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Mahmood, Faiq, Amir Inam Bhutta et Muhammad Usman. « Effect of Executive Ownership on the Relationship between Agency Cost and Equity Mispricing ». Global Social Sciences Review IV, no IV (30 octobre 2019) : 171–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2019(iv-iv).23.
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The purpose of the current work is to investigate the influence of agency cost on equity mispricing for the firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange during the period from 2008 to 2016. Agency cost is estimated by asset utilization ratio, mispricing is computed by book- to -market ratio and some firms characteristic such as size, profitability and leverage are taken as control variables. Balanced panel method is used to estimate the results. The sample is divided into two parts on the basis of stock mispricing; undervalued and overvalued firms. The influence of agency costs is then separately examined on both sub-samples. Moreover, the effect of managerial ownership on the relationship between agency cost and mispricing is investigated. Results show that agency cost is positively linked with equity mispricing. Moreover, findings demonstrate that for undervalued firms, effect of agency costs is stronger but for overvalued firm, it is weaker and negative. Results are consistent with previous studies.
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Sackley, William H. « Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity ». CFA Digest 35, no 4 (novembre 2005) : 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v35.n4.1790.
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Jensen, Michael C. « Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity ». Financial Management 34, no 1 (mars 2005) : 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00090.x.
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Kałdoński, Michał, et Tomasz Jewartowski. « Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and Earnings Management in Companies Listed on WSE ». Economics and Business Review 3 (17), no 1 (2017) : 7–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2017.1.2.
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Jensen, Michael C. « The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance ». European Financial Management 10, no 4 (décembre 2004) : 549–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-7798.2004.00265.x.
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Liu, Chia-Ying, Shiu-Chen Huang et Shieh-Liang Chen. « The Effects of Agency Costs and Insiders’ Shareholdings on Financing Choices ». Asian Journal of Finance & ; Accounting 8, no 1 (16 avril 2016) : 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ajfa.v8i1.9288.
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<p><span style="font-size: medium;">This paper investigates the effects of debt agency cost and equity </span><span style="font-size: medium;">agency cost of current and prior periods on the financing choices of long-term debts, seasoned equity offering, and private equity financings. It also examines the effects of the shareholdings of insiders on the association between both debt and equity agency costs and the choice of financing methods. </span></p>The findings show that both prior and current debt agency costs are positively related to seasoned equity offerings of current period, and both prior and current debt agency costs are positively related to private equity financing of current period regardless of whether the models consider the factor of insiders’ shareholdings. As for equity agency cost, the document indicate that both current and prior equity agency costs are negatively related to current seasoned equity offerings, however, only prior equity agency costs are negatively related to current seasoned equity offerings under considering shareholdings of insiders. Moreover, the shareholdings of insiders would affect the positive association between the corporate debt agency cost and seasoned equity offerings and the positive association between the corporate equity agency cost and debt financing.
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Warr, Richard S., William B. Elliott, Johanna Koëter-Kant et Özde Öztekin. « Equity Mispricing and Leverage Adjustment Costs ». Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, no 3 (17 janvier 2012) : 589–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109012000051.
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AbstractWe find that equity mispricing impacts the speed at which firms adjust to their target leverage (TL) and does so in predictable ways depending on whether the firm is over- or underlevered. For example, firms that are above their TL and should therefore issue equity (or retire debt) adjust more rapidly toward their target when their equity is overvalued. However, when a firm is undervalued but needs to reduce leverage, the speed of adjustment is much slower. Our findings support the role of equity mispricing as an important factor that alters the cost of making capital structure adjustments.
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Bargeron, Leonce, et Alice Bonaime. « Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers ? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information ». Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55, no 8 (18 octobre 2019) : 2431–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851.
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Though short sellers on average succeed at identifying overvalued equity, firms often signal disagreement with short sellers by repurchasing stock when short interest increases. We investigate whether this disagreement reflects a myopic defense of inflated prices, or positive private information. These repurchases appear motivated by managers’ private information, not agency issues, even when managerial benefits to short-termism are enhanced or monitoring is weaker. Managers’ informational advantage relates to subsequent news, earnings, and risk, but is attenuated if activists target management or insiders sell. A trading strategy based on our findings earns 7.5% annually.
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Krishnaswamy, C. R. « An analysis of the performance of private equity : Agency cost approach ». Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no 3 (2009) : 424–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c4p1.
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In this paper, we explore the effects of agency costs on the performance of private equity. We discuss why private equity firms generally have much lower agency costs. We show using Capital Asset Pricing Model approach that private equity funds would be better off by investing in firms with low beta than high beta firms.
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Majeed, Muhammad Ansar, Xianzhi Zhang et Muhammad Umar. « Impact of investment efficiency on cost of equity : evidence from China ». Journal of Asia Business Studies 12, no 1 (2 janvier 2018) : 44–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jabs-09-2015-0163.
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Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of investment efficiency on cost of equity capital. Design/methodology/approach Prior research indicated that any governance mechanism which reduces the agency conflict reduces the cost of equity capital. This study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency represents such governance mechanism which reduces agency conflict and hence cost of equity. The authors use price earning growth ratio (Easton, 2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model for the measurement of cost of equity while investment efficiency measure of Biddle et al. (2009) have been employed to examine the association. We also use Chen et al. (2013) measure of investment efficiency for robustness. Findings The results show that investment efficiency is negatively associated with cost of equity. It was also found that there is a strong relationship of investment efficiency with cost of equity for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), while no significant relationship is found for state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, overinvestment is significantly associated with cost of equity capital. However, no significant relationship was found between underinvestment and cost of equity. Originality/value The results provide empirical support to the argument that investment efficiency acts as a mechanism which represents lower agency conflict. Moreover, the findings provide evidence that government act as “deep pocket” while NSOEs are punished by investors for inefficient resource allocation. This study also proposes that there is a positive relationship between overinvestment and cost of equity.
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Chen, Kevin C. W., Zhihong Chen et K. C. John Wei. « Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital ». Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, no 1 (17 septembre 2010) : 171–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109010000591.
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AbstractIn this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity and the impact of agency problems from free cash flow (FCF) on this effect. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights have a significantly lower implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, price momentum, analysts’ forecast biases, and industry and year effects than do firms with weak shareholder rights. Further analysis shows that the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity is significantly stronger for firms with more severe agency problems from FCFs.
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Hwang, Induck, Hyungtae Kim et Sangshin Pae. « Equity-Based Compensation For Outside Directors And Cost Of Equity Capital ». Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 30, no 1 (30 décembre 2013) : 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v30i1.8277.
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<p>This study provides evidence on the association between equity-based compensation for outside directors and the implied cost of equity capital. Based on the premise that equity-based compensation for outside directors better aligns the interests of the directors with those of shareholders, we investigate whether the more equity-based compensation is granted to outside directors, the lower cost of equity capital firms enjoy. We find a negative relationship between the proportion of equity-based compensation to total compensation for outside directors and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that equity-based compensation for outside directors, by motivating the directors to play their monitoring role more faithfully, reduces agency risks resulting in the lower cost of equity capital.</p>
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Hasibuan, M. Anggra, et Ardhansyah Putra Harahap. « Analisis Penilaian Harga Wajar Saham Dengan Metode Dividend Discount Model Pada PT Jasamarga Tbk ». Jurnal Multidisiplin Madani 1, no 2 (30 novembre 2021) : 113–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.54259/mudima.v1i2.123.
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Fair Value adalah konsep yang digunakan dalam ekonomi dan keuangan serta akuntansi,. Fair value merupakan estimasi rasional dan tidak biasa atas harga pasar potensial dari barang, jasa atau asset dengan mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor seperti kelangkaan, karakteristik risiko, replacement cost, serta biaya produksi dan distribusi, termasuk Cost Of Capital. Fair Value dapat dilakukan dengan berbagai metode valuasi salah satunya metode valuasi dengan menggunakan pendekatan Dividen Discount Model. Penulisan ilmiah ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui berapa harga wajar saham PT. Jasamarga Tbk dengan menggunakan metode pendekatan Dividen Discount Model dan bagaimana keputusan investasi yang harus diambil oleh investor. Metode penelitian yang digunakan pada penulisan ilmiah ini adalah analisis kuantitatif dengan menghitung estimasi pertumbuhan deviden, Cost Of Equity dan Value Of Equity. Harga wajar saham PT. Jasamarga Tbk dengan Metode Dividen Discount Model, menunjukkan sebesar Rp. 4.340,- atau bersifat Overvalued yang artinya harga pasar saham lebih tinggi dari harga wajar PT. Jasamarga Tbk dan keputusan investasi yang sebaiknya dilakukan adalah tidak membeli saham pada sekarang ini dan menjual (Sell) bagi investor yang telah memiliki saham tersebut.
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Thompson, R. Steve, et Mike Wright. « UK management buy-outs : Debt, equity and agency cost implications ». Managerial and Decision Economics 12, no 1 (février 1991) : 15–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090120103.
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Chen, Zhihong, Yuan Huang et K. C. John Wei. « Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital ». Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, no 3 (juin 2013) : 849–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109013000306.
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AbstractExecutive pay disparity, as measured by chief executive officer (CEO) pay slice (CPS), is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, even after controlling for other determinants of the cost of equity. The difference in the cost of equity can explain 43% of the difference in the valuation effect attributable to CPS reported by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011). Further analysis shows that the positive association is stronger when agency problems of free cash flow are more severe and when CEO succession planning is more important. Our evidence suggests that a large CPS is associated with CEO entrenchment and high succession risk.
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Mohd Waliuddin Mohd Razali. « Disclosure Level and Cost Equity : A Theoretical Framework ». UNIMAS Review of Accounting and Finance 2, no 1 (26 décembre 2019) : 65–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.33736/uraf.1968.2019.
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Nowadays the users of financial reports are more demanding and requesting better information of a company’s performance. With the sophistication in the business environment, disclosure is becoming more important to business communities. The impact of information disclosure in the annual reports to the cost of equity capital is of significant interest to managers. This paper review literatures from many theoretical papers and empirical studies the effect information disclosure on cost equity capital. Many theories being discuss in this paper such as agency cost theory, signaling theory, capital markets transaction hypothesis, and positive accounting theory. Many empirical studies proved that disclosure reduce cost equity capital by reducing the information asymmetry and increasing the companies’ liquidity.
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Cheng, Fu, et Shanshan Ji. « The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plan on the Cost of Equity Capital : Evidence from China ». Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2021 (29 novembre 2021) : 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/4440406.
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Due to the immaturity of bond market and the defects of internal governance structure, Chinese-listed companies have a strong preference for equity financing. How to reduce the cost of equity capital is particularly important for Chinese-listed companies. As an equity incentive system, employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) can reduce the agency conflicts among shareholders, executives, and employees to some extent. These reduced conflicts will, in an efficient capital market, be reflected in a lower cost of equity capital. This paper investigates whether the implementation of ESOP in a new era in China affects the cost of equity capital and further explores whether the impact of ESOP on the cost of equity capital is affected by the ownership nature, the firm size, and the contract design of ESOP. The results show that the implementation of ESOP reduces the cost of equity capital of enterprises. Compared with state-owned enterprises and large enterprises, the implementation of ESOP is more likely to reduce the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises and small enterprises. Furthermore, the reduction effect of ESOP on the cost of equity capital is influenced by the contract design of ESOP. This study not only enriches the literature on the relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity capital but also provides a new idea for listed companies to reduce the cost of equity financing.
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Prabowo, Bombang Hadi. « The Impact of Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Information Asymmetry on the Cost of Equity Capital ». International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science (2147-4478) 6, no 5 (19 septembre 2017) : 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijrbs.v6i5.763.
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This research aims to analyze the impact of Intellectual Capital Disclosure and Information Asymmetry on Cost of Equity Capital and stock prices. It used purporsive sampling and studied LQ 45 companies enlisted in 2014-2015 Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research data gathered through non-partisan observation method and then analyzed with PLS analysis equation. The result shown: (1) Information Asymmetry has positive significance towards stock price; (2) Intellectual Capital has insignificant positive influence towards stock price; (3) Intellectual Capital has insignificant positive influence towards Cost of Equity Capita; (4) Information Asymmetry has insignificant positive towards Cost of Equity Capital; (5) Cost of Equity Capital has insignificant negative influence towards stock price. This research result validate previous researches’ findings especially in agency theory and asymmetry theory.
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Khilji, Yawar Miraj, Shehzad Khan et Muhammad Faizan Malik. « The Effect of Chief Executive Officer Dominance and Shareholder Rights on Cost of Equity Capital in Pakistan ». Global Management Sciences Review V, no III (30 septembre 2020) : 84–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gmsr.2020(v-iii).09.
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This Research explores the effect of Chief executive Dominance and Shareholder rights on Cost of equity of listed companies in an emerging equity market, Pakistan. The research is for the period of 2012 to 2018 for which firm level data of top 100 non-financial listed firms from Pakistan Stock Exchange has been examined by using descriptive statistics, a correlation -matrix, Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Model approach. The impact of controlled variables which includes firm size, Financial Leverage, and Book to market ratio influence on the firms cost of equity has also been investigated. Research results indicate that when Chief executive officers align their interest with that of shareholders, the risk of agency problem is mitigated thus leading to lower cost of equity.
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Negara, Iwan Kusuma. « ANALISIS PENGARUH KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN DAN LEVERAGE TERHADAP NILAI PERUSAHAAN DENGAN AGENCY COST SEBAGAI VARIABEL INTERVENING PADA EMITEN MANUFAKTUR SEKTOR INDUSTRI BARANG KONSUMSI YANG TERDAFTAR DI BURSA EFEK INDONESIA ». Jurnal Riset Manajemen 19, no 1 (14 août 2019) : 49. http://dx.doi.org/10.29303/jrm.v19i1.37.
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This research examines the influence of dividend policy and leverage on firm value with agency cost as an intervening variable in manufacturing companies in the consumer goods industry sector listed at Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 2012-2016. The type of research used is associative research. Anumber of populationin this research are 42 firms. Sampling technique used purposive sampling, so selected 14 firms as research sample.Research variables consist of Dividend policy proxied byDividend Per Share (DPS), Leverage proxied byDebt to Equity Ratio (DER), Agency cost proxied by effectiveness, and firm value proxied byPrice to Book Value (PBV).Data analysis uses simple regression, path analysis, and Sobel test.The research resultindicates that dividend policy has a significant negative effect on Agency cost. Leverage has a negative significant effect on Agency cost. Dividend policy has a significant positive effect on firm value. Leverage has a significant positive effect on firm value. Agency cost has a significant negative effect on firm value. The test results using path analysis and sobel test show that Agency cost is able to mediate the influence of dividend policy on firm value. Nevertheless, Agency cost is unable to mediate the effect of leverage on firm value.
Keywords : Firm value, Dividend policy,Leverage, Agency cost, Intervening variable
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Mitra, Pradip Kumar, et Omkar Naik. « Debt Financing and Agency Cost on Profitability : Are Real Estate Firms’ Performance in India Getting Affected ? » Asia-Pacific Journal of Management Research and Innovation 17, no 1-2 (mars 2021) : 43–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2319510x211048549.
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This article tries to understand the relationship between agency cost, debt financing and Indian real estate companies’ performance. The study attempts to document the effect of debt on the firm’s profitability and then explores the reason behind such an impact by introducing the agency cost as a parameter. The study is conducted in two phases. Phase I is carried out to establish the relationship between debt financing and the firm’s financial performance. In Phase II, the study is conducted to understand the impact of agency cost on debt financing. Firms from the BSE Realty Index were selected for the period 2011–2018. Profitability is measured through return on equity (ROE), whereas debt financing is measured through the firm’s leverage ratio. The agency cost is measured through the asset utilisation ratio and general expense to sales ratio. Panel regression method is used to understand the impact of debt financing and agency cost on the firms’ profitability. The result of Phase I suggests a significant negative relationship between debt financing and the ROE and the result of Phase II suggests a positive relationship between the agency cost and debt financing. This means that reduction in agency cost will lead to lesser amount of debt financing thereby improving the firm’s financial performance.
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Pandey, Krishna Dayal, et Tarak Nath Sahu. « Debt Financing, Agency Cost and Firm Performance : Evidence from India ». Vision : The Journal of Business Perspective 23, no 3 (21 août 2019) : 267–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0972262919859203.
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This empirical investigation attempts to enquire into the relationship among debt financing, agency cost and performance of Indian manufacturing firms. The study tries to document the impact of debt financing on firm performance in two different phases of panel data estimations. In the first phase, the study enquires the effect of debt on firms’ profitability measured by ‘return on equity’. The second phase tries to empirically explain the reason behind such impact by introducing agency cost. Considering the manufacturing firms traded in the BSE 200 Index from 2009–2016, the study documents a significant and negative effect of debt on firm performance. The magnitude of debt is also found to be positively affecting the agency cost measured by ‘general and administrative expenses’. So the negative effect of debt on firm performance is reinforced and justified as debt is also found to elevate the agency costs for the firms.
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Harith, Samir, et Ruth Helen Samujh. « Small Family Businesses : Innovation, Risk and Value ». Journal of Risk and Financial Management 13, no 10 (14 octobre 2020) : 240. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm13100240.
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This article reviews the literature and applies principal-to-principal (PP) conflict theory to small family based businesses. The lack of accurate measurement and communication of risk leading to issues with innovation, is the primary cause of PP agency costs. Careful analysis of the risk levels reflected in the cost of debt and opportunity cost of equity provides a theoretically robust and empirically estimable process for ascertaining the true PP agency cost. Awareness of the constraining governance structures and the suggested method, based on the cost of capital, to assess small business risk can assist SME owners and financiers to SMEs to promote business efficiency and innovation.
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Casotti, Felipe Pretti, et Luiz Felipe Jacques da Motta. « Oferta Pública Inicial no Brasil (2004-2006) : Uma Abordagem da Avaliação através de Múltiplos e do Custo de Capital Próprio ». Brazilian Review of Finance 6, no 2 (11 octobre 2008) : 157. http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/rbfin.v6n2.2008.1303.
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The pricing process of new shares in IPOs has been under study in several countries. This paper initially looks at the valuation process using multiples and seeks to classify the new shares under two categories: underpriced or overpriced at the time of the IPOs. Analysis of the cost of equity, comparing betas at the time of the offerings (usually calculated as the betas of comparable companies) and the betas of the companies after 12 months of trading, is also carried out. Companies in the sample are those that went public between 2004 and 2006. Results indicated that companies were not undervalued, even after some high short-term returns. However there is no statistical evidence that they were overvalued. Finally, results indicated that betas after twelve months of trading are significantly higher than the comparable companies’ betas used at the time of the IPOs.
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Jabbouri, Imad, et Abdelillah El Attar. « Does a high dividend payout ratio signal proper corporate governance or high agency cost of debt ? » Corporate Ownership and Control 14, no 2 (2017) : 51–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv14i2art5.
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This paper examines the relationship between dividend policy and the cost of debt in Morocco. The results show that high dividend payments reflect a low level of agency costs of equity and low information asymmetries. Consequently, creditors demand lower return for providing their capital to high dividend-paying firms. The findings reveal that creditors are less concerned with agency costs of debt. The study shows that the negative relationship between dividend payout ratios and cost of debt is more pronounced in firms with higher information asymmetries.
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Wang, Kehluh, Yi-Hsuan Chen et Szu-Wei Huang. « Agency Theory and Flotation Methods in Seasoned Equity Offerings : The Case in Taiwan ». Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 11, no 04 (décembre 2008) : 555–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091508001477.
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The purpose of this study is to examine the impacts of alternative flotation methods on price performance of seasoned equity offerings, and to compare the competing hypotheses supported by asymmetric information theory and agency theory. Based on 385 sample issues which were listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2006, we find that the bookbuilding flotation method demonstrates significant positive abnormal returns for issuing firms, whereas the fixed-price method exhibits negative results. The empirical findings support the agency theory in the sense that the bookbuilding procedure offers a mechanism to strengthen the external monitoring provided by blockholders, which can subsequently reduce the agency cost and thus increase the share price. Further cross sectional analysis confirms this argument. The result of the study implies that the governments should take effective actions to help regulate agency problems in emerging markets such as Taiwan.
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Zhai, Dongxue, Xuefeng Zhao, Yanfei Bai et Delin Wu. « Research on the Effectiveness of Deep Learning−Based Agency Cost Suppression Strategy : A Case Study of State−Owned Enterprises in Mainland China ». Systems 10, no 6 (2 décembre 2022) : 242. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems10060242.
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The mixed ownership reform aims to improve the property rights structure of the state−owned enterprises (SOEs) and reduce agency costs, and the current mixed reform strategies mainly include equity blending by introducing external non−state capital, executive assignments, and employee stock ownership. In this paper, 953 valid data of A−shares listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 are used as samples to construct the indicators of mixed reform strategy by the literature statistics method. After obtaining multiple impact indicators, the regression impact model of corporate agency cost suppression strategy is constructed by MATLAB software using a machine learning algorithm. On this basis, the performance of multiple machine learning algorithms is compared, and it is found that the integrated optimization−based bag−boosting model is used to study the effect of hybrid reform strategy to reduce the agency costs of SOEs, and the proportional setting of indicators when the effect is optimal is also explored. Finally, the laws of different influencing factors on the agency costs of enterprises are explored separately by the eigenvalue method. The results of the study show that the proportion of shareholding of the first largest non−state shareholder is sin−functional with the agency costs of SOEs when non−state majority shareholders are introduced into SOEs’ equity mix, and the agency costs tend to decrease after SOEs become privately held enterprises. The greater the number and proportion of supervisors appointed by non−state shareholders, the greater the supervisory restraint effect on SOE managers and the better the effect of suppressing agency costs. The participation of non−state−owned shareholders in the company’s business decisions by appointed executives and the special resource advantages of SOEs intensify the occurrence of the self−interest of appointed executives and the increase of agency costs of SOEs. The implementation of an employee stock ownership plan plays the role of employee supervision and restraint on SOE managers, which reduces the agency costs of SOEs. Based on this, it can provide support for the government to improve the hybrid reform policy and promote the process layer by layer, and also provide theoretical reference for SOEs to deepen the equity mix, incentivize employee shareholding, and empower non−state shareholders to govern and thus reduce agency costs.
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Mardiana, Ana. « The Impact of Corporate Reputation on the Cost of Equity as Mediated by Earnings Quality ». ATESTASI : Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi 4, no 2 (9 juillet 2021) : 217–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.33096/atestasi.v4i2.808.
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Good corporate reputation is important for companies because of their potential for value creation and also as intangible asset which makes it difficult for competitors to replicate it. This research is aimed to investigate the effect of corporate reputation and cost of equity through earning quality as a mediating variable. Corporate reputation is measured by Corporate Image Index. Cost of Equity is measured by Ohlson Method. The earning quality as an intervening variable is measured by Modified Jones. The sample used in this study were non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and Corporate Image Index from 2016 to 2018. The sample was selected using purposive sampling method. The number of sample resulted from this method are 189 companies. This study used path analysis method and supported by SPSS version 23. The theory used in this study is agency theory. Based on statistical results this study indicate that there is no significant relationship between corporate reputation and earning quality but has negative and significant relationship to cost of equity. This study also shows that earning quality has a negative and significant effect on the cost of equity. In addition, Sobel’s test results show that earning quality does not mediate the effect of corporate reputation and cost of equity
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Karimi, Kirima Lucy. « Effects of Agency Banking on Bank Performance : A Case of Equity Bank Meru Branch, Kenya ». Business and Economic Research 8, no 4 (21 novembre 2018) : 100. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ber.v8i4.13941.
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The purpose of this study was to establish the effects of agency banking on bank performance with a focus of Equity Bank Meru Branch, Kenya. The reason for the selection of Equity Bank was because of its large customer base and because of its growth. The study adopted a descriptive research design and the target population was the eighteen agency bank agents. The study used stratified random sampling to select 11 agents that were used in the study. Both quantitative and qualitative data was collected by use of questionnaires with both open and closed ended questions. Data was analyzed and presented using descriptive statistical tools. The study findings indicated that the general cost such as operations and transactions cost were still high even for agency banking, security measures were in place that is physical security though it needed strengthening, transaction security and customer security were not good and needed improvement and the regulations that were in place for agency banking also needed to be improved. The study made the following recommendations: For agent banking operations to be effective, strong internal control systems should be put in place which should be flexible and be evaluated periodically to increase efficiency and effectiveness; there should also be frequent updates of regulations and policies that guide agency banking and procedures that are used in the banking and agency industry in Kenya. Bankers Association in consultation with the Central Bank of Kenya should carry out frequent audit and research in relationship to agency banking to determine any loopholes and challenges in order to advice the banks accordingly. Also banks should work closely with the agents in order to streamline the systems and processes to help achieve efficiency. The results gathered out of the audit and research will help the banks to keep their agents updated.
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Mardiana, Ana. « The Impact of Corporate Reputation on the Cost of Equity as Mediated by Earnings Quality ». Atestasi : Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi 4, no 2 (30 septembre 2021) : 217–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.57178/atestasi.v4i2.268.
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A good corporate reputation is essential for a company because it can create value and an intangible asset that makes it difficult for competitors to replicate. This study investigates the effect of company reputation on the cost of equity through earnings quality as an intervening variable. The Corporate Image Index measures the reputation of the company in this study. The cost of equity is measured using the Ohlson method. Modified Jones measures earnings quality as an intervening variable. The sample used in this study were non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the Corporate Image Index from 2016 to 2018. The sample selection was carried out using the purposive sampling method, with a total sample of 189 companies. This research uses a path analysis method with the help of SPSS version 23 software. The theory used in this research is agency theory. Based on this study's statistical results, the company's reputation does not have a significant effect on earnings quality but has a negative and significant effect on the cost of equity. This study also shows that earnings quality has a negative and significant effect on the cost of equity. In addition, the results of the Sobel test show that earnings quality does not mediate the relationship between company reputation and cost of equity.
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Dewanti, Yossy Octa. « The Effect of Disclosure and Earnings Quality on the Cost of Equity in Indonesia ». International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding 6, no 2 (8 avril 2019) : 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.18415/ijmmu.v6i2.584.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This study aims to examine the effect of disclosure and earnings quality on the cost of equity. The theory used to explain the relationship of each variable in this study is agency theory and signal theory. The population used in this study is a manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2013-2017. The sample selection method used is the purposive sampling method and produced 87 companies as samples. Data analysis in this study used E-Views (Econometric Views). The results of this study succeeded in proving that the higher the disclosure and earnings quality can reduce the cost of equity.
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Li, Shujia. « Research on the impact of equity incentives on corporate tax avoidance ». BCP Business & ; Management 21 (20 juillet 2022) : 14–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v21i.1169.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper selects the data of China's A - share listed companies from 2008 to 2021 as the research sample, to empirically explore the impact of equity incentives on corporate tax avoidance. The result shows that equity incentives can promote corporate tax avoidance, agency cost is an important way for equity incentives to influence on corporate tax avoidance, overseas business significantly promotes the tax avoidance effect of equity incentive, and considering the nature of property rights , equity incentives promote tax avoidance of state-owned enterprises, the role is weaker than that of non-state-owned enterprises .Based on the regression results, it is necessary to grasp the focus of tax inspection, improve the tax law and develop mixed ownership economy.
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Risliana, Febri. « PENGARUH GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN KEBIJAKAN HUTANG TERHADAP AGENCY COST ». Jurnal Riset Ekonomi dan Bisnis 12, no 3 (19 décembre 2019) : 206. http://dx.doi.org/10.26623/jreb.v12i3.1663.
Texte intégralRésumé :
<div class="Section1"><p>Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji bagaimana peran <em>good corporate governance</em> dan kebijakan hutang terhadap <em>agency cost</em>. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode eksplanasi. Variabel yang diteliti adalah variabel bebas yaitu Kepemilikan Manajerial, Kepemilikan Institusional dan Ukuran Dewan Direksi, sedangkan variabel terikat adalah <em>Agency Cost</em>. Populasi penelitian ini adalah perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia, adapun teknik pengambilan sampel yang digunakan adalah <em>purposive sampling</em>. Teknik pengolahan dan analisis data yang digunakan adalah analisis statistik deskriptif dan analisis regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitiah membuktikan bahwa <em>good corporate governance</em> yang diproksi dengan kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusi dan ukuran dewan direksi berpengaruh terhadap agency cost. Kebijakan hutang yang diproksi dengan debt to equity ratio berpengaruh terhadap <em>agency cost</em>.</p><p><em>This study aims to examine how the role of good corporate governance and debt policy towards agency costs. This research uses the explanation method. The variables studied were independent variables namely Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership and Board of Directors Size, while the dependent variable was Agency Costs. The population of this study is companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, while the sampling technique used is purposive sampling. Data processing and analysis techniques used are descriptive statistical analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. The results of the study prove that good corporate governance which is proxied by managerial ownership, institutional ownership and the size of the board of directors influences agency costs. Debt policies which are proxied by the ratio of debt to capital affect agency costs.</em></p><pre> </pre></div>
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Ali, Syed Tauseef, Zhen Yang, Zahid Sarwar et Farman Ali. « The impact of corporate governance on the cost of equity ». Asian Journal of Accounting Research 4, no 2 (14 octobre 2019) : 293–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ajar-08-2019-0062.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Purpose In view of organizational inertia, with the occurrence of a major event, though resource rigidity minimizes, however simultaneously, it increases process rigidity, which creates difficulties in motivating managers and dealing with the agency problem. Therefore, keeping in mind the high demand created by the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and Naya Pakistan Housing Scheme in the cement sector of Pakistan, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) on the cost of equity (COE) in the cement sector, to deal with the problems surging during and after the completion of these projects and highlight further opportunities for the cement sector of Pakistan. Design/methodology/approach CG is a qualitative concept therefore, eight proxies have been used to measure it along with the two control variables. This study uses balance panel data of six years from 2012 to 2017, collected from 18 companies of the cement sector of Pakistan. Descriptive statistics have been used to describe the data, correlation matrix to see the nature of the relationship, and Pooled OLS as the estimation technique, while to analyze the data a statistical package 13 has been used. To measure the COE, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has been used. Findings Regression results suggest that block ownership, insider ownership and the board size are insignificant, while CEO tenure is negatively and significantly associated with the COE. Non-executive directors, independence and CEO duality are insignificant; however, diversity is positively and significantly associated with the COE. Moreover, the mean value of the COE is 8.22 percent for the cement sector, while the coefficient of determination of the model under study is 74 percent. Research limitations/implications This paper is based on the data from the cement sector of Pakistan only. Therefore, this is the reason that these results cannot be generalized on the whole economy of Pakistan. Practical implications This study helps in finding out the COE value specific to the cement sector, which will help this sector to evaluate the capital budgeting decision more precisely and accurately than before. Moreover, the association of diversity as positive, while independence as negative with the COE highlights a room for improvement in the implementation of CG codes by SECP. This study also helps to mitigate the impact of inertia, the after-effects of high demand, and managing the agency problem in the cement sector. Originality/value This is the first study using CG data collected just after the revised promulgation of CG codes in 2012, along with a wide range of eight proxies measuring CG and its impact on the COE in the cement sector.
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Li, Oliver Zhen. « Taxes and Valuation : Evidence from Dividend Change Announcements ». Journal of the American Taxation Association 29, no 2 (1 septembre 2007) : 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jata.2007.29.2.1.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Under the U.S. tax system, dividends are historically taxed at a higher rate than capital gains and thus incur a tax-related penalty. I provide evidence that the dividend tax penalty partially offsets the positive signaling and agency cost effects of dividends for fully taxable individual investors. The level of institutional ownership and the frequency of institutional trading, which proxy for the likelihood that the marginal investor is not a fully taxable individual, mitigate the negative dividend tax effect. My results support the notion that taxes impact equity valuation. I contribute to the literature by isolating dividends' negative tax effect from their positive signaling and agency cost effects.
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Javaid, Hafiz Mustansar, et Snober Javid. « Determining Agency Theory Framework through Financial Leverage & ; Insider Ownership : Evidence from Pakistan ». International Journal of Economics and Finance 9, no 3 (30 janvier 2017) : 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v9n3p21.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Sound practices of corporate governance help firms to lift their performance and bring in investors’ confidence while enabling shareholders’ rights protection, qualifying the legal requirements and spotlight the vast public image about how they are operating their business. Most of the previous literature on agency theory in Pakistan has demonstrated connection among ownership structure on firm performance, value and profitability. This study extends the literature by proposing the effect of change in leverage & insider equity ownership on agency cost mitigation. Proxy is used to measure agency cost: Expense ratio: Operating expense / annual sales. We applied “Fixed effect” method on sample of 41 non-financial firms from four economic groups listed in Pakistan Stock Exchange from the period of 2010-2014. The practical implications of the study is that those investors who desire long term performance of the firm may perhaps invested in those firms which are owned by insiders or containing acceptable amount of debt, for the reason that such firms try to maintain & continue long term performance by agency cost minimization & shareholders’ interests protections.
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Lizarzaburu Bolaños, Edmundo, Luis Berggrun et Kurt Johnny Burneo Farfan. « Corporate governance in emerging markets and its impact on finance performance ». Corporate Ownership and Control 12, no 1 (2014) : 625–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i1c7p2.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This paper reviews the theoretical framework of Corporate Governance and multiple issues in which it is evaluated such as agency costs, asymmetric information, insider trading, manipulation of earnings, Board of Directors, etc. Finally, it is reviewed the impact of Corporate Governance over cost of equity, capital structure and financial performance
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Bizjak, John M., Swaminathan L. Kalpathy et Vassil T. Mihov. « Performance Contingencies in CEO Equity Awards and Debt Contracting ». Accounting Review 94, no 5 (1 novembre 2018) : 57–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-52317.
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ABSTRACT We find that firms that grant performance-contingent (p-c) equity awards with accounting-based vesting conditions to their CEOs have lower cost of debt and less restrictive loan terms. The benefits of p-c accounting-based awards on debt financing are greater when the moral hazard problem faced by debtholders is potentially more significant—for example, for firms with poorer credit ratings and lower asset tangibility. We find some evidence that certain types of p-c equity awards with stock price-based conditions increase the cost of debt financing. The adoption of p-c accounting-based awards increases firm value, as indicated by stock and bond event studies. Overall, our findings suggest that the incentive compatibility of accounting-based p-c awards mitigates the potential agency conflict between shareholders and debtholders. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; J33; M12; M52.
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Odat, Mahmoud A., Khaldoon Ahmad Al Daoud et Ziad Mohammad Zurigat. « Corporate governance and the cost of equity : Evidence from the developing country ». Journal of Governance and Regulation 10, no 4 (2021) : 144–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgrv10i4art13.
Texte intégralRésumé :
This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on a firm’s cost of equity. The corporate governance mechanisms examined consist of board size, board independence, CEO duality, multiple directorships held by board members, and board political influence. To accomplish the study objective, 210 firm-year observations for manufacturing companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in the period 2014–2018 are analyzed using panel data analysis techniques. The results of the fixed effects regression model reveal that CEO duality and board political influence negatively affect the cost of equity, while there is no significant effect of board size, board independence, and multiple directorships on the cost of equity. The results suggest that firms’ board of directors is an important factor in mitigating the agency problem suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They also suggest that information risk is priced, which is consistent with previous research such as Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), and that the board of directors plays a role in reducing that risk in capital markets.
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Muslim, Ade Imam, et Doddy Setiawan. « Information Asymmetry, Ownership Structure and Cost of Equity Capital : The Formation for Open Innovation ». Journal of Open Innovation : Technology, Market, and Complexity 7, no 1 (29 janvier 2021) : 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/joitmc7010048.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Our study aims to investigate how information asymmetry and ownership structure affect cost of equity capital. For that purpose, we collected 246 issuers over 4 years for a total of 984 observations. By using panel data processing, we found that the information asymmetry we proxied through Price non-Synchronization and trading volume had an effect on the cost of equity capital. Our results also confirmed both Agency Theory and Pecking Order Theory. Both theories are in line with the conditions of the stock market in Indonesia. In addition, we found that institutional and foreign ownership structures also had an effect on the cost of equity capital. Furthermore, our results also confirmed Interest Alignment Theory and Entrenchment Theory. Our research is expected to contribute to the debate on the existence of information asymmetry and ownership structures in relation to the cost of equity capital. We also hope that it will be a valuable input for investors in considering their investment. Moreover, from the results of this study, investors can also consider foreign ownership or institutional ownership in determining their investment. In addition, stock market regulators in Indonesia can develop approaches to minimize information asymmetry and encourage foreign investors to invest in Indonesia.
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Mazlan, Ahmad Rizal, Afiruddin Tapa, Nasaruddin Md Yusoff et Ali Badron Mokhtar. « The Relationship between Agency Cost and Corporate Performance among Manufacturing Companies in Malaysia ». Indian-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Finance 3, no 3 (1 juillet 2019) : 38–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.52962/ipjaf.2019.3.3.81.
Texte intégralRésumé :
The relationship between agency cost and corporate performance of manufacturing companies is examined in this study. The sample of this study is based on companies listed in Bursa Malaysia for the period from 2011 to 2016. A regression analysis was done and corporate performance is regressed against the predictor variables which where leverage, size, growth, expense, and efficiency. Data for both the dependent and predictor variables were obtained from Bursa Malaysia. This study found that in the model, three out of five proxy of agency costs are significantly related to corporate performance which measured by return on equity (ROE). The three variables which significantly related to corporate performance (ROE) are efficiency, leverage, and size with p-value 0.0226, 0.0002 and 0.0002 respectively. The other two variables found that not significantly related to corporate performance (ROE) which are company growth and expense with p-value 0.6915 and 0.3871 respectively. Hence the study found that agency cost to be significantly related to corporate performance.
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Reddy, Y. V., et Pinkesh Dhabolkar. « Pricing Efficiency of Exchange Traded Funds in India ». Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies 11, no 1 (29 mai 2020) : 244–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/omee.2020.11.33.
Texte intégralRésumé :
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) have two prices, the market price and the net asset value (NAV) price. ETFs NAV price gets determined by the net value of the constituent assets, whereas the market price of ETFs depends upon the number of units bought or sold on the stock exchange during trading hours. As per the law of one price, the NAV and market price of the ETF should be the same. However, due to demand and supply forces, the market price may divert from its NAV. This price difference may have significant repercussions to investors, as it represents a cost if they buy overvalued ETF shares or sell undervalued ETF shares. Pricing efficiency is the speed at which the market makers correct the deviations between ETFs NAV and market price. The present study attempts to investigate the pricing efficiency of Indian equity ETFs employing an autoregression model over its price deviation, and also attempts to understand the lead-lag relationship between the price and NAV using the vector error correction model (VECM).
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Choong, Yap Voon, Chan Kok Thim et John Stanley Murugesu. « Does better corporate governance attract foreign equity ownership ? Evidence from Malaysian listed companies ». Corporate Ownership and Control 9, no 4 (2012) : 118–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv9i4art9.
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This study examines the effect of firm-level corporate governance variables on foreign equity ownership (FEO) in Malaysia. Foreign equity ownership can be an important source of capital for companies to fund their expansion and growth. To attract FEO, good corporate governance practices are vital because these practices are used to reduce or mitigate agency cost. Based on a sample of listed firms on Bursa Malaysia and employing multiple regression analysis, the study finds that a number of corporate governance mechanisms significantly improve the ability of companies to attract foreign equity ownership, especially, Insider Ownership, Government Ownership, Firm Size, Dividend Yield and Tobin’s Q. The results of the study indicate that firm-level efforts for better corporate governance sends positive signals and confidence to foreign investors.
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Moon Sub Choi, Paul, et Francis Joonsung Won. « Do firms park capital ? Evidence from the U.S. manufacturing sector ». Investment Management and Financial Innovations 15, no 2 (4 juin 2018) : 194–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.15(2).2018.17.
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This study uses the “cost of carry” (CoC) measure to identify the motive for corporate cash holdings. Based on the historical, moving-average holdings of currency and liquid assets, the measure represents the net opportunity cost of corporate demand for money. This study finds that large manufacturing firms in the U.S. park their capital in short-term assets appealing to the agency motive for cash holdings. Because dividend-paying firms can choose to distribute their capital to equity shareholders when their investment opportunities are unfavorable, these firms might show a non-positive association between capital expenditure and the CoC measure, championing the transactions motive. Still, dividend-paying large firms exhibit an overall positive correlation, suggesting that they park their capital on the agency motive. A detailed literature review and discussions are followed.
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Suzuki, Yasushi, et Mohammad Dulal Miah. « Altruism, reciprocity and Islamic equity finance ». International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 9, no 2 (20 juin 2016) : 205–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/imefm-09-2014-0091.
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Purpose This paper argues how Islamic altruism and reciprocity can enhance or drain the supply of Islamic equity finance. The paper also analyzes the feasibility of Islamic equity finance through the lens of new institutional economics (NIE) and transaction cost economics (TCE). Design/methodology/approach One of the salient contributions by NIE is to support the proposition that effective contracting depends greatly on institutions in terms of “rules that constrain economic behavior”, including informal or intangible institutions, such as religion, culture and customary practices. This paper draws on the theoretical contributions of the NIE and TCE and applies some of these contributions to an analysis of general altruism and reciprocity in Islamic economies. Findings It is said that solutions based on the Islamic injunctions (collectively termed as spiritual quotient) could serve to mitigate agency risks. However, in theory, the Muslim principal (particularly fund providers) is exposed to higher agency risk unless appropriate rules of protecting the right of the principal (or of punishing the agent when its opportunistic behavior is revealed) are devised, because the Muslim fund providers have the divine obligation to share risks in enterprise under the profit-loss sharing (PLS) scheme as well as to share a portion of income with the poor or those entrepreneurs who face difficulties in fund-raising. Originality/value Many scholars refer to the lack of the “formal” institutions that hinder the sound development of Islamic venture capital (VC). This paper contributes to shedding an analytical light on the unique feature of the Muslims’ “informal” constraints which make them hesitate to invest in Islamic VC. To develop the Islamic VC market, this paper provides a theoretical background to suggest how important it would be for the national financial system to devise some tangible provisions by installing enterprise-friendly regulations as well as adequate incentive and protection mechanisms consistent with Islamic principles.
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Zulvia, Yolandafitri. « FAMILY OWNERSHIP AS MODERATING VARIABLE ON THE EFFECT OF AGENCY COST ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE : A STUDY IN INDONESIA MANUFACTURING COMPANY ». Jurnal Ilmiah Manajemen dan Bisnis 2, no 2 (5 mai 2020) : 17. http://dx.doi.org/10.38043/jimb.v2i2.2301.
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Family Ownership As Moderating Variable On The Effect Of Agency Cost On Financial Performance: A Study In Indonesia Manufacturing Company. Perusahaan manufaktur merupakan sektor terbesar yang terdapat di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI). Penelitian ini bertuajuan untuk mengetahui seberapa besar pengaruh agency cost terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan manufaktur dengan perusahaan keluarga sebagai variabel moderasi. Agency cost dalam penelitian ini diproksikan dengan expense ratio dan asset utilization ratio, sementara itu kinerja keuangan perusahaan diproksikan dengan Return on Equity (ROE). Populasi penelitian ini adalah seluruh perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indoneia (BEI) periode 2013-2017 dan sampel dipilih berdasarkan metode purposive sampling sehingga diperoleh sampel sebanyak 310 perusahaan-tahun pengamatan. Data penelitian merupakan data sekunder yang diambil dari situs resmi Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI). Penelitian ini menggunakan regresi panel sebagai alat analisisnya. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa expense ratio memiliki pengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan. Kemudian untuk asset utilization ratio memiliki pengaruh positif signifikan terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan. Sementara itu, Kepemilikan keluarga sebagai variabel moderasi tidak memperkuat ataupun memperlemah hubungan antara expense ratio dan asset utilization ratio terhadap kinerja keuangan perusahaan. Kata Kunci : Biaya Keagenan, Kepemilikan Keluarga, ROE
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Chu, Ei Yet, et Kooi Guan Cheah. « Does ownership structure matter ? Evidence from Malaysian equity market ». Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no 1 (2006) : 77–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i1p6.
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The paper examines the determinants of ownership structure characteristics of the 147 firms listed on main board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). Three dimensions of governance issues in firm theory:- asymmetric information, agency conflicts and risk as discussed in Putterman (1993) are used to assess the effects of ownership concentration. Ownership concentration is divided into dispersed, dominant minority, and majority controlled firms, while ownership identities are classified as family controlled, conglomerate, others institution, state, foreign and dispersed firms in explaining the above determinants of firm’s ownership. With the exception of leverage and year effects, we prove that ownership structure is able to extract cost and benefits from governance structure. We further provide evidence that ownership identities influence asymmetric information and risk
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Manzur Quader, Syed, et Michael Dietrich. « Corporate efficiency in the UK : a stochastic frontier analysis ». International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management 63, no 8 (4 novembre 2014) : 991–1011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijppm-07-2013-0125.
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Purpose – Using a panel of 1,122 UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period of 1981-2009, corporate efficiencies are predicted in this paper as inverse proxies of agency cost and the agency cost hypotheses are tested. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach – Stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate corporate efficiency of firms, but from two different perspectives. The long-run and short-run corporate efficiencies are predicted focussing on modern approach of value maximization and traditional approach of profit maximization, respectively. Findings – The estimation results reveal that, an average firm in the sample achieves 74.5 percent of its best performing peer's market value and 86.6 percent of its best performing peer's profit and both of them are highly significant in the analysis. The long-run market value efficiency supports the agency cost of outside equity and the short-run profit efficiency supports the agency cost of outside debt hypothesis. Also there is a positive rank correlation between these two efficiencies which confirms that an average firm in the UK suffers from inefficiency or agency conflicts to a certain extent, no matter whether the firm is driven by short-run or long-run growth perspectives. Research limitations/implications – The predicted broad measures of agency costs in the paper have wider implications in enhancing the understanding of the UK firms’ corporate performance especially when they operate under a relatively free and market based governance and financial system. Originality/value – The work is distinguished by the large panel of UK firms and a long period of time that is considered. Emphasizing on the empirical implications of the distinctions between short-run and long-run efficiency is also novel.
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La Rosa, Fabio, Francesca Bernini et Roberto Verona. « Ownership structure and the cost of equity in the European context ». Meditari Accountancy Research 28, no 3 (2 janvier 2020) : 485–514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/medar-12-2018-0421.
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Purpose Based on the institutionalized agency theory, this paper aims to analyses the role of earnings management (EM) in mediating the relationship between ownership structure (OS) and the cost of equity capital (COE). Design/methodology/approach The authors test the above relationship by investigating a sample of 249 European non-financial listed companies during 2005-2012. The authors adopt different measures for both EM and COE and identify three main types of ownership by the majority share of the ultimate owners. Path analysis is used to explore the role of direct, mediated (i.e. EM) and total effects of OS on COE. Findings While OS directly affects COE, the results support the idea that an EM-mediating effect contributes to further explain this relationship in some ownership structures. Particularly European listed family-owned firms experience lower COE owing to the prevailing direct and negative effect of OS, despite the fact that both accrual and real EM mediate and have a positive effect on COE. In financial institutions-owned firms, only a direct and positive effect can be observed on COE while state-owned firms do not have a direct influence on the COE, although they do reduce real EM, which, in turn, decreases the COE in a mediated effect. Further analysis comparing the Anglo-Saxon context with Continental Europe shows more detailed results. Practical implications The study marks its entry into the international debate on the evolution in the value relevance of accounting information by arguing that the COE implications of EM depend on institutional factors such as OS and the context investigated. Originality/value The paper contributes to extant finance, accounting and corporate governance literature by providing new, robust evidence on the mediating role of EM in defining COE for different ownership types and their diverse risk-taking propensities in Continental Europe, which differs from the Anglo-Saxon context both institutionally and legally.
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Nuryani, Nunung, Tan Thing Heng et Phan Ferah. « Value Relevance of Firms' Reportable Segment Profit or Loss Reconciliation ». GATR Accounting and Finance Review 2, no 3 (23 juin 2017) : 26–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/afr.2017.2.3(4).
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Objective - The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) No.8 adopted in Indonesian GAAP (Statement No. 5, 2012) requires a company to provide a reconciliation of the total of the reportable segments' profit or loss of the firm's profit or loss. The objective of this standard is to improve the value relevance of information in the financial statement. This study aims to investigate the value relevance of the segment reconciliation and the determinants of segment income dissimilarity, i.e. agency cost, proprietary cost, and audit quality. Methodology/Technique - Data used in this study was a secondary data obtained from 142 manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period 2009 to 2013. Purposive sampling method yielded 59 firms. Two research models were used to test proposed hypotheses. Findings - The results show reconciliation of total of segments' profit or loss of the firms' profit or loss positively affects the market value of equity; this means segments' reconciliation disclosure has value relevance for the investment decisions. In addition, this paper provides evidence that audit quality negatively affects the segment income dissimilarity, while agency cost and proprietary cost have no effect. This is consistent with hypothesis that firms audited by the Big Four tend to avoid disclosure of dissimilarity between firms profit or loss and segment profit or loss. Novelty - Our findings show that audit quality (Big 4 accounting firms) plays an important role in reducing dissimilarity between the sum of segment profit and firm profit (segment profit dissimilarity) Type of Paper: Empirical Keywords: Segment Reconciliation; Value Relevance; Agency Cost; Proprietary Cost; Audit Quality. JEL Classification: M41, M42.