Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Cognitive injustice »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Cognitive injustice"
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Giladi, Paul. « Epistemic injustice ». Philosophy & ; Social Criticism 44, no 2 (2 juin 2017) : 141–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453717707237.
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My aim in this article is to propose that an insightful way of articulating the feminist concept of epistemic injustice can be provided by paying significant attention to recognition theory. The article intends to provide an account for diagnosing epistemic injustice as a social pathology and also attempts to paint a picture of some social cure of structural forms of epistemic injustice. While there are many virtues to the literature on epistemic injustice, epistemic exclusion and silencing, current discourse on diagnosing as well as explicating and overcoming these social pathologies can be improved and enriched by bringing recognition theory into the conversation: under recognition theory, social normative standards are constructed out of the moral grammar of recognition attributions. I shall argue that the failure to properly recognize and afford somebody or a social group the epistemic respect they merit is an act of injustice in the sense of depriving individuals of a progressive social environment in which the epistemic respect afforded to them plays a significant role in enabling and fostering their self-confidence as rational enquirers. Testimonial injustice is particularly harrowing, because it robs a group or an individual of the status of a rational enquirer, thereby creating an asymmetrical cognitive environment in which that group or individual is not deemed one’s conversational peer. Hermeneutical injustice is particularly harrowing, because asymmetrical cognitive environments further entrench the normative power of ideology.
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Baumert, Anna, Mario Gollwitzer, Miriam Staubach et Manfred Schmitt. « Justice Sensitivity and the Processing of Justice–Related Information ». European Journal of Personality 25, no 5 (septembre 2011) : 386–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.800.
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We investigated how Justice Sensitivity (JS) shapes the processing of justice–related information. We proposed that due to frequently perceiving and ruminating about injustices, persons high in JS develop highly accessible and differentiated injustice concepts that shape attention, interpretation and memory for justice–related information. Three studies provided evidence for these assumptions. After witnessing injustice, persons high in JS attended more strongly to unjust stimuli than to negative control stimuli (Study1) and interpreted an ambiguous situation as less just than persons low in JS (Study2). Finally, they displayed a memory advantage for unjust information (Study3). Results suggest that JS involves the availability and accessibility of injustice concepts as parameters of cognitive functioning and offer explanations for effects of JS on justice–related behaviour. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Zhu, Ruida, Zhenhua Xu, Song Su, Chunliang Feng, Yi Luo, Honghong Tang, Shen Zhang, Xiaoyan Wu, Xiaoqin Mai et Chao Liu. « From gratitude to injustice : Neurocomputational mechanisms of gratitude-induced injustice ». NeuroImage 245 (décembre 2021) : 118730. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.118730.
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Hyde, Krista. « Testimonial Injustice and Mindreading ». Hypatia 31, no 4 (2016) : 858–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12273.
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Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial responsibility is the proper corrective to testimonial injustice. She proposes a perceptual‐like “testimonial sensibility” to explain the transmission of knowledge through testimony. This sensibility is the means by which a hearer perceives an interlocutor's credibility level. When prejudice causes a hearer to inappropriately deflate the credibility attributed to a speaker, the sensibility may have functioned unreliably. Testimonial responsibility, she claims, will make the capacity reliable by reinflating credibility levels to their proper degree. I argue that testimonial sensitivity may be or involve “mindreading,” the cognitive capacity by which we predict human behavior and explain it in terms of mental states. Further, I claim that, if testimonial sensibility is or involves mindreading, and mindreading is a function of brain processes (as claimed by cognitive neuroscientists), testimonial injustice cannot be corrected by testimonial responsibility. This is because 1) it appears to rely on conscious awareness of prejudice, whereas much bias occurs implicitly, and 2) it works at the individual level, whereas testimonial injustice occurs both individually and socially. I argue that the remedy for testimonial injustice is, instead, engaging in social efforts that work below the level of consciousness.
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Wodziński, Maciej, et Marcin Moskalewicz. « Mental Health Experts as Objects of Epistemic Injustice—The Case of Autism Spectrum Condition ». Diagnostics 13, no 5 (1 mars 2023) : 927. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/diagnostics13050927.
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This theoretical paper addresses the issue of epistemic injustice with particular reference to autism. Injustice is epistemic when harm is performed without adequate reason and is caused by or related to access to knowledge production and processing, e.g., concerning racial or ethnic minorities or patients. The paper argues that both mental health service users and providers can be subject to epistemic injustice. Cognitive diagnostic errors often appear when complex decisions are made in a limited timeframe. In those situations, the socially dominant ways of thinking about mental disorders and half-automated and operationalized diagnostic paradigms imprint on experts’ decision-making processes. Recently, analyses have focused on how power operates in the service user–provider relationship. It was observed that cognitive injustice inflicts on patients through the lack of consideration of their first-person perspectives, denial of epistemic authority, and even epistemic subject status, among others. This paper shifts focus toward health professionals as rarely considered objects of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice affects mental health providers by harming their access to and use of knowledge in their professional activities, thus affecting the reliability of their diagnostic assessments.
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Beugré, Constant D. « Understanding injustice-related aggression in organizations : a cognitive model ». International Journal of Human Resource Management 16, no 7 (juillet 2005) : 1120–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09585190500143964.
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Correia, Isabel, Ana-Raquel Lopes, Patrícia Alcântara et Hélder Alves. « Does injustice reduce cognitive performance ? An experimental test / ¿Provoca la injusticia una disminución en el rendimiento cognitivo ? Una prueba empírica ». Revista de Psicología Social 32, no 3 (2 septembre 2017) : 462–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02134748.2017.1352168.
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Beugré, Constant D. « Reacting aggressively to injustice at work : a cognitive stage model ». Journal of Business and Psychology 20, no 2 (décembre 2005) : 291–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10869-005-8265-1.
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Li, Yi. « Testimonial Injustice without Prejudice : Considering Cases of Cognitive or Psychological Impairment ». Journal of Social Philosophy 47, no 4 (décembre 2016) : 457–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12175.
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Maniglio, Francesco. « Substituting, Differentiating, Discriminating ! Migration and Cognitive Borders in Aging Societies ». Migration Letters 19, no 4 (29 juillet 2022) : 489–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/ml.v19i4.1547.
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Both Legislators and demographers have shown concerns about the aging of populations in the global North countries, and, for over two decades, have suggested encouraging migrations to make up for its effects. As a result, qualified and highly qualified migration have boomed, reflecting the global consolidation of migrant labor in technological, scientific and financial sectors. This substitution migration policy, however, is put into question from a knowledge-based economical and political perspective, since, by disregarding the relationship between labor productivity transformations and demographic crisis, it fails to see important processes whereby immigrants are differentially included. Moreover, we want to reject the philanthropic and optimistic views of globalization, as consolidated in formulations such as “brain gain” and “brain circulation”, which emphasize the generalized positive effects of qualified workers’ migration. Instead, we suggest delving into the cognitive injustice of international migration processes, which are part of a greater global social injustice pattern. Indeed, rather than reproducing the discourse of mobility, democracy and human rights, we assert that selective immigration policies effectively consolidate the reproduction of global social inequalities.
Thèses sur le sujet "Cognitive injustice"
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Calhoun, Melinee Melissa Marie. « Abstract Uneducated Injustice : A Social Cognitive Approach to Understanding Juror Misconduct and Verdict Errors ». ScholarWorks, 2015. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/1880.
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A continual problem in the adjudication of crime in the United States is the continued occurrence of erroneous convictions and acquittals. This problem impacts the victims of crimes as they endure emotional and mental distress of additional investigations and new trials. Defendants are impacted by errors in verdicts because of the loss of freedom while being factually innocent. These errors may occur because jurors may not be knowledgeable of their role, right and responsibilities. Without regard to the judge's minimum instruction, the jury is not provided direction on the purpose and limitations of their roles. Guided by the social cognitive theory, this correlational study examined the incorrect verdicts by jurors in 2 Georgia counties in order to evaluate whether pretrial training has an impact on the incidence of verdict error. An experimental design was used to evaluate the impact of juror training on the occurrence of erroneous convictions and acquittals. The study included 156 participants who were registered voters from Lowndes and Lanier County, Georgia. The variables training, verdict errors, and juror misconduct were analyzed using t test, Pearson correlation analysis, Levene's Test of Equality of Variances, and Chi square analysis. The findings indicated a significant inverse relationship between the administration of pre-trial training and the occurrence of verdict error. The results suggest a relationship between the occurrence of juror misconduct and erroneous convictions, which is consistent with impact of behavior on decision making as posited by SCT. The implications for positive social change include recommendations to Lowndes and Lanier County court administrators to consider routine pretrial training that includes information about the role of the juror in criminal trials.
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Seakgwa, Kyle Vuyani Tiiso. « Exploring the philosophical mind : An empirical investigation of the process of philosophizing using the protocol analysis methodology ». University of Western Cape, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/7548.
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Masters of ArtMany empirically supported versions of stage and componential models of the cognitive processing underlying the completion of various tasks spanning a wide range of domains have been developed by cognitive scientists of various kinds. These include models of scientific (e.g. Dunbar 1999), mathematical (e.g. Schoenfeld 1985), artistic (e.g. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976), engineering (e.g. Purzer et al 2018), legal (e.g. Ronkainen 2011), medical (e.g. Vimla et al 2012) and even culinary cognition (e.g. Stierand and Dörfler 2015) (and this list is nowhere near exhaustive). Yet, despite the existence of fields such as experimental and metaphilosophy which take philosophy as their object, often by using methods from the cognitive sciences, a stage or componential model of philosophizing is conspicuously missing from even an exhaustive list of the kind just produced.
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Agostoni, Egede Carlo. « Blowing the Whistle : Narratives and Frames of Truth-Telling ». Thesis, Perpignan, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PERP0004.
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Cette thèse explore le phénomène de whistleblowing et comment il a été encadré, principalement du point de vue anglo-saxon, à travers des lectures proches de récits culturels et une vue critique sur l'érudition existante sur whistleblowing. À travers des lectures rapprochées d'une sélection de cas, la poursuite, l'importance et l'impact de la vérité apparaîtront comme le thème central dans les récits culturelles explorées, mais aussi les moments où la vérité est rendu impuissante, en raison de sa nature coercitive comme factualité. L'impuissance de la vérité vécue par les lanceurs d'alerte ("les whistleblowers") est ce qui relie d'autre part les récits culturels à l'art tragique. Les diseurs de vérité ne sont pas reconnus, et ils entrent dans un conflit tragique parce qu'elles révèlent des vérités qui ne sont pas pratiques pour les gens au pouvoir. En d'autres termes, les whistleblowers, en disant la vérité, cherchent à élargir l'espace épistémique dans la sphère publique et à tenir les gens et le pouvoir responsables. Cependant, ils sont continuellement négativement encadrés avec des métaphores conceptuelles qui obstruent la perception d'eux en tant que conteurs de la véritéThis dissertation posits that whistleblowing is factual truth-telling, or truthful public denunciation. In scholarship, media, and in the popular perception of whistleblowing, the truth-claim is often overlooked, and in many occasions hampered by the dominant ways it is framed (e.g. as leak, which is explored among other frames as a problematic conceptual metaphor). Interestingly, the representation of the whistleblower is different in cultural narratives. Through close readings of a selection of cases, the pursuit, importance, and impact of truth will appear as the central theme in the explored plots, but also the moments where truth becomes impotent, due to its coercive nature as factuality - a process that furthermore connects whistleblowing with the idea of the tragic. Put differently, the special literary interest of narratives of whistleblowing is to turn ignorance into knowledge, knowledge into telling, and how the unraveling of truth becomes a reversal of fortune for the truth-teller who enters a particular tragic conflict. As frame, as narrative, and as a modern phenomenon of truthful public denunciation, whistleblowing offers particular moments of truth, often about moments of falsehood, and ultimately seeks to be a moment of impetus: for the public to restore justice, and for readerships and audience of narrative and dramatic configurations to choose or to distance themselves from multiple proposals of justice emplotted - not only ethical justice, but also epistemic, hermeneutical, and testimonial justice. In other words, whistleblowers, by telling the truth, seek to expand the epistemic space in the public sphere and hold people and power accountable
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MARCHI, ELISA. « Accommodation of cultural diversity and collective rights at the crossroads of conservation discourses : the case of indigenous communities in Oaxaca, Mexico ». Doctoral thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/2158/1128473.
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Abstract
We are living in the epoch of 'enlightenment disillusion' in which the Anthropocene debate shows the inconsistency of some of the pillars of the Western enlightenment thought, e.g., confidence in the abundance of natural resources, faith in historical progress, and conviction of humanity's dominance over nature. In this scenario, environmental conservation policies are gaining momentum as solutions for the ecological crisis. Currently, the interrelation between conservation and group rights is still underexplored by legal scholars, even if these policies are having a substantial impact on indigenous communities and the enjoyment of their collective rights. In fact, conservation policies are mostly implemented in areas with a significant presence of indigenous and other ethnic groups. This dissertation seeks to bridge this gap by navigating the interrelation among conservation studies, group rights and accommodation of cultural diversity. In detail, it explores how conservation policy can limit or support the enjoyment of collective rights and, more generally, how it should accommodate cultural diversity.
Since the late 1980s, two discourses of conservation have emerged in the field of conservation studies: biodiversity and biocultural diversity. The former is still the dominant focus of conservation policy, while the latter is just appearing from the sub-disciplines of ethnobiology and ethnoecology. In the case of biodiversity, objects of conservation are genetic resources, species, and ecosystems. In the case of biocultural diversity, objects of conservation are ecosystems conceived as the product of an inextricable link between biological and cultural diversities.
Borrowing methodological tools from constructivist, legal pluralist, decolonial, and Science Technology and Social Studies scholarship, and relying on a fieldwork research, this dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: how biocultural diversity discourse shapes the idea of culture and the relationship between humans and non-humans vis-à-vis the dominant biodiversity paradigm; how indigenous communities use biocultural diversity discourse to re-appropriate their way of life the territory; how conservation discourses are 'vernacualarized' into indigenous customary legal system and legal strategies; and how biocultural diversity discourse can offer insights into the debate on multiculturalism in the era of ecological crisis.
In showing the interconnection between legal and conservation studies, this dissertation offers new insights at the intersection of these two disciplines. Mainly, it suggests new possible fields for future investigations on accommodation of cultural diversity and protection of collective rights in the era of ecological crisis.
Abstract
Il dibattito che si è sviluppato nel campo delle scienze della conservazione riguardo all'impatto negativo dell'uomo sull'ambiente, ha mostrato i limiti di alcuni dei fondamenti del pensiero illuminista, come l'idea dell'abbondanza delle risorse naturali, la fede nel progresso storico e la convinzione della superiorità dell'uomo sulla natura. La necessità di ripensare la relazione tra uomo e natura, al fine di trovare soluzioni per affrontare la crisi ambientale, ha quindi favorito lo sviluppo di politiche di conservazione ambientale. Tuttavia, anche se la gran parte di queste politiche sono promosse in luoghi ad alta presenza di gruppi indigeni, sino a oggi la dottrina giuridica non ha soddisfacentemente esplorato l'impatto che queste hanno sull'effettivo godimento dei diritti collettivi costituzionalmente riconosciuti ai popoli indigeni stessi.
Questa tesi si pone l'obiettivo di colmare tale lacuna dottrinale, analizzando la relazione esistente tra teorie e idee che emergono nell'ambito delle scienze della conservazione, la tutela dei diritti collettivi e la definizione delle politiche di accomodamento della diversità culturale. In particolare, questo lavoro guarda ai meccanismi attraverso i quali le politiche di conservazione ambientale possono limitare o favorire l'effettivo godimento dei diritti collettivi e promuovere una politica d'accomodamento della diversità culturale.
Dagli anni '80, nell'ambito degli studi in materia di conservazione ambientale, sono emersi due discorsi, quello sulla biodiversità e quello sulla diversità bioculturale. Nel caso della biodiversità, dominante nelle politiche conservazioniste, gli oggetti di conservazione sono le specie, le risorse genetiche e gli ecosistemi. Nel caso della diversità bioculturele, discorso emerso più recentemente in discipline come l'etno-ecologia e l'etno-biologia, oggetto di conservazione sono gli ecosistemi concepiti come il prodotto di un vincolo inseparabile tra diversità biologica e culturale.
Prendendo in prestito gli strumenti metodologici di discipline come il costruttivismo sociale, il pluralismo giuridico, il pensiero critico e post-coloniale e gli studi sociali in materia di tecnologia e scienza, questo lavoro vuole rispondere alle seguenti domande: Come il discorso sulla diversità biculturale concepisce l'idea di culture e la relazione tra uomo e ambiente rispetto al paradigma della biodiversità che domina le attuali politiche di conservazione? Come le comunità indigene ricorrono al discorso sulla diversità bioculturale per riappropriarsi del loro territorio? Come i discorsi sulla conservazione sono 'vernacolarizzati' nel diritto consuetudinario indigeno? Come il discorso sulla conservazione della diversità biculturale può offrire nuovi spunti per il dibattito in materia di accomodamento della diversità culturale in un'epoca di crisi ecologica?
Mostrando la relazione tra il dibattito in materia di conservazione e quello giuridico, questa tesi offre nuovi spunti per analizzare l'accomodamento della diversità culturale e il godimento dei diritti collettivi in un'epoca di crisi ambientale. In conclusione, vengono proposte una serie di riflessioni che aprono a future ricerche volte all'esplorazione dei confini tra conservazione ambientale e accomodamento della diversità culturale.
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Lopes, Ana Raquel do Paço Ferreira. « A justiça como uma necessidade fundamental : A exposição à injustiça reduz o desempenho numa tarefa cognitiva complexa ? » Master's thesis, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/9268.
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PsycINFO Classification Categories and Codes: 2340 Cognitive Processes,
3040 Social Perception & CognitionA Psicologia Social da Justiça tem assumido que a justiça é uma necessidade fundamental (Lerner, 1980). Se assim for, a ameaça a esta necessidade provocada pelo confronto com a injustiça provocará um esforço de auto-regulação que diminuirá o desempenho numa tarefa cognitiva complexa que envolva raciocínio lógico. O mesmo processo foi mostrado quando ocorre uma ameaça à necessidade fundamental de pertença (Baumeister, Twenge & Nuss, 2002). Assim, este estudo pretendeu investigar se a exposição à injustiça reduzia o desempenho numa tarefa cognitiva complexa. O desempenho intelectual dos participantes foi avaliado através da resolução de exercícios retirados das Matrizes Progressivas de Raven (Raven, Court & Raven, 2001) em quatro medidas: (i) número de exercícios feitos; (ii) número de exercícios corretos; (iii) número de erros cometidos e (iv) exatidão nas respostas. A exposição à injustiça foi manipulada, em laboratório, através do «não cumprimento de promessas» (Mikula, 1986) em termos distributivos e procedimentais. Os participantes foram 90 estudantes universitários que foram distribuídos aleatoriamente por três condições (justa, neutra e injusta). Os resultados mostraram que os indivíduos, na condição injusta, completaram menos exercícios; apresentaram um menor número de exercícios corretos e cometeram menos erros do que os indivíduos que passaram pela condição justa. No entanto, não houve qualquer diferença entre condições na exatidão das respostas. Entre as condições justa e neutra não se verificaram diferenças significativas nas quatro medidas de avaliação do desempenho intelectual. Este estudo constitui assim um primeiro passo no sentido de estabelecer experimentalmente a justiça como necessidade fundamental. Estudos subsequentes deverão investigar os mecanismos de “esgotamento do ego” supostamente envolvidos neste processo
The Social Psychology of Justice has assumed that justice is a fundamental need (Lerner, 1980). If so, the threat caused by this need to confront injustice will lead an effort of self-regulation that will decrease performance on a complex cognitive task involving logical reasoning. The same process was shown when a threat to the fundamental need to belong occurs (Baumeister, Twenge & Nuss, 2002). Thus, this study sought to investigate whether exposure to injustice reduced performance on a complex cognitive task. The intellectual performance of the participants was evaluated by solving exercises taken from Raven's Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court & Raven, 2001) in four steps: (i) number of exercises done; (ii) number of correct exercises; (iii) number of errors and (iv) accuracy in the answers. Exposure to injustice was manipulated, in the laboratory, through “promises not kept” (Mikula, 1986) in distributive and procedural terms. Participants were 90 college students who were randomly assigned to three conditions (just, neutral and unjust). The results showed that individuals, in the unjust condition, completed less exercises; showed less correct exercises and made less errors than individuals who have gone through just condition. However, there was no difference between conditions on the accuracy of responses. There were no significant differences on the measures for evaluating the intellectual performance between the just and neutral conditions. This study represents a first step to establish experimentally justice as a fundamental need. Subsequent studies should investigate the mechanisms of "ego depletion" supposedly involved in this process.
Livres sur le sujet "Cognitive injustice"
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Ackerly, Brooke A. Injustice Itself. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190662936.003.0003.
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Chapter 2 defines injustice itself and argues that political responsibility requires taking on injustice itself. Injustice itself entails complex causality, power inequalities, normalization, and the social epistemologies of injustice. Complex causality means that taking responsibility for injustice itself cannot require that we first understand how we are connected to an injustice and all of the factors contributing to it. Relatively powerful actors can exploit power inequalities causing domination, economic or physical exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, violence, and oppression. Normalization is when social, economic, and political habits can render the consequence of these so familiar that their unjustness is invisible. Even when these consequences are observed, social epistemologies can function like normalization at the cognitive level—creating shared understandings of how to interpret those consequences such that they are not assessed as matters of injustice. These points are illustrated drawing on research on gender, environment, and climate change in addition to the garment industry.
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Alfano, Mark, et Joshua August Skorburg. Extended Knowledge, the Recognition Heuristic, and Epistemic Injustice. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0014.
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This chapter argues that the interaction of biased media coverage and widespread employment of the recognition heuristic can produce epistemic injustices. It explains the recognition heuristic as studied by Gigerenzer and colleagues, highlighting how some of its components are largely external to the cognitive agent. Having connected the recognition heuristic with recent work on the hypotheses of embedded, extended, and scaffolded cognition, it argues that the recognition heuristic is best understood as an instance of scaffolded cognition. It considers the double-edged sword of cognitive scaffolding before using Fricker’s (2007) concept of epistemic injustice to characterize the nature and harm of these false inferences, emphasizing the Darfur Inference. Finally, it uses data-mining and an empirical study to show how Gigerenzer’s population estimation task is liable to produce Darfur Inferences. It ends with some speculative remarks on more important Darfur Inferences, and how to avoid them by scaffolding better.
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Unfair : The New Science of Criminal Injustice. Crown, 2015.
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Unfair : The New Science of Criminal Injustice. Broadway Books, 2016.
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Benforado, Adam, et Joe Barrett. Unfair : The New Science of Criminal Injustice. HighBridge Audio, 2015.
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Ackerly, Brooke A. The Theoretical (Ir)relevance of the Unknowns of Injustice Itself. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190662936.003.0004.
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Just responsibility expects that we take political responsibility for injustice itself because there is injustice itself, and not because we know and understand all of its dimensions. Relying on the cognitive and voluntary conditions generally required by moral and legal philosophy for assigning or taking personal responsibility is a politically conservative approach to injustice. Due to the complexities of politics, injustice itself entails unforeseen and unforeseeable interaction effects and contingencies. Due to the social epistemologies developed in chapter 2, individually and in groups we have cognitive limitations in perceiving certain forms of injustice. Likewise, the voluntary condition imposes an inappropriate political limitation on considerations of the complex relations of actions and interacting forces affecting injustice itself. Just responsibility requires other approaches to identifying and taking responsibility for injustice itself. These are set out in the chapter.
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Suls, Jerry, Rebecca L. Collins et Ladd Wheeler, dir. Social Comparison, Judgment, and Behavior. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190629113.001.0001.
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This edited volume presents both classic and contemporary conceptual, empirical, and applied perspectives on the role of comparisons with other people—a core aspect of social life—that have implications for the self-concept, opinions, subjective and physical well-being, conformity, decision-making, group behavior, education, and social movements. The volume is comprised of original chapters, authored by noted experts, divided into three sections: basic comparison processes, neighboring fields, and applications. The first section is comprised of chapters that update classic theories and present advances, such as the dominating effect of local versus global comparisons, an analysis of the psychology of competition, how comparisons across different domains influence self-concept and achievement, and the integral connections between stereotyping and comparison. The second section introduces perspectives from neighboring fields that shed new light on social comparison. These chapters range from judgment and decision science, cognitive psychology, social network theory, and animal social behavior. The third section presents chapters that describe applications of comparison, including relative deprivation; health psychology; the effects of income inequality on well-being; the relationships among social hierarchies, power, and comparison; and the interconnections of psychological processes such as comparison and differential construal that favor the status quo and can discourage social action in the face of injustice and inequity.
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Brink, David O. Fair Opportunity and Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859468.001.0001.
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Fair Opportunity and Responsibility lies at the intersection of moral psychology and criminal jurisprudence and analyzes responsibility and its relations to desert, culpability, excuse, blame, and punishment. It links responsibility with the reactive attitudes but makes the justification of the reactive attitudes depend on a response-independent conception of responsibility. Responsibility and excuse are inversely related; an agent is responsible for misconduct if and only if it is not excused. Consequently, we can study responsibility by understanding excuses. We excuse misconduct when an agent’s capacities or opportunities are significantly impaired, because these capacities and opportunities are essential if agents are to have a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. This conception of excuse tells us that responsibility itself consists in agents having suitable cognitive and volitional capacities—normative competence—and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities free from undue interference—situational control. Because our reactive attitudes and practices presuppose the fair opportunity conception of responsibility, this supports a predominantly retributive conception of blame and punishment that treats culpable wrongdoing as the desert basis of blame and punishment. We can then apply the fair opportunity framework to assessing responsibility and excuse in circumstances of structural injustice, situational influences in ordinary circumstances and in wartime, insanity and psychopathy, immaturity, addiction, and crimes of passion. Though fair opportunity has important implications for each issue, treating them together allows us to explore common themes and appreciate the need to take partial responsibility and excuse seriously in our practices of blame and punishment.
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Orantes García, José Rubén. Derecho tenejapaneco. Procedimientos legales híbridos entre los tseltales de Chiapas. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Programa de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias sobre Mesoamérica y el Sureste, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/cimsur.9786070257100p.2014.
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El análisis de la justicia desde conocimientos locales de los pueblos originarios, y no desde epistemologías europeas o norteamericanas, permite reconocer que la aplicación del derecho mexicano en asuntos de los pueblos originarios de Chiapas ocasiona problemas de injusticia cognitiva. Esto es, que la penetración de una forma legal que se dice hegemónica, sin serlo, propicia la destrucción de alternativas legales en los pueblos, bajo el discutible argumento de aplicar una mejor justicia.
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López de Ramos, Aura, et Daniel Brito. Proyectos de pasantía de extensión social comunitaria de la Universidad Internacional de Ciencia y Tecnología. Universidad Internacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.47300/978-9962-5599-9-3.
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Esta publicación electrónica recoge los proyectos de pasantías de extensión social comunitaria realizados por estudiantes de carreras de Técnico Superior Universitario y Licenciatura que ofrece la Universidad Internacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (UNICyT) durante el año 2020. Estas pasantías tienen como principal objetivo, la inserción de nuestros estudiantes al mundo de la sensibilidad social y la investigación. La Pasantía de Extensión Social Comunitaria (PESC) es el servicio comunitario enmarcado en la metodología pedagógica del aprendizaje servicio y la fundamentación epistemológica de la investigación acción participativa. Esta pasantía permite integrar los conocimientos del aula a las necesidades reales de la comunidad a través de proyectos sociales, asumidos por los estudiantes en sus etapas o fases: Diagnóstica, planificación, ejecución, resultados y evaluación, buscando dar respuestas a la comunidad donde se involucren. Los 22 artículos publicados en esta edición recogen los resultados del servicio comunitario realizado por 38 estudiantes que aplicaron los conocimientos adquiridos durante su formación en la carrera y en el curso CH 003 001 PASANTIA DE EXTENSION SOCIAL COMUNITARIA sobre la metodología aprendizaje servicio, como parte de la solución de los problemas de las comunidades. La orientación académica de los profesores guías, Sorayda Rincón y Daniel Brito, estuvo centrada en fortalecer los saberes pedagógicos, tecnológicos, y operativos de los estudiantes en concordancia con las necesidades del entorno. Todos los proyectos estuvieron enmarcados en una metodología de investigación-acción. Algunos proyectos lograron cumplir todos los objetivos planteados, otros se tuvieron que redimensionar para poder ser realizados en un cuatrimestre. Este es el primer acercamiento formal que tienen los estudiantes de la universidad al método científico, la idea es que en sus próximos trabajos pongan en práctica las lecciones aprendidas en esta importante experiencia. El curso de Pasantía de Extensión Social Comunitaria (PESC) se divide en dos periodos académicos, y en ese lapso se propone a los estudiantes las metodologías que acompañan la esencia de esta asignatura: la investigación acción y la etnografía como instrumento de reflexión y acción. Y desde estas propuestas se van desarrollando las distintas reflexiones del entorno y junto a estas reflexiones se busca generar propuestas de proyectos que permitan encarnarse en la realidad de la sociedad panameña. En 2020, se hizo la propuesta de abordar la investigación acción sustentándose en la reflexión de las ODS. Y es que en el marco de la agenda 2030 era necesario que nuestra universidad pusiera su mirada en estos objetivos y qué mejor manera era hacerlo desde PESC. Pero el 2020, fue y será recordado como el año que nos cambió el estilo de vida, lo que nos llevó a emprender PESC desde una contemplación virtual del entorno y de las ODS, quizás se pudo pensar que no iba ser posible tal cometido, pero los obstáculos se convierten en fortaleza. Durante dos bimestres, metodología que aplica nuestra universidad para la formación de saberes, el curso PESC busca centrar su mirada en el entorno en la comprensión de la propia realidad del estudiante y del medio donde reside. Para lograr tal cometido, se recurre al método etnográfico como el instrumento para despertar la conciencia de los estudiantes sobre el rol que tiene la comprensión del hecho social como componente en la formación profesional. Durante estos dos bimestres se visualiza al proyecto de extensión social no solo como una formalidad académica, sino cómo la universidad se encarna en su propia historia de vida. Por supuesto, no para dar una respuesta, pero si para idear una posible respuesta que permita ver al estudiante que su formación académica no se restringe en un plano de pasividad cognitiva, sino que, al conocer su entorno, con las luces y sombras que esta pueda tener, le motive a dar lo mejor de sí mismo y no caer en el espiral de generar excusas, llevando entonces a la deserción escolar. Ahora bien, ¿Cómo llegamos a tomar las PESC como objeto para el desarrollo de las ODS? Pues bien, en la cumbre para el Desarrollo Sostenible que tuvo lugar en septiembre de 2015 los Estados Miembros de la ONU aprobaron la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible integrada por 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS) desagregados en 169 metas para poner fin a la pobreza, luchar contra la desigualdad y la injusticia, y hacer frente al cambio climático. Bajo el lema “Transformar nuestro mundo” la Agenda 2030 convoca a la comunidad internacional para erradicar la pobreza y favorecer un desarrollo sostenible e igualitario para 2030. Y en tal sentido, se quiso iniciar, como universidad, el impulsar el estudio y profundización sobre las ODS, y qué mejor manera que hacerlo desde Proyecto de Extensión Social, ya que no sería objeto de un hecho visto desde la academia, sino desde la academia vinculado a la realidad. Pero si en un momento de la ideación del curso en relación con las ODS, la llegada del COVID se convierte en el compañero de camino, quizás al momento nos parecía un mar sin horizonte, pero a lo largo de este tiempo, se puede dar fe de cómo se ha convertido en aliado. ¿Pero cómo se convierte en aliado la llegada del COVID? Pues durante esta pandemia se han visualizado muchas realidades y necesidades que quizás, por el modo de vida que anteriormente se tenía, no permitían verle con la nitidez ni con la hondura que ahora si se tiene. Desde esta perspectiva se ha querido compartir con ustedes las experiencias de encarnar lo social en nuestro ser académico.
Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Cognitive injustice"
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Mikula, Gerold. « Perspective-related differences in interpretations of injustice in close relationships ». Dans Human Cognitive Processing, 251–62. Amsterdam : John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hcp.9.16mik.
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Clough, Sharyn. « Peace Literacy, Cognitive Bias, and Structural Injustice ». Dans Transformative Approaches to Social Justice Education, 105–23. New York : Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003091998-8.
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Maisel, Eric. « Sorting Through Injustices ». Dans 60 Innovative Cognitive Strategies for the Bright, the Sensitive, and the Creative, 73–74. New York, NY : Routledge, 2018. : Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351203753-21.
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Gerken, Mikkel. « Coda ». Dans Scientific Testimony, 248–58. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198857273.003.0009.
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Abstract The brief Coda indicates how scientific testimony relates to (cognitive) diversity and epistemic injustice. After characterizing these notions, the author considers how cognitive diversity bears on intra-scientific testimony. He argues that it has good epistemic consequences in virtue of adding critical perspectives but also bad consequences in virtue of complicating intra-scientific communication. Relatedly, he notes that cognitively diverse minorities’ intra-scientific testimony is particularly liable to be received in epistemically unjust ways. Turning to public scientific testimony’s relationship to cognitive diversity and epistemic injustice, he suggests that a social environment characterized by an appreciative deference to scientific testimony may help minimize some types of epistemic injustice for cognitively diverse or epistemically disadvantaged groups. On this basis, he suggests that social and institutional initiatives combating epistemic injustice for cognitively diverse groups should be central to the pursuit of the broader goal of aligning scientific expertise and democratic values.
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Weissmark, Mona Sue. « Diversity and Social Justice ». Dans The Science of Diversity, 189–224. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190686345.003.0007.
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This chapter studies the evolution of the psychological concept of injustice, for which there is broad agreement, in contrast to individual ideas about what is fair and unfair, which differ greatly across time and societies. Charles Darwin argued that people have an innate sense of what “ought” to be, an idea that the psychologist Fritz Heider expanded on. Heider defined the sense of ought as beliefs about the “requiredness” of acting in a particular way. Requiredness to act, posits Heider, is rooted in the gap or incompleteness or injustice of a situation. Bringing about needed closure, then, is tantamount to the just and right. Heider’s ideas relate to Leon Festinger’s more recent concept of “cognitive dissonance,” which suggests that individuals feel tension or discord when grappling with two incongruent thoughts, beliefs, or attitudes. The chapter then considers the conundrum that arises in instances when the human drive for fairness and justice cannot be rebalanced. For instance, neither the law nor individual attempts to restore justice could successfully redress the injustices of slavery and the Holocaust. In fact, research shows a neural foundation for the need for revenge and retribution. Injustice, then, becomes an intergenerational matter when injustices are not rebalanced between people. They simply extend to their descendants after the original people involved die.
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Metzger, Mary Janell. « Shakespearean Tragedy, Ethics, and Social Justice ». Dans Teaching Social Justice Through Shakespeare, 115–23. Edinburgh University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474455589.003.0011.
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How can the study of literary form shape students’ understanding of ethics, justice, and community? This chapter describes a course that yokes Shakespearean tragedies to ethical philosophy from Aristotle to Patricia J. Williams. Through these pairings, students compare the benefits of cognitive and affective learning, consider questions of epistemic injustice, reasoning, and belief in historical moments of epistemological crisis, and question the roles of individuals and collectivities in precipitating tragic outcomes. Detailing her approach to teaching Othello alongside Williams’ “The Obliging Shell,” the author illustrates the importance of historicizing the construction of whiteness in order to illuminate the effects of systematized injustice.
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Skotnicki, Andrew. « Conclusion ». Dans Injustice and Prophecy in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 133–40. Policy Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529222210.003.0007.
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The voluntary and involuntary prophets who crowd our jails and prisons have been chosen to make us in the normal majority uncomfortable. That, however, does not fulfil their primary task which is to “save the world.” Their enforced exile will only come to an end via a cognitive, moral, psychological, and spiritual transformation among those who seek their demotion and disposal. That transformation must include the realization that those who make us uncomfortable and insecure must be given the opportunity to speak so their world-saving mission can be accomplished.
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Skotnicki, Andrew. « How We Think about the Mentally Ill ». Dans Injustice and Prophecy in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 44–64. Policy Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529222210.003.0003.
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The second chapter will explore theological and philosophical sources that account for the massive shift in worldviews that normalized two disparate strategies in response to the ravings of the “mad” and the foibles of the “sane.” Nietzsche and Foucault are particularly helpful in this task as they underscore the shattering of a largely wholistic, non-binary reaction to those floundering in the cognitive mainstream that characterized the traditional approach with “a moral genealogy” predicated upon the unimpeachable authority of those who have elevated themselves to a role of political and economic superiority. It is at this juncture that the concept of “man,” in Nietzschean parlance, was first brought into being, a creature definitively categorized by measurable performance in accord with heavily constrictive statutory and bureaucratic constraints. The discussion will blend with the suppositions of philosophical and perceptual dualism that furnish the necessary intellectual and moral stance for the guiltless desire to omit realms of experience, and classes of people, who fall outside the hyper-comparative and evaluative perspective part and parcel of a binary vision of the world.
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Levine, Peter. « A Case ». Dans What Should We Do ?, 12–32. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197570494.003.0002.
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The Montgomery bus boycott of 1955–1956 was a successful social movement that exemplified civic deliberation and action. The organizers faced problems of collective action, such as free-riding, path-dependence, oligarchy, boundary problems, and principal/agent conflicts; problems of discourse, such as ideology and propaganda; injustice based on identity distinctions; and human cognitive limitations, such as implicit bias and motivated reasoning. They built alternative institutions that effectively challenged white supremacy. They made choices regarding objectives, tactics, targets, and rhetoric that can be debated.
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Krebs, Dennis L. « A Sense of Justice ». Dans Survival of the Virtuous, 197–208. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197629482.003.0015.
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This chapter reviews evidence that we possess a sense of fairness that is similar to that of other primates in some respects, but different in others. It argues that, like other animals, the primitive forms of fairness we display are mediated by emotions such as guilt, shame, righteous indignation, vindictiveness, gratitude, indebtedness, and forgiveness, but that our cognitive abilities endow us with a significantly more complex sense of justice than that displayed by any other animal. Some aspects of our sense of injustice are activated when we behave in unfair ways, and others are activated when others behave in unfair ways. Our sense of justice normally becomes increasingly sophisticated as we develop.