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1
Powell, Stephen R., et Adrian Florea. « Introducing the Armed Nonstate Actor Rivalry Dataset (ANARD) ». Civil Wars 23, no 2 (29 mars 2021) : 177–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2021.1883334.
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Wrange, Pål. « Does Who Matter ? Legal Authority and the Use of Military Violence ». Ethics & ; International Affairs 31, no 2 (2017) : 191–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679417000077.
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What does authority mean under international law? There are various actors with different forms of authority, but no overarching concept of what characteristic endows an actor with authority, and even less of a coherent conception of legitimacy as a requirement for such authority. In fact, international law recognizes different authorities for different causes and different contexts, allocated to different actors, who base their authority on different characteristics (state legitimacy, representativity, military power, control). After disaggregating the concept of authority and outlining some of the consequences that follow from each type, this article highlights a number of different actors and describes the various authorities each has under international law. For instance, under jus in bello, nonstate actors can create a state of armed conflict in which they can often continue to use military means without legal sanction. While jus ad bellum may still in principle require legitimacy (in the formal sense of being a state), current jus in bello covers a range of non-state actors. Thus, from a practical point of view, the jus in bello regulations undermine any jus ad bellum requirement of legitimate authority.
3
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Simon Hug, Livia Isabella Schubiger et Julian Wucherpfennig. « International Conventions and Nonstate Actors ». Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no 2 (7 juin 2016) : 346–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002716650924.
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Whether international humanitarian norms are respected during and after civil conflict depends on the behavior of both governments and nonstate actors (NSAs). However, international conventions on the protection of civilians generally do not address NSAs, as such conventions are open only to the representatives of states. In a pioneering initiative, the nongovernmental organization Geneva Call has started to address this problem by soliciting NSAs to sign “deeds of commitment” to ban particular activities violating humanitarian norms. Focusing on the case of antipersonnel mines, we examine why NSAs would choose to sign conventions that limit their autonomy, and whether such conventions can change the behavior of governments and nonstate armed groups. We propose a game-theoretic model of how the interaction between governments and NSAs shape their incentives to commit to and comply with international humanitarian norms. Our empirical evidence highlights the importance of these interdependencies between governments and NSAs in the realm of humanitarian engagements.
4
Larratt-Smith, Charles. « Navigating Formal and Informal Processes : Civic Organizations, Armed Nonstate Actors, and Nested Governance in Colombia ». Latin American Politics and Society 62, no 2 (20 mars 2020) : 75–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lap.2019.61.
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ABSTRACTDespite the recent surge of scholarship on the role that civic organizations play in armed conflicts and postconflict settings, there is little consensus on how they interact with armed nonstate actors. This article examines how disparate armed nonstate actors can co-opt and manage preexisting civic organizations, and even create new ones, to embed themselves in civilian communities and perform governance functions while simultaneously advancing their ideological agendas. Employing a comparative historical analysis between two armed nonstate units in Colombia, one from a Marxist insurgent group and the other from a counterinsurgent paramilitary organization, the study demonstrates that regardless of their different ideological motivations, regional settings, and repertoires of violence, these actors could navigate formal processes related to legal economies, electoral contests, and bureaucratic-administrative institutions, and informal processes tied to illicit rackets and territorial and population control, more efficiently through their skilled management of local civic organizations.
5
Krähenmann, Sandra. « The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law, Terrorism and the “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” Regime ». Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 112 (2018) : 307–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/amp.2019.26.
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There seems to be a natural connection between armed conflict and terrorism: both involve acts of violence by nonstate armed actors. The acts of armed groups during armed conflicts are frequently labeled as acts of terrorism. Similarly, both international humanitarian law (IHL) and the international legal regime governing terrorism address acts of violence committed by nonstate armed actors. Yet, these superficial similarities obscure the significant conceptual differences between acts of violence in armed conflicts and those outside armed conflicts as well as the differences in the legal regimes governing them. Before turning to an analysis of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2178 (2014), it is necessary to briefly explain how IHL addresses acts of terrorism, followed by a brief description of the international treaty regime governing terrorism, including how this regime regulates its relationship with IHL.
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Wilmshurst, Elizabeth, et Michael Wood. « Self-Defense Against Nonstate Actors : Reflections on the “Bethlehem Principles” ». American Journal of International Law 107, no 2 (avril 2013) : 390–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.2.0390.
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Daniel Bethlehem has set down sixteen principles relevant to the scope of a state’s right of self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate actors “with the intention of stimulating a wider debate.” While these principles “are published under [the author’s] responsibility alone,” they have “nonetheless been informed by detailed discussions over recent years with foreign ministry, defense ministry, and military legal advisers from a number of states who have operational experience in these matters.”
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Bethlehem, Daniel. « Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack By Nonstate Actors ». American Journal of International Law 106, no 4 (octobre 2012) : 770–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.106.4.0769.
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There has been an ongoing debate over recent years about the scope of a state’s right of selfdefense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate actors. The debate predates the Al Qaeda attacks against the World Trade Center and elsewhere in the United States on September 11,2001, but those events sharpened its focus and gave it greater operational urgency. While an important strand of the debate has taken place in academic journals and public forums, there has been another strand, largely away from the public gaze, within governments and between them, about what the appropriate principles are, and ought to be, in respect of such conduct. Insofar as these discussions have informed the practice of states and their appreciations of legality, they carry particular weight, being material both to the crystallization and development of customary international law and to the interpretation of treaties.
8
Tladi, Dire. « The Nonconsenting Innocent State : The Problem with Bethlehem’s Principle 12 ». American Journal of International Law 107, no 3 (juillet 2013) : 570–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.3.0570.
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In a recent issue of this Journal, Daniel Bethlehem proposed a set of principles on the scope of a state’s right of self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate actors. In response, this essay seeks to assess Bethlehem’s proposition in principle 12 that a state may use force against nonstate actors on the territory of another state without the consent of the territorial state when the territorial state is not responsible for the initial attack and when the attack cannot be imputed to the territorial state. This description might be termed the non-consenting innocent state problem.
9
Hmoud, Mahmoud. « Are New Principles Really Needed ? The Potential of the Established Distinction Between Responsibility for Attacks by Nonstate Actors and the Law of Self-Defense ». American Journal of International Law 107, no 3 (juillet 2013) : 576–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.3.0576.
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Daniel Bethlehem’s note on self-defense principles is intended to stimulate debate on one of the most contentious issues facing the international community today, namely, the legal response to imminent or actual terrorist attacks by nonstate actors. The note contains a set of principles that are sensitive to the practical realities of the circumstances that it addresses. But it is also intended to take up a legal policy matter—to create or amend principles of international law related to the use of armed force in dealing with threats from nonstate actors. To create or amend these principles, there must be clear evidence and sufficient state practice, or at least opinio juris, pointing toward the change of existing rules or the creation of new rules to “fill the gap.” The whole balance in international law among the various rights, obligations, and interests of international actors will be compromised if the notion of self-defense is to be expanded beyond its legitimate limitations. As illustrated below by some basic examples drawn from the existing law of self-defense, there is sufficient flexibility in the current legal order to allow for the lawful exercise of self-defense in response to most situations of armed terrorist attacks.
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Bellinger, John B., et Vijay M. Padmanabhan. « Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts : Four Challenges for The Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law ». American Journal of International Law 105, no 2 (avril 2011) : 201–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.105.2.0201.
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In September 2010, President Jakob Kellenberger of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) summarized the conclusions of a two-year, internal ICRC study of changes that have occurred in the nature of armed conflict since the signing of the Geneva Conventions in 1949, and he also suggested how international humanitarian law (IHL) should respond to those changes. In a previous address marking the sixtieth anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, Kellenberger had observed that in the place of traditional conflicts between state-sponsored armies on a battlefield, modern conflicts frequently involve nonstate actors, such as terrorist groups—a development that has blurred the line between civilians and combatants, and created challenges for IHL. The ICRC study concluded that IHL generally provides a suitable legal framework for regulating armed conflict.
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Manekin, Devorah, et Reed M. Wood. « Framing the Narrative : Female Fighters, External Audience Attitudes, and Transnational Support for Armed Rebellions ». Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no 9 (26 mars 2020) : 1638–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002720912823.
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Female combatants play a central role in rebel efforts to cultivate and disseminate positive narratives regarding the movement and its political goals. Yet, the effectiveness of such strategies in shaping audience attitudes or generating tangible benefits for the group remains unclear. We propose and test a theory regarding the channels through which female fighters advance rebel goals. We argue that female fighters positively influence audience attitudes toward rebel groups by strengthening observers’ beliefs about their legitimacy and their decision to use armed tactics. We further contend that these effects directly help them secure support from transnational nonstate actors and indirectly promote state support. We assess our arguments by combining a novel survey experiment in two countries with analyses of new cross-national data on female combatants and information about transnational support for rebels. The empirical results support our arguments and demonstrate the impact of gender framing on rebel efforts to secure support.
12
Fazal, Tanisha M. « Rebellion, War Aims & ; the Laws of War ». Daedalus 146, no 1 (janvier 2017) : 71–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00423.
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Most wars today are civil wars, but we have little understanding of the conditions under which rebel groups might comply with the laws of war. i ask three questions in this essay: What do the laws of war require of rebels, or armed nonstate actors (ansas)? To what extent are rebels aware of the laws of war? Under what conditions do rebel groups comply with international humanitarian law? i argue that the war aims of rebel groups are key to understanding their relationship with the laws of war. In particular, secessionist rebel groups – those that seek a new, independent state – are especially likely to comply with the laws of war as a means to signal their capacity and willingness to be good citizens of the international community to which they seek admission.
13
Pomerance, Michla. « The ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial ». American Journal of International Law 99, no 1 (janvier 2005) : 26–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3246087.
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It is hardly surprising that the controversial advisor)’ opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the Israeli security fence raised serious concerns in many quarters, on multiple grounds. Most prominently, as some of the judges and numerous commentators have noted, the restriction of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to attacks by “states” is unwarranted on the basis of the text. It is also, of course, illogical in an era when the worldwide terrorist threats stem primarily from nonstate actors. Additionally, in the current case, while the Court assimilated “Palestine” to a state for the purpose of granting it certain rights (including procedural rights before the Court), the ICJ made no corresponding acknowledgment of Palestine’s obligation to refrain from engaging in an armed attack. This, as Judge Rosalyn Higgins recognized, was “formalism of an unevenhanded sort.”
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BLAIR, ROBERT A., et PABLO KALMANOVITZ. « On the Rights of Warlords : Legitimate Authority and Basic Protection in War-Torn Societies ». American Political Science Review 110, no 3 (août 2016) : 428–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055416000423.
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This article examines the legitimacy of the use of force by armed nonstate actors resisting the imposition of state rule over territories they control. We focus on the rights of warlords: subnational strongmen who seek autonomy within geographically demarcated territories, but not secession or control of the state itself. We argue that behind the resistance to state-building lies a twofold question of legitimate authority: the authority of states to consolidate power within their own internationally recognized borders and the authority of warlords to resist that expansion, by force if necessary, when it threatens social order and the protection of basic rights. This article draws on just war theory to develop a set of conditions under which such resistance may be justified, explores the argument's practical implications for state-building under the tutelage of third parties (e.g., the United Nations), and demonstrates its empirical relevance through an application to Afghanistan.
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Akinola, Adeoye O., et Ufo Okeke Uzodike. « Ubuntu and the Quest for Conflict Resolution in Africa ». Journal of Black Studies 49, no 2 (28 octobre 2017) : 91–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021934717736186.
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Many postcolonial African states have experienced violent conflicts, prompting the quest for viable approaches to conflict resolution and peace-building. Certain groups’ desire to control power and resources at the expense of others lies at the heart of the racism, civil wars, armed insurrections, terrorism, ethnic conflict, genocide, xenophobia, and intracommunity and domestic conflict prevalent in Africa, particularly in countries that experienced prolonged foreign domination. The quest for peace and security led to the resurgence of Ubuntu, an African humanist ideology, as an indigenous approach to conflict resolution and peace-building. This article explores the place of Ubuntu in the continent’s peace and security projects. Despite the utility of Ubuntu’s principles in a few postconflict societies, the article highlights the difficulties involved in its adoption by state institutions, mainly due to the complex interactions exemplified by the modern state. However, adherence to the principles of Ubuntu by state and nonstate actors would drastically reduce threats to peace and security in Africa.
16
Andreas, Peter. « Drugs and War : What Is the Relationship ? » Annual Review of Political Science 22, no 1 (11 mai 2019) : 57–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051017-103748.
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What is the relationship between psychoactive drugs and war? This review article identifies and traces five key dimensions of this relationship: war while on drugs, war for drugs, war through drugs, war against drugs, and drugs after war. The review provides empirical illustrations across times, places, and drugs to demonstrate the importance of each of these dimensions. Political scientists and other scholars have typically either ignored the drugs–war relationship or focused on only one dimension. The common tendency is to privilege illegal drugs such as cocaine and heroin in the contemporary era over the historical centrality of legal drugs such as tobacco and alcohol in relation to armed conflict. Placing both history and a wider range of drugs (legal and illegal) front and center in the analysis provides a corrective that allows for a fuller and richer understanding of the multiple linkages between psychoactive substances and warfare. It also suggests that as a counterbalance to contemporary accounts stressing the growing threat posed by drug-financed violent nonstate actors, we should recognize the many ways in which the centuries-old nexus between drugs and war has also been about statecraft and the pursuit of the state's strategic objectives.
17
Florea, Adrian. « Rebel governance in de facto states ». European Journal of International Relations 26, no 4 (6 mai 2020) : 1004–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066120919481.
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De facto states, such as Somaliland (Somalia), are unrecognized separatist enclaves that display characteristics of statehood but lack an international legal status. To acquire domestic and external legitimacy, these actors engage in a wide range of governance practices: they set up military and police forces; executive, legislative, and judicial branches; hospitals; schools; banks; or social security networks. In spite of the obvious gains that can be accrued through the establishment of a complex governance architecture, de facto states exhibit great variation in the range of statelike institutions that they build: some, like Luhansk People’s Republic (Ukraine), put together a rudimentary governance apparatus, while others, like Transnistria (Moldova), manage to construct a complex system of rule. What explains the variation in governance practices across these separatist enclaves? Using original data on governance institutions across all de facto states (1945–2016), this study offers an empirical examination of the key factors that shape separatists’ incentives to supply governance. The findings reveal that de facto state separatists are less likely to provide governance when they have access to lootable mineral resources but are more likely to do so when they receive external military support, when peacekeepers are present, when they have access to relatively immobile assets, when they adopt a Marxist ideology, and when they control the territory for a long time. The findings help us better understand the conditions under which armed nonstate actors supplant sovereign states as de facto authorities and successfully institutionalize their rule.
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Johnson, James Turner. « The Ethics of Insurgency ». Ethics & ; International Affairs 31, no 3 (2017) : 367–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679417000259.
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In the latter half of the twentieth century, lasting memories of two world wars and astonishment over the power of nuclear weapons left both policymakers and scholars of war largely preoccupied with the possibility of a catastrophic World War III. Instead, however, the face of war since 1945 has been that of regionally limited small wars and insurgencies fought with conventional weapons. Many of these conflicts began as armed rebellions against colonial regimes, but often later evolved into armed conflicts between and among various subgroups seeking control of state government. Such conflicts have usually been asymmetrical, with the party holding the reins of state power using aircraft, artillery, and armored vehicles, while those fighting against the regime have been limited to weapons that individuals can carry, such as automatic rifles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and improvised weapons of various sorts. The asymmetries have also typically gone deeper, with the fighters on the former side wearing uniforms and those on the latter often not; those on the former side making use of fortified bases and those on the latter side protecting themselves by blending in with the civilian population. Further, there have frequently been asymmetries in how each side has fought, with the militarily weaker side relying on stealth tactics, deception, and attacks against nonmilitary targets of more general public value, including direct attacks on people protected as noncombatants under the laws of war. The particular range of tactics classified as terrorism begins at this point, with the specific, direct, and intentional targeting of noncombatants. Such attacks not only have been the means of choice for transnational nonstate actors, including al-Qaeda and the self-styled Islamic State, but have also been used to considerable effect in local civil wars.
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Mendelsohn, Barak. « The Battle for Algeria : Explaining Fratricide among Armed Nonstate Actors ». Studies in Conflict & ; Terrorism, 27 mars 2019, 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1580419.
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Shesterinina, Anastasia. « Civil war as a social process : actors and dynamics from pre- to post-war ». European Journal of International Relations, 6 juin 2022, 135406612210959. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/13540661221095970.
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What accounts for overarching trajectories of civil wars? This article develops an account of civil war as a social process that connects dynamics of conflict from pre- to post-war periods through evolving interactions between nonstate, state, civilian, and external actors involved. It traces these dynamics to the mobilization and organization of nascent nonstate armed groups before the war, which can induce state repression and in some settings escalation of tensions through radicalization of actors, militarization of tactics, and polarization of societies, propelled by internal divisions and external support. Whether armed groups form from a small, clandestine core of dedicated recruits, broader networks, social movements, and/or fragmentation within the regime has consequences for their internal and external relations during the war. However, not only path-dependent but also endogenous dynamics shape overarching trajectories of civil wars. During the war, armed groups develop cohesion and fragment in the context of evolving internal politics, including socialization of fighters, institution-building in the areas that they control, which civilians can collectively resist, competition and cooperation with other nonstate and state forces, and external influence. After the war, armed groups transform to participate in continuing conflict and violence in different ways in interaction with multiple actors. This analysis highlights the contingency of civil wars and suggests that future research should focus on how relevant actors form and transform as they relate to one another to understand linkages between conflict dynamics over time and on continuities and discontinuities in these dynamics to grasp overarching trajectories of civil wars.
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Shesterinina, Anastasia. « Civil war as a social process : actors and dynamics from pre- to post-war ». European Journal of International Relations, 6 juin 2022, 135406612210959. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/13540661221095970.
Texte intégralRésumé :
What accounts for overarching trajectories of civil wars? This article develops an account of civil war as a social process that connects dynamics of conflict from pre- to post-war periods through evolving interactions between nonstate, state, civilian, and external actors involved. It traces these dynamics to the mobilization and organization of nascent nonstate armed groups before the war, which can induce state repression and in some settings escalation of tensions through radicalization of actors, militarization of tactics, and polarization of societies, propelled by internal divisions and external support. Whether armed groups form from a small, clandestine core of dedicated recruits, broader networks, social movements, and/or fragmentation within the regime has consequences for their internal and external relations during the war. However, not only path-dependent but also endogenous dynamics shape overarching trajectories of civil wars. During the war, armed groups develop cohesion and fragment in the context of evolving internal politics, including socialization of fighters, institution-building in the areas that they control, which civilians can collectively resist, competition and cooperation with other nonstate and state forces, and external influence. After the war, armed groups transform to participate in continuing conflict and violence in different ways in interaction with multiple actors. This analysis highlights the contingency of civil wars and suggests that future research should focus on how relevant actors form and transform as they relate to one another to understand linkages between conflict dynamics over time and on continuities and discontinuities in these dynamics to grasp overarching trajectories of civil wars.
22
Hafez, Mohammed M., Michael Gabbay et Emily Kalah Gade. « Consolidation of Nonstate Armed Actors in Fragmented Conflicts : Introducing an Emerging Research Program ». Studies in Conflict & ; Terrorism, 16 décembre 2021, 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2021.2013751.
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Wulf, Herbert. « Privatizing and internationalizing violence ». Economics of Peace and Security Journal 2, no 1 (1 janvier 2007). http://dx.doi.org/10.15355/2.1.35.
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Privatization of violence and international interventions to stop wars are two recent trends in wars. Both affect how the traditional state monopoly of force is exercised and on how armed forces operate. The concept of state monopoly of force is now questioned since the execution of force is increasingly delegated to armed nonstate actors. Nationally organized armed forces are outdated, given the new international tasks. Since the role of the nation-state in security has changed so fundamentally, it is argued that changes in three political and legal fields are necessary: Private military companies need to be regulated; the democratic deficit in international bodies which decide on international intervention needs to be overcome; and the monopoly of force needs to be re-conceptualized.
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van der Borgh, Chris. « Everyday Security Practices in Gang-Controlled Neighborhoods in San Salvador ». Conflict and Society, 1 décembre 2022, 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/arcs.2023.09115of1.
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This article looks at the everyday security practices of local residents in violent local orders, where capacities and strategies of state and non-state armed actors to produce regularity and stability are weak and contested. It discusses the case of gang-controlled neighborhoods in the metropolitan area of Greater San Salvador, El Salvador, in the years 2017–2018, when security “provision” of armed state and nonstate actors was weak and contested, and as a result civilians mostly took care of themselves. The article analyzes the main characteristics of local violent orders, the insecurity experiences of local residents, and the everyday practices of local residents to deal with these circumstances. It argues that in neighborhoods where security provision by state and non-state actors is weak and contested, everyday security practices of local residents are key to understanding the functioning and reproduction of the local forms of “disordered order.
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« Editors’ Note ». American Journal of International Law 107, no 2 (avril 2013) : 378. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.2.0378.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The October 2012 issue of the Journal carried a Note by Daniel Bethlehem with the author’s proposal for a set of principles on the scope of a state’s right of self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate actors. The Editors’ Note to that item indicated that critiques of the proposal and other responses would be published in a subsequent issue of the Journal. Four such responses are presented here; the July 2013 issue will carry a continuation of the debate.
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Gaviria, Juan Camilo, Laura Baron Mendoza et James Meernik. « Victims and Ex-Combatants in Colombia : The Aulas de Paz Model of Truth, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation ». Latin American Perspectives, 20 octobre 2022, 0094582X2211310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094582x221131046.
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In recent years there has been increasing interest in the interactions and relationships between victims of armed conflict and former members of armed nonstate actors. For many survivors, a critical element of restoration and repair is coming to terms with the violence that was visited upon them. At the same time, many of those who took part in acts of violence have sought to account for and apologize for their behavior—to unburden themselves of their knowledge, recover their own lost humanity, and be reconciled with those whom they victimized. The victim and the perpetrator are both vital elements in any effort at truth telling and reconciliation and ultimately the successful reincorporation of ex-combatants into the population. The method used by Aulas de Paz (Classrooms of Peace) in Colombia is effective in fostering interaction between ex-combatants and victims that can contribute to truth, forgiveness, and reconciliation. It is a theoretically grounded strategy of individual and collective healing that can help advance restorative justice in states affected by armed conflict. Los últimos años han visto un creciente interés en las interacciones y relaciones entre víctimas de conflictos armados y antiguos miembros de actores armados no estatales. Para muchos sobrevivientes, aceptar la violencia que se les impuso resulta un elemento crítico para la restauración y reparación. Al mismo tiempo, muchos de quienes participaron en actos de violencia han buscado rendir cuentas y disculparse por su comportamiento con el objeto de librarse de su conocimiento, recuperar la propia humanidad perdida y reconciliarse con aquellos a quienes victimizaron. La víctima y el perpetrador son elementos vitales en cualquier esfuerzo por hablar la verdad, fomentar la reconciliación y, en última instancia, reincorporarar exitosamente a los excombatientes a la población. El método utilizado por Aulas de Paz en Colombia fomenta de manera efectiva la interacción entre excombatientes y víctimas, asunto que puede contribuir a la verdad, el perdón y la reconciliación. Se trata de una estrategia teóricamente fundamentada de sanación individual y colectiva que puede promover la justicia restaurativa en los estados afectados por conflictos armados.
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Swaine, Aisling. « Resurfacing Gender : A Typology of Conflict-Related Violence Against Women for the Northern Ireland Troubles ». Violence Against Women, 25 août 2022, 107780122211149. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10778012221114923.
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The “Troubles” in Northern Ireland are often assumed to represent an outlier in respect of contemporary global discourse on conflict-related violence against women (CRVAW), and particularly “strategic rape.” CRVAW has neither commanded the narrative nor imagery of that conflict nor specifically recognized globally as part of women's experiences of it. A composite and comprehensive analysis of CRVAW for that context has been absent. Based on primary and secondary research, and analytically advanced through gender and critical harm theory, the article presents the first typology of CRVAW for the Northern Ireland Troubles. The article maps and evidences a range of gendered harms directly and indirectly resulting from the conflict enacted by state and nonstate actors. It argues that a resurfacing of gender is required to ensure current global debates on CRVAW are informed by a reconsideration of what constitutes “strategic” harm in armed conflict.
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Gillooly, Shauna N. « A Woman’s Place Is at the Negotiating Table : Evidence from Colombian Peace Processes ». Latin American Research Review, 19 décembre 2022, 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lar.2022.87.
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Abstract A substantial amount of scholarly work has been conducted on considerations (or lack thereof) of gender in the context of peace negotiations. While gender-specific concerns, particularly those focused on women’s empowerment, are now emphasized in the language of international and national organizations involved in peacebuilding (e.g., UN Security Council Resolution 1325), many times this language is just “talk.” Often, on-the-ground practice and policy does not reflect the lived experiences of women in post-accord or transitional contexts. This article analyzes the change in roles and the roles available to women in pre-negotiation and framework-setting negotiation processes between the Colombian government and nonstate armed actors. The study examines the negotiations between the Colombian government under the Juan Manuel Santos administration and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC) in 2012–2016 to interrogate the ways that women, feminist groups, and women’s organizations play a role in pre-negotiation processes.
29
Quinn V, John M., Trisha Jigar Dhabalia, Lada L. Roslycky, James M. Wilson V, Jan-Cedric Hansen, Olesya Hulchiy, Olga Golubovskaya et al. « COVID-19 at War : The Joint Forces Operation in Ukraine ». Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 25 mars 2021, 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2021.88.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Abstract The ongoing pandemic disaster of coronavirus erupted with the first confirmed cases in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV2) novel coronavirus, the disease referred to as coronavirus disease 2019, or COVID-19. The World Health Organization (WHO) confirmed the outbreak and determined it a global pandemic. The current pandemic has infected nearly 300 million people and killed over 3 million. The current COVID-19 pandemic is smashing every public health barrier, guardrail, and safety measure in underdeveloped and the most developed countries alike, with peaks and troughs across time. Greatly impacted are those regions experiencing conflict and war. Morbidity and mortality increase logarithmically for those communities at risk and that lack the ability to promote basic preventative measures. States around the globe struggle to unify responses, make gains on preparedness levels, identify and symptomatically treat positive cases, and labs across the globe frantically rollout various vaccines and effective surveillance and therapeutic mechanisms. The incidence and prevalence of COVID-19 may continue to increase globally as no unified disaster response is manifested and disinformation spreads. During this failure in response, virus variants are erupting at a dizzying pace. Ungoverned spaces where nonstate actors predominate and active war zones may become the next epicenter for COVID-19 fatality rates. As the incidence rates continue to rise, hospitals in North America and Europe exceed surge capacity, and immunity post infection struggles to be adequately described. The global threat in previously high-quality, robust infrastructure health-care systems in the most developed economies are failing the challenge posed by COVID-19; how will less-developed economies and those health-care infrastructures that are destroyed by war and conflict fare until adequate vaccine penetrance in these communities or adequate treatment are established? Ukraine and other states in the Black Sea Region are under threat and are exposed to armed Russian aggression against territorial sovereignty daily. Ukraine, where Russia has been waging war since 2014, faces this specific dual threat: disaster response to violence and a deadly infectious disease. To best serve biosurveillance, aid in pandemic disaster response, and bolster health security in Europe, across the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and Black Sea regions, increased NATO integration, across Ukraine’s disaster response structures within the Ministries of Health, Defense, and Interior must be reinforced and expanded to mitigate the COVID-19 disaster.