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1
Gopnik, Alison. How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1993.
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2
Driving with the brakes on: How to recognize and renovate thought structures we create that steer us off our paths. Cornville, AZ: High Mesa LLC, 2012.
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3
Textor, Mark. Intentionality Primitivism. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0004.
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Brentano endorsed (conceptual) primitivism about intentionality and the view that intentionality is fully revealed to us in its instantiations. The pros and cons of Brentano’s view that intentionality is a conceptually primitive property of every mental act are discussed. On the one hand, it makes clear why we need to distinguish between the immanent object (intentional correlate) and the external object. But, on the other hand, propositional attitudes turn out to be a major problem for intentionality primitivism. Meinong accepted Brentano’s Thesis as well as the existence of ‘propositional attitudes’ but one cannot defend Brentano’s Thesis by saying that propositional attitudes are directed on objectives or the like. A plausible mark of the mental needs to disentangle being a mental act (process) from having an object.
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Mendelovici, Angela. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001.
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Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles. This book develops an alternative theory, the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which the source of intentionality is none other than phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, felt, or qualitative aspect of mental life. While PIT avoids the problems that plague tracking and functional role theories, it faces its own challenges in accounting for the rich and complex contents of thoughts and the contents of nonconscious states. In responding to these challenges, this book proposes a novel version of PIT, one on which all intentionality is phenomenal intentionality, though we in some sense represent many non-phenomenal contents by ascribing them to ourselves. This book further argues that phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental life, resulting in a view that is radically internalistic in spirit: Our phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly targeted by us.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Fixing Reference on Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0001.
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This chapter fixes reference on our target, intentionality. "Intentionality" is sometimes defined as the "aboutness" or "directedness" of mental states. While such definitions succeed at gesturing towards the phenomenon of interest, they are too fuzzy and metaphorical to fix firmly upon it. This chapter recommends an alternative ostensive way of defining "intentionality" as the feature of mental states that we at least sometimes notice introspectively in ourselves and are tempted to describe using representational terms like "of" or "about". This chapter argues that this definition does a better job than alternative definitions—such as those in terms of folk psychology, the mind-brain sciences, and truth and reference—at capturing the phenomenon that talk of "aboutness" and "directedness" is gesturing at.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0009.
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This chapter argues against the relation view of intentionality, on which intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing contents, and for the alternative aspect view, on which intentionality is a matter of having states with certain aspects. The relation view faces two problems: First, it cannot accommodate all the intentional contents we can manifestly represent without accepting a bloated ontology, which suggests that the view is wrong-headed. Second, it is not clear why being related to an item should make it perceptually represented, thought, entertained, or otherwise represented. The relation view might be thought to have many virtues that the aspect view lacks: It is arguably supported by common sense, allows for public contents, provides an account of structured intentional states, facilitates a theory of truth and reference, and is congenial to externalism. This chapter argues that the aspect view has any such truth-indicating virtues to the same extent as the relation view.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Goals and Methodology. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0002.
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This chapter introduces the goals that will structure much subsequent discussion, as well as two theory-independent ways of knowing about intentionality. The overall goal of the book is to provide a theory of intentionality, which is a theory that describes the deep nature of intentionality—i.e., what it really is, metaphysically speaking. However, much of the discussion in later chapters is structured around the more modest goal of providing a theory that specifies what gives rise to actual instances of original intentionality. In order to meet this goal, it is helpful to have a theory-independent way of testing the predictions of competing theories of intentionality. This chapter proposes two such ways: (1) introspection and (2) consideration of psychological role. Importantly, these methods tell us which contents we represent, not what they consists of. In other words, they tell us about the superficial character of intentional states and contents, not their deep natures.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Nonconscious States. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0008.
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Nonconscious states, like standing beliefs and nonconscious states involved in early visual processing, pose a challenge for PIT: They seem to be intentional but not phenomenal. This chapter addresses this challenge. It begins by considering versions of PIT that take nonconscious states to have derived intentionality, arguing that none of the suggested derivation mechanisms is up to the task of generating new instances of intentionality. This chapter then recommends an alternative treatment of nonconscious states on which neither standing states nor most nonconscious occurrent states are genuinely intentional, though the self-ascriptivist view described in Chapter 7 might be extended to accommodate some standing state contents, and perhaps even standing states in their entirety. This chapter also suggests that some nonconscious occurrent states might have phenomenal properties we are not aware of and so might have phenomenal intentionality we are also not aware of.
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Mendelovici, Angela. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0003.
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One prominent theory of intentionality is the tracking theory, on which original intentionality arises from tracking, where tracking is detecting, carrying information about or having the function of carrying information about, or otherwise appropriately corresponding to items in the environment. This chapter argues that tracking theories cannot accommodate certain paradigm cases of intentionality; in these mismatch cases, the contents ascribed by the tracking theory fail to match the contents that we have theory-independent reason to ascribe. This chapter focuses on one of the most obvious mismatch cases, that of perceptual representations of color: Tracking theories predict that perceptual color representations represent surface reflectance profiles or the like, while theory-independent considerations suggest that they represent primitive colors, which, it happens, are probably uninstantiated.
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Furtak, Rick Anthony. Feeling Apprehensive. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190492045.003.0003.
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Our bodily states can affect our susceptibility toward emotional arousal; empirical research suggests that discrete patterns of somatic upheaval can be identified, at least for some emotions. Such findings correspond with the observation that there is something it’s like to feel a particular emotion: that the experience of emotion has a distinct subjective character. Rather than bodily feelings that are nothing but physical disturbances devoid of intentionality, they can be feelings about our surroundings, which have intentionality and are therefore capable of conveying significant information. The somatic agitation we feel when we are trembling with fear is not a mere sensation but a felt apprehension of danger. When we are afraid, we are not convinced that the object of our fear is harmless—contrary to what others have argued. It would be false to claim that emotions are divorced from cognition, or to identify them simply with intellectual judgments.
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Winner, Ellen. “But My Kid Could Have Done That!”. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863357.003.0011.
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Many of us have a deep mistrust of abstract art. How can we tell if it is any good when we can’t use realism, subject matter, or narrative implications as a guide? In addition, abstract art looks superficially like paintings by preschoolers. This is why people say “My kid could have done that.” This chapter examines studies with adults and children showing that the untutored eye can distinguish works by children (and certain animals) from superficially similar works by abstract expressionist painters. We make this discrimination by perceiving intentionality. A computer can also be programmed to make this discrimination—and at about the same rate of accuracy as a human! The chapter concludes that your kid could not have done that. We see more than we think we do in abstract art. When we evaluate a work of art, we are thinking about the mind that made it.
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Textor, Mark. The Intentionality of Enjoyment. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0010.
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Brentano sees a very close relation between enjoyment and perceptual consciousness. Enjoying an activity is, Brentano proposed, an intuitive model of awareness of an activity. The chapter outlines the Aristotelian background of Brentano’s view of enjoyment, highlighting four suggestions Aristotle made about pleasure. I will assess Brentano’s arguments for the view that the proper objects of enjoyment are only activities (Hedonic Energism), and defend this view against the claims of the Hedonic Objectivists and Subjectivists. In order to understand Brentano’s development of Hedonic Energism, as well as the range of alternatives, we need to take into account that ‘enjoy’ is a polysemous word. Since there is a basic sense of ‘enjoy’ in which we can truly say that we enjoy activities, I conclude that Hedonic Energism is defensible.
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Carman, Taylor. Phenomenology. Editado por Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler y John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.31.
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This article explores the role of phenomenology in philosophical inquiry. It begins by discussing Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reductions (the “transcendental” and the “eidetic”), the sharp distinction he draws between consciousness and reality, and his intuitive claims about intentionality. It then considers Martin Heidegger’s conceptions of phenomenon and phenomenology in relation to hermeneutics before returning to Husserl’s argument that we have a direct intuition, not just of entities, but of the phenomenal appearance of their being (and nonbeing). It also examines Heidegger’s claim that “ontology is possible only as phenomenology” and concludes by assessing phenomenology’s legacy and relevance to philosophy.
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Zahavi, Dan. Intersubjectivity, Sociality, Community. Editado por Dan Zahavi. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.29.
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The chapter discusses how various early phenomenologists by starting from an examination of empathy and other forms of dyadic interpersonal relations went on to develop analyses of larger social units in order to address questions concerning the nature of our communal being-together. More specifically, it shows how an investigation of dyadic empathic encounters figures prominently in not only Husserl’s, but also Scheler’s and Walther’s subsequent analyses of experiential sharing and we-intentionality. Not all phenomenologists, however, agreed with this prioritization of second-person engagement and face-to-face relationships. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Gurwitsch’s and Heidegger’s criticisms and alternative approaches.
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Heylighen, Francis y Shima Beigi. Mind Outside Brain. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0005.
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We approach the problem of the extended mind from a radically non-dualist perspective. The separation between mind and matter is an artifact of the mechanistic worldview, which leaves no room for mental phenomena such as agency, intentionality, or experience. We propose to replace it by an action ontology, which conceives mind and matter as aspects of the same network of processes. By adopting the intentional stance, we interpret the catalysts of elementary reactions as agents exhibiting desires, intentions, and sensations. Autopoietic networks of reactions constitute more complex super-agents, which exhibit memory, deliberation and sense-making. In the case of social networks, individual agents coordinate their actions via the propagation of challenges. The distributed cognition that emerges cannot be situated in any individual brain. This non-dualist, holistic view extends and operationalizes process metaphysics and Eastern philosophies. It is supported by both mindfulness experiences and mathematical models of action, self-organization, and cognition.
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Linafelt, Tod. Poetry and Biblical Narrative. Editado por Danna Nolan Fewell. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199967728.013.6.
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Although virtually all other long narratives from the ancient world take the form of verse, biblical authors pioneered a prose style that, for reasons unknown, came to dominate ancient Hebrew narrative, relegating verse to nonnarrative genres. In other words, extended biblical Hebrew narrative always takes the form of prose, and biblical Hebrew poetry is nearly always nonnarrative. And yet, one finds authors and editors of the narratives dropping poems into the stories at key points, often because poetry provides literary resources unavailable in prose. By exploring both the form and function of these poetic insets, we may see the intentionality with which the ancient authors treated literary form and the crucial roles that nonnarrative poetic genres came to play in the biblical stories.
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Farkas, Katalin. Know-How and Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0004.
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This chapter addresses the question of whether know-how is non-propositional. The question is usually approached through asking whether “know-how” is distinct from “know-that”. The chapter proposes that we should narrow our question. It briefly recalls a certain tradition of talking about knowledge that sees it as a uniquely human cognitive achievement with a normative aspect. The central and paradigmatic case has been a certain kind of possession of truth. But is there another, similarly valuable and uniquely human cognitive achievement? The outlines of such a concept are presented: it’s an ability to reliably succeed in performing some action, which was developed and refined through reflection. Practical knowledge is evaluated for reliable success in action, rather than for truth, so it’s not propositional; but it has a reflective element which makes it similar to propositional knowledge. This conception combines elements of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about knowledge-how.
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Lauria, Federico. The “Guise of the Ought-to-Be”. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0006.
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How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act. This essay examines these conceptions of desire and argues for a deontic alternative, namely the view that desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be. Three lines of criticism of the classical pictures of desire are provided. The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should conform to our desires. The second concerns the “death of desire” principle, i.e. the intuition that one cannot desire what one represents as actual. The last pertains to desire’s role in psychological explanations, i.e. the intuition that desires can explain motivations and be explained by evaluations. Following these criticisms, three positive arguments in favor of the deontic conception are sketched.
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Burazin, Luka. Legal Systems as Abstract Institutional Artifacts. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198821977.003.0006.
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This chapter claims that legal systems are abstract institutional artifacts and that as such they existentially or ontologically depend on collective intentionality in the form of (a we-mode) collective recognition. It argues that this recognition, as a social practice accompanied with its participants’ particular attitude toward it, constitutes a social norm by which a group of people collectively imposes an institutional status of officials or make it the case that an institutional status of legal system exists. It further claims that legal systems often emerge gradually from standing rudimentary pre-legal practices which may be said to create the context in which social norms of recognition can emerge. Finally, it argues that the actual existence of a legal system depends on whether or not the content of collective recognition was largely successfully realized, which is manifested precisely in people actually using a legal system, i.e., in their social (legal) practices.
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Persson, Ingmar. Reasons in Action. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845034.001.0001.
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The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalysed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way these agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficent for our acting for reasons is also sketched.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Thought. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0007.
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Thoughts present a challenge for PIT. They seem to represent various contents, including rich descriptive contents, broad contents, and object-involving contents, but it is not clear how PIT can accommodate them. This chapter argues that thoughts have a largely neglected kind of content, immediate content, which is plausibly phenomenally represented and from which rich descriptive, broad, and object-involving contents can be derived. On the proposed view of derived mental representation, self-ascriptivism, thoughts derivatively represent their alleged contents because we ascribe them to our thoughts' immediate contents. This self-ascription is a matter of our dispositions to have certain thoughts that specify that one content cashes out into another. Although on this view, thoughts derivatively represent their alleged contents, this kind of derived representation is not a kind of intentionality. The chapter also briefly suggests that self-ascriptivism can be applied to perceptual states and to the attitude component of propositional attitudes.
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McDonough, Jeffrey K. Teleology. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190845711.001.0001.
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Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. It is the belief that, for example, eyes are for seeing and gills are for breathing. It is the belief that people go to the cinema in order to see films and that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn. The core idea of teleology is thus intuitive enough. Nonetheless, difficult questions arise as we dig deeper into the concept. Is teleology intrinsic or extrinsic—that is, is teleology inherent in its subjects or is it imposed on them from the outside? Does teleology necessarily involve intentionality—that is, does teleology necessarily involve a subject’s cognizing some end, goal, or purpose? What is the scope of teleology—is the concept of teleology, for example, applicable to elements and animals, or only to rational beings? Finally, is teleology explanatory? When we say that salmon swim upstream in order to spawn, have we explained why they swim upstream? When we say that eyes are for seeing, have we explained why we have eyes? This volume explores the development of the concept of teleology from ancient times to the present. It begins in the golden age of ancient Greece with Plato and Aristotle, winds its way through Islamic, Latin, and Jewish medieval traditions, passes into treatments by leading figures of the scientific revolution, and European Enlightenment, and finishes with current debates in contemporary philosophy of biology. Chapter discussions of key figures, traditions, and contexts are enlivened and contextualized by a series of intermittent reflections on the implications of teleology in medicine, art, poetry and music.
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McNamara, Patrick y Magda Giordano. Cognitive Neuroscience and Religious Language. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190636647.003.0005.
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Communication between deities and human beings rests on the use of language. Religious language has peculiarities such as the use of a formal voice, reductions in first-person and elevation of third-person pronoun use, archaistic elements, and an abundance of speech acts—features that reflect and facilitate the binding of the individual to conceived ultimate reality and value, decentering the Self while focusing on the deity. Explorations of the neurologic correlates of these cognitive and linguistic processes may be useful to identify constraints on neurocognitive models of religious language, and metaphor. The key brain regions that may mediate religious language include neural networks known to be involved in computational assessments of value, future-oriented simulations, Self-agency, Self-reflection, and attributing intentionality of goals to others. Studies indicate that some of the areas involved in those processes are active during personal prayer, whereas brain regions related to habit formation appear active during formal prayer. By examining religious language, and the brain areas engaged by it, we aim to develop more comprehensive neurocognitive models of religious cognition.
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Bartlett, Becky. Badfilm. Edinburgh University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474450423.001.0001.
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This book examines badfilms, a subcategory of ‘bad cinema’ marked by incompetence and typically exacerbated by material poverty and restrictive production conditions. It establishes a framework through which the formal characteristics of failure can be established and analysed, and identifies intentionality as central to how badfilms are recognised and valued as cult texts. Drawing on debates about cult cinema, film form, cultural value and taste, and interrogating critical concepts such as ‘so bad it’s good’, the book investigates the impact of failure, incompetence, and ineptitude in post-production sound, uses of recycled footage, performance and editing through a series of case studies. Focusing primarily on ‘classic’ American badfilms from the 1950s and 1960s, such as Plan 9 from Outer Space, Robot Monster, The Beast of Yucca Flats, and Manos: The Hands of Fate, this book proposes a means of ‘taking the badness of badfilms seriously’. With the films discussed within this book characterised by incompetence and failed intentions, they provide unique opportunities to consider not only how we identify, respond to, and potentially value failure, but how failure itself works within the films.
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Ratcliffe, Matthew. Real Hallucinations. The MIT Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262036719.001.0001.
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Real Hallucinations is a philosophical study of the structure of human experience, its vulnerability to disruption, and how its integrity depends on interpersonal relations. It focuses on the beguilingly simple question of how we manage to routinely distinguish between our experiences of perceiving, remembering, imagining, and thinking. This question is addressed via a detailed philosophical study of auditory verbal hallucinations (usually defined as hearing a voice in the absence of a speaker) and thought insertion (somehow experiencing one’s own thoughts as someone else’s). The book shows how thought insertion, and also a substantial proportion of auditory verbal hallucinations, consist of disturbances in the structure of experience and –more specifically - in our sense of the various types of intentional state, such as believing, perceiving, remembering, and imagining, as distinct from one another. It is further argued that episodic and seemingly localized experiential disturbances such as these usually occur against a backdrop of less pronounced but much wider-ranging alterations in the structure of intentionality. To do so, the book addresses types of experience associated with trauma, schizophrenia, and profound grief. The outcome of this is a more generally applicable account of how the integrity of human experience, including the most basic sense of self, is inseparable from how we relate to other people and to the social world as a whole.
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Roelofs, Luke. Combining Minds. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190859053.001.0001.
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This book explores a neglected philosophical question: How do groups of interacting minds relate to singular minds? Could several of us, by organizing ourselves the right way, constitute a single conscious mind that contains our minds as parts? And could each of us have been, all along, a group of mental parts in close cooperation? Scientific progress seems to be slowly revealing that all the different physical objects around us are, at root, just a matter of the right parts put together in the right ways: How far could the same be true of minds? This book argues that we are too used to seeing the mind as an indivisible unity and that understanding our place in nature requires being willing to see minds as composite systems, simultaneously one conscious whole and many conscious parts. In thinking through the implications of such a shift of perspective, the book relates the question of mental combination to a range of different theories of the mind (in particular panpsychism, functionalism, and Neo-Lockeanism about personal identity) and identifies, clarifies, and addresses a wide array of philosophical objections (concerning personal identity, the unity of consciousness, the privacy of experience, and other issues) that have been raised against the idea of composite minds. The result is an account of the metaphysics of composition and consciousness that can illuminate many different debates in philosophy of mind, concerning split brains, collective intentionality, and the combination problem, among others.
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Tomasello, Michael. What did we learn from the ape language studies? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198728511.003.0007.
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The ‘ape language’ studies have come and gone, with wildly divergent claims about what they have shown. Without question, the most sophisticated skills have been displayed by Kanzi, a male bonobo exposed from youth to a human-like communicative system. This chapter attempts to assess, in an objective a manner as possible, the nature of the communicative skills that Kanzi and other great apes acquired during the various ape language projects. The overall conclusion is that bonobos and other apes possess most of the requisite cognitive skills for something like a human language, including such things as basic symbol learning, categorization, sequential (statistical) learning, etc. What they lack are the skills and motivations of shared intentionality—such things as joint attention, perspective-taking and cooperative motives—for adjusting their communicative acts for others pragmatically, or for learning symbols whose main function is pragmatic. Il y a eu beaucoup d’études sur la langue des singes avec des résultats très divergents. Sans question, on a vu les compétences les plus avancées chez Kanzi, un bonobo mâle qui a été exposé dès la jeunesse à un système de communication humain. Ici j’essaye d’évaluer le plus objectivement possible l’origine des compétences de communication que Kanzi et d’autres Grands singes ont appris pendant les différents projets linguistiques. Je conclue que les bonobos et les autres grands singes possèdent la plupart des compétences cognitives nécessaires à un langage humain, inclut les bases d’apprentissage de symboles, catégorisation, apprentissage séquentiel statistique, etc. Ils manquent les compétences et motivations d’intentionnalité commune—comme attention commune, prendre une perspective différente, motifs coopératifs—pour qu’ils améliorent leurs actes communicatives pragmatiquement.
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Clay, Zanna y Emilie Genty. Natural communication in bonobos: Insights into social awareness and the evolution of language. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198728511.003.0008.
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Our capacity for language is a central aspect of what it means to be human and sets us apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. Given that language does not fossilize, one way to understand how and when it first evolved is to examine the communicative capacities of our closest living relatives, the great apes. This chapter reviews recent research exploring natural communication in our least understood but closest living relative, the bonobo (Pan paniscus). It primarily focuses on what natural bonobo communication can tell us about their underlying social awareness and how this relates to the evolution of language. Examining vocal and gestural communication, we report findings that highlight considerable communicative complexity, flexibility, and intentionality which, cumulatively, suggest that many of the building blocks for language are deeply rooted in our primate past. Notre qualité de langage est un aspect central d’être humain, et nous sépare du reste de l’univers animal. Vu que le langage ne fige pas, les qualités communicatives des grands singes nous peuvent aider à expliquer comment et quand est-ce-que nos langues ont évolué. Ici nous révisons les recherches plus récentes explorant la communication naturelle chez notre plus proche relatif vivant, le bonobo (Pan paniscus). Nous nous concentrons sur ce que la communication naturelle des bonobos nous peut dire à propos de leur conscience sociale et comment cela se rapporte à l’évolution des langues. En examinant la communication vocale et gestuelle, nous signalons des trouvailles qui soulignent la complexité, la flexibilité et l’intentionnalité dans la communication. Ces aspects suggèrent que les fondations de notre langue sont enracinées dans notre passé primate.
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Beyer, Christian, Frode Kjosavik y Christel Fricke. Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.
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Beyer, Christian, Frode Kjosavik y Christel Fricke. Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.
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Beyer, Christian, Frode Kjosavik y Christel Fricke. Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.
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Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Historical Interpretations and Contemporary Applications. Taylor & Francis Group, 2018.
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