Thèses sur le sujet « Combat – Moral and ethical aspects »
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Coleman, Stephen 1968. « The ethical implications of human ectogenesis ». Monash University, School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Bioethics, 2001. http://arrow.monash.edu.au/hdl/1959.1/8904.
Texte intégralOlivier, Stephen Chris. « Ethical issues in human movement research ». Thesis, Rhodes University, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1015402.
Texte intégralOkolie, Patricia. « Suicide : a philosophical and ethical perspective ». Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/52469.
Texte intégralENGLISH ABSTRACT: Suicide is a truly philosophical problem. Judging whether life is or not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. In Africa, suicide is not uncommon as evidenced by the Botswana experience. Suicide acts are the forefront of the daily existence even today. Suicide is felt in different areas of Botswana and while the study draws heavily on Africa especially Botswana, reference is also made to countries outside Africa. Hence, suicide in this thesis is not addressed in a restrictive manner. But its manifestation in essence is assessed in a general mode. This implies that the escalation of suicide is viewed from the sociological, psychological and philosophical implications. Although it is not easy to accept and live with suicide, people are beginning to accommodate it as an inevitable concept. However, the family and friends of a person who has committed suicide still feels ashamed, humiliated and sometimes guilty. The aim of this assignment is to analyse and evaluate the moral argument for and against suicide and to focus on the moral implications of committing suicide. While agreeing that individuals' autonomy are personal, the writer tries to suggest a way out of this self-destruction (suicide) which is just a means to an end and not an end in itself. The writer in the concluding chapter tries to explore the pros and cons of suicide, and comes up with the conclusion that the right to live should be given attention than the right to die, at least to preserve its generations which all creatures strive for. Areas of focus: • The concept of Suicide • The nature and incidence of Suicide. • Arguments in favour of Suicide • Arguments against Suicide • The Suicide I Euthanasia Debate
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Selfmoord is 'n ware filosofiese probleem. Om te oordeel of 'n lewe die moeite werd is om gelewe te word, vereis 'n antwoord op 'n fundamentele vraag van filosofie. In Afrika is selfmoord nie ongewoon nie, soos gesien in die geval van Botswana. Selfmoord kom baie algemeen daar voor. Selfmoord word aangetref in verskeie areas in Botswana, en, alhoewel die studie fokus op Afrika - en spesifiek Botswana, word daar ook verwys na lande buite Afrika. Maar die manifestasie daarvan word in essensie en in die algemeen aangespreek. Dit beteken dat die toename in selfmoord in terme van die verskynsel se sosiologiese, sielkundige en filosofiese implikasies aangespreek word. Alhoewel dit nie maklik is on selfmoord te aanvaar en mee saam te leef nie, begin mense dit aanvaar as 'n onvermydelike verskynsel. Maar die familie van 'n persoon wat selfmoord gepleeg het voel steeds skaam, verneder en soms skuldig. Die doel van hierdie werkstuk is om die argumente vir en teen selfmoord te analiseer, te evalueer, en om te fokus op die morele implikasies van selfmoord. Alhoewel die outeur saamstem dat individue outonoom is, word sterk teen die morele aanvaarbaarheid van selfmoord geargumenteer. In die gevolgtrekking ondersoek die outeur die voordele en nadele van selfmoord en eindig met die bevinding dat die reg tot lewe meer aandag behoort te kry as die sg. reg om te sterf. Areas waarop gefokus word: • Die konsep "selfmoord" as sodanig • Die aard van selfmoord en (hoe algemeen dit voorkom.) • Argumente ten gunste van selfmoord • Argumente teen selfmoord • Die selfmoord -genadedood debat
Scott, Rebekah Anne. « On complex terms : James among the ethical critics ». Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.609038.
Texte intégralVan, Schalkwyk Tanya Leonie. « The ethical conduct of new entry level emerging contractors ». Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/4932.
Texte intégralHooker, Brad. « Why should I be moral ? » Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:2b44fe6f-39b7-4d16-9b5c-8d8eb7251323.
Texte intégralSilove, Melanie. « Ethical decision-making in the therapeutic space : a psychoanalytic view ». Thesis, Rhodes University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1020873.
Texte intégralVan, Bogaert Louis-Jacques. « Abortion, sentience and moral standing : a neurophilosophical appraisal ». Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/52619.
Texte intégralENGLISH ABSTRACT: Moral theories on abortion are often regarded as mutually exclusive. On the one hand, pro-life advocates maintain that abortion is always morally wrong, for life is sacred from its very beginning. On the other hand, the extreme liberal view advocated by the absolute pro-ehoieers claims that the unborn is not a person and has no moral standing. On this view there is no conflict of rights; women have the right to dispose of their body as they wish. Therefore, killing a non-person is always permissible. In between the two extreme views, some moral philosophers argue that a 'pre-sentient' embryo or fetus cannot be harmed because it lacks the ability to feel pain or pleasure, for it is 'sentience' that endows a living entity (human and non-human) with moral considerability. Therefore, abortion of a pre-sentient embryo or fetus is permissible. Neurophilosophy rests a philosophical conclusion on neurological premises. In other words, to be tenable sentientism - the claim that sentience endows an entity with moral standing - needs robust neurobiological evidence. The question is, then: What is the basic neuroanatomical and neurophysiological apparatus required to be sentient? The answer to that question requires a fair understanding of the evolution, anatomy and function of the brain. The exploration thereof shows quite convincingly that the advocates of sentientism do not provide convincing arguments to root their theory in neurobiological facts. Their claims rest rather on emotions and on behaviours that look like a reaction to pain. The other shortcoming of sentientism is that it fails to distinguish pain from suffering, and that as a utilitarian moral theory it considers only the alleged pain of the aborted sentient fetus and disregards the pregnant woman's pain and suffering. And, finally, sentientism leaves out of our moral consideration living and non-living entities that deserve moral respect. The main thrust of the dissertation is that the argument of sentience as its advocates present it has no neurophilosophical grounds. Therefore, the argument from sentience is not a convincing argument in favour or against abortion.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Morele teorieë wat handeloor aborsie word dikwels as wedersyds uitsluitend beskou. "Pro-life" kampvegters hou oor die algemeen vol dat aborsie onder alle omstandighede moreel veroordeelbaar is, omdat die lewe van meet af heilig is. Daarteenoor hou die ekstreem-liberale oogpunt, wat deur "Pro-choice" voorstaanders ingeneem word, vol dat die ongeborene nie 'n persson is nie, en as sulks geen morele status het nie. Volgens hierdie standpunt is daar geen konflik van regte hier ter sprake nie; vroue het uitsluitelike beskikkingsreg oor hulle eie liggame. Dus is dit toelaatbaar om onder hierdie omstandighede 'n "nie-persoon" om die lewe te bring. Tussen hierdie twee ekstreme standpunte argumenteer party morele filosowe dat die voorbewuste embrio of fetus nie skade berokken kan word nie, omdat dit nie oor die vermoë beskik om pyn of plesier te voel nie. Dit is juis bewussyn en die vermoë om waar te neem wat morele status aan 'n entiteit (hetsy menslik of nie-menslik) verleen. Dus is dit toelaatbaar om 'n voorbewustw embrio of fetus te aborteer. Neurofilosofie basseer filosofiese gevolgtrekkinge op neurolgiese beginsels. Met andere woorde, so 'n standpunt sal eis dat 'n argument oor bewustheid op betroubare neurologiese feite gebasseer word, om sodoende met sekerheid morele status, al dan nie, aan de fetus of embrio toe te ken. Die vraag is dan: Wat is die basiese neuroanatomiese en neurofiologiese apparatuur waaroor 'n entiteit moet beskik om as bewus beskou te word? Die antwoord op hierdie vraag vereis dan ook 'n redelik grondige kennis van die evolusie, anatomie en funksie van die brein. Wanneer die vraagstuk van naderby beskou word, word dit duidelik dat voorstaanders van die bewustheids-argument oor die algemeen nie hulle standpunte op oortuigende, neurologiese feite berus nie. Hulle beweringe rus dan eerder op emosie en op waargenome optredes wat voorkom asof dit 'n reaksie op pyn is. Nog 'n tekortkoming van die bewustheids-argument is dat dit nie 'n onderskeid tref tussen die konsep van pyn en die van leiding nie, en dat dit as 'n utilitaristiese morele teorie slegs die beweerde pyn van die ge-aborteerde fetus in ag neem en nie die leiding van die swanger vrouw nie. Ten slotte neem die bewustheids-argument ook nie morele status van lewende en nie-lewende entiete, wat geregtig is op morele respek, in ag nie. Die hoof uitgangspunt van hierdie dissertasie is dan dat die bewustheids-argument, soos wat dit tans deur voorstanders daarvan voorgehou word, nie neurofilosfies begrond kan word nie. Dus is die argument vanuit 'n bewustheids-standpunt nie 'n oortuigende argument hetsy vir of teen aborsie nie.
Brouillet, Miriam. « Is it justified to patent human genetic resources ? » Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=19699.
Texte intégralBigney, Mark W. « Neither mechanic nor high priest : moral suasion and the physician-patient relationship ». Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=99576.
Texte intégralOne feature that varies within competing conceptions of medical shared decision-making is how a patient's values are to be engaged by a physician. One detail that can be overlooked under "shared" decision-making is whether or not a physician ought (or be allowed) to attempt to persuade the patient to adopt particular health-related values. Some argue that it is incumbent on a physician to share her privileged understanding of medicine so as to help her patient embrace "better" values. This thesis argues that it is dangerous to patient autonomy for a physician to exert moral suasion on her patient to attempt to influence or change those values; the danger lies in the power imbalance between patients and physicians that seems inherent in medical encounters, and is exacerbated by the sick role. Thus, while a physician ought to help her patient articulate his health-related values, she ought not try to change them.
Lasky, Benjamin M. « Chronic accessibility of virtue-trait inferences : a social-cognitive approach to the moral personality ». Virtual Press, 2000. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1177985.
Texte intégralDepartment of Educational Psychology
Fu, Lin. « On efficacy of ethical investment : a comparative study between UK and Chinese company practices ». Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683316.
Texte intégralMoore, Nancy Helen Vuckovic 1956. « Things that are good and things that are chocolate : A cultural model of weight control as morality ». Thesis, The University of Arizona, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/291712.
Texte intégralWatkins, Gareth. « Animal suffering in factory farming and the best way to prevent it ». Thesis, Rhodes University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003736.
Texte intégralHurlimann, Thierry. « The duty to treat very defective neonates as "persons" : from the legal and moral personhood of very defective neonates to their best interests in medical treatment ». Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=80929.
Texte intégralBrown, Elizabeth Jean. « The quest for whole sight or seeing with the eye of the mind and the eye of the heart : a place for imagination in moral education ». Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ37194.pdf.
Texte intégralPousao-Lopes, Cecilia. « The mind values meaning above knowledge : narrative and moral education ». Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape11/PQDD_0004/MQ43935.pdf.
Texte intégralWimbush, James C. « Ethical climates and ethical behavior ». Diss., This resource online, 1991. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-07282008-134238/.
Texte intégralBenshalom, Edna. « Moral dilemmas of medical students : a study of ethical aspects of medical training ». Thesis, University of Leicester, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/30935.
Texte intégralBrugger, E. Christian. « Capital punishment, abolition and Roman Catholic moral tradition ». Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:352bddad-62d7-4621-9043-b603afdc5855.
Texte intégralReilly, Elizabeth. « Objectivity and responsibility in moral education ». Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ27233.pdf.
Texte intégralViviers, Suzette. « A critical assessement of socially responsible investing in South Africa ». Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/637.
Texte intégralConroy, Mervyn. « An Ethical Dimension to Organisational Change : Virtue-to-Virtue Combat for the Moral High Ground of UK NHS Reform ». Thesis, Lancaster University, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.524742.
Texte intégralSansbury, George Ernest, et G. Sansbury@latrobe edu au. « The employment relationship and integrated theory ». La Trobe University. School of Business, 2004. http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au./thesis/public/adt-LTU20060427.125729.
Texte intégralCrouch, Robert Alan. « The child as tissue and organ donor ». Thesis, McGill University, 1996. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=23714.
Texte intégralThis thesis will present a review of the medical risks associated with bone marrow and kidney donations, as well as a review of the common law dealing with donations by minors and incompetent persons. The final chapter then makes a case for the permissibility of minor donation based on the interests of the family.
Ho, Ching-ching Mary, et 何晶晶. « Socially responsible investment indices in Asian markets : merging stakeholder theories with social construction for improved index construction methodology ». Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/193511.
Texte intégralpublished_or_final_version
Kadoorie Institute
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy
Carey, John N. « War and justice ». Thesis, Kansas State University, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/9826.
Texte intégralMentor, Marcelle. « The role of values and corporate culture in people management ». Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/50186.
Texte intégralENGLISH ABSTRACT: The business world has seemingly become hit by, or perhaps it has been more exposed of its unethical and morally bad decisions and procedures. One just has to follow the businessrelated issues and one becomes aware of events of corruption, greed, fraud, embezzlement, theft, nepotism and so forth. This is not just an occurrence in South Africa, but a global phenomenon. However, as South Africa approaches its tenth year of democracy, and the move towards the realization of our President's vision of an African Renaissance, there is an increasing awareness that a commitment to management by acceptable values is needed to remove negativity around management processes and practices in South Africa. We have to move to a culture of management where people are the central aspect around which good management revolves. As the forerunners of The African Renaissance, we need to engage with the concept of "Ubuntu", and truly realize that value-management is really that - being people through other people. We need to accept that we should be people driven, inclusive of every single person to be able to achieve the goals we set out for our companies. Emotional intelligence is vital if one bases a style of management on a people directed goals and orientations. When we look at each other through empathetic eyes this allows for consideration of others and ultimately allows for positive change and growth in an organization. To be able to move effectively towards such a management style is not as easy as discarding a predominantly Eurocentric style and embracing an African one. There is the element of human beings that plays a vital role. The values of an individual, the norms and beliefs that that individual holds dear, is pivotal to the structure of organizational culture. It is the stance of this thesis that each individual is responsible, in one way or another, for the structure and make up of the organizational culture of which it is a part. This thesis looks at research in this regard and how the findings could be applied in the South African corporate world to help facilitate effective transformation.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die besigheidswêreld word oënskynlik gebombardeer - of moontlik word dit net meer blootgestel aan die onetiese en moreel verkeerde besluite en prosedures. Dit is slegs nodig om te let op besigheidsaangeleenthede om gevalle van korrupsie, bedrog, hebsug, diefstal, nepotisme, en so voorts te bespeur. Bogenoemde gevalle kom nie slegs voor in Suid Afrika nie, maar is 'n universele verskynsel. Soos Suid Afrika sy tiende jaar van Demokrasie nader en daar 'n beweging is in die rigting van ons President se visie vir 'n Afrika Renaissance, is daar 'n toenemende bewuswording van die feit dat toewyding aan bestuur deur (aanneemlike) waardes noodsaaklik is om negatiwiteit rondom bestuurprosesse en - praktyke in Suid Afrika te verwyder. Ons moet ons beywer om te beweeg na 'n kultuur van bestuur waar individue die fokuspunt is te midde van voortreflike bestuurstyle. As die voorlopers van die Afrika Rennaissance moet ons meer verbind wees tot die konsep van "Ubuntu" en werklik besef dat waarde-bestuur inderwaarheid mens-gesentreerd behoort te wees. Ons moet die uitdagings aanvaar om gedissiplineerd op te tree en sorg te dra dat alle mylpale, wat deur die maatskappy daargestel word bereik word deur die optimale benutting van elke individu binne die maatskappy. Emosienele intelligensie is van die uiterste belang as die besigstyl gefundeer is op die beginsel van mens-gerigte doelwitte en ingesteldhede. Daar moet 'n kultuur gekweek word van empatie en konsiderasie vir ons medemens, wat uiteindelik positiewe veranderinge en groei binne die maatskappy sal bevorder. Om effektief in die rigting van so 'n bestuurstyl te beweeg, is nie bloot 'n geval van wegdoen met 'n oorwegend Eurosentriese styl en die aagryp van 'n Afrika - styl nie. Die menslike faktor speel'n beslissende rol. Die waardes van 'n individu, die norme en oortuigings wat vir hom of haar belangrik is, is van deurslaggewende belang vir die struktuur van organisatoriese kultuur. Hierdie tesis ondersoek narvorsing in hierdie verband en kyk hoe die bevindinge toegepas kan word in die Suid Afrikaanse korporatiewe wêreld om effektiewe transformasie te help fasiliteer.
Wiebe, Jeff, et University of Lethbridge Faculty of Management. « Near or far : psychological distance construal and its role in ethical ». Thesis, Lethbridge, Alta. :|bUniversity of Lethbridge, Faculty of Management,|cc2013, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10133/3431.
Texte intégralviii, 103 leaves ; 29 cm
Wang, Jie. « Moral Judgment and Digital Piracy : Predicting Attitudes, Intention, and Behavior Regarding Digital Piracy Using a Modified Version of the Defining Issues Test ». Thesis, University of North Texas, 2015. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc822761/.
Texte intégralThorne, Linda 1956. « The influence of social interaction on auditors' moral reasoning / ». Thesis, McGill University, 1997. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=34471.
Texte intégralWash, Dwight Derrell. « Concepts of supernatural punishment for worldly moral misconduct ». CSUSB ScholarWorks, 1989. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/450.
Texte intégralDe, Roubaix J. A. M. (John Addey Malcolm). « Value, utility and autonomy : a moral-critical analysis of utilitarian positions on the value of prenatal life ». Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/50542.
Texte intégralENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will". The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life. Methodology and results I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian position, based on six particular arguments: • Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance of special obligations to special groups. • Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears. • Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions. • Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism. • The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian. • There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian theory. As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability. This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability (viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life. In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate" position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated research on human pre-embryos and stem cells.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Probleemstelling Utilitariste huldig sterk omlynde standpunte oor die waarde van lewe. Hulle redeneer dat menslike (inderwaarheid, alle lewende) wesens slegs op grond van twee eienskappe intrinsieke morele waarde kan verwerf: sentiëntisme, d.i. die vermoë om lyding te ervaar, en persoonstatus. Sentiëntisme is 'n bepalende vereiste vir morele status, maar regverdig nie 'n "reg op lewe"-aanspraak nie. Persoonsyn, verstaan as 'n vorm van selfbewustheid tesame met 'n bewuste belang by die voortsetting van eie bestaan, mag wel so 'n aanspraak regverdig. Voorgeboortelike (en "voorpersoonlike") wesens is egter nie persone nie; hulle word eers (aansienlik) ná geboorte volwaardige persone. Die implikasie is dat sulke wesens weinig morele status het, en byvoorbeeld, na willekeur gedood mag word. Die morele probleem wat ek in hierdie dissertasie aanspreek is om die utilitaristiese beskouing ten opsigte van die morale status of waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe krities-filosofies te ondersoek en te evalueer. Metodologie en gevolgtrekkings Eerstens maak ek na aanleiding van 'n gedetaileerde literatuurstudie 'n in-diepte analise van van die utilitaristiese posisie aan die hand van 'n aantal temas wat ek in hul argument geïdentifiseer het. Daarna volg 'n krities-filosofiese evaluasie van die utilitaristiese posisie, aan die hand van ses argumente: • Utilitarisme is filosofies onsamehangend. Dit oorvereenvoudig die morele argument deur voor te gee dat gevolge al is wat moreel saakmaak. Die onderliggende utilitaristiese teorie bots met die morele eise vervat in kontemporêre sienings van menseregte en geregtigheid. Dit negeer die morele belangrikheid van spesiale verpligtinge teenoor spesiale belangegroepe. • Utilitarisme het potensieelonaanvaarbare gevolge. Dit IS inherent diskriminerend en kan lei tot onkeerbare glybaan ("slippery slope")-argumente. Utilitarisme bots met ons fundamentele morele intuïsies betreffende die waarde van voorgeboortelike lewe. Hierdie intuïsies word onder meer ondersteun deur die meeste hoofstroom godsdienste. • Spesiësisme is, in kontras met die utilitaristiese beskouing, onafwendbaar vir ons selfverstaan as mense, soos aangetoon kan word met 'n beroep op die eksistensiële fenomenologie. Self-konstituering, gelyktydige konstituering van die wêreld van die mens, en selfs die moontlikheid van moraliteit is slegs moontlik vanuit' n bepaalde spesiësistiese beskouing. • Die potensialiteit van "pre-persone" om tot volwaardige persone te ontwikkel kan nie, soos die utilitaris doen, sonder meer geïgnoreer word nie. • Daar is 'n basiese en onderliggende morele eis om swak en weerlose menslike wesens te beskerm. Hierdie idees bots lynreg met utilitaristiese teorie. As 'n alternatief tot die utilitaristiese beskouing, ontwikkel ek 'n twee-fase posisie betreffende die morele waarde van voorgeboortelike menslike lewe. Ek noem hierdie posisie agting vir voorgeboortelike en voor-persoonlike menslike lewe gebaseer op die menslikheid, potensialiteit en oorleefbaarheid van prenatale mense. Dit lei, eerstens, tot die gevolgtrekking van 'n gegradeerde glyskaal konsepsie van voor-persoonlike menslike morele waarde, min of meer parallel aan die vlak van ontwikkeling en die ontwikkeling van potensialiteit. Tweedens lei dit tot die gevolgtrekking dat die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid 'n moreel-beduidende afsnypunt is waarna die menslike fetus "normaalweg" aanspraak kan maak op 'n reg dat sy lewe voortgesit moet word. In soverre dit die toepassing van my argument betref, ontwikkel ek 'n "gematigde" posisie vis-á-vis aborsie. Ek redeneer dat alle menslike voorgeboortelike wesens wat 'n redelike kans het dat hul intrinsieke potensialiteit verder sal ontwikkel, die geleentheid daartoe gegun behoort te word. Ek aanvaar ook dat nog hierdie beskouing, nog die kompleksiteit van die menslike bestaan "absolute" posisies moreel regverdig. Die problematiek en inherente spanning tussen hierdie oënskynlik-opponerende posisies word in die teks bespreek. Nogtans beskou ek die ontwikkeling van lewensvatbaarheid as 'n moreel insiggewende afsnypunt waarna terminasie net in buitengewone omstandighede moreel regverdigbaar is.
Vandenabeele, Fabienne. « Patentability of living organisms : legal and ethical aspects of the question ». Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=31177.
Texte intégralNotwithstanding some reluctance at the outset, most of patent offices as well as courts and tribunals in the United States, Canada and Europe have finally accepted patentability of living organisms. Oppositions are however numerous and, more than a criticism towards the patent system itself, it is genetic engineering that is put into question.
Europe has recently regulated the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. Being a text of compromise, the Directive is already subject of controversies. The United States and Canada have not yet decided to explicitly legislate in this field. Some decisions taken in particular cases allow to determine the state of the question in these two countries. It is however not certain that they can be satisfied with an unregulated technology that raises so many moral questions.
The question of the foremost importance concerns the research branch, as well as the use that will be done with inventions emerging from the biotechnology industry. Patent law being unable to prevent technological creations, it is above all the utilisation of it that will allow to retain the most beneficial inventions for humankind and its environment.
Williams-Jones, Bryn. « Embodiment, property, and the patenting of human genetic material ». Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ29520.pdf.
Texte intégralDick, Liezl. « Verantwoordelikheid en die nuwe genetiese tegnologiee : filosofiese perspektiewe op die relevansie van 'n etiek van verantwoordelikheid vir morele besinning oor kloning en stamselnavorsing ». Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/21775.
Texte intégralENGLISH ABSTRACT: New genetic technologies (e.g. stem-cell research, gene-therapies and cloning) raise some of the most enigmatic moral problems in the field of bioethics. My aim in this thesis is to explore the philosophical and ethical significance of the idea of an “ethics of responsibility” (as, particularly, developed in the work of Hans Jonas, Zygmunt Bauman and Emmanuel Levinas) for moral reflection on these problems. “Ethics of responsibility” is a new approach to ethics that represents an alternative to both rule morality (where moral action is identified with the application of rules) and utilitarianism (where moral action is identified with establishing the best consequences for the most people). Rule morality has the serious shortcoming of being unable to deal with real and actual moral dilemmas, and of being unclear as to which rule applies in which situation. Utilitarianism has the serious shortcoming of often being way too counter-intuitive: deeds that we normally find morally abhorrent, such a lying, stealing and even torturing can, within the utilitarian calculus, sometimes be justified. The notion of an ethics of responsibility has been promoted by the mentioned authors both to counter the simplistic idea that a rule exists in terms of which every moral action can be determined, but also to counter the crassness of the utilitarian calculus. It represents an approach to ethics in which the interests of the other are taken as seriously as possible within the confines of the situation in which action is called for. My aim is to explore this approach critically, and to invesitgate its desirability, applicability and efficacy with particular reference to the moral problems raised by the new genetic technologies.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Nuwe genetiese tegnologieë bv stamselnavorsing en kloning, opper enigmatiese morele probleme binne die veld van bio-etiek. Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die filosofiese en etiese belang van die idee van “ ‘n etiek van verantwoordelikheid” (soos dit in die werk van Hans Jonas, Zygmunt Bauman en Emmaneul Levinas ontwikkel is) vir morele refleksie van hierdie probleme te ondersoek. ‘n Etiek van verantwoordelikheid is ‘n nuwe benadering binne etiek wat ‘n alternatief daarstel vir onderskeidelik utilitarisme (waar ‘n moreel korrekte aksie dié aksie is wat die beste gevolge vir die meeste mense tot stand bring) en deontologie of reël-moraliteit (waar ‘n moreel korrekte aksie dié aksie is wat die morele reëls gehoorsaam). Albei hierdie tradisionele etiese teorie beskik oor tekortkominge. Utilitarisme voer byvoorbeeld aan dat ‘n aksie wat gewoonlik as kontraintuitief beskou word, moreel korrek is. Aksies soos steel, die vertel van leuens en marteling kan volgens die utilitaristiese beskouing moreel regverdig word. Deontologie slaag weer nie daarin om sinvol met werklike en aktuele morele probleme om te gaan nie, en dit is dikwels onduidelik watter morele reël voorkeur moet kry wanneer dit op ‘n morele dilemma toegepas word. ‘n Etiek van verantwoordelikheid wat deur bogenoemde outeurs voorgestaan word, bied ‘n alternatief vir die simplisitese idee dat vaste morele reël bestaan wat op ‘n universele wyse kan bepaal wanneer ‘n aksie moreel reg of verkeerd is. ‘n Etiek van verantwoordelikheid beweeg ook weg van die kras benadering van utilitarisme, en bied ‘n maak ruimte vir ‘n meer komplekse, genuanseerde benadering tot die etiese problematiek. Dit verskaf ‘n benadering tot etiek waar die belange van die ander binne die etiese besluitnemingsproses, ernstig opgeneem word. Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die tradisionele etiese teorie krities te benader, waarna die toepasbaarheid en effektiwiteit van ‘n etiek van verantwoordelikheid, ondersoek sal word.
Pierce, Lynn Margaret. « Physicians who write about talking with patients : the interview ». Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=56935.
Texte intégralBurstein, Ronald Mark. « The ethical decision-making self-efficacy of psychologists and counselors ». Diss., The University of Arizona, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186308.
Texte intégralMitchell, Leslie Roy. « Discourse and the oppression of nonhuman animals : a critical realist account ». Thesis, Rhodes University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003951.
Texte intégralMELLOR, Ewan Edward. « Just and unjust distributions in war : the moral equality of combatants and the normative structure of war ». Doctoral thesis, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/46006.
Texte intégralExamining Board: Professor Chris Reus-Smit, The University of Queensland, formerly EUI, (Supervisor); Professor Jennifer Welsh, EUI; Professor James Pattison, The University of Manchester; Professor Peter Sutch, Cardiff University
This develops a defence of the principle of the moral equality of combatants against recent revisionist critiques. It does this by developing an interpretive and hermeneutical approach to the study of war and the just war tradition. This approach allows the meanings of war and of actions within war to be explored and it is on the basis of this understanding of meaning that the moral equality of combatants is defended. It shows that these meanings and distinctions cannot be recognized by the revisionists and that this is a moral and interpretive loss. The thesis develops the argument of Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice and applies it to war; it demonstrates that war has a distinct meaning and that the principles for distributing identities, rights, and responsibilities in war are relative to this meaning. The thesis begins by exploring the history of the just war tradition and the evolution of the concept of combatancy and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants in order to demonstrate how the just war tradition constitutes war as an institution. It then explores the contemporary debate and argues that whilst the traditional defences of the principle of the moral equality of combatants have been found wanting, the conclusions of the revisionists need not be accepted. To demonstrate this, the following chapters study a number of examples that highlight important and meaningful contrasts associated with both the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum. The final chapter introduces the concept of the normative structure of war and argues that the right to participate and to kill in war depends upon a public relationship of duty between soldiers and the state. The reciprocal relationships of duty are the source of the moral equality of combatants.
Dolan-Henderson, Alvin Augustus. « Shame, guilt, and ethical orientation ». Thesis, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3119670.
Texte intégralNoja, Marcelle Maria. « Moral identity and ethical decision making ». Phd thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/156334.
Texte intégral« An ethical review on advertising ». Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5887203.
Texte intégralThesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves [93-97]).
Chapter SECTION I. --- AN OVERVIEW
Chapter CHAPTER 1. --- THE ENVIRONMENT & BACKGROUND OF ADVERTISING
Chapter 1.1. --- Overview --- p.2
Chapter 1.2. --- Viewpoints on Advertising --- p.3
Chapter 1.3. --- The Marketing-Advertising Connection --- p.4
Chapter 1.3.1. --- A Historical Review on Changing Concept of Marketing
Chapter 1.3.2. --- What is Marketing ?
Chapter 1.3.3. --- What is Promotion ?
Chapter 1.3.4. --- Advertising in the Promotion Mix
Chapter 1.4. --- Advertising Planning --- p.8
Chapter 1.5. --- The Communication / Persuasion Process --- p.9
Chapter 1.6. --- Summary --- p.9
Chapter SECTION II. --- COMMON DEFENSES OF ADVERTISING
Chapter CHAPTER 2. --- "CAN ADVERTISING BE SELF-REGULATED BY THE ""INVISIBLE HAND"" ?"
Chapter 2.1. --- A General Interpretation of Smith's Invisible Hand --- p.13
Chapter 2.2. --- A More Complete Picture of Smith's Theories --- p.15
Chapter 2.2.1. --- Prudence
Chapter 2.2.2. --- Benevolence
Chapter 2.2.3. --- Self-Command
Chapter 2.3. --- Stoicism --- p.18
Chapter 2.4. --- A Closer Look at Smith's Invisible Hand --- p.20
Chapter 2.5. --- Can Advertising be Justified by Smith's Invisible Hand or Free Market Mechanism ? --- p.22
Chapter CHAPTER 3. --- CAM ADVERTISING PROVIDE INFORMATIONAL UTILITY ?
Chapter 3.1. --- Advertising Provides Important Information for Consumers --- p.26
Chapter 3.2. --- A More Complete Picture of Advertising's Reality --- p.27
Chapter 3.2.1. --- Ambiguity
Chapter 3.2.2. --- Concealed Facts
Chapter 3.2.3. --- Exaggeration & Puffery
Chapter 3.2.4. --- Psychological Appeals
Chapter 3.2.5. --- Conclusion
Chapter 3.3. --- A Historical Explanation of Why Advertising Cannot be Pure Informative --- p.37
Chapter 3.3.1. --- The Early Stage
Chapter 3.3.2. --- A Breakthrough
Chapter 3.3.3. --- The Mature Stage
Chapter 3.4. --- Can We Conclude that Persuasive Advertising is Deceptive? --- p.40
Chapter 3.4.1. --- Gardner's Definition of Deception
Chapter 3.4.2. --- A Reasonable Man Standard of Deception
Chapter 3.5. --- More on Rational/Irrational Persuasion & Deceptive/ Non-Deceptive Advertising --- p.43
Chapter 3.5.1. --- The Two Dimensions
Chapter 3.5.2. --- Various Combinations
Chapter CHAPTER 4. --- IS ADVERTISING A NECESSITY FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRMS
Chapter 4.1. --- Discussions --- p.47
Chapter 4.2. --- Conclusion --- p.49
Chapter SECTION III. --- ADVERTISING & SOCIETY
Chapter CHAPTER 5. --- THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING
Chapter 5.1. --- Providing Informational Utility --- p.51
Chapter 5.2. --- Employment --- p.52
Chapter 5.3. --- Distribution Costs --- p.52
Chapter 5.4. --- Advertising & Brand Names --- p.53
Chapter 5.5. --- Media Support --- p.54
Chapter 5.6. --- Effect on the Business Cycle --- p.54
Chapter 5.7. --- Stimulating Product Utility --- p.55
Chapter 5.8. --- Developing New Products --- p.56
Chapter 5.9. --- Contribution to the Overall Welfare of the Economy --- p.57
Chapter 5.9.1. --- A Common Misunderstanding
Chapter 5.9.2. --- "Advertising can be Counterproductive, Unproductive or Productive"
Chapter 5.10. --- Conclusion --- p.60
Chapter CHAPTER 6. --- CULTURAL & SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERTISING
Chapter 6.1. --- Reviewing Advertising from the Social Context --- p.62
Chapter 6.2. --- """Explicit"" Content vs. ""Implicit"" Content" --- p.63
Chapter 6.3. --- Social Conditions Affecting Individual Autonomy --- p.64
Chapter 6.3.1. --- A Brief Review on Individual Autonomy
Chapter 6.3.2. --- A Background of Social Influences on Individual Autonomy
Chapter 6.4. --- The Power of Marketing & Advertising : Technique- & Result- Oriented --- p.70
Chapter 6.4.1. --- Techniques of Marketing
Chapter 6.4.2. --- Technique-Orientation on Advertising
Chapter 6.4.3. --- A Culture of Commercialization & Consumption
Chapter 6.5. --- The Real Evils of Advertising --- p.77
Chapter 6.5.1. --- """Suppressing "" Autonomy"
Chapter 6.5.2. --- Effects on Future Generations
Chapter 6.5.3. --- Changing Values
Chapter 6.5.4. --- Consumerism
Chapter 6.5.5. --- Neglecting Public Goods & Services
Chapter 6.7. --- Conclusion --- p.90
CONCLUSION --- p.91
REFERENCES
Ehrich, Kristine Renee. « Willful ignorance : the avoidance of ethical attribute information ». Thesis, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/1955.
Texte intégralBaggot, Siobhan M. « The canine connection : an anthropologically grounded philosophical perspective on caring for dogs ». Thesis, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1957/32481.
Texte intégralGraduation date: 2004
Kruger, Teresa. « Moral intelligence : the construct and key correlates ». Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10210/7907.
Texte intégralThe spate of large-scale financial misconduct across the globe, sparked interest, and concern regarding moral conduct in organisations. The impact of the immoral actions proved to be devastating for many companies, especially for the financial sector. These entities spend a lot of time and effort managing threats from external sources, such as clients and terrorist. Less focus is placed in reducing fraud from within. Conforming to the regulations however, increases strain on companies to comply with the guidelines. This compliance consumes a lot of an organisation’s resources such as time and money. Little focus, if any is placed on the psychological component of governance, namely, the moral intelligence of employees and on understanding the human contribution to corporate governance and immoral actions. Human Resource practitioners are not doing enough to understand this dynamic, specifically the role of moral intelligence, underlined by the moral decision-making process. From a theoretical point of view, the study was aimed at understanding the moral domain from a more integrated, broad-based approach, including the moral dynamic as a form of intelligence. From a practical point of view, the need for more reliable and scientific information on moral conduct served as driver for the study. This investigation included the examination of the construct moral intelligence as part of the multiple intelligence theory, understanding the moral decision-making process as part of moral intelligence, identifying an underlying set of universal moral principles as foundation for moral decision-making in business, and analyzing patterns of covariability between moral reasoning and moral competence as part of the decision-making process. The study was conducted in a large South African financial institution with a sample size of 466. The Moral Judgment Test was preferred as measure for moral reasoning and moral competence, while the EQ Map and Psychomatrix Spirituality Inventory (PSI) measured emotional and spiritual intelligence respectively. Results revealed support for Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. There was evidence that the use of post-conventional stages of moral reasoning increased moral competence, which is the consistency between reasoning and action. There was further statistical support for differences in moral reasoning and moral competence when compared with selected demographical variables. The various statistical operations provided information for the calculation of risk-ratios, aimed at identifying individuals prone to immoral action. This data is useful when selecting and promoting individuals in the bank. As a result of the qualitative information and quantitative data, an amalgamation of the various approaches produced an integrated model on moral intelligence. It is envisaged that this will contribute to understanding true moral intelligence as a broad approach. Various theoretical and practical conclusions are reached, and recommendations and limitations are discussed.
VAHA, Milla Emilia. « The metaphysics of moral subjectivity : theory without practice ? » Doctoral thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/28056.
Texte intégralExamining Board: Professor Christian Reus-Smit, University of Queensland (EUI Supervisor); Professor Kimberly Hutchings, London School of Economics and Political Science; Professor Mervyn Frost, King's College London; Professor Friedrich Kratochwil, Central European University (formerly EUI).
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
In this work I aim to offer a theory of moral subjectivity of the state that helps to explain, in an analytically sound way, what is required for theorising about states as moral agents within a system of very different types of state-units, and, furthermore, enables one to explore what kind of consequences the practices of moral subjectivity might have for that very same system. The argument that I present has two levels. The first level consists of two theoretical claims about exploring the moral subjectivity of the state in International Relations. The first claim is that in order to argue meaningfully about the moral subjectivity of the state one has to take seriously the state's being-in-theworld qua state. By relying on Immanuel Kant's political philosophy and practical metaphysics, I will offer a theory that is applicable when one wishes to conceptualise the state as an autonomous entity in its own right, and, subsequently, allows one to argue that all states, despite their different prudential and contingent differences and characteristics, are moral agents. The second theoretical claim is that the moral personhood of the state is not in and of itself merely metaphysical – that it is, in fact, something purely intrinsic to the agent. Here I depart from Kant's original idea of essentialist moral personality of the state, and, in contrast to Kant, argue that the moral subjectivity of the state is always reciprocal. Moral subjectivity, therefore, cannot be studied without the concept of moral standing: the agent's positioning among other similar entities. Moral subjectivity proper is then constituted by recognition of other similar subjects who consider themselves as moral subjects. Moral subjectivity is always conditional and placed under scrutiny by politics of recognition. The second level of the argument maintains that when one then studies practices of moral subjectivity of the state – that is, states vis-à-vis each other in international society – it is the recognition of subjectivity that plays a central role in identifying states as moral agents in world affairs. While every state in theory qualifies as a moral person, their moral standing as fully-fledged moral subjects is constantly challenged due to their empirical differences in practice. One such difference explored in this study is the liberal/non-liberal character of the state. In order to make sense of the claims of different and sometimes even contradictory moral statuses of different types of empirical states in world politics, I argue that one has to explore the practices of moral subjectivity as well.
Naicker, Dhirsen. « Moral decision-making : personality type as influence on moral intuitionism ». Diss., 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/45007.
Texte intégralDissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2014.
lmgibs2015
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
Unrestricted
Marais, Len. « Moral decision-making : personality type as influence on moral intuitionism ». Diss., 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/45032.
Texte intégralDissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2014.
lmgibs2015
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
Unrestricted
Van, Marle Karin. « Towards an ethical interpretation of equality ». Thesis, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/17733.
Texte intégralThe aim of this thesis is to search for an "ethical" interpretation of equality. Although the current South African approach of "substantive" equality is better than mere "formal" equality, I fear that even substantive equality will again deny or reduce difference. An "ethical" interpretation of equality is a way of interpretation that radically acknowledges difference and otherness. I argue for an ethical interpretation of equality as an alternative to substantive and formal equality. The intersection between public space, equality and justice is essential to such an ethical interpretation. An ethical interpretation of equality requires that present South African visions of public space must be reconstructed and transformed continuously. This means that an ethical interpretation of equality rejects finality and closure in respect of public space. The visions of public space and perspectives of equality that I support are alert to difference and otherness. My understanding of justice is that it is never fully achieved in the present. Justice functions as a future orientated ideal. The "ethical" in an ethical interpretation of equality reflects an awareness of the limits of any present system to encompass equality and justice completely. Visions of public space, perspectives on equality and landscapes of justice (the features of the ethical intersection) form the main sections of the thesis. I discuss the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a manifestation of the ethical intersection between public space, equality and justice. The TRC was an outstanding example of reconstruction and transformation of public space. It was a public space where each and every individual was treated equally while concrete contexts, specific circumstances and difference were taken into account. The TRC as event was inspired by the ideal of justice. The value of the TRC as a manifestation of the ethical intersection is the profound effect it may have on our interpretation of equality by demonstrating the limits of the substantive approach.
Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om ondersoek in te stel na 'n "etiese" interpretasie van gelykheid. Alhoewel die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse benadering van "substantiewe" gelykheid beter is as blote formele gelykheid, vrees ek dat selfs substantiewe gelykheid weereens verskil sal ontken of gering skat. 'n "Etiese" interpretasie van gelykheid is 'n manier van interpretasie wat radikaal kennis neem van verskil en andersheid. Ek argumenteer vir 'n etiese interpretasie van gelykheid as 'n alternatief tot substantiewe en formele gelykheid. Die interseksie tuseen publieke spasie, gelykheid en geregtigheid is noodsaaklik vir so 'n etiese interpretasie. 'n Etiese interpretasie van gelykheid vereis dat huidige Suid-Afrikaanse visies van publieke spasie aanhoudend gerekonstrueer en getransformeer moet word. Dit beteken dat 'n etiese interpretasie van gelykheid finaliteit en geslotenheid met betrekking tot publieke spasie verwerp. Die visies van publieke spasie en perspektiewe op gelykheid wat ek ondersteun is gevoelig vir verskil en andersheid. Ek verstaan geregtigheid as nooit volkome bereikbaar in die teenswoordige nie. Geregtigheid tree op as 'n toekomsgerigte ideaal. Die "etiese" in 'n etiese interpretasie van gelykheid weerspieel 'n bewustheid van die onvermoe van enige teenswoordige sisteem om gelykheid en geregtigheid volledig te omvat. Visies van publieke spasie, perspektiewe op gelykheid en landskappe van geregtigheid (die eienskappe van die etiese interseksie) vorm die hoofafdelings van die proefskrif. Ek bespreek die Suid-Afrikaanse Waarheids-en Versoeningskommissie (WVK) as 'n manifestasie van die etiese interseksie tussen publieke spasie, gelykheid en geregtigheid. Die WVK was 'n uitstaande voorbeeld van die rekonstruksie en transformasie van publieke spasie. Dit was 'n publieke spasie waar elke individu gelyk behandel is terwyl konkrete kontekste, spesifieke omstandighede en verskil in ag geneem is. Die WVK as 'n gebeurtenis is ge'lnspireer deur die ideaal van geregtigheid. Die waarde van die WVK as 'n manifestasie van die etiese interseksie is die diepgaande effek wat dit op ons interpretasie van gelykheid kan he deur die beperkings van die teenswoordige substantiewe benadering uit te wys.
Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law
LL.D.