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1
Olson, Jonas. « Hume's sentimentalism : Not non-cognitivism ». Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1, no 34 (2021) : 95–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bpa2134095o.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper considers and argues against old and recent readings of Hume according to which his account of moral judgement is non-cognitivist. In previous discussions of this topic, crucial metaethical distinctions-between sentimentalism and non-cognitivism and between psychological and semantic non-cognitivism-are often blurred. The paper aims to remedy this and argues that making the appropriate metaethical distinctions undermines alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations of Hume. The paper focuses in particular on Hume's so-called 'motivation argument' and argues that it is a poor basis for non-cognitivist interpretations. While there is textual support for attributing to Hume what may be called 'modally weak' motivational internalism, there is no solid textual support for attributing to him either psychological or semantic non-cognitivism. The paper also challenges briefly some further alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations. It concludes by offering some positive evidence against such interpretations, namely that Hume appears to hold that there are moral beliefs and moral knowledge.
2
Grzankowski, Alex. « Navigating Recalcitrant Emotions ». Journal of Philosophy 117, no 9 (2020) : 501–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2020117931.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In discussions of the emotions, it is commonplace to wheel out examples of (for instance) people who know that rollercoasters aren’t dangerous but who fear them anyway. Such cases are well known to have been troubling for cognitivists who hold the emotions are (at least in part) judgments or beliefs. But more recently, it has been argued that the very theories that emerged from the failure of cognitivism (perceptual theories and other neo-cognitivist approaches) face trouble as well. One gets the sense that the theory that can accomplish this will win a crucial point over its competitors. In the present paper I offer a new approach to making sense of the normative tension to which recalcitrant emotions give rise. Interestingly, the approach is one that can be adopted by anyone willing to grant that emotions are themselves governed by norms.
3
Ridge, Michael. « Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's ‘Do so as well!’ ». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no 4 (décembre 2003) : 563–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716555.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Meta-ethical non-cognitivism makes two claims—a negative one and a positive one. The negative claim is that moral utterances do not express beliefs which provide the truth-conditions for those utterances. The positive claim is that the primary function of such utterances is to express certain of the speaker's desire-like states of mind. Non-cognitivism is officially a theory about the meanings of moral words, but non-cognitivists also maintain that moral states of mind are themselves at least partially constituted by desire-like states to which moral utterances give voice. Non-cognitivists need a plausible account of what distinguishes whims, addictions and cravings from genuinely moral judgments. For while non-cognitivists maintain that in a suitably broad sense moral judgments just are constituted by desire-like states they also insist that not any old desire constitutes a genuinely moral judgment. Since the challenge is to demarcate what is distinctive about moral attitudes we might usefully call this the demarcation challenge.
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Dammann, Guy, et Elisabeth Schellekens. « Aesthetic Understanding and Epistemic Agency in Art ». Disputatio 13, no 62 (1 décembre 2021) : 265–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0014.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract Recently, cognitivist accounts about art have come under pressure to provide stronger arguments for the view that artworks can yield genuine insight and understanding. In Gregory Currie’s Imagining and Knowing: Learning from Fiction, for example, a convincing case is laid out to the effect that any knowledge gained from engaging with art must “be judged by the very standards that are used in assessing the claim of science to do the same” (Currie 2020: 8) if indeed it is to count as knowledge. Cognitivists must thus rally to provide sturdier grounds for their view. The revived interest in this philosophical discussion targets not only the concept of knowledge at the heart of cognitivist and anti-cognitivist debate, but also highlights a more specific question about how, exactly, some artworks can (arguably) afford cognitive import and change how we think about the world, ourselves and the many events, persons and situations we encounter. This paper seeks to explore some of the ways in which art is capable of altering our epistemic perspectives in ways that might count as knowledge despite circumventing some standards of evidential requirement. In so doing we will contrast two alternative conceptions of how we stand to learn from art. Whereas the former is modelled on the idea that knowledge is something that can be “extracted” from our experience of particular works of art, the latter relies on a notion of such understanding as primarily borne out of a different kind of engagement with art. We shall call this the subtractive conception and cumulative conception respectively. The cumulative conception, we shall argue, better explains why at least some insights and instances of knowledge gained from art seem to elude the evidential standards called for by sceptics of cognitivism.
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Courtois, Stéphane. « L'éthique du discours et le problème de la connaissance morale ». Dialogue 41, no 2 (2002) : 251–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300013895.
Texte intégralRésumé :
ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to assess the coherence of the metaethical positions on which discourse ethics as developed by Habermas and Apel rests. After showing that one is faced here with a non-descriptivist, anti-realist but cognitivist moral theory, I examine whether a non-descriptivist cognitivism, on the one hand, and an anti-realist cognitivism, on the other hand, can consistently be held. I maintain that the problem of the relation between cognitivism and non-descriptivism is adequately solved by the two authors, but that the problem of the relation between cognitivism and anti-realism is still waiting for an appropriate answer, which I put forth in my article.
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Guan, Chengying. « The Wishful Thinking Problem for Non-cognitivism : Does It Really Make Sense ? » KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 1, no 28 (1 janvier 2014) : 30–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2014-012804.
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Abstract This paper concerns the Wishful Thinking Problem for non-cognitivism, which has recently been raised by Cian Dorr. Contrary to Dorr’s claim that the Wishful Thinking Problem is a new crucial objection to non-cognitivism in addition to the well-known Frege- Geach Problem, I argue that recent research has shown that the Wishful Thinking Problem is not independent of the Frege-Geach Problem and therefore it is not lethal to non-cognitivism. However, the Wishful Thinking Problem is still a problem for noncognitivism, for it reveals that the Frege-Geach Problem may be even more troublesome than non-cognitivists originally thought
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Copp, David. « A semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism ». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no 3-4 (2018) : 569–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1432392.
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AbstractRecently, some philosophers have attempted to escape familiar challenges to orthodox nonnaturalist normative realism by abandoning the robust metaphysical commitments of the orthodox view. One such view is the ‘Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism’ or ‘Non-Realist Cognitivism’ proposed by Derek Parfit and a few others. The trouble is that, as it stands, Non-Realist Cognitivism seems unable to provide a substantive non-trivial account of the meaning and truth conditions of moral claims. The paper considers various strategies one might use to address the challenge. There is a rich field of views that are cognitivist and non-realist. But the paper is skeptical of the prospects of Non-Realist Cognitivism.
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Fischer, Jeremy. « Why are You Proud of That ? » Southwest Philosophy Review 36, no 2 (2020) : 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202036240.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).
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CIANCIARDO, JUAN. « A “Defense” of Cognitivism and the Law ». Право України, no 2021/01 (2021) : 139. http://dx.doi.org/10.33498/louu-2021-01-139.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper consists of a journey marked by three important milestones: (i) an overview of the controversy between cognitivism and non-cognitivism, (ii) a review of the different theoretical positions around this controversy, and (iii) an assessment on the impact of such controversy in theory of law and in the way the work of the jurist is understood. The ultimate objective is to demonstrate that, if followed coherently, noncognitivism can only lead to the unintelligibility of the legal phenomenon. Jointly, and as corollary of the latter, it will be revealed that even highly convinced advocates of noncognitivism implicitly or unintentionally ground their legal theorization in cognitivisttype of assumptions. The author adds that a non-cognitivist judge has a serious risk of incurring in a certain type of professional hypocrisy that would consist in camouflaging the real reasons that led her to choose for the application of a norm instead of another, or to choose one method of interpretation over others, with empty formulas that have nothing to do with those real reasons. As we will see, a non-cognitivist jurist approaches legal norms from a very different perspective than a cognitivist. Although it may sound shocking, justice has little or nothing to do with the work of the non-cognitivist from his perspective. This means that laws can have whatever moral content, that their reasonableness and/or their justice value is defined by the legislator, and that most of the time there are no strict reasons that justify what is that the legislator did when passing a law.
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Sinnerbrink, Robert. « Guest Editor's Introduction ». Projections 13, no 2 (1 juin 2019) : 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/proj.2019.130201.
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Since the early 1990s, phenomenology and cognitivism have become influential strands of inquiry in film theory. Phenomenological approaches remain focused on descriptive accounts of the embodied subject’s experiential engagement with film, whereas cognitivist approaches attempt to provide explanatory accounts in order to theorize cognitively relevant aspects of our experience of movies. Both approaches, however, are faced with certain challenges. Phenomenology remains a descriptive theory that turns speculative once it ventures to “explain” the phenomena upon which it focuses. Cognitivism deploys naturalistic explanatory theories that can risk reductively distorting the phenomena upon which it focuses by not having an adequate phenomenology of subjective experience. Phenomenology and cognitivism could work together, I suggest, to ground a pluralistic philosophy of film that is both descriptively rich and theoretically productive. From this perspective, we would be better placed to integrate the cultural and historical horizons of meaning that mediate our subjective experience of cinema.
11
SVENSSON, FRANS. « DoesNon-Cognitivism Rest on a Mistake ? » Utilitas 19, no 2 (juin 2007) : 184–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820807002464.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Philippa Foot has recently argued that non-cognitivism rests on a mistake. According to Foot, non-cognitivism cannot properly account for the role of reasons in moral thinking. Furthermore, Foot argues that moral judgements share a conceptual structure with the kind of evaluations that we make about plants and animals, which cannot be couched in non-cognitivist terms. In this article I argue that, in the form of expressivism, non-cognitivism is capable of accommodating most of what Foot says about reasons and morality. I then argue that the kind of evaluative judgements Foot suggests that we make about plants and animals, does not constitute a plausible alternative to an expressivist understanding of moral judgements. Finally I consider an account similar to Foot's, defended by Rosalind Hursthouse, which, I argue, suffers from an inconsistency, the avoidance of which leaves Hursthouse with a view that is either compatible with expressivism or shares the same problems as Foot's.
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Lobo, Lorena. « Current alternatives on perceptual learning : introduction to special issue on post-cognitivist approaches to perceptual learning ». Adaptive Behavior 27, no 6 (16 septembre 2019) : 355–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712319875147.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This special issue is focused on how perceptual learning is understood from a post-cognitivist approach to cognition. The process of perceptual learning is key in our cognitive life and development: we can learn to discriminate environmental aspects and hence adapt ourselves to it, using our resources intelligently. Perceptual learning, according to the classic cognitivist view, is based on the enrichment of passively received stimuli, a linear operation on sensations that results in a representation of the original information. This representation can be useful for other processes that generate an output, like a motor command, for example. On the contrary, alternative approaches to perceptual learning, different from the one depicted in the classic cognitivist theory, share the ideas that perception and action are intrinsically tied and that cognitive processes rely on embodiment and situatedness. These approaches usually claim that mental representations are not useful concepts, at least when portraying a process of perceptual learning. Approaches within post-cognitivism are not a unified theory, but a diversity of perspectives that need to establish a dialogue among their different methodologies. In particular, this special issue is focused on ecological psychology and enactivism as key traditions within the post-cognitivist constellation.
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Plantinga, Carl. « Cognitive Film Theory : An Insider’s Appraisal ». Cinémas 12, no 2 (31 octobre 2007) : 15–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/024878ar.
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ABSTRACT This article appraises the contributions of what has been called cognitivism or the cognitive approach to film studies, and suggests the means by which the cognitive approach can become more central to film studies than it has been so far. The author first shows that much of what has been called "cognitivist" film studies is only cognitivist in a broad sense, and could just as well be called "analytic." He then argues that the cognitive approach would be most useful when it is thus broadly applied, becoming then more a commitment to the rationality of discourse and human thought than a narrow project within psychology. The article then goes on to appraise the utility of the cognitive approach in our understanding of the psychological power of film and film aesthetics.
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Swaminathan, S. « Nothing ‘Mere’ to It : Reclaiming Subjective Accounts of Normativity of Law ». Journal of Human Values 25, no 1 (22 novembre 2018) : 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0971685818804957.
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If the bindingness of morality was to rest on something as ‘subjective’ as the non-cognitivist says it does, the grouse goes, and morality itself would come down crashing. Nothing less than an ‘objective’ (response-independent) source of normativity, it is supposed, could hold morality in orbit. Some of these worries automatically morph into worries about the projectivist model of normativity of law (based on a non-cognitivist meta-ethic) as well: one which understands the authority or normativity of law in terms of subjective attitudes taken towards the law. As well as the stock worries about non-cognitivism, there are some additional ones that the projectivist model brings in its wake that it cannot account for the ‘uniform’ bindingness of law and that a subjective source of normativity of law based on mental states is unintelligible. This essay makes the case for acquitting the projectivist model of normativity of law from the above charges. But the route to that necessarily leads through first acquitting the non-cognitivist model of moral bindingness from analogous charges.
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Burdman, Federico Gabriel. « El post-cognitivismo en cuestión : extensión, corporización y enactivismo ». Principia : an international journal of epistemology 19, no 3 (8 mars 2016) : 475. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p475.
Texte intégralRésumé :
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p475In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the ‘post-cognitivist’ theoretical framework. I will firs consider critically a proposal put forth by Rowlands (2010), which identifie the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I fin in this proposal will lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches. I will then discuss the standing of embodied, enactive and extended approaches in the face of the dividing issue concerning functionalism, with an eye on the possibility of divorcing the thesis of the extended mind of its original formulation in functionalist terms. In this way, I shall consider the outlook of overcoming some of the conceptual tensions in post-cognitivism by thinking its theoretical framework as non-functionalist.
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Villalobos, Mario, et Joe Dewhurst. « Why post-cognitivism does not (necessarily) entail anti-computationalism ». Adaptive Behavior 25, no 3 (juin 2017) : 117–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712317710496.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Post-cognitive approaches to cognitive science, such as enactivism and autopoietic theory, are typically assumed to involve the rejection of computationalism. We will argue that this assumption results from the conflation of computation with the notion of representation, which is ruled out by the post-cognitivist rejection of cognitive realism. However, certain theories of computation need not invoke representation, and are not committed to cognitive realism, meaning that post-cognitivism need not necessarily imply anti-computationalism. Finally, we will demonstrate that autopoietic theory shares a mechanistic foundation with these theories of computation, and is therefore well-equipped to take advantage of these theories.
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Gert, Joshua. « Neo-pragmatism, morality, and the specification problem ». Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no 3-4 (2018) : 447–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1432397.
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AbstractA defender of any view of moral language must explain how people with different moral views can be be talking to each other, rather than past each other. For expressivists this problem drastically constrains the search for the specific attitude expressed by, say, ‘immoral’. But cognitivists face a similar difficulty; they need to find a specific meaning for ‘immoral’ that underwrites genuine disagreement while accommodating the fact that different speakers have very different criteria for the use of that term. This paper explains how neo-pragmatism deals with this issue while avoiding problems that arise with existing expressivist and cognitivist solutions.
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Brady, Emily. « Adam Smith's ‘Sympathetic Imagination’ and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Environment ». Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9, no 1 (mars 2011) : 95–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2011.0007.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper explores the significance of Adam Smith's ideas for defending non-cognitivist theories of aesthetic appreciation of nature. Objections to non-cognitivism argue that the exercise of emotion and imagination in aesthetic judgement potentially sentimentalizes and trivializes nature. I argue that although directed at moral judgement, Smith's views also find a place in addressing this problem. First, sympathetic imagination may afford a deeper and more sensitive type of aesthetic engagement. Second, in taking up the position of the impartial spectator, aesthetic judgements may originate in a type of self-regulated response where we stand outside ourselves to check those overly humanizing tendencies which might lead to a failure in appreciating nature as nature.
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Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. « Wittgenstein and the 'Factorization Model' of Religious Belief ». European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6, no 1 (21 mars 2014) : 93–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.193.
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In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a ‘factorization model’ which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent ‘factors’ – the belief’s content and the belief-attitude – appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a ‘factorization model’ severely distorts Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief.
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Szałek, Piotr. « Berkeley, Expressivism, and Pragmatism ». Forum Philosophicum 24, no 2 (20 décembre 2019) : 435–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2019.2402.18.
Texte intégralRésumé :
There is a long‑standing dispute among scholars concerning Berkeley’s supposed commitment to an emotivist theory of meaning as the very first (and an early modern) instance of non‑cognitivism. According to this position, the domains of religious and moral language do not refer to facts about the world, but rather express the emotional attitudes of religious or moral language users. Some scholars involved in the dispute argue for taking Berkeley to be an emotivist (non‑cognitivist), while others hold that we should not do so. This paper puts forward an interpretation that lends support to the non‑cognitivist reading of his stance, but in expressivist rather than emotivist terms. It argues that the label “expressivism” does more justice to the textual evidence concerning his understanding of moral language, as what is distinctive where this philosopher is concerned is his interest in explaining the nature of our practice of employing moral language (i.e. how we come to formulate moral statements as expressions of our non‑referential attitudes, and the meta‑level considerations pertaining to morality associated with this), rather than whether morality is just a matter of our emotions or feelings (i.e. such first‑order considerations about morality as whether moral rightness and wrongness correspond merely to our emotional states).
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Salmela, Mikko. « The problem of affectivity in cognitive theories of emotion ». Consciousness & ; Emotion 3, no 2 (31 décembre 2002) : 159–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ce.3.2.04sal.
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Despite their paradigmatic status in the modern philosophy of emotions, cognitive theories have been criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of affectivity in emotions. I agree with much of this criticism, but I argue that an amended cognitive theory can overcome the flaws of the two main theories, strong cognitivism and componential cognitivism. I argue that feeling cannot be reduced to the evaluative content of emotion and attitudinal mode of holding it as strong cognitivists suggest. Typical emotional feelings are induced by either propositionally explicable or biologically “hard-wired” evaluations instead of being involved in the latter. We, then, face the challenge of explaining why the feeling and the evaluative construal that figure into an emotion are aspects of the same state, unlike occasional feelings and thoughts that happen to occur in us at the same time. I propose that evaluative content and feeling are different kinds of representations of the formal property of an emotional object. This is a second-order property that is ascribed to every individual object of a particular emotion-type in virtue of its perceived first-order properties and that is experienced as a property of those objects in a state of emotion. Evaluative content involves a conceptual representation of the formal property while feeling represents its inherent affective quality.
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Pupo, Alexandre. « Cognitivity Everywhere ». World Futures Review 6, no 2 (juin 2014) : 114–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1946756714533206.
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Kramarz, Andreas. « Is the Idea of ‘Musical Emotion’ Present in Classical Antiquity ? » Greek and Roman Musical Studies 5, no 1 (23 février 2017) : 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22129758-12341286.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article investigates to what degree the concept of ‘musical emotion,’ a term coined by contemporary psychology, can be traced in antiquity. Hence, it is necessary to begin by clearly defining ‘music’ and ‘emotion,’ in both ancient and modern understandings. The distinctions between ‘musically induced emotions’ and ‘musical emotions’ strictly speaking, and between the ‘referentialist’ and ‘absolutist’ (or ‘cognitivist’) school in music psychology structure the question. While most ancient theorists believe that the impact of music on the passions (παθήµατα) is of pedagogical or therapeutical relevance as it is able to create ethos in the human soul through mimēsis, others, similar to the cognitivists, limit its effect to (aesthetic) pleasure. Emotions unique to music are not explicitly discussed by the ancient theorists, although an indirect acknowledgment possibly exists in form of metaphorical descriptions of musical experiences, a certain notion of specifically musical pleasure, and the idea of music’s magical power.
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Sushchin, M. A. « Cognitive science : from paradigms to theoretical complexes ». Philosophy of Science and Technology 26, no 2 (2021) : 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-5-22.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article deals with the task of understanding main theoretical movements in cognitive science, including classical computational cognitivism, connectionism, moderate embodied cognition, and predictive processing. For this purpose, the article analyzes the well-known post-positivist conceptions of philosophy of science developed by T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, and L. Laudan, which focus not on individual theories, but on groups of theories. Despite the fact that all these well-known post-positivist conceptions describe well certain features of theoretical movements in cognitive science, none of them as such can be taken as a basis for understanding those cognitivist groups of theories and models. Thus, the article develops an alternative approach based on the author’s idea of theoretical complexes. With the help of this idea, it becomes possible, firstly, to characterize the form of organization of main theoretical movements in cognitive science. From this point of view, complexes of individual theories, models, and conceptions in cognitive science can be formed both on the basis of one common property or a number of common properties, and on the basis of family resemblance. And, secondly, the idea of theoretical complexes has made it possible to clarify the basic functions of cognitivist theoretical movements. These functions include the constructive function of a landmark for the supporters of one particular complex (including the subordinate functions of creating and modifying individual theories, defining their basic concepts, etc.). and the negative function of a target for criticism for supporters of competing complexes.
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ZUK, PETER. « Mill's Metaethical Non-cognitivism ». Utilitas 30, no 3 (4 décembre 2017) : 271–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820817000280.
Texte intégralRésumé :
In section I, I lay out key components of my favoured non-cognitivist interpretation of Mill's metaethics. In section II, I respond to several objections to this style of interpretation posed by Christopher Macleod. In section III, I respond to David Brink's treatment of the well-known ‘competent judges’ passage in Mill's Utilitarianism. I argue that important difficulties face both Brink's evidential interpretation and the rival constitutive interpretation that he proposes but rejects. I opt for a third interpretative option that I call the psychological interpretation. This interpretation makes sense of otherwise difficult aspects of chapter IV of Utilitarianism. In section IV, I offer some reasons for rejecting Nicholas Drake's claim that Mill is ultimately best characterized as a Humean constructivist. If we accept Drake's suggestion that Mill's non-cognitivism is compatible with his being a constructivist, I argue, we should view Mill as putting forward a distinctively Millian form of constructivism rather than a Humean one.
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Gilabert, Pablo. « Two Sets of Concerns about Heath's “Pragmatic Theory of Convergence” ». Dialogue 44, no 2 (2005) : 383–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006272.
Texte intégralRésumé :
A central concern of Joseph Heath's Communicative Action and Rational Choice is to find a plausible response to “the problem of convergence … to explain why we should ever expect to secure agreement on moral questions” (pp. 8–9). In Chapter 7 of his book, Heath proposes what he calls “a pragmatic theory of convergence.” This account is presented as contrasting with the one proposed by Jürgen Habermas, which emphasizes the existence of an internal relation between convergence and moral truth. According to Habermas, there is a “connection … between moral cognitivism and the expectation of convergence” (p. 220). One cannot take moral judgements to be amenable to rational justification (i.e., be a cognitivist) unless one also assumes that an agreement among those participating in the discursive evaluation of that moral judgement is possible in principle. (Habermas adds that this a priori possibility lies in the use of a procedural criterion of moral validity, which in his moral theory is provided by a discursive principle of universalization.) Heath considers this claim about a supposed internal connection as a remnant of foundationalism in Habermas's otherwise promissory contextualist account of moral justification. To reject non-cognitivism, according to Heath, we need not demonstrate that convergence on moral judgement is always forthcoming. It is enough to show that ordinary moral thinking takes moral claims as amenable to discursive justification. As to whether actual practices of discursive justification of moral claims will indeed end in agreement or convergence, a “wait and see” attitude seems all we can legitimately hope for.
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Cekic, Nenad. « Frege-Geach problem and metaethical expressivism ». Theoria, Beograd 51, no 2 (2008) : 49–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo0802049c.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This article consists of four parts: introduction which includes an explanation of what Frege-Geach (FG) problem is; Blackburn's solution of the problem; Gibbard's solution of the problem and author's conclusion. The origin of the FG problem is not ethics nor metaethics, but logic. The key question of the FG problem is: What is the (semantic or other) function of the so-called Frege's 'assertoric sign' in 'unasserted contexts'. In metaethical non-cognitivism the problem derived from this question is: what is the status of antecedent in 'moral modus ponens'. Two 'non-cognitivists', 'exspressivists' and 'quasirealists', Blackburn and Gibbard, have almost the same idea: without necessary philosophical intervention antecedent in moral modus ponens cannot has same status which it has in modus ponens of classical logic. They think we can expand notions of so-called 'operators' (logical and moral) and even construct artificial languages to make that kind of 'logic' possible. Author concludes that those ideas are counter-intuitive, logically problematic and even unintelligible. So FG problem cannot be solved from 'quasi-realistic' prospective.
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Jovanovic, Monika. « Simon Blackburn's projectivism and quasi-realism ». Theoria, Beograd 57, no 1 (2014) : 87–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1401087j.
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In this paper, I will deal with Simon Blackburn?s metaethical theory. Blackburn?s metaethics can be described by two ?-isms? - projectivism and quasi-realism. In the first part of the paper, I will try to show what the nature of their relation is. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss two reasons Blackburn advances in favor of his projectivism. The first pertains to the simplicity of his position, whereas the second claims that projectivism, unlike cognitivism, can explain the thesis of supervenience of moral features over the natural features. I will try to show that the first argument does not have the strength, and that the second argument does not have the plausibility that Blackburn ascribes to the two. In the third part of the paper, I will point out to probably the hardest problem that every non-cognitivist theory is faced with - the Frege-Geach problem. I will discuss Blackburn?s attempt at a solution, and after that, express some doubts with respect to the proposal that Blackburn puts forward.
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Gualtieri, Elena, Roberta De Filippis et Silvia Vayr. « I modelli teorici di matrice cognitivista nella consulenza tecnica in ambito civile nei casi di separazione divorzio : riflessioni ed esemplificazioni cliniche ». QUADERNI DI PSICOTERAPIA COGNITIVA, no 50 (août 2022) : 115–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/qpc50-2022oa14084.
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L'articolo valuta il ruolo dell'esperto impegnato nelle consulenze tecniche, nell'ambito delle vicende separative. Vengono analizzati gli strumenti a supporto del lavoro clinico forense e i modelli tecnico-teorici dei terapeuti cognitivisti che lavorano in questo ambito. Le autrici propongono il tema della valutazione della genitorialità, con particolare attenzione alla teoria dell'attaccamento, al modello dinamico-maturativo e al primario interesse del minore. Seguendo il modello cognitivista evoluzionista e quello post-razionalista, viene poi sottolineato il ruolo della relazione e del processo conoscitivo narrativo. Vengono messe in luce altresì le principali criticità che lo psicologo forense può dover affrontare in un contesto denso di conflittualità, come quello delle separazioni. Vengono affrontati i temi centrali da esplorare in CTU e gli interventi che si possono attuare durante l'iter peritale, al fine di promuovere il riconoscimento e la condivisione della sofferenza, oltre che la cooperazione, ritenuti elementi centrali del buon esito della consulenza. Vengono affrontati due casi clinici-forensi, rileggendoli alla luce dei modelli proposti. Le autrici auspicano inoltre che i professionisti in ambito forense acquisiscano competenze e riflessività sulle ricadute del proprio agire professionale, sufficienti a perseguire lo scopo, ovvero il benessere del minore e della famiglia.
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Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. « MUST MORALITY MOTIVATE ? » DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY 37, no 1 (2 août 2002) : 7–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300_0370102.
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Internalism – here the view that moral judgments entail motivation – is often taken to support non-cognitivism about morality. However, Michael Smith has defended a variety of it in combination with a cognitivist account of morality. Despite the eminence of Smith’s contribution, his case in favour of internalism is flawed. I distinguish several internalist positions and argue that Smith’s version, unlike standard ones, expresses a view about, not the nature of the state one is in when one makes a moral judgment, but the norms of practical rationality. I then defend the externalist appeal to the possibility of amoralism. Such an appeal need not beg the question against internalism and can in any case be backed up by independent considerations. Moreover, neither of Smith’s two main arguments in favour of internalism – the reliable connection argument and the appeal to rationalism about moral requirements – are sound. Having shored up the case for externalism and dismissed Smith’s case against it, I end the essay with a suggestion as to why many philosophers have been attracted to internalism even though the theory turns out to be ill-founded.
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Pigden, Charles. « Two Arguments for Emotivism and a Methodological Moral ». Russell : the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 39 (25 mai 2020) : 5–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/russell.v39i1.4322.
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In 1913 Russell gave up on the Moorean good. But since naturalism was not an option, that left two alternatives: the error theory and non-cognitivism. Despite a brief flirtation with the error theory Russell preferred the non-cognitivist option, developing a form of emotivism according to which to say that something is good is to express the desire that everyone should desire it. But why emotivism rather than the error theory? Because emotivism sorts better with Russell’s Fundamental Principle that the “sentences we can understand must be composed of words with whose meaning we are acquainted.” I construct an argument for emotivism featuring the Fundamental Principle that closely parallels Ayer’s verificationist argument in Language, Truth, and Logic. I contend that Russell’s argument, like Ayer’s, is vulnerable to a Moorean critique. This suggests an important moral: revisionist theories of meaning such as verificationism and the Fundamental Principle are prima facie false. Any modus ponens from such a principle to a surprising semantic conclusion (such as emotivism) is trumped by a Moorean modus tollens from the negation of the surprising semantics to the negation of the revisionist principle.
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Wainwright, William J. « The Cognitivity of Religion ». Faith and Philosophy 5, no 1 (1988) : 97–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil1988516.
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Potter, Jonathan. « Beyond Cognitivism ». Research on Language & ; Social Interaction 32, no 1-2 (janvier 1999) : 119–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08351813.1999.9683615.
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Lillehammer, Hallvard. « Moral Cognitivism ». Philosophical Papers 31, no 1 (mars 2002) : 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568640209485092.
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Levy, Yair. « Why cognitivism ? » Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no 2 (2018) : 223–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1345207.
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AbstractIntention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.
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Elizondo, E. Sonny. « Kantian Cognitivism ». Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101, no 4 (18 novembre 2020) : 711–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12326.
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Potter, Jonathan. « Beyond Cognitivism ». Research on Language & ; Social Interaction 32, no 1 (1 janvier 1999) : 119–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327973rlsi321&2_15.
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Skorupski, John. « Irrealist Cognitivism ». Ratio 12, no 4 (décembre 1999) : 436–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00103.
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Harold, James. « Cognitivism, non-cognitivism, and skepticism about folk psychology ». Philosophical Psychology 25, no 2 (avril 2012) : 165–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.569921.
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Allanazarova, M. « Vocabulary Retention in Cognitive Theory ». Bulletin of Science and Practice 6, no 9 (15 septembre 2020) : 414–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.33619/2414-2948/58/42.
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Vocabulary learning has been a key aspect of acquiring a second language for many years. Many scholars and linguists claimed that learning languages cannot be successful without a wide range of vocabulary. However, most ESL learners are confronted with recalling difficulties as they tend to forget the word fast that they learned recently. These challenges are commonly discussed and researched by Cognitivists since they deem that there are several reasons for forgetting associated with memory and mental process. This case study entails small-scale research on vocabulary retention, reasons for forgetting, and some potential solutions to recall words in the second language. For this case study, we have chosen Cognitivism Theory in a bid to investigate and find out remembering challenges of our ESL learner and give her some possible solutions because according to cognitive psychology it is said that systematic forgetting occurs owing to interfering effects, a continuation of the very process of subsumption, neurolinguistic blocking and other factors. Relying on their findings we tried to help our seventeen-year-old student who tends to forget English words easily. In this case, the hypothesis of the research is that pictorial texts or stories can be more effective for short and long-term vocabulary learning and retention.
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Galoob*, Stephen R., et Ethan J. Leib*. « Motives and Fiduciary Loyalty ». American Journal of Jurisprudence 65, no 1 (8 mai 2020) : 41–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajj/auaa002.
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Abstract: How, if at all, do motives matter to loyalty? We have argued that loyalty (and the duty of loyalty in fiduciary law) has a cognitive dimension. This kind of “cognitivist” account invites the counterargument that, because most commercial fiduciary relationships involve financial considerations, purity of motive cannot be central to loyalty in the fiduciary context. We contend that this counterargument depends on a flawed understanding of the significance of motive to loyalty. We defend a view of the importance of motivation to loyalty that we call the compatibility account. On this view, A acts loyally toward B only if A’s motives are compatible with A’s robustly assigning non-derivative significance to the interests of B. We show that the compatibility account describes the motivational structure of fiduciary loyalty and of loyalty as such. This account provides a realistic picture of motivation and helps respond to two broader criticisms of cognitivism: first, that attributing significance to motivation is paradoxical; second, that attributing significance to motive would make fiduciary law impossible to administer. We also show that the compatibility account can help explain features of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which draws on the lawyer’s duty of loyalty toward the client.
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Nicolaides, Angelo. « Bertrand Russell : Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism and Ethical Critical Thinking ». Phronimon 18 (31 août 2017) : 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.25159/2413-3086/1953.
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Bertrand Russell converted from ethical cognitivism to ethical non-cognitivism and this was historically important, as it gave rise in part, to meta-ethics. It also clarified the central problem between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Russell’s view was that defining “good†is the basic problem of ethics. If “good†is not amorphous, the rest of ethics will follow. He did not believe in ethical knowledge per se and asserted that reason is, and must only be, the servant of desire. A factual statement is thus true if there is an equivalent fact, but as ethical statements do not state facts, there is no issue of a corresponding fact or the statement being true or false in the sense in which factual statements are. Ethics has no statement whether true or false, but consists only of desires of a general kind and people know intuitively what is “right†or “wrongâ€. To Russell critical thinking is entrenched in the structure of philosophy. His epistemological conviction was that knowledge is difficult to attain, while his ethical conviction showed that people should be expected to exercise freedom of inquiry when arriving at conclusions of something being either “good†or “badâ€.
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Kamppinen, Matti, et Antti Revonsuo. « Relativism and Cognitivism ». Science & ; Technology Studies 4, no 2 (1 janvier 1991) : 35–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.23987/sts.55030.
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Parsons, J. « Cognitivism about imperatives ». Analysis 72, no 1 (7 décembre 2011) : 49–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr132.
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Boudon, Raymond. « THE `COGNITIVIST MODEL' ». Rationality and Society 8, no 2 (mai 1996) : 123–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346396008002001.
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Wright, Crispin. « LOGICAL NON-COGNITIVISM ». Philosophical Issues 28, no 1 (17 septembre 2018) : 425–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12132.
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Kitchen, Gary. « Habermas's Moral Cognitivism ». Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97, no 3 (septembre 1997) : 317–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9264.00019.
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Kitzinger, C. « After post-cognitivism ». Discourse Studies 8, no 1 (1 février 2006) : 67–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461445606059556.
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Markowski, Joseph D. « Buddhist Non-Cognitivism ». Asian Philosophy 24, no 3 (3 juillet 2014) : 227–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2014.952577.
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Keen, Suzanne. « Historicizing Literary Cognitivism ». Eighteenth-Century Studies 44, no 4 (2011) : 535–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ecs.2011.0016.
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