second algorithm uses matching funds. We show the cost to induce a cooperative Nash equilibrium is near-optimal for both algorithms. Finally, the cost of matching funds can always be smaller than the cost of adding an external investment. Intuitively, matching funds provide a greater incentive for cooperation than adding an external investment does.
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Dong, Hongzhao. « Fractal-Agent Based Cooperation Style of Industrial Alliance ». Dans ASME 2005 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. ASMEDC, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2005-84357.

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Internet technology provides a convenient and low-cost platform for the cooperation among two or more manufacturers. Industrial alliance is a networked cooperative enterprise group linked by the similar product and technology relying on such an Internet platform coupled with supporting cooperation system. However, with increasing bulkiness and complexity of the cooperation system, it is a significant issue in industrial alliance to simplify the cooperation style among these manufacturers. The hierarchical industrial alliance is always classified into alliance level, enterprises level and departments level. Based on the self-similarity principle of fractal, the paper analyzes the similarity concerning both function structure and workflow of the industrial alliance. To describe these self-similar organizations at different levels while developing information system, fractal-agent theory is raised here. Moreover, based on the fractal-agent theory, a new cooperation style of industrial alliance is put forward, by which a cooperation pool of fractal-agents and the multi-level nested dynamic sub-alliance can be established to simplify their cooperation activities. It’s practically proved that the technology can efficiently enable the industrial alliance to fulfill rapid reconfiguration.
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Pu, Jyun-Wei, Chih-Peng Li, Tsang-Yi Wang et Hsueh-Jyh Li. « Selective cooperation in dual-hop cooperative networks ». Dans 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Broadband Multimedia Systems and Broadcasting (BMSB). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/bmsb.2014.6873517.

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« Cooperation ». Dans 2009 Pan American Health Care Exchanges. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pahce.2009.5158342.

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« Cooperation ». Dans 2010 Pan American Health Care Exchanges (PAHCE 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pahce.2010.5474562.

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Ze'evi, Tal, Roie Zivan et Omer Lev. « Socially Motivated Partial Cooperation in Multi-agent Local Search ». Dans Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California : International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/81.

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Partial Cooperation is a paradigm and a corresponding model, proposed to represent multi-agent systems in which agents are willing to cooperate to achieve a global goal, as long as some minimal threshold on their personal utility is satisfied. Distributed local search algorithms were proposed in order to solve asymmetric distributed constraint optimization problems (ADCOPs) in which agents are partially cooperative. We contribute by: 1) extending the partial cooperative model to allow it to represent dynamic cooperation intentions, affected by changes in agents’ wealth, in accordance with social studies literature. 2) proposing a novel local search algorithm in which agents receive indications of others’ preferences on their actions and thus, can perform actions that are socially beneficial. Our empirical study reveals the advantage of the proposed algorithm in multiple benchmarks. Specifically, on realistic meeting scheduling problems it overcomes limitations of standard local search algorithms.
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Frese, Christian, Jurgen Beyerer et Peter Zimmer. « Cooperation of Cars and Formation of Cooperative Groups ». Dans 2007 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ivs.2007.4290119.

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Rapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Cooperation in"

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Kaminiski, Paul G. Transatlantic Armament Cooperation. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, avril 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada340764.

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McGaha, Pamela L. Global Reserve Cooperation. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, mars 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada547455.

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Avis, Rupert. South-south Cooperation. Institute of Development Studies, juillet 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2022.133.

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This rapid literature review collates available literature on South-South cooperation (SSC) (including the origins of the concept and how is it explained by different developing countries). It draws on a diverse range of sources including academic and grey literature. Given the breadth of debates regarding SSC, this review should be considered as indicative of broad narratives. SSC, both the theoretical notion and its practical application, is a commonly accepted component in discussions of international development policy. However straight forward the concept of SSC might appear, the term is not without ambiguity and many commentators highlight that there is no agreed definition. SSC is broadly understood as the transfer and exchange of resources, technologies and knowledge between developing countries and has grown exponentially in recent years as a result of the increased engagement of ‘new’ or ‘(re)emerging’ development cooperation ‘providers’ from the South. However, the notion of SSC is neither new nor static, rather it has evolved in response to global developments.
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Bauer, Michal, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel et Tamar Mitts. Can War Foster Cooperation ? Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, juin 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22312.

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Kaminski, Paul G. Defense Trade and Cooperation. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, mai 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada340177.

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Kaminski, Paul G. Horizons in Armaments Cooperation,. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, mars 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada340879.

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Renzi, Jr, et Alfred E. The Military Cooperation Group. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, décembre 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada462633.

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Liang, Guanfeng, et Nitin Vaidya. Cooperation Helps Power Saving. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, avril 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada555080.

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Alsiri, Faisal M. Gulf Cooperation Council : Arabian Gulf Cooperation Continues Defense Forces (Peninsula Shield Force). Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, mai 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada623449.

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Moor, Donald B. Iran : Theatre Security Cooperation Plan. Fort Belvoir, VA : Defense Technical Information Center, avril 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada484358.

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