Articles de revues sur le sujet « Aid-governance »

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1

Kaufmann, Daniel. « Aid Effectiveness and Governance ». Development Outreach 11, no 1 (février 2009) : 26–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1020-797x-11_1_26.

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Rajan, Raghuram, et Arvind Subramanian. « Does Aid Affect Governance ». American Economic Review 97, no 2 (1 avril 2007) : 322–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.2.322.

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Brazys, Samuel. « Aid and Governance : Negative Returns ? » European Journal of Development Research 28, no 2 (16 avril 2015) : 294–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2014.77.

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Ear, Sophal. « Does Aid Dependence Worsen Governance ? » International Public Management Journal 10, no 3 (23 août 2007) : 259–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10967490701515580.

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Zanger, Sabine C. « Good Governance and European Aid ». European Union Politics 1, no 3 (octobre 2000) : 293–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116500001003002.

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Hoeven, R. van der. « Assessing Aid and Global Governance ». Journal of Development Studies 37, no 6 (août 2001) : 109–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713601085.

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NAIR, SHEILA. « Governance, Representation and International Aid ». Third World Quarterly 34, no 4 (mai 2013) : 630–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.786287.

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8

Brautigam, Deborah. « Governance, economy, and foreign aid ». Studies In Comparative International Development 27, no 3 (septembre 1992) : 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02687132.

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Busse, Matthias, et Steffen Gröning. « Does foreign aid improve governance ? » Economics Letters 104, no 2 (août 2009) : 76–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.002.

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Doucouliagos, Chris, Jack Hennessy et Debdulal Mallick. « Health aid, governance and infant mortality ». Journal of the Royal Statistical Society : Series A (Statistics in Society) 184, no 2 (23 mars 2021) : 761–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rssa.12679.

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Khan, Mushtaq H. « Aid and Governance in Vulnerable States ». ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 656, no 1 (9 octobre 2014) : 59–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716214543900.

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Bangladesh and Pakistan had very different experiences with aid after 1971. Politics in Pakistan was less inclusive in terms of opportunities for intermediate (middle- and lower-middle-) class political entrepreneurs, and the dominance of military aid to Pakistan exacerbated the problem by allowing the top leadership to continue to rule without sharing much power with these classes. This not only had negative effects on the evolution of Pakistan’s politics but also slowed down the growth of a broad-based manufacturing sector. In contrast, in Bangladesh the less centralized organization of political power and less concentrated forms of aid allowed intermediate-class political entrepreneurs to improve their access to resources and created opportunities for many of them to enter productive manufacturing activities such as the garments industry. Differences in patterns of aid can help to explain significant differences in economic and political outcomes in the two countries. These experiences challenge conventional ideas about the relationship among aid, good governance, and security. Designing aid policies so that aid can assist developing countries in improving their economic and political viability requires a better understanding of the complex relationships between aid and the political economies of recipient countries.
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Johnson, John. « Aid and good governance in Africa ». Round Table 80, no 320 (octobre 1991) : 395–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358539108454060.

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McAuslan, Patrick. « Good Governance and Aid in Africa ». Journal of African Law 40, no 2 (1996) : 168–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855300007749.

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Strong criticisms and statements of concern about corruption and governance in Africa are being voiced more and more often. What is highly significant is that increasingly open and fierce criticism is being voiced by commentators in and from Africa itself. It is this fact that emboldens me to offer the following analysis and set of proposals for addressing the issues of good governance and aid in Africa. I shall concentrate principally on Anglophone Africa in which Jim Read did most of his work.
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Sobhan, Rehman. « Aid and Governance in South Asia ». South Asian Survey 3, no 1-2 (mars 1996) : 245–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097152319600300120.

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Asongu, Simplice A., et Jacinta C. Nwachukwu. « Foreign aid and governance in Africa ». International Review of Applied Economics 30, no 1 (14 septembre 2015) : 69–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02692171.2015.1074164.

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Kasuga, Hidefumi, et Yuichi Morita. « Aid effectiveness, governance and public investment ». Economic Modelling 29, no 2 (mars 2012) : 514–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2011.12.009.

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Qayyum, Unbreen, Musleh-ud Din et Adnan Haider. « Foreign aid, external debt and governance ». Economic Modelling 37 (février 2014) : 41–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.08.045.

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18

Epstein, Gil S., et Ira N. Gang. « Good governance and good aid allocation ». Journal of Development Economics 89, no 1 (mai 2009) : 12–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.010.

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19

Dijkstra, Geske. « Aid and good governance : Examining aggregate unintended effects of aid ». Evaluation and Program Planning 68 (juin 2018) : 225–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2017.09.004.

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20

Egenti, Stanley, Chinedu Nevo, Israel Onwe, Tobechi Faith et Oludare Durodola. « HAS FOREIGN AID IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA ? » International Journal of New Economics and Social Sciences 9, no 1 (28 juin 2019) : 217–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.3045.

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This study investigates foreign aid, quality of governance and human development in West Africa, adopting the Random-Effects Model (REM) of the Panel Data Analysis and Estimated Generalized Least Square (EGLS) estimation technique for 15 West African countries from 1990-2015. Governance Composite Index with Goal Post and Geometric Mean approach on six indicators of governance were constructed to treat foreign aid effects on governance collectively. Results showed that most foreign aids improve human development (income, life expectancy, and education). However, some foreign aids weaken the quality of governance. The researchers recommended that government should have little or no role in foreign aid influx into the economy; rather, foreign aid should be channeled through tax effort and private investment. More so, donors should concentrate on poor countries with good institutions if foreign aid must be channeled through government expenditure. Finally, an independent body should ensure mutual accountability between recipients and donors routinely to ensure foreign aid improves human development without weakening governance quality.
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Sahqani, G. B. « Aid and Governance : issues in developing countries ». SocioEconomic Challenges 1, no 2 (2017) : 34–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/sec.1(2).34-38.2017.

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Epstein, Gil S., et Ira N. Gang. « Poverty and Governance : The Contest for Aid ». Review of Development Economics 13, no 3 (août 2009) : 382–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2009.00496.x.

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Feeny, Simon. « Foreign Aid and Fiscal Governance in Melanesia ». World Development 35, no 3 (mars 2007) : 439–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.04.002.

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Araral, Eduardo. « Is Foreign Aid Compatible with Good Governance ? » Policy and Society 26, no 2 (janvier 2007) : 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1449-4035(07)70105-4.

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Asongu, Simplice A., et Joseph Nnanna. « Foreign Aid, Instability, and Governance in Africa ». Politics & ; Policy 47, no 4 (26 juillet 2019) : 807–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/polp.12320.

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26

Fielding, David. « Health aid and governance in developing countries ». Health Economics 20, no 7 (3 avril 2011) : 757–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hec.1631.

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27

Kébré, W. Jean Marie. « Does Foreign Aid Promote Financial Development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ? » Research in Economics and Management 5, no 2 (21 mai 2020) : p39. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/rem.v5n2p39.

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This article analyzes relationship between foreign aid and financial development in ECOWAS countries. These countries receive aid flows from developed countries and from international financial institutions. The article’s idea is to evaluate this aid effects on financial development and to assess role of governance on this relationship. The analysis uses panel data from ECOWAS countries over the period 1984-2016. The estimations’ results, based on Dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator, show that aid is negatively and significantly linked with financial development indicators used. These results suggest that aid is an obstacle to financial development. Governance role tests do not change the negative effect of aid on financial development. However, the magnitude of the negative effect of interactive variables (with governance variables) is less than aid direct effect on financial development. These results suggest that an additional effort to improve governance in these countries would reduce aid negative effect on financial development, or even reverse this effect.
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28

Mamoon, Mahjabeen. « Does Political Instability in Developing Countries Attract More Foreign Aid ? » International Journal of Economics and Finance 8, no 1 (24 décembre 2015) : 208. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v8n1p208.

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<p>While foreign aid has many determinants, an important factor influencing aid allocation is the political risk prevailing in the aid receiving country. This paper uses panel approach to investigate empirically how different political instabilities in the aid receiving country influence aid allocation by donors. The paper specifies and estimates models using fixed effect and random effect approach that explain the allocation of net per capita ODA among 50 developing countries over the period 1990-2012. Out of the total eight risk indices used, five exerts a significant impact on aid allocation of which four are indicators of governance while the fifth is an indicator of internal conflict. Based on the models, there is a negative relationship between corruption and aid flow indicating donors’ intolerance for malfeasance. However, the significantly positive association between aid flow and other three governance indicators- government stability, law and order and bureaucratic quality is questionable. While addressing the concept of governance in the development agenda reflects donors’ increasing concern for aid effectiveness, the rise in aid inflow with the worsening of government stability, law and order and bureaucratic quality leads to one critical question- Are donors aiding bad governance? Based on the positive significance of poor governance and the insignificance of the socioeconomic condition on aid flow, the paper argues that donors are motivated by self-interest rather than altruistic nature.</p>
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29

Ji Woong, Yoon, et Kim Eun Ju. « Does Aid Improve Governance in Developing Countries ? Different Effects by Multi-Dimensional Governance ». Korean Journal of Policy Studies 30, no 2 (31 août 2015) : 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps30201.

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This paper examines whether aid to developing countries has achieved the policy goals of international development, which have tended to place considerable emphasis on the improvement of governance in developing countries. Previous studies have explored this issue by conceptualizing governance in terms of one aspect or by conducting micro-level case studies. In contrast, in this paper we try to analyze the effect of aid on governance by suggesting a new conceptual framework that defines governance as made up of three parts. political, administrative, and judicial sectors. Then we analyze the effects of aid on these three sectors at macro level using a panel analysis of 90 developing countries over the 10-year period from 2002 to 2011. We found that aid helped improve political and administrative governance but not judicial governance. Based on our results, we suggest that strategies for governance improvement need to focus on public administration, since this appears to be the sector that is most amenable to reform. In addition, considering that judicial reform requires a long-term outlook to accumulate social trust, we need to put more effort into genuinely understanding the context of developing countries and into promoting reform based on their unique historical and cultural backgrounds as well as their political and socioeconomic circumstances.
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Savun, Burcu, et Daniel C. Tirone. « Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool ». Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no 8 (5 mai 2017) : 1607–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002717704952.

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Is foreign aid effective in reducing terrorism? The existing evidence is mostly negative. We argue that this pessimistic outlook on the efficacy of aid as a counterterrorism tool is partly a function of focusing on only one type of aid: economic aid. Governance and civil society aid can dampen the participation in and support for terrorism by altering the political conditions of a country. We expect countries that receive high levels of governance and civil society aid to experience fewer domestic terrorist incidents than countries that receive little or none. Using a sample of aid eligible countries for the period from 1997 to 2010, we find that governance and civil society aid is effective in dampening domestic terrorism, but this effect is only present if the recipient country is not experiencing a civil conflict. Our findings provide support for the continued use of democracy aid as a counterterrorism tool.
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Fon, Roger, et Ilan Alon. « Governance, foreign aid, and Chinese foreign direct investment ». Thunderbird International Business Review 64, no 2 (11 février 2022) : 179–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tie.22257.

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32

Booth, David. « Aid, Institutions and Governance : What Have We Learned ? » Development Policy Review 29 (3 décembre 2010) : s5—s26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2011.00518.x.

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Dadasov, Ramin. « European Aid and Governance : Does the Source Matter ? » European Journal of Development Research 29, no 2 (10 février 2017) : 269–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2016.16.

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De Matteis, Alessandro. « Relevance of poverty and governance for aid allocation ». Review of Development Finance 3, no 2 (avril 2013) : 51–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2013.04.001.

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Reinsberg, Bernhard. « Blockchain technology and the governance of foreign aid ». Journal of Institutional Economics 15, no 3 (26 novembre 2018) : 413–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137418000462.

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AbstractBlockchain technology has been considered a vehicle to foster development in poor countries by promoting applications such as secure delivery of humanitarian aid, digital identity services, and proof of provenance. This article examines whether (and if so, how) blockchain technology can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of foreign aid governance, thereby moving beyond completely anonymous contexts. Foreign aid governance is plagued by lack of credible commitments among states, which are further exacerbated by information asymmetries and which often undermine aid effectiveness. In this context, blockchain technology holds two promises. First, through the guaranteed execution of smart contracts, it can strengthen the credibility of state commitments, for example collective burden-sharing rules among a group of donors or recipient country compliance with policy conditionality in return for aid. Second, through leveraging prediction markets, blockchain technology can allay information problems related to the verification of real-world events along the entire aid delivery chain.
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In’airat, Mohammad. « Aid allocation, selectivity, and the quality of governance ». Journal of Economics Finance and Administrative Science 19, no 36 (juin 2014) : 63–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jefas.2014.03.002.

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Schneider, Aaron. « Aid and Governance : Doing Good and Doing Better ». IDS Bulletin 36, no 3 (juillet 2005) : 90–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2005.tb00226.x.

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Sharma, Kishor. « Foreign Aid, Governance and Economic Development in Nepal ». Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 33, no 2 (décembre 2011) : 95–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2011.10779380.

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39

Cooksey, Brian. « Aid, governance and corruption control : a critical assessment ». Crime, Law and Social Change 58, no 5 (12 janvier 2012) : 521–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10611-011-9359-5.

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40

Gani, Azmat. « Governance and foreign aid in Pacific Island countries ». Journal of International Development 21, no 1 (janvier 2009) : 112–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jid.1480.

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41

Petrikova, Ivica. « Aid for food security : does it work ? » International Journal of Development Issues 14, no 1 (7 avril 2015) : 41–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijdi-07-2014-0058.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to contribute to existing literature by examining whether development aid has any measurable impact on food security, whether the impact is conditioned on the quality of governance and whether it differs based on the type of aid provided. Design/methodology/approach – Panel-data analysis of 85 developing countries between 1994 and 2011, using generalized method of moments and two-stage least squares estimators. Findings – The paper finds that aid in general has a small positive impact on food security; that multilateral aid, grants and social and economic aid have a positive effect on food security in their own right, and that bilateral aid, loans and agricultural aid are more conditioned on the quality of governance that other aid. Research limitations/implications – The main limitations rest with the imperfect nature of cross-country data on food security and governance, which I have tried to overcome through a series of robustness tests. Practical implications – The findings suggest that aid, despite its many deficiencies, can play a positive role in strengthening food security. Furthermore, they indicate that concessional loans, bilateral aid and agricultural aid are likely to foster food security only in countries with better governance. Originality/value – The paper constitutes a novel contribution to existing literature because it is one of the first to use cross-country data to explore the impact of aid on food security and because it utilizes a relatively complex aid categorization, which allows its conclusions to be more nuanced.
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Cassimon, Danny, Olusegun Fadare et George Mavrotas. « The Impact of Food Aid and Governance on Food and Nutrition Security in Sub-Saharan Africa ». Sustainability 15, no 2 (11 janvier 2023) : 1417. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su15021417.

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The paper focuses on the impact of food aid and governance quality (the latter disaggregated in different components) on both food and nutrition security in the SSA region and for a sample of 25 countries over the period 1996 to 2018. The main novelty and contribution of the paper in the relevant literature is by providing macro-level evidence in the SSA region to complement country-specific evidence in this research area. We also use different food and nutrition security outcome measures, which include the average value of food production, average dietary energy supply adequacy, and prevalence of undernourishment. Furthermore, we combine the above with the use of both aggregated and disaggregated governance indicators to examine the impact of governance quality on the outcome variables. We find evidence of a robust relationship between food aid, governance quality, and food and nutrition security outcomes by employing the GMM estimator. We also find that food aid increases food and nutrition security while it reduces undernourishment. Among the various governance quality indicators we have employed, the control of corruption and political stability show a significant relationship with the measured outcomes. However, the composite governance index and food aid jointly have no significant effect on food security, but they significantly increase nutrition security and reduce undernourishment across the various empirical models we have employed in our empirical analysis. An important policy lesson emanating from our empirical findings is that controlling corruption and maintaining political stability may have significant implications for enhancing the impact of food aid on food and nutrition security in the region.
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Krawczyk, Weronika. « Aid, Governance and Public Finance Fraud : Evidence from Zimbabwe ». Gospodarka Narodowa 299, no 3 (30 septembre 2019) : 119–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/gn/111468.

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Krawczyk, Weronika J. « Aid, Governance and Public Finance Fraud : Evidence from Angola ». Politeja 17, no 6(69) (1 octobre 2020) : 19–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/politeja.17.2020.69.02.

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This article examines the process of public finance fraud leading to unjust enrichment of ruling elites in Angola, a resource-rich, yet ironically povertytrapped country, owing to decades of rule of José Eduardo dos Santos. It analyses the phenomenon of political corruption in the Angolan context, translating into mismanagement of public revenues coming from natural resources as a means of attaining private economic benefits and consolidating power. Moreover, by examining cross-border inter-company networks aimed at concealing public assets behind front companies, the author attempts to establish a connection between corruption and illicit financial flows. Ultimately, since political corruption is intrinsically linked to governance, the article looks at the impact of the latter on social development as well as on the effectiveness of development aid granted to Angola. It was written based on secondary resources including existing literature and material evidence. Its findings and conclusions correspond with the overall theory postulated by the academic community, maintaining that natural resources and aid have negative impact on governance, institutional accountability, and in consequence on human development, especially in countries characterised by despotic rule.
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Hout, Wil. « Good Governance and Aid : Selectivity Criteria in Development Assistance ». Development and Change 33, no 3 (juin 2002) : 511–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.00265.

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Bräutigam, Deborah A., et Stephen Knack. « Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub‐Saharan Africa ». Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no 2 (janvier 2004) : 255–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/380592.

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Sally, Razeen. « AID, DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE : NEW INITIATIVES AND REHASHED IDEAS ». Economic Affairs 25, no 3 (septembre 2005) : 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2005.00575.x.

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Kangoye, Thierry. « Does Aid Unpredictability Weaken Governance ? Evidence from Developing Countries ». Developing Economies 51, no 2 (26 mai 2013) : 121–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/deve.12008.

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Mikhaylova, Marina. « Project Governance beyond Foreign Aid : Mediating Neoliberalism in Lithuania ». PoLAR : Political and Legal Anthropology Review 41, no 2 (novembre 2018) : 290–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/plar.12270.

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Carbone, Maurizio. « The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-ordination ». Third World Quarterly 31, no 1 (février 2010) : 13–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436590903557306.

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