Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Constitutional courts – France »
Créez une référence correcte selon les styles APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard et plusieurs autres
Consultez les listes thématiques d’articles de revues, de livres, de thèses, de rapports de conférences et d’autres sources académiques sur le sujet « Constitutional courts – France ».
À côté de chaque source dans la liste de références il y a un bouton « Ajouter à la bibliographie ». Cliquez sur ce bouton, et nous générerons automatiquement la référence bibliographique pour la source choisie selon votre style de citation préféré : APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.
Vous pouvez aussi télécharger le texte intégral de la publication scolaire au format pdf et consulter son résumé en ligne lorsque ces informations sont inclues dans les métadonnées.
Articles de revues sur le sujet "Constitutional courts – France"
1
Hunter-Henin, Myriam. "CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN FRANCE: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2011): 167–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589310000709.
Texte intégralRésumé :
A major constitutional reform has occurred in France. On 1 March 2010, by virtue of the Constitutional Act of 10 December 20091 (itself pursuant to the constitutional reform of 23 July 2008)2 a new form of constitutional review came into force,3 with the blessing of the Conseil constitutionnel (the Constitutional council).4 The changes are considerable: the role of the Conseil constitutionnel has undergone a revolution which will have implications for ordinary courts as well as for citizens' rights. Arguably, the reform transforms the Conseil constitutionnel—so far a council with limited powers of review—into a true Constitutional court, and as discussed below, opens up constitutional issues in ordinary litigation, enhancing the protection of citizens' human rights. Owing to the reform, ‘Constitutional rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution’ can now be invoked against legislation in the course of litigation. This is a true revolution in France because, up until now, no individual was allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Conseil constitutionnel,5 nor were they authorized to invoke a constitutional principle in litigation, as this would have been asking ordinary judges to assess a piece of legislation against the Constitution, a task which exclusively belongs to the Conseil constitutionnel.6 Constitutional rights and liberties will now (as is further discussed below) play a key part in ordinary litigation.
2
Baranger, Denis. "The Language of Eternity: Judicial Review of the Amending Power in France (or the Absence Thereof)." Israel Law Review 44, no. 3 (2011): 389–428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700018112.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In several rulings from 1962, 1992, and 2003, the French Constitutional Court (Conseil constitutionnel) has denied jurisdiction over constitutional amendments. This article shows that this solution can only be understood in the light of the doctrinal background that provides its intellectual justification. While refusing to judicially review constitutional amendments, the Constitutional Court is in fact deeply involved in the ongoing process of altering the Constitution. Also, while the quasi-official doctrinal analysis insists on the absence of material limits to the amendment of the Constitution, and on the absence of any “supra-constitutional” rules, an analysis of the language used by the Court in these rulings offers reasons to diverge from this view. While the Court has refused to review constitutional amendments, it has done so in a way that comes very close to the language used by those courts that stated that such amendments were justiciable. Far from adhering to a mere policy of neutrality and self-restraint, the Constitutional Court speaks a “language of eternity” with a rich substantive content.
3
Traser, Julianna Sára, Nóra Béres, György Marinkás, and Erzsébet Pék. "The Principle of the Primacy of EU Law in Light of the Case Law of the Constitutional Courts of Italy, Germany, France, and Austria." Central European Journal of Comparative Law 1, no. 2 (2020): 151–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.47078/2020.2.151-175.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article examines the relationship among national constitutions, constitutional courts, and the primacy of Community Law in connection with four Member States (Germany, France, Italy, and Austria). It starts with the question of whether national constitutions contain a European Union (EU) clause and explicitly provide for the primacy of Community Law. It examines whether any constitutional restriction or reservation has been elaborated in the case law of constitutional courts, and the extent to which the constitutional courts examined can exercise control indirectly over cases of conformity of EU legislative acts with constitutions or cases of misuse of powers (ultra vires acts). The constitutions examined can be considered uniform in that they contain references to the individual Member States’ relationships with the EU and create the possibility of restricting their competence or sovereignty. However, they do not declare the principle of the primacy of Community Law. As a consequence, the constitutional courts of Member States play a key role in the interpretation of the principle of the primacy of Community Law, including the formulation of constitutional requirements and counterbalances in connection with the enforcement of the principle. A reference to constitutional identity appears in the case law of recent decades, the elements of which are elaborated on and filled with more or less specific content by the constitutional courts on a case-by-case basis. In the event of a possible violation of constitutional identity or principles with unconditional effectiveness, some constitutional courts exclude the possibility of Community Law being invoked against the constitution of a Member State, but at least on a case-by-case basis, they maintain the possibility of inapplicability or of creating compatibility. In the latter respect, the article also addresses the limited nature of the powers of constitutional courts to examine the compatibility of EU Treaties and their amendments with the constitution of a Member State (see ex-ante or ex-post review, procedural or substantive examination).
4
Samsudin, Muhammad Iqbal. "A Comparison of Judicial Review in Indonesian Constitutional Court and French Constitutional Council." Indonesian Comparative Law Review 5, no. 1 (2022): 31–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/iclr.v5i1.15127.
Texte intégralRésumé :
One of the advances in contemporary legal and governmental ideas to arise in the 20th century was the notion of establishing a Constitutional Court. A constitutional court is a high court that focuses on constitutional law issues. Its primary authority is to rule on whether laws that are reviewed are in fact in line with constitution or not. The purpose of this study is to compare the judicial review functions and institutional aspect of the Indonesian Constitutional Court with the French Constitutional Council. It explains the distinctions and similarities between the roles of the Indonesian Constitutional Court and the French Constitutional Council as judicial entities allowed to conduct judicial reviews of statutes in accordance with the constitution. The research method employed is library research, while the research approach is a statutory approach and a comparative approach. The study shows that the Constitutional Courts in France and Indonesia have certain similarities and differences that come from the issue of court’s authority, nature of decision, complainant party, and qualification and composition of justices.
5
Canivet, Guy. "Principes fondamentaux et transposition des directives communautaires Le contrôle du Conseil constitutionnel sur les lois de transposition des directives communautaires." European Review of Private Law 18, Issue 3 (2010): 487–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/erpl2010038.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract: In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel did, at first, not consider the control of the transposition of European directives as its task. This has changed by the approval of the Maastricht Treaty. Inspired by other constitutional courts in Europe, the Conseil Constitutionnel has started to exercise a limited control as of 2004. It may even be foreseen that, after the example of the Italian Constitutional Court, the Conseil Constitutionnel will in the near future pose prejudicial questions to the European Court of Justice. Résumé: En France, le Conseil constitutionnel n’a pas exercé, au départ, de contrôle de la transposition des directives européennes. Cette situation a changé avec l’approbation du Traité de Maastricht. Inspiré par d’autres Cours constitutionnelles en Europe, le Conseil constitutionnel a commencé à exercer un contrôle limité à partir de 2004. Il est à prévoir que, à l’instar de la Cour constitutionnelle italienne, le Conseil constitutionnel posera, dans un proche avenir, des questions préjudicielles à la Cour européenne de justice. Zusammenfassung: In Frankreich hat der Conseil constitutionnel die Kontrolle über die Einhaltung der Umsetzung von europäischen Richtlinien zunächst nicht als eine seiner Aufgaben angesehen. Mit der Annahme des Maastrichter Vertrages hat sich das geändert. Inspiriert durch andere europäische Verfassungsgerichte, hat der Conseil constitutionnel seit 2004 eine beschränkte Kontrolle ausgeübt. Es wäre sogar abzusehen, dass der Conseil constitutionnel nach Vorbild des italienischen Verfassungsgerichts in absehbarer Zukunft dem Europäischen Gerichtshof Fragen im Rahmen des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens stellen wird.
6
Wendel, Mattias. "Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives." European Constitutional Law Review 7, no. 1 (2011): 96–137. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019611100061.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Lisbon decisions of the constitutional courts in Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and Poland from a comparative perspective – Democracy, sovereignty and identity – Permeability of national and supranational law – Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and its constitutional foundations – Procedural background and legal outcome of the Lisbon decisions – Differences of institutional self-conception – Parliamentary responsibility for integration – Prior parliamentary assent to the future application of ‘dynamic treaty provisions’ – Different conceptions of national and multi-levelled democracy – Popular vote – Constitutional limits to European integration – Limits indicating the necessity of an amendment and limits protecting the inalienable substantial core of a constitutional order – German Bundesverfassungsgericht only court in Europe spelling out an eternity clause in a detailed, catalogue style manner – Judicial restraint – Ultra vires and identity review – Article 4.2 TEU as an integration clause of EU law and not a derogation clause – Comparative dialectics
7
Bossuyt, Marc, and Willem Verrijdt. "The Full Effect of EU Law and of Constitutional Review in Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment." European Constitutional Law Review 7, no. 3 (2011): 355–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019611300028.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Coincidence of human rights review by national and European courts – Courts questioning and delimiting each other's jurisdiction – Evolution of judicial review of legislation in Belgium and France – Rules giving priority to national human rights review over European human rights review – Melki judgment Court of Justice – Conformity with Union law – Balance between effectiveness of EU review and effectiveness of constitutional review – Effectiveness of human rights – Obligatory a priori human rights review of secondary Union law
8
Nuriyev, G. H. "The powers of the European Constitutional Courts to hear cases on the constitutionality of regulations at the request of the courts and their corresponding features of manufacture." Russian Journal of Legal Studies 2, no. 3 (2015): 110–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/rjls18054.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The article analyzes the powers of the constitutional courts of four leading European countries: Germany, France, Italy and Spain to consider cases on the constitutionality of regulations at the request of the courts, as well as the corresponding features of the production. Reveals the nature of this type of constitutional proceedings. It is proved that the adversarial principle is applied only partially, and in some cases does not apply.
9
Gárdos-Orosz, Fruzsina. "Preliminary Reference and the Hungarian Constitutional Court: A Context of Non-Reference." German Law Journal 16, no. 6 (2015): 1569–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200021271.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Jiri Zemanek, Professor at Charles University, Prague, asks what conclusions may be drawn from the current state of acceptance of the European Union (EU) law doctrine by the constitutional courts of the new Member States for their performance in the agenda of preliminary rulings. What can they learn from the experience of the old Member States? Should they follow the practice of the AustrianVerfassungsgerichtshof(Constitutional Court), which referred its first question in 1999, four years after its accession, and later repeated it several times? Or should they follow the most active Belgian Cour Constitutionnelle? Should Hungary follow the practice of the Italian Constitutional Court, Lithuania, France, Spain, or Germany? Having reviewed the case law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the scholarly analysis in search of the “missing links,” this study wishes to contribute to the diverse range of ideas concerning European “rule of law” integration and constitutional court contributions to it.
10
Vatsov, Mihail. "European Integration Through Preliminary Rulings? The Case of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court." German Law Journal 16, no. 6 (2015): 1591–622. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200021283.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is instrumental for the so-called “judicial dialogue” within the European Union (EU). The goals of the preliminary reference procedure are to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law and to contribute to the harmonious development of the law throughout the EU. It was through the preliminary reference procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the principles of direct effect and supremacy were developed. It took many years before the first request by a Constitutional Court was sent to the CJEU. So far, the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and most recently Slovenia, have sent requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. By far the most active of these in sending requests has been the Belgian Court. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has indicated that it can request preliminary rulings from the CJEU but is yet to do so. In the other Member States (MS) with Constitutional Courts, references have not been sent yet, although worthy occasions in terms of EU-law-related cases have occurred, as also observed in various contributions in this special issue. These MSs include Bulgaria.
Thèses sur le sujet "Constitutional courts – France"
1
Paour, Raphaël. "Le pouvoir des cours constitutionnelles : analyse stratégique des cas espagnol, français et italien." Thesis, Paris 10, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA100132.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Si l’on comprend le pouvoir des cours constitutionnelles comme l’influence qu’elles exercent sur les autres organes, il faut concevoir leurs compétences comme les ressources et les moyens que les autres organes peuvent mobiliser afin de limiter leur influence comme les contraintes auxquelles leur pouvoir se heurte. En Espagne, en France et en Italie, la configuration institutionnelle alloue aux cours et aux autres organes des ressources et des moyens de pressions différents. L’analyse stratégique du pouvoir de la cour constitutionnelle dans ces trois pays consiste à interpréter leur histoire au regard de l’allocation de ces ressources et moyens de pression. Elle permet d’éclairer les manières singulières dont leur pouvoir s’est établi dans les trois pays étudiés. Elle permet de comprendre la déférence du Tribunal espagnol a l’égard du législateur et son activisme envers les juges ordinaire, les rapports au contraire collaboratifs que le Conseil constitutionnel et la Cour italienne ont noués avec les juges ordinaires et les relations souvent plus conflictuelles qu’ils entretiennent avec le législateur<br>If the power of constitutional courts is defined by the influence that they exercise upon other legal bodies, one must consider the review mechanisms at their disposal to exercise that power and the various ways in which other legal bodies can limit constitutional court influence. In Spain, France and Italy, the distribution of judicial review mechanisms and means of legal influence between the courts and the other legal bodies is different. The Power of Constitutional Courts gives an account of constitutional court power based on the distribution of judicial review mechanisms and other means of legal influence. It details specific ways in which constitutional courts have been able to establish their power in the three countries. It explains: the judicial deference of the Spanish Tribunal towards the legislature and its domination of other Spanish courts; the collaborative relationships of the French Conseil constitutionnel and the Italian Court have established with other courts and the more confrontational relationship they have had with the legislature
2
Silva-Arroyave, Sergio-Orlando. "La suprématie interprétative des juridictions constitutionnelles : étude comparée en droit français et colombien." Thesis, Paris 2, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA020026.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Les juridictions constitutionnelles ont sans doute de larges compétences interprétatives. Toutefois, l’ampleur de ces compétences varie dans les différents ordres juridiques selon l’aptitude que les autres organes et autorités de l’Etat peuvent adopter devant ces interprétations. Une juridiction constitutionnelle a une suprématie interprétative dans un Etat en particulier si ses interprétations doivent être obligatoirement respectées et appliquées par tous les autres organes et autorités de l’Etat. Si ses interprétations sont seulement obligatoires pour quelques autorités, cette juridiction constitutionnelle a simplement une compétence interprétative supérieure vis-à-vis de ces autorités. Afin d’identifier les plus larges compétences interprétatives des juridictions constitutionnelles, la démarche comparative est hautement recommandée parce qu’elle permet de distinguer plus facilement les limitations que ces juridictions peuvent rencontrer dans leurs ordres juridiques respectifs. Ainsi, en suivant cette démarche, seront identifiées l’ampleur des compétences interprétatives des juridictions constitutionnelles française et colombienne et leurs répercussions dans chacun de leurs Etats<br>Constitutional jurisdictions should have wide interpretative powers. However, the scope of these competences varies in different legal systems depending on the ability of other authorities to adopt such interpretations. A constitutional court has interpretative supremacy in a particular State, if its interpretations are binding for all other departments of the State. If its interpretations are just binding for some authorities, this constitutional court would simply have a superior interpretative competence toward those authorities. In order to determine the broader interpretative powers of the constitutional courts, the comparative approach is highly recommended because it makes easier to distinguish the limitations that these jurisdictions may encounter in their respective legal systems. In this way, the scope of the interpretative powers of the French and Colombian constitutional courts will be identified as well as their repercussions in each of its states
3
Ploux, Antoine. "La motivation des décisions des cours constitutionnelles : étude du discours de motivation des cours belge et française." Thesis, Bordeaux, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020BORD0291.
Texte intégralRésumé :
La motivation des décisions des cours constitutionnelles est un sujet classique pour la doctrine juridique, mais il est apparu que la manière habituelle, formelle, de le traiter ne permettait pas de donner entière satisfaction. La comparaison de la motivation des décisions des cours constitutionnelles belge et française a nécessité de retenir une conception fonctionnelle de la motivation. Nous avons appréhendé les décisions des cours constitutionnelles dans le contexte plus général du discours des cours et de leur processus de motivation. Dans cette perspective, il est apparu que ce discours s’insérait dans un réseau de contraintes particulières, mais exerçait néanmoins une influence manifeste. L’analyse de cette situation permet de dévoiler la part de contrainte et de liberté des cours constitutionnelles, spécialement belge et française, dans le processus de motivation de leurs décisions<br>The motivation of constitutional decisions is a classic subject for legal doctrine but it appears that the usual way, a formal way, of dealing with it does not provide complete satisfaction. The comparison of the motivation between the Belgian and French constitutional courts required to adopt a functional conception of this notion. We approached the motivation of constitutional courts decisions in the most general context of the constitutional court’s discourse and during their motivational process. Following this reasoning, it appeared then that this discourse is integrated in a particular network of pressures but exerted a clear influence. The analysis of this situation allows to reveal the freedom-pressure part of constitutional courts, especially Belgian and French, in the motivational process of their decisions
4
Espinosa, Romain. "Analyse économique de la norme juridique : des origines constitutionnelles à la mise en oeuvre par le juge." Thesis, Paris 2, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA020044/document.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Les questions de légitimité et de stabilité des systèmes politiques ont longtemps été étudiées séparément des problèmes de mise en oeuvre du droit en sciences économiques. L’objectif de cette thèse est concilier ces différentes approches afin de replacer la mise en oeuvre de la norme juridique au centre du débat institutionnel. Ce travail se décompose en cinq investigations empiriques ou expérimentales portant chacune sur une des étapes du processus politique et judiciaire.Le premier article s’intéresse à l’impact des droits constitutionnels sur les dépenses publiques. La seconde étude explore l’influence des biais d’auto-complaisance sur la demande et l’offre de redistribution. Le troisième travail analyse les décisions rendues par le Conseil Constitutionnel. La quatrième partie examine la réforme de la carte judiciaire des Conseils de Prud’hommes de 2008. Le dernier chapitre étudie la relation entre la composition syndicale des Conseils de Prud’hommes et les issues des litiges qui y sont portés.Nos analyses reposent sur les outils économétriques et expérimentaux. Elles font usage de méthodes d’estimations classiques (OLS, GLS, Probit, Logit, Within OLS), de modèles à sélection (Heckman, Triprobit), des outils destinés aux problèmes d’endogénéité (2SLS)et des techniques d’estimation de systèmes d’équation (3SLS). L’approche expérimentale contient également des tests statistiques communément appliqués (tests de permutation,tests de comparaison de moyenne, tests de proportion) ainsi que de récentes méthodes pour traiter l’hétérogénéité (wild clustering)<br>The legitimacy and the stability of political systems have very often been studied in economics separate from considerations about legal norms’ enforcement. My objective is to combine these different approaches, and to place the question of the legal enforcement at the heart of the debate about institutions. This work is made of cinq empirical and experimental investigations that deal with each of the stages of the political and legal process.This first paper analyzes the impact of constitutional rights on public expenditures. The second article explores the influence of self-serving biases on the demand and the supplyof redistribution. The third analysis focuses on the decisions of the French Constitutional Council. The fourth work deals with the recent reform of the judiciary map of Frenchlabor courts. The last study investigates the relationship between the composition of the elected jurors in French labor courts and the way cases are terminated.Our investigations rely on econometric and experimental techniques. They use standard estimation methods (OLS, GLS, Probit, Logit, Within OLS), selection models (Heckman,Triprotibt), techniques for endogeneity correction (2SLS), and methods to estimate systems of equations (3SLS). The experimental analysis makes use of standard statistical tests(permutation tests, proportion tests, two-group mean-comparison tests), and more recent methods to solve heterogeneity (wild clustering)
5
Estanguet, Pauline. "Rejuger la constitutionnalité de la loi." Thesis, Pau, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PAUU2021/document.
Texte intégralRésumé :
La loi organique relative à la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité prévoit qu’en principe, une disposition législative peut être examinée par le Conseil constitutionnel si elle n’a pas été déjà déclarée conforme dans une précédente décision. Mais, par exception, l’existence d’un changement de circonstances peut néanmoins justifier son réexamen. A l’instar de toute décision de justice, un jugement rendu en application de l’article 61 ou 61-1 de la Constitution demeure circonstancié. Il paraît, dès lors, nécessaire de permettre à tout justiciable de remettre en cause de ce qui a été précédemment jugé. Toutefois, ce contrôle vise des lois déjà en application et ayant produit des effets. Il constitue, alors, un facteur non-négligeable d’insécurité juridique.C’est donc un véritable numéro d’équilibriste auquel le Conseil constitutionnel s’adonne depuis presque sept ans. D’un côté, poser une QPC constitue un véritable droit pour le justiciable dont l’effectivité tient aux possibilités réelles d’accès au prétoire du juge constitutionnel. D’un autre côté, la juridiction a le devoir de préserver les situations juridiques existantes ainsi que les droits légalement acquis. L’âge de raison étant atteint, cette étude a vocation à exposer et analyser l’attitude du juge, mais également à proposer quelques ajustements nécessaires au développement d’une justice constitutionnelle de qualité<br>According to the organic law relating to the « question prioritaire de constitutionnalité » (QPC), a law may essentially be reviewed by the constitutional council, if it hasn’t already been validated in a former court decision. But exceptionally, a court review may be justified by a change circumstances. Just like every court decision, a court ruling based on both articles 61 or 61-1 of the Constitution must be detailed. Thus, it appears to be necessary to make possible for every litigant to question what had already been ruled. However, this judicial control is about laws that already entered into force and took effect. Indeed, it may represent a significant cause of legal insecurity.Then, the constitutional judge has been spending seven years balancing those issues. On one hand, the possibility to submit a QPC is a real right for the litigant, which efficacy is made possible by an effective access to the constitutional court. On the other hand, the court has to preserve all existing legal situations and acquired rights. Now that the age of reason has been reached, this study is aimed at showing and analysing the behaviour of the judge, and also proposing some adjustments necessary to the development of a quality constitutional justice
6
Jan, Pascal. "La saisine du Conseil constitutionnel." Tours, 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997TOUR1009.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Le conseil constitutionnel charge d'assurer l'ordre constitutionnel est, a cette fin, saisi de multiples et divers recours. La saisine de la haute juridiction constitutionnelle, apprehendee sous un angle procedural et definie comme l'exercice d'une action juridictionnelle repond a des conditions de recevabilite qui varient selon l'objet des recours, institutionnels ou electoraux. Mais l'efficacite des mecanismes de selection des demandes renforce le respect de la regle de droit comme elle revele la transformation du controle des majorites politiques<br>THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL, CHARGED WITH SECURING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, IS, TO THIS END, SEIZED OF MUILTIPLE ANS SEVERAL RECOURSES. THE SEISIN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIGH JURISDICTION, UNDERSTOOD AS PROCEDURAL ANS DEFINIED AS THE EXERCICE OF A JURIDICTIONAL ACTION, CORRESPONDS TO CONDITIONS OF RECEVABILITY WHICH CHANGE IN ACCORDANCE TO THE OBJECT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL OR ELECTORAL RECOURSES. THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MECHANISMS OF ACTIONS SELECTION strengthHENS THE RESPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW AS IT REVEALS THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL MAJORITIES
7
Lebedel, Sophie. "Le précédent dans les décisions des cours constitutionnelles : Étude comparée des expériences française, espagnole et italienne de justice constitutionnelle." Thesis, Toulon, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012TOUL0067.
Texte intégralRésumé :
La règle du précédent, clé de voûte de la Common law, impose au juge de respecter les décisions analogues précédentes, en l’absence de justification pour se départir de celles-ci. Cette règle est donc logiquement absente de la théorie du droit romano-germanique, selon laquelle, schématiquement, le juge n’est soumis qu’à la loi. Pourtant, l’étude des décisions des juridictions de tradition romaniste et, plus précisément, des cours constitutionnelles montrent que ces dernières n’hésitent pas à appliquer la règle du précédent. Il ne s’agit pas d’une volonté de se soumettre à un précédent contraignant et obligatoire, mais de juger en conformité et dans la logique des solutions antérieurement adoptées. L’autorité du précédent constitutionnel est donc, le plus souvent, psychologique et le juge constitutionnel peut renoncer à l’appliquer lorsqu’il l’estime nécessaire. Le précédent devient ainsi un instrument judiciaire universel, permettant d’assurer, indifféremment du système juridique, l’uniformité et la cohérence de la jurisprudence<br>Precedent, the key-stone of Common law, obliges the Court to comply with analogous preceding decisions, in the absence of justification for abandoning them. This rule is therefore logically absent from the theory of Civil law, according to which, schematically, the Court is only bound by written law. Nevertheless, the study of court decisions in Civil law systems and, more exactly, those of constitutional courts show that they do not hesitate to apply the rules of precedent. It is not a question of a will to be held by a binding and obligatory precedent, but to judge in conformity and within the logic of previously adopted solutions. The authority of constitutional precedent is therefore, more often than not, psychological and the constitutional court can desist from applying it when it deems necessary. Precedent thus becomes a universal judicial instrument, enabling to ensure, regardless of the legal system, the uniformity and the coherence of case-law
8
Dyevre, Arthur. "L' activisme juridictionnel en droit constitutionnel comparé : France, États-Unis, Allemagne." Paris 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008PA010266.
Texte intégralRésumé :
La Due Process Clause du XIVe amendement, l'article 2 al. 1 de la Loi fondamentale et les principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République occupent une place considérable dans les jurisprudences de la Cour suprême, de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale et du Conseil constitutionnel. Au nom de ces dispositions, ces juridictions ont développé une conception extrêmement large de leur compétence de contrôle et d'appréciation. Ces conceptions et les décisions qu'elles justifient s'écartent, sur plusieurs points, du cadre normatif pourtant très étendu qu'elles prétendent concrétiser (activisme juridictionnel au sens fort). D'autre part, dans. Les hypothèses vis-à-vis desquelles ces dispositions constitutionnelles s'avèrent indéterminées, ces juridictions ont souvent substitué leur propre concrétisation à celle opérée par le législateur, l'administration ou les autres juridictions (activisme au sens faible).
9
Danilenko, Denis. "Le procès constitutionnel et le droit processuel." Aix-Marseille 3, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008AIX32037.
Texte intégralRésumé :
La procédure devant le Conseil constitutionnel est-elle juridictionnelle ? Connaît-elle des ressemblances avec les procédures juridictionnelles de droit commun ?Bien que le phénomène de la « juridictionnalisation » de la procédure devant le Conseil constitutionnel ait été évoqué par plusieurs auteurs, la procédure devant le Conseil constitutionnel n'a pourtant pas donné lieu à des études approfondies sur le sujet. La présente recherche a pour objet de confronter les données de la procédure devant le Conseil constitutionnel en matière de contrôle des normes avec les procédures de droit commun. La discipline de droit processuel, dont l'objet consiste en l'étude du droit des différentes procédures juridictionnelles, offre une base solide à la recherche entreprise et permet – à l'aide notamment des notions propres au droit processuel – d'appréhender la procédure que connaît la juridiction constitutionnelle française. Cette approche permet d'identifier, d'une part, dans la procédure que connaît le Conseil constitutionnel les principes processuels communs à toute procédure juridictionnelle. D'autre part, les spécificités, que connaît indéniablement la procédure devant le Conseil constitutionnel, sont replacées à leur juste place : un bon nombre d'entre-elles se retrouve dans des procédures juridictionnelles particulières, ce qui conduit à leur dénier le statut de spécificités propres au procès constitutionnel<br>Is the procedure before the “Conseil constitutionnel” jurisdictional ? Is it comparable with procedures before other courts ? Although the phenomenon of “juridictionnalisation” of the procedure before the “Conseil constitutionnel” has been examined by some authors, it has nevertheless not been studied thoroughly. This research aims to compare the procedure before the “Conseil constitutionnel” with regard to its normative jurisdiction with procedures before common law tribunals. Procedural law, which deals with an analysis of the different jurisdictional procedures, offers a solid basis for this research. It allows us to tackle the procedure before the “Conseil constitutionnel” in jurisdictional terms thanks to the concepts and principles characteristic to jurisdictional procedures. This approach enables, on the one hand, to assess if the key concepts and principles common to any jurisdictional procedure appear in the procedure before the “Conseil constitutionnel”. On the other hand, the characteristics of the procedure before the “Conseil constitutionnel” are not so distinctive: some of the specificities of this procedure, regarded as unique, can be found in some jurisdictional procedures before other courts and thus are not so characteristic to the constitutional process
10
Jurion, Roxane. "La jurisprudence économique du Conseil constitutionnel." Thesis, Université de Lorraine, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LORR0176.
Texte intégralRésumé :
La thèse porte sur le contenu économique de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel. Il s'agit, dans un premier temps, de délimiter l'ensemble des décisions de cette jurisprudence qu'on peut qualifier d'économiques. Cette étape vise à s'interroger sur la spécificité de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle dans ce domaine. L'hypothèse centrale consiste dans l'idée d'une marge de pouvoir discrétionnaire laissée au législateur s'agissant des grands choix de politique économique. Cette étude jurisprudentielle aboutit donc à une conclusion plus générale en ce qui concerne le contenu économique de la Constitution de 1958. La faible contrainte constitutionnelle sur la politique économique nationale peut être interprétée comme une forme de « neutralité économique » de la constitution. En dépit de cette neutralité apparente, il est possible de déceler une philosophie économique sous-jacente dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle relative tant aux limites opposables au législateur qu’à la répartition des pouvoirs en termes de politique économique. L’analyse jurisprudentielle est confrontée aux grands courants de pensée économique et soulève les difficultés posées par la construction européenne, à l’heure où celle-ci fait peser un certain nombre de contraintes sur la politique économique des États et dans un contexte appelant à une redéfinition des rapports structurants entre droit, économie et politique<br>The research analyses the economic content of the decisions of the French constitutional court. Which decisions can be qualified as economic decisions ? Is there a specificity of such economic decisions compared to other kinds of decisions ? We conclude that as far as economic policies are concerned we can observe a marked judicial self-restraint of the court. This judicial self-restraint can be interpreted as a sign of a kind of ″economic neutrality″ of the French constitution. Despite this apparent neutrality, it is possible to detect an underlying philosophy in the Constitutional Council’s decisions related to the judicial limitation of the legislator’s intervention and to the division of powers in the matter of economic policy. The analysis will be compared with the economic thinking, and will take into account the European construction, at a time when European Union impose burdens on Member States’ economic policies, and in a context calling for a redefinition of the structural links between law, economics and policy
Livres sur le sujet "Constitutional courts – France"
1
Favoreu, Louis. Le Conseil constitutionnel. 3rd ed. Presses universitaires de France, 1985.
Trouver le texte intégral
2
Loïc, Philip, ed. Le Conseil constitutionnel. 5th ed. Presses universitaires de France, 1991.
Trouver le texte intégral
3
Favoreu, Louis. Le Conseil constitutionnel. 6th ed. Presses universitaires de France, 1995.
Trouver le texte intégral
4
Favoreu, Louis. Le Conseil constitutionnel. 4th ed. Presses universitaires de France, 1988.
Trouver le texte intégral
8
Viala, Alexandre. Les réserves d'interprétation dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel. L.G.D.J., 1999.
Trouver le texte intégral
10
La pratique française de la justice constitutionnelle. Presses universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 1990.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Constitutional courts – France"
1
Mak, Elaine. "Another Turn of the Screw: An Evaluation of Lasser’S judicial Deliberations in the Light of the Practices of Constitutional Review in France, Germany and the United States." In The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings. T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-519-3_19.
Texte intégral
2
Pavoni, Riccardo. "A Plea for Legal Peace." In Remedies against Immunity? Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62304-6_5.
Texte intégralRésumé :
AbstractThis chapter advocates legal peace between Germany and Italy as the most sensible and appropriate way to deal with the aftermath of Sentenza 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court and its declaration of the unconstitutionality of the 2012 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities. This plea does not only arise from frustration with the current impasse but also from the suspicion that the public good of legal peace has never seriously been canvassed by the Italian and German governments. Section II takes stock of the legal developments relating to the dispute between Germany and Italy since Sentenza 238/2014 was delivered. It especially focuses on the attitudes of the governments concerned, both in the context of the ongoing proceedings before Italian courts and elsewhere. It finds such attitudes opaque and unduly dismissive of the necessity to devise legal peace in the interest of the victims and of the integrity of international law. Section III highlights how the behaviour of the governments so far was at odds with the successful outcome of other intergovernmental negotiations concerning reparations for crimes committed during World War II (WWII), a process which has not been entirely finalized, as evidenced by the 2014 Agreement between the US and France on compensation for the French railroad deportees who were excluded from prior French reparation programmes. The Agreement between the US and France and all previous similar arrangements were concluded under mounting pressure of litigation before domestic courts against those states (and/or their companies) that were responsible for unredressed WWII crimes, thus a situation resembling the current state of the dispute between Germany and Italy. It is telling that litigation ended when the courts took cognizance of the stipulation of intergovernmental agreements establishing fair mechanisms for compensating the plaintiffs and victims of the relevant crimes. Such practice, therefore, is essentially in line with the proposition that state immunity (for human rights violations) is essentially conditional on effective alternative remedies for the victims. This and other controversial aspects related to the law of state immunity—such as the nature of state immunity, the North American remedies against immunity for state sponsors of terrorism, and the persistent dynamism of pertinent practice—are revisited in section IV. The purpose is to suggest that certainty about the law of international immunities, as allegedly flowing from the 2012 ICJ Judgment, is more apparent than real and that this consideration should a fortiori urge the realization of legal peace in the German–Italian affair.
3
Dutheillet de Lamothe, O. "The Primacy of Community Law Over National Constitutions: The Case of France." In Highest Courts and the Internationalisation of Law. Hague Academic Press, an imprint of T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-6704-641-1_5.
Texte intégral
4
Bobek, Michal. "France." In Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199680382.003.0007.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Assessing French theory and practice of the use of comparative arguments by courts, in particular by the three French highest courts, the Conseil constitutionnel, the Cour de cassation, and the Conseil d´Etat, the chapter suggests that in spite of not being visible on the surface, there is comparative exchange going on. For reasons peculiar to the legal and judicial tradition, such an exchange does, however, take on particular form. First, it is not openly displayed. Comparative reasoning in courts is primarily used as a tool of internal debates, not as an instrument for external justification. Secondly, because of the historical constitutional balance within the legal system, comparative law has traditionally been seen as a matter for the legislator and legal scholarship, not for the courts.
5
Elster, Jon. "The Royal Government and the Courts." In France before 1789. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691149813.003.0004.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This chapter provides a more general discussion of the royal government. It discusses the psychology of absolute power that is utterly different from the psychology of ordinary citizens or subjects. It focuses on the obstacles and constraints on the power of the royal government due to unwritten constitutional laws. The chapter argues that the psychology of the kings was in a sense self-defeating, in that their search for glory caused them to make choices that tended to diminish it. It also explains how royal officials were considered unreliable tools for the implementation of policy. This chapter ends by covering the mechanisms by which the courts could obstruct the king's will.
6
Quint, Peter E. "The Influence of the United States Supreme Court on Judicial Review in Europe." In The Max Planck Handbooks in European Public Law. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198726418.003.0016.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This chapter outlines the influence of the United States Supreme Court, and its institution of ‘judicial review’, on certain constitutional systems of Europe. It first introduces the United States Supreme Court and the institution of ‘decentralized’ judicial review, and then discusses the fate of American judicial review in the early nineteenth century. The chapter proceeds to an examination of the influence of the American Constitution and the American Supreme Court in the early nineteenth century in Europe, before recounting how the great philosopher and political thinker, Hans Kelsen, advanced another form of judicial review—‘centralized’ judicial review. Next, an analysis of the influence of the United States Supreme Court on certain constitutional tribunals created in Europe in the post-Second World War period is made, alongside a discussion of the separate path taken by judicial review in France under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958) and the influences on constitutional tribunals created in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. Finally, this chapter offers some reflections on the influence of the Supreme Court’s case law on decisions of European courts of the contemporary period.
7
Harlow, Carol. "France and the United Kingdom." In Tort Liability of Public Authorities in European Laws. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867555.003.0016.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This chapter compares the respective answers of the English and French systems of administrative liability within a wider comparative study that focuses on outcomes. The chapter is in three parts. It first looks briefly at the constitutional and cultural framework in which the rules operate. In France, we find a separate system of administrative courts which handle all questions relating to the administration, including liability, and which have built a sophisticated public law system of non-contractual liability. In the UK, where all questions of liability go to the ‘ordinary’ civil courts, the law is uncodified, and there are gaps in the liability principles. The chapter then looks at basic principles. In France, where the dominant principle is faute de service public, the courts also acknowledge a no-fault principle. In the UK, the strongest form of redress is strict liability for assault, battery, and false imprisonment, but the dominant principle is negligence, and a public authority must owe a duty of care to the claimant to be held liable. In the final part, the chapter answers specific liability questions, making the point that it is often hard to get redress for economic loss. Claimants often fail to get redress for wrongful failures to grant licences or exercise a discretion or statutory power.
8
Costa, Delphine. "Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review in France." In Judicial Review of Administration in Europe. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867609.003.0007.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This chapter describes administrative procedure and judicial review in France. In French public law, no constitutional provision provides for judicial review of administrative measures. Nor is there a convention providing for judicial review of administrative measures. This is only envisaged by the laws and regulations, in particular the Administrative Justice Code and the Code of Relations between the Public and the Administration. The administrative courts exercise extensive control over the acts or measures of the public administration, including both individual decisions and regulatory acts, but some are nonetheless beyond judicial review. Where an act or measure is contested on procedural grounds, judicial review takes place only under certain conditions: the procedural defect must have deprived the applicant of a guarantee or it must have influenced the meaning of the decision taken. Two types of judicial remedy exist in administrative law: it is therefore up to the applicant to limit their application before the administrative judge.
9
Martenet, Vincent. "Comparative Perspectives on Expropriation and Other Takings." In Procedural Requirements for Administrative Limits to Property Rights. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867586.003.0016.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract In many countries, administrative limits to property rights are subject to procedural requirements which differ not only among jurisdictions but also within a given jurisdiction. England, France, Germany, and the United States share many commonalities and some distinctive features regarding these requirements. Although similarities may be noted, these four countries differ in terms of their constitutional and statutory framework and how their courts and authorities deal with administrative limits to property rights. Depending on the country, the power to expropriate land can be either centralised or decentralised. Furthermore, this power usually belongs to government and other public bodies, but may even be granted to private entities under certain specific circumstances. Some cross-cutting issues relating, for instance, to urban planning, urgent situations, the expropriation of land for the creation or expansion of private facilities, or regulatory taking highlight various commonalities and differences among England, France, Germany, and the United States. In these four countries, concrete facts and specific situations matter—or should matter—when property rights are subject to administrative limits. Even if the framework regarding expropriation and other takings is usually set by legislatures—and the importance of statutes should not be underestimated in this area; the role of governmental or administrative bodies and of reviewing courts, in case of litigation, is also of great importance. They usually enjoy some discretion in order to take into account all the relevant facts in a given situation.
10
Wenzelburger, Georg. "Patterns of Law and Order Policies in 20 Western Industrialized Countries." In The Partisan Politics of Law and Order. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190920487.003.0003.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Chapter 3 provides a quantitative analysis of the politics of law and order. It is presented in three steps. First, it is tested whether party competition affects how much parties emphasize law and order issues in their programs and whether this is different for issue owners. The study reveals that high public salience of security-related issues pushes all parties to emphasize law and order more strongly and that issue owners react strongly to the pressure of right-wing populist parties by emphasizing law and order in their manifestos. Second, the quantitative analysis tests whether these different programmatic stances translate into more spending on law and order. This is indeed the case, but only if constitutional courts are weak. Third, the analysis takes a closer look at legislation in France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and finds the main results of the analysis on public spending corroborated.
Actes de conférences sur le sujet "Constitutional courts – France"
1
Karaman, Ebru. "Structure of the Constitutional Courts in Comparative Law: Macedonia, Turkey, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Spain." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c05.01158.
Texte intégralRésumé :
When the legislative has delimited rights and freedoms illegally, Constitutional Court should step in as an efficient assurance and this forcefulness is undoubtedly related to the structure of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court's organization and election of the members of the Constitutional Court and status have a great importance for freedom of the Court. As a matter of fact, the only way to protect people’s fundamental rights and freedoms is possible with independent verdict. Judiciary which fulfills the function of judgment behalf of the nation and the judges who hold the judicial power, have an indispensable importance. The assurance of people’s right and freedoms could be provided only, when the court has accomplished their mission away from all kinds of pressure and influence. The freedom of judges also means their appointments, employee rights and working condition therefore; in first place, the organization of the Turkish Constitutional Court (General Assembly, Department, Division, Commission), then the election of members of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the status are compared with the regulation of Macedonia, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Spain.
2
Karaman, Ebru. "Principle of Laicity in Turkish and French Constitutions." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c11.02275.
Texte intégralRésumé :
To be assumed as a truly democratic state of law; the state should not make law according to a religion and not have a religion-based structure. Turkey and France are two countries different from others being in the discussions on secularism examining the relationship between religion and state. Because the laicity is one of the foundations of the regime and takes part in the legal system as a constitutional principle.
 In the first chapter the provisions on laicity in the Turkish Constitutions before the date 1982 and in the Turkish Constitution dated 1982 are going to be explained then the discussions in Turkey are going to be evaluated according to the Turkish Constitutional Court's approach to the principle of laicity. In the second part the provisions on the principle of laicity in the French Constitution dated 1958 are going to be explained, afterwards the discussions on laicity in France is going to take place.
 State and religion relations continue to be relevant a subject. That is why it still gives form to Turkish political life. The freedom of religion and the separation of religious and state relations are the requirements of the laic state. For a state these includes not to have an official religion, be impartial to all the religion and to treat equal to all the believers to different religions, to distinguish the religious institutions and state institutions and not to have an accordance between the rules of and the rules of religion.
3
Kačer, Hrvoje. "CHF CASE – 2019. god." In XV Majsko savetovanje: Sloboda pružanja usluga i pravna sigurnost. University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Law, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/xvmajsko.153k.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In this text the authors deal with the latest developments in the Croatian model of solving the so-called CHF case. Unfortunately, the legislator did not do well and failed to see the possibility that, when he had already decided to bring the new normative framework, to predict and to properly regulate in it at least the key legal issues, such as: (no)admissibility of the lawsuit for those who decided to convert, the statutory limitation of the judgment on collective lawsuit and the currency clause relating to the Swiss franc. Instead of preventing reasons for the future lawsuit by the amendment of the Consumer Credit Law, it seems that (whatever it is desired) has come to the contrary. Despite the criticism of the legislator, the authors agree with the current court practice, for which the authors think it might and must (regarding to the highest courts) be much faster, in any case, the waiting for decisions of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia should be measured in months rather than years. The authors certainly repeat their already stated opinion that in the procedures that are labeled with the CHF case syntax, as a rule, there is no exclusive responsibility, and that is only (above slowness) what should be criticized in the court practice, which has not recognized it.