Literatura académica sobre el tema "Xinjiang-Central Asian region"

The Xinjiang region in northwest China is a historically important geographical passage between East and West Eurasia. By sequencing 201 ancient genomes from 39 archaeological sites, we clarify the complex demographic history of this region. Bronze Age Xinjiang populations are characterized by four major ancestries related to Early Bronze Age cultures from the central and eastern Steppe, Central Asian, and Tarim Basin regions. Admixtures between Middle and Late Bronze Age Steppe cultures continued during the Late Bronze and Iron Ages, along with an inflow of East and Central Asian ancestry. Historical era populations show similar admixed and diverse ancestries as those of present-day Xinjiang populations. These results document the influence that East and West Eurasian populations have had over time in the different regions of Xinjiang.

Xinjiang is a key region in northwestern China, connecting East and West Eurasian populations and cultures for thousands of years. To understand the genetic history of Xinjiang, we sequenced 237 complete ancient human mitochondrial genomes from the Bronze Age through Historical Era (41 archaeological sites). Overall, the Bronze Age Xinjiang populations show high diversity and regional genetic affinities with Steppe and northeastern Asian populations along with a deep ancient Siberian connection for the Tarim Basin Xiaohe individuals. In the Iron Age, in general, Steppe-related and northeastern Asian admixture intensified, with North and East Xinjiang populations showing more affinity with northeastern Asians and South Xinjiang populations showing more affinity with Central Asians. The genetic structure observed in the Historical Era of Xinjiang is similar to that in the Iron Age, demonstrating genetic continuity since the Iron Age with some additional genetic admixture with populations surrounding the Xinjiang region.

The genus Brachygluta Thomson, 1859 and two widely distributed Central Asian species, B. iranica (Saulcy, 1876) and Trissemus melinus (Solsky, 1870), are newly recorded from China (Xinjiang). A diagnosis, illustrations of the habitus and morphological details of both species, and a redescription of T. melinus is provided.

The importance of Central Asia for China increased with the change in international power structure, growth of its economy, rapid industrialization and increase in population. China is regarded as the second largest energy consumer in the world while Central Asia has rich energy resources and raw materials complementary for its economic growth. It is interested in the energy resources of Central Asia for the security of its energy supply and a large market for its finished goods. Prior to Central Asian energy resources, China was importing oil from the Middle East. The route of oil supply from M.E to China was passing through Malacca strait, under the control of United States, a perceived rival of China in the world politics. In case of conflict this route may be blocked by United States. This situation worried the Chinese policy makers and prepared a comprehensive policy regarding the energy resources of Central Asian region. Energy is not the only concern of China in Central Asia; it is also worried about the security of its Xinjiang, sharing border with some Central Asian Republics (CARs). About 60% of the population of Xinjiang are Uyghur Muslims. The same ethnic community also exists on the other side of the border in the Central Asian Republics. China has an apprehension that in case of instability in the region, terrorists organizations may instigate the China’s Uyghur for independence. That is why, China is supporting United States in its fight against terrorism. Politically, it wants to reduce the influence of United States in the region by integration with the CARs (Central Asian Republics) through SCO particularly after US military penetration in the region in 2001. Applying a descriptive-analytical approach in the paper, the interests of China in CARs are surveyed.

In the XXI century the role of Central Asia in international politics is increasing. This region, possessing rich natural, energy, mineral and raw material resources, has an important geostrategic position, in which we see the geopolitical confrontation of global actors. The confrontation is explained by the fact that, for example, for Russia this region, being a “vulnerable underbelly”, is included in the traditional sphere of influence, from the perspective of China, the region seems to be an alternative source of energy and a vital partner for stabilizing and developing the troubled Xinjiang province. As for the United States and their allies, this region appears to be an important transportation hub, for example, for military supplies to unstable Afghanistan. Central Asia is not only a key region on the world map, the establishment of control over which allows you to manage the regional transit of hydrocarbons and other types of strategic raw materials for the largest developing economies, primarily China, and, as a result, affect their economic growth and aggregate power. Central Asia is a crossroad of civilizations, control over which, as was believed over the centuries, allows you to rule the world. The region retains its exceptional geopolitical significance today.

The Uyghurs are a Turkic-Muslim minority in the People`s Republic of China (PRC), their native language belongs to a Turkic language family and is written on the basis of Arabic graphics, and regard themselves as culturally and ethnically close to Central Asian nations. This article deals with the issue of the Uyghur identity role in the case of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in China and its manifestations in relation to Chinese policy in the region. In order to study this issue the article analyzes the Uyghurs` attitude towards the Han Chinese migrants and their reaction towards Mandarin tuition as well as the salience of Islam faith as a crucial identity marker.

China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan formed the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) in 2001. China's backing for an SCO charter, permanent secretariat and anti-terrorism centre for the past three years reflects its desire to strengthen the SCO in countering United States influence in Central Asia. Diplomatically, China fears that the American presence means that regional states will be less accommodating to China's political demands. Economically, China worries that the United States' support for American petroleum companies will compromise Chinese efforts to wrest concessions from Central Asian governments. Security-wise, with bases close to China's western borders, Washington can assist Beijing in flushing out Xinjiang separatists operating in Central Asia, or put military pressure on China, should it be perceived as a threat. The American presence and resurgent Russian involvement in Central Asia seem to have put China's influence in the region on the defensive.

Limited natural resources, internal socio-economic and political crises, and the low level of infrastructure development, especially in the first years after gaining sovereignty, have affected the trade, transport, and logistics vulnerability of Central Asian countries. Trade between the People’s Republic of China and European countries became a determining factor in developing the region’s transport routes. More than 90 % of freight is delivered by sea, but the role of land routes has increased significantly since 2020. China faces the pressing issues of developing the economies of its western provinces, especially the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The development of land routes coincides with the implementation of the strategic objectives for the Silk Road Economic Belt, as well as the interests of the countries whose territories these transport routes run through. The countries of the Central Asian region are striving to participate in transit and have been very active at interstate meetings, discussing cargo delivery options. This issue became especially relevant after the sharp decline in China’s use of transit through the territory of the Russian Federation. Of many proposed transport routes and corridors, the most promising are the Trans-Afghan Railway and the “Middle Corridor”. The successful construction of the transport and logistics will largely depend on developing relationships with Afghanistan’s political leadership and the PRC’s attention to infrastructure projects.

The article examines the place and role of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China in the economic project of the New Silk Road in the context of China's international relations. The importance of the XUAR for China at the beginning of the XXI century increases due to its economic and geostrategic characteristics. China's economic strategy contributes to its strengthening in the Central Asian region and strengthens its position in comparison with the capabilities of Russia and the United States. For China, this is not only a desire to achieve foreign economic goals, but also an opportunity to reduce the risks of the terrorist threat. Xinjiang is becoming not only a springboard for China's new economic policy in Central Asia, but also a link between the important route of goods, raw materials and investments from the Pacific Ocean to Europe. At the same time, the XUAR is a zone of long-term instability, which is expressed in the development of separatism, terrorism and extremism. The actions of the Chinese authorities are aimed at stabilizing the situation in the autonomous region. But sometimes this is achieved by force and contradicts the ethno-religious traditions of the local population. Thus, XUAR, which is part of the New Silk Road, is characterized not only as a promisingly developing region, but also represents a hotbed of significant risk.

Purpose. This article considers and analyzes the information, contained in ancient and medieval sources, about residence areas of the Yenisei and Central Asian Kyrgyz during particular historical periods, including late Antiquity, Early and High Middle Ages. These periods are related to the time of existence of political and military domination in the Central Asian Region of the ancient and medieval Turkic and Mongolian nomads, including Xiongnu, Xianbei, Turkic, Teles and Khitan nomadic ethnic groups. Results. During one of those historical periods, after the defeat of the Uyghur Khaganate, the Kyrgyz themselves dominated over Central Asian steppes. Resettlement areas of the Kyrgyz in Central Asia and Southern Siberia changed considerably on several occasions. During various historical periods, the Kyrgyz resided in the territory of Eastern Tian Shan, within the bounds of modern Xinjiang and during the following historical periods in Minusinsk Basin as well, followed by the vast territories of the Sayan and Altai Mountains and a major part of Central Asia, as well as within the bounds of the Western Tian Shan mountain range. The article analyzes the available informative historical data in ancient and medieval sources about the main resettlement areas of the Kyrgyz in different territories in definite time periods of their residence within the bounds of the Central Asian historical and cultural region. Conclusion. Since their repeated resettlement into the eastern Tian Shan region in the era of the Kyrgyz Great Power, the Old Kyrgyz descendants could have reclaimed the mountains and valleys of Tengir-Too. They could have also restored their statehood at the turn of historical modernity, firstly in its capacity as a republic within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and during the last decades by way of the independent state of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Despite all existing current complexities, the Kyrgyz keep their State.

The past decade has seen a transformation in the relationships among states in the Xinjiang-Central Asian region. The thesis is an analysis of this relationship, a relationship primarily built on economic and strategic interdependency. Within the thesis, the basis of the relationship is established; the extent of the relationship is ascertained, and the impact of this relationship is evaluated. The thesis differs from previous studies of this area in several ways. The most significant is that a group of Central Asian states and an autonomous region of China have formed into a unit of economic interdependency, which needs to be assessed as a group rather than as individual entities. Much of previous and recent scholarship tends to focus on issues within a particular country or part of a country, such as the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. However, it is my contention that this is not an adequate representation of what is occurring in the region today. The focus needs to be widened to take into account the dynamics of this interdependent relationship which consists of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and several of the former Soviet Union states, primarily Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. All of these states with the exception of Uzbekistan are contiguous with Xinjiang. This relationship of interdependency has reached a level sufficient to influence decisions taken by governments within the region, and a prime factor of this has been the suppression of secessionist movements, principally Uygur separatist movements, among the Uygur diaspora residing in neighbouring states. Another highly relevant issue the thesis evaluates is sources of tension within the Xinjiang-Central Asian region and the impact these tensions have on the interdependency relationship. An assessment is made as to whether because of this interdependency, the sources of tension may not be adequately addressed by the respective governments to the satisfaction of the general populace. This is seen as due to the individual governments' hesitation to upset China by addressing such matters as border demarcation and transboundary water diversion between China and neighbouring states. An outcome of this scenario may be that many of the tensions are left to simmer and therefore bode ill for future stability in the region. Fundamentally, the thesis argues that the matters raised in the previous paragraphs need to be assessed on the basis of an ongoing relationship of interdependency encompassing Xinjiang and several neighbouring Central Asian states. The overlapping of multiple sources of commonality such as geography, ethnicity, culture, religion, economics and strategic matters, dictates that we should not assess issues on a country-by-country basis. Rather, it is necessary to consider the region as a whole, taking into account the prevailing conditions emanating from this relationship of economic and strategic interdependency.

The past decade has seen a transformation in the relationships among states in the Xinjiang-Central Asian region. The thesis is an analysis of this relationship, a relationship primarily built on economic and strategic interdependency. Within the thesis, the basis of the relationship is established; the extent of the relationship is ascertained, and the impact of this relationship is evaluated. The thesis differs from previous studies of this area in several ways. The most significant is that a group of Central Asian states and an autonomous region of China have formed into a unit of economic interdependency, which needs to be assessed as a group rather than as individual entities. Much of previous and recent scholarship tends to focus on issues within a particular country or part of a country, such as the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. However, it is my contention that this is not an adequate representation of what is occurring in the region today. The focus needs to be widened to take into account the dynamics of this interdependent relationship which consists of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and several of the former Soviet Union states, primarily Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. All of these states with the exception of Uzbekistan are contiguous with Xinjiang. This relationship of interdependency has reached a level sufficient to influence decisions taken by governments within the region, and a prime factor of this has been the suppression of secessionist movements, principally Uygur separatist movements, among the Uygur diaspora residing in neighbouring states. Another highly relevant issue the thesis evaluates is sources of tension within the Xinjiang-Central Asian region and the impact these tensions have on the interdependency relationship. An assessment is made as to whether because of this interdependency, the sources of tension may not be adequately addressed by the respective governments to the satisfaction of the general populace. This is seen as due to the individual governments' hesitation to upset China by addressing such matters as border demarcation and transboundary water diversion between China and neighbouring states. An outcome of this scenario may be that many of the tensions are left to simmer and therefore bode ill for future stability in the region. Fundamentally, the thesis argues that the matters raised in the previous paragraphs need to be assessed on the basis of an ongoing relationship of interdependency encompassing Xinjiang and several neighbouring Central Asian states. The overlapping of multiple sources of commonality such as geography, ethnicity, culture, religion, economics and strategic matters, dictates that we should not assess issues on a country-by-country basis. Rather, it is necessary to consider the region as a whole, taking into account the prevailing conditions emanating from this relationship of economic and strategic interdependency.
Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
Full Text

The Qing conquest of 'Xinjiang' ('New Dominion' or 'New Territory') in 1759 proved to be a watershed development in the complex and often ambiguous relation between China and the amorphous Xiyu or 'Western Regions' that had lay 'beyond the pale' of Han Chinese civilisation since the Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang (618-907) dynasties. The Qing destruction of the Mongol Zunghar state in the process of conquering 'Xinjiang' brought to a close the era of the dominance of the steppe nomadic-pastoralist world of Inner Asia over sedentary and agricultural China that had existed since at least 300 BCE with the expansion of the Xiongnu. Immediately following the conquest, as chapter two shall demonstrate, the over-arching goal of Qing rule in the region was to segregate Xinjiang from the Chinese regions of the empire. Yet, at the beginning of the 21st century the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) maintains that the 'Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region' (XUAR) is, and has been throughout recorded history, an 'integral' province of China. This thesis is thus focused on the evolution of the Chinese state's perception of Xinjiang as a dependent appendage in the late 18th century to that of an 'integral' province at the beginning of the 21st century. As such there are two key questions that are the focus of the thesis. First, how - by what processes, means and strategies - did Xinjiang arrive at its contemporary position as a province of the PRC? Second, how has this process impacted on China's 'foreign policy' along its western continental frontiers since the Qing conquest? The thesis is therefore not simply focused upon a discrete period or aspect of the historical development of China's interactions with Xinjiang, but rather an encompassing exploration of the processes that have resulted in China's contemporary dominance in the region. Two encompassing and related themes flow from these questions regarding the Chinese state's response to the dilemmas posed by the rule of Xinjiang. The first stems from the recognition that the present government of China's claims to the 'Chinese-ness' of Xinjiang are more than simply a statement of fact or an attempted legitimisation of current political realities. The statement that Xinjiang is an 'integral' province of the PRC, although indeed a statement of contemporary political reality, is also a profound statement of intent by the Chinese state. It is in fact one manifestation of an over-arching theme of integration and assimilation within the state's perceptions of Xinjiang across the 1759-2004 period. The second theme stems from the question as to how the processes associated with the first theme of integration and assimilation impacted upon the Chinese state's conception of its relation to those regions beyond its orbit. Xinjiang throughout most of Chinese history has been perceived as a 'frontier' region from which non-Chinese influences have entered and at times threatened the North China plain 'heartland' of Han civilisation. This is essentially a theme of confrontation between or opposition of 'external' to Chinese influences. The relationship between these two themes across the 1759-2004 period has been one of 'permanent provocation' whereby their interaction has produced mutual continuity and contestation. The Chinese state's goal of integration, and the concrete strategies and techniques employed in Xinjiang to attain it, have required the continued operation and vitality of opposing tendencies and dynamics. This process has provided (and continues to provide) both impetus and legitimation, in the perception of the state, for the exercise of state power in Xinjiang. Yet, as will become evident in the proceeding chapters, this interaction has not developed along a constant trajectory. Rather, the process has been characterised by fluctuations in the state's commitment to the goal of integration and in its ability to implement appropriate strategies with which to achieve integration. The thesis will thus argue that from the early 19th century onward the goal of integration became embedded in the state's perception of the 'correct' relation between itself and Xinjiang. Moreover, across the 1759-2004 period the notion of integration has evolved to become both the end and means of state action in Xinjiang.

This thesis analyses tha impact of the Xinjiang Problem on the foreign policy of China. Because of its strategic location and natural resources, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has great importance for China. this thesis argues that Chinese foreign policy towards Central Asian region has been shaped by security considerations of China related to the Xinjiang Problem. the Xinjiang Problem shapes China'
s foreign relaitons wsth Central Asian States, Russia, the U.S. and Turkey becouse this problem has became important element of China'
s territorial integrity as well ass its strategy of stabilizing Central Asian region.

The Qing conquest of 'Xinjiang' ('New Dominion' or 'New Territory') in 1759 proved to be a watershed development in the complex and often ambiguous relation between China and the amorphous Xiyu or 'Western Regions' that had lay 'beyond the pale' of Han Chinese civilisation since the Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang (618-907) dynasties. The Qing destruction of the Mongol Zunghar state in the process of conquering 'Xinjiang' brought to a close the era of the dominance of the steppe nomadic-pastoralist world of Inner Asia over sedentary and agricultural China that had existed since at least 300 BCE with the expansion of the Xiongnu. Immediately following the conquest, as chapter two shall demonstrate, the over-arching goal of Qing rule in the region was to segregate Xinjiang from the Chinese regions of the empire. Yet, at the beginning of the 21st century the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) maintains that the 'Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region' (XUAR) is, and has been throughout recorded history, an 'integral' province of China. This thesis is thus focused on the evolution of the Chinese state's perception of Xinjiang as a dependent appendage in the late 18th century to that of an 'integral' province at the beginning of the 21st century. As such there are two key questions that are the focus of the thesis. First, how - by what processes, means and strategies - did Xinjiang arrive at its contemporary position as a province of the PRC? Second, how has this process impacted on China's 'foreign policy' along its western continental frontiers since the Qing conquest? The thesis is therefore not simply focused upon a discrete period or aspect of the historical development of China's interactions with Xinjiang, but rather an encompassing exploration of the processes that have resulted in China's contemporary dominance in the region. Two encompassing and related themes flow from these questions regarding the Chinese state's response to the dilemmas posed by the rule of Xinjiang. The first stems from the recognition that the present government of China's claims to the 'Chinese-ness' of Xinjiang are more than simply a statement of fact or an attempted legitimisation of current political realities. The statement that Xinjiang is an 'integral' province of the PRC, although indeed a statement of contemporary political reality, is also a profound statement of intent by the Chinese state. It is in fact one manifestation of an over-arching theme of integration and assimilation within the state's perceptions of Xinjiang across the 1759-2004 period. The second theme stems from the question as to how the processes associated with the first theme of integration and assimilation impacted upon the Chinese state's conception of its relation to those regions beyond its orbit. Xinjiang throughout most of Chinese history has been perceived as a 'frontier' region from which non-Chinese influences have entered and at times threatened the North China plain 'heartland' of Han civilisation. This is essentially a theme of confrontation between or opposition of 'external' to Chinese influences. The relationship between these two themes across the 1759-2004 period has been one of 'permanent provocation' whereby their interaction has produced mutual continuity and contestation. The Chinese state's goal of integration, and the concrete strategies and techniques employed in Xinjiang to attain it, have required the continued operation and vitality of opposing tendencies and dynamics. This process has provided (and continues to provide) both impetus and legitimation, in the perception of the state, for the exercise of state power in Xinjiang. Yet, as will become evident in the proceeding chapters, this interaction has not developed along a constant trajectory. Rather, the process has been characterised by fluctuations in the state's commitment to the goal of integration and in its ability to implement appropriate strategies with which to achieve integration. The thesis will thus argue that from the early 19th century onward the goal of integration became embedded in the state's perception of the 'correct' relation between itself and Xinjiang. Moreover, across the 1759-2004 period the notion of integration has evolved to become both the end and means of state action in Xinjiang.
Thesis (PhD Doctorate)
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Griffith Business School
Griffith Business School
Full Text

China's problem with terrorism has historically been considered an outgrowth of Beijing's efforts to integrate the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region into the People's Republic of China. Since the end of the Cold War, however, this internal dynamic has converged with an evolving external environment, stimulating the development of linkages between Uyghur separatism and terrorism and broader terrorist movements in Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. This book brings together some of the leading experts on Chinese terrorism, offering the first systematic, scholarly assessment of the country's approaches to this threat. Four areas of investigation are looked at: the scope and nature of terrorism in China and its connection with developments in other regions; the development of legislative measures to combat terrorism; the institutional evolution of China's counter-terrorism bureaucracy; and Beijing's counter-terrorism cooperation with international partners.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

AbstractThe presence of China in the OSCE region is becoming resilient, particularly after Beijing began providing infrastructural loans to OSCE states. The size of the issued infrastructural loans in less developed economies is disproportionate to national economies, resulting in the borrowing countries becoming incapable of paying back the loans. In this chapter, I argue that China’s practices of infrastructural loans and China’s overall standing on minority issues and democratization contradicts the OSCE core principles and undermines OSCE integrity. To illustrate this, I use, first, the example of the promotion of non-democratic practices through non-transparent procurement, surveillance of civilians, and supply of police hardware for suppression and control of political dissidents (based on evidence from Eastern and Central Europe, and Central Asia) and, for the second example, I illustrate the violation of minority rights in re-education camps in the Xinjiang region (based on political and civic reaction from Central Asia), which Chinese authorities call “Vocational Education and Training Centers.” The first example helps to analyze how Chinese foreign loans contradict the democratic commitments of the borrowing countries. Chinese infrastructural loans promote non-democratic practices in borrowing countries through unfair, non-transparent procurement in infrastructural development projects. The Chinese side also provides surveillance systems and anti-protest police vehicles and ammunition which help to undermine individual rights and freedoms. The second example helps to analyze the reaction of Central Asian Muslim countries toward China’s treatment of kin-groups, namely the lack of critical reaction of CA states despite their OSCE-membership and commitment toward promotion of individual rights and freedoms (including freedom of faith). China has been providing infrastructural loans to most OSCE member states over the past two decades; and these member states have not officially responded to Chinese treatment of their own kin-groups, such as Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uyghur minorities—according to the OSCE core principles on minority rights. The OSCE core principles are categorized under the “human dimension” to ensure OSCE states’ “respect for individual rights and fundamental freedoms” and their commitment to “abide by the rule of law; promote principles of democracy; strengthen and protect democratic institutions” Yamamoto (2015). Most likely if there were no infrastructural loans from China, the OSCE countries under analysis would respond to Chinese domestic policy toward ethnic minorities critically. Most likely, by providing surveillance and police machinery, China tends to support the existing political regimes in borrowing countries and, by its non-transparent procurement, it does not encourage enforcement of laws.

Central Asia has gained extraordinary importance in recent years in the framework of global energy security. China is the most significant example of a power that looks to its periphery as a viable option for energy supply. In Central Asia, Chinese companies are dynamic players having even broken the long Soviet and Russian monopoly over regional pipelines. This chapter examines the importance of the region within China's energy security, while not overlooking the potential contribution of the China-Pakistan economic corridor in the energy transit. In addition, Central Asia is likely to help China reduce the energy deficit in Xinjiang, through the import of hydroelectricity generated in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Although Central Asia's contribution to global energy security is low, it matters in a context of energy diversification, in which China's One Belt One Road brought a more promising dynamics to the cooperation between Beijing and Central Asian countries.

This chapter considers the strategic interrelation of the US, China and Russia in Central Asia. It views the region both from the perspective of China’s concerns for the stability of its sensitive western province of Xinjiang, and the prospects for the US to advance its military and strategic position in the region. It looks at the problems of China’s Xinjiang province and the challenge from separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. It demonstrates the growing collaboration of Russia and China in Central Asia, for both security and trade. It concludes that after an advance into the region in the aftermath of the fall of the USSR, accelerated by US and NATO intervention in Afghanistan from 2001, the US is now in retreat from Central Asia, while Russian and Chinese influence has grown.

The challenge of diversity is especially acute along China’s Inner Asian periphery, which encompasses Northeastern China, previously referred to as Manchuria, and the autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. These areas were intermittently controlled by Sinitic states based on the Central Plain, but most comprehensively integrated with “China proper” during periods of rule by Inner Asian dynasties like the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Qing. By the last decades of Qing rule, new ideas about national identity and the threat posed by European and, later, Japanese imperialism sparked efforts to extend the system of provincial administration prevailing in the eighteen provinces of “China proper” to Inner Asia. Following the Qing collapse, foreign support helped sustain Tibet and Xinjiang from reconquest by China for decades. Today, Tibet and Xinjiang remain only partly integrated into the political and social fabric of the PRC. In recent years, this legacy of foreign intervention and separatism has led Beijing to intensify efforts to secure its hold in both Tibet and Xinjiang, adopting a strategy mirroring the approaches of Eurasia’s other postimperial states, albeit magnified by China’s comparative wealth and access to modern technology.

Treat the entire Asia and Europe as a geo-economic space is impossible and counterproductive. In our opinion, Eurasian geo-economic space can be considered as a geographical area, which is the junction between Europe and Asia. Geographically, it is - the Urals, the Volga region, the Caspian Sea region of Russia, post-Soviet Central Asia, the Caucasus and the territory where Turkey and Xinjiang is located. The economic interests of the Eurasian countries for "unity" can be the same, but there are non-economic conditions (state and political system, the mode of government - authoritarian, democratic, way of life of the state - secular, religious, moral and cultural values, ideological differences, and historical features of interethnic relations) that as factors may influence positively or negatively. Principles of formation of the Eurasian Economic Cooperation shall include economic feasibility and mutual benefit, political loyalty, ideological, philosophical and ethnic tolerance, peer contacts, peace-loving nature and solving conflict with a positive decision.