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1
Racz, Barnabas. « The Far-Left in Postcommunist Hungary : The Workers' Party ». Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no 1302 (1 janvier 1998) : 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/cbp.1998.75.
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The emotional euphoria of the East European regime changes in 1989-1990 and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet system led to a widespread view in both West and East that communist parties would disappear and become a matter of only historical interest. Closer analysis of political processes raised doubts about this view. Whatever rational or irrational reactions emerged about the post-Soviet communist parties, they were forces deeply rooted in twentieth century history and were unlikely to disappear in a quantum leap of change. It is the hypothesis of this inquiry into the radical left, which had enjoyed considerable support in the aftermath of World War II, that it was capable of surviving the crisis and may remain a part of the political realities for some time to come.
2
Haig, Fiona. « The Poznań Uprising of 1956 as Viewed by French and Italian Communists ». Journal of Cold War Studies 18, no 2 (avril 2016) : 160–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00641.
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The Poznań uprising of June 1956, coming just a few months after Nikita Khrushchev's landmark “secret speech” at the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, constituted the first real test of de-Stalinization. The uprising was a turning point in postwar Polish history and the precursor to subsequent bouts of unrest in Poland. Yet, the episode itself and its repercussions that year were overshadowed by more pressing and dramatic developments, especially the revolution in Hungary four months later. The responses of the leaders of the two largest non-ruling Communist parties to the Poznań rebellion have been well documented, but much less is known about how ordinary Communist Party members in Italy and France viewed the unrest. This article draws for the first time on the personal testimonies of more than fifty people who in 1956 were rank-and-file Communists from the federations of Var and Gorizia. The article looks in detail at the contemporary reactions to the anti-Communist rebellion. In so doing, it reveals much about ordinary Communists’ priorities, degrees of critical detachment, and level of commitment to the Soviet Union and the Communist cause.
3
Ciobanu, Monica. « Communist regimes, legitimacy and the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe ». Nationalities Papers 38, no 1 (janvier 2010) : 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990903394490.
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The purpose of this article is to clarify the relationship between forms of political legitimacy employed by communist regimes in East and Central Europe and subsequent models of revolutionary change in 1989. The conceptual basis of the analysis lies in Max Weber's theoretical framework of legitimacy. The four cases selected for comparison are Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The attempts of de-Stalinization and reformation of these party-state regimes through the introduction of paternalistic and also more goal-oriented measures could not prevent their disintegration in the 1980s and their subsequent collapse in 1989. But, I argue, it was the withdrawal of ideological support by elites that ultimately brought communism to an end. The differences in revolutionary scenarios and transitions to democracy in the four cases indicate the importance of a shift in both rulers and masses towards interest in dialogue and compromise. Hungary and Poland represent the clearest scenarios in which communist parties acted as agents of regime change in a rational-legal direction. The Bulgarian case stands as an intermediary case between these two and Romania. Finally, Romania represents an extreme case of violent revolution and the overthrow of a traditionalist and sultanistic regime and illustrates the difficulties following a complete collapse of political authority.
4
Varga, Mihai, Mihai Varga et Annette Freyberg-Inan. « The Threat of Selective Democracy. Popular Dissatisfaction and Exclusionary Strategy of Elites in East Central and Southeastern Europe ». Southeastern Europe 36, no 3 (2012) : 349–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763332-03603004.
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The large dissatisfaction of citizens with post-communist democracy in Central and Eastern Europe favors populist and anti-systemic parties and movements. These parties accuse their rivals of various forms of corruption and prescribe anti-systemic cures, including the discretionary exclusion of their rivals from political life. Analyzing the situations in Poland, Romania, and Hungary more closely, we reveal a risk of the development of “selective democracy,” in which key elites and their supporters redefine the borders of the polity in an exclusionary way, denying various groups of “enemies” legitimate access and representation and thereby undermining basic democratic principles.
5
Penner, Mack. « Year of refusal : crisis and ideology in the Communist Party of Canada, 1956-7 ». Twentieth Century Communism 21, no 21 (1 novembre 2021) : 55–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3898/175864321834645814.
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Just as they did for other communist parties around the world, events in 1956 brought a crisis to the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). Khrushchev's Secret Speech and the Soviet invasion of Hungary produced a reckoning with what exactly it meant to be a communist and a marxist-leninist. In Canada, this reckoning would lead to a mass exit of party members and to a precipitous decline in the general fortunes of the party after 1956. In existing histories, this crisis has been presented as though it played out in quite strictly bipolar fashion as a conflict between a growing minority of independent marxists on the one hand and, on the other, a larger group of party leaders and their supporters who remained committed to a Soviet-aligned marxist-leninist politics in Canada. In fact, the ideology of the crisis was more complex. Ideological reactions to 1956 could range, at least, across stalinist, liberal, marxist-leninist, or independent-marxist iterations. Taking 1956 to constitute a year of refusal in the CPC, this essay follows the trajectories of these ideologically distinct 'modes of refusal' and suggests an alternative history.
6
Ferkai, András. « Modernity in the wilderness ? Architects’ role in developing rural Hungary, 1930–1960 ». Journal of Modern European History 18, no 4 (30 juillet 2020) : 428–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1611894420943782.
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The aim of this article is to survey a longer period in Hungarian architecture starting from around 1930 and into the 1960s in order to investigate how subsequent generations of modern architects related to the social and housing problems of the countryside. It is widely held that although social sensitivity was a dominant feature of the modernist agenda, it was limited to an urban context, with little regard for rural areas unfamiliar to the movement’s leading proponents. Since the most radical and best-organized group of Hungarian architects was a section of the international organization Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne, their theoretical work was largely guided by the group’s centre in Zürich. This article traces some of the visions that were set against these ‘imported ideas’ and the extent to which these visions could be realized under the Horthy regime, which was at the time gradually moving towards the far-right. Furthermore, it maps the process that led to the confrontation between modernists and regionalists in the early 1940s. It also shows how the bipolar discourse revolving around social modernization was resolved by the democratic transformations of 1945, which set the stage for temporary cooperation between rivalling factions and led to architects reaching an understanding with reconstruction in mind. However, the hope for a strong and independent farming class and long-term development and planning policies backed by peasant parties was dashed by the communist breakthrough in 1948 As a result, the issue of rural housing would be raised anew only in the 1960s, when the Kádár regime made concessions to the collectivized peasantry. In the final section of this article, I will discuss why both the functionalist modern and regionalist models offered by architects failed. The family house type, which had been spontaneously developed by ‘self-help building’ and was condemned by the architecture profession in a new debate of the 1960s, cannot be explained by mere ideological or cultural discrepancies but through a profound socio-psychological analysis.
7
Ziblatt, Daniel F. « The Adaptation of Ex-Communist Parties to Post-Communist East Central Europe : a Comparative Study of the East German and Hungarian Ex-Communist Parties ». Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no 2 (1 juin 1998) : 119–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(98)00003-8.
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The “Ex-communist party” label has often been used to describe the political ideas and political behavior of the former ruling communist parties operating in post-communist political systems. Yet, the former ruling communist parties have not only followed diverse paths of organizational transformation, but also have developed very different strategic visions of their role in the politics of post-communism. By comparing the political environments faced by the former ruling organizations of East Germany and Hungary and then utilizing content analysis to identify the strategic visions of each of the two organizations, this article demonstrates how different post-communist national political settings have resulted in divergent strategic visions for successor parties in Germany and Hungary.
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Kovacs, Andras. « Antisemitism in post‐communist Hungary ». Patterns of Prejudice 27, no 2 (octobre 1993) : 95–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0031322x.1993.9970113.
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Mueller, Wolfgang. « Soviet Policy, Political Parties, and the Preparation for Communist Takeovers in Hungary, Germany, and Austria, 1944-1946 ». East European Politics and Societies : and Cultures 24, no 1 (21 janvier 2010) : 90–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325409354557.
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A large number of similarities can be seen between Soviet and communist activities following World War II in Germany and Austria and in East Central European countries such as Hungary, which were later entirely incorporated into the Soviet bloc. In both cases, Moscow-trained communists aimed at establishing “people’s democracy” and took a leading role in rebuilding the respective country’s adminis-trative apparatus. However, while they managed, with Soviet support, to take over power in Hungary, they failed to do so in Austria. In Germany, communist and Soviet action contributed to the partition of the country. This article, on the basis of Soviet and German documents, draws the conclusion that the main reason for the success or failure of communist takeover was the Soviet factor: the power Soviet authorities had in the respective countries and the priority they assigned to communist takeover.
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Lubecki, Jacek. « Echoes of Latifundism ? Electoral Constituencies of Successor Parties in Post-Communist Countries ». East European Politics and Societies : and Cultures 18, no 1 (février 2004) : 10–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325403258286.
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This article examines patterns of elector support for successor parties in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Russia. After consideration of competing hypotheses purporting to explain variance in successor vote, the author proposes a new hypothesis—that regions dominated by latifundism in pre-communist times, and where masses of agricultural proletarians and impoverished peasants experienced the communist period as an era of unprecedented social advancement, show an above-average level of elector support for successor parties. This hypothesis is tested on a regional level in the four country-cases and found to be valid and a more powerful determinate of regional variance in patterns of successor vote than socio-economic status of regions in the post-communist era.
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Todosijević, Bojan. « The Structure of Political Attitudes in Hungary and Serbia ». East European Politics and Societies : and Cultures 22, no 4 (8 septembre 2008) : 879–900. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325408319103.
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The article presents a comparative examination of the structure of political ideology in two post-communist countries, Serbia and Hungary. A broad set of indicators of specific political attitudes is reduced to a smaller number of latent ideological dimensions via factor analysis. The precise meaning of the dimensions is determined after the analysis of their relationships with authoritarianism, out-group sympathy, prejudices, ideological self-identification, party-preference, and socio-demographic variables. Hungarian mass attitudes vary along dimensions of (1) alienation—socialism and (2) nationalist—antisocialism. Results for Serbia revealed the convergence of nationalist and pro-communist attitudes into a single dimension while another factor joined egalitarianism with social alienation. In both countries, authoritarianism is an important determinant of ideological dimensions, especially of pro-communist nationalism in Serbia and alienation— socialism in Hungary. Socio-demographic background variables are weaker determinants of ideological dimensions in Serbia compared with Hungary. In both countries, attitudinal factors differentiate supporters of the main political parties.
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TAVITS, MARGIT, et NATALIA LETKI. « When Left Is Right : Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe ». American Political Science Review 103, no 4 (20 octobre 2009) : 555–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055409990220.
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According to the classic partisan theory of spending, leftist parties are expected to increase government spending, and rightist parties are expected to decrease it. We argue that this relationship does not hold in post-Communist countries, where in the context of dual transition to democracy and to a market economy, leftist parties have had stronger incentives and better opportunities to enact tighter budgets, whereas rightist parties were compelled to spend more in order to alleviate economic hardships. We illustrate this theoretical argument with case studies from Hungary and Poland. We then test and find support for our theory by considering the influence of cabinet ideology on total, health, and education spending in thirteen post-Communist democracies from 1989 to 2004. We explore various alternative explanations and provide further narratives to support our causal argument.
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Beslin, Milivoj, Petar Zarkovic et Srdjan Milosevic. « The Third Road policy : Eurocommunism and its Yugoslav assessment ». Filozofija i drustvo 33, no 4 (2022) : 1037–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid2204037b.
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This paper deals with a critical stage in the dissolution of the Soviet Communist (Bolshevik) Party?s domination in the Communist commonwealth. The gradual emancipation of European Communist parties, starting with Yugoslavia (1948), through the developments that caused the Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), gave birth to independent strategies of political struggle, autonomous from Moscow?s ideological centre, which were implemented by the largest Communist parties in Western Europe. The attempts aimed at the syncretism of the communist platform, and ideas of political rights and adapting to the parliamentary regime resulted in the ?Third Road? movement, which strove to unify the positive experiences of the two ideologically opposed sides of the Cold War international constellation. Although it was a belated and, eventually - purely ideological concept, the movement itself and the idea of Eurocommunism has remained as an important testimony of an attempt at finding new paths in the struggle for a more just society.
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Ishiyama, John T., et Sahar Shafqat. « Party identity change in post-communist politics : the cases of the successor parties in Hungary, Poland and Russia☆ ». Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33, no 4 (1 décembre 2000) : 439–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(00)00015-5.
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In recent years much has been written on the communist successor parties. Although much of the existent work focuses on the electoral performance of these parties or has described, in great detail, the development of single parties, this paper evaluates the utility of theories of party identity change in application to the successor parties. As an initial exploration we investigate the successor parties’ programs before and after the initial competitive parliamentary elections in Hungary (in 1990), Poland (in 1991) and Russia (in 1993) to determine the extent to which poor electoral performance in initial competitive elections compelled the successor parties to alter their political identities.
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Dutkiewicz, Piotr, et Yuriy M. Pochta. « Issues of Democratic Development and Construction of National Identity at the End of the Age of Imitations : Editorial Introduction ». RUDN Journal of Political Science 23, no 3 (31 août 2021) : 339–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-1438-2021-23-3-339-347.
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In the article, the guest editor Piotr Dutkiewicz and editor-in-chief Yuriy M. Pochta introduce the current issue of the journal, interpreting cross-cutting topics such as democratic development and the construction of national identity in the societies of the East and the West. They believe that the most appropriate heuristic explanation for these issues today is the idea that after the end of the Cold War the hopes for the final victory of the liberal democratic project on a global scale ended in disappointment. The end of history never took place, just like the victory of communism did not take place previously. All these years we have been witnessing an imitation of liberalism, the era of which is already over. There is currently a global revolt against the liberal imitation imperative. From this point of view, there is a great interest in articles devoted to Russian-Turkish relations, the place of the Central Asian states in the international rankings of democratic development, the evolution of the political development of the Lebanese Republic, the formation of democratic political regimes in such Eastern European EU member states as Poland and Hungary, the role of parties in the political life of Great Britain and Nigeria, as well as such theoretical and methodological problems of political science as the processes of forming future political leaders, methodology of the study of GR-management and approaches to the study of the political and psychological characteristics of the heads of Russian regions. In general, this issue of the journal pictures the current state of democratic development of Western and non-Western countries in the context of globalization, which is at the stage of transition from American monopolarity to multipolarity, from imitation of the Western liberal-democratic project to the search for its own development projects. The authors believe that from the point of view of Russia and its interests the materials of this issue allow for outlining the prospects for further research on ways to build the most effective relations with world and regional powers, the possibilities of protecting its sovereignty and its geopolitical interests, and the mechanisms for forming the Russian post-Soviet identity at the national and regional levels.
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Norkus, Zenonas. « Political Development of Lithuania : A Comparative Analysis of Second Post-communist Decade ». World Political Science 8, no 1 (27 septembre 2012) : 217–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/wpsr-2012-0012.
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AbstractThe goal of this paper is to put into focus and explain distinctive features of the political developments in Lithuania during second post-communist decade, comparing them with other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and those Central European countries with political systems which resembled most closely Lithuania (Poland and Hungary) by the end of the first post-communist decade. In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for understanding of Rolandas Paksas’ impeachment in Lithuania in 2003–2004. His Order and Justice Party has to be classified together with the Kaczynski twins Law and Justice Party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and Gábor Vona’s Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part’s Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repše’s New Era in Latvia. They all were right-wing populist parties, proclaiming in their anti-establishment rhetoric the war on corruption of the (ex-communist) elite and the coming of new politics. While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in Estonia and Latvia, its outcome in Hungary and Poland was the breakup of the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact which was the foundation of the political stability during first post-communist decade. The Kaczynski twins founded Rzecz Pospolita IV (4th Republic of Poland), grounded in the thorough and comprehensive lustration of the ex-communist cadres. Fidesz leader Orban used the two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti-communist elites pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated thanks to the collaboration of all, by this time, established and left-of-center populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment of Paksas can be considered as the stress test of the young Lithuanian liberal democracy just on the eve of the accession of Lithuania to the European Union and NATO. An unhappy peculiarity of the stress tests is that they sometimes break or damage the items tested. Preventing the transformation of liberal post-communism into populist post-communism in Lithuania, the impeachment as stress test was a success. However, against the expectation of many observers, it did not enhance the quality of democracy of Lithuania. The legacy of impeachment are disequilibrium of the balance of power between government branches in favor of the Constitutional Court, strengthening of the left-of-centre populist political forces and the interference of secret services into Lithuanian politics with the self-assumed mission to safeguard Lithuanian democracy from the perils of populism.
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HARPER, MARCUS A. G. « Economic Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe ». Comparative Political Studies 33, no 9 (novembre 2000) : 1191–227. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414000033009004.
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This study tests the hypothesis that the replacement of incumbent promarket, prodemocracy governments with ex-communist parties in postcommunist East European elections was a function of the economic calculus of frustrated citizens at the ballot box. Using data from the Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer studies, this investigation adopts an individual-level approach to examine the degree to which economic assessments and unemployment influenced both proreform incumbent and ex-communist party voting intentions in Lithuania (1992), Hungary (1994), and Bulgaria (1994). The dominant impression that emerges from the logistic regression estimations predicting voting intentions is that despite strong expectations to the contrary, economic factors had at best a modest effect on party choice in these nations. These findings corroborate country-specific studies of electoral behavior in Eastern Europe that observe that the return to parliamentary power of ex-communist parties in these societies was not simply a function of economic voting.
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Szilágyi, Anna. « “Threatening other” or “role-model brother” ? » Contemporary Discourses of Hate and Radicalism across Space and Genres 3, no 1 (2 octobre 2015) : 151–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jlac.3.1.07szi.
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In the late 2000s far-right parties made significant gains in numerous countries of the European Union. Sharing the same agenda and discourse of discrimination, many of these parties collaborate today at the European level as well. Yet, it is unclear whether the contemporary European far-right is indeed homogenous in terms of ideology. This project in critical discourse analysis shows that the far-right in the EU is actually characterized by ideological diversity. The paper compares and contrasts how China, an emerging great power with a booming economy, has been portrayed in the early 2010s by far-right parties in the UK and Hungary. By identifying major references, metaphors, frames and argumentation schemes, the article concludes that despite belonging to the same party family, and being actual political allies, the British National Party (BNP) and the Jobbik party in Hungary construct fundamentally different images of the “Chinese Other”. The far-right in the UK, a major Western power, presents China clearly in hostile terms, mainly as a “dangerous, threatening intruder” into the British market. Additionally, in the discourse of the British far-right China is primarily identified as a communist dictatorship and used as a metaphor of oppression in the domestic UK context. Meanwhile, in Hungary, a post-communist country in Eastern Europe and a relatively recent member of the European Union, an opposite picture of China is constructed by the far-right. Here, China serves as a tool to distance Hungary from the West. China is positioned by the Hungarian far-right as a state where communism has lost its significance. By stressing the Asian origin of Hungarians, brotherhood is claimed among Hungarians and Chinese and China is presented as a “role model country” which successfully resisted “Western dominance”.
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Lankov, Andrei N. « The Demise of Non-Communist Parties in North Korea (1945–1960) ». Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no 1 (janvier 2001) : 103–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/15203970151032164.
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This article, based on newly declassified material from the Russian archives, deals with the fate of non-Communist parties in North Korea in the 1950s. Like the “people's democracies” in Eastern Europe, North Korea had (and still technically has) a few non-Communist parties. The ruling Communist party included these parties within the framework of a “united front,” designed to project the facade of a multiparty state, to control domestic dissent, and to establish links with parties in South Korea. The article traces the history of these parties under Soviet and local Communist control from the mid-1940s to their gradual evisceration in the 1950s.
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Drew, Allison. « Bolshevizing Communist Parties : The Algerian and South African Experiences ». International Review of Social History 48, no 2 (août 2003) : 167–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020859003001007.
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In 1924 and 1925 the Comintern introduced its policy of Bolshevization. A goal of Bolshevization was the creation of mass-based communist parties. In settler societies this meant that the local communist party should aim to be demographically representative of the entire population. This article traces the efforts of the communist parties in Algeria and South Africa to indigenize, seeking to explain why their efforts had such diverse outcomes. It examines four variables: the patterns of working-class formation; the socialist tradition of each country; the relationship between the Comintern and the two communist parties; and the level of repression against communists in both societies. The cumulative weight of the variables in the Algerian case helps to explain why communist activity in the 1920s – including the communist party's ability to indigenize – was far more difficult in Algeria than South Africa.
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MARK, JAMES. « DISCRIMINATION, OPPORTUNITY, AND MIDDLE-CLASS SUCCESS IN EARLY COMMUNIST HUNGARY ». Historical Journal 48, no 2 (27 mai 2005) : 499–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x05004486.
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This article explores the middle-class response to life under the early Communist state in Hungary. It is based on an oral history of the Budapest bourgeoisie, and challenges some of the dominant indigenous representations of the central European middle class as persecuted victims who were forced into ‘internal exile’ by the Stalinist state. Despite being officially discriminated against as ‘former exploiters’, large numbers achieved educational and professional success. Their skills were increasingly needed in the rapid modernization of the 1950s, and the state provided them with semi-official opportunities to remake themselves into acceptable Communist citizens. Middle-class testimony revealed how individuals constructed politically appropriate public personas to ensure their own upward mobility; they hid aspects of their pasts, created ‘class conscious’ autobiographies, and learnt how to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. The ways in which individuals dealt with integrating into a system which officially sought to exclude them and which many disliked ideologically is then examined. In order to ‘cope with success’, respondents in this project invented new stories about themselves to justify the compromises they had made to ensure their achievements. These narratives are analysed as evidence of specifically Communist middle-class identities.
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Case, Holly. « Shape-Shifting Illiberalism in East-Central Europe ». Current History 116, no 788 (1 mars 2017) : 112–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2017.116.788.112.
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GrzymañA-Busse, Anna. « Political Competition and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe ». Comparative Political Studies 36, no 10 (décembre 2003) : 1123–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414003257610.
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The expansion and politicization of the postcommunist state, even among the reform leaders of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, has confounded early expectations that the state would shrink and grow autonomous once the communist regime collapsed. The variation in these patterns is a function of the distribution of party power in parliament, both over time (turnover) and among parties (fragmentation and effective opposition). Where several strong opposing parties competed for governance, the resulting electoral uncertainty led them to constrain each other through formal regulations and informal practices. In contrast, where one party dominated political competition, lax (or nonexistent) regulations allowed the informal extraction of resources from state firms, the procurement of favorable privatization deals, and the accumulation of positions in public administration. This explanation contrasts with existing accounts, which emphasize either broad communist regime legacies or the functional need for state growth in newly independent states.
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Lugosi, Nicole VT. « Radical right framing of social policy in Hungary : between nationalism and populism ». Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 34, no 3 (octobre 2018) : 210–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21699763.2018.1483256.
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AbstractThe populist radical right (PRR) is increasingly associated with welfare chauvinism, but the literature mainly focuses on Western and Northern European cases. Turning attention to Central Eastern Europe, this article investigates how PRR parties in Hungary frame welfare issues in five social policy areas from 2010 to 2016. This is done through a critical frame analysis applied to party manifestos and State of the Nation speeches by the Fidesz and Jobbik parties. Special care is taken to delineate the interlocking but not interchangeable concepts of nationalism and populism, as recent research asserts this distinction is often overlooked. The main findings are threefold: First, these parties articulate their positions chiefly through nationalist rather than populist framing; Second, while Hungary's PRR exhibits welfare chauvinist framing similar to Western and Northern Europe, a main difference detected was the role of the communist legacy; Third, beyond the article's original goals, the findings revealed a strong connection between nationalist framing and the role of gender, suggesting that the two are not mutually exclusive.
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Werkmann, Caroline, et Sergiu Gherghina. « Organized for Parliament ? Explaining the Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties in Post-Communist Europe ». Government and Opposition 53, no 3 (10 novembre 2016) : 461–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.38.
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Over the last three decades a great deal of research has been carried out in an attempt to explain the electoral performance of radical right parties in Europe. Most approaches concentrate on demand-side determinants and have some limitations. We compensate for these shortcomings and focus on the context of party competition and supply-side determinants (consistency of ideological discourse, functioning party propaganda, the continuity of the leader in office and strong party organization) to explain the electoral success of radical right parties in post-communist Europe. We conducted our analysis at party level in nine radical right parties in four countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania) between 1990 and 2014. The bivariate and multivariate (ordinal logistic regression) analyses draw on unique data collected from primary and secondary sources.
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Schelchkov, Andrey. « Latin America and the Soviet-Chinese Conflict (the 1960s – mid-1970s) ». Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no 4 (2021) : 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640016189-5.
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The disagreements and rupture between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) were the most important event in the history of the International Communist Movement in the 60s and 70s of the 20th century, which had a huge impact on the fate of communist parties around the world. Latin America has become a place of fierce rivalry between Moscow and Beijing for influence on the political left flank. Moscow's tough opposition to any attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to increase its influence in the continent's communist parties without resorting to splitting them caused a backlash and a change in the policy of criticism within the parties to a policy of secession of independent “anti-revisionist” communist parties. Maoist communist parties emerged in all countries of the continent, opposing their policies to the pro-Moscow left parties. Maoism was able to penetrate not only the old communist movement but also the ranks of socialists, leftist nationalists and even Christian democrats. It often became the ideological and political basis for a break with the “traditional” left parties, a kind of transit bridge towards the “new left”. The ideas of Maoism were partly accepted by the trend of the “new left”, which gained special weight among the intelligentsia and students of the continent. This article is devoted to the emergence and development of the Maoist Communist Parties, the reaction of Moscow and Havana in the political circumstances of Latin America in the 60s of the 20th century.
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Tavits, Margit. « Party organizational strength and party unity in post-communist Europe ». European Political Science Review 4, no 3 (16 novembre 2011) : 409–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773911000257.
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The existing comparative literature focuses on political institutions to explain party unity in parliament, and largely ignores the role of party characteristics in this process. This study argues that the strength of political party organization directly and independently influences the level of party unity. Organizational strength makes the party a valuable asset to individual legislators, thus increasing their willingness to be disciplined. Therefore, parties with strong organizations are likely to be more unified in parliament than those with weak organizations. I find support for this argument with data from four post-communist democracies: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. Narratives suggest that the proposed causal mechanism is plausible.
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BAGDASARYAN, V. E. « COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE : PHASES OF HISTORICAL RISE AND DECLINE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCES ». JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION 9, no 3 (2020) : 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2225-8272-2020-9-3-53-74.
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The article presents the results of a study of the history of the communist parties of Western European states in the context of assessing the degree of their social influence. The aim of the work was to identify the phases of the rise and fall of the communist parties in Western Europe. The research methodology consisted in correlating the history of the communist parties with the results of elections to national parliaments. The factors that led to the growth or loss of the popularity of the communist movement among Western Europeans were identified. Special attention was paid to ideological splits within the Communist Parties and their attitude to the CPSU line. The conclusion is made about the achievement of the apogee of the popularity of the Communist parties in the first post-war years on the wave of the Victory in the Second World War, associated with the special role of the USSR. The subsequent decline of the communists in Western Europe is explained by the loss of the attractiveness of the Soviet project, by the erosion of the original values. At the present historical stage, a new rise in the popularity of the left forces is recorded, which is associated with a modern systemic crisis and a search for alternatives to capitalism.
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Melnichenko, Tanya. « National Communist Parties In Ukraine : Ukrainian Historiography ». ISTORIYA 13, no 10 (120) (2022) : 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840023526-7.
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The article attempts to systematize the works of Ukrainian historians devoted to the National Communist Parties of Ukraine. The author shows the peculiarities of perception by Ukrainian researchers of the Ukrainian Communist Party (borotbists) and the Ukrainian Communist Party (Ukapists), depending on their views and the time of writing. There are three stages in the extensive Ukrainian historiography on this issue. The first works were written by contemporaries of these events and, in turn, are divided into works created by historians in exile and studies by historians — supporters of the Soviet government. The second stage of historiography was marked by the unification of the picture of the revolutionary past within the framework of the official Soviet doctrine. The third stage of historiography — the period of independence of Ukraine — is characterized by increased interest in the topic and positive assessments of the National Communist parties.
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NIKOLENYI, CSABA. « The Impact of the Electoral System on Government Formation : The Case of Post-Communist Hungary ». Japanese Journal of Political Science 5, no 1 (mai 2004) : 159–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109904001367.
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Conventional theories of government formation have assumed that the coalition formation process starts after legislative elections are over and the distribution of parliamentary seats becomes common knowledge. This perspective, however, ignores the important constraints that the formation of electoral coalitions may exert on the formation of the government. This article argues that the electoral system of Hungary provides very strong incentives for political parties to build electoral coalitions, which are also identified as alternative governments before the electorate.
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Fazekas, Csaba. « Impact of the Waco Branch Davidian Case and the Anticult Movement in Post-Communist Hungary ». Nova Religio 26, no 1 (1 août 2022) : 59–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nr.2022.26.1.59.
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This article examines the ways Hungarian political life and public debate were influenced by the news media’s coverage of the 1993 conflict involving the Branch Davidians living at Mount Carmel Center near Waco, Texas and United States federal agents, in which a total of eighty-six people were killed. After the collapse of the Soviet political system, new religious movements began spreading rapidly in Eastern European nations at the beginning of the 1990s. The first anticult movements in Hungary were closely connected to the political conservativism and traditional religiosity represented by so-called “historical” Christian churches. The conservative governing parties aimed to restrict new religious movements by withdrawing financial support and by enacting a new law on religion and denominations resulting in anticult propaganda disseminated by the state. The news about the conflict and deaths at Mount Carmel Center played an important catalyzing role in the anticult parliamentary and press debates in Hungary. The tragedy of the deaths at Mount Carmel became one of the most important arguments in the hands of politicians in Hungary who wanted to limit freedom of religion for members of new religious movements.
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Pop-Eleche[UNKNOWN]s, Grigore. « Separated at Birth or Separated by Birth ? the Communist Successor Parties in Romania and Hungary ». East European Politics and Societies : and Cultures 13, no 1 (décembre 1998) : 117–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325499013001004.
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TAMÁS, ÁGNES. « OLD-NEW ENEMIES IN HUNGARIAN AND YUGOSLAV CARICATURES AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1945–1947) ». ИСТРАЖИВАЊА, no 28 (27 décembre 2017) : 171–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.19090/i.2017.28.171-188.
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In this paper I analyse caricatures of Hungarian and Yugoslav comic papers (Jež, Ludas Matyi, Új Szó, and Pesti Izé) between 1945 and 1947. I chose this source since the analysis of caricatures can demonstrate the functioning of communist propaganda. After the presentation of sources and goals of the paper, I analyse the depiction of war criminals, the perception of democracy and the Western states, and the representation of democrats and German enemies within the country in Hungary. Then I analyse the depiction of the self of the communists and finally, before the conclusions, the Peace Treaty of Paris in caricatures. The analysed propaganda caricatures documented well the views and propaganda methods of the Communist Parties regarding the above-mentioned topics.
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Péteri, György. « Streetcars of desire : cars and automobilism in communist Hungary (1958–70)∗ ». Social History 34, no 1 (février 2009) : 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071020802628020.
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Živković, Bogdan. « Inspiring Dissent : Yugoslavia and the Italian Communist Party during 1956 ». Tokovi istorije 29, no 3 (31 décembre 2021) : 171–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.31212/tokovi.2021.3.ziv.171-198.
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This paper analyzes the relations between the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Italy during 1956, one of the most important years of the history of communism. The dissenting nature of those relations, which were based on the mutual wish to limit the Soviet hegemony within the global communist movement, is in the focus of this analysis. Finally, this paper aims to demonstrate how the roots of the close friendship between the two parties during the sixties and seventies can be traced back to 1956, and how the Yugoslav communists influenced or tried to influence their Italian counterparts.
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Chambers, Collin L. « Having Faith in the Party Again : The Two-Line Party Struggle in the Chinese Communist Party ». Human Geography 11, no 1 (mars 2018) : 44–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/194277861801100104.
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At the present time, the Communist Party is not looked upon as an agent for revolutionary change. It is seen as an archaic artifact that needs to be left in the dustbin of 20th century history. Some in the “New Left” argue for a “post-party politics” – because contemporary party politics are so “closely bound up with structures of power, the possibility that political parties will transform themselves and formulate a new politics is extremely low” (Wang 2016, 169). In sum, we should not have faith in the Party in radically changing social formations. However, this view abstracts from the political and social dynamics of communist parties. Communist parties provide the “affective infrastructure” for activists (Dean 2016) and create the flexible, disciplined organizational form necessary for maneuvering through the complexities of a revolutionary moment. An investigation of the historical and contemporary “line struggles” within the Chinese Communist Party gives insight into how communist parties can foster change in a social formation. This paper seeks to install hope that the Party, particularly the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), can once again create revolutionary change.
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Samarghitan, Crina, Victor Cioara, Sergiu Gherghina et Adrian Muica. « The Evolution of the Party System and Cleavages in Post- Communist Hungary ». Politikon : The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 8 (30 septembre 2004) : 37–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.22151/politikon.8.4.
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The post-Communist countries suffered many transformations in a short period of time; their political, economic and social system is in a continuous change. All the countries from Central and Eastern Europe try to cope with the Western political systems, try to avoid the third wave of authoritarianism, wave that usually comes after a democratization one. One country’s political system is impressing and interesting in many ways. We decided to approach and to analyze only a part of the political system in a country that relatively succeeded on its way towards democracy – Hungary. The evolution of Hungarian cleavages allows us to identify the emergence of parties and from that point on to deeply analyze the party system from 1990 until now. One main advantage of our study is that we make a dynamic evaluation of the party system, using some variables that were applied in the case of other party systems. The variables and indicators were used by well-known scholars to observe some variations in the Western party systems and to realize some categories. The conclusions obtained have a degree of specificity; they cannot be entirely applied to the countries in the region. The research can be improved by analyzing the electoral system and by searching new indicators for the already used variables.
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Racz, Barnabas. « The socialist‐left opposition in post‐communist Hungary ». Europe-Asia Studies 45, no 4 (janvier 1993) : 647–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668139308412113.
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Bowlby, Chris. « Blutmai 1929 : Police, Parties and Proletarians in a Berlin Confrontation ». Historical Journal 29, no 1 (mars 1986) : 137–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00018653.
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In May 1929 illegal Communist demonstrations in Berlin led to several days' fighting as the Prussian police sought to restore order. Over thirty civilians were killed. Communist publications hailed events as an heroic defeat, in which lessons had been learned for the ‘final struggle’ to come; the Social Democrats hailed a decisive victory over Bolshevik aggression. Liberals expressed concern at the soverity of police action; National Socialists expressed sinister satisfaction at a significant portent of the distintegration of social and political stability. Above all, the dramatic events of Blutmai (‘Bloody May’) reinforced an element of emotional tension in Weimar and Prussian politics of great importance in understanding the final collapse of 1933.
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Barabash, Yurii, et Hryhorii Berchenko. « Freedom of Speech under Militant Democracy : The History of Struggle against Separatism and Communism in Ukraine ». Baltic Journal of European Studies 9, no 3 (1 septembre 2019) : 3–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjes-2019-0019.
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Abstract The article is devoted to the experience of the application of a concept of militant democracy in modern Ukraine. This concept is relevant due to the prolonged domination of the communist totalitarian regime until 1991, and also in view of the encroachment on the principle of territorial integrity in 2014. It is argued that Ukraine, formally consolidating separate instruments of militant democracy at the level of the Constitution of Ukraine, almost did not apply such instruments until 2014. The active process of decommunization started in 2014, after the Revolution of Dignity; it was realised, in particular, in the declaration of lustration, as well as the banning of the two communist parties, but the most influential Communist Party remains officially not banned up till now. Also, the two parties, accused of infringement on territorial integrity, were banned in 2014. The issue of differentiation between aggressive words and aggressive actions of parties is analysed. It is argued that representatives of the parties, who during the twenty years of Ukrainian independence openly denied one of the key values of the constitutional order of Ukraine, its territorial integrity, became active participants of the temporary occupation.
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SCRANTON, PHILIP. « Managing Communist Enterprises : Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, 1945–1970 ». Enterprise & ; Society 19, no 3 (septembre 2018) : 492–537. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eso.2018.13.
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Business history for three generations has focused almost exclusively on capitalist firms, their managers, and their relations with markets, states, and rivals. However, enterprises on all scales also operated within communist nations “building socialism” in the wake of World War II. This article represents a first-phase exploration of business practices in three Central European states as Stalinism gave way to cycles of reform and retrenchment in the 1960s. Focusing chiefly on industrial initiatives, the study asks: How did socialist enterprises work and change across the first postwar generation, given their distinctive principles and political/economic contexts, and implicitly, what contrasts with capitalist activities are worth considering.
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Sokhey, Sarah Wilson, et A. Kadir Yildirim. « Economic liberalization and political moderation ». Party Politics 19, no 2 (15 novembre 2012) : 230–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462932.
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Although economic liberalization has been argued to promote political liberalization, this relationship is poorly understood and we do not consistently observe greater economic openness leading to more open and moderate political systems. We examine the connection between liberalization and moderation in the context of Islamist and Communist parties, both of which are characterized by ideologies opposed to democracy and the market. When will these ideological parties moderate by adopting more pragmatic agendas? We argue that competitive liberalization spurs the emergence of more moderate parties, but crony liberalization does not. In support of this, we use two sets of most different case comparisons in which we compare two instances of competitive liberalization (Turkey and Hungary) and two instances of crony liberalization (Egypt and Bulgaria). Our research offers an important clarification to existing explanations and a more generalizable theory of how and why liberalization is linked to political moderation.
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Smuk, Peter. « Law pertaining to political parties and political pluralism — freedom of the foundation and functioning of political parties in post-communist Hungary ». Acta Juridica Hungarica 48, no 1 (mars 2007) : 71–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/ajur.47.2007.1.5.
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Lubecki, Jacek. « Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets. The Establishment of the Communist Regime in Hungary, 1944-1948 ». Canadian-American Slavic Studies 44, no 3 (2010) : 373–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221023910x533108.
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Evans, Geoffrey, et Stephen Whitefield. « Social and ideological cleavage formation in post‐communist hungary ». Europe-Asia Studies 47, no 7 (novembre 1995) : 1177–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668139508412314.
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Bajomi-Lázár, Péter. « The Party Colonisation of the Media ». East European Politics and Societies : and Cultures 27, no 1 (20 novembre 2012) : 69–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325412465085.
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Media scholars looking into the relationship between political and media systems in the former communist countries have mainly worked on the assumption that parties seek control over the media in order to suppress critical voices and to gain favourable coverage so that they can influence voting behaviour, but have barely explored political actors’ other possible motivations. Meanwhile, political scientists studying the region’s countries have often focused on parties’ relationship to the state and the resources that they extracted from state institutions such as ministries and municipalities but largely ignored the relationship between parties and the media. This article, written as part of the project Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, attempts to link these two traditions of research. Introducing the concept of the party colonisation of the media, it looks into what benefits other than suppressing criticism and gaining favourable coverage parties may gain from controlling the media. It uses the example of Hungary to illustrate how the party colonisation of the media works. It also intends to assess how different patterns of media colonisation affect media freedom.
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March, Luke. « Power and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union ». Party Politics 12, no 3 (mai 2006) : 341–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068806063085.
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Much of the literature on communist successor parties has concentrated far more on East-Central Europe than the former Soviet bloc and on the ‘social-democratic’ successors than those of a neo-communist hue. This article aims to extend the comparative impact of studies of such successor parties by analysing two of the principal ‘neo-communist’ successor parties in the former Soviet Union (FSU): the Russian CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) and PCRM (Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova). I argue that legacy-based approaches, which focus on the ‘patrimonial communist’ history of the FSU, explain much of the general context for party origins, political profile and the political capital possessed by the neo-communists, but are far less persuasive at explaining both the timing and extent of party return and their longer-term trajectory and electoral success than previously accounted for in the literature. In particular, differences in the political environment (such as the role of presidentialism versus parliamentarianism) and (especially) the role of political agency are seen to have greater importance.
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Marcou, Lilly. « La conférence de Berlin de juin 1976 : analyse du discours communiste ». Études internationales 10, no 3 (12 avril 2005) : 439–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/700961ar.
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The Berlin Congress would seem to have completed the historic sequence of Congresses begun in 1957 with the Moscow world congress of Communist parties. It represents a turning point in the history of the Communist movement, especially as it pertains to Europe. Its long and laborious preparatory phase as well as the density and contradictory nature of its proceedings provide a new image of European Communism in crisis by bringing together a diversity of governing parties. Certain among the latter are all-powerful in their countries, others, important opposition forces involved closely or indirectly in the process of governing, while others are either underground or represent an infinitely small portion of their respective electorates. The Berlin Congress was the theater of debates containing the potentialities of conflict that animate the European Communist parties. It confirmed and stabilized a major phenomenon whose origins are to be found at the world Communist Party Congress of 1969 - Eurocommunism.
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Szabó, Máté. « From a suppressed anti-communist dissident movement to a governing party : the transformations of FIDESZ in Hungary ». Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 2, no 2 (12 décembre 2011) : 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.14267/cjssp.2011.02.03.
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FIDESZ, as an outlawed protest movement of the Kádár era, has preserved their specific type of “outlawed and clandestine” political tradition and identity. A strong anti-communism, a popular mobilizing strategy and an atmosphere of hatred towards the agents of Hungary’s communist past remained within the political culture of the party from the suppressed underground movement. The political generation of leading activists, including current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has been socialized in the “underground” of the eighties. The experience of “being outlawed” under the Communist system has had longlasting effects on them. The “myths”, symbols, and “fights” of the suppressed protest movements keep themselves alive in the new political culture in the present goals and strategies of FIDESZ-MPP. The former protest movement transformed itself into a minority party with liberal affiliations in the new parliament of 1990. However, as the Hungarian Liberal Party (SZDSZ) moved into a governing alliance with the successor to the Communist party, FIDESZ moved to the right, becoming its leading force. Competition between five centre-right parties led to FIDESZ’s control as the leader of a centre-right government (1998-2002). While the socialists (MSZP) and liberals (SZDSZ) became governing forces twice (2002-2010), FIDESZ became a mobilizing populist party, gaining hegemony within the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition. The economic and financial crisis assisted FIDESZ in mobilizing protest, leading the FIDESZ-KDNP alliance to a two–thirds majority victory in the 2010 elections.
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Mišić, Saša. « „Ne može se više ponoviti 1948. godina!“ Jugoslavija i italijanski komunisti i socijalisti 1957–1962. » Tokovi istorije 30, no 2 (31 août 2022) : 153–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.31212/tokovi.2022.2.mis.153-185.
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The paper presents an analysis of relations between Yugoslavia and the two most important parties of the Italian left: the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) at a time when relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union deteriorated again. It is an effort to explain the way in which the dispute between Belgrade and Moscow affected the relations of the Yugoslav communists with those Italian parties.