Bibliographies thématiques / Accountability. Inspection Panel

Littérature scientifique sur le sujet « Accountability. Inspection Panel »

Auteur : Grafiati
Publié le 11 mars 2023

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Articles de revues sur le sujet "Accountability. Inspection Panel"

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Sovacool, Benjamin. « Cooperative or Inoperative ? Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel ». Case Studies in the Environment 1, no 1 (2017) : 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/cse.2017.000463.

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The World Bank remains the largest international financial institution in the world. This case study examines the effectiveness of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. The Inspection Panel makes it possible for citizens and communities to challenge World Bank projects through an independently administered accountability process. Between 1994 and 2016, the World Bank Inspection Panel has received 112 requests for inspection across more than 50 countries. This case study analyzes the history, dynamics, benefits, and barriers to the Inspection Panel, including an assessment of World Bank projects spread across Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Tibet, Togo, and Uzbekistan. On doing so, this case study highlights how Inspection Panels like the one operating at the World Bank can improve and enhance governance outcomes and result in more equitable decision-making processes. Yet there are also limits to what such independent accountability mechanisms can accomplish.
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Lallas, Peter L. « Citizen-Driven Accountability : The Inspection Panel and Other Independent Accountability Mechanisms ». Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 107 (2013) : 308–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/procannmeetasil.107.0308.

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Castro de la Mata, Gonzalo, Zeinab El-Bakri, Jan Mattsson, Dilek Barlas et Jordan Burns. « THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL : ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEARNING ». Il Politico 84, no 1 (25 juin 2019) : 70–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.4081/ilpolitico.2019.53.

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L’Inspection Panel della Banca Mondiale è stato il primo meccanismo indipendente (IAM) finalizzato a ricevere denunce da parte di persone che lamentavano un danno derivante dalla potenziale mancanza di sostegno alle politiche e alle procedure delle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali. Dal 1993 il Panel ha trattato denunce riguardanti i progetti della Banca Mondiale su richiesta delle comunità interessate e ha contribuito a porre rimedio ai relativi danni. L’articolo descrive dettagliatamente questi risultati, con particolare riguardo all’ “apprendimento istituzionale”, soffermandosi inoltre sulla collana Emerging Lessons Series del Panel stesso, una serie di pubblicazioni recenti che riassumono le esperienze derivanti da casi relativi a: reinsediamento involontario, popolazioni indigene, valutazione ambientale, consultazione e divulgazione. L’articolo si conclude con una discussione dei recenti miglioramenti apportati all’attività del Panel, sottolineando il suo ruolo nel promuovere comportamenti responsabili attraverso le procedure operative adottate e il successivo “apprendimento istituzionale”.
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Park, Susan. « Designing accountability, international economic organisations and the World Bank's Inspection Panel ». Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no 1 (18 janvier 2010) : 13–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357710903459990.

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LITTLE, PAUL E. « Demanding Accountability : Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel ». American Anthropologist 107, no 3 (septembre 2005) : 514–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/aa.2005.107.3.514.

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Sovacool, Benjamin K. « Monitoring the moneylenders : Institutional accountability and environmental governance at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel ». Extractive Industries and Society 4, no 4 (novembre 2017) : 893–903. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.08.003.

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Bin, Gu. « MDBs’ Accountability Mechanism : A Perspective of AIIB ». Journal of World Trade 51, Issue 3 (1 juin 2017) : 409–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2017016.

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Within the sphere of multilateral development banks’ (MDB) dispute settlement, the accountability system is one stellar important development. It is essentially MDBs’ legal efforts to address complaints made by people adversely affected by an MDB-funded project. Such complaints arise from concerns with environmental and social implications, including involuntary resettlement and human rights violations. Under this system, Bank investigators assess Bank staff’s compliance (or noncompliance) with Bank operational policies and procedures relating to project design, appraisal and/or implementation. The World Bank’s Inspection Panel is a leading example for establishing a credible accountability culture and mechanism. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the first MDB initiated by a group of Asian developing countries with China at the centre. The AIIB’s committed high standards can only be possible with a fair and effective accountability mechanism.
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Orakhelashvili, Alexander. « The World Bank Inspection Panel in Context : Institutional Aspects of the Accountability of International Organizations ». International Organizations Law Review 2, no 1 (2005) : 57–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1572374054798323.

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Gualtieri, A. G. « The Environmental Accountability of the World Bank to Non-State Actors : Insights from the Inspection Panel ». British Yearbook of International Law 72, no 1 (1 janvier 2002) : 213–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bybil/72.1.213.

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Bradlow, Daniel D., et Andria Naudé Fourie. « The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation ». International Organizations Law Review 10, no 1 (2013) : 3–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15723747-01001002.

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International financial institutions (‘IFIs’), such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (‘IFC’), have progressively refined their own operational policies and established institutional accountability mechanisms, such as the Inspection Panel and Compliance Advisory Ombudsman, in response to external and internal demands for their enhanced accountability. This article argues that these two developments are instrumental in transforming IFIs such as the World Bank and the IFC into law-making and law-governed institutions. We argue that the operational policies, as well as the institutional processes surrounding these policies (that is, rule-making, rule-application and rule-enforcement processes), should be assessed in legal terms – even though the legal nature of the operational policies are contested, and the policies are only applicable to IFI staff and their borrowers. The main objective of this article is to provide an analysis in support of this contention.
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Thèses sur le sujet "Accountability. Inspection Panel"

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Gugliotta, Oscar. « I Meccanismi di accountability delle Istituzioni finanziarie multilaterali : dall’Inspection Panel della Banca Mondiale al Project-Affected People’s Mechanism dell’Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ». Doctoral thesis, Luiss Guido Carli, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/11385/223978.

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Accountability e responsabilità delle istituzioni finanziarie multilaterali nel diritto internazionale. La nascita dei meccanismi di controllo (Independent Accountability Mechanisms – IAMs). I meccanismi indipendenti di accountability (IAMs) delle principali MFIs: composizione, competenze, procedure e funzioni. I diversi meccanismi indipendenti di accountability (IAMs) a confronto.
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VAN, DIJK Tania. « Accountability of international organizations : an analysis of the World Bank inspection panel ». Doctoral thesis, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/5642.

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Livres sur le sujet "Accountability. Inspection Panel"

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Panel, World Bank Inspection, dir. Accountability at the World Bank : The Inspection Panel 10 years on. Washington, DC : World Bank, 2003.

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missing], [name. Demanding accountability : Civil society claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel. Lanham, Md : Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

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Clark, Dana. Demanding Accountability : Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003.

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Clark, Dana. Demanding Accountability : Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003.

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Clark, Dana, Jonathan A. Fox et Kay Treakle. Demanding Accountability : Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2003.

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Park, Susan. The Good Hegemon. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197626481.001.0001.

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Powerful international development organizations like the World Bank recognized that they contributed to ecosystem destruction and a loss of land and livelihoods for people in developing countries in the 1990s. Pressure from activists and the United States led the World Bank to give affected people recourse through an inspection panel. Within a decade other similar multilateral development banks would follow suit. This book argues that these accountability mechanisms embody a norm of “accountability as justice,” which has now spread globally. It makes three arguments for why the norm was created, how the accountability mechanisms operate, and whether they hold the banks to account. First, the United States promoted this norm during debates over how to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the multilateral development banks in the 1990s. As the banks’ premier shareholder, the United States built on its history of using “accountability as control” to establish the “accountability as justice” norm of for all the banks even when pressure from activists was absent or muted. It was able to do so using its “power of the purse,” its “vote,” and its “voice” in the banks. Second, the banks resisted the norm, leading the United States to invoke the same practices to demand the banks reformulate the mechanisms in egregious cases. Finally, the book shows how the accountability mechanisms have become more accessible, transparent, independent, responsive, and effective. Despite these gains, the banks adhere to the accountability as justice norm as a corrective to their operations rather than to preempt harm.
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Chapitres de livres sur le sujet "Accountability. Inspection Panel"

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Wong, Yvonne, et Benoit Mayer. « The World Bank’s Inspection Panel : A Tool for Accountability ? » Dans The World Bank Legal Review Volume 6 Improving Delivery in Development : The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and Accountability, 495–530. The World Bank, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0378-9_ch23.

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« 6. THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL AND THE LIMITS OF ACCOUNTABILITY ». Dans Reinventing the World Bank, 131–63. Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/9781501729492-007.

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Park, Susan. « US Hegemony for What ? » Dans The Good Hegemon, 51–96. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197626481.003.0003.

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This chapter examines how providing recourse to people harmed by MDB financed projects was promulgated by donor shareholders, pivotally the United States. It traces how the demand for accountability resulted from dissatisfaction with MDB performance and activist campaigns revealing large-scale harm. The US history of using accountability as control for the MDBs is articulated, to which concerns of justice were added. The design of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel reflected US demands for accountability as justice. The United States used its power of the purse, vote, and voice to press for the accountability as justice norm in the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the African Development Bank. The banks sought to compromise over the norm. Outside the high-profile campaigns against the World Bank and World Bank Group, the MDBs designed accountability mechanisms with limited independence.
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Lukas, Karin. « The Inspection Panel of the World Bank : An Effective Extrajudicial Complaint Mechanism ? » Dans The World Bank Legal Review Volume 6 Improving Delivery in Development : The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and Accountability, 531–44. The World Bank, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0378-9_ch24.

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Barlas, Dilek, et Tatiana Tassoni. « Improving Service Delivery through Voice and Accountability : The Experience of the World Bank Inspection Panel ». Dans The World Bank Legal Review Volume 6 Improving Delivery in Development : The Role of Voice, Social Contract, and Accountability, 475–93. The World Bank, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0378-9_ch22.

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« Interpretation and Application of the World Bank’s Operational Policies and Bank Procedures Relating to Environmental Issues by the World Bank Inspection Panel ». Dans The Practice of Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs), 237–61. Brill | Nijhoff, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004337787_011.

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Moloney, Kim. « Internal Evaluators and External NGOs ». Dans Who Matters at the World Bank ?, 201–24. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192857729.003.0009.

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Abstract This chapter engages two sets of actors. The first is the multiple internal evaluative units and other related accountability actors. This includes the Operational Evaluation Department (later renamed the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)), the Inspection Panel, an Integrity Vice Presidency, the now-defunct Quality Assurance Group (QAG), and a similarly defunct Results Secretariat. For this book’s identified policy sector, each internal actor’s influence over policy change is minimal. Reasons vary from evaluations which do not alter incentives (IEG), no sector-specific bureaucratic and operational procedures (Panel), and no sector-specific interactions (Integrity). While both QAG and the Secretariat did interact with this book’s sector of interest (as well as other sectors), each faced organizational disincentives to their continuation as internal evaluative actors. The second set of actors are NGOs. Contrary to most scholarship on civil society interaction with the Bank in non-PSM/PSG sectors, NGOs with a specific focus on PSM/PSG are far less common. Of the five NGOs identified by interviewe as relevant to this sector of policy change, only Transparency International (TI) and the International Budget Project (IBP) had some influence over PSM/PSG policy change. In TI’s case, its influence was most significant in the 1990s as President Wolfensohn added anticorruption to the Bank’s sector agenda. In contrast, IBP’s influence arose after the mid-2000s and was specific to IMF-Bank interactions on budget transparency initiatives.
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Van Den Meerssche, Dimitri. « Law as Management—An Agenda of Cultural Change ». Dans The World Bank's Lawyers, 191—C6.F1. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192846495.003.0006.

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Abstract Part III provides an account of the changes in international law(yering) instilled by Anne-Marie Leroy (General Counsel 2009–2016). It reconstructs Leroy’s introduction of a ‘new normative architecture’ in the World Bank and the associated cultivation of a new, deformalized and pragmatic practice of lawyering. Chapter 6 focuses on Leroy’s explicit agenda of cultural change and the internal documents through which she sought to instil a new professional sensibility (setting out a new ‘road ahead for the Legal Vice Presidency’ and redescribing the ‘role of lawyers in the Solutions Bank’). It shows how Leroy thereby aimed to ‘instil and nurture a culture of informed risk-taking’ modelled on the image of a flexible, dynamic, decentralized and outcome-oriented administrative practice. The chapter thereby offers a detailed reconstruction of the ‘paradigm shift’ in legal practice from a ‘rules-based’ to a ‘principles-based normative approach’ that has remained entirely unexplored. It concludes by analysing how Leroy’s pragmatic professional posture translated into a specific invocation of the ‘rule of law’ that aimed at curtailing the Inspection Panel and reconfiguring the standards that this accountability mechanism is assigned to apply. The chapter thereby shows how Leroy’s ‘new normative architecture’—attuned to what some described as ‘the risk management of everything’—both diluted the promise of internal accountability practices and deformalized the practice of international law(yering). It is thereby, inevitably, also an argument on the changing politics of international law and the inscription of its language in evolving modes of global governance and rationalities of rule.
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Leuprecht, Christian. « New Zealand ». Dans Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft, 156–70. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893949.003.0007.

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As the smallest and most centralized in the Five Eyes community, New Zealand’s intelligence and security community, and the system that holds it accountable, is an outlier. New Zealand’s proximity to Australia is reflected in parallels in intelligence accountability between the two Tasman allies. On the one hand, its relatively smaller size is reflected in certain unique attributes of intelligence accountability, such as its limited scope and access to sensitive material. On the other hand, its more modest size has been beneficial in driving innovation that has subsequently been adopted elsewhere, notably the double lock system for warrants. The chapter reviews the member organizations of the New Zealand’s National Intelligence Community, the particular strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in New Zealand, its rather distinct national security threats, as well as New Zealand’s modest, centralized yet innovative intelligence accountability architecture: the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, which has an Advisory Panel that is an attribute unique to New Zealand, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, and the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants. New Zealand’s experience draws attention to economies of effort to be harnessed for scarce resources on the big collectors and assessor rather than other government clients that only receive intelligence. New Zealand also differs from other Five Eyes parliamentary intelligence committees in granting only limited access to sensitive operational matters or information. Mandatory regular review of legislation offers an opportunity to assess for efficacy and propose comprehensive improvements to innovate agencies and practices.
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