Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Angola – Politics and government – 1961-1975 »

The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty. Mao ZedongIn the middle of October 1975, a dusty column of South African troops, equipped with armoured cars and helicopters, rumbled north into Angola, further internationalizing the already complex civil war there. The South African attack not only broadened the war, prompting an even greater Cuban intervention, it also posed a dilemma for China, which supported the same Angolan parties as did South Africa: should China follow its policy of tit-for-tat opposition to Soviet expansion world-wide, even if it meant allying with the racist government of South Africa? Or should it follow the opinions of its fellow Third World nations in Africa, even if it led to a Soviet bloc advance? The difficulty China's leaders faced in the autumn of 1975 was one which had hidden origins in the different ways in which China viewed conflicts around the world, a difficulty that had lain dormant for years but which erupted in 1975 into full view, and with disastrous consequences for Chinese foreign policy in Africa. It is, moreover, a discrepancy which continues to exist in China's views of the world today.How does China view conflicts and revolutions in the Third World? How do the Chinese organize their relations with Third World revolutionary organizations and their post-independence governments? This article examines the tensions and shifts of Chinese policy towards two essentially simultaneous revolutionary struggles and their post-independence governments: Angola and Mozambique.

José Eduardo do Santos (JES), President of Angola, has been in charge since 1979, and is also the commander-in-chief of the FAA (Angola Armed Forces) and president of the MPLA, (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, in charge of the country’s politics since 1975).Since 2011, inspired by the rise of the Arab Spring, some groups started group debates, trying to finding pacific ways to raise awareness to the authoritarian regime they were living. Consequently, the government dealt with them with extreme violence, using them as object-example of fear to whoever tried to oppose. In 2015, a group of 17 activists was arrested for reading a book in an open reunion, and accused of conspiring against JES’ government. One of the front men of this movement just spoke at the European Parliament in January 2017, though a month later he was suffering police violence again when joining a new manifestation in Luanda. In April 2017, a similar case happened to another group of activists, and the 7 remain in jail in poor health conditions.

This investigation contributes to studies of post-1945 Europe and the Cold War by examining the culture, economics, and politics surrounding the consumption of a single commodity in East Germany, coffee. Coffee was associated with many cultural values and traditions that became tied to the GDR's official image of socialism. When the regime's ability to supply this good was jeopardized in 1975–77, the government sought out new sources of coffee in the developing, so-called Third World. East Germany entered into long-term trade and development projects with countries such as Angola, Ethiopia, Laos, and Vietnam to secure sufficient beans to supply its own population – this article singles out the GDR's relationship with Laos for discussion. These trade deals connected East Germany to a much broader, globalizing economy, and led to certain lasting effects on the world coffee trade.

It is generally agreed that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in March 1988 marked the final attempt to secure a military solution to the Angolan conflict. Thereafter, in December 1988, South Africa, Cuba, and Angola signed the so-called ‘New York accord’ that included a timetable for the phased withdrawal of the South Africans and the Cubans from Namibia and Angola, respectively; in June 1989, the Gbadolite agreement initiated African attempts to end the continuing armed struggle in Angola; and in March 1990, Namibia achieved its long-awaited independence. But despite these efforts and developments, the war continued between the Government that had been established in Luanda by the Movimento Popular de Libertacão de Angola (M.P.L.A.) in November 1975 and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (Unita), with devastating implications for the country's estimated ten million inhabitants. Not before May 1991 was a final peace agreement signed in Portugal, and then with considerably poorer options for political stability and economic recovery than would have been the case after the original accord in New York.

Just before midnight on 10 November 1975 Portugal's high commissioner in Angola, along with the last remnants of the Portuguese army in Africa, embarked for Lisbon. Earlier in the day he had formally transferred sovereignty not to a successor government but to ‘the Angolan people’, a formulation which permitted Portugal to ‘decolonise’ without taking sides in the civil war which was at that time reaching its climax in Angola. Immediately the perfunctory ceremony in Luanda ended, the Portuguese officials left at speed for the harbour and the relative safety of their ships which departed immediately. Thus ended Portugal's 500-year empire in Africa. It is tempting to see Portugal's indecorous withdrawal from Angola as an emblematic climax to an increasingly destructive relationship with the former jewel in its African crown. In this view, the chaotic circumstances of Angola's road to independence had brought Portugal's own fragile and unstable post-revolutionary state to the point of destruction. Yet a quite different view can be proposed. The political and diplomatic challenges thrown down by the Angolan crisis might be seen, on the contrary, to have had a ‘disciplining’ effect on a revolutionary process in Portugal which was threatening to spin out of control as a result of its own internal pressures. Arguably, rather than exacerbating these pressures, the demands of events in Angola had a unifying effect on an otherwise fragmenting state.

Based on newly declassified documents from former Yugoslav archives, this article reconstructs the process of material and political assistance that was rendered to the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) by Yugoslavia throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s until the time of Angola's independence and the beginning of the Angolan civil war in 1975. The archival evidence demonstrates that Yugoslavia's assistance to the MPLA guerrillas was one of the crucial factors that enabled the organization not only to survive the vicissitudes of international politics, but also to preserve and stabilize its strength for the final phase of the power struggle in Angola.

This essay investigates the ways in which contemporary artistic practices have been working towards an epistemic and ethico-political decolonization of the present by means of critical examinations of several sorts of colonial archives, whether public or private, familial or anonymous. Through the lens of specific artworks by the artists Ângela Ferreira, Kiluanji Kia Henda, Délio Jasse, Daniel Barroca and Raquel Schefer, this essay examines the extent to which the aesthetics of these video, photographic and sculptural practices puts forth a politics and ethics of history and memory relevant to thinking critically about the colonial amnesias and imperial nostalgias which still pervade a post-colonial condition marked by neo-colonial patterns of globalization and by uneasy relationships with diasporic and migrant communities. Attention will be paid to the histories and memories of the Portuguese dictatorship and colonial empire, the liberation wars / the “colonial” war fought in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau between 1961 and 1974, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, the independence of Portugal’s former colonies between 1973 and 1975, and the mass “return” of Portuguese settlers from Angola and Mozambique in 1975, without losing sight of apartheid South Africa and the ways in which the Cold War played out on the African continent.

After spending a decade as an independent trucker hauling milk, watermelons, and paper across the United States, Mike Parkhurst sold his tractor-trailer in 1961 and used the proceeds to establish Overdrive magazine—the “Voice of the American Trucker.” Believing “truckers were ready for a magazine that would pull no punches,” Parkhurst launched a decades-long editorial assault on transportation regulations that he believed bound American enterprise in the chains of corporate control, government malfeasance, and brutish boss unionism. By the mid-1970s, Parkhurst became one of the nation's most outspoken advocates of transportation deregulation. As he told a reporter for Time in 1975, he hoped “to wake the truckers up to the fact that they're slaves to a monopoly”—a monopoly on freight transportation maintained by corporate trucking firms, abetted by the Teamsters Union, and sanctioned by corrupt government officials. In the summer of 1979, Parkhurst helped to orchestrate a nationwide strike by tens of thousands of independent truckers, in which drivers demanded, according to William Scheffer of the Overdrive-sponsored Independent Truckers Association, “the dismantling of a giant Federal bureaucracy that has grown to govern the trucking industry since the mid-1930's.”

The development of contemporary South Africa political economy occurred within the context of a global capitalist order characterized by increasingly unequal political and economic relations between and within countries. Before liberation in 1994, many people across the world actively supported the struggle against apartheid, with South Africa’s neighbouring states paying the highest price. The ‘sovereignty’ of the apartheid state was challenged by three processes: first, economic, cultural and sporting sanctions called for by Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress and other liberation movements, which from the 1960s-80s were increasingly effective in forcing change; second, solidaristic foreign governments including Sweden’s and the USSR’s provided material support to overthrowing the Pretoria Regime; and third, military defeat in Angola and the liberation of neighbouring Mozambique (1975), Zimbabwe (1980) and Namibia (1990) signalled the inevitability of change. But that state nevertheless maintained sufficient strength - e.g. defaulting on foreign debt and imposing exchange controls in 1985 - to ensure a transition to democracy that was largely determined by local forces. Since 1994, the shrinkage of sovereignty means the foreign influences of global capitalism amplify local socio-economic contradictions in a manner destructive to the vast majority of citizens. This is evident when considering economic, ecological, geopolitical and societal considerations.

e4436026This text presents some reflections on the possibilities of a philosophical education in prisons in the current scenario of the actual pandemic in Brazil. To do so, we first consider, in "Pandemic times: are we worse than covid-19, the critical state of the so-called "civilization” that the pandemic has helped to highlight; in a second moment, "Times of prisons: disappearance by the power of hate" we consider the current state of education in prisons in Brazil, the effects on them of the pandemic and the way the Bolsonaro government responded to it; finally, in "Times of school: reappearance by the wisdom of love" we consider the actual state of education in the schools at prisons and what a philosophical education could be in pandemic times: not only a love of wisdom, but a wisdom of love with and for otherness, to, who knows, bring forth politics of life, and with them, freedom, justice and social peace.ResumoO artigo apresenta reflexões sobre as possibilidades de se pensar uma educação filosófica nas escolas no cárcere no atual cenário de pandemia no Brasil. Para isso consideramos, num primeiro momento, em “Tempos de pandemia: nós somos piores que o covid-19?”, o estado crítico da chamada civilização que a pandemia contribuiu a evidenciar; num segundo momento, “Tempos de cárcere: o desaparecimento pela força do ódio” nos focamos no estado atual do cárcere no Brasil, assim como nos efeitos nele da pandemia e da forma do governo Bolsonaro responder a ela; finalmente, em “Tempos de escola: o reaparecimento pela sabedoria do amor” consideramos o estado atual da educação nas escolas no cárcere no Brasil e o que poderia uma educação filosófica em tempos de pandemia: consideramos a filosofia não apenas um amor à sabedoria, mas uma sabedoria do amor com, pela e para as outridades, para, quem sabe, fazer brotar políticas de vida e, com elas, liberdade, justiça e paz social.ResumenEste texto presenta reflexiones sobre las posibilidades de pensar una educación filosófica en escuelas presiónales en el actual escenario de pandemia en Brasil. Para ello, primero consideramos, en "Tiempos de pandemia: ¿somos peores que el covid-19?" el estado crítico de la llamada "civilización" que la pandemia ha ayudado a resaltar; en un segundo momento “Tiempos de cárcel: la desaparición por la fuerza del odio" consideramos el estado actual de la educación en las prisiones en Brasil y los efectos en ella de la pandemia y la respuesta dada por el gobierno de Bolsonaro; por último, en "Tiempos de escuela: la reaparición por la sabiduría del amor" consideramos el estado actual de la educación en las escuelas carcelarias de Brasil y lo que podría ser una educación filosófica en tiempos de pandemia: no sólo un amor a la sabiduría, sino una sabiduría de amor con, para y por las otredades, para, quién sabe, hacer brotar políticas da vida y, con ellas, libertad, justicia y paz social.Palavras-chave: Cárcere, Ensino de filosofia, Outridade.Keywords: Prison, Teaching philosophy, Otherness.Palabras clave: Cárcel, Enseñanza de la filosofía, Otredades.ReferencesADORNO, Theodor; HORKHEIMER, Max. 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Brasília: Ministério da Justiça e da Segurança Pública (MJSP); Departamento Penitenciário Nacional (DEPEN), 2019. in: https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiZTlkZGJjODQtNmJlMi00OTJhLWFlMDktNzRlNmFkNTM0MWI3IiwidCI6ImViMDkwNDIwLTQ0NGMtNDNmNy05MWYyLTRiOGRhNmJmZThlMSJ9 (Acesso em 09/06/2020)BRASIL. INFOPEN 2017 - atualização junho - Levantamento nacional de informações penitenciárias. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça e da Segurança Pública (MJSP); Departamento Penitenciário Nacional (DEPEN), 2019. http://depen.gov.br/DEPEN/depen/sisdepen/infopen/relatorios-sinteticos/infopen-jun-2017-rev-12072019-0721.pdf (Acesso em 09/06/2020).BRASIL. Relatoria Nacional para o Direito Humano à Educação: Educação nas Prisões Brasileiras. São Paulo: Plataforma DhESCA, 2009. https://www.cmv-educare.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/FINAL-relatorioeduca%C3%A7%C3%A3onasprisoesnov2009.pdf (Acesso em 09/06/2020)BRASIL. 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(eds). The African Philosophy Reader. New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 391-415. Tradução para uso didático de Wanderson Flor do Nascimento.PIMENTA, Victor Martins. Por trás das grades: o encarceramento em massa no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 2018.PLATÃO. Banquete. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: Editora UFPA, 2003.RAMOS, Graciliano. Memórias do cárcere. São Paulo: Record, 1975.RODRÍGUEZ, Símon. Inventamos ou erramos. Tradução de Cinthia Fernandes. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2016.RUSCHE, Georg; KIRCHHEIMER, Otto. Punição e estrutura social. Tradução de Gizlene Neder. Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 2004.SAFATLE. Vladimir. Só mais um esforço. São Paulo: Três Estrelas, 2017.SIMAS, Luiz Antonio; RUFINO, Luiz. Encantamento: sobre política de vida. Rio de Janeiro: Mórula Editorial, 2020.WACQUANT, Loic. Punir os pobres: a nova gestão da miséria nos Estados Unidos. Tradução de Eliana Aguiar. Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 2003.WACQUANT, Loic. As duas faces do gueto. Tradução de Paulo Castanheira. 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Defence date: 16 November 2007
Examining Board: Prof. Diogo Ramada Curto, European University Institute (EUI) ; Prof. Raffaele Romanelli, (European University Institute/Università La Sapienza) ; Prof. António Costa Pinto, (Universidade de Lisboa) ; Prof. Luís Reis Torgal, (Universidade de Coimbra)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
no abstract available

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: African affairs have traditionally not occupied a central place in Norway’s official foreign policy, and relations with countries in West Africa have been limited. However, in recent years, resource-rich countries such as Angola – Africa’s largest oil producer – have become the focus of Norwegian strategic interests. Private and public investments are increasing rapidly, paralleling a larger focus on aid. Today, Angola is a core country within Norway’s most prominent petroleum-related assistant programme, Oil for Development (OfD). This thesis will aim to contribute, by means of a critical political economy analysis, to a better understanding of Norway’s role in Angola through OfD. Specifically, this study aims to question who and what structures Norway really is aiding in Angola. Such an objective will be achieved by firstly using critical theory to demonstrate Norway’s role as a traditional middle power – through which Norway seeks to export an altruistic perception of a ‘do-good- image’ – is underpinned by a deeper national self-interest. Secondly, the thesis questions the theoretical foundation of OfD, and, thirdly, it attempts to identify whom the OfD programme is aiding. Ultimately, the thesis questions whether Norway is promoting sustainable development in Angola, or whether, instead, it is contributing to maintaining a status quo, from which Norway as a middle power continues to benefit. The study illustrates that Norway, as a middle power, has neither the capacity nor the national self-interest to achieve fundamental change in Angola. Norway’s commitment to the good governance agenda, and the belief in solutions offered by the resource curse thesis, is tackling the symptoms of Angola’s underdevelopment, rather than its root causes. OfD adopts a state-centric approach, which accepts the political economy structures in Angola, and gives limited attention to global structures and civil society. The thesis offers an alternative analysis, which illustrates how OfD is masking a neo-liberal development approach by incorporating Norwegian business interests and development goals in the same programme.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Afrika sake het tradisioneel nie 'n sentrale plek in Noorweë se amptelike buitelandse beleid beklee nie, en verhoudings met die westelike deel van die Afrika-kontinent is beperk. Tydens die afgelope jare het olie-ryk lande, soos Angola, egter die fokus van Noorweegse strategiese belange geword. Angola is vandag 'n kern land binne Noorweë se mees prominente petroleum-verwante hulpverleningsprogram, Oil for Development (OfD). Hierdie tesis het ten doel om, deur middel van 'n kritiese politieke ekonomie ontleding, by te dra tot ’n beter begrip van Noorweë se rol in Angola deur die OfD. Spesifiek bevraagteken hierdie studie aan wie en watter strukture in Angola Noorweë hulp verleen. Dit sal gedoen word deur eerstens gebruik te maak van kritiese teorie om te demonstreer dat Noorweë se rol as 'n tradisionele middelmoondheid – waardeur Noorweë poog om 'n altruïstiese persepsie van die staat uit te dra – onderskryf word deur 'n dieper nasionale selfbelang. Tweedens sal hierdie studie die teoretiese begronding van OfD bevraagteken, en derdens poog om te identifiseer wie deur die OfD program ondersteun word. Laastens sal die tesis bevraagteken of Noorweë volhoubare ontwikkeling in Angola bevorder, en eerder bydra tot die instandhouding van die status quo, waaruit Noorweë as 'n middelmoondheid voordeel trek. Die studie sal illustreer dat Noorweë, as ‘n middelmoondheid, nie die kapasiteit of die nasionale selfbelang het om fundamentele verandering in Angola te weeg te bring nie. Norweë se ondersteuning van die ‘good governance’ agenda, en oplossings wat deur die sogenaamde ‘hulpbronvloek’ tesis aangebied word, spreek die simptome van Angola se onder-ontwikkeldheid aan, eerder as die kernoorsake. OfD funksioneer op grond van ‘n staat-sentriese benadering, wat die politieke ekonomiese strukture in Angola aanvaar, en beperkte aandag aan globale strukture en die burgerlike samelewing gee. Hierdie tesis bied ‘n alternatiewe analise, wat wys hoe OfD eintlik ‘n neoliberale ontwikkelingsbenadering volg wat Noorweegse besigheids- en ontwikkelingsdoelwitte in dieselfde program inkorporeer.

Orientador: Omar Ribeiro Thomaz
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T05:15:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_ArielRolim_M.pdf: 2189699 bytes, checksum: 933089fd3c1ecc008020db1de7a1c9bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013
Resumo: O líder político Jonas Savimbi ocupou uma posição privilegiada de observação dos entrecruzamentos das linguagens segundo as quais se lutou a guerra em Angola. O nexo entre as esferas global e local do conflito, incluindo aí seus diferentes códigos de reportagem, pode ser apreendido a partir da análise das lideranças - entendidas aqui, não como indivíduos, mas como catalisadores de "comunidades imaginadas". Atento ao plano das estratégias dos agentes que, mesmo se relacionando a referências discursivas inconciliáveis e irredutíveis umas às outras, na prática, conformaram uma rede de inimizades produtiva - e aí surge uma dimensão completamente desvinculada dos modelos e discursos. A questão que coloco aqui é em que medida a noção de "inimigo" como categoria de alteridade no plano das relações práticas, entrevista nos discursos de Savimbi, pode nos ajudar a compreender o cenário de disparidades e a multiplicidade de formas de conflito que o caso angolano comporta. Volto-me aos códigos mobilizados por cada um dos contendores na significação da luta como condição para que, fugindo dos preceitos dos modelos a que cada um se reporta nesse processo, possamos ver a guerra como uma arena de interações onde os atores se comunicam ou, ao menos, se reconhecem (no duplo sentido do termo) para melhor lutar. Sigo a hipótese de que a guerra tenha sido uma rede prática de trocas violentas (jamais simétricas) não só de projéteis, mas também de nomes e códigos entre os contendores que iriam moldar de forma decisiva o imaginário nacional angolano - um país cujas fronteiras mais ou menos arbitrárias haviam sido herança direta do colonialismo português. Nesse sentido, cada umas das partes em disputa necessitavam criar um discurso nacional unificador - concorrente ao rival. Os beligerantes mantinham uma esfera de aliança tácita, mas não expressa, em torno da construção e manutenção da plausibilidade nacional
Abstract: The political leader Jonas Savimbi has occupied a privileged observing position of the language crossings according to which the war in Angola was fought. The nexus between global and local dimensions of this conflict (the different codes of report there included), can be apprehended from the analysis of the leaders - understood, here, not as individuals, but as catalyzers of "imagined communities". I focus on the plan of the agents' strategies that, even if in relation to irreconcilable references of discourse to one another, in practice, comprehend a productive net of enmity. Therefore a dimension completely detached from models rises. The question I pose here is: in which measure the notion of "enemy" as a category of alterity on the plan of practical relations - glimpsed in the speeches of Savimbi - can help us to understand the set of disparities and multiplicity of ways of conflict that the Angolan case bears? I turn myself to the codes mobilized by each of the contenders to ascribe meaning to the fight as a condition - escaping the tenets of the models to which each one reports in this process - for us to see the war as an arena of interaction where de actors communicate or, at least, acknowledge (in the double meaning of the term) themselves to better fight. I follow the hypothesis that the war has been a practical net of violent (and never symmetrical) exchange not only of bullets, but also of names and codes between contenders who would engrave the imagery of Angola in a decisive way - a country which its more or less arbitrary borders had been a direct heritage from the Portuguese colonialism. In this sense, each part in the dispute needed to create a rival national unifying discourse. The belligerents kept a level of tacit alliance, though not expressed, around the construction e maintenance of national plausibility
Mestrado
Antropologia Social
Mestre em Antropologia Social

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study was to describe the factors that led to the creation of warlords in Angola and Sierra Leone so as to better understand the dynamics and origins of warlord politics. The two warlords that were focused on, and compared, were Jonas Savimbi (Angola) and Charles Taylor (Liberia and Sierra Leone). Authors like Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) contributed toward the base of this study. Their work captured the issues contributing toward the warlord phenomenon and generated thought surrounding the context in which these warlords arose. John Mackinlay (2000) was used to describe and analyse the origins of warlordism and how the warlord phenomenon has changed with the onset of new wars, especially in the late 20th and 21st centuries (Kaldor, 2006). Furthermore, the work of Thomas H. Greene (1984) was used in guiding this thesis into a systematic study, focusing mainly on the leadership, following, organization, techniques and external support of both Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor as examples of contemporary warlords. Through utilizing the contributions of the above authors on this topic, the similarities and differences between the two warlords were explored. The study found that while Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor emerged from different eras and contexts (Savimbi out of the Cold War and Taylor as a result of globalization), they both became typical warlords. Savimbi only became a warlord after 1992. Before, Savimbi used Maoist ideology while an insurgent against Portugal, whereafter he became a rebel in the Angolan civil war. Taylor was a warlord in diamond-rich neighbouring Sierra Leone. Both used identity politics to gather a following while Taylor used brute force and the manipulation of the youth. They both manipulated illicit criminal networking and operated internationally, smuggling diamonds. The main difference, however, is that Taylor was an insurgent in Liberia where he seized power in 1990 and became president in 1997, while a warlord in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Savimbi, on the other hand, never attained presidential power even though he participated in the 1992 Angolan elections which he lost, whereafter he ceased to be a revolutionary, and became a real warlord without the external support he previously had. Savimbi was assassinated in 2002 and Taylor abdicated in 2003, currently standing trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. He stands trial for the human right atrocities committed in Sierra Leone. Their legacies live on.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie was om die faktore te beskryf wat gely het tot die ontstaan van krygshere (“warlords“)in Angola en Sierra Leone, en om die dinamika van krygsheerpolitiek beter te verstaan. Die twee krygshere waarop gefokus en vergelyk was, is Jonas Savimbi (Angola) en Charles Taylor (Liberië en Sierra Leone). Die denke van skrywers soos Mary Kaldor (2006), William Reno (1995, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2007) en Collier & Hoeffler (2004) het bygedra tot die basis van hierdie studie. Hulle werk het ingesluit die aspekte wat bygedra het tot die krygsheer fenomeen, en het besinning aangemoedig oor die agtergrondsfaktore waaruit hierdie twee krygshere ontstaan het. John Mackinlay (2000) se werk is gebruik om die oorsprong van krygsheerpolitiek te beskryf, asook hoe die krygsheerfenomeen verander het met die uitbreek van “nuwe oorloë“ (Kaldor, 2006), veral aan die einde van die 20ste en 21ste eeue. Verder is die werk van Thomas H. Greene (1984) gebruik om hierdie tesis ‘n sistematiese struktuur te gee wat gefokus is op die leierskap, volgelinge, organisasie, tegnieke en eksterne ondersteuning van Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor. Hierdie twee persone is albei voorbeelde van kontemporêre krygshere in die jongste verlede. ‘n Vergelykende studie verg dat ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die twee krygshere verken word deur gebruik te maak van die bydraes van bogenoemde skrywers. In die studie is bevind dat alhoewel Jonas Savimbi en Charles Taylor uit verskillende eras en agtergrond kom (Savimbi uit die Koue Oorlog en Taylor as gevolg van globalisasie), albei tipiese krygshere geword het. Savimbi het Maoistiese ideologie gebruik terwyl hy ’n insurgent teen Portugal was. Daarná het hy ’n rebel in die Angolese burgeroorlog geword. Hy het eers na 1992 ‘n krygsheer geword nadat hy die verkiesing verloor het en sy buitelandse steun verloor het. Taylor, aan die ander kant, was ‘n krygsheer in die diamantryke buurland, Sierra Leone. Altwee krygshere het identiteitspolitiek gebruik om volgelinge te kry, terwyl Taylor ook brutale krag en die manipulasie van die jeug gebruik het. Hulle het beide internasionale diamante gesmokkel deur kriminele netwerke te gebruik. Die groot vi verskil is egter dat terwyl Taylor ‘n krygsheer in Sierra Leone was, was hy ook ‘n insurgent in Liberië, waar hy in 1990 mag gekry het en in 1997 president geword het. Savimbi, aan die ander kant, het nooit presidensiële mag verkry nie, alhoewel hy deelgeneem het aan die 1992 Angolese verkiesing. Hy het daarna opgehou om ‘n revolusionêr en ‘n rebel te wees en het ‘n ware krygsheer geword (sonder die eksterne ondersteuning wat hy voorheen gehad het). Savimbi is in 2002 vermoor en Taylor het in 2003 abdikeer. Taylor is tans onder verhoor in Den Haag waar hy tereg staan by die Internasionale Strafhof vir oorlogsmisdade en menseregteskendings in Sierra Leone. Beide hierdie krygshere se nalatenskap leef egter voort.

This dissertation examines the following research question: Which types of electoral rules chosen in post-conflict states best promote peace? And are those effects conditional upon other factors? I argue that the effects are conditional upon the types of political parties that exist in the post-conflict environment. Although this explanation is contrary to scholars that speak of political parties as products of the electoral system, political parties often predate the choice of electoral system. Especially in post-conflict states, political parties play an important role in the negotiation process and hence in the design of the electoral rules. I argue that the effects of electoral rules on peace duration are mitigated by the degree to which a party system is broad (nonexclusive) or narrow (exclusive). I develop a theoretical model that led to three hypotheses focusing on the independent role that political parties play in mitigating the effects of electoral rules on peace duration. To test these hypotheses, I use the Cox proportional hazard model on 57 post-conflict states from 1990 to 2009 and had competitive elections. The empirical results show support for the main argument of this study. First, the findings show that electoral rules alone do not increase or decrease the risk of civil war outbreak, yet when interacting with the degree to which political parties are broad or narrow, there is a significant effect on the outbreak of civil war. Second, the results show that post-conflict states with party centered electoral systems (closed list PR system) are less likely to have an outbreak of civil war when more seats in the parliament are controlled by broad-based parties. In addition, I conduct a comparative case study analysis of two post-conflict states, Angola (1975-1992) and Mozambique (1975-1994), using the most similar systems (MSS) research design.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Since South Africa’s military intervention in the Angolan conflict twenty years ago, many scholars have written various conflicting accounts on the subject. Why did South Africa become involved in the first place, what made the SADF withdraw, and why did the country decide to become involved once again in a conflict that seemingly did not concern them? What happened at Cuito Cuanavale? These are the questions this study aims to address by drawing on the work of several influential authors. But why the differing narratives? Internal factors such as South Africa’s regional policies during apartheid as well as external factors such as pressure on the Nationalist government from the international arena, all played significant roles in the decision to become more deeply involved in Angola. South African regional policies during apartheid have been regarded in very different ways by various authors which this study will explore. SA’s policies during apartheid were characterised by anti-communism and influenced mainly by the thought that if SA supported a Western ideal, SA would be able to regain some international credit from Western powers. In addition, pressure from international actors increased on SA to protect the southern African region from communist domination. As a result, SA’s second intervention in Angola became prolonged as the clashes between the SADF/UNITA and Angolan/Cuban/Soviet forces grew in intensity. The battle/siege of Cuito Cuanavale is still considered to be the watershed moment that ended the Angolan conflict. The outcome of this battle, however, is still a very controversial subject to this day as some authors claim Cuba won, while others claim the SADF won. At the time there was no surrender. However, establishing exactly who the winner was is very difficult as every party to the conflict has its own ideas about what really happened. The military outcome and political consequences may have influenced this debate. For that reason it is imperative to remember all important influence that various schools of thoughts have on different observers and therefore accounts of the conflict as many of them were written in a time when Cold War and liberation sentiments thrived. Twenty years later is a good time for better informed hindsight. iv
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sedert Suid-Afrika se militêre betrokkenheid in Angola twintig jaar gelede, het verskeie kontrasterende verhale van dié konflik die lig gesien. Hoekom het SA in die eerste plek betrokke geraak, waarom het die SAW die eerste keer onttrek en hoekom het die land besluit om weer ’n keer betrokke te raak by ’n konflik wat op die oog af niks met hulle te doen gehad het nie? Wat het by Cuito Cuanavale gebeur? Dit is die vrae wat hierdie studie sal probeer antwoord deur gebruik te maak van verskeie invloedryke outeurs. Maar hoekom die uiteenlopende stories? Interne faktore soos SA se streeksbeleide tesame met eksterne faktore soos internasionale druk op die NP regering, het almal deurslaggewende rolle gespeel in die besluit om dieper betrokke te raak in Angola. Suid-Afrikaanse streeksbeleide gedurende apartheid word anders geïnterpreteer deur verskillende outeurs afhangende uit watter oogpunt hulle skryf, hetsy liberaal of realisties. Streeksbeleide gedurende apartheid was gekenmerk deur anti-kommunistiese sentimente en is hoofsaaklik beïnvloed deur die denke dat indien SA hierdie Westerse ideaal ondersteun het, die land dalk ’n mate van sy reeds kwynende internasionale aansien sou herwin. Hoe dit ook al sy, die druk op SA om Suider Afrika te beskerm teen die kommunistiese aanslag, het geleidelik vergroot vanuit die internasionale arena. Dit is dan ook die rede waarom SA se tweede inval in Angola ‘n meesleurende en uitgerekte saga geword het aangesien botsings tussen die SAW/UNITA alliansie en die Angolese/Kubaanse/Russiese alliansies meer intens en op ’n meer gereelde basis voorgekom het. Die laaste offensief by Cuito Cuanavale word dus steeds gesien as die oomblik wat die einde van die Angolese oorlog ingelui het. Die uitkoms van hierdie geveg/beleg word egter steeds in kontroversie gehul aangesien daar steeds nie konsensus bereik kan word oor wie die eintlike wenners was nie. Sekere outeurs voer aan dat die Kubane sonder twyfel gewen het, terwyl ander beweer dat die SAW gewen het. Op daardie punt was daar egter geen militêre oorgawe nie. Juis om daardie rede is dit baie moeilik om vas te stel wie die eintlike wenner was, aangesien elke betrokke party sy eie idees gevorm het oor wat eintlik gebeur het. Dit is waarom dit belangrik is om te let op die invloed wat verskeie outeurs kan hê op dié onderwerp aangesien baie daarvan geskryf is gedurende ’n tyd toe die Koue Oorlog en bevrydingsoorloë aan die orde van die dag was. Twintig jare later is dalk ’n goeie tyd vir ’n terugblik.

This study examines the use of graduated escalation in Vietnam under the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson and attempts to discover the underlying causes that led to the enactment and the continuation of this policy throughout his administration.Factors studied include Johnson's perception of his place in history, his personal style of control, his dual loyalties to expanding "The Great Society" as well as stopping communism through military pressure, and his limited cultural understanding of the needs of the Vietnamese people and the intentions of their leaders.The conclusion is that, while Johnson was a canny politician in his own arena, his controlling personality probably prevented him from considering all of the options open to him in resolving the Vietnam problem and his simplistic, frontier type of diplomacy closed other doors and forced him along a path of frustration and defeat.
Department of Political Science

On 23 April 1964, five months after assuming the office of President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson launched the "More Flags" program as United States policy. While the publicly stated purpose of.the "More Flags" program was to obtain as much non-military free world aid for the Republic of Vietnam as possible, the program's principle goal centered around Lyndon Johnson's desire to obtain an international consensus for America's policies toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The "More Flags" program continued to serve both goals for the remainder of Johnson's presidency. Although started with high expectations of success, the "More Flags" program never succeeded in achieving the levels of international cooperation Lyndon Johnson desired. In fact, the program's significant lack of success necessitated a number of changes, during the program's first year, in both its stated goals and in the methods used to prosecute it's implementation. The most important of these changes would be Washington's use of the program's beneficent objectives to mask it's use as the means through which the United States would purchase mercenary troops to fight in South Vietnam. "Mercenaries in Service to America: The 'More Flags' Foreign Policy of the United States," presents the available history of the "More Flags" program during the years of the Johnson Presidency, with an emphasis on the documentation of the program's use as a disguise for America's obtaining mercenary forces from the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. The non-mercenary troop contributions from Australia and New Zealand are likewise examined. The majority of documentary evidence comes from the original sources documents in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas.

Defence date: 30 May 2014
Examining Board: Professor Dr. Sebastian Conrad (EUI/Free University, Berlin) Professor Dr. Jorge Flores (EUI) Professor Dr. Andreas Eckert (Humboldt University, Berlin) Dr. Philip Havik (Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Lisbon).
First made available online 20 January 2022
This Ph.D. thesis examines the colonial efforts aimed at increasing and physically improving the native population in Portuguese Angola from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. It argues that, throughout this period, these / thus far under-researched / efforts were diverse and inextricably linked to the pervasive idea of a demographic crisis: due to alarming reports on epidemic and endemic diseases, high infant mortality rates and mounting emigration flows, many colonialists feared that the native population was declining, and that this endangered both the economic development of the colony and the legitimacy of Portuguese colonial rule. While critically assessing this depopulation discourse and the role played in it by scarce but widely used demographic knowledge, my analysis focuses on the ideas, policies and practices that were conceived and implemented by colonial administrators, doctors, missionaries and scientists in order to 'stem the tide'. I pay particular attention to the colonial response to sleeping sickness from the late nineteenth century onwards and the establishment of a broader system of African healthcare after the First World War. I also look at colonial attempts to resettle the rural population into model villages, to reduce long-distance labour migration and to curtail emigration to neighbouring colonies. This study reveals that the impact of population politics in Angola often remained more modest than planned, insofar as their implementation was severely hampered by the 'weakness' of the colonial state and by the attitudes and actions of many Africans themselves. These last did often not approve of Portuguese goals and methods and sought to evade medical and administrative control. Moreover, this dissertation consistently argues that both the discourse of population decline and the particular policies conceived and implemented were not unique to Angola. They were embedded in and shaped by broader contemporary debates and practices that transcended colonial and imperial boundaries.

This chapter covers evangelical resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees from 1975 to the early 1980s. During this time, a number of evangelical organizations ran resettlement ministries and refugee service programs. This chapter describes the professionalization of evangelical refugee resettlement, including the founding of the first evangelical resettlement agency, World Relief Refugee Services. Evangelical volunteers and former missionaries to Vietnam played a significant role in running recreational and educational activities in the refugee resettlement camps in the mid-1970s. These “missionaries without a country” became an important resource for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which relied on their interpreting and translating services. By differentiating between mainstream evangelical and progressive evangelical responses to the government’s appeal for evangelical sponsors, this chapter shows that evangelicals’ political stances on the US involvement in Vietnam fundamentally shaped their response to the refugees.