Articles de revues sur le sujet « Constitutional law – Kosovo »

This article analyzes the constitutional provisions and practices of the Kosovar process of forming a government in two scenarios: after a parliamentary election, and after a motion of no confidence. The factors that most prominently complicate this process are the proportional electoral system, extreme party pluralism, and ambiguous constitutional provisions. Leaving aside the first two factors, which have thus far resisted efforts to change them, the authors claim that the constitutional law dealing with the government-formation process has undergone both procedural and substantive changes as a result of interpretations and decisions by the Constitutional Court. The authors further note that these changes are constitutional constructions, rather than constitutional interpretations, and describe the novel, resultant practice as legitimized without amendment. These constitutional interpretations and constructions, their possible alternatives, and the relevant constitutional provisions are analyzed through doctrinal legal research. That constitutional judgments can be reinterpreted and abused by interim, and office-seeking (rather than policy-seeking) political coalitions seems a condition poised to engender future instability; therefore, the authors hold that the amendment of the constitution is the best insurance against political and constitutional crises when it comes to forming a government, either after elections or with the same legislature. The authors hope that this paper will contribute to the enrichment of the constitutional practice of forming parliamentary governments and the development of the doctrine of constitutional interpretation.

Abstract The year 1989 marked the return of the right to self-determination to center stage in constitutional politics. It was at the root of demands for constitutional democracy; it was also invoked by minority nations to make claims for secession and independent states. That year also marked the emergence of a new model of “post-sovereign” constitution-making that rejects the idea of a sovereign people who can act unilaterally with unlimited power. While this new model was developed in the context of transitions to constitutional democracy, before and after 1989, minority nations have relied on the unilateral declaration of independence as a foundational act of constitution-making, which is firmly rooted in the pre-1989 sovereign mindset. Drawing on the example of the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in the Quebec Secession Reference, I sketch how we might complete the legacy of 1989 by extending the project of post-sovereign constitution-making to secession.

This article examines implementation of the peace settlement compromises translated into constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia. The three countries struggle with their violent past, loss of interethnic trust and political fragmentation. Consequently, the implementation of peace settlement compromises that are translated into constitutional arrangements is hampered. Through analyses of constitutional jurisprudence in three countries this study provides further insights into the effectiveness and enforcement of the constitutional choices in practice. The article concludes that international supporters in the process of negotiation of peace settlements need to revisit the international assistance in constitution-making as a part of peacebuilding projects through the lens of constitutional review practices.

The authors will point out some possible models for solving an extremely complex problem, which for decades has been an open issue for which, without much success, a mutually acceptable solution is being sought – Kosovo and Metohija. The paper analyzes three possible options, with different intensity of relations between the Republic of Serbia and so called Kosovo. In the first case, which implies the strongest relationship between Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija, this issue could be resolved by passing a law on substantial autonomy (with changes to certain constitutional provisions) which would formally assign all the competencies now available in the province, while the other two models do not imply the adoption of such a law, so it could be done exclusively by changing the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. In none of the proposed models, the so-called Kosovo would not have full international legal subjectivity, Serbia would not recognize Kosovo’s self-proclaimed independence, nor could so-called Kosovo become a member of the United Nations, and there would be no Kosovo Army. The province would have internal sovereignty.

The aim of this case study is to analyze the protection of the rights of the defendant in criminal proceedings and the implementation of international standards on the rights of the defendant in criminal proceedings in the domestic law of the Republic of Kosovo. This paper will focus on the role of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo in protecting the rights of the defendant during a criminal process, based on specific cases decided by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. For more than ten years since the Declaration of its Independence, Kosovo has established a legal system, which provides effective protection for the rights of a defendant. A significant role in this regard was played by the fact that Kosovo directly applies the jurisprudence of the International Court on Human Rights (ECtHR), as a constitutional obligation. Out of all institutions of the legal system in Kosovo, which are obliged to protect the rights of defendants, a determinant role was played by the Constitutional Court in such regards, therefore, this paper presents arguments how the Constitutional Court of Kosovo has become a guardian for protection of the rights of defendants, in compliance with the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the “ICJ”) delivered its advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. The ICJ concluded that the declaration of independence dated 17 February 2008 did not violate any applicable rule of international law consisting of general international law, UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) (hereinafter the “Resolution 1244”) and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (hereinafter the “Constitutional Framework”). The ICJ delivered the advisory opinion in response to a question set out in resolution 63/3 dated 8 October 2008 of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (hereinafter the “General Assembly”), which asked if “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law.”

On 15 May 2001 the Head of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (‘UNMIK’) signed into law Regulation 2001/9 establishing a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. The document creates a provisional institutional framework for the exercise of public authority by Kosovo's institutions of self-government during the territory's administration under United Nations rule. UNMIK delegates important parts of its responsibilities in the legislative, executive and judicial field to the local institutions envisaged in the document. At the same time, however, crucial areas remain under the direct authority of the United Nations administration. This article examines the modifications brought about by the Constitutional Framework by discussing the legal nature and the contents of the document in the light of the various legal instruments governing Kosovo's institutional system throughout the last thirty years and previous international practice in the field of state-building and territorial reconstruction.

AbstractThis paper discusses the transfer of judicial sovereignty in Kosovo from a comparative perspective. In particular, it addresses the transfer of constitutional jurisdiction to the Special Court of Kosovo. This court was formed as a result of Kosovo’s commitment to address allegations made by the Council of Europe in a document known as the Dick Marty report. The report alleges that war crimes and crimes against humanity and international law were committed during and in the aftermath of the Kosovo war (1998–1999). It took several years for the Court to be formed as constitutional amendments, legal infrastructure, and other practical steps were needed to make the Court operational. These preparatory measures have been taken, but practical results are missing, and there is fear that the Court might end up like previous UN- and EU-led justice systems, which did too little and were too late to address the culture of impunity in Kosovo.

This paper examines both the process of, and the constitutional and legal dilemmas in, forming the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo. The association, which aims to be established and has emerged as a demand of Kosovo Serbs, has caused a lot of trouble to the government in establishing it. This paper presents these difficulties and how they commenced. It is shown at the outset that in 2013, Kosovo assumed an international and constitutional obligation to establish this Association. A long time has passed since that year and the association is not established even to this day. The paper shows that this passivity was further cemented by a decision of the Constitutional Court which, instead of explaining the way in which it was formed and competencies used a strange and dubious language. In this paper, however, it is clearly shown that the formation of the Association is an international obligation that Kosovo must fulfill. It is further noted that there is a risk that its formation will take place in a format other than the one envisaged in 2015 as a result of the delay on the side of the Kosovo party. The paper also seeks to point out a deficiency of this entity, which has to do with the fact that the drafting of legal texts on its establishment did not involve local Serbs at all, to whom the Association is supposedly dedicated.

SummaryThe article examines the constitutional position of the president of republic in the view of the appointment procedure established in Hamiti et al and Derguti et al. Both constitutional court decisions have construed a rhetorical interpretation of the expected role of the president of republic as representative of the unity of the people in a constitutional nutshell. The article questions both decisions’ structural rationality and legitimacy in what is likely a tough political controversy requiring two-third majority for the appointment of the president of republic in the first two rounds. To better designate the logic upon which the court relied when ruling in the two decisions, the article considers relevant comparative literature and case-law to channel the analysis. The article concludes that though the court demonstrated a rather activist tone in interpreting the procedure for the appointment of the president of republic, it also showed quite unprecedented willingness to constitutionally empower the position of the president of republic on basis of appointment-related preconditions.

On February 17, 2008 Kosovo declared independence. The foundation for the creation of the Republic of Kosovo was the international community, which created the legal framework for the future statehood of Kosovo. The concept developed in the Athisari Plan of making the Judicial Council the guarantor of judicial autonomy and independence of judges was also a kind of anticipation of the subsequent fundamental changes in the system, introduced under the 2008 Constitution. This article attempts to analyze the systemic position of the Kosovo Judicial Council in the state system formed under the 2008 Constitution. It presents the composition of the Council, the procedure for the appointment of its members and the principles of its organization and functioning. The solution adopted in the Kosovo Basic Law is in line with the widely understood Southern European organizational model of judicial councils.

AbstractUsing Kosovo and its constitutional jurisprudence as a case study, this paper discusses the role of constitutional courts as agents for implementing a democratic project on behalf of the sovereign as the principal. It discusses that role primarily from the point of view of the court’s functional intervention in improving the behaviour of the three branches of government. The paper begins by unveiling the historical development of constitutional justice, with as its focus the concept of new constitutionalism and the European/Kelsenian model encountered in Kosovo. It discusses too the theories of delegation of power, the contractual relationship, and trust between sovereigns and constitutional adjudicators in the context of subjects connected with this article. To present scenarios where the court manifests itself as a negative legislator, a positive legislator, and as an influencer of attitudes, the article includes convincing illustrations from both legal theory and case-law.

Abstract In August 2015 the Assembly of Kosovo, following an international request, passed constitutional amendments and the Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office [‘the Law’], marking the legal foundation of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (‘the Specialist Chambers’). However, what has sparked widespread reaction in Kosovo is the narrow jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers. Therefore, this article argues first that the Specialist Chambers have mono-ethnic jurisdiction, being charged with investigating and prosecuting only one warring party and effectively granting an amnesty to the other. Next it will be argued that the current jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers ought to be extended to cover all mass atrocities committed during and after the Kosovo war by all warring parties. Finally, the article briefly discusses the indictment against the President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, and others vis-á-vis the rejection of the main allegation of the Marty Report, on organ trafficking.

AbstractConstitutional courts play an essential role in authoritatively interpreting constitutions. Oftentimes they go beyond the constitutional text by inventing so-called judge-made law. Their authority to interpret the text covers not only substantive parts but also the clause authorizing their jurisdiction. Such power, namely the power to interpret the limits of their jurisdiction, is often used to intervene in the interpretation of the constitution more vigorously than explicitly authorized. One example is the invention, designation, and development of the advisory jurisdiction by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. On that basis, the Court has, for almost ten years of its existence, pronounced on numerous fundamental issues relating to the governing system, power maps, and entitlements on political authority. The Court developed its advisory jurisdiction in a rather unpredictable and impulsive fashion; however, it steadily revealed its willingness to engage with interpretations that sought to resolve high-stakes issues. Such braveness also had a credibility cost for the Court. The year 2018 marked a major shift in the Court’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction to “advise.” In the Central Election Commission case, it abandoned its previous precedent and commenced a passive, restrained attitude in engaging with the constitutional interpretation on the basis of case or controversy. This Article analyzes the Court’s path and change of course in this cycle.

Abstract The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) manifest the first effort of the European Union to participate in an international criminal law project by running a hybrid criminal tribunal, vested with jurisdiction to investigate the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Marty Report. The KSC is entrusted with a mandate originating in a number of legal instruments. A “termination clause” is also present in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The Specialist Constitutional Chamber has recently ruled on an amendment discreetly activating the termination of the KSC. The Chamber’s decision outlawing “the amendment” manifests an attempt to reinforce the constitutive nature of the EU’s proprietorship over the KSC, attaching to it an international personality detached from that of Kosovo. The decision contends that the “power to dissolve” the KSC is basically vested with the EU, and Kosovo’s internal law cannot affect that relationship unilaterally. The article argues that the strong adherence of the Chamber’s decision on fundamental rights is an attempt to expose the victim-rights-centered mission of the KSC, clearly leaning towards a legitimacy rather than a legalistic exercise. The article concludes that the decision will have ample effect on the EU’s responsibility over the KSC, the nature of the “power to dissolve”, and the KSC’s mission in the European fundamental rights landscape in general.

In the most general sense, the mission of the local administration or local government is to "ensure governance at the level closest to citizens". Knowing that local government has an important role in the functioning of the state and of law, the local governance in the political system in most countries is primarily seen in its relations with the central government.If the historic point of view is taken into account, the development of local government in Kosovo has a tradition of two centuries. If the Constitution of the Ottoman Empire of 1876 is reviewed, it shows the pyramid of organization of local government in Kosovo, which was in fact inspired from the local government in the West. Speaking about local governance means slotting or reviewing a range of significant phenomena directly related to the destiny of the state. The local government, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, represents the public power. It sanctions municipalities as basic administrative and political units.

Abstract This article studies the Kosovo Government decision to restrict freedom of movement vis-á-vis freedom of gathering during the Covid-19 pandemic, a restriction which has directly affected religious freedoms and practices across multiple religions. The article also addresses the decision of the Constitutional Court, which ruled that the Government’s decision was unconstitutional. The article reflects on and contextualizes the behaviors of different religious communities in Kosovo, in light of these religious restrictions in the age of Covid-19.

Abstract Kosovo’s statehood has been contested by foes as well as friends. Much is known about the former and less about the latter. This contribution explores the contestation of Kosovo’s independence by the judges of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (eulex) working on privatization matters before Kosovo courts. As put by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo (kcc), eulex judges working on privatization matters, “simply continued to ignore the existence of Kosovo as an independent State and its legislation emanating from its Assembly”. The kcc stated this after eulex judges working on privatization matters had refused to respect Kosovo laws and institutions subsequent to the 2008 Kosovo Declaration of Independence. This paper explores the judicial dialogue on Kosovo’s independence between eulex judges and the kcc and identifies the limitations and risks of the ‘status neutral’ policy applied by international organizations to collaborate with Kosovar institutions without prejudging its political status. This submission suggests that ‘status neutrality’ leads to either acceptance or contestation of Kosovo’s statehood and thus brings more uncertainty than clarity to Kosovo’s position in international relations.

The intensive debate about the legality of NATO air strikes from March to June 1999 in the context of use of force, Chapter VII competences and humanitarian intervention1 including their implication in the domestic constitutional law of NATO members,2 may be concealed another development the importance of which in modern Public International Law should not be underestimated: since the time when the Yugoslav/Serbian army left Kosovo, the province has been under direct administration by the international community.3 Only a little time later the same phenomenon of international administration came into being in East-Timor, a Portuguese colony until 1975 and claimed by Indonesia afterwards.4

The role of political parties in increasing the capacities for the rule of law and the internal development of political parties, are two issues among several ones discussed in this analysis. The reformation of political parties from nationwide movements in structured political parties was and remains a very little analyzed process. The developments in Kosovo and the solution of its final status have distracted the political parties from having the dedication towards many vital issues, such as rule of law, their internal reformation. In the end I have analyzed another issue which appears as an obstacle for substantial reforms of political parties, which is the lack of constitutional control for political parties’ programs and their way of functioning.The treatment of the organization of political life, focusing on the role of political parties and their dedication for law and order, is undoubtedly a substantial and analytical innovation, important for the political parties themselves. Having a look in general scientific analysis for political parties not only within Kosovo, we can understand that studies that treat certain segments of political parties, especially their platforms, are quite late.

Whence does international law derive its normative force as law in a world that remains, in many respects, one where legitimate politics is practiced primarily at the national level? As with domestically focused legal theories, one standard answer is positivistic: the law's authority is based on its origin in agreed procedures of consent. This is certainly plausible with respect to treaty obligations and commitments that derive from the United Nations Charter, but it leaves customary international law vulnerable to legitimacy critiques—of which there is no shortage among international law skeptics. Even with respect to conventional international norms, such as treaty provisions, there is often a sense that such consent is democratically thinner than the public consent to domestic law, particularly fundamental domestic law, constitutional norms, and derivative principles of legitimate governance. State consent in international law, in this view, is often a very imperfect proxy for democratic consent to international legal norms. While it is obvious to international lawyers why (as a matter of positive law doctrine) state consent should make international norms prevail over domestic norms to which there is arguably deeper democratic consent, persistent critics of international law have questioned whether this should be so as a matter of legitimacy.

This article focuses on the participation of local citizens in Kosovo in the process of state-building and their engagement with the institutions imposed by the international community. While previous literature focuses either on the constitutional and institutional framework or on the more direct forms of local resistance to international intervention, this article looks into more subtle forms of resistance whereby local citizens change the meanings of imposed institutions. To this purpose, this article examines the process of adoption of two minority-relevant laws: the Law on Historic Centre of Prizren and the Law on the Village of Velika Hoča/Hoçë e Madhe. By employing a critical frame analysis, this paper points to the very subtle forms of resistance to the international rule such as: exclusion of citizens from participation in decision-making, defining citizenship in ethnic terms or changing the meaning of minority relevant legislation by framing it from the perspective of state- and nation-building. All of these actions resist the international efforts to build Kosovo as a multiethnic state and impugn the legitimacy of the system. These findings indicate the important role of local citizens in creating the sustainable peace.

The legal regulation of secession – the unilateral withdrawal of a part of territory from the parent state, is carried out at the junction of two branches of law – international and constitutional. Due to the absence in most of written constitutions of norms directly related to secession, and the laconic nature of relevant principles of international law, allowing for the possibility of ambiguous interpretation, decisions of international and domestic judicial authorities on the admissibility of secession play a special role in the legal mechanisms for its prevention, which determines the relevance of the chosen themes. Based on the analysis of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of the United Nations of July 22, 2010 “On compliance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo”, we formulate a conclusion about the absence of uniform international legal criteria to determine the admissibility of secession. In our opinion, the Inter-national Court of Justice has not resolved the legal issue underlying the pro-tracted political conflict, has not created a new norm of customary interna-tional law, but has not provided the supporters of the unilateral declaration of independence with the necessary and sufficient arguments for the legal justification of their position. This allows us to speak about the importance of this decision in the international legal mechanisms for the prevention of secession, which, however, are at the stage of formation. Their development should take place synchronously with the constitutional and legal intrastate mechanisms, which in modern conditions should be aimed at finding a bal-ance between the interests of the center and regional communities, establish-ing a dialogue with supporters of independence and protecting the national and cultural identity of population.

This article deals with complex systems. It takes the reader on a journey to the origins of the paradigm shift which has taken place in the sciences since the path breaking works of Edward N. Lorenz, Benoît B. Mandelbrot, Mitchell J. Feigenbaum, and others. Gradually, linear “twodimensional” thinking has been replaced by non-linear “multi-dimensional” reasoning and multi-factorial genesis, risk, and uncertainty have come into focus. The article looks at the beginnings of the conception of complex systems — chaos theory — and reveals the implications for the law and legal science. Having explained the premises of chaos theory by means of a metaphor (the kneading of dough) the article proposes to look at the law through the lens of chaos: the law, especially case law, is perceived as a system which is itself subject to the phenomenon of chaos. The power of the image of chaos is illustrated by means of a study of the case law of the European Court of Justice on family reunification of moving persons and its projection to Switzerland in an attempt to create parallel regimes. The article also takes advantage of chaos theory to portray the broader implications for society and the law, tentatively illustrating them by thoughts on the Lisbon judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009 and on UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 (on Kosovo).

AbstractDuring the Cold War, both NATO's role and purpose were clearly defined by the existence of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The traditional confrontation between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact military organizations effectively has ceased to exist. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact—combined with the emerging constitutional democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the transformation of the Russian Federation—has essentially assured that the future threat of a confrontation between the major armies on the European continent is highly unlikely. However, it soon became obvious that several non-traditional, and quite unexpected, risks would give NATO a new mission and new challenges. One of the greatest challenges for post-Cold War Eastern Europe lies in the unresolved questions of ethnic self-determination. The unprecedented human tragedy of two world wars failed to resolve these questions. The concept of ethnic self-determination has been the central theme of the conflicts in the Yugoslav civil wars. NATO played a significant, if not central, role in the final resolution of the Yugoslav civil wars, particularly in the case of Kosovo. The Kosovo experience creates a real challenge for NATO and international legal scholars to create a more precisely defined body of international law to protect ethnic minorities and to build an effective institutional framework for the observation and implementation of so-called minority rights. which would have prevented the tragedy of the Yugoslavian civil war and can prevent future conflicts.

Private international law is a globally established field of law however, its pre-eminence in Africa is insignificant and this has been as a result of its relevance, which according to many scholars is arguable. It follows logically therefore, that it is underdeveloped in Africa, and as this article posits, specifically in South Africa. This article advocates for the development of South African private international law by endorsing South Africa as a viable neutral jurisdiction venue for cross-border commercial disputes, in future. According to this article, this is to be achieved by the recognition of neutral jurisdiction clauses in South African courts. This can only be done by developing an effective and just system of cross-border/trans-national litigation. The proposed sound cross-border jurisdictional rules will supplement the newly established transnational arbitration regime. In order to achieve this, this research reflects an integrated comparative approach by establishing comparative perspectives mainly from the UK, USA, Brazil, Kosovo and South Africa.1 Based on its constitutional values of inalienable human rights and access to courts (justice), South Africa stands to gain immensely from incoming commercial arbitration and commercial litigation as forms of dispute resolution. This will establish the country as the preferred venue for arbitration and litigation on the African continent and beyond.

Protection of personal data and the privacy, at the time of final approval of the New Regulation on the protection of personal data, for the subjects of personal data brings hope; however, it is to believe that "in a world with protected privacy." Despite the challenge of protection of personal data in the era of colossal development of communication technology, the Internet and the major inventions of smart portable mobile devices, some new legal provisions are put in the Regulation of the EC, EU and the Parliament, in the future strengthens the protection of personal data; Freedom, justice and security, as notions that are spread in our country Kosovo, are the constitutional and legal obligations to provide stability to the country. However, the institutional strengthening of the law in this regard, with compact action (interaction) between the competent authorities within the country, our region and the competent authorities of the segment of rights and freedoms, justice and security of the EU, the EC and the European Parliament will undoubtedly bring success in the overcoming of challenges, through which the personal protection of data is going through. Strengthening of the National Authorities of personal data protection and freedom of information, is, and remains, the main input of justice, freedoms and security, now as standard globalist values.

This article analyses the legal, political and moral basis of citizenship in the contemporary world. India is analyzed here as a case in point of a general category of ‘changing societies’ emerging from colonial or communist rule. Citizenship, which used to be considered a part of the general problem of nation-building, has increasingly acquired the character of a salient problem in its own right. This change in perspective has come about as a consequence of globalization and the world-wide diffusion of basic norms of human rights. In the contemporary context, with regard to the problems of endangered minorities whose lives, dignity and welfare are at risk – be it in Kashmir or Kosovo – the world at large considers itself morally bound to intervene, if not militarily, then at least in terms of the invocation of law and good conduct. As such, from the point of view of the post-colonial state, both its national sovereignty and legitimacy are contingent on its success with turning its whole population into citizens. This, the article argues, is contingent on the ability of the post-colonial state to gear its laws, courts and administration towards effective management of identity and the constitutional incorporation of core social values (see Figure 2 below). With regard to ‘making citizens out of subjects’, the Indian ‘experiment’ holds important lessons for other states, ensconced in multi-cultural societies.

Since it declared its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia has faced several problems of key importance. Apart from the economic underdevelopment, this country has been characterised by bad ethnic relations between the two most numerous communities in the country - the Macedonian and Albanian ones. The Albanian community, which makes approximately one fourth of the total population in Macedonia, has tended to define itself as a "constitutive nation" within the newly formed and independent Macedonia. The outstanding ethnic tensions present in 1990s turned into open armed conflicts in the February-August 2001 period. More than 200 people were killed, while 100,000 people were displaced from their homes in the conflicts between the Albanian militia and regular Macedonian police and armed forces. After the USA and EU had made pressures on the conflicting parties, they adopted the Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001 in Ohrid. It proposed the amendments to the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The amendments have brought out changes in the constitutional and political system of Macedonia - "double majority" in the Parliament, increased number of members of ethnic communities in the police and administration, Albanian language as an official, strengthening of the local self-rule, etc. Apart from the Macedonian people as a holder of sovereignty, the preamble of the Constitution of Macedonia includes the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Serbs, Romans and members of other peoples who live in Macedonia. In September 2002, parliamentary elections took place in Macedonia. The coalition For Macedonia Together headed by the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia won half of the seats in the Macedonian parliament. Then were defeated the nationalistic parties VMRO-DPMNE and Democratic Party of Albanians that had been in power during the ethnic conflicts. The Democratic Union for Integration (established in 2002) won almost 70 per cent of the Albanian votes while the Party for Democratic Prosperity and People's Democratic Party were defeated at the elections. After the September elections, the new government was forded and it embraced the members of the coalition For Macedonia Together and Democratic Union for Integration - with five Albanian ministers. The Ohrid Agreement is a step forward in settling the ethnic relations in Macedonia. Apart from the fact that it was adopted under the pressure of the international community, it is a basis for constitutional and political reforms, improving the position of the Albanians as the most numerous non-Macedonian community. However, it should be said that even today there are two parallel "societies" - Macedonian and Albanian ones, with no common touch between them, living separately from each other. In spite of all obstacles, it is necessary to insist on building of confidence and reconciliation between the Albanians and Macedonians. This can be achieved by repatriation of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, by implementation of the law that includes the provisions on the positive discrimination of the Albanian community and by strengthening of security and stability in the region. As the author assesses, the bad economic situation in Macedonia could set new priorities to the government and it would include improvement of living conditions for its citizens. On the other hand, the greatest danger to the peaceful development of Macedonia is the Albanian National Army (ANA) whose substantial aim is to achieve unification of the "Albanian" territories in Western Macedonia with Kosovo and "Albanian parts" of Montenegro and southern Serbia.

The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo recognizes and protects the property right on property, as well as the use of property in accordance with the public interest regulated by law. Both the cadaster and the RDPP are established and are in operation in the Republic of Kosovo. Right to Send is a branch of civil law that regulates legal relationships that have objects that are not found in the exchange process. Property is an important institution in human society and has dual economic and legal significance. Ownership as an economic meaning means acquisition of material goods, while ownership in a legal sense means the collection of legal norms that regulate this exploitation. A general view on the right to property and especially the issue of ownership in Kosovo with a special emphasis on the legal status of construction and agricultural land. This paper deals with some of the key issues that are the main factors of the problems in the field of civil law in Kosovo.

Kosovo independence still remains a key issue on a global scale. In simple terms, there are two contradictory stands on the sovereignty of Kosovo. According to the first one, Kosovo declaration of independence is illegal due to the breach of international law and the constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 2006. Meanwhile the second stand proves that unilateral Kosovo declaration of independence was legal since Kosovo Albanians are fully entitled to the right of self-determination. The following paper presents an opinion on Kosovo independence expressed by the students of the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade and the University of Zagreb – two most important universities in Serbia and Croatia. The results presented in the paper are based on the survey carried out by the author in 2013.

The present tensions in Belgrade–Pristina relations highlight the relevance of a consensus regarding the question of Kosovo. This article argues that the cyclical nature of Kosovo’s history has been muted by the thesis ‘Kosovo is a unique case’ which through unilateral decisions produced various legal schizophrenias. These legal schizophrenias embodied in a power triangle—Ahtisaari Plan–European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)–Kosovo’s Constitution. Despite gaps and inherited chaos, the indisputable achievements of the EU’s efforts in normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina show that the EU not only can facilitate peace but also possesses the capacity to achieve a consensus. Already there is a ‘silent’ consensus among actors on the status of Kosovo—the European protectorate. The article also discusses institutional design based on the consensus, which aims to promote shared narratives.

The legal framework regulating property in Kosovo has been defined as ‘A jumble of laws, regulations, administrative instructions, court practices and directives combine to create a complicated and seemingly impenetrable system for determining contests over immovable property ownership in Kosovo. At the highest level, international human rights standards affect property rights…’1 As in other areas of legislation, laws addressing property issues derive from different periods in Kosovo’s history, that is to say the Yugoslav time, the so-called discriminatory period of the 1990s, UNMIK’s rule of the first decade of the 2000s and, finally, independent Kosovo. Laws are scattered through several legal texts, regulate different aspects of property rights, and often refer to institutions that no longer exist. This paper focuses on the specific issues affecting property law in Kosovo, a sector where international organizations and bilateral cooperation are massively intervening. While assessing legal acts in force and data collected on the field, the author argues how, for an effective reformation of the sector, a clear and coordinated strategy will have to be adopted by the two main donors which, in the next few years, will be launching several technical assistance contracts. Comparing European best practices with the proposed intervention suggested by the European Union and USAID will also give the chance to illustrate how a strict adherence to ECHR standards in the field of property, as the Constitution of Kosovo requires, will bring to light problems already seen in other European countries, that is to say a clash between domestic civil legislation on property, on the one hand, and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 1 Protocol 1, on the other. The author will also notice that the tendency to adopt a too political approach, typical of international organizations and donors, in an area characterized by legal principles of a more technical nature, will be cause for additional confusion.

Making a testament seems to be one of the available freedoms, and most significant of the law subjects. Testament, as final declaration of the testator’s will, is considered to be one of the most significant freedoms of the same, since by declaring his will, determines the fate of his/her property heritage, earned with lots of efforts throughout life.Freedom of compiling the testament, in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is guaranteed by the Law on Inheritance in Kosovo but also by the international Conventions. However, every subjective right has its limits. Such limitation comes as a result of the care toward subjective rights of other persons, sometimes the best of the society, but the purpose of limiting such freedom in terms of inheritance, comes as result of common marital life, as a result of the care toward children and parents. Quota of the obligatory part is part of heritage that shall not be deprived, since it is guaranteed with imperative norms.This inheritance quota is presented as object for analyses and study in relation to testamentary freedom, always in a comparative view in the region and broader.

The decision of Indonesian Constitutional Court No. 100/PUU-XII/2015 legitimizing single candidate give solution for democracy deadlock in some regions.Based on that decision, The Election Commission make a regulation giving alternative for some regions having only one candidate for choosing the picture of candidate against empty box.These battle in the beginning seems not fair because of political intention, empty box has no resources to compete with candidate. But, in the local election 2018, in some regions, empty box success to gain more voters than his rival. Winning of empty box in contestation of democracy became a proof that people feel tired because the system of regeneration in political parties not running well, other proof that single candidate that bring up by all political parties not always supported by voters. In the Indonesia constitutional law, the phenomenon of empty box surely implicate tomany problems. This writing will try to see this phenomenon and its implication according to Indonesian constitutional law.

Recognition of regional features, outlining of the contours of regions, tendency to regionalize ethnic, economic, cultural and state-administrative space, and strengthening the ideology of regionalism in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, appear as a practical and political but also as a theoretical problem which includes and combines several scientific disciplines. The phenomenon of regionalism is not contradictory although it is primarily expressed through the numerous conflicts of interests rivalry and antagonisms of political subjects. The problematic side of the phenomenon of regionalism includes the result of an extremely negative and existentially tragic experience of the several years-long disintegration of the complex Yugoslav state. During the partition and disintegration of the second Yugoslavia, there also happened the disintegration of the Serbian ethnic area Growth, support and instigation of regional tendencies occurred in the historical circumstances of secession and did not stop in the post-secession period. Particularization and segmentation of political area, as well as the disintegration of the former state, did not occur in accordance with the norms of internal and international law. Legality was late and was achieved within the transformation of power reflected in the changed territorial policy of the dominant alliance of great powers. The entire past decade was characterized by an extraordinary metamorphosis of political space. Secession trend had the territorial features which included the change of borders and had been long in the focus of the global geopolitical attention. Territories were divided and made smaller. Intensive territorial dynamics within the external silhouette of the de-stated SFR of Yugoslavia resulted in the creation of several state and quasi-state political formations. Former republics became semi-sovereign states. Dispersed and displaced Serbian ethnos was configured in the three territories: in the Republic of Serbia - from which Kosovo and Metohia were amputated and placed under the UN protectorate - in the entire Republic of Montenegro and in the Republic Srpska, located in one part of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Demopolitical result of the geopolitical destruction of the Serbian ethnos was a great movement of the Serbian population from the west to the east, and its concentration in the territory of the Republic of Serbia this implied that the Serbs were expelled from their millennia-long abodes in Croatia, parts of Bosnia and from Kosmet. The geo-economic result of the same process was the devastation of the national economic strength west of the Drina and in the southern province. Economic regression occurred also in the national parent-land state. Balkan re-arrangement of the spheres of interest in the post-bipolar period was in 1995. fixed by the interest arrangement of the great powers known under the name Dayton Peace Agreement. Redistribution of the territories from the destroyed state occurred in the post-communist period with the expansion of west-civilization structures to the European east Westernization of the eastern part of Europe, or entire Europe as the other pole of the global West, could be characterized as a dual mega-regionality. Namely, the west is composed of Europe and America; on the other side, there is the global East or its hybrid variation Eurasia. With the disappearance of their common state and its framework, south Slavs found themselves in the seemingly independent, and actually client states. Western delimitation of the south Slavic area moved from the Yugoslav borders towards a wider Balkan demarcation. One could say that the revitalized notion of the Balkans became a new, in many aspects obligatory framework for regional thinking. The Balkan macroregion is further determined by the intentions to expand the European Union. One of the Euro-centric concepts, which is being experimentally employed precisely in the Balkans, is the establishment of the so-called Europe of regions in the peripheral areas. On the other hand, even though the process of the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation appears to be irreversible, the superordinate Euro-American factor does not give up the possibility of the mezzo-regional initiatives, cooperations, associations and integrations. This "middle" level of dealing with the specificities of the Yugoslav region is related to the states and nations from the former Yugoslavia, or the so-called West Balkans. Naturally, it is not the tendency to revive the silhouette of the previous state, but certainly there is a noticeable intention to achieve a regional linking of the related, now semi-sovereign territories which sometimes belonged to the same state framework. The fourth level deals with microregionalism, that is the relation between the different areas in the newly-created states. It is interesting that the regionalist discourse is mostly cherished exactly in the ethno-heterogeneous Serbian area, although other Yugoslav states also have or had regional tradition and mixed population, like, for example, Slovenia and Croatia Nevertheless, these former Yugo-republics are structured as mono-national states, so the regional policy and ideology of regionalism are still not in the first plane. Regionalism within the newly-formed states could be supplemented with the micron level implying specific sub-regionalism of the highest degree, within the larger regions in the same state. This could be illustrated with Backa, Banat and Srem inside Vojvodina, understood as the northern Serbian region, or Kosovo and Metohia in the south of Serbia, in the province with the same name. In the part of Serbia outside the provinces, similar things could be said for Belgrade with its surroundings, Macva, Podrinje, Sumadija, Raska District etc. Thus, when it comes to the present FR of Yugoslavia, all five levels of regional dynamics have a principled, but insufficiently studied significance. Mega-regional level is related to the mark denoting the global belonging to the West. Macroregional level deals with the European loyalty, that is inclusion of the FR of Yugoslavia into the continental European trends. This trans-continental and continental direction of inclusion implies a historical teleology of the relative eastern belonging to the absolute West, that is Euro-America, and the entrance into the full structure of the European Union. All the mentioned problems of recognition and characterization of the regional phenomenology in the political topography of the world are motivated by the tendency to achieve as clear as possible spatial-temporal national and state orientation The direction is related to the so-called safety dilemma of the nation and the country faced with the change of size and essence of one's own state, with the different geopolitical position and redefined foreign-policy priorities. It is also the case of the changed alliance policy, and the innovated strategy of integration into the old and new global and regional political structures. On the basis of the indicated components of geopolitical context, one could say that the phenomenon of regions and their cognate correlates {regionally regionalization and regionalism) should not be understood exclusively through the legal categories of international law and the so-called constitutional solutions, that is administrative division of the state territory. Actually in the analysis of regions and regionalism in Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia it is necessary first to discuss the pre-normative or meta-le-gal factors in the creation of the regional issue within the national and state issue, which have the form of the unsolved political problem. Meta-legality is located within the domain of the international relations and geopolitic. Meta-legal or pre-normative factors of the formation or recognition of regions and regionalisms deal with the possibility of the political constitution of the Serbian, that is Serbian / Montenegrin (still Yugoslav) society. Since the unique state area was destroyed in the four-year secession wars and there occurred significant demopolitical changes, war migrations, forceful displacements and expulsion of the population - the ethnic character of many areas was also drastically changed. At the same time, the post-secession existence of the FR of Yugoslavia could be also viewed through the optics of the state residuum. The remaining Serbia or Serbia (temporarily) without Kosovo is certainly not an equivalent for the Serbian ethnic space, nor for the entire Serbian lands. It is not even the FR of Yugoslavia, as a dual con federation of the Serbian / Montenegrin nation. Geopolitical reduction of the SFR of Yugoslavia to a residual creation of the FR of Yugoslavia was not deduced from the legality sui generis, but resulted from a conflict, the defeat of integralism and the victory of separatism, as well as from a new triumphal configuration of power. The impulse implying the statism of the collective rights from the former complex federal necessarily-multinational level was transferred to a lower mononational level. Therefore, the regionalist ideology in the post-secession reality of the residual state almost inevitably, as a tendency, nears the separatory particularism. Even the lost national state and the state entirety are openly denied within the requests for the territorization of the collective rights of various minorities. Naturally these requests do not carry the primary features of the development of democracy. On the contrary, in the majority of cases this implies the rise of parish and tribal consciousness prone to narrow-minded separation. Thus the post-secession requests for the regionalization are often just a slight rhetorical mask for real separatism. For example, they are expressed through the pseudo-national separation of Vojvodina from Serbia, as well as Montenegro from Serbia, or through the establishment of state-like entities in the territorial tissue of Serbia Alleged arguments are found in the unfinished disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia on the one hand, and in the prevention of the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia, even within the diminished Serbia That way, even in the post-secession, reduced Serbia one could easily recognize the tendencies of federalization and confederalization, even the amputation of its remaining state space. Additional arguments for the crawling secession and prolonged territorial destruction are found in the ideology of globalization and world trends of relativizing territorial integrity and state sovereignty. On the other hand, the idea about the principled insignificance of borders in Europe without borders, as well as Europe of regions, is emphasized. Thus, it is obvious that the new state and regional delimitations and demarcations are in contradiction with the vision of the trans-statal and trans-national integrity of the European continent. In Serbia itself, me problem of the restructuring of regions is determined by the inherited and unchanged triple division of its territory into the central part and two autonomous provinces in the north and south. Thus every idea for regionalization (expert, party, leader's, NGO and the like) faces the inherited, too narrow constitutional framework and easily slides to the federalization or confederalization of the Republic, and in extreme cases to the independence and sovereignty of ethnic, religious, linguistic and other minorities. Roughly put, the tendencies for territorial separation from the Republic of Serbia still exist in several neuralgic and unstable areas or regions. In Vojvodina, the presented tendencies have the character of a meaningless internal - Serbian autonomy, autonomism, latent separatism. Authentic Serbian autonomy lost its original character long ago and deteriorated into an internal national re-statism. On the other hand, in the furthest south of Serbia, in Kosmet, the UN protectorate is established, but the region is actually occupied and thus the status of the Province is "frozen". In the three municipalities in the south of Serbia, with the relative Albanian majority, Albanian separatism smolders within the platform of the so-called east Kosovo. In the Raska region (Sandzak) there are also strong tendencies for separateness on the religious-ecclesiastical, so-called Bosniac platform, with religious solidarity, and ethnic and territorial unity of all Bosniacs. In the meta-legal or pre-normative situation - which most often denotes political and geopolitical context implying interests, power and force - the inclinations for territorial design are faced with the conflicting ideology of regionalism. Therefore, the constitutional-legal solutions of the former, present and future regions, generated within the self-created legality which does not respect meta-legal, political and geopolitical impulses regardless of how aestheticized and "humanized" they may be - at the end face the practical impossibility of realization.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of how the media generally function in relation to their responsibilities to the state. Knowing that despite the legal protection enjoyed by the media under international conventions and in general domestic legislation, all criminal offenses committed through the media are defined in one way or another by adequate legal norms to prevent and sanction such offenses abusive. During the different periods of law adoption in Kosovo, it is evident that the sphere of criminal and civil liability for criminal offenses committed through the media has changed. This is due to the fact that various provisions have not infrequently been used to restrict freedom of expression, which is otherwise the most basic, but also the most sensitive provision provided by Article 10 of the International Covenant on Human Rights. Therefore, in this paper will be explained the fluidity of the legislation on criminal and civil liability for criminal offenses committed through the media and that starting from international conventions, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, international legislation compared to domestic, comparison of provisions which with the old codes have been defined as criminal offenses, while today those offenses are considered of a civil character and for these offenses there is only civil liability.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) accepted in Paris on December 14, 1995 was signed by: for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović, for the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There are good reasons why the international community has demanded that these people be signatories to the Dayton Peace Agreement. Namely, after unsuccessful attempts to establish an agreement on constitutional solutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, starting with Cutileiro's plan (cantonization of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ethnic grounds), on which talks in Sarajevo began in February 1992, until the conference in London on 26 and On August 27, 1992, it was obvious that the positions of the Serb and Croat sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina were being harmonized with the positions of Belgrade and Zagreb, that is, the policies previously agreed and agreed upon on the Milosevic-Tudjman route. Three delegations participated in the conference in London. On behalf of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government were President Alija Izetbegović, Minister of Foreign Affairs Haris Silajdžić, Ejup Ganić and General Sefer Halilović. The Bosnian Serb delegation included Radovan Karadzic, RS President Momcilo Krajisnik, RS Vice President and VRS General Ratko Mladic, who were in direct consultations with Belgrade throughout the negotiations. Representatives of Bosnian Croats were the President of HZ HB Mate Boban, then the Prime Minister of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mile Akmadžić (although he was a member of the Government of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, he participated as a member of the Croatian delegation) and General Milivoj Petković. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman also took part in the negotiations and was the unofficial but de facto head of the Croatian delegation. Following the London Conference and the failure of the previous negotiations, the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia was expanded to include the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, chaired by Cyrus Vance (US diplomat on behalf of the UN) and Lord David Owen (on behalf of the EC / U). a new era of peace negotiations. Vance-Owen's plan foresaw the decentralization of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the existing borders with a constitutional order based on federal principles contained in a number of constitutive elements - regions (ten cantons formed on ethnic principles) and with the Sarajevo district where the central government would be located. This plan, after the refusal of the Serbian Assembly from Pale to ratify it, was definitely rejected. This was followed by the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan (Constitutional Agreement on the Alliance of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina) which offered a confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of three republics made up of ethnicity, but this plan also proved unacceptable. The Contact Group's plan followed the establishment of the Washington Agreement, which established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in March 1994. This plan provided for the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a union within its internationally recognized borders, and territorial division according to the percentage of territory (51:49). The Serbian leadership in Pale also refused to accept this proposal. The international community had to look for new solutions. The Contact Group's plan was a step towards negotiations that will result in the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. However, it is important to note that all the plans offered led to the discovery of hidden policies created by the eastern and western neighbors of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, all the proposed proposals for "peace plans", which the international community tried to impose in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were based on constitutional devastation and territorial division, thus accepting armed conquests and occupation of the area with the ultimate goal of destroying its territorial integrity and statehood. sovereignty, which made it obvious that the international community was not ready to protect the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state guaranteed by international law, which was especially denied by the introduction of an arms embargo, which prevented it from protecting its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. What was the role of the signatories of the Dayton Agreement in the preparation and execution of bilateral aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of implementing plans for the partition of Bosnia and the realization of large-scale projects, and whether it determined their position as signatories to the General Framework Agreement? and the topic of trials of international courts with the aim of establishing, proving and convicting committed crimes. What is the significance of the signatories in the establishment and preservation of peace, and whether large-scale projects and plans for their implementation ended with the signing of the Dayton Agreement are questions whose answers are still being sought 25 years after the signing of the agreement. Namely, Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), before the signing of the Dayton Agreement, appeared before the ICTY as an indictee for crimes committed in the Republics of the former Yugoslavia - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. The trial was not terminated due to the death of the accused, but the Trial Chamber rendered a decision on the motion for acquittal (Interim Judgment of the Hague Tribunal of 16 June 2004), which established his responsibility for genocide committed in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Franjo Tudjman, the then President of the Republic of Croatia, was identified as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise in a verdict handed down for crimes committed by the Croatian Army (HV) and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) against the civilian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Case IT-04-74 Prlić etc). In its appeal verdict against the Bosnian six, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that there was an international armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the state of occupation, but also confirmed the existence of a Croatian joint criminal enterprise aimed at "ethnic cleansing" certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia's Franjo Tudjman as one of the participants in this JCE. Thus, persons who found themselves in court proceedings and were held responsible for the consequences of the policies they implemented, the commission of crimes and joint criminal enterprises realized in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, became signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement and guarantors of peace.

Parliament is the body of legislative power and, along with the government and the head of state, it plays the most important role in the state. The article concerns the analysis of the parliamentary institutions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Montenegro, the Republic of Kosovo, the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Macedonia. The method used in the study was a system analysis and a comparative method, thanks to which we can see the similarities and differences in the functioning of the parliaments. In the analyzed countries, parliaments are subjects that influence political processes and the creation of law. The creators of the constitution had to take into account the traditions of parliamentarism as well as the complicated nationality situation in the countries.

Human rights occupy a privileged position within contemporary politics. They are widely taken to constitute perhaps the most fundamental standards for evaluating the conduct of states with respect to persons residing within their borders. They are enshrined in numerous international documents, national constitutions, and treaties; and those that have been incorporated into international law are monitored and enforced by numerous international and regional institutional bodies. Human rights have been invoked to justify popular revolt, secession, large-scale political reform, as well as forms of international action ranging from the imposition of conditions on foreign assistance and loans to economic sanctions (as in South Africa and Burma) and military intervention (as in Kosovo and East Timor). Michael Ignatieff has gone so far as to claim that human rights have become “the major article of faith of a secular culture that fears it believes in nothing else,” and one might add that they are articles of faith of many non-secular cultures, too.

In international relations, the last three decades have been marked by national and institutional fragmentation. The fate of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the regrettable way that events played out (especially in the former case), could befall other federative entities as well. Canada and Belgium come to mind, as do countries like Spain, all of which effectively function as federations. However, while federations usually have dispute settlement and mechanisms for secession embedded in their constitutions, sub-constitutive territories are often excluded from such considerations. What territories such as Kosovo, Sandjak, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, etc. have in common is that they share a desire for independence from their parent country. However, achiveing independence would present risks to the territorial integrity of other countries (what can be termed the domino principle), as well as risks to the endurance of flexible international law. The cases we have alluded to above culminated in the Crimean crisis. The problems between Estonia and the Russian Federation stem from the choice of precedent and founding text on which to base the former’s renewed independence. While Estonia was founded on the basis of the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty that put an end to the country’s War of Independence, its experience as a Soviet Republic added another legislative filter in the form of the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union. However, the principle of uti possidetis had evolved to apply to more than cases of colonialism. Thus, when Estonia seceded from the USSR with the borders it had been since 1945, it was doing so under the principle of uti possidetis. The current dispute stems from the fact that the Estonian political elite seek to have the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty recognized as the foundational document for the country’s renewed independence. Under the Treaty, Estonian sovereignty applied over a much larger territory. By insisting that any new border arrangement with Russia be based on that Treaty, Estonia is invalidating the principle of uti possidetis and the validity of the Constitution of the Soviet Union as a vehicle for independence. It implies a latent Article 5 situation between NATO and Russia, and threatens the legitimacy of other post-Soviet secessions.

AbstractThe Kosovo Advisory Opinion reaches its conclusions in what is admittedly a very condensed and swift way of reasoning. The Court did not expand upon the question that was put to it. However, it is unfair to criticize the Court for failing to address the very issues the drafters of the question carefully and deliberately did not ask. Moreover, the Court did in fact clarify a number of important points that go beyond the narrow question of the lawfulness of Kosovo's declaration of independence. In particular, the Court confirmed that a state is a matter of fact in the first instance. It can come into being in consequence of unilateral secession when attempts to negotiate a separation have been frustrated by the central government. The doctrine of territorial integrity operates among states and furnishes no legal bar in such instances that applies to the seceding entity. Moreover, a decision on independence by such an entity cannot be evaluated according to the domestic legal order of the state from which it secedes. In this instance, Kosovo's secession was in any event not quite as unilateral as it may have seemed. Its declaration of independence and new constitution fully incorporate the entire package of measures proposed by the UN mediators in the final status talks. Hence, Kosovo has implemented what was in fact developed and proposed under the UN mandate for final status talks contained in Resolution 1244. Rather than overturning that resolution, it has acted in accordance with its terms.

Abstract The right of citizens to privacy in the Republic of Kosovo is guaranteed under the Law on Personal Data Protection. Moreover, this right is guaranteed by the Constitution (Official Gazette, 2008), which is the highest legal act. The purpose of this academic paper goes beyond a superficial assessment of the level of implementation of this fundamental right of the citizen. The core of this paper focuses on highlighting the existing challenges and those that may persist in guaranteeing the privacy of each of us under the reign of the 'Covid 19' Virus in the geographical and psychological space of all citizens of Kosovo. Despite the existence of an independent authority, mandated to oversee the implementation of this right in the public and private sector, its implementation is a permanent mission of this authority, which in our country is the Information and Privacy Agency, but also is subject to challenges, which are not always generated by human negligence. To give the deserved physiognomy to this article, official accessible sources of the sole authority that oversees the implementation of this right in our country have been used. Statistical data presented within the trunk of the paper reinforce the thesis introduced in the introduction of the article, which is confirmed during its full elaboration, reinforcing the view that part of the main challenges for Information and Privacy Agency persists being the limited number of human professional resources, as a guarantee for establishing an unwavering trust among the citizens that their privacy is guaranteed.