Articles de revues sur le sujet « Canada Army – Organization »

In 1954 army historian George Stanley claimed that naval initiatives from the eighteenth century to the 1870s by the French and British armies in Canada and the local land militia were the true roots of the Royal Canadian Navy. He privately admitted that he was being intentionally provocative. The present article, however, reviews subsequent scholarship and offers new research that strengthens Stanley’s findings, and shows that the Canadian army continued to promote the organization of naval forces after the 1870s. The army, moreover, lobbied for the founding of the Royal Canadian Navy in 1910, and supported the new service in its troubled early years. En 1954, l’historien de l’armée George Stanley a affirmé que les initiatives navales entreprises du 18e siècle aux années 1870 par les armées française et britannique au Canada et par la milice terrestre locale étaient les véritables racines de la Marine royale canadienne. Par contre, il a aussi admis en privé qu’il avait été délibérément provocateur. Le présent article passe en revue les études ultérieures et propose de nouvelles recherches qui viennent renforcer les conclusions de Stanley et indiquent que l’armée canadienne a continué de promouvoir l’organisation des forces navales après les années 1870. De plus, l’armée a fait pression en faveur de la fondation de la Marine royale canadienne en 1910, puis elle a appuyé le nouveau service au cours de ses premières années tumultueuses.

Fighting the threat of possible assimilation of the Ukrainian ethnic group combined with the necessity for successful socio-economic integration into the multiethnic Canadian society, on the one hand, and the need for Uk-rainian women to protect their rights on the other hand, prompted Ukrainian Canadian women to establish the UCC (– UCC – Ukrainian Canadian Congress) (Ukrainian Women’s Association of Canada) in 1926. Founded as a voluntary association to overcome illiteracy and to provide mutual assi¬stance in the adaptation of emigrant women and their families, the UCC has over time developed into a full-fledged public organization with a wide range of activity. This became possible due to the well-organized work of the leadership of the Ukrainian Women’s Association of Canada and the change of attitude towards gender equality. One of the important tasks of the Associa¬tion was the fostering of an educated nationally conscious mother and public person, educator of the younger generation, guardian of her religion and traditional customs. In addition to education and art events, the Ukrainian Women’s Association of Canada also organized assistance to the Ukrainian liberation movement by collecting donations to help political prisoners and injured soldiers of the Ukrainian army and shaping the public position and national consciousness of Ukrainian women. Publications in calendars and almanacs of the 1920’s–1930’s clearly testify to the great work done by the Ukrainian Women’s Association of Canada. It was a self-sufficient multi-level organization that effectively encouraged Ukrainian women to work sys¬tematically in the community and their family. Keywords: Ukrainian diaspora of Canada, women’s movement, Ukrainian Women’s Association of Canada, liberals, calendars, “Ukrainian Voice”.

Polish Issues in Canada During World War I The article presents the impact of World War I on Polish immigrants in Canada, the position of the Polish ethnic group in this country and the efforts of persons of Polish descent in regard to recruitment for the Polish Army in North America. Poles, who were subjects of Germany or the Austro-Hungarian Empire were treated as enemy aliens. Those people were forced to register and report to the police on a regular basis and some of them were interned in labour camps during the war. Some were released from the camps after an intervention of Polish organizations and priests. Soldiers of Polish descent, volunteers and recruits also fought in the Canadian Expeditionary Forces in Europe. Over 20,000 Polish volunteers from the US (including over 200 from Canada) enrolled in a training camp formed in Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario on the border with the US. The problems with the organization and functioning of the camp, and opinions on Polish volunteers shaped the attitude of many Canadians towards the Polish diaspora and the newly established Polish state. Keywords: World War I, Polish Diaspora in Canada, Niagara-on-the-Lake camp, Haller’s Army, Colonel Arthur D’Orr LePan Streszczenie Artykuł przedstawia kilka przykładów obrazujących oddziaływanie wydarzeń I wojny światowej na żyjących w Kanadzie polskich imigrantów, pozycję polskiej grupy etnicznej w tym kraju oraz na aktywność osób polskiego pochodzenia na rzecz rekrutacji do wojska polskiego w Ameryce Północnej. Polaków, którzy byli poddanymi Niemiec lub monarchii austro-wegierskiej traktowano jak przedstawicieli państw wrogich. Mieli obowiązek rejestracji i regularnego zgłaszania się na policję a niektórzy zostali internowani w stworzonych w czasie wojny obozach pracy. Część z nich była z tych obozów zwolniona po interwencji polskich organizacji i polskich duchownych. Żołnierze polskiego pochodzenia, zarówno ochotnicy jak i poborowi, znaleźli się także w oddziałach Kanadyjskich Sił Ekspedycyjnych walczących w Europie. Ponad 20 tys. polskich ochotników z USA (w tym ponad 200 z Kanady) zgłosiło się też do obozu szkoleniowego utworzonego w Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, przy granicy z USA. Problemy z organizacją i funkcjonowaniem tego obozu oraz opinie o polskich ochotnikach, kształtowały nastawienie wielu Kanadyjczyków do polskiej grupy etnicznej i nowotworzonego Państwa Polskiego.

The article analyzes the peculiarities of western scientists’ coverage of the problems of organization and effectiveness of the guerrilla movement in Ukraine, which, in their opinion, had a rather complex and ambiguous phenomenon. The role of various factors that took place in the creation and leadership of the detachments, including both the factor of upper leadership of the movement, and the factor of spontaneity, has been examined. The circumstances that served as an accelerator for its expansion in 1943 have been clarified; the thesis of the "nationwide struggle against the Nazi invaders", to which western scientists have always been skeptical, has been considered from a critical point of view. There are some contradictions in the works of historians of Western Europe, the United States, Canada and other countries to the estimation of the effectiveness of guerrilla action. The authors did not ignore the typical problems associated with the attitude of Soviet leaders to the seemingly excessive independence of the guerrillas. Western historians also clarify the relationship between the guerrillas and the local community, which has not always been cloudless. In addition, they constantly emphasize the indifference of guerrilla leaders to the events of Holocaust. Moreover, as a rule, partisans of Jewish origin often felt protected from anti-Semitic manifestations only in mono-ethnic Jewish detachments. The situation of girls and women guerrillas was rather difficult; many of them were forced to become mistresses of certain captains due to the aggressive behavior of male guerrillas. It should be highlighted that the classic work of D.A. Armstrong (1922-2010), Professor of the University of Wisconsin, "Soviet guerrillas. Legend and Reality, 1941-1944” stated that by the autumn of 1942 there were almost no guerrillas in Ukraine. The exceptions were the regions of Sumy and Chernihiv; according to his estimates, even at the beginning of 1943 there were no more than 20,000 guerrillas in Ukraine. It is noteworthy that the historical department of the US Army during the Cold War was monitoring closely the Soviet publications on the activities of Soviet guerrillas. In 1965 the bibliography of books, essays, memoirs, and collections of documents on the guerrillas group in the occupied territory of the USSR, which was collected there, figured up to 227 titles. Western scientists supported the formula of the "involuntary Resistance Movement" that existed in the occupied lands not only in Ukraine. According to them, the activities of the guerrillas had more psychological and political significance than purely military one - that is, the population should have felt that they were the representatives of the Soviet government.

Through a critical analysis of Guiding's official programming books, the hierarchy of its organizational structure, and scholarly works on the history of the Guiding and Scouting Movements in Britain and Canada, this paper explores the early development of the Girl Guides of Canada; analyzing the early 20th century public's shifting views on girlhood and examining the relationship between Guiding and the British Empire. The central thesis of this essay is that the organization was originally founded in 1910 with a strict, conservative gender ideology and a strong imperial connection, but changed its messaging during the Interwar Period to reflect emerging modern notions of girlhood and imperialism; while still retaining its core values in its official programming. Born out of the Scouting Movement of Great Britain, the Girl Guides of Canada were originally founded with the intention of preparing young girls for a domestic life; serving the British Empire by being dutiful wives and mothers. The organization's mission was to address the public's anxiety surrounding modern girlhood. As new economic and leisure opportunities appeared for women and girls in Canada's urban areas, so did the fear that these working women would lead lives of promiscuity, potentially causing the breakdown of domestic life. Guiding sought to prevent this issue by taking up young girls' spare time with gendered instruction on subjects such as how to run a home and the role of women in the British Empire. This messaging and ideology was incredibly popular at the time, and the Guiding movement spread like wildfire. Following the First World War, the Canadian public's views on the role of girls and the British Empire were changing: through Guiding's wartime volunteer efforts, girls had proven themselves to be capable of much more than domestic instruction, and Canada began to question its place within the empire. The emergence of alternative youth movements, with a specific focus on physical training and fostering a Canadian national identity, reflected this change. In response to these developments, the Girl Guides released introduced international camps with messaging surrounding peace and international friendship, and promoted a more progressive view of girls with new badges and activities. This new rhetoric made the movement more appealing to a wider array of girls, but only obscured the organizations original values of imperialism and domesticity. The structure of the organization still adhered to a hierarchy that favoured British Girl Guides, with the Canadian arm taking all direction from Britain. Upon analysis of Guiding's programming books, it is also clear that gendered instruction was still the primary focus of the organization. This paper also examines how Canadian Girl Guides' programming was used to naturalize and assimilate girls who did not fit the Empire's idealized model of white womanhood, such as Indigenous girls attending residential schools and girls from immigrant households, further complicating its notion of internationalism. The changes to the Guiding Movement's programming reflect the organization's desire to spread its ideology to a wider audience, rather than a commitment to more modern ideas of girlhood and progressive notions of international friendship. The programming, while becoming more refined over time, still centered around domestic skills and preparing girls for motherhood, while the organization's international structure relied on a hierarchy that placed Britain at the top, and kept Canada at an arms' length.

During the Cold War, military and economic tensions between the US and the Soviet Union shaped the process of war in conflict regions in different parts of the world. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s reshaped the balance of power in global politics, as new actors appeared on the global scene and global foreign policy shifted to mediating and providing humanitarian assistance in conflict regions zones. Humanitarianism became the method of conflict resolution, which provided humanitarian organizations, especially the religious ones among them, with the opportunity to have more influence in the outcomes of sociopolitical events occurring in the world. These dynamics impacted conflicts in Africa, especially within Sudan. This is because that era coincided with Sudan’s Second Civil War (1983-2005) between the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Government of Sudan (GofS). During the Cold War, both the US and Russia intervened in the civil war in Sudan by providing military and economic assistance to different parties, but, again, in the post-Cold War era humanitarianism was used in relation to the civil war. Transnational religious organizations provided humanitarian assistance in the war-torn and drought-afflicted regions in Southern Sudan, and sought to help implement peace initiatives to end the war. The organizations included Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a consortium of UN agencies and NGOs1 which was created in 1989. In addition, transnational religious groups based in the United States and Canada such as the Christian Solidarity International (CSI), the Canadian Crossroads, Catholic Relief Service, Mennonite Central Committee and the Lutheran Church got involved in humanitarian relief in Sudan. The global focus on religious humanitarianism extended to Southern Sudan as the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was founded in 1989-1990 to coordinate the humanitarian assistance. Because SPLA has led the civil war on behalf of Southern Sudan and had suzerainty over territories there, the humanitarian organizations had to build relationships with the SPLA to deliver relief through Southern Sudan and negotiate peace initiatives. This article analyzes how the transnational activities of the religious humanitarian groups shaped the evolution of SPLA from 1990 to 2005, with a particular focus on the US and Canadian organizations. We will see that the organizations influenced SPLA in a manner that impacted the civil war both in positive and negative ways. The organizations were ambivalent as, on one hand, they aggravated the conflict and, on the other hand influenced the development of both Church and non-Church related peace initiatives. Their humanitarian work was intricate as the civil war itself became more complex due to political issues that involved slavery, and oil extraction in Southern Sudan by US and Canadian multinational oil companies. All the parties involved took action to help end the civil war, but they all sought to serve their own interests, which jeopardized the possibility of a lasting peace. Thus, the interpretation of that history provides ways to help solve the current armed conflict in South Sudan.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the Canadian experience of supporting national culture in response to the challenges of the «pandemic period», the experience of optimizing the resources of available cultural capital to create a system of self-organization of Canadian society in modern realities. For the whole Ukrainian society, as well as for the theory and practice of domestic culturological knowledge, to optimize cultural policy it is necessary to investigate and understand universal and specific steps in the management of cultural and artistic spheres of other countries, the resources of cultural capital, Article is focused on the process of conceptualization of the experimental knowledge gained in recent management of Canada's national culture which took place in a short period of the first pandemic challenges in parallel with the rapid instrumentalization of the results (approaches, analytical and interpretive systems, management models). It is noted that the Canadian experience of providing flexibility in the movement of managerial, financial and organizational resources, which would be optimally correlated with the dynamics of modern socio-cultural life, is extremely valuable. The existing model of cultural governance in Canada, the organization of interaction between the state and cultural institutions - «the arms-length principle» in modern realities allows to flexibly and dynamically respond to the variability of socio-cultural situation. The policy of multiethnic multicultural Canada has for many decades been pursued in the field of culture in the context of affirmation of national cultural identity and cultural sovereignty. The article analyzes ways and means to strengthen the support of Canadian content at the international level and stimulate the development of the domestic market of creative industries, artists support, creative professions, cultural management sector at the national, regional and local levels in recent years. The research is focused on the Canadian experience of integrating into the organizational culture of management of various creative actors - the state, civil society institutions, artistic communities, organizations and individuals whose activities are directly or indirectly related to cultural and artistic practices.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the events surrounding the participation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the World Expo–1967 exhibition in Montreal and to identify the features of this process, such as the actions of diaspora organizations to attract the attention of the Canadian government and the international community to the political status of Ukraine within the Soviet Union. The publication proves that the youth movement of the Ukrainian diaspora is able to influence the course of important political events, one of which was the Montreal World Exhibition. It was used by the Kremlin as a component of preparations for the 50th anniversary of the October Bolshevik coup in Petrograd on November 7, 1917. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian diaspora was preparing to celebrate the anniversaries of the Ukrainian settlements in Canada, the Ukrainian National Revolution of 1917–1921, and the creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The author concluded that the Ukrainian Canadian community drew the attention of the Canadian government and the international community to the political status of Ukraine within the Soviet Union and contributed to the consolidation of all Ukrainian world in the fight for human rights in Soviet Ukraine and its proper place in the international political and legal environment. Despite the strong involvement of the Soviet Union’s State Security Committee’s agent network, the activities of Ukrainian youth organizations in Canada in July–August 1967 brought a number of positive gains. In particular, it fostered a sense of patriotism, self–identification, and continuity in the traditions of national liberation struggle. At the same time, the nature of the events was driven by local characteristics, the size of the diaspora and its financial resources. In this context, the activities of Ukrainian youth organizations in Canada during Expo-1967 were a kind of impetus for the further struggle for freedom and independence of the native generations of the state – Ukraine.

This paper examines the history of the research and development (R&D) of myoelectric upper limb prosthesis in Canada from 1960 to 2000. It focuses on two of the prosthetic research and training units (PRTUs) that were created and funded by the federal government as a result of the Thalidomide tragedy: the Rehabilitation Centre at the Ontario Crippled Children’s Centre (OCCC) and successor organizations, and the University of New Brunswick’s (UNB) Institute of Biomedical Engineering (the Institute or IBME). Both developed commercial systems for myoelectrically controlled arms and hands. We argue that, in contrast to the common view that research in universities and public research institutions has increasingly moved away from basic problems and to product development and commercialization over the period, research in this field has moved in the opposite direction. We explore these cases in detail and examine the forces at work in this change from a design-oriented approach to one that became research intensive.

This article explains how search and rescue (SAR) equipment and personnel can strengthen Canada’s Arctic security without contributing to a classic “security dilemma”—whereby a perceived military buildup by one state leads to a responsive buildup by another state, and so on into an arms race. This is because Arctic SAR involves dual-use assets that can fulfill most existing and reasonably foreseeable Arctic security roles as a secondary mission. Avoiding a security dilemma is key with regards to Canada–Russia relations. In the Arctic arena, Russia sees itself surrounded by North Atlantic Treaty Organization states during a period of considerable tension with those same states elsewhere in the world. Although most of the responsibility for that tension lies with Russia, it is still in Canada’s interest to avoid feeding Russia’s Arctic uncertainties and insecurities, since regional military buildups can cause instability and even conflict.

BACKGROUND:There are no published studies that have assessed whether adding long-acting beta 2-agonist bronchodilators and/or inhaled steroids to chronic therapy with tiotropium would provide additional clinical benefit to patients with moderate to severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).METHODS:The Canadian Optimal Therapy of COPD Trial is a randomized, prospective, double-blind, placebo-controlled, multicentre trial funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research that has been designed to determine which combination of inhaled medications will most effectively prevent exacerbations and optimize disease-specific quality of life in patients with COPD. The trial is the first to evolve from the Canadian Thoracic Society Clinical Trials Group. The study will randomize 432 patients with moderate to severe COPD to one of three parallel treatment arms for 52 weeks: tiotropium and fluticasone/salmeterol; tiotropium and salmeterol; or tiotropium and placebo inhaler. The participants will be allowed to use salbutamol as required throughout the trial period.OUTCOMES:The primary outcome measure is the proportion of patients in the three treatment groups who experienced a respiratory exacerbation within 52 weeks of randomization. Other outcomes that will be assessed over the 52-week trial period will include: changes in disease-specific quality of life and changes in dyspnea, health care use and changes in lung function. A pharmacoeconomic analysis will also be performed to evaluate the cost of these therapies.RESULTS:The study commenced recruitment in October 2003. It is currently operating at 22 centres across Canada and has randomized 137 patients during the first four months of recruitment. Recruitment is scheduled to continue until April 2005 or until 432 patients have been randomized.CONCLUSION:The present randomized, placebo-controlled trial offers a unique opportunity to answer the question, what is the best combination of inhaled medications to use for COPD patients? It is hoped that optimal use of inhaled medications will improve patient health and quality of life, reduce patient respiratory exacerbations, and ultimately, reduce health care resource use.

This paper evaluates the forecasting performance of linear and non-linear time series models of some macroeconomic variables viz a viz the forecasts outlook of these variables generated by professionals in international economic organizations i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Many time series and econometrics models are used to forecast financial and macroeconomic variables. The accuracy of such forecasts depends crucially on careful handling of nonlinearity present in the time series. The debate of forecasting ability of linear vs nonlinear models is far from settled. These models use the past patterns of the economic time series to infer the parameters of the underlying stochastic process and use them to make forecasts. In doing so these models use only the information contained in the past data. However the economists working in professional international economic organizations not only look at the past trends but use the condition of local and global economy prevailing at the time and expected future path of economies as well as their professional expertise and judgment to arrive at forecasts of macroeconomic variables. However the specific underlying models and methodology used by the economists generating these forecast is usually not communicated to the public. In comparison to the forecasts of these organizations the time series models are well developed and accessible to researchers working anywhere around the globe. Thus it is an interesting task to compare the foresting ability of linear and nonlinear time series models. This paper aims at comparing the forecasts from these models to assess how well they compete with forecasts generated from the professional economists employed by international economic organizations. The nonlinear models employed in this study are quite well known namely the Self Exciting Threshold Autoregressive (SETAR) model and the Markov Switching Autoregressive (MSAR) model. The linear models employed are the AR and ARMA models. The paper have used annual data of three macroeconomic time series variables GDP growth, consumer price inflation and exchange rate of G7 countries i.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA) as well as an emerging south Asian economy namely Pakistan. Three forecast accuracy criteria i.e. Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) are employed and the statistical significance of difference in forecasts is assessed using the Diebold-Mariono test. The results show that the forecasting ability of nonlinear Regime Switching models SETAR and MSAR is superior to the linear models. Further, although the point forecasts of linear and nonlinear models are not superior to that of economic organizations but in more than 60 percent of the cases considered the forecasting accuracy of two sets of forecast is not statistically significantly different.

Purpose Formal quality-of-life (QOL) assessments may contribute important information on patient symptoms. Despite many trials of systemic chemotherapy in ovarian cancer, reports of its effect on QOL are few. Patients and Methods QOL was assessed in an Intergroup randomized trial comparing paclitaxel plus cisplatin to cyclophosphamide plus cisplatin in women with advanced ovarian cancer. One hundred fifty-two eligible patients accrued in Canada completed the European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer Quality of Life Questionnaire C30 and a trial-specific checklist at baseline (after surgical debulking) and at regular intervals during and after chemotherapy. Mean change scores over time in the two arms were calculated. Results Compliance with QOL questionnaire completion was excellent (81% to 93%). In general, deterioration was seen in the QOL domains immediately after chemotherapy (day 8 of cycle 1), followed by clinically meaningful improvements compared with baseline (change scores ≥ 10) in both arms during the treatment period in a number of domains and items, including global QOL, emotional function, social function, fatigue, pain, sleep, constipation, appetite, abdominal swelling, and abdominal cramps. Improvements in global QOL persisted for the duration of follow-up. More neurosensory effects and myalgia were documented in the paclitaxel arm; however, this did not adversely affect global or other domains of QOL and improved once chemotherapy was completed. Conclusion Improvement from baseline in QOL measures was seen in both treatment arms. The greater neurologic and muscle toxicity of paclitaxel did not adversely influence QOL. QOL data can contribute useful information on the experience of symptoms and their time course, which may assist patients and physicians in their discussion about the anticipated effects of therapy.

Gonzalez, R. R., T. M. McLellan, W. R. Withey, S. K. Chang, and K. B. Pandolf. Heat strain models applicable for protective clothing systems: comparison of core temperature response. J. Appl. Physiol. 83(3): 1017–1032, 1997.—Core temperature (Tc) output comparisons were analyzed from thermal models applicable to persons wearing protective clothing. The two models evaluated were the United States (US) Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) heat strain experimental model and the United Kingdom (UK) Loughborough (LUT25) model. Data were derived from collaborative heat-acclimation studies conducted by three organizations and included an intermittent-work protocol (Canada) and a continuous-exercise/heat stress protocol (UK and US). Volunteers from the US and the UK were exposed to a standard exercise/heat stress protocol (ambient temperature 35°C/50% relative humidity, wind speed 1 m/s, level treadmill speed 1.34 m/s). Canadian Forces volunteers did an intermittent-work protocol (15 min moderate work/15 min rest at ambient temperature of 40°C/30% relative humidity, wind speed ≈0.4 m/s). Each model reliably predicted Tc responses (within the margin of error determined by 1 root mean square deviation) during work in the heat with protective clothing. Models that are analytically similar to the classic Stolwijk-Hardy model serve as robust operational tools for prediction of physiological heat strain when modified to incorporate clothing heat-exchange factors.

PURPOSE: This was a multicentric, open, randomized, phase II study of single-agent paclitaxel and oxaliplatin to evaluate the efficacy of oxaliplatin in a relapsing progressive ovarian cancer patient population and to analyze the safety profile and impact of both agents on quality of life, time to progression, and survival. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Eighty-six patients with platinum-pretreated advanced ovarian cancer were randomly assigned to two arms: 41 received paclitaxel at 175 mg/m2 over 3 hours every 3 weeks, and 45 received oxaliplatin at 130 mg/m2 over 2 hours every 3 weeks. For inclusion, patients had to have a performance status of 0 to 2 and to have received at least one and no more than two prior cisplatin- and/or carboplatin-containing chemotherapy regimens within the last 12 months. RESULTS: Seven confirmed responses were observed in each arm, for an overall response rate in the total treated population of 17% (95% confidence interval [CI], 7% to 32%) in the paclitaxel arm and 16% (95% CI, 7% to 29%) in the oxaliplatin arm. Median time to progression was 14 weeks and 12 weeks, and overall survival was 37 weeks and 42 weeks in the paclitaxel and oxaliplatin arms, respectively. Among 63 patients with a 0- to 6-month progression-free, platinum-free interval, there were five objective responses with paclitaxel in 31 patients and two objective responses with oxaliplatin in 32 patients. Nine patients (22%) in the paclitaxel arm had grade 3 or 4 neutropenia (National Cancer Institute of Canada [NCIC] Common Toxicity Criteria). Two patients (4%) experienced grade 3 thrombocytopenia in the oxaliplatin arm. Maximum grade (grade 3) NCIC neurosensory toxicity was experienced by three patients (7%) in the paclitaxel arm and by four patients (9%) in the oxaliplatin arm. CONCLUSION: Single-agent oxaliplatin at 130 mg/m2 every 3 weeks is active with moderate toxicity in patients with cisplatin-/carboplatin-pretreated advanced ovarian cancer.

Purpose: Platinum-containing chemotherapy regimens are the standard treatment for patients with advanced non–small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC), although toxicity is common and may significantly affect the patient’s quality of life (QoL). This trial aimed to assess whether a combination of gemcitabine and vinorelbine had benefits in terms of QoL, without influencing negatively on survival, compared with cisplatin-containing regimens. Patients and Methods: Patients with stage IIIB (effusion and supraclavicular nodes) or IV documented NSCLC who were younger than 70 years of age were randomly assigned gemcitabine plus vinorelbine (GemVin) or either gemcitabine plus cisplatin or vinorelbine plus cisplatin (cisplatin-based). European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer scales were used for QoL analysis. Results: Five hundred one patients were randomly assigned to treatment. The median age was 62 years. There were no significant differences in global QoL scores between the two arms after 2 months of treatment. However, worsening scores for appetite, vomiting, and alopecia were significantly more common in the cisplatin-based arm. Median survival was 38 v 32 weeks and median progression-free survival was 23 v 17 weeks in the cisplatin-based versus GemVin arms, respectively. For the GemVin arm the hazard ratio for death was 1.15 (90% confidence interval [CI], 0.96 to 1.37) and the hazard ratio for progression was 1.29 (90% CI, 1.10 to 1.52). Grade 3 or 4 myelosuppression, vomiting, alopecia, and ototoxicity were significantly more frequent with cisplatin-based treatment. Conclusion: Global QoL is not improved with GemVin, although advantages in some components of QoL were apparent. GemVin is less toxic than standard cisplatin-based chemotherapy. There is a nonsignificant slight survival advantage with cisplatin-based chemotherapy. GemVin could be offered to advanced NSCLC patients who express concern about toxicity.

Abstract Background GBM AGILE (Glioblastoma Adaptive, Global, Innovative Learning Environment) is a biomarker based, multi-arm, international, seamless Phase 2/3 Response Adaptive Randomization platform trial designed to rapidly identify experimental therapies that improve overall survival and confirm efficacious experimental therapies and associated biomarker signatures to support new drug approvals and registration. It is a collaboration between academic investigators, patient organizations and industry, under the sponsorship of the non-profit organization, Global Coalition for Adaptive Research, to support new drug applications for newly diagnosed and recurrent GBM. Material and Methods The primary objective of GBM AGILE is to identify therapies that effectively improve overall survival in patients with newly diagnosed or recurrent GBM. Bayesian response adaptive randomization is used within subtypes of the disease to assign participants to investigational arms based on their performance. Operating under a master protocol, GBM AGILE allows multiple drugs from different pharmaceutical companies to be evaluated simultaneously and/or over time against a common control arm. Based on performance, a drug may graduate and move to a Stage 2 (Phase 3) within the trial, and the totality of the data can be used for a new drug application and registration process. New experimental therapies are added as information about promising new drugs is identified while other therapies are removed as they complete their evaluation. The master protocol/ trial infrastructure includes efficiencies through an adaptive trial design, shared control arm and operational processes such as risk-based monitoring and enhanced remote activities. With its adaptable structure, GBM AGILE has continued trial activation, inclusion of new investigational therapies, and enrollment globally through the challenges of a global pandemic.GBM AGILE provides an efficient mechanism to screen and develop robust information regarding the efficacy of proposed novel therapeutics and associated biomarkers for GBM and to quickly move therapies and biomarkers into clinic. GBM AGILE received initial approval from the United States FDA in April 2019, and in Europe through the Voluntary Harmonization Procedure (VHP) in April, 2021. As of 2022, AGILE has screened over 1000 patients studying multiple investigational treatments. Enrollment rates are 3 to 4 times greater than traditional GBM trials, with active sites averaging 0.75 to 1 patients/site/month. Currently, there are 41 sites activated in the US, 4 in Canada and 2 in Switzerland and an estimated 24 sites yet to open in Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy and Austria. In addition to the continued expansion in Europe, effort is undergoing to extend the trial to China and Australia as well. Clinical trial information: NCT03970447

The life path, scientific-pedagogical and public activity of Volodymyr Sokurenko – a prominent Ukrainian jurist, doctor of law, professor, talented teacher of the Lviv Law School of Franko University are analyzed. It is found out that after graduating from a seven-year school in Zaporizhia, V. Sokurenko entered the Zaporizhia Aviation Technical School, where he studied two courses until 1937. 1/10/1937 he was enrolled as a cadet of the 2nd school of aircraft technicians named after All-Union Lenin Komsomol. In 1938, this school was renamed the Volga Military Aviation School, which he graduated on September 4, 1939 with the military rank of military technician of the 2nd category. As a junior aircraft technician, V. Sokurenko was sent to the military unit no. 8690 in Baku, and later to Maradnyany for further military service in the USSR Air Force. From September 4, 1939 to March 16, 1940, he was a junior aircraft technician of the 50th Fighter Regiment, 60th Air Brigade of the ZAK VO in Baku. The certificate issued by the Railway District Commissariat of Lviv on January 4, 1954 no. 3132 states that V. Sokurenko actually served in the staff of the Soviet Army from October 1937 to May 1946. The same certificate states that from 10/12/1941 to 20/09/1942 and from 12/07/1943 to 08/03/1945, he took part in the Soviet-German war, in particular in the second fighter aviation corps of the Reserve of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army. In 1943 he joined the CPSU. He was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree and the Order of the Red Star (1943) as well as 9 medals «For Merit in Battle» during the Soviet-German war. With the start of the Soviet-German war, the Sokurenko family, like many other families, was evacuated to the town of Kamensk-Uralsky in the Sverdlovsk region, where their father worked at a metallurgical plant. After the war, the Sokurenko family moved to Lviv. In 1946, V. Sokurenko entered the Faculty of Law of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University, graduating with honors in 1950, and entered the graduate school of the Lviv State University at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law. V. Sokurenko successfully passed the candidate examinations and on December 25, 1953 in Moscow at the Institute of Law of the USSR he defended his thesis on the topic: «Socialist legal consciousness and its relationship with Soviet law». The supervisor of V. Sokurenko's candidate's thesis was N. Karieva. The Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR, by its decision of March 31, 1954, awarded V. Sokurenko the degree of Candidate of Law. In addition, it is necessary to explain the place of defense of the candidate's thesis by V. Sokurenko. As it is known, the Institute of State and Law of the USSR has its history since 1925, when, in accordance with the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of March 25, 1925, the Institute of Soviet Construction was established at the Communist Academy. In 1936, the Institute became part of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in 1938 it was reorganized into the Institute of Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1941–1943 it was evacuated to Tashkent. In 1960-1991 it was called the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In Ukraine, there is the Institute of State and Law named after V. Koretsky of the NAS of Ukraine – a leading research institution in Ukraine of legal profile, founded in 1949. It is noted that, as a graduate student, V. Sokurenko read a course on the history of political doctrines, conducted special seminars on the theory of state and law. After graduating from graduate school and defending his thesis, from October 1, 1953 he was enrolled as a senior lecturer and then associate professor at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv State University named after Ivan Franko. By the decision of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR of December 18, 1957, V. Sokurenko was awarded the academic title of associate professor of the «Department of Theory and History of State and Law». V. Sokurenko took an active part in public life. During 1947-1951 he was a member of the party bureau of the party organization of LSU, worked as a chairman of the trade union committee of the university, from 1955 to 1957 he was a secretary of the party committee of the university. He delivered lectures for the population of Lviv region. Particularly, he lectured in Turka, Chervonohrad, and Yavoriv. He made reports to the party leaders, Soviet workers as well as business leaders. He led a philosophical seminar at the Faculty of Law. He was a deputy of the Lviv City Council of People's Deputies in 1955-1957 and 1975-1978. In December 1967, he defended his doctoral thesis on the topic: «Development of progressive political thought in Ukraine (until the early twentieth century)». The defense of the doctoral thesis was approved by the Higher Attestation Commission on June 14, 1968. During 1960-1990 he headed the Department of Theory and History of State and Law; in 1962-68 and 1972-77 he was the dean of the Law Faculty of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University. In connection with the criticism of the published literature, on September 10, 1977, V. Sokurenko wrote a statement requesting his dismissal from the post of Dean of the Faculty of Law due to deteriorating health. During 1955-1965 he was on research trips to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria, and Bulgaria. From August 1966 to March 1967, in particular, he spent seven months in the United States, England and Canada as a UN Fellow in the Department of Human Rights. From April to May 1968, he was a member of the government delegation to the International Conference on Human Rights in Iran for one month. He spoke, in addition to Ukrainian, English, Polish and Russian. V. Sokurenko played an important role in initiating the study of an important discipline at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv University – History of Political and Legal Studies, which has been studying the history of the emergence and development of theoretical knowledge about politics, state, law, ie the process of cognition by people of the phenomena of politics, state and law at different stages of history in different nations, from early statehood and modernity. Professor V. Sokurenko actively researched the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of Ukrainian legal and political thought. He was one of the first legal scholars in the USSR to begin research on the basics of legal deontology. V. Sokurenko conducted extensive research on the development of basic requirements for the professional and legal responsibilities of a lawyer, similar to the requirements for a doctor. In further research, the scholar analyzed the legal responsibilities, prospects for the development of the basics of professional deontology. In addition, he considered medical deontology from the standpoint of a lawyer, law and morality, focusing on internal (spiritual) processes, calling them «the spirit of law.» The main direction of V. Sokurenko's research was the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of legal and political studies. The main scientific works of professor V. Sokurenko include: «The main directions in the development of progressive state and legal thought in Ukraine: 16th – 19th centuries» (1958) (Russian), «Democratic doctrines about the state and law in Ukraine in the second half of the 19th century (M. Drahomanov, S. Podolynskyi, A. Terletskyi)» (1966), «Law. Freedom. Equality» (1981, co-authored) (in Russian), «State and legal views of Ivan Franko» (1966), «Socio-political views of Taras Shevchenko (to the 170th anniversary of his birth)» (1984); «Political and legal views of Ivan Franko (to the 130th anniversary of his birth)» (1986) (in Russian) and others. V. Sokurenko died on November 22, 1994 and was buried in Holoskivskyi Cemetery in Lviv. Volodymyr Sokurenko left a bright memory in the hearts of a wide range of scholars, colleagues and grateful students. The 100th anniversary of the Scholar is a splendid opportunity to once again draw attention to the rich scientific heritage of the lawyer, which is an integral part of the golden fund of Ukrainian legal science and education. It needs to be studied, taken into account and further developed.

Nos últimos 30 anos, a autonomia se tornou um novo paradigma na luta dos povos indígenas por descolonização. Organizações indígenas de todo o continente americano assumiram a autonomia como demanda central. No entanto, o debate em torno das demandas indígenas por autonomia tem gerado muitas polêmicas decorrentes da incompreensão sobre o que querem os movimentos indígenas quando reivindicam seu direito à autodeterminação e autonomia. Para melhor entendimento dessa questão, interessa-nos, aqui, trazer alguns elementos e conceitos que possibilitem apreciar as contribuições de três intelectuais indígenas a esse debate: Taiaiake Alfred, mohawk do Canada; Floriberto Díaz, mixe de Tlahuitoltepec eGersem Baniwa, do povo Baniwa do Alto Rio Negro e das propostas do Exército Zapatista de Libertação Nacional (EZLN). Veremos que a maneira como esses intelectuais e o EZLN vêm construindo suas ideias sobre autonomia funciona como veículo para suas críticas à imposição de controle por parte do Estado, levando esse último a perceber as inconsistências de seus próprios princípios e do tratamento que dá aos povos indígenas.Palavras-Chave: Autonomia Indígena, Pensamento Político, Autodeterminação, Movimento Indígena.Autonomía indígena en el pensamiento político de Taiaiake Alfred, Floriberto Díaz, Gersem Baniwa y en las propuestas del EZLNResumen: En los últimos 30 años, la autonomía se ha convertido en un nuevo paradigma en la lucha de los pueblos indígenas por descolonización. Organizaciones indígenas de todo el continente americano asumieron la autonomía como demanda central. Sin embargo, el debate en torno a las demandas indígenas por autonomía ha generado muchas polémicas derivadas de la incomprensión sobre lo que quieren los movimientos indígenas cuando reivindican su derecho a la autodeterminación y a la autonomía. Para entender mejor esta cuestión, nos interesa, aquí, traer algunos elementos y conceptos que posibiliten apreciar los aportes de tres intelectuales indígenas a ese debate: Taiaiake Alfred, mohawk de Canada; Floriberto Díaz, mixe de Tlahuitoltepec y Gersem Baniwa, del pueblo Baniwa del Alto Río Negro y de las propuestas del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN). Veremos que la manera como estos intelectuales y el EZLN vienen construyendo sus ideas sobre autonomía funciona como vehículo para sus críticas a la imposición de control por parte del Estado, llevando ese último a percibir las inconsistencias de sus propios principios y del trato que da a los pueblos indígenas.Palabras-clave: Autonomía Indígena, Pensamiento Político, Autodeterminación, Movimiento Indígena.Indigenous autonomy in the political thought of Taiaiake Alfred, Floriberto Díaz, Gersem Baniwa and in the EZLN proposalsAbstract: Over the last 30 years, autonomy has become a new paradigm in the struggle of indigenous peoples for decolonization. Indigenous organizations throughout the Americas assumed autonomy as a central demand. However, the debate over indigenous demands for autonomy has generated many controversies which were derived from the misunderstanding of what indigenous movements want when they claim their right to self-determination and autonomy. To better understand this question, we are interested here in bringing up some elements and concepts that make it possible to appreciate the contributions of three indigenous intellectuals to that debate: Taiaiake Alfred, mohawk from Canada; Floriberto Diaz, mixe of Tlahuitoltepec and Gersem Baniwa, from the Baniwa people of the Alto Rio Negro and of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) proposals. We will see that the way these intellectuals and the EZLN construct their ideas about autonomy functions as a vehicle for their criticism of the imposition of control by the State, leading the latter to perceive the inconsistencies of its own principles and the treatment it gives to indigenous peoples.Keywords: Indigenous Autonomy, Political Thought, Self-Determination, Indigenous Movement.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to report the findings of a research project that analyzed records management (RM) and electronic records management (ERM) course syllabi from North American archival studies’ programs. By identifying the convergences and divergences of the topics and literature found within the syllabi, the authors sought to understand the relationship between the two courses and gain insight about how these courses continue to serve as an integral component of archival studies education. Design/methodology/approach The paper is based on a qualitative analysis of 23 RM and 12 ERM course syllabi from 26 academic institutions from North America. The research examined three different aspects of the syllabi: textbooks, required articles and weekly topics. The syllabi were analyzed as separate data sets (RM syllabi and ERM syllabi), which was followed by a comparative analysis of the two types of syllabi. Findings The findings of this study reveal that RM, ERM and (to a lesser extent) DA (digital archives) knowledge as represented in archival education converges in some course contents but diverges in others. Archival educators should pay close attention to overlapping areas so that the courses can better complement each other and advance knowledge representation within archival studies. Research limitations/implications This study only considered graduate-level programs in the USA and Canada. The study did not include syllabi or instructional guides from associate-level programs or professional organizations such as the International Certification of Records Managers or Association of Records Managers and Administrators (ARMA) International. Practical implications The results of this study lead the authors to present two different approaches for how RM and ERM knowledge may be incorporated into archival curriculum. Originality/value This is the first research project to analyze RM and ERM syllabi with regards to the enhancement of records and information management education and archival curriculum development.

Abstract BACKGROUND GBM AGILE (Glioblastoma Adaptive, Global, Innovative Learning Environment) is a biomarker based, multi-arm, international, seamless Phase 2/3 response adaptive randomization platform trial designed to rapidly identify experimental therapies that improve overall survival and confirm efficacious experimental therapies and associated biomarker signatures to support new drug approvals and registration. GBM AGILE is a collaboration between academic investigators, patient organizations and industry to support new drug applications for newly diagnosed and recurrent GBM. METHODS The primary objective of GBM AGILE is to identify therapies that effectively improve the overall survival in patients with ND or recurrent GBM. Bayesian response adaptive randomization is used within subtypes of the disease to assign participants to investigational arms based on their performance. Operating under a Master Protocol, GBM AGILE allows multiple drugs from different pharmaceutical/biotech companies to be evaluated simultaneously and/or over time against a common control. New experimental therapies are added as information about promising new drugs is identified while therapies are removed as they complete their evaluation. The master protocol/ trial infrastructure includes efficiencies through an adaptive trial design, shared control arm and operational processes to serve the goal of helping patients receive optimal care in a fast and efficient manner. GBM AGILE has screened over 1200 patients and enrollment rates are 3 to 4 times greater than traditional GBM trials, with active sites averaging 0.75 to 1 patients/sites/month. There are 41 active sites in the US, 4 active sites in Canada and 3 active sites in Europe with more sites anticipated to open across 5 countries in Europe. Expansion to China and Australia are under progress. Through the use of improved and flexible processes, GBM AGILE serves as a global trial that supports the efficient and rapid incorporation and evaluation of new experimental therapies for patients with GBM.Clinical trial information: NCT03970447.

Background Despite evidence in scientific literature indicating the effectiveness of both cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and physical exercise in the management of major depressive disorder (MDD), few studies have directly compared them. Objective This study aims to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of group CBT, physical exercise, and only wait-listing to receive treatment-as-usual (TAU) in the management of MDD. The investigators hypothesize that participants with MDD assigned to the group CBT or exercise arms of the study will achieve superior outcomes compared with participants wait-listed to receive TAU only. Methods This prospective rater-blinded randomized controlled trial assesses the benefits of group CBT and exercise for participants with MDD. A total of 120 patients with MDD referred to addiction and mental health clinics in Edmonton, Canada, will be randomly assigned to one of the three equal-sized arms of the study to receive either weekly sessions of group CBT plus TAU, group exercise three times a week plus TAU, or only TAU for 14 weeks. Participants will be assessed at enrollment, 3 and 6 months post enrollment, midtreatment, and upon treatment completion for primary (functional and symptom variables) and secondary outcomes (service variables and health care utilization). In addition, participants in the intervention groups would be evaluated weekly with one functional measure. The data will be analyzed using repeated measures and effect size analyses, and correlational analyses will be completed between measures at each time point. Results The study will be conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (Hong Kong amendment) and Good Clinical Practice (Canadian guidelines). Written informed consent will be obtained from each subject. The study received ethical clearance from the Health Ethics Research Board of the University of Alberta on September 7, 2018 (Pro 00080975) and operational approval from the provincial health authority (Alberta Health Services 43638). As of October 13, 2019, we have enrolled 32 participants. The results will be disseminated at several levels, including patients, practitioners, academics, researchers, and health care organizations. Conclusions The results of the pilot trial may inform the implementation of a multicenter clinical trial and provide useful information for administrators and clinicians who are interested in incorporating group CBT and group exercise interventions into existing care. Trial Registration ClinicalTrials.gov NCT03731728; https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03731728 International Registered Report Identifier (IRRID) PRR1-10.2196/14309

TPS2579 Background: Glioblastoma (GBM) is an aggressive brain tumor with few effective therapies and is invariably fatal. Developing new therapies for patients with GBM requires focused interaction between industry, academia, nonprofits, patient advocacy, and health authorities, and novel approaches to clinical trials. Industry is wary of developing drugs for GBM due to the high failure rate and high cost of drug development. GBM Adaptive Global Innovative Learning Environment (GBM AGILE) Trial was designed by over 130 global key opinion leaders in consultation with health authorities to provide an optimal mechanism for phase II/III development in GBM. The Sponsor of GBM AGILE is the Global Coalition for Adaptive Research (GCAR), a non-profit organization. GCAR’s mission is to speed the discovery and development of treatments for patients with rare and deadly diseases by serving as sponsor of innovative trials. Methods: GBM AGILE is an international, seamless phase II/III platform trial designed to evaluate multiple therapies in newly diagnosed and recurrent GBM. Its goals are to identify effective therapies for GBM and match effective therapies with patient subtypes, with data generated to support regulatory filing for new drug applications. Bayesian response adaptive randomization is used within subtypes of the disease to assign participants to investigational arms based on their performance. The primary endpoint is overall survival. The trial is being conducted under a master Investigational New Drug Application/Clinical Trial Agreement and Master Protocol, allowing multiple drugs/drug combinations from different pharmaceutical companies to be evaluated simultaneously and/or over time. The plan is to add experimental therapies as new information is identified and remove therapies as they complete their individual evaluation against a common control. GBM AGILE received IND approval from the FDA in April 2019, enrolling its first patient in June 2019. Site activation is ongoing in the US, with approximately 40 US planned. The trial received CTA approval from Health Canada in January 2020. Expansion to Europe, China, and Australia is also underway. Clinical trial information: NCT03970447 .

The article establishes, identifies and attributes the biographies of a part of the personnel of the special department "Vineta" of the Ministry of Education and Propaganda of the Reich, and examines the common elements of the biographies of the staff members of the Ukrainian editorial office and the translation staff of this special department. The goal of the article is to establish and identify the personnel of the Ukrainian translation staff of the central (Berlin) apparatus of the "Vineta" special department of the Ministry of Education and Propaganda of the Reich in 1941-1944, their biographical attribution, establishing the presence and research of the nature of their interpersonal and corporate ties, common elements and features of biographies. The methodological basis of the research was the principles of objectivity, historicism, and systematicity. The methods of historical-typological, historical-biographical and prosopographic research are applied. Scientific novelty of the publication. For the first time, the biographies of a part of the personnel of the special department "Vineta" of the Ministry of Education and Propaganda of the Reich were established, identified and attributed, and the common elements of the biographies of the staff of the Ukrainian editorial office and the translation staff of the special department were investigated. It is shown that the staff of "Vineta" included well-known linguists, philologists, literary experts, translators, journalists, artists, etc., participants in liberation struggles and activists of political emigration. The article summarizes the data and examines the elements of the "Vinetа" stage of their life path, establishes unknown facts of their pre-war biographies, common and similar features of the latter. Conclusions. Ukrainian intellectuals, artists or high-level specialists were invited to work in the Ukrainian editorial office of the “Vineta” special department. The common biographical feature of the staff is intellectual creative activity, pursuit of literature, journalism, fine arts, etc. in Europe or the USSR; repression by the Soviet authorities. Most of them worked in educational and scientific institutions in Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, Kyiv, etc. during the interwar period. The participants of the Ukrainian Revolution of Liberation identified in the article were veterans of the 3rd Iron Division of the Active Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The corporate connections of the rest were: participation in political activities, membership in political organizations, joint professional, scientific and artistic activities. In the post-war period, a certain number of staff members settled in Munich and/or left for Canada, the USA, Argentina and Australia. Most of the former employees of the special branch continued their activities even after the war in the fields of politics, economy and culture.

TPS2074 Background: GBM AGILE, Glioblastoma Adaptive, Global, Innovative Learning Environment, is an international, multi-arm, seamless phase 2/3 response adaptive randomization platform trial designed to evaluate multiple therapies in newly diagnosed (ND) and recurrent glioblastoma (GBM) with the goal of identifying effective therapies matching them accurately to different patient subtypes in an accelerated manner. It is a collaboration between academic investigators, patient organizations and industry to support new drug applications for newly diagnosed and recurrent GBM. Methods: The primary objective of GBM AGILE is to identify therapies that effectively improve overall survival in patients with ND or recurrent GBM. Bayesian response adaptive randomization is used within subtypes of the disease to assign participants to investigational arms based on their performance. Operating under a Master Protocol, GBM AGILE allows multiple drugs from different pharmaceutical companies to be evaluated simultaneously and/or over time against a common standard of care control. Based on performance, a drug may graduate and move to a rapid stage 2 (phase 3) within the trial, and the totality of the data can be used for a new drug application. An active pipeline is critical to the ongoing success of GBM AGILE. With the leadership of the trial’s Arm Selection Committee, uniform processes for including new drugs have been established to ensure a consistent review of drugs/drug combinations over the course of the trial. Factors considered include relevant pre-clinical data, preliminary evidence for antitumor activity. pharmacokinetic data to support proposed drug dosing and administration, and potential biomarkers helpful for the development of a drug. GBM AGILE provides an efficient mechanism to screen and develop robust information regarding the efficacy of proposed novel therapeutics and associated biomarkers for GBM and to quickly move therapies and biomarkers into clinic. GBM AGILE received IND approval from the FDA in April 2019, screening its first patient in June 2019. Site activation is ongoing in the US, with over 35 active sites and over 425 patients screened (as of February 2021). Expansion to Canada, Europe and China are under progress. Clinical trial information: NCT03970447.

This paper will discuss the recognition of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in legal cases based on the historical development of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM). Further the discussion will draw on the diagnostic relationship between the DSM and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). It is important to understand how the courts received evidence in relation to a person’s traumatic experience and to define the limits of liability for psychiatric illness cases. In tort law, the courts had been cautious to permit recovery to underserving litigants. Interpreting traumatic experiences from psychiatry to law, at times, do not succeed in a claim for compensation.  Belanger-Hardy opined ‘Tort Law has always viewed mental harm with caution, not to say scepticism’.  Historically, compensation for PTSD claims have always been awarded on ad hoc basis in tort law for fear of opening the floodgates.  In Saadati v Moorhead , Brown J acknowledged the requirement of a psychiatrist to diagnose a psychiatric disorder by referring to DSM and ICD classifications.  The diagnostic manual is a guide book and should be used with caution.  The DSM Manual also explains the concept of malingering and practitioners should be cautious when preparing an expert report to assist the court. It is argued the courts are trying to play catch up with psychiatry, however, in its deliberations pronouncing inappropriate policy decisions, hampering recovery for a deserving claimant in tort law.  Ultimately, Judges control the goal posts for awarding damages in trauma related cases.  Historically, PTSD was defined as railway spine, shell shock, traumatic neurosis, accident neurosis and fright neurosis. Medical science established there is a relationship between the mind and body and the mind can only function in the body. Therefore, if the mind is affected by an external factor, the psyche may become muddled to develop post traumatic symptoms. This paper will examine the method adopted by practitioners and judges in interpreting the manual. This is seen from a methodological assessment of diagnostic concordance in the light of inherent problems of psychiatric classifications and malingering. This assessment will ultimately relate to psychiatric classification of individual patients who are subjected to an intense trauma resulting in fear and helplessness. Hence, unable to relate to what had taken place and subsequently not able to realize that the psyche is muddled or disorganized. In the absence of an actual physical lesion, the courts have become sceptical and wary of extending the defendant’s liability to cover alleged damage such as psychiatric illness. The inherent fears are that evidence can be confabulated and based on false premise. Hence, the courts make a linguistic interpretation in view of the struggle between the law and psychiatric illness. Furthermore, the discussion will capture the essence of PTSD which was introduced in the 1970’s and adopted in DSM-III in 1980 by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). In 1992, PTSD was recognised as a diagnosis in the International Classifications of Diseases (ICD-10) in Europe under the rubric of Neurotic, Stress-related and Somatoform Disorders by the World Health Organization (WHO).  The DSM is a guidebook for mental health practitioners.  However the origins of PTSD lie further back than the twentieth century. The history can be traced through the experience of the American Civil War, First World War, Second World War and the Vietnam War where veterans who returned home suffered trauma because of devastating exposure to war. Their traumatic experiences were documented and translated as symptoms which were eventually associated with PTSD, as described in DSM-III. These traumatic experiences were observed in the civil and forensic setting.  Moreover, this paper will contain a summary of the historical development of the ICD and DSM classifications depicting war associated syndromes as they played a dominant role in shaping the early diagnostic thinking of WHO and APA. From 1840 to 1921, in the United States, data was collected by gathering statistical information across mental hospitals in order to produce a nationally acceptable psychiatric nomenclature.  In particular, a notable physician called Da Costa in the American Civil War gave the name ‘irritable heart’ to the symptoms suffered by some soldiers. Consequently, the statistical information was broadened to take account of and incorporate outpatient presentations from World Wars I and II veterans. This was known as ‘shell shock’ and ‘war neurosis’. War neurosis was further refined following World War II and the Vietnam War in terms of ‘trauma’. Contemporaneously in 1948, WHO adopted the Armed Forces categorisation based on Army, Navy and Veteran experiences in World War I and II, when it integrated mental disorders into the sixth revision of the ICD depicting an European model. Mental disorders were not introduced into the ICD until its sixth edition, published by WHO in 1948,  and therefore it is not pertinent to discuss ICD classifications from 1 to 5 editions for the purposes of mental illness.  Besides, this paper will explore the development of trauma as defined in the current understanding of PTSD. This development is necessary to show how the term ‘trauma’ was transformed into PTSD. Evidence is also drawn from the courts as to how PTSD is used in a legal setting. As was the case for DSM-I where a category called ‘gross stress reaction’  was recognized in 1952 and a diagnosis called ‘transient situational disturbance’ or ‘anxiety neurosis’  was declared in DSM-II in 1968. The development of DSM-III was coordinated with the ninth revision of ICD.  In 1980, DSM-III introduced PTSD for the first time. DSM-III made major changes in which the diagnosis of PTSD was formally introduced. DSM-III did not prescribe duration of the symptoms.  Similarly, ICD-9 did not include diagnostic criteria to specify mental categories and facilitate the collection of basic health statistics. In view of the incompatibility between ICD-9 and DSM-III, APA suggested that modifications to be made to ICD-9 for its use in the United States. The result was ICD-9-CM.  In 1987, DSM-III-R was introduced to refine the duration of symptoms. In 1992, WHO introduced the diagnosis of PTSD in ICD-10 and consequently the APA formed a task force to develop the DSM-IV in 1994. At the time, WHO was ready to publish ICD-10. The U.S. was under a treaty to maintain systems consistent with WHO and there was a desire to build a better empirical foundation, using 13 groups of researchers in field trials. Research in natural environment diagnoses in the United States and Canada used DSM-IV, whilst most countries officially use ICD-10 and now ICD-11adopted in 2019. In DSM-IV-TR of 2002, there was still doubt by psychiatrists as to whether PTSD is an anxiety disorder or a disorder in its own category. Refinement of DSM-IV-TR was undertaken in the current DSM-5 following research. In addition, issues related to malingering and methodology for the detection of malingering are explored. Such methodology will confirm evidence as to whether an individual malingers or not. In conclusion, this paper will look at the latest developments in the DSM Manual and by discussing how such a manual should be utilised effectively by the courts and psychiatrists.

According to the 2006 Canadian Red Cross Drowning Report, 2007 persons died of cold-water immersion in Canada between 1991 and 2000. These statistics indicate that prevention of cold-water immersion fatalities is a significant public health issue for Canadians. What should a person do after accidental immersion in cold water? For a long time, aquatic safety organizations and government agencies stated that swimming should not be attempted, even when a personal flotation device (PFD) is worn. The objective of the present paper is to present the recent scientific evidence making swimming a viable option for self-rescue during accidental cold-water immersion. Early studies in the 1960s and 1970s led to a general conclusion that “people are better off if they float still in lifejackets or hang on to wreckage and do not swim about to try to keep warm”. Recent evidence from the literature shows that the initial factors identified as being responsible for swimming failure can be either easily overcome or are not likely the primary contributors to swimming failure. Studies over the last decade reported that swimming failure might primarily be related not to general hypothermia, but rather to muscle fatigue of the arms as a consequence of arm cooling. This is based on the general observation that swimming failure developed earlier than did systemic hypothermia, and can be related to low temperature of the arm muscles following swimming in cold water. All of the above studies conducted in water between 10 and 14 °C indicate that people can swim in cold water for a distance ranging between about 800 and 1500 m before being incapacitated by the cold. The average swimming duration for the studies was about 47 min before incapacitation, regardless of the swimming ability of the subjects. Recent evidence shows that people have a very accurate idea about how long it will take them to achieve a given swimming goal despite a 3-fold overestimation of the absolute distance to swim. The subjects were quite astute at deciding their swimming strategy early in the immersion with 86% success, but after about 30 min of swimming or passive cooling, their decision-making ability became impaired. It would therefore seem wise to make one’s accidental immersion survival plan early during the immersion, directly after cessation of the cold shock responses. Additional recommendations for self-rescue are provided based on recent scientific evidence.

Abstract BACKGROUND GBM AGILE (Glioblastoma Adaptive, Global, Innovative Learning Environment) is a biomarker based, multi-arm, international, seamless Phase 2/3 platform trial designed to rapidly identify experimental therapies that improve overall survival and confirm efficacious experimental therapies and associated biomarker signatures to support new drug approvals and registration. GBM AGILE is a collaboration between academic investigators, patient organizations and industry to support new drug applications for newly diagnosed (ND) and recurrent GBM. METHODS The primary objective of GBM AGILE is to identify therapies that effectively improve the overall survival in patients with ND or recurrent GBM. Bayesian response adaptive randomization is used within subtypes of the disease to assign participants to investigational arms based on their performance. New experimental therapies are added as information about promising new drugs is identified, while therapies are removed as they complete their evaluation. GBM AGILE has screened over 1400 patients and enrollment rates are 3 to 4 times greater than traditional GBM trials, with active sites averaging 0.75 to 1 patients/site/month. There are 41 active sites in the US, 4 active sites in Canada and 3 active sites in Europe with a total of 15 sites planned for Switzerland, France and Germany. Expansion to Australia is currently underway. GBM AGILE operates under a Master Protocol which allows multiple drugs from different pharmaceutical/biotech companies to be evaluated simultaneously and/or over time against a common control. Along with an adaptive trial design, shared control arm and operational processes to serve the goal of helping patients receive optimal care in a fast and efficient manner, GBM AGILE incorporates new design and operational elements to enhance efficiencies, including more recently dose finding and enhanced safety management components. The dose finding phase allows for an initial evaluation of the experimental study drug in combination with radiotherapy and temozolomide, and/or lomustine in a limited number of patients at a select number of study sites within the trial in order to ensure that there are no critical safety signals before expansion to a larger subset of patients for enhanced safety monitoring followed by broader inclusion of the combination at all global study sites. The investigational drugs that have employed the dose finding phase and enhanced safety monitoring process have tolerable safety profile with toxicities that are monitorable, reversible, and not related to the control arm treatments. Through the use of improved and flexible processes, GBM AGILE continues to serve as a global trial that supports the efficient and rapid incorporation and evaluation of new experimental therapies for patients with GBM. Clinical trial information: NCT03970447.

Abstract Background: GBM AGILE (Glioblastoma Adaptive, Global, Innovative Learning Environment) is a biomarker based, multi-arm, international, seamless Phase 2/3 Response Adaptive Randomization platform trial designed to rapidly identify experimental therapies that improve overall survival and confirm efficacious experimental therapies and associated biomarker signatures to support new drug approvals and registration. GBM AGILE is a collaboration between academic investigators, patient organizations and industry to support new drug applications for newly diagnosed and recurrent GBM. Methods: The primary objective of GBM AGILE is to identify therapies that improve the overall survival in patients with newly diagnosed or recurrent GBM. Operating under a Master Protocol, GBM AGILE allows multiple drugs from different pharmaceutical/biotech companies to be evaluated simultaneously and/or over time against a common control. New experimental therapies are added as new information about promising new drugs is identified while other therapies are removed as they complete their evaluation. Bayesian response adaptive randomization is used within subtypes of the disease to assign participants to investigational arms based on their performance. GBM AGILE has screened over 1300 patients and enrollment rates are 3 to 4 times greater than traditional GBM trials, with active sites averaging 0.75 to 1 patients/site/month. There are 41 active sites in the US, 4 active sites in Canada and 3 active sites in Europe with 12 more sites anticipated to open across 3 countries in Europe. Expansion to Australia is in progress. Stratification of the newly diagnosed patients is based on methylation status per the MGMT assay provided by a central CLIA lab. Maintaining reasonable timelines for MGMT read out to support eligibility and screening requires ongoing operational oversight. In order to continue to improve MGMT testing times, the percentage discordance between results from central testing and local lab testing is being evaluated to assess if local lab testing can be utilized for randomization within GBM AGILE. Exploratory analyses are ongoing to expand knowledge of GBM. For example, information from imaging and clinical assessments will be used to build a longitudinal model, which may inform randomization by providing earlier and continuous information regarding how a given experimental arm is performing. Citation Format: Ingo K. Mellinghoff, Brian Alexander, Donald Berry, Nicholas Blondin, Meredith Buxton, Webster Cavenee, Howard Colman, John de Groot, Macarena I. de la Fuente, Benjamin Ellingson, Gary Gordon, Emma M.V. Hyddmark, Mustafa Khasraw, Andrew Lassman, Eudocia Lee, Wenbin Li, Michael Lim, Tom Mikkelsen, Apoorva Nelli, James Perry, Erik Sulman, Kirk Tanner, Michael Weller, Patrick Y. Wen, Timothy Cloughesy. GBM AGILE: A global, phase 2/3 adaptive platform trial to evaluate multiple regimens in newly diagnosed and recurrent glioblastoma [abstract]. In: Proceedings of the American Association for Cancer Research Annual Meeting 2023; Part 2 (Clinical Trials and Late-Breaking Research); 2023 Apr 14-19; Orlando, FL. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Cancer Res 2023;83(8_Suppl):Abstract nr CT062.

Abstract Abstract 2107 Introduction: Iron deficiency is the most common cause of anemia worldwide affecting 50% of children under 5 years of age and 25% of women under the age of 50 (11% in the USA) worldwide. Standard treatment is oral iron supplementation, however this route of administration is associated with several adverse drug reactions (ADRs), the most common being epigastralgia and constipation leading to lack of compliance or dose reduction in 30% of patients. Intravenous (IV) iron is an alternative treatment for patients intolerant or non-responsive to oral formulations. Of the two most common formulations available in Canada, IV iron dextran is less expensive but may be associated with more overall ADRs compared to IV iron sucrose. Methods: We conducted a single centre, double-blinded pilot RCT to assess the feasibility of a full RCT to compare ADRs between iron dextran and iron sucrose in non-hemodialysis and IV iron treatment naïve adult patients with iron deficiency anemia. The incidence of immediate (during outpatient hospital visit) and delayed (within 24 hours after patient discharged) ADRs for each iron formulation were compared. Baseline characteristics of participants were analyzed by means of descriptive statistics. Demographic and clinical characteristics of study participants were evaluated by adverse reaction status. They were compared using a two-sample t-test for continuous variables and a two-way contingency table using Chi square or Fisher's exact test for categorical variables, as appropriate. Patients were contacted 24 hours after discharge to answer a standardized questionnaire. Assessment of ADRs and severe ADRs were done using the standardized World Health Organization and International Conference on Harmonisation definitions. Grading of severity was done independently by three individuals from an independent Drug Safety Monitoring Board. Results: 143 adult patients with iron deficiency anemia were were approached and erolled in the study between January 2008 and January 2009 (100% enrolment). Baseline characteristics of patients is depicted in Table 1. All patients received IV iron (73 iron dextran and 70 iron sucrose) and none were lost to follow-up. Immediate ADRs were similar between the two study arms; iron dextran 8/73 (11%) and iron sucrose 5/70 (7%), p=0.568. The average additional nursing time required to manage immediate ADRs was approximately 30 minutes. Delayed ADRs approached statistical significance with a higher rate of ADRs in the iron sucrose group [ iron dextran 9/73 (12%) and iron sucrose 18/70 (26%), p=0.0541]. Details in Table 2. Four patients were considered to have serious adverse reactions (shortness of breath, bronchospasm and diaphoresis). Two form each study arm. Conclusions: A RCT to compare adverse drug reaction rates between iron dextran and iron sucrose in non-hemodialysis adult patients with iron deficiency anemia is feasible. In our pilot study we were able to get 100% enrolment rate, in a timely fashion with no patients lost to follow up. The design of the study with a one point in time evaluation and a short follow up that did not require extra hospital visits and blood tests were probably attractive features that maximized patient participation. The incidence and severity of ADRs to both IV iron preparations studied were similar with greater than 25% of patients experiencing either immediate or delayed ADRs. However, a striking higher rate of delayed ADRs, albeit not severe, was slightly more pronounced in patients receiving iron sucrose therapy. The elevated level of ADRs to IV iron suggests the need for alternative formulations and a full RCT to compare the rate of ADRs between iron preparations is warranted. The choice of IV iron formulation in the adult non-hemodialysis population should take into account factors other than cost of the medication such as incidence and severity of ADRs, extra time required by Healthcare professionals, and patient preferences. Disclosures: No relevant conflicts of interest to declare.

Abstract Background: Essential thrombocythemia (ET) is a subtype of chronic myeloproliferative neoplasms (MPN) characterized by thrombocytosis and disease-related symptoms, which may be difficult to manage. Patients with ET are also at higher risk of thrombosis and hemorrhage. Ideal therapeutic approaches should achieve adequate cytoreduction, reduce the risk of thrombo-hemorrhagic complications, and prevent progression to post-ET myelofibrosis (PET-MF) or secondary acute myeloid leukemia (AML). Low-dose aspirin with hydroxyurea (HU) is typically given as first-line therapy in high-risk patients. However, approximately 20-40% of ET patients become HU-intolerant or -resistant. In ET, resistance and/or intolerance portend an increased risk of thrombosis, hemorrhage, disease transformation and death. There is a paucity of prospective clinical trial data to guide management of ET patients who are HU resistant or intolerant. P1101 is a next generation monopegylated interferon (IFN) alfa-2b, developed specifically to treat MPNs, including ET. Study Design and Methods: The SURPASS-ET trial (NCT04285086) is a Phase 3, open-label, multicenter, randomized, active-controlled study to assess the efficacy, safety, tolerability, and pharmacokinetics (PK) of P1101 after 12 months of treatment compared with anagrelide as second line therapy for subjects with ET who have shown resistance or intolerance to HU. The primary endpoint is durable modified ELN composite response at 9 and 12 months from dosing. Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel test will be used for comparing the primary endpoint in the two treatment arms. The PK parameters of P1101, including (but not limited to) C min, T max, C max, and area-under-curve (AUC) will be derived using PPK analysis and the relationship between exposure and efficacy and safety endpoints will be examined using E-R analysis. Evaluation of efficacy will include clinical laboratory assessments, allelic burden measurements of CALR, JAK2, and MPL, spleen size measurements, bone marrow sampling (optional), EQ-5D-3L, and MPN Symptom Assessment Form Total Symptom Score (MPN-SAF TSS) assessments. A total of 130 randomized subjects is planned to detect a difference of 40% (P1101) versus 15% (anagrelide) in durable ELN response rate with 90% power at alpha level = 0.05 using the chi-square test. To account for possible non-evaluability (e.g., no follow-up data), approximately 160 subjects will be randomized in this study to get 130 completed patients. Because of uncertainty in the assumptions on which the calculation of the sample size is based, an interim analysis for sample size adjustment will be implemented. Major inclusion criteria include subjects diagnosed with high-risk ET (either older than 60 years and JAK2V617F-positive at screening or having disease-related thrombosis or hemorrhage in the past), diagnosed according to the World Health Organization (WHO) 2016 criteria, documented resistance/intolerance to HU and IFN naïve or anti-P1101 binding antibody negative. Key exclusion criteria include pregnant females, significant cardiovascular disease, documented autoimmune disease and a history or presence of clinically significant depression or neurological disease. The study involves approximately 65 sites across the US, Taiwan, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, S. Korea, Canada, and Europe. To-date 55 patients (54 Asians, 1 Caucasian) have been randomized. The mean and median age at recruitment was 58.9 years (SD: 14.34) and 63 years (range 21 to 80 years) respectively. Twenty-seven men (49.1%) and twenty-eight women (50.9%) were recruited. Forty-two subjects (76.4%) had a TSS < 20. The study is being overseen by a Data Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB). Figure 1 Figure 1. Disclosures Mesa: Gilead: Research Funding; Promedior: Research Funding; AOP: Consultancy; Incyte Corporation: Consultancy, Research Funding; Abbvie: Research Funding; Genentech: Research Funding; La Jolla Pharma: Consultancy; Novartis: Consultancy; Sierra Oncology: Consultancy, Research Funding; Samus: Research Funding; Pharma: Consultancy; CTI: Research Funding; Celgene: Research Funding; Constellation Pharmaceuticals: Consultancy, Research Funding; CTI: Research Funding. Komatsu: Fujifilm Wako Pure Chemical Corporation: Research Funding; Fuso Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.: Research Funding; Japan Tobacco Inc.: Consultancy; Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd: Membership on an entity's Board of Directors or advisory committees, Research Funding; Novartis Pharma KK: Consultancy, Research Funding, Speakers Bureau; Shire Japan KK: Consultancy, Research Funding, Speakers Bureau; PharmaEssentia Japan KK: Consultancy, Current Employment, Research Funding; Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.: Research Funding; Kyowa Hakko Kirin Co., Ltd.: Research Funding. Sato: PharmaEssentia Japan KK: Current Employment. Qin: PharmaEssentia Corp.: Current Employment. Urbanski: PharmaEssentia Corporation: Current Employment. Shih: PharmaEssentia Corporation: Consultancy. Zagrijtschuk: PharmaEssentia U.S.A. Corp.: Current Employment. Zimmerman: PharmaEssentia Corporation: Current Employment. Verstovsek: Gilead: Research Funding; Protagonist Therapeutics: Research Funding; NS Pharma: Research Funding; Incyte Corporation: Consultancy, Research Funding; PharmaEssentia: Research Funding; Ital Pharma: Research Funding; CTI BioPharma: Research Funding; Blueprint Medicines Corp: Research Funding; AstraZeneca: Research Funding; Promedior: Research Funding; Genentech: Research Funding; Celgene: Consultancy, Research Funding; Roche: Research Funding; Novartis: Consultancy, Research Funding; Sierra Oncology: Consultancy, Research Funding; Constellation: Consultancy; Pragmatist: Consultancy.

AbstractCanada mirrors developments in most countries with the growth of government agencies created to deliver public goods—whether it is service delivery, adjudication of disputes, regulatory oversight, enforcement activities—purported to benefit from an arms‐length relationship to cabinet. There is a robust comparative literature documenting the “agencification” of the state, yet Canadian studies remain mostly absent. This article draws on the Government of Canada's Public Service Employee Survey (PSES) microdata from 2017, 2011, 2005, and 1999 to test key hypotheses advanced by proponents of agencification, specifically that agencies are more innovative, autonomous, and efficient public organizations. We find that those working in enforcement agencies exhibit few of the purported advantages of agencification. We also observe that in recent years regulatory, adjudicative, and parliamentary agencies consistently surpass conventional department organizations on these metrics. Future research avenues are proposed to explore how governance and oversight reforms may explain this shift.

ABSTRACT The Government of Canada's Oceans Protection Plan (OPP) is a comprehensive, transformative $1.5 billion strategy to build a world-leading marine safety system to protect marine ecosystems, while enabling inclusive economic growth. A key component of the OPP is the Multi-Partner Research Initiative (MPRI), led by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) in collaboration with other federal agencies (Environment and Climate Change Canada, Canadian Coast Guard, Natural Resources Canada, and Transport Canada), that aims to advance oil spill research by fostering a national/international research network that brings together scientific experts in the field. The core studies under this program are focused on the provision of scientific knowledge to support the development, validation and regulatory approval of Alternative Response Measures (ARMs) that include: spill treating agents, in situ burning, oil translocation and decanting/oily waste disposal. Additional research includes studies on key “cross-cutting” issues, such as natural attenuation and bioremediation of oil, assessment of toxic impacts associated with oil spills and the application of oil spill countermeasures, and oil detection and mapping by autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). The deliverables from this research program will provide essential information to support Net Environmental Benefit Analysis (NEBA) for decision making to select the optimal oil spill response option(s) to protect the marine environment and its living resources. With an emphasis on supporting the development of the next generation of scientists in the field through engagement with the private sector (i.e., spill response organizations and oil industry partners) and other international (e.g., USA, Norway, France, Australia, China) government agencies, MPRI is anticipated to have a profound influence on the oil spill research community and emergency response agencies within Canada and abroad.

Abstract Background While audit & feedback (A&F) is an effective implementation intervention, the design elements which maximize effectiveness are unclear. Partnering with a healthcare quality advisory organization already delivering feedback, we conducted a pragmatic, 2 × 2 factorial, cluster-randomized trial to test the impact of variations in two factors: (A) the benchmark used for comparison and (B) information framing. An embedded process evaluation explored hypothesized mechanisms of effect. Methods Eligible physicians worked in nursing homes in Ontario, Canada, and had voluntarily signed up to receive the report. Groups of nursing homes sharing physicians were randomized to (A) physicians’ individual prescribing rates compared to top-performing peers (the top quartile) or the provincial median and (B) risk-framed information (reporting the number of patients prescribed high-risk medication) or benefit-framed information (reporting the number of patients not prescribed). We hypothesized that the top quartile comparator and risk-framing would lead to greater practice improvements. The primary outcome was the mean number of central nervous system-active medications per resident per month. Primary analyses compared the four arms at 6 months post-intervention. Factorial analyses were secondary. The process evaluation comprised a follow-up questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. Results Two hundred sixty-seven physicians (152 clusters) were randomized: 67 to arm 1 (median benchmark, benefit framing), 65 to arm 2 (top quartile benchmark, benefit framing), 75 to arm 3 (median benchmark, risk framing), and 60 to arm 4 (top quartile benchmark, risk framing). There were no significant differences in the primary outcome across arms or for each factor. However, engagement was low (27–31% of physicians across arms downloaded the report). The process evaluation indicated that both factors minimally impacted the proposed mechanisms. However, risk-framed feedback was perceived as more actionable and more compatible with current workflows, whilst a higher target might encourage behaviour change when physicians identified with the comparator. Conclusions Risk framing and a top quartile comparator have the potential to achieve change. Further work to establish the strategies most likely to enhance A&F engagement, particularly with physicians who may be most likely to benefit from feedback, is required to support meaningfully addressing intricate research questions concerning the design of A&F. Trial registration ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT02979964. Registered 29 November 2016.

When we think of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, the first image that is conjured in our mind is of an individual sporting a blue helmet or a blue beret (fig. 1). While simple and uncomplicated, these blue accessories represent an expression and an embodiment resembling that of a warrior, sent to bring peace to conflict-torn communities. UN peacekeeping first conceptually emerged in 1948 in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that ensued following the United Kingdom’s relinquishing of its mandate over Palestine, and the proclamation of the State of Israel. “Forged in the crucible of practical diplomacy” (Rubinstein 16), unarmed military observers were deployed to Palestine to monitor the hostilities and mediate armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), significantly exemplified the diplomatic and observational capabilities of military men, in line with the UN Charter’s objectives of international peace and security, setting henceforth a basic archetype for international peacekeeping. It was only in 1956, however, that peacekeeping formally emerged when armed UN forces deployed to Egypt to supervise the withdrawal of forces occupying the Suez Canal (informally known as the ‘Second Arab-Israeli’ war). Here, the formation of UN peacekeeping represented an international pacifying mechanism comprised of multiple third-party intermediaries whereby peaceful resolution would be achieved by transcending realist instincts of violence for political attainment in favour of applying a less-destructive liberal model of persuasion, compromise, and perseverance (Howard). ‘Blue helmet’ peacekeeping operations continue to be regarded by the UN as an integral subsidiary instrument of its organisation. At present, there are 12 active peacekeeping operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping across the world (United Nations Peacekeeping). Fig. 1: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) sporting blue berets (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-awarded-un-medals-for-south-sudan-peacekeeping-mission) But where did the blue helmets and berets originate from? Rubinstein details a surprisingly mundane account of the origins of the political accessory that is now a widely recognised symbol for UN peacekeepers’ uniforms. Peacekeepers’ uniforms initially emerged from the ad hoc need to distinguish UN troops from those of the armed forces in a distinctive dress during the 1947 UNTSO mission by any means and material readily available, such as armbands and helmets (Henry). The era of early peacekeeping operations also saw ‘observers’ carry UN flags and paint their vehicle white with ‘UN’ written in large black letters in order to distinguish themselves. The blue helmets specifically came to be adorned during the first peacekeeping operation in 1956 during the Suez crisis. At this time, Canada supplied a large number of non-combatant troops whose uniform was the same as the belligerent British forces, party to the conflict. An effort to thus distinguish the peacekeepers was made by spray-painting surplus World War II American plastic helmet-liners, which were available in quantity in Europe, blue (Urquhart; Rubenstein). The two official colours of the UN are ‘light blue’ and ‘white’. The unique light “UN” blue colour, in particular, was approved as the background for the UN flag in the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 167(II), alongside a white emblem depicting a map of the world surrounded by two olive branches. While the UN’s use of the colour was chosen as a “practical effect of identifying the Organization in areas of trouble and conflict, to any and all parties concerned”, the colour blue was also specifically chosen at this time as “an integral part of the visual identity of the organisation” representing “peace in opposition to red, for war” (United Nations). Blue is seen to be placed in antithesis to the colour red across several fields including popular culture, and even within politics, as a way to typically indicate conflict between two warring groups. Within popular culture, for example, many films in the science fiction, fantasy, or horror genres, use a clearly demarcated, dichotomous ‘red vs. blue’ colour scheme in their posters (fig. 2). This is also commonly seen in political campaign posters, for example during the 2021 US presidential election (fig. 3). Fig. 2: Blue and red colour schemes in film posters (left to right: Star Wars: The Force Awakens (2015), Captain Marvel (2019), and The Dead Don’t Die (2019)) Fig. 3: Biden (Democratic party) vs. Trump (Republican party) US presidential election (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-15/us-election-political-parties-explained-democrats-vs-republicans/12708296) This dichotomy can be traced back to the high Middle Ages between the fourteenth and seventeenth century where the colour blue became a colour associated with “moral implications”, rivalling both the colours black and red which were extremely popular in clothing during the eras of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance (Pastoureau 85). This ‘moral metamorphosis’ in European society was largely influenced by the views of Christian Protestant reformers concerning the social, religious, and artistic use of the colour blue (Pastoureau). A shift in the use of blue and its symbolic connotations may also be seen, for example, in early Christian art and iconography, specifically those deriving from depictions of the Virgin Mary; according to Pastoureau (50), this provides the “clearest illustration of the social, religious, and artistic consequences of blue's new status”. Up until the eighteenth century, the colour blue, specifically ‘sky blue’ or light blue tones resemblant of the “UN” shade of blue, had minimal symbolic or aesthetic value, particularly in European culture and certainly amongst nobility and the upper levels of society. Historically, light blue was typically associated with peasants’ clothing. This was due to the fact that peasants would often dye their clothes using the pigment of the woad herb; however, the woad would poorly penetrate cloth fibres and inevitably fade under the effects of sunlight and soap, thereby resulting in a ‘bland’ colour (Pastoureau). Although the blue hues worn by the nobility and wealthy were typically denser and more solid, a “new fashion” for light blue tones gradually took hold at the courts of the wealthy and the bourgeoisie, inevitably becoming deeply anchored in Western European counties (Pastoureau). Here, the reorganisation of the colour hierarchy and reformulation of blue certainly resembles Pastoureau’s (10) assertion that “any history of colour is, above all, a social history”. Within the humanities, colour represents a social phenomenon and construction. Colour thus provides insights into the ways society assigns meaning to it, “constructs its codes and values, establishes its uses, and determines whether it is acceptable or not” (Pastoureau, 10). In this way, although colour is a naturally occurring phenomenon, it is also a complex cultural construct. That the UN and its subsidiary bodies, including the Department of Peacekeeping, deliberately assigned light blue as its official organisational colour therefore usefully illustrates a significant social process of meaning-making and cultural sociology. The historical transition of light blue’s association from one of poverty in and around the eighteenth century to one of wealth in the nineteenth century may perhaps also be indicative of the next transitional era for light blue in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, representative of the amalgamation or unity between the two classes. Representing the ambitions not only of the organisation, but rather of the 193 member-states, of attaining worldwide peace, light blue may be seen as a colour of peace, as well as one of the people, for the people. This may be traced back, according to Pastoureau, as early as the Middle Ages where the colour blue was seen a colour of ‘peace’. Colours, however, do not solely determine social and cultural relevance in a given historical event. Rather, fabrics and clothing too offer “the richest and most diverse source of artifacts” in understanding history and culture. Artifacts such as UN peacekeepers’ blue berets and helmets necessarily incorporate economic, social, ideological, aesthetic, and symbolic aspects of both colour and material into the one complete uniform (Pastoureau). While the ‘UN blue’ is associated with peace, the beret, on the other hand, has been described as “an ally in the battlefield” (Kliest). The history of the beret is largely rooted in the armed forces – institutions typically associated with conflict and violence – and it continues to be a vital aspect of military uniforms worn by personnel from countries all around the globe. Given that the large majority of UN peacekeeping forces are made up of military personnel, peacekeeping, as both an action and an institution, thus adds a layer of complexity when discussing artifact symbolism. Here, a peacekeeper’s uniform uniquely represents the embodiment of an amalgamation of two traditionally juxtaposing concepts: peace, nurture, and diplomacy (often associated with ‘feminine’ qualities) versus conflict, strength, and discipline (often associated with ‘masculine’ qualities). A peacekeeper’s uniform thus represents the UN’s institutionalisation of “soldiers for peace” (Howard) who are, as former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold proclaimed, “the front line of a moral force” (BBC cited in Howard). Aside from its association with the armed forces, the beret has also been used as a fashion symbol by political revolutionaries, such as members of the ‘Black Panther Party’ (BPP) founded in the 1960s during the US Civil Rights Movement, as well as Che Guevara, prominent Leftist figure in the Cuban Revolution (see fig. 4). For, Rosabelle Forzy, CEO of beret and headwear fashion manufacturing company ‘Laulhère’, the beret is “emblematic of non-conformism … worn by people who create, commit, militate, and resist” (Kliest). Fig. 4: Berets worn by political revolutionaries (Left to right: Black Panthers Party (BPP) protesting outside of a New York courthouse (https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2988897/Black-Panther-double-cop-killer-sues-freedom-plays-FLUTE-Murderer-demands-parole-changed-fury-victim-s-widow.html), and portrait of Che Guevara) In a way, the UN’s ‘blue beret’ too bears a ‘non-conformist’ visage as its peacekeepers neither fit categorisations as ‘revolutionaries’ nor as traditional ‘soldiers’. Peacekeepers personify a cultural phenomenon that operates in a complex environment (Rubinstein). While peacekeepers retain their national military (usually camouflage) uniforms during missions, the UN headwear is a symbol of non-conformity in response to sociological preconceptions regarding military culture. In the case of peacekeeping, the implementation and longevity of peacekeepers’ uniforms has occurred through a process of what Rubinstein (50) refers to as ‘cultural’ or ‘symbolic inversion’ wherein traditional notions of military rituals and symbolism have been appropriated or ‘inverted’ and given a new meaning by the UN. In other words, the UN promotes the image of soldiers acting without the use of force in service of peace in order to encode an image of a “world transformed” through the contribution of peacekeeping toward the “elaboration of an image of an international community acting in a neutral, consensual manner” (Rubinstein, 50). Cultural inversion therefore creates a socio-political space wherein normative representations are reconfigured and conditioned as acceptable. Rubinstein argues, however, that the UN’s need to integrate individuals with such diverse backgrounds and perceptions into a collective peacekeeper identity can be problematic. Rubinstein (72) adds that the blue beret is the “most obvious evidence” of an ordinary symbol investing ‘legitimacy’ in peacekeeping through ritual repetition which still holds its cultural relevance to the present day. Arguably, institutional uniforms are symbols which profoundly shape human experience, validating contextual action according to the symbol’s meanings relevant to those wearing it. In this way, uniform symbolism not only allows us to make sense of our daily experiences, but allows us to construct and understand our identities and our interactions with others who are also part of the symbolic culture we are situated in. Consider, for example, a police officer. A police officer’s uniform not only grants them membership to the policing institution but also necessarily grants them certain powers, privileges, and jurisdictions within society which thereby impact on the way they see the world and interact with it. Necessarily, the social and cultural identity one acquires from wearing a specific uniform only effectively functions by “investing differences”, however large or small, into these symbols that “distinguish us from others” (Rubinstein, 74). For example, a policeman’s badge is a signifier that they are, in fact, part of an exclusive group that the majority of the citizenry are not. To this extent, the use of uniforms is not without its controversies or without the capacity to be misused as a tool of discrimination in a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ scenario. Referring to case regarding the beret, for example, in 2000 then US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shineski, announced that the black beret – traditionally worn exclusively by specialised US Army units such as ‘Rangers’ – would become a standardised part of the US Army uniform for all soldiers and would denote a “symbol of unity”. General Shineski’s decision for the new headgear symbolised “the half-million-strong army’s transition to a lighter, more agile force that can respond more rapidly to distant trouble spots” (Borger). This was, however, met with angry backlash particularly from the Rangers who stated that they “were being robbed of a badge of pride” as “the beret is a symbol of excellence … that is not to be worn by everybody” (Borger). Responses to the proposition pointed to the problem of ‘low morale’ that the military faced, which could not be fixed just by “changing hats” (Borger). In this case, the beret was identified and isolated as a tool for coordinating perceptions (Rubinstein, 78). Here, the use of uniforms is as much about being external identifiers and designating a group from another as it is about sustaining a group by means of perpetuating what Rubinstein conceptualises as ‘self-legitimation’. This occurs in order to ensure the survival of a group and is similarly seen as occurring within UN peacekeeping (Joseph & Alex). Within peacekeeping the blue beret is an effective symbol used to perpetuate self-legitimacy across various levels of the UN which construct systems, or a ‘community’, of reinforcement largely rooted on organisational models of virtue and diplomacy. In the broadest sense, the UN promotes “a unique responsibility to set a global standard” in service to creating a unified and pacific world order (Guterres). As an integral instrument of international action, peacekeeping is, by extension, necessarily conditioned and supported by this cultural model whereby the actions of individual peacekeepers are strategically linked to the symbolic capital at the broadest levels of the organisation to manage the organisation’s power and legitimacy. The image of the peacekeeper, however, is fraught with problems and, as such, UN peacekeepers’ uniforms represent discrepancies and contradictions in the UN’s mission and organisational culture, particularly with relation to the UN’s symbolic construction of community and cooperation amongst peacekeepers. Given that peacekeeping troops are made up of individuals from different ethnic, cultural, and professional backgrounds, conditions for cultural interaction become challenging, if not problematic, and may necessarily lead to cross-cultural misunderstandings, miscommunication, and conflict. This applies to the context of peacekeeper deployment to host nations amongst local communities with whom they are also culturally unfamiliar (Rubinstein, "Intervention"). According to Rubinstein ("Intervention", 528), such operations may “create the conditions under which criminal activities or the institution of neo-colonial relationships can emerge”. Moncrief adds to this by also suggesting that a breakdown in conduct and discipline during missions may also contribute to peacekeepers engaging in violence during missions. Consequently, multiple cases of misdemeanour by UN peacekeepers have been reported across the years including peacekeeper involvement in bribery, weapons trading, and gold smuggling (Escobales). One of the most notorious acts of misconduct and violence that continues to be reported in the present day, however, is of peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse against host women and children. Between 2004 and 2016, for example, “the UN received almost 2,000 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse” (Essa). According to former chief of operations at the UN’s Emergency Co-ordination Centre, Andrew Macleod, this figure may be, however, much more disturbing, estimating in general that approximately “60,000 rapes had been carried out by UN staff in the past decade” (Zeffman). An article in the Guardian reported that a 12-year-old girl had been hiding in a bathroom during a house search in a Muslim enclave of the capital, Bangui [in the Central African Republic] … . A man allegedly wearing the blue helmet and vest of the UN peacekeeping forces took her outside and raped her behind a truck. (Smith & Lewis) In the article, the assailant’s uniform (“the blue helmet and vest”) is not only described as literal imagery to contextualise the grave crime that was committed against the child. In evoking the image of the blue helmet and vest, the author highlights the uniform as a symbolic tool of power which was misused to perpetuate harm against the vulnerable civilian ‘other’. In this scenario, like many others, rather than representing peace and hope, the blue helmet (or beret) instead illustrates the contradictions of the UN peacekeeper’s uniform. Here, the uniform has consequently come to be associated as a symbol of violence, fear, and most significantly, betrayal, for the victim(s) of the abuse, as well as for much of the victim’s community. This discrepancy was also highlighted in a speech presented by former Ambassador of the UK Mission to the UN, Matthew Rycroft, who stated that “when a girl looks up to a blue helmet, she should do so not in fear, but in hope”. For many peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly transactional sex, however, they “do not see themselves as abusing women”. This is largely to do with the power and privileges peacekeepers are afforded, such as ‘immunity’ – that is, a peacekeeper is granted immunity from trial or prosecution for criminal misconduct by the host nation’s judicial system. Over the years, scholarly research regarding peacekeepers’ immunity has highlighted a plethora of organisational problems within the UN, including lack of perpetrator accountability, and internal investigation or follow-up. More so, it has undoubtedly “contributed to a culture of individuals committing sexual violence knowing that they will get away with it” (Freedman). When a peacekeeper wears their uniform, they are thus imbued with the power and charged with the responsibility to properly embody and represent the values of the UN; “if [peacekeepers] don’t understand how powerful a position they are in, they will never understand what they do is actually wrong” (Elks). As such, unlike other traditional institutional uniforms, such as that of a soldier or a police officer, a peacekeeper’s uniform stands out as an enigma. One the one hand, peacekeepers channel the peaceful and passive organisational values of the UN by wearing the blue beret or helmet, whilst at the same time, they continue to sport the national military body uniform of their home country. Questions pertaining to the peacekeeper’s uniform arise and require further exploration: how can peacekeepers disassociate from their disciplined military personas and learnt combat skills if they continue to wear military camouflage during peacekeeping missions? Is the addition of the blue beret or helmet enough to reconfigure the body of the peacekeeper from one of violence, masculinity, and offence to that of peace, nurture, and diplomacy? Certainly, a range of factors are pertinent to an understanding of peacekeepers’ behaviour and group culture. But whether these two opposing identities can cohesively create or reconstitute a third identity using the positive skills and attributes of both juxtaposing institutions remains elusive. Nonetheless, the blue beret is a symbol of international hope, not only for vulnerable populations, but also for the world population collectively, as it represents neutral third-party member states working together to rebuild the world through non-combative means. References Borger, Julian. “Elite Forces Fear the Coming of the Egalitarian Beret.” The Guardian 19 Oct. 2000. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/19/julianborger>. Elks, Sonia. “Haitians Say Underaged Girls Were Abused by U.N. Peacekeepers.” Reuters 19 Dec. 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-women-peacekeepers-idUSKBN1YM27W>. Escobales, Roxanne. “UN Peacekeepers 'Traded Gold and Guns with Congolese rebels'.” The Guardian 28 Apr. 2008. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/28/congo.unitednations>. Essa, Azad. “Why Do Some Peacekeepers Rape? The Full Report.” Al Jazeera 10 Aug. 2017. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/8/10/why-do-some-peacekeepers-rape-the-full-report>. Freedman, Rosa. “Why Do peacekeepers Have Immunity in Sex Abuse Cases?” CNN 25 May 2015. <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/22/opinions/freedman-un-peacekeepers-immunity/index.html>. Guterres, António. Address to High-Level Meeting on the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. United Nations. 18 Sep. 2017. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-09-18/secretary-generals-sea-address-high-level-meeting>. Henry, Charles P. Ralph Bunche: Model Negro or American Other? New York: New York UP, 1999. Howard, Lise Morjé. Power in Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019. Joseph, Nathan, and Nicholas Alex. "The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective." American Journal of Sociology 77.4 (1972): 719-730. Kliest, Nicole. “Why the Beret Never Goes Out of Style.” TZR 6 April 2021. <https://www.thezoereport.com/fashion/history-berets-hat-trend>. Rubinstein, Robert A. "Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations." Security Dialogue 36.4 (2005): 527-544. DOI: 10.1177/0967010605060454. ———. Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention. Routledge, 2015. Rycroft, Matthew. "When a Girl Looks Up to a Blue Helmet, She Should Do So Not in Fear, But in Hope." 10 Mar. 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/when-a-girl-looks-up-to-a-blue-helmet-she-should-do-so-not-in-fear-but-in-hope>. Smith, David, and Paul Lewis. "UN Peacekeepers Accused of Killing and Rape in Central African Republic." The Guardian 12 Aug. 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/11/un-peacekeepers-accused-killing-rape-central-african-republic>. United Nations. :United Nations Emblem and Flag." N.d. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-emblem-and-flag>. United Nations Peacekeeping. “Where We Operate.” N.d. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>. Urquhart, Brian. Ralph Bunche: An American Life. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1993. Zeffman, Henry. “Charity Sex Scandal: UN Staff ‘Responsible for 60,000 rapes in a Decade’.” The Times 14 Feb. 2018. <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/un-staff-responsible-for-60-000-rapes-in-a-decade-c627rx239>.

Introduction Daffodil Day, usually held in spring, raises funds for cancer awareness and research using this symbol of hope. On that day, people who donate money to this good cause are usually given a yellow daffodil pin to wear. When I lived in Auckland, New Zealand, on the last Friday in August most people walking around the city centre proudly wore a cheerful yellow flower. So many people generously participated in this initiative that one almost felt obliged to join the cause in order to wear the ‘uniform’ – the daffodil pin – as everyone else did on that day. To donate and to wear a daffodil is the social expectation, and operating in social environment people often endeavour to meet the expectation by doing the ‘appropriate things’ defined by societies or communities. After all, who does not like to receive a beam of acceptance and appreciation from a fellow daffodil bearer in Auckland’s Queen Street? States in international society are no different. In some ways, states wear ‘uniforms’ while executing domestic and foreign affairs just as human beings do within their social groups. States develop the understandings of desirable behaviour from the international community with which they interact and identify. They are ‘socialised’ to act in line with the expectations of international community. These expectations are expressed in the form of international norms, a prescriptive set of ideas about the ‘appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 891). Motivated by this logic of appropriateness, states that comply with certain international norms in world politics justify and undertake actions that are considered appropriate for their identities. This essay starts with examining how international norms can be spread to different countries through the process of ‘state socialisation’ (how the countries are ‘talked into’ wearing the ‘uniform’). Second, the essay investigates the idea of ‘cultural match’: how domestic actors comply with an international norm by interpreting and manipulating it according to their local political and legal practices (how the countries wear the ‘uniform’ differently). Lastly, the essay probes the current international normative community and the liberal values embedded in major international norms (whether states would continue wearing the ‘uniform’). International Norms and State Socialisation: Why Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’? Norm diffusion is related to the efforts of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ using various platforms to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 895-896). Early studies of norm diffusion tend to emphasise nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as norm entrepreneurs and advocates, such as Oxfam and its goal of reducing poverty and hunger worldwide (Capie 638). In other empirical research, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were shown to serve as ‘norm teachers,’ such as UNESCO educating developing countries the value of science policy organisations (Finnemore 581-586). Additionally, states and other international actors can also play important roles in norm diffusion. Powerful states with more communication resources sometimes enjoy advantages in creating and promoting new norms (Florini 375). For example, the United States and Western European countries have often been considered as the major proponents of free trade. Norm emergence and state socialisation in a normative community often occurs during critical historical periods, such as wars and major economic downturns, when international changes and domestic crises often coincide with each other (Ikenberry and Kupchan 292). For instance, the norm entrepreneurs of ‘responsible power/state’ can be traced back to the great powers (mainly the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) and their management of international order at the end of WWII (see Bull). With their negotiations and series of international agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conference in the 1940s, these great powers established a post-World War international society based on the key liberal values of international peace and security, free trade, human rights, and democracy. Human beings are not born to know what appropriate behaviour is; we learn social norms from parents, schools, peers, and other community members. International norms are collective expectations and understanding of how state governments should approach their domestic and foreign affairs. States ‘learn’ international norms while socialising with a normative community. From a sociological perspective, socialisation summarises ‘how and to what extent diverse individuals are meshed with the requirement of collective life’ at the societal level (Long and Hadden 39). It mainly consists of the process of training and shaping newcomers by the group members and the social adjustment of novices to the normative framework and the logic of appropriateness (Long and Hadden 39). Similarly, social psychology defines socialisation as the process in which ‘social organisations influence the action and experience of individuals’ (Gold and Douvan 145). Inspired by sociology and psychology, political scientists consider socialisation to be the mechanism through which norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors (usually a norm novice) to adhere to a particular prescriptive standard (Johnston, “Social State” 16). Norm entrepreneurs can change novices’ behaviour by the methods of persuasion and social influence (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 496-506). Socialisation sometimes demands that individual actors should comply with organisational norms by changing their interests or preferences (persuasion). Norm entrepreneurs often attempt to construct an appealing cognitive frame in order to persuade the novices (either individuals or states) to change their normative preferences or adopt new norms. They tend to use language that can ‘name, interpret and dramatise’ the issues related to the emerging norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 987). As a main persuasive device, ‘framing’ can provide a singular interpretation and appropriate behavioural response for a particular situation (Payne 39). Cognitive consistency theory found in psychology has suggested the mechanism of ‘analogy’, which indicates that actors are more likely to accept new ideas that share some similarities to the extant belief or ideas that they have already accepted (see Hybel, ch. 2). Based on this understanding, norm entrepreneurs usually frame issues in a way that can associate and resonate with the shared value of the targeted novices (Payne 43). For example, Finnemore’s research shows that when it promoted the creation of state science bureaucracies in the 1960s, UNESCO associated professional science policy-making with the appropriate role of a modern state, which was well received by the post-war developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (Finnemore 565-597). Socialisation can also emanate actors’ pro-norm behaviour through a cost-benefit calculation made with social rewards and punishments (social influence). A normative community can use the mechanism of back-patting and opprobrium to distribute social reward and punishment. Back-patting – ‘recognition, praise and normative support’ – is offered for a novice’s or member’s cooperative and pro-norm behaviour (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503). In contrast, opprobrium associated with status denial and identity rejection can create social and psychological costs (Johnston 504). Both the reward and punishment grow in intensity with the number of co-operators (Johnston 504). A larger community can often create more criticism towards rule-breakers, and thus greatly increase the cost of disobedience. For instance, the lack of full commitment from major powers, such as China, the United States, and some other OECD countries, has arguably made global collective action towards mitigating climate change more difficult, as the cost of non-compliance is relatively low. While being in a normative environment, novice or emerging states that have not yet been socialised into the international community can respond to persuasion and social influence through the processes of identification and mimicking. Social psychology indicates that when one actor accepts persuasion or social influence based on its desire to build or maintain a ‘satisfying self-defining relationship’ to another actor, the mechanism of identification starts to work (Kelman 53). Identification among a social group can generate ‘obligatory’ behaviour, where individual states make decisions by attempting to match their perceptions of ‘who they are’ (national identity) with the expectation of the normative community (Glodgeier and Tetlock 82). After identifying with the normative community, a novice state would then mimic peer states’ pro-norm behaviour in order to be considered as a qualified member of the social group. For example, when the Chinese government was deliberating over its ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2003, a Ministry of Environmental Protection brief noted that China should ratify the Protocol as soon as possible because China had always been a country ‘keeping its word’ in international society, and non-ratification would largely ‘undermine China’s international image and reputation’ (Ministry of Environmental Protection of PRC). Despite the domestic industry’s disagreement with entering into the Protocol, the Chinese government’s self-identification as a ‘responsible state’ that performs its international promises and duties played an important role in China’s adoption of the international norm of biosafety. Domestic Salience of International Norms: How Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’ Differently? Individual states do not accept international norms passively; instead, state governments often negotiate and interact with domestic actors, such as major industries and interest groups, whose actions and understandings in turn impact on how the norm is understood and implemented. This in turn feeds back to the larger normative community and creates variations of those norms. There are three main factors that can contribute to the domestic salience of an international norm. First, as the norm-takers, domestic actors can decide whether and to what extent an international norm can enter the domestic agenda and how it will be implemented in policy-making. These actors tend to favour an international norm that can justify their political and social programs and promote their interests in domestic policy debates (Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?” 453). By advocating the existence and adoption of an international norm, domestic actors attempt to enhance the legitimacy and authority of their current policy or institution (Acharya, “How Ideas Spread” 248). Political elites can strengthen state legitimacy by complying with an international norm in their policy-making, and consequently obtain international approval with reputation, trust, and credibility as social benefits in the international community (Finnemore and Sikkink 903). For example, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), only four states – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States – voted against the Declaration. They argued that their constitutional and national policies were sufficiently responsive to the type of Indigenous self-determination envisioned by UNDRIP. Nevertheless, given the opprobrium directed against these states by the international community, and their well-organised Indigenous populations, the four state leaders recognised the value of supporting UNDRIP. Subsequently all four states adopted the Declaration, but in each instance state leaders observed UNDRIP’s ‘aspirational’ rather than legal status; UNDRIP was a statement of values that these states’ policies should seek to incorporate into their domestic Indigenous law. Second, the various cultural, political, and institutional strategies of domestic actors can influence the effectiveness of norm empowerment. Political rhetoric and political institutions are usually created and used to promote a norm domestically. Both state and societal leaders can make the performative speech act of an international norm work and raise its importance in a national context by repeated declarations on the legitimacy and obligations brought by the norm (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). Moreover, domestic actors can also develop or modify political institutions to incorporate an international norm into the domestic bureaucratic or legal system (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). These institutions provide rules for domestic actors and articulate their rights and obligations, which transforms the international norm’s legitimacy and authority into local practices. For example, the New Zealand Government adopted a non-nuclear policy in the 1980s. This policy arose from the non-nuclear movement that was leading the development of the Raratonga Treaty (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone) and peace and Green party movements across Europe who sought to de-nuclearise the European continent. The Lange Labour Government’s 1984 adoption of an NZ anti-nuclear policy gained impetus because of these larger norm movements, and these movements in turn recognised the normative importance of a smaller power in international relations. Third, the characteristics of the international norm can also impact on the likelihood that the norm will be accepted by domestic actors. A ‘cultural match’ between international norm and local values can facilitate norm diffusion to domestic level. Sociologists suggest that norm diffusion is more likely to be successful if the norm is congruent with the prior values and practices of the norm-taker (Acharya, “Asian Regional Institutions” 14). Norm diffusion tends to be more efficient when there is a high degree of cultural match such that the global norm resonates with the target country’s domestic values, beliefs or understandings, which in turn can be reflected in national discourse, as well as the legal and bureaucratic system (Checkel 87; Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 73). With such cultural consistency, domestic actors are more likely to accept an international norm and treat it as a given or as ‘matter-of-fact’ (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 74). Cultural match in norm localisation explains why identical or similar international socialisation processes can lead to quite different local developments and variations of international norms. The debate between universal human rights and the ‘Asian values’ of human rights is an example where some Asian states, such as Singapore and China, prioritise citizen’s economic rights over social and political rights and embrace collective rights instead of individual rights. Cultural match can also explain why one country may easily accept a certain international norm, or some aspect of one particular norm, while rejecting others. For example, when Taiwanese and Japanese governments adapted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into their local political and legal practice, various cultural aspects of Indigenous rights have been more thoroughly implemented compared to indigenous economic and political rights (Gao et al. 60-65). In some extreme cases, the norm entrepreneurs even attempt to change the local culture of norm recipients to create a better cultural match for norm localisation. For example, when it tried to socialise India into its colonial system in the early nineteenth century, Britain successfully shaped the evolution of Indian political culture by adding British values and practices into India’s social, political, and judicial system (Ikenberry and Kupchan 307-309). The International Normative Community: Would States Continue Wearing ‘Uniforms’? International norms evolve. Not every international norm can survive and sustain. For example, while imperialism and colonial expansion, where various European states explored, conquered, settled, and exploited other parts of the world, was a widely accepted idea and practice in the nineteenth century, state sovereignty, equality, and individual rights have replaced imperialism and become the prevailing norms in international society today. The meanings of the same international norm can evolve as well. The Great Powers first established the post-war international norms of ‘state responsibility’ based on the idea of sovereign equality and non-intervention of domestic affairs. However, the 1980s saw the emergence of many international organisations, which built new standards and offered new meanings for a responsible state in international society: a responsible state must actively participate in international organisations and comply with international regimes. In the post-Cold War era, international society has paid more attention to states’ responsibility to offer global common goods and to promote the values of human rights and democracy. This shift of focus has changed the international expectation of state responsibility again to embrace collective goods and global values (Foot, “Chinese Power” 3-11). In addition to the nature and evolution of international norms, the unity and strength of the normative community can also affect states’ compliance with the norms. The growing size of the community group or the number of other cooperatives can amplify the effect of socialisation (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503-506). In other words, individual states are often more concerned about their national image, reputation and identity regarding norm compliance when a critical mass of states have already subscribed into the international norm. How much could this critical mass be? Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that international norms reach the threshold global acceptance when the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded at least one third of all states to adopt the new norm (901). The veto record of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) shows this impact. China, for example, has cast a UNSC veto vote 17 times as of 2022, but it has rarely excised its veto power alone (Security Council Report). For instance, though being sceptical of the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which prioritises human right over state sovereignty, China did not veto Resolution 1973 (2011) regarding the Libyan civil war. The Resolution allowed the international society to take ‘all necessary measure to protect civilians’ from a failed state government, and it received wide support among UNSC members (no negative votes from the other 14 members). Moreover, states are not entirely equal in terms of their ‘normative weight’. When Great Powers act as norm entrepreneurs, they can usually utilise their wealth and influence to better socialise other norm novice states. In the history of promoting biological diversity norms which are embedded in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the OECD countries, especially France, UK, Germany, and Japan, have been regarded as normative leaders. French and Japanese political leaders employed normative language (such as ‘need’ and ‘must’) in various international forums to promote the norms and to highlight their normative commitment (see e.g. Chirac; Kan). Additionally, both governments provided financial assistance for developing countries to adopt the biodiversity norms. In the 2011 annual review of CBD, Japan reaffirmed its US$12 million contribution to assisting developing countries (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). France joined Japan’s commitment by announcing a financial contribution of €1 million along, with some additional funding from Norway and Switzerland (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). Today, biological diversity has been one of the most widely accepted international environmental norms, which 196 states/nations have ratified (United Nations). While Great Powers can make more substantial contributions to norm diffusion compared to many smaller powers with limited state capacity, Great Powers’ non-compliance with the normative ‘uniform’ can also significantly undermine the international norms’ validity and the normative community’s unity and reputation. The current normative community of climate change is hardly a unified one, as it is characterised by a low degree of consensus. Major industrial countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, have not yet reached an agreement concerning their individual responsibilities for reducing greenhouse emissions. This lack of agreement, which includes the amount of cuts, the feasibility and usefulness of such cuts, and the relative sharing of cuts across various states, is complicated by the fact that large developing countries, such as China, Brazil, and India, also hold different opinions towards climate change regimes (see Vidal et al.). Experts heavily criticised the major global powers, such as the European Union and the United States, for their lack of ambition in phasing out fossil fuels during the 2022 climate summit in Egypt (COP27; Ehsan et al.). In international trade, both China and the United States are among the leading powers because of their large trade volume, capacity, and transnational network; however, both countries have recently undermined the world trade system and norms. China took punitive measures against Australian export products after Australia’s Covid-19 inquiry request at the World Health Organisation. The United States, particularly under the Trump Administration, invoked the WTO national security exception in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to justify its tariffs on steel and aluminium. Lastly, norm diffusion and socialisation can be a ‘two-way path,’ especially when the norm novice state is a powerful and influential state in the international system. In this case, the novices are not merely assimilated into the group, but can also successfully exert some influence on other group members and affect intra-group relations (Moreland 1174). As such, the novices can be both targets of socialisation and active agents who can shape the content and outcome of socialisation processes (Pu 344). The influence from the novices can create normative contestation and thus influence the norm evolution (Thies 547). In other words, novice states can influence international society and shape the international norm during the socialisation process. For example, the ‘ASEAN Way’ is a set of norms that regulate member states’ relationships within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It establishes a diplomatic and security culture characterised by informality, consultation, and dialogue, and consensus-building in decision-making processes (Caballero-Anthony). From its interaction with ASEAN, China has been socialised into the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Ba 157-159). Nevertheless, China’s relations with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also suggest that there exists a ‘feedback’ process between China and ARF which resulted in institutional changes in ARF to accommodate China’s response (Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way?” 291). For another example, while the Western powers generally promote the norm of ‘shared responsibility’ in global environment regimes, the emerging economies, such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), have responded to the normative engagement and proposed a ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ regime where the developing countries shoulder less international obligations. Similarly, the Western-led norm of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which justifies international humanitarian intervention, has received much resistance from the countries that only adhere to the conventional international rules regarding state sovereignty rights and non-intervention to domestic affairs. Conclusion International norms are shared expectations about what constitutes appropriate state behaviour. They are the ‘uniforms’ for individual states to wear when operating at the international level. States comply with international norms in order to affirm their preferred national identities as well as to gain social acceptance and reputation in the normative community. When the normative community is united and sizable, states tend to receive more social pressure to consistently wear these normative uniforms – be they the Geneva Conventions or nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, in the post-pandemic world where liberal values, such as individual rights and rule of law, face significant challenges and democracies are in decline, the future success of the global normative community may be at risk. Great Powers are especially responsible for the survival and sustainability of international norms. The United States under President Trump adopted a nationalist ‘America First’ security agenda: alienating traditional allies, befriending authoritarian regimes previously shunned, and rejecting multilateralism as the foundation of the post-war global order. While the West has been criticised of failing to live up to its declared values, and has suffered its own loss of confidence in the liberal model, the rising powers have offered their alternative version of the world system. Instead of merely adapting to the Western-led global norms, China has created new institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiatives, to promote its own preferred values, and has reshaped the global order where it deems the norms undesirable (Foot, “Chinese Power in a Changing World Order” 7). Great Power participation has reshaped the landscape of global normative community, and sadly not always in positive ways. Umberto Eco lamented the disappearance of the beauty of the past in his novel The Name of the Rose: ‘stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus’ ('yesterday’s rose endures in its name, we hold empty names'; Eco 538). If the international community does not want to witness an era where global norms and universal values are reduced to nominalist symbols, it must renew and reinvigorate its commitment to global values, such as human rights and democracy. It must consider wearing these uniforms again, properly. References Acharya, Amitav. “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localisation and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism.” International Organisations 58.2 (2004): 239-275. Acharya, Amitav. “Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States.” Asian Development Bank Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration 82 (June 2011). Ba, Alice D. “Who’s Socializing Who? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations.” The Pacific Review 19.2 (2006): 157-179. Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Caballero-Anthony, Mely. “The ASEAN Way and The Changing Security Environment: Navigating Challenges to Informality and Centrality.” International Politics, June 2022. Capie, David. “Localization as Resistance: The Contested Diffusion of Small Arms Norms in Southeast Asia.” Security Dialogue 36.6 (2008): 637–658. Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe.” International Studies Quarterly 43.1 (1999): 83-114. Chirac, Jacques. Statement by the President of the French Republic to the International Conference on ‘Biodiversity: Science and Governance’, UNESCO, 24-28 Jan. 2005. <https://cbd.int/kb/record/statement/9026?RecordType=statement>. Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis, Jr. “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of Intentional Rules and Norms.” International Studies Quarterly 40.4 (1996): 451-478. Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis, Jr. “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda.” International Studies Review 2.1 (2000): 65-87. Eco, Umberto. The Name of the Rose. London: Penguin, 2014. Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52.4 (1998): 887-917. Finnemore, Martha. “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy.” International Organization 47.4 (1993): 565-597. Florini, Ann. “The Evolution of International Norms.” International Studies Quarterly 40.3 (1996): 363-389. Foot, Rosemary. “Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State.” The China Journal 45 (2001): 1-19. ———. “Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State in a Changing World Order.” The Centre of Gravity Series, Australian National University, Feb. 2018. Gao, Xiang, et. al. “The Legal Recognition of Indigenous Interests in Japan and Taiwan.” Asia Pacific Law Review 24.1: 60-82. Glodgeier, James M., and Philip E. Tetlock. “Psychology and International Relations Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 67-92. Gold, Martin, and Elizabeth Douvan. A New Outline of Social Psychology. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1997. Hybel, Alex R. How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Ikenberry, Gilford J., and Charles A. Kupchan. “Socialization and Hegemonic Power.” International Organization 44.3 (1990): 283-315. Johnston, Alastair I. “The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum.” Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space. Eds. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. 287-324. ———. “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” International Studies Quarterly 45.4 (2001): 487–515. ———. Social States: China in International Institution, 1980-2000. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008. Kan, Naoto. Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan at the opening of the High Level Segment of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 27 Oct. 2010. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/kan/address101027.html>. Kelman, Herbert C. “Compliance, Identification and Internalisation: Three Processes of Attitude Change.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 2.1 (1958): 51-60. Long, Theodore E., and Jeffrey K. Hadden. “A Preconception of Socialization.” Sociological Theory 3.1 (1985): 39-49. Masood, Ehsan, et al. “COP27 Climate Talks: What Succeeded, What Failed and What’s Next.” Nature 29 Nov. 2022. <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-03807-0>. Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China. Shewu duoyangxing lvyue jianbao 生物多样性履约简报 [Brief of Implementing Convention on Biological Diversity] 4 (2003). Moreland, Richard L. “Social Categorization and the Assimilation of ‘New’ Group Members.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48.5 (1985): 1173-1190. Payne, Rodger A. “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction.” European Journal of International Relations 7.1 (2001): 37-61. Pu, Xiaoyu. “Socialisation as a Two-way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 5.4 (2012): 341-367. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The Convention on Biological Diversity: Year in Review 2011. 2011 <https://www.cbd.int/doc/reports/cbd-report-2011-en.pdf>. Secrity Council Report. "The Veto." 16 Dec. 2020. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php>. Thies, Cameron G. “Sense and Sensibility in the Study of State Socialisation: A Reply to Kai Alderson.” Review of International Studies 29.4 (2003): 543-550. United Nations. “Convention on Biological Diversity, Key International Instrument for Sustainable Development.” <https://www.un.org/en/observances/biological-diversity-day/convention>. Vidal, John, Allegra Stratton, and Suzanne Goldenberg. “Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure.” The Guardian, 19 Dec. 2009. <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal>.

For seven months in 1999/2000, six-year old Cuban Elián González was embroiled in a family feud plotted along rival national and ideological lines, and relayed televisually as soap opera across the planet. In Miami, apparitions of the Virgin Mary were reported after Elián’s arrival; adherents of Afro-Cuban santería similarly regarded Elián as divinely touched. In Cuba, Elián’s “kidnapping” briefly reinvigorated a torpid revolutionary project. He was hailed by Fidel Castro as the symbolic descendant of José Martí and Che Guevara, and of the patriotic rigour they embodied. Cubans massed to demand his return. In the U.S.A., Elián’s case was arbitrated at every level of the juridical system. The “Save Elián” campaign generated widespread debate about godless versus godly family values, the contours of the American Dream, and consumerist excess. By the end of 2000 Elián had generated the second largest volume of TV news coverage to that date in U.S. history, surpassed only by the O. J. Simpson case (Fasulo). After Fidel Castro, and perhaps the geriatric music ensemble manufactured by Ry Cooder, the Buena Vista Social Club, Elián became the most famous Cuban of our era. Elián also emerged as the unlikeliest of popular-cultural icons, the focus and subject of cyber-sites, books, films, talk-back radio programs, art exhibits, murals, statues, documentaries, a South Park episode, poetry, songs, t-shirts, posters, newspaper editorials in dozens of languages, demonstrations, speeches, political cartoons, letters, legal writs, U.S. Congress records, opinion polls, prayers, and, on both sides of the Florida Strait, museums consecrated in his memory. Confronted by Elián’s extraordinary renown and historical impact, John Carlos Rowe suggests that the Elián story confirms the need for a post-national and transdisciplinary American Studies, one whose practitioners “will have to be attentive to the strange intersections of politics, law, mass media, popular folklore, literary rhetoric, history, and economics that allow such events to be understood.” (204). I share Rowe’s reading of Elián’s story and the clear challenges it presents to analysis of “America,” to which I would add “Cuba” as well. But Elián’s story is also significant for the ways it challenges critical understandings of fame and its construction. No longer, to paraphrase Leo Braudy (566), definable as an accidental hostage of the mass-mediated eye, Elián’s fame has no certain relation to the child at its discursive centre. Elián’s story is not about an individuated, conscious, performing, desiring, and ambivalently rewarded ego. Elián was never what P. David Marshall calls “part of the public sphere, essentially an actor or, … a player” in it (19). The living/breathing Elián is absent from what I call the virtualizing drives that famously reproduced him. As a result of this virtualization, while one Elián now attends school in Cuba, many other Eliáns continue to populate myriad popular-cultural texts and to proliferate away from the states that tried to contain him. According to Jerry Everard, “States are above all cultural artefacts” that emerge, virtually, “as information produced by and through practices of signification,” as bits, bites, networks, and flows (7). All of us, he claims, reside in “virtual states,” in “legal fictions” based on the elusive and contested capacity to generate national identities in an imaginary bounded space (152). Cuba, the origin of Elián, is a virtual case in point. To augment Nicole Stenger’s definition of cyberspace, Cuba, like “Cyberspace, is like Oz — it is, we get there, but it has no location” (53). As a no-place, Cuba emerges in signifying terms as an illusion with the potential to produce and host Cubanness, as well as rival ideals of nation that can be accessed intact, at will, and ready for ideological deployment. Crude dichotomies of antagonism — Cuba/U.S.A., home/exile, democracy/communism, freedom/tyranny, North/South, godlessness/blessedness, consumption/want — characterize the hegemonic struggle over the Cuban nowhere. Split and splintered, hypersensitive and labyrinthine, guarded and hysterical, and always active elsewhere, the Cuban cultural artefact — an “atmospheric depression in history” (Stenger 56) — very much conforms to the logics that guide the appeal, and danger, of cyberspace. Cuba occupies an inexhaustible “ontological time … that can be reintegrated at any time” (Stenger 55), but it is always haunted by the prospect of ontological stalling and proliferation. The cyber-like struggle over reintegration, of course, evokes the Elián González affair, which began on 25 November 1999, when five-year old Elián set foot on U.S. soil, and ended on 28 June 2000, when Elián, age six, returned to Cuba with his father. Elián left one Cuba and found himself in another Cuba, in the U.S.A., each national claimant asserting virtuously that its other was a no-place and therefore illegitimate. For many exiles, Elián’s arrival in Miami confirmed that Castro’s Cuba is on the point of collapse and hence on the virtual verge of reintegration into the democratic fold as determined by the true upholders of the nation, the exile community. It was also argued that Elián’s biological father could never be the boy’s true father because he was a mere emasculated puppet of Castro himself. The Cuban state, then, had forfeited its claims to generate and host Cubanness. Succoured by this logic, the “Save Elián” campaign began, with organizations like the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) bankrolling protests, leaflet and poster production, and official “Elián” websites, providing financial assistance to and arranging employment for some of Elián’s Miami relatives, lobbying the U.S. Congress and the Florida legislature, and contributing funds to the legal challenges on behalf of Elián at state and federal levels. (Founded in 1981, the CANF is the largest and most powerful Cuban exile organization, and one that regards itself as the virtual government-in-waiting. CANF emerged with the backing of the Reagan administration and the C.I.A. as a “private sector initiative” to support U.S. efforts against its long-time ideological adversary across the Florida Strait [Arboleya 224-5].) While the “Save Elián” campaign failed, the result of a Cuban American misreading of public opinion and overestimation of the community’s lobbying power with the Clinton administration, the struggle continues in cyberspace. CANF.net.org registers its central role in this intense period with silence; but many of the “Save Elián” websites constructed after November 1999 continue to function as sad memento moris of Elián’s shipwreck in U.S. virtual space. (The CANF website does provide links to articles and opinion pieces about Elián from the U.S. media, but its own editorializing on the Elián affair has disappeared. Two keys to this silence were the election of George W. Bush, and the events of 11 Sep. 2001, which have enabled a revision of the Elián saga as a mere temporary setback on the Cuban-exile historical horizon. Indeed, since 9/11, the CANF website has altered the terms of its campaign against Castro, posting photos of Castro with Arab leaders and implicating him in a world-wide web of terrorism. Elián’s return to Cuba may thus be viewed retrospectively as an act that galvanized Cuban-exile support for the Republican Party and their disdain for the Democratic rival, and this support became pivotal in the Republican electoral victory in Florida and in the U.S.A. as a whole.) For many months after Elián’s return to Cuba, the official Liberty for Elián site, established in April 2000, was urging visitors to make a donation, volunteer for the Save Elián taskforce, send email petitions, and “invite a friend to help Elián.” (Since I last accessed “Liberty for Elián” in March 2004 it has become a gambling site.) Another site, Elian’s Home Page, still implores visitors to pray for Elián. Some of the links no longer function, and imperatives to “Click here” lead to that dead zone called “URL not found on this server.” A similar stalling of the exile aspirations invested in Elián is evident on most remaining Elián websites, official and unofficial, the latter including The Sad Saga of Elian Gonzalez, which exhorts “Cuban Exiles! Now You Can Save Elián!” In these sites, a U.S. resident Elián lives on as an archival curiosity, a sign of pathos, and a reminder of what was, for a time, a Cuban-exile PR disaster. If such cybersites confirm the shipwrecked coordinates of Elián’s fame, the “Save Elián” campaign also provided a focus for unrestrained criticism of the Cuban exile community’s imbrication in U.S. foreign policy initiatives and its embrace of American Dream logics. Within weeks of Elián’s arrival in Florida, cyberspace was hosting myriad Eliáns on sites unbeholden to Cuban-U.S. antagonisms, thus consolidating Elián’s function as a disputed icon of virtualized celebrity and focus for parody. A sense of this carnivalesque proliferation can be gained from the many doctored versions of the now iconic photograph of Elián’s seizure by the INS. Still posted, the jpegs and flashes — Elián and Michael Jackson, Elián and Homer Simpson, Elián and Darth Vader, among others (these and other doctored versions are archived on Hypercenter.com) — confirm the extraordinary domestication of Elián in local pop-cultural terms that also resonate as parodies of U.S. consumerist and voyeuristic excess. Indeed, the parodic responses to Elián’s fame set the virtual tone in cyberspace where ostensibly serious sites can themselves be approached as send ups. One example is Lois Rodden’s Astrodatabank, which, since early 2000, has asked visitors to assist in interpreting Elián’s astrological chart in order to confirm whether or not he will remain in the U.S.A. To this end the site provides Elián’s astro-biography and birth chart — a Sagittarius with a Virgo moon, Elián’s planetary alignments form a bucket — and conveys such information as “To the people of Little Havana [Miami], Elian has achieved mystical status as a ‘miracle child.’” (An aside: Elián and I share the same birthday.) Elián’s virtual reputation for divinely sanctioned “blessedness” within a Cuban exile-meets-American Dream typology provided Tom Tomorrow with the target in his 31 January 2000, cartoon, This Modern World, on Salon.com. Here, six-year old Arkansas resident Allen Consalis loses his mother on the New York subway. His relatives decide to take care of him since “New York has much more to offer him than Arkansas! I mean get real!” A custody battle ensues in which Allan’s heavily Arkansas-accented father requires translation, and the case inspires heated debate: “can we really condemn him to a life in Arkansas?” The cartoon ends with the relatives tempting Allan with the delights offered by the Disney Store, a sign of Elián’s contested insertion into an American Dreamscape that not only promises an endless supply of consumer goods but provides a purportedly safe venue for the alternative Cuban nation. The illusory virtuality of that nation also animates a futuristic scenario, written in Spanish by Camilo Hernández, and circulated via email in May 2000. In this text, Elián sparks a corporate battle between Firestone and Goodyear to claim credit for his inner-tubed survival. Cuban Americans regard Elián as the Messiah come to lead them to the promised land. His ability to walk on water is scientifically tested: he sinks and has to be rescued again. In the ensuing custody battle, Cuban state-run demonstrations allow mothers of lesbians and of children who fail maths to have their say on Elián. Andrew Lloyd Weber wins awards for “Elián the Musical,” and for the film version, Madonna plays the role of the dolphin that saved Elián. Laws are enacted to punish people who mispronounce “Elián” but these do not help Elián’s family. All legal avenues exhausted, the entire exile community moves to Canada, and then to North Dakota where a full-scale replica of Cuba has been built. Visa problems spark another migration; the exiles are welcomed by Israel, thus inspiring a new Intifada that impels their return to the U.S.A. Things settle down by 2014, when Elián, his wife and daughter celebrate his 21st birthday as guests of the Kennedys. The text ends in 2062, when the great-great-grandson of Ry Cooder encounters an elderly Elián in Wyoming, thus providing Elián with his second fifteen minutes of fame. Hernández’s text confirms the impatience with which the Cuban-exile community was regarded by other U.S. Latino sectors, and exemplifies the loss of control over Elián experienced by both sides in the righteous Cuban “moral crusade” to save or repatriate Elián (Fernández xv). (Many Chicanos, for example, were angered at Cuban-exile arguments that Elián should remain in the U.S.A. when, in 1999 alone, 8,000 Mexican children were repatriated to Mexico (Ramos 126), statistical confirmation of the favored status that Cubans enjoy, and Mexicans do not, vis-à-vis U.S. immigration policy. Tom Tomorrow’s cartoon and Camilo Hernández’s email text are part of what I call the “What-if?” sub-genre of Elián representations. Another example is “If Elián Gonzalez was Jewish,” archived on Lori’s Mishmash Humor page, in which Eliat Ginsburg is rescued after floating on a giant matzoh in the Florida Strait, and his Florida relatives fight to prevent his return to Israel, where “he had no freedom, no rights, no tennis lessons”.) Nonetheless, that “moral crusade” has continued in the Cuban state. During the custody battle, Elián was virtualized into a hero of national sovereignty, an embodied fix for a revolutionary project in strain due to the U.S. embargo, the collapse of Soviet socialism, and the symbolic threat posed by the virtual Cuban nation-in-waiting in Florida. Indeed, for the Castro regime, the exile wing of the national family is virtual precisely because it conveniently overlooks two facts: the continued survival of the Cuban state itself; and the exile community’s forty-plus-year slide into permanent U.S. residency as one migrant sector among many. Such rhetoric has not faded since Elián’s return. On December 5, 2003, Castro visited Cárdenas for Elián’s tenth birthday celebration and a quick tour of the Museo a la batalla de ideas (Museum for the Battle of Ideas), the museum dedicated to Elián’s “victory” over U.S. imperialism and opened by Castro on July 14, 2001. At Elián’s school Castro gave a speech in which he recalled the struggle to save “that little boy, whose absence caused everyone, and the whole people of Cuba, so much sorrow and such determination to struggle.” The conflation of Cuban state rhetoric and an Elián mnemonic in Cárdenas is repeated in Havana’s “Plaza de Elián,” or more formally Tribuna Anti-imperialista José Martí, where a statue of José Martí, the nineteenth-century Cuban nationalist, holds Elián in his arms while pointing to Florida. Meanwhile, in Little Havana, Miami, a sun-faded set of photographs and hand-painted signs, which insist God will save Elián yet, hang along the front fence of the house — now also a museum and site of pilgrimage — where Elián once lived in a state of siege. While Elián’s centrality in a struggle between virtuality and virtue continues on both sides of the Florida Strait, the Cuban nowhere could not contain Elián. During his U.S. sojourn many commentators noted that his travails were relayed in serial fashion to an international audience that also claimed intimate knowledge of the boy. Coming after the O.J. Simpson saga and the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, the Elián story confirmed journalist Rick Kushman’s identification of a ceaseless, restless U.S. media attention shift from one story to the next, generating an “übercoverage” that engulfs the country “in mini-hysteria” (Calvert 107). But In Elián’s case, the voyeuristic media-machine attained unprecedented intensity because it met and worked with the virtualities of the Cuban nowhere, part of it in the U.S.A. Thus, a transnational surfeit of Elián-narrative options was guaranteed for participants, audiences and commentators alike, wherever they resided. In Cuba, Elián was hailed as the child-hero of the Revolution. In Miami he was a savior sent by God, the proof supplied by the dolphins that saved him from sharks, and the Virgins who appeared in Little Havana after his arrival (De La Torre 3-5). Along the U.S.A.-Mexico border in 2000, Elián’s name was given to hundreds of Mexican babies whose parents thought the gesture would guarantee their sons a U.S. future. Day by day, Elián’s story was propelled across the globe by melodramatic plot devices familiar to viewers of soap opera: doubtful paternities; familial crimes; identity secrets and their revelation; conflicts of good over evil; the reuniting of long-lost relatives; and the operations of chance and its attendant “hand of Destiny, arcane and vaguely supernatural, transcending probability of doubt” (Welsh 22). Those devices were also favored by the amateur author, whose narratives confirm that the delirious parameters of cyberspace are easily matched in the worldly text. In Michael John’s self-published “history,” Betrayal of Elian Gonzalez, Elián is cast as the victim of a conspiracy traceable back to the hydra-headed monster of Castro-Clinton and the world media: “Elian’s case was MANIPULATED to achieve THEIR OVER-ALL AGENDA. Only time will bear that out” (143). His book is now out of print, and the last time I looked (August 2004) one copy was being offered on Amazon.com for US$186.30 (original price, $9.95). Guyana-born, Canadian-resident Frank Senauth’s eccentric novel, A Cry for Help: The Fantastic Adventures of Elian Gonzalez, joins his other ventures into vanity publishing: To Save the Titanic from Disaster I and II; To Save Flight 608 From Disaster; A Wish to Die – A Will to Live; A Time to Live, A Time to Die; and A Day of Terror: The Sagas of 11th September, 2001. In A Cry for Help, Rachel, a white witch and student of writing, travels back in time in order to save Elián’s mother and her fellow travelers from drowning in the Florida Strait. As Senauth says, “I was only able to write this dramatic story because of my gift for seeing things as they really are and sharing my mystic imagination with you the public” (25). As such texts confirm, Elián González is an aberrant addition to the traditional U.S.-sponsored celebrity roll-call. He had no ontological capacity to take advantage of, intervene in, comment on, or be known outside, the parallel narrative universe into which he was cast and remade. He was cast adrift as a mere proper name that impelled numerous authors to supply the boy with the biography he purportedly lacked. Resident of an “atmospheric depression in history” (Stenger 56), Elián was battled over by virtualized national rivals, mass-mediated, and laid bare for endless signification. Even before his return to Cuba, one commentator noted that Elián had been consumed, denied corporeality, and condemned to “live out his life in hyper-space” (Buzachero). That space includes the infamous episode of South Park from May 2000, in which Kenny, simulating Elián, is killed off as per the show’s episodic protocols. Symptomatic of Elián’s narrative dispersal, the Kenny-Elián simulation keeps on living and dying whenever the episode is re-broadcast on TV sets across the world. Appropriated and relocated to strange and estranging narrative terrain, one Elián now lives out his multiple existences in the Cuban-U.S. “atmosphere in history,” and the Elián icon continues to proliferate virtually anywhere. References Arboleya, Jesús. The Cuban Counter-Revolution. Trans. Rafael Betancourt. Research in International Studies, Latin America Series no. 33. Athens, OH: Ohio Center for International Studies, 2000. Braudy, Leo. The Frenzy of Renown: Fame and Its History. New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986. Buzachero, Chris. “Elian Gonzalez in Hyper-Space.” Ctheory.net 24 May 2000. 19 Aug. 2004: http://www.ctheory.net/text_file.asp?pick=222>. Calvert, Clay. Voyeur Nation: Media, Privacy, and Peering in Modern Culture. Boulder: Westview, 2000. Castro, Fidel. “Speech Given by Fidel Castro, at the Ceremony Marking the Birthday of Elian Gonzalez and the Fourth Anniversary of the Battle of Ideas, Held at ‘Marcello Salado’ Primary School in Cardenas, Matanzas on December 5, 2003.” 15 Aug. 2004 http://www.revolutionarycommunist.org.uk/fidel_castro3.htm>. Cuban American National Foundation. Official Website. 2004. 20 Aug. 2004 http://www.canf.org/2004/principal-ingles.htm>. De La Torre, Miguel A. La Lucha For Cuba: Religion and Politics on the Streets of Miami. Berkeley: U of California P, 2003. “Elian Jokes.” Hypercenter.com 2000. 19 Aug. 2004 http://www.hypercenter.com/jokes/elian/index.shtml>. “Elian’s Home Page.” 2000. 19 Aug. 2004 http://elian.8k.com>. Everard, Jerry. Virtual States: The Internet and the Boundaries of the Nation-State. London and New York, Routledge, 2000. Fernández, Damián J. Cuba and the Politics of Passion. Austin: U of Texas P, 2000. Hernández, Camilo. “Cronología de Elián.” E-mail. 2000. Received 6 May 2000. “If Elian Gonzalez Was Jewish.” Lori’s Mishmash Humor Page. 2000. 10 Aug. 2004 http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/6174/jokes/if-elian-was-jewish.htm>. John, Michael. Betrayal of Elian Gonzalez. MaxGo, 2000. “Liberty for Elián.” Official Save Elián Website 2000. June 2003 http://www.libertyforelian.org>. Marshall, P. David. Celebrity and Power: Fame in Contemporary Culture. Minneapolis and London: U of Minnesota P, 1997. Ramos, Jorge. La otra cara de América: Historias de los inmigrantes latinoamericanos que están cambiando a Estados Unidos. México, DF: Grijalbo, 2000. Rodden, Lois. “Elian Gonzalez.” Astrodatabank 2000. 20 Aug. 2004 http://www.astrodatabank.com/NM/GonzalezElian.htm>. Rowe, John Carlos. 2002. The New American Studies. Minneapolis and London: U of Minnesota P, 2002. “The Sad Saga of Elian Gonzalez.” July 2004. 19 Aug. 2004 http://www.revlu.com/Elian.html>. Senauth, Frank. A Cry for Help: The Fantastic Adventures of Elian Gonzalez. Victoria, Canada: Trafford, 2000. Stenger, Nicole. “Mind Is a Leaking Rainbow.” Cyberspace: First Steps. Ed. Michael Benedikt. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1991. 49-58. Welsh, Alexander. George Eliot and Blackmail. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Allatson, Paul. "The Virtualization of Elián González." M/C Journal 7.5 (2004). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0411/16-allatson.php>. APA Style Allatson, P. (Nov. 2004) "The Virtualization of Elián González," M/C Journal, 7(5). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0411/16-allatson.php>.

Introduction Children are not only born digital, they are fashioned toward a lifestyle that needs them to be digital all the time (Palfrey and Gasser). They click, tap, save, circulate, download, and upload the texts of their lives, their friends’ lives, and the anonymous lives of the people that surround them. They are socialised as Internet consumers ready to participate in digital services targeted to them as they age such as Snapchat, Instagram, and YouTube. But they are also fashioned as producers, whereby their lives are sold as content on these same markets. As commodities, the minutiae of their lives become the fodder for online circulation. Paradoxically, we also celebrate these digital behaviours as a means to express identity. Personal profile-building for adults is considered agency-building (Beer and Burrows), and as a consequence, we praise children for mimicking these acts of adult lifestyle. This article reflects on the Kids, Creative Storyworlds, and Wearables project, which involved an ethnographic study with five young children (ages 4-7), who were asked to share their autobiographical stories, creative self-narrations, and predictions about their future mediated lives (Atkins et al.). For this case study, we focus on commercialised forms of children’s automedia, and we compare discussions we had with 6-year old Cayden, a child we met in the study who expresses the desire to make himself famous online, with videos of Jacob, a child vlogger on YouTube’s Kinder Playtime, who clearly influences children like Cayden. We argue that child social influencers need consideration both as autobiographical agents and as child subjects requiring a sheltered approach to their online lives.Automedia Automedia is an emergent genre of autobiography (Smith and Watson Reading 190; “Virtually Me” 78). Broadcasting one’s life online takes many forms (Kennedy “Vulnerability”). Ümit Kennedy argues “Vlogging on YouTube is a contemporary form of autobiography in which individuals engage in a process of documenting their life on a daily or weekly basis and, in doing so, construct[ing] their identity online” (“Exploring”). Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson write that “visual and digital modes are projecting and circulating not just new subjects but new notions of subjectivity through the effects of automediality” with the result that “the archive of the self in time, in space and in relation expands and is fundamentally reorganized” (Reading 190). Emma Maguire addresses what online texts “tell us about cultural understandings of selfhood and what it means to communicate ‘real’ life through media” naming one tool, “automedia”. Further, Julie Rak calls on scholars “to rethink ‘life’ and ‘writing’ as automedia” to further “characterize the enactment of a personal life story in a new media environment.” We define automedia as a genre that involves the practices of creating, performing, sharing, circulating, and (at times) preserving one’s digital life narrative meant for multiple publics. Automedia revises identity formation, embodiment, or corporealities in acts of self-creation (Brophy and Hladki 4). Automedia also emphasizes circulation. As shared digital life texts now circulate through the behaviours of other human subjects, and automatically via algorithms in data assemblages, we contend that automediality currently involves a measure of relinquishing control over perpetually evolving mediatised environments. One cannot control how a shared life narrative will meet a public in the future, which is a revised way of thinking about autobiography. For the sake of this paper, we argue that children’s automedia ought to be considered a creative, autobiographical act, in order to afford child authors who create them the consideration they deserve as agents, now and in the future. Automedial practices often begin when children receive access to a device. The need for a distraction activity is often the reason parents hand a young child a smartphone, iPad, or even a wearable camera (Nansen). Mirroring the lives of parents, children aspire to share representations of their own personal lives in pursuit of social capital. They are often encouraged to use technologies and apps as adults do–to track aspects of self, broadcast life stories and eventually “live share” them—effectively creating, performing, sharing, and at times, seeking to preserve a public life narrative. With this practice, society inculcates children into spheres of device ubiquity, “socializing them to a future digital lifestyle that will involve always carrying a computer in some form” (Atkins et al. 49). Consequently, their representations become inculcated in larger media assemblages. Writing about toddlers, Nansen describes how the “archiving, circulation and reception of these images speaks to larger assemblages of media in which software protocols and algorithms are increasingly embedded in and help to configure everyday life (e.g. Chun; Gillespie), including young children’s media lives (Ito)” (Nansen). Children, like adult citizens, are increasingly faced with choices “not structured by their own preferences but by the economic imperatives of the private corporations that have recently come to dominate the internet” (Andrejevic). Recent studies have shown that for children and youth in the digital age, Internet fame, often characterized by brand endorsements, is a major aspiration (Uhls and Greenfield, 2). However, despite the ambition to participate as celebrity digital selves, children are also mired in the calls to shield them from exposure to screens through institutions that label these activities detrimental. In many countries, digital “protections” are outlined by privacy commissioners and federal or provincial/state statutes, (e.g. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada). Consequently, children are often caught in a paradox that defines them either as literate digital agents able to compose or participate with their online selves, or as subjectified wards caught up in commercial practices that exploit their lives for commercial gain.Kids, Creative Storyworlds and Wearables ProjectBoth academic and popular cultural critics continually discuss the future but rarely directly engage the people who will be empowered (or subjugated) by it as young adults in twenty years. To address children’s lack of agency in these discussions, we launched the Kids, Creative Storyworlds and Wearables project to bring children into a dialogue about their own digital futures. Much has been written on childhood agency and participation in culture and mediated culture from the discipline of sociology (James and James; Jenks; Jenkins). In previous work, we addressed the perspective of child autobiographical feature filmmakers to explore issues of creative agency and consent when adult gatekeepers facilitate children in film production (Pedersen and Aspevig “My Eyes”; Pedersen and Aspevig “Swept”). Drawing on that previous work, this project concentrates on children’s automediated lives and the many unique concerns that materialize with digital identity-building. Children are categorised as a vulnerable demographic group necessitating special policy and legislation, but the lives they project as children will eventually become subsumed in their own adult lives, which will almost certainly be treated and mediated in a much different manner in the future. We focused on this landscape, and sought to query the children on their futures, also considering the issues that arise when adult gatekeepers get involved with child social media influencers. In the Storyworlds ethnographic study, children were given a wearable toy, a Vtech smartwatch called Kidizoom, to use over a month’s timeframe to serve as a focal point for ethnographic conversations. The Kidizoom watch enables children to take photos and videos, which are uploaded to a web interface. Before we gave them the tech, we asked them questions about their lives, including What are machines going to be like in the future? Can you imagine yourself wearing a certain kind of computer? Can you tell/draw a story about that? If you could wear a computer that gave you a super power, what would it be? Can you use your imagination to think of a person in a story who would use technology? In answering, many of them drew autobiographical drawings of technical inventions, and cast themselves in the images. We were particularly struck by the comments made by one participant, Cayden (pseudonym), a 6-year-old boy, and the stories he told us about himself and his aspirations. He expressed the desire to host a YouTube channel about his life, his activities, and the wearable technologies his family already owned (e.g. a GroPro camera) and the one we gave him, the Kidizoom smartwatch. He talked about how he would be proud to publically broadcast his own videos on YouTube, and about the role he had been allowed to play in the making of videos about his life (that were not broadcast). To contextualize Cayden’s commentary and his automedial aspirations, we extended our study to explore child social media influencers who broadcast components of their personal lives for the deliberate purpose of popularity and the financial gain of their parents.We selected the videos of Jacob, a child vlogger because we judged them to be representative of the kinds that Cayden watched. Jacob reviews toys through “unboxing videos,” a genre in which a child tells an online audience her or his personal experiences using new toys in regular, short videos on a social media site. Jacob appears on a YouTube channel called Kinder Playtime, which appears to be a parent-run channel that states that, “We enjoy doing these things while playing with our kids: Jacob, Emily, and Chloe” (see Figure 1). In one particular video, Jacob reviews the Kidizoom watch, serving as a child influencer for the product. By understanding Jacob’s performance as agent-driven automedia, as well as being a commercialised, mediatised form of advertising, we get a clearer picture of how the children in the study are coming to terms with their own digital selfhood and the realisation that circulated, life-exposing videos are the expectation in this context.Children are implicated in a range of ways through “family” influencer and toy unboxing videos, which are emergent entertainment industries (Abidin 1; Nansen and Nicoll; Craig and Cunningham 77). In particular, unboxing videos do impact child viewers, especially when children host them. Jackie Marsh emphasizes the digital literacy practices at play here that co-construct viewers as “cyberflâneur[s]” and she states that “this mode of cultural transmission is a growing feature of online practices for this age group” (369). Her stress, however, is on how the child viewer enjoys “the vicarious pleasure he or she may get from viewing the playing of another child with the toy” (376). Marsh writes that her study subject, a child called “Gareth”, “was not interested in being made visible to EvanHD [a child celebrity social media influencer] or other online peers, but was content to consume” the unboxing videos. The concept of the cyberflâneur, then, is fitting as a mediatising co-constituting process of identity-building within discourses of consumerism. However, in our study, the children, and especially Cayden, also expressed the desire to create, host, and circulate their own videos that broadcast their lives, also demonstrating awareness that videos are valorised in their social circles. Child viewers watch famous children perform consumer-identities to create an aura of influence, but viewers simultaneously aspire to become influencers using automedial performances, in essence, becoming products, themselves. Jacob, Automedial Subjects and Social Media InfluencersJacob is a vlogger on YouTube whose videos can garner millions of views, suggesting that he is also an influencer. In one video, he appears to be around the age of six as he proudly sits with folded hands, bright eyes, and a beaming, but partly toothless smile (see Figure 2). He says, “Welcome to Kinder Playtime! Today we have the Kidi Zoom Smartwatch DX. It’s from VTech” (Kinder Playtime). We see the Kidi Zoom unboxed and then depicted in stylized animations amid snippets of Jacob’s smiling face. The voice and hands of a faceless parent guide Jacob as he uses his new wearable toy. We listen to both parent and child describe numerous features for recording and enhancing the wearer’s daily habits (e.g. calculator, calendar, fitness games), and his dad tells him it has a pedometer “which tracks your steps” (Kinder Playtime). But the watch is also used by Jacob to mediate himself and his world. We see that Jacob takes pictures of himself on the tiny watch screen as he acts silly for the camera. He also uses the watch to take personal videos of his mother and sister in his home. The video ends with his father mentioning bedtime, which prompts a “thank you” to VTech for giving him the watch, and a cheerful “Bye!” from Jacob (Kinder Playtime). Figure 1: Screenshot of Kinder Playtime YouTube channel, About page Figure 2: Screenshot of “Jacob,” a child vlogger at Kinder Playtime We chose Jacob for three reasons. First, he is the same age as the children in the Storyworlds study. Second, he reviews the smart watch artifact that we gave to the study children, so there was a common use of automedia technology. Third, Jacob’s parents were involved with his broadcasts, and we wanted to work within the boundaries of parent-sanctioned practices. However, we also felt that his playful approach was a good example of how social media influence overlaps with automediality. Jacob is a labourer trading his public self-representations in exchange for free products and revenue earned through the monetisation of his content on YouTube. It appears that much of what Jacob says is scripted, particularly the promotional statements, like, “Today we have the Kidizoom Smartwatch DX. It’s from VTech. It’s the smartest watch for kids” (Kinder Playtime). Importantly, as an automedial subject Jacob reveals aspects of his self and his identity, in the manner of many child vloggers on public social media sites. His product reviews are contextualised within a commoditised space that provides him a means for the public performance of his self, which, via YouTube, has the potential to reach an enormous audience. YouTube claims to have “over a billion users—almost one-third of all people on the Internet—and every day people watch hundreds of millions of hours on YouTube and generate billions of views” (YouTube). Significantly, he is not only filmed by others, Jacob is also a creative practitioner, as Cayden aspired to become. Jacob uses high-tech toys, in this case, a new wearable technology for self-compositions (the smart watch), to record himself, friends, family or simply the goings-on around him. Strapped to his wrist, the watch toy lets him play at being watched, at being quantified and at recording the life stories of others, or constructing automediated creations for himself, which he may upload to numerous social media sites. This is the start of his online automediated life, which will be increasingly under his ownership as he ages. To greater or lesser degrees, he will later be able to curate, add to, and remediate his body of automedia, including his digital past. Kennedy points out that “people are using YouTube as a transformative tool, and mirror, to document, construct, and present their identity online” (“Exploring”). Her focus is on adult vloggers who consent to their activities. Jacob’s automedia is constructed collaboratively with his parents, and it is unclear how much awareness he has of himself as an automedia creator. However, if we don’t afford Jacob the same consideration as we afford adult autobiographers, that the depiction of his life is his own, we will reduce his identity performance to pure artifice or advertisement. The questions Jacob’s videos raise around agency, consent, and creativity are important here. Sidonie Smith asks “Can there be a free, agentic space; and if so, where in the world can it be found?” (Manifesto 188). How much agency does Jacob have? Is there a liberating aspect in the act of putting personal technology into the hands of a child who can record his life, himself? And finally, how would an adult Jacob feel about his childhood self advertising these products online? Is this really automediality if Jacob does not fully understand what it means to publicly tell a mediated life story?These queries lead to concerns over child social media influence with regard to legal protection, marketing ethics, and user consent. The rise of “fan marketing” presents a nexus of stealth marketing to children by other children. Stealth marketing involves participants, in this case, fans, who do not know they are involved in an advertising scheme. For instance, the popular Minecon Minecraft conference event sessions have pushed their audience to develop the skills to become advocates and advertisers of their products, for example by showing audiences how to build a YouTube channel and sharing tips for growing a community. Targeting children in marketing ploys seems insidious. Marketing analyst Sandy Fleisher describes the value of outsourcing marketing to fan labourers:while Grand Theft Auto spent $120 million on marketing its latest release, Minecraft fans are being taught how to create and market promotional content themselves. One [example] is Minecraft YouTuber, SkydoesMinecraft. His nearly 7 million strong YouTube army, almost as big as Justin Bieber’s, means his daily videos enjoy a lot of views; 1,419,734,267 to be precise. While concerns about meaningful consent that practices like this raise have led some government bodies, and consumer and child protection groups to advocate restrictions for children, other critics have questioned the limits placed on children’s free expression by such restrictions. Tech commentator Larry Magid has written that, “In the interest of protecting children, we sometimes deny them the right to access material and express themselves.” Meghan M. Sweeney notes that “the surge in collaborative web models and the emphasis on interactivity—frequently termed Web 2.0—has meant that children are not merely targets of global media organizations” but have “multiple opportunities to be active, critical, and resistant producers”...and ”may be active agents in the production and dissemination of information” (68). Nevertheless, writes Sweeney, “corporate entities can have restrictive effects on consumers” (68), by for example, limiting imaginative play to the choices offered on a Disney website, or limiting imaginative topics to commercial products (toys, video games etc), as in YouTube review videos. Automedia is an important site from which to consider young children’s online practices in public spheres. Jacob’s performance is indeed meant to influence the choice to buy a toy, but it is also meant to influence others in knowing Jacob as an identity. He means to share and circulate his self. Julie Rak recalls Paul John Eakin’s claims about life-writing that the “process does not even occur at the level of writing, but at the level of living, so that identity formation is the result of narrative-building.” We view Jacob’s performance along these lines. Kinder Playtime offers him a constrained, parent-sanctioned (albeit commercialised) space for role-playing, a practice bound up with identity-formation in the life of most children. To think through the legality of recognising Jacob’s automedial content as his life, Rak is also useful: “In Eakin’s work in particular, we can see evidence of John Locke’s contention that identity is the expression of consciousness which is continuous over time, but that identity is also a product, one’s own property which is a legal entity”. We have argued that children are often caught in the paradox that defines them either as literate digital creators composing and circulating their online selves or as subjectified personas caught up in commercial advertising practices that use their lives for commercial gain. However, through close observation of individual children, one who we met and questioned in our study, Cayden, the other who we met through his mediated, commercialized, and circulated online persona, Jacob, we argue that child social influencers need consideration as autobiographical agents expressing themselves through automediality. As children create, edit, and grow digital traces of their lives and selves, how these texts are framed becomes increasingly important, in part because their future adult selves have such a stake in the matter: they are being formed through automedia. Moreover, these children’s coming of age may bring legal questions about the ownership of their automedial products such as YouTube videos, an enduring legacy they are leaving behind for their adult selves. Crucially, if we reduce identity performances such as unboxing, toy review videos, and other forms of children’s fan marketing to pure advertisement, we cannot afford Jacob and other child influencers the agency that their self representation is legally and artistically their own.ReferencesAbidin, Crystal. “#familygoals: Family Influencers, Calibrated Amateurism, and Justifying Young Digital Labor.” Social Media + Society 3.2 (2017): 1-15.Andrejevic, Mark. “Privacy, Exploitation, and the Digital Enclosure.” Amsterdam Law Forum 1.4 (2009). <http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/94/168>.Atkins, Bridgette, Isabel Pedersen, Shirley Van Nuland, and Samantha Reid. “A Glimpse into the Kids, Creative Storyworlds and Wearables Project: A Work-in-Progress.” ICET 60th World Assembly: Teachers for a Better World: Creating Conditions for Quality Education – Pedagogy, Policy and Professionalism. 2017. 49-60.Beer, David, and Roger Burrows. “Popular Culture, Digital Archives and the New Social Life of Data.” Theory, Culture & Society 30.4 (2013): 47–71.Brophy, Sarah, and Janice Hladki. Introduction. Pedagogy, Image Practices, and Contested Corporealities. Eds. Sarah Brophy and Janice Hladki. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 1-6.Craig, David, and Stuart Cunningham. “Toy Unboxing: Living in a(n Unregulated) Material World.” Media International Australia 163.1 (2017): 77-86.Fleischer, Sandy. “Watch Out for That Creeper: What Minecraft Teaches Us about Marketing.” Digital Marketing Magazine. 30 May 2014. <http://digitalmarketingmagazine.co.uk/articles/watch-out-for-that-creeper-what-minecraft-teaches-us-about-marketing>.James, Allison, and Adrian James. Key Concepts in Childhood Studies. London: Sage, 2012.Jenkins, Henry. The Childhood Reader. New York: NYU P, 1998.Jenks, Chris. Childhood. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2015.Kennedy, Ümit. "Exploring YouTube as a Transformative Tool in the 'The Power of MAKEUP!' Movement." M/C Journal 19.4 (2016). <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/1127>.———. “The Vulnerability of Contemporary Digital Autobiography” a/b: Auto/Biography Studies 32.2 (2017): 409-411.Kinder Playtime. “VTech Kidizoom Smart Watch DX Review by Kinder Playtime.” YouTube, 4 Nov. 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JaxCSjwZjcA&t=28s>.Magid, Larry. “Protecting Children Online Needs to Allow for Their Right to Free Speech.” ConnectSafely 29 Aug. 2014. <http://www.connectsafely.org/protecting-children-online-needs-to-allow-for-their-right-to-free-speech/>.Maguire, Emma. “Home, About, Shop, Contact: Constructing an Authorial Persona via the Author Website.” M/C Journal 17.3 (2014). <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/821>.Marsh, Jackie. “‘Unboxing’ Videos: Co-construction of the Child as Cyberflâneur.” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 37.3 (2016): 369-380.Nansen, Bjorn. “Accidental, Assisted, Automated: An Emerging Repertoire of Infant Mobile Media Techniques.” M/C Journal 18.5 (2015). <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/1026>.———, and Benjamin Nicoll. “Toy Unboxing Videos and the Mimetic Production of Play.” Paper presented at the 18th Annual Conference of Internet Researchers (AoIR), Tartu, Estonia. 2017.Palfrey, John, and Urs Gasser. Born Digital: How Children Grow Up in a Digital Age. New York: Basic Books, 2016.Pedersen, Isabel, and Kristen Aspevig. “‘My Eyes Ended Up at My Fingertips, My Ears, My Nose, My Mouth’: Antoine, Autobiographical Documentary, and the Cinematic Depiction of a Blind Child Subject.” Biography: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly 34.4 (2011).Pedersen, Isabel, and Kristen Aspevig. “‘Swept to the Sidelines and Forgotten’: Cultural Exclusion, Blind Persons’ Participation, and International Film Festivals.” Canadian Journal of Disability Studies 3.3 (2014): 29-52.Rak, Julie. “First Person? Life Writing versus Automedia.” International Association for Biography and Autobiography Europe (IABA Europe). Vienna, Austria. 30 Oct. – 3 Nov. 2013.Smith, Sidonie. “The Autobiographical Manifesto.” Ed. Shirely Neuman. Autobiography and Questions of Gender. London: Frank Cass, 1991.———, and Julia Watson. Reading Autobiography. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010.———. “Virtually Me: A Toolbox about Online Self-Presentation.” Identity Technologies: Constructing the Self Online. Eds. Anna Poletti and Julie Rak. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 2014. 70-95.Sweeney, Meghan. “‘Where Happily Ever After Happens Every Day’: Disney's Official Princess Website and the Commodification of Play.” Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 3.2 (2011): 66-87.Uhls, Yalda, and Particia Greenfield. “The Value of Fame: Preadolescent Perceptions of Popular Media and Their Relationship to Future Aspirations.” Developmental Psychology 48.2 (2012): 315-326.YouTube. “YouTube for Press.” 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/press/>.