Bibliographies thématiques / Accountability. Inspection Panel / Articles de revues

Articles de revues sur le sujet « Accountability. Inspection Panel »

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Auteur : Grafiati
Publié le 11 mars 2023

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1

Sovacool, Benjamin. « Cooperative or Inoperative ? Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel ». Case Studies in the Environment 1, no 1 (2017) : 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/cse.2017.000463.

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The World Bank remains the largest international financial institution in the world. This case study examines the effectiveness of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. The Inspection Panel makes it possible for citizens and communities to challenge World Bank projects through an independently administered accountability process. Between 1994 and 2016, the World Bank Inspection Panel has received 112 requests for inspection across more than 50 countries. This case study analyzes the history, dynamics, benefits, and barriers to the Inspection Panel, including an assessment of World Bank projects spread across Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Tibet, Togo, and Uzbekistan. On doing so, this case study highlights how Inspection Panels like the one operating at the World Bank can improve and enhance governance outcomes and result in more equitable decision-making processes. Yet there are also limits to what such independent accountability mechanisms can accomplish.
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Lallas, Peter L. « Citizen-Driven Accountability : The Inspection Panel and Other Independent Accountability Mechanisms ». Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 107 (2013) : 308–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/procannmeetasil.107.0308.

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Castro de la Mata, Gonzalo, Zeinab El-Bakri, Jan Mattsson, Dilek Barlas et Jordan Burns. « THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL : ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEARNING ». Il Politico 84, no 1 (25 juin 2019) : 70–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.4081/ilpolitico.2019.53.

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L’Inspection Panel della Banca Mondiale è stato il primo meccanismo indipendente (IAM) finalizzato a ricevere denunce da parte di persone che lamentavano un danno derivante dalla potenziale mancanza di sostegno alle politiche e alle procedure delle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali. Dal 1993 il Panel ha trattato denunce riguardanti i progetti della Banca Mondiale su richiesta delle comunità interessate e ha contribuito a porre rimedio ai relativi danni. L’articolo descrive dettagliatamente questi risultati, con particolare riguardo all’ “apprendimento istituzionale”, soffermandosi inoltre sulla collana Emerging Lessons Series del Panel stesso, una serie di pubblicazioni recenti che riassumono le esperienze derivanti da casi relativi a: reinsediamento involontario, popolazioni indigene, valutazione ambientale, consultazione e divulgazione. L’articolo si conclude con una discussione dei recenti miglioramenti apportati all’attività del Panel, sottolineando il suo ruolo nel promuovere comportamenti responsabili attraverso le procedure operative adottate e il successivo “apprendimento istituzionale”.
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Park, Susan. « Designing accountability, international economic organisations and the World Bank's Inspection Panel ». Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no 1 (18 janvier 2010) : 13–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357710903459990.

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5

LITTLE, PAUL E. « Demanding Accountability : Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel ». American Anthropologist 107, no 3 (septembre 2005) : 514–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/aa.2005.107.3.514.

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Sovacool, Benjamin K. « Monitoring the moneylenders : Institutional accountability and environmental governance at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel ». Extractive Industries and Society 4, no 4 (novembre 2017) : 893–903. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.08.003.

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7

Bin, Gu. « MDBs’ Accountability Mechanism : A Perspective of AIIB ». Journal of World Trade 51, Issue 3 (1 juin 2017) : 409–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2017016.

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Within the sphere of multilateral development banks’ (MDB) dispute settlement, the accountability system is one stellar important development. It is essentially MDBs’ legal efforts to address complaints made by people adversely affected by an MDB-funded project. Such complaints arise from concerns with environmental and social implications, including involuntary resettlement and human rights violations. Under this system, Bank investigators assess Bank staff’s compliance (or noncompliance) with Bank operational policies and procedures relating to project design, appraisal and/or implementation. The World Bank’s Inspection Panel is a leading example for establishing a credible accountability culture and mechanism. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the first MDB initiated by a group of Asian developing countries with China at the centre. The AIIB’s committed high standards can only be possible with a fair and effective accountability mechanism.
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Orakhelashvili, Alexander. « The World Bank Inspection Panel in Context : Institutional Aspects of the Accountability of International Organizations ». International Organizations Law Review 2, no 1 (2005) : 57–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1572374054798323.

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9

Gualtieri, A. G. « The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank to Non-State Actors : Insights from the Inspection Panel ». British Yearbook of International Law 72, no 1 (1 janvier 2002) : 213–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bybil/72.1.213.

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10

Bradlow, Daniel D., et Andria Naudé Fourie. « The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation ». International Organizations Law Review 10, no 1 (2013) : 3–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15723747-01001002.

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International financial institutions (‘IFIs’), such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (‘IFC’), have progressively refined their own operational policies and established institutional accountability mechanisms, such as the Inspection Panel and Compliance Advisory Ombudsman, in response to external and internal demands for their enhanced accountability. This article argues that these two developments are instrumental in transforming IFIs such as the World Bank and the IFC into law-making and law-governed institutions. We argue that the operational policies, as well as the institutional processes surrounding these policies (that is, rule-making, rule-application and rule-enforcement processes), should be assessed in legal terms – even though the legal nature of the operational policies are contested, and the policies are only applicable to IFI staff and their borrowers. The main objective of this article is to provide an analysis in support of this contention.
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11

Sovacool, Benjamin K., Andria Naudé Fourie et May Tan‐Mullins. « Disequilibrium in Development Finance : The Contested Politics of Institutional Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank Inspection Panel ». Development and Change 50, no 4 (19 juin 2018) : 867–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dech.12427.

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12

Lin, Wei-Chung. « Implementing Environmental Treaty Obligations in Project Finance Activities through an Accountability Mechanism : An Analysis of the World Bank Inspection Panel ». Cambridge International Law Journal 5, no 2 (2016) : 238–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/cilj.2016.02.04.

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13

Sinclair, Guy Fiti. « Beyond Accountability ? Human Rights, Global Governance, and the World Bank Inspection Panel ». SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3391646.

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14

Pereira, Alexsandro Eugenio, Rodrigo Rossi Horochovski, Mariana Mattos de Almeida Cruz et Noeli Rodrigues. « Accountability in International Organizations : the case of World Bank Inspection Panel (1993-2015) ». Brazilian Political Science Review 11, no 1 (2017). http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821201700010002.

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Zeng, Shian, et Chengdong Yi. « The impact of accountability on local officials’ behavior in the pandemic prevention and control in China based on utility maximization ». Global Health Research and Policy 7, no 1 (27 septembre 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s41256-022-00268-w.

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Abstract Background The COVID-19 pandemic is a public health crisis and an inspection of national governance systems and crisis response capabilities of countries globally. China has adopted a tough accountability system for officials and has succeeded in containing the spread of the pandemic. This study aimed to assess the impact of accountability on local officials’ behavior in the pandemic prevention and control based on the official promotion tournament theory and utility maximization analysis framework. Methods The panel data of 237 Chinese cities were extracted with local officials’ characteristics, confirmed cases, Baidu migration index, Baidu search index according to city names, and data were excluded with local officials’ relocation or sub-provincial cities between January 1, 2020 and May 5, 2020. Promotion gain and accountability cost were constructed by adopting promotion speed indicator, and the research hypotheses were assumed based on the utility maximization. It was the first time to apply the interaction model to empirically investigate the relationship between the promotion speed of local officials and the COVID-19 confirmed cases. Results Our study showed that the promotion speed of provincial governors and mayors significantly affected the number of confirmed cases (β = − 11.615, P < 0.01). There was a significant interaction between the promotion speeds of provincial governors and mayors (β = − 2594.1, P < 0.01), indicating that they had a coordinated effect on the pandemic control. Additionally, mayors with different promotion speeds made a significant difference in controlling the imported cases and those who promoted faster better controlled the imported cases (β = − 0.841, P < 0.01). Mayors with full-time postgraduate education, titles, and majors in science and engineering had a better effect on controlling the number of confirmed cases. Conclusions Our study provides evidence that the official accountability system has played an important role in containing the pandemic, which suggests that local officials motivated by the accountability system would respond to the pandemic actively for higher utility. Furthermore, provincial governors and mayors have played a coordinated effect in pandemic control. The above evidences reveal that implementing the official accountability system could improve the government’s emergency management capability and the efficiency of pandemic control. Therefore, adopting a strict accountability system could be effective in pandemic containment globally, especially in centralized countries.
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