Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « CEOs entrenchment »
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Articles de revues sur le sujet "CEOs entrenchment"
Shi, Juehui, et Ngoc Cindy Pham. « The Boundary Conditions of Optimal Contracting and Managerial Entrenchment : A Simultaneous Two-Equation Vector Autoregression with Exogenous Variables Approach for Chief Executive Officer Compensation and Firm Performance ». American Business Review 27, no 1 (mai 2024) : 182–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.37625/abr.27.1.182-206.
Texte intégralForst, Arno, Myung Seok Park et Benson Wier. « Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation : Evidence from Initial Public Offering Firms ». Journal of Management Accounting Research 26, no 1 (1 septembre 2013) : 101–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50622.
Texte intégralASLANOĞLU, Suphi, et Tri DAMAYANTİ. « TÜRKİYE'DE YERLEŞTİRME ETKİSİ VE İLİŞKİLİ TARAF İŞLEMLERİ ». Muhasebe ve Vergi Uygulamaları Dergisi 15, no 3 (1 novembre 2022) : 463–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.29067/muvu.1080458.
Texte intégralYang, Mei-Ling. « The Impact of Controlling Families and Family CEOs on Earnings Management ». Family Business Review 23, no 3 (18 juin 2010) : 266–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894486510374231.
Texte intégralHollandts, Xavier, Nicolas Aubert, Abdelmehdi Ben Abdelhamid et Victor Prieur. « Beyond Dichotomy : The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment ». Management international 22, no 2 (11 mars 2019) : 112–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1058165ar.
Texte intégralWoo, Heejin. « New CEOs’ previous experience and acquisition performance ». International Journal of Organizational Analysis 27, no 3 (8 juillet 2019) : 745–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijoa-03-2018-1389.
Texte intégralKeil, Thomas, Markku Maula et Evangelos Syrigos. « CEO Entrepreneurial Orientation, Entrenchment, and Firm Value Creation ». Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 41, no 4 (juillet 2017) : 475–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/etp.12213.
Texte intégralMateus, Cesario, Thomas Hall et Irina B. Mateus. « Are listed firms better governed ? Empirical evidence on board structure and financial performance ». Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no 1 (2015) : 736–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i1c7p2.
Texte intégralFagbemi, Temitope Olamide, Olubunmi Florence Osemene et Oyinlade Agbaje. « Management Entrenchment, Firm Characteristics and Earnings Management Of Conglomerate Companies In Nigeria ». Jurnal Administrasi Bisnis 9, no 1 (22 mars 2020) : 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/jab.v9i1.28576.
Texte intégralKang, Hyung Cheol, et Jaemin Kim. « Why do family firms switch between family CEOs and non-family professional CEO ? » Review of Accounting and Finance 15, no 1 (8 février 2016) : 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-03-2015-0032.
Texte intégralThèses sur le sujet "CEOs entrenchment"
Forst, Arno. « Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms : An Empirical Investigation ». VCU Scholars Compass, 2009. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1714.
Texte intégralBen, Abdelhamid Abdelmehdi. « Corporate governance and employee ownership : evidence from France ». Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université Clermont Auvergne (2021-...), 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2021UCFAD016.
Texte intégralThis doctoral work examines the way employee share ownership influences the governance and strategic choices of a company. The first chapter of the thesis presents an inventory of the literature on employee share ownership and corporate governance. This review helps to develop the conceptual foundations on the research questions addressed in the thesis. Chapter 2 assesses the impact of employee share ownership on the entrenchment of CEOs in their jobs. The measures of managerial entrenchment in our research are the age, seniority and turnover rate of the CEO. Our empirical study examines the majority of French companies making up the SBF 120 stock market index and the methodology of generalized moments (GMM) is implemented. Essentially, the results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between employee ownership and CEO entrenchment. We also show that the presence of employee shareholder representatives on boards of directors or supervisory boards also has an impact and varies the inflection points of the relationships observed. Chapter 3 examines the impact of employee share ownership and its representation on the board of directors on a company's cost of capital. The study focuses on the companies in the SBF 120 index. The empirical results document the increase in employee ownership which results in an increase in the cost of capital up to a certain level, and that subsequently this relationship is reversed. The results converge and show that variations in employee share ownership and the presence of employees on the board of directors significantly affect the cost of equity of the company and therefore implicitly influence the value of the company. Chapter 4 examines the impact of employee share ownership on the level of environmental responsibility of companies. The results show that a positive relationship exists between employee share ownership, employee involvement in boards and corporate environmental responsibility scores. Finally, this research sheds additional light on the consequences of employee ownership in the French context
Markham, James. « CEO entrenchment versus boards of directors performance is not all that matters to turnover / ». Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company ; downloadable PDF file, 172 p, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1654492691&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=8331&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Texte intégralDah, Mustafa A. « Essays on the Effect of Excess Compensation and Governance Changes on Firm Value ». Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2012. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/5179.
Texte intégralID: 031001341; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Title from PDF title page (viewed April 15, 2013).; Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Central Florida, 2012.; Includes bibliographical references.
Ph.D.
Doctorate
Business Administration
Business Administration; Finance
Ampofo, Akwasi Amankwaah. « Two Essays on Capital Structure Decisions of the Firm : An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Managerial Entrenchment and Ethical Corporate Citizenship ». Diss., Virginia Tech, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/103152.
Texte intégralDoctor of Philosophy
This study consists of two essays. Essay 1 examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on financial flexibility, and leverage decisions of the firm. Managerial entrenchment is measured using the entrenchment index. The excess cash ratio of a firm over the median cash ratio of firms measures financial flexibility. Capital structure decisions include the extent and maturity of debt as measured by debt-to-equity ratio, and average debt maturity respectively. I find that entrenched managers use less debt than managers who are not entrenched. Also, entrenched managers prefer using long-term rather than short-term debt, and they keep more excess cash than managers who are not entrenched. This is especially the case for small and large firms compared to medium sized firms. Essay 2 investigates the impact of ethical corporate citizenship and CEO power on cost of capital, and firm value. Ethical corporate citizenship (ECC) refers to firms' commitment to a culture of ethics, effective governance, leadership, and innovation. ECC is measured as a binary variable of one if a firm is listed on World's Most Ethical Companies (WMEC), and zero otherwise. CEO power is primarily measured using CEO pay slice that is calculated as CEO total compensation as a percentage of top 5 executives of the firm. Powerful CEOs have pay slice above the 50th percentile, and weak CEOs pay slice is below the 50th percentile. WMECs and non-WMECs in the same 3 digits standard industry classification, which have similar total assets as the WMECs are compared. I find that WMECs have neither lower cost of capital nor higher Tobin's q than non-WMECs. Powerful CEOs often utilize their influence to reduce cost of debt capital, but also reduce firm value compared to weak CEOs. Self-interested CEOs who extract firm value for personal advantage partly explains the negative effect of CEO power on firm value.
Backlund, Carl-Oscar, et Viktor Granström. « Påverkar VD:ns aktieinnehav bolags finansiella prestation ? : En kvantitativ studie om sambandet mellan VD:ns nivå av aktieinnehav inom bolaget och dess finansiella prestation ». Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-186680.
Texte intégralLin, Chuan-Ju, et 林娟如. « Debt Maturity Choice in CEO Entrenchment : Evidence in Taiwan ». Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4mt79j.
Texte intégral國立交通大學
管理學院財務金融學程
107
This study examines the effect of CEO entrenchment on a firm’s debt maturity choice. We examine Taiwanese firms over the period 1998–2016 and find that entrenched managers choose long-term debt financing to avoid early liquidation. In addition, we show that the effect of CEO entrenchment on long-term debt is more pronounced for firms with a higher degree of informational opacity and poorer credit quality. Our evidence supports the agency theory argument for the manager–creditor conflict. This investigation provides novel empirical insights into CEO entrenchment and debt maturity.
Chen, Ting-Chung, et 陳鼎中. « The Relationship between Audit Fees, CEO Perquisites and Entrenchment index in the Post-SOX Era ». Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61625298527808119948.
Texte intégral元智大學
財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)
105
This study examines the relationship between audit fee and CEO perquisites with Entrenchment Index, after the implement of SOX Act. Wysocki (2010) indicates that the CEO compensation is significantly positive linked with the audit fees. However, Kim et al. (2011) indicate this positive relation between CEO compensation and audit fees is mitigated for the firms which have better corporate governance. Furthermore, there is no study uses the CEO perquisites to examine the relation with audit fee. In that case, I use the Entrenchment Index (See Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009)) to be a standard of corporate governance, and examine the relationship between audit fee and perquisites. The evidence shows that the firm with higher corporate governance quality (lower E-index), the committee will ask for higher audit quality. Furthermore, the relation between audit fee and perquisites is significantly negative. However, this negative relation will be mitigated when the firm is under better corporate governance.
Livres sur le sujet "CEOs entrenchment"
Rose, Nancy L. Firm diversification and CEO compensation : Managerial ability or executive entrenchment ? Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.
Trouver le texte intégralRose, Nancy L. Firm diversification and CEO compensation : Managerial ability or executive entrenchment ? Cambridge, Mass : Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994.
Trouver le texte intégralChapitres de livres sur le sujet "CEOs entrenchment"
Lee, Kin Wai, et Gillian Hian Heng Yeo. « Capital Structure in Asia and CEO Entrenchment ». Dans Handbook of Quantitative Finance and Risk Management, 863–72. Boston, MA : Springer US, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77117-5_56.
Texte intégralFinet, Alain. « The Agency Theory, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Governance Theories ». Dans Handbook of Top Management Teams, 576–82. London : Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230305335_68.
Texte intégralDherment-Ferere, Isabelle, et Luc Renneboog. « Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies ». Dans Corporate Governance Regimes, 297–322. Oxford University PressOxford, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199247875.003.0013.
Texte intégralFerretti, Paola, et Cristina Gonnella. « Governance Practices and CEO Hubris ». Dans Transforming Corporate Governance and Developing Models for Board Effectiveness, 161–82. IGI Global, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-6669-5.ch008.
Texte intégralActes de conférences sur le sujet "CEOs entrenchment"
Yuan, Chun-sheng. « A study of the effect of managerial entrenchment on CEO turnover in Chinese listed companies ». Dans 2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2009.5318057.
Texte intégralRapports d'organisations sur le sujet "CEOs entrenchment"
Rose, Nancy, et Andrea Shepard. Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation : Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment ? Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, avril 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4723.
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