Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Competition – Government policy – European Union countries »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Competition – Government policy – European Union countries"
Frieden, Jeffry A. « Real Sources of European Currency Policy : Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration ». International Organization 56, no 4 (2002) : 831–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081802760403793.
Texte intégralRajabiun, Reza. « Strategic Considerations in the Emergence of Private Action Rights ». World Competition 32, Issue 3 (1 septembre 2009) : 409–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2009038.
Texte intégralBoiko, Nataliia. « UNITED KINGDOM MIGRATION POLICY AND MIGRATION FROM UKRAINE (1990–2020) ». Naukovì zapiski Nacìonalʹnogo unìversitetu "Ostrozʹka akademìâ". Serìâ Ìstoričnì nauki 1 (17 décembre 2020) : 41–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.25264/2409-6806-2020-31-41-49.
Texte intégralKramar, Hans. « Economic convergence on different spatial levels : the conflict between cohesion and growth ». Raumforschung und Raumordnung 64, no 1 (31 janvier 2006) : 18–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf03183103.
Texte intégralBednarczyk, Jan L., Katarzyna Brzozowska-Rup et Sławomir Luściński. « Opportunities and Limitations of Hydrogen Energy in Poland against the Background of the European Union Energy Policy ». Energies 15, no 15 (29 juillet 2022) : 5503. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en15155503.
Texte intégralPach, Janina, et Mieczysława Solińska. « Problem pomocy dla małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw w Polsce po akcesji do Unii Europejskiej ». Przedsiębiorczość - Edukacja 6 (1 janvier 2010) : 310–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.24917/20833296.6.23.
Texte intégralGrzymała-Busse, Anna. « The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions ». Comparative Political Studies 39, no 3 (avril 2006) : 271–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414005284216.
Texte intégralYaroshenko, I. V., et I. B. Semigulina. « Global Experience of State Support in the System of Public Management of Territorial Communities’ Development ». PROBLEMS OF ECONOMY 4, no 46 (2020) : 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-0712-2020-4-19-28.
Texte intégralGUDZ, PETER, MARYNA GUDZ et BARBARA DĄBROWSKA. « COMMON POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRY : PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES IN THE NEW REALITY OF POSTPANDEMIC ». Economic innovations 23, no 3(80) (20 août 2021) : 85–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.31520/ei.2021.23.3(80).85-100.
Texte intégralBerthold, Norbert. « Das Bündnis für Arbeit – Ein Weg aus der institutionellen Verflechtungsfalle ? » Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 2, no 4 (novembre 2001) : 383–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2516.00063.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "Competition – Government policy – European Union countries"
KARAGIANNIS, Yannis. « Preference heterogeneity and equilibrium institutions : The case of European competition policy ». Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/15460.
Texte intégralExamining board: Prof. Adrienne Héritier (EUI)(Supervisor) ; Prof. Christian Joerges (EUI, Law Department) ; Prof. Jacint Jordana (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona) ; Prof. Hussein Kassim (Birkbeck College, University of London)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
One characteristic of European competition policy is its complex governance structure. On the one hand, the European competition regulator has always enjoyed a high degree of formal autonomy from national governments. On the other hand, that regulator has always been embedded in a multi-task and collegial organisation that mirrors intergovernmental politics. Although the literature has often disapprovingly noted this complexity, it has not been explained. Part I elaborates on the theoretical lens for understanding the governance structures of EC competition policy. Despite the prominence of principal-agent models, transaction cost economics seems to offer a more promising venue. The assumption that Member States maximise their total expected gains and postpone excessive bargaining costs leads to the following hypothesis: the greater the preference heterogeneity (homogeneity) between Member States, the higher (lower) the asset-specific investments involved, hence the higher (lower) the risk of post-contractual hold-ups, and hence the more (less) integrated the governance structures created to sustain future transactions. Alternatively, this logic leads to a deterministic hypothesis about the sufficiency of preference heterogeneities for the production of complex governance structures. Part II examines this deterministic hypothesis. Using various sources, and conducting both within- and comparative case- studies, it analyses three important cases: the negotiations of the Treaty of Paris (1951), of the Treaty of Rome (1957), and of the two implementing Council Regulations (1962 and 2003). The evidence shows that (a) the relevant actors do reason in terms of transaction cost-economising, and (b) in the presence of preference heterogeneity, actors create complex governance structures. Nevertheless, it is also found that (c) the transaction cost-economising logic is not as compelling as it may be in private market settings, as bargaining costs are not systematically postponed to the post-contractual stage, and (d) the transaction costs between Member States are not the only relevant costs.
Zhong, Xiao Fei. « China and the EU : competition and cooperation in the Caspian region ». Thesis, University of Macau, 2010. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b2555549.
Texte intégralFERNANDES, Daniel. « Governments, public opinion, and social policy : change in Western Europe ». Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/75046.
Texte intégralExamining Board: Prof. Ellen Immergut (EUI, Supervisor); Prof. Anton Hemerijck (EUI); Prof. Christoffer Green-Pedersen (Aarhus University); Prof. Evelyne Hübscher (Central European University)
This dissertation investigates how public opinion and government partisanship affect social policy. It brings an innovative perspective that links the idea of democratic representation to debates about the welfare state. The general claim made here is that social policy is a function of public and government preferences. This claim hinges on two critical premises. The first relates to the general mechanisms that underlie government representation. Politicians have electoral incentives to align their actions with what citizens want. They may respond to public opinion indirectly by updating their party agendas, which can serve as the basis for social policy decisions in case they get elected. They may also respond directly by introducing welfare reforms that react to shifts in public opinion during their mandates. The second premise concerns how citizens and politicians structure their preferences over welfare. These preferences fall alongside two dimensions. First, general attitudes about how much should the state intervene in the economy to reduce inequality and promote economic well-being (how much policy). Second, the specific preferences about which social programmes should get better funding (what kind of policy). The empirical analysis is split into three empirical chapters. Each explores different aspects of government representation in Western European welfare states. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) asks how governments shape social policy when facing severe pressures to decrease spending. It argues that governments strategically reduce spending on programmes that offer less visible and indirect benefits, as they are less likely to trigger an electoral backlash. The experience of the Great Recession is consistent with this claim. Countries that faced the most challenging financial constraints cut down social investment and services. Except for Greece, they all preserved consumption schemes. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) explores how public opinion affects government spending priorities in different welfare programmes. It expects government responsiveness to depend on public mood for more or less government activity and the most salient social issues at the time. Empirical evidence from old-age, healthcare and education issue-policy areas supports these claims. Higher policy mood and issue saliency is positively associated with increasing spending efforts. Public opinion does not appear to affect unemployment policies. vii The third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) examines how party preferences affect spending priorities in unemployment programmes. It claims that preferences on economic intervention in the economy and welfare recalibration affect different components of unemployment policy. Evidence from the past 20 years bodes well with these expectations. The generosity of compensatory schemes depends on economic preferences. The left invests more than the right. The funding of active labour-market policies depends on both preference dimensions. Among conventional parties, their funding follows the same patterns as compensatory schemes. Among recalibration parties, parties across the economic spectrum present comparable spending patterns.
Lai, I. Tak. « Towards the EU common migration and asylum policy : challenges or opportunities ? » Thesis, University of Macau, 2010. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b2555551.
Texte intégralDAVITER, Falk. « The power of initiative : framing legislative policy conflicts in the European Union ». Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7044.
Texte intégralExamining Board: Prof. Adrienne Héritier, (European University Institute/SPS/RSCAS) ; Prof. Stefano Bartolini, (European University Institute/RSCAS) ; Prof. Ellen M. Immergut, (Humboldt University Berlin) ; Prof. Claudio Radaelli, (University of Exeter)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
This thesis asks how the framing of policy issues in EU legislative politics influences the way issues are processed, how it affects which interests play a role during policy drafting and deliberation, and what type of political conflicts and coalitions emerge as a result. Focusing in particular on the European Commission’s role in EU policy-making, this thesis goes on to investigate how actors in EU politics define and redefine the issues at stake according to their shifting policy agendas and in doing so attempt to shore up support and marginalise political opposition. Drawing on the empirical investigation of two decades of EU biotechnology policy-making, the thesis finds that the framing of policy issues systematically affects how the complex and fragmented EU political decision-making process involves or excludes different sets of actors and interests from the diverse political constituencies of the Union. It argues that the Commission’s role in structuring the EU policy space can at times be substantial. Yet the longitudinal perspective adopted in this study also reveals how the structuring and restructuring of the biotechnology policy space led to the increasing politicisation of the EU decision-making process. Eventually, the empirical investigation concludes, the Commission was unable to control the political dynamics set off by the reframing of the policy choices, and the resulting revision of the EU biotechnology policy framework ran counter to the Commission’s original policy objectives. This study thus provides fresh insights into the dynamics of policy-level politicisation and its effects on political conflict and competition in the EU. The framing perspective allows students of EU politics to trace how political agents and institutions interact to shape and at times exploit the complexities of EU policy-making in pursuit of their often conflicting agendas. Finally, the findings suggest that the key to conceptualising the scope of Commission agency in terms of systematic policy dynamics lies in exploring the interlocking effects of policy framing and EU politicisation in the political construction of interests at the supranational level.
Luedtke, Adam. « Fortress Europe or spillover ? : immigration politics and policy at the European level ». Thesis, McGill University, 1997. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=20441.
Texte intégralZhang, Lu. « Is the EU a social union ? :the function of common social policy for European integration ». Thesis, University of Macau, 2012. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b2554777.
Texte intégralPapandropoulos, Sylvie-Pénélope. « Issues in european competition policy : lobbying, reputation and R&D co-operation ». Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/211988.
Texte intégralWang, Yan Chao. « EU's agricultural support policy and its revelation on China's agricultural policy ». Thesis, University of Macau, 2011. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b2555588.
Texte intégralJónsdóttir, Jóhanna. « Europeanisation of the Icelandic policy process ». Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.609096.
Texte intégralLivres sur le sujet "Competition – Government policy – European Union countries"
Cini, Michelle. Competition policy in the European union. New York : St. Martin's Press, 1998.
Trouver le texte intégralLee, McGowan, dir. Competition policy in the European Union. 2e éd. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Trouver le texte intégralXavier, Vives, dir. Competition policy in the EU : Fifty years from the treaty of Rome. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2009.
Trouver le texte intégralEdmund, Fitzpatrick, et Johnson Debra, dir. The European competitive environment : Text and cases. Oxford : Butterworth-Heinemann, 1995.
Trouver le texte intégralStates of liberalization : Redefining the public sector in integrated Europe. Albany : State University of New York Press, 2005.
Trouver le texte intégralThe political economy of European Union competition policy : A case study of the telecommunications industry. New York : Routledge, 2008.
Trouver le texte intégralEC competition law and policy. Cullompton, Devon, UK : Willan Pub., 2002.
Trouver le texte intégralFuller, Sue. Guide to information on European Union competition policy. 2e éd. Manchester : EIA, 1999.
Trouver le texte intégralGreening EU competition law and policy. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Trouver le texte intégralJ, Richardson J., dir. European Union : Power and policy-making. 2e éd. London : Routledge, 2001.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "Competition – Government policy – European Union countries"
Carlberg, Michael. « Competition between the European Central Bank, the German Government, and the French Government ». Dans Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union, 175–83. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24797-5_21.
Texte intégralMahmutaj, Noela. « Russian Government Policy in the Western Balkans ». Dans Securitization and Democracy in Eurasia, 125–35. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16659-4_8.
Texte intégralvan Dijk, Frans. « Independence and Trust ». Dans Perceptions of the Independence of Judges in Europe, 77–92. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63143-7_6.
Texte intégralMichailidou, Asimina, Elisabeth Eike et Hans-Jörg Trenz. « Journalism, Truth and the Restoration of Trust in Democracy : Tracing the EU ‘Fake News’ Strategy ». Dans Europe in the Age of Post-Truth Politics, 53–75. Cham : Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13694-8_4.
Texte intégralCan, Hamit, et Daniela Minkovska. « The Energy Policy of Bulgaria ». Dans CSR and Socially Responsible Investing Strategies in Transitioning and Emerging Economies, 120–36. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-2193-9.ch007.
Texte intégralCan, Hamit, et Daniela Minkovska. « The Energy Policy of Bulgaria ». Dans Research Anthology on Clean Energy Management and Solutions, 1841–57. IGI Global, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-9152-9.ch081.
Texte intégralPatey, Luke. « What Is Best for Europe ? » Dans How China Loses, 158–95. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190061081.003.0007.
Texte intégralSchimmelfennig, Frank, et Thomas Winzen. « Explaining Differentiation in EU Treaties ». Dans Ever Looser Union ?, 67–82. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854333.003.0005.
Texte intégralBache, Ian, Simon Bulmer, Stephen George et Owen Parker. « 18. Policies and Policy Making in the European Union ». Dans Politics in the European Union, 331–50. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780199689668.003.0018.
Texte intégralHarrison, Glenn W., Thomas F. Rutherford et David G. Tarr. « Increased Competition and Completion of the Market in the European Union : Static and Steady State Effects ». Dans Applied Trade Policy Modeling in 16 Countries, 361–94. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814551434_0015.
Texte intégralActes de conférences sur le sujet "Competition – Government policy – European Union countries"
Diril, Funda. « Comparison of Fiscal Reforms in Some South and East European Transition Economies ». Dans International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c05.01014.
Texte intégralBaigonushova, Damira, Junus Ganiev et Mairam Baigonusheva. « Government Support of the Agricultural Sector in the EAEU Countries ». Dans International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c11.02291.
Texte intégralKalenova, Saulesh, Rahman Alshanov, Ali Abishev et Valentina Gerasimenko. « The Resource Potential of the Participating Countries of the Eurasian Economic Union ». Dans International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c06.01243.
Texte intégralLina, Al Eassa. « FOSTERING RESILIENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2015 EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY REVIEW׃ EVIDENCE FROM JORDAN ». Dans NORDSCI International Conference. SAIMA Consult Ltd, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32008/nordsci2020/b2/v3/13.
Texte intégralSilvestru, Ramona camelia, Lavinia Nemes et Catalin ionut Silvestru. « CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN KNOWLEDGE SHARING IN E-LEARNING PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ». Dans eLSE 2014. Editura Universitatii Nationale de Aparare "Carol I", 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.12753/2066-026x-14-212.
Texte intégralOzolina, Velga, et Astra Auzina-Emsina. « Macroeconometric Input-Output Model For Transport Sector Analysis ». Dans 35th ECMS International Conference on Modelling and Simulation. ECMS, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.7148/2021-0082.
Texte intégralGeambazu, Serin. « "Yeni Instanbul" : the expansion of a global city ». Dans 55th ISOCARP World Planning Congress, Beyond Metropolis, Jakarta-Bogor, Indonesia. ISOCARP, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.47472/mwhr1573.
Texte intégralRapports d'organisations sur le sujet "Competition – Government policy – European Union countries"
Jones, Emily, Beatriz Kira, Anna Sands et Danilo B. Garrido Alves. The UK and Digital Trade : Which way forward ? Blavatnik School of Government, février 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-wp-2021/038.
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