Literatura académica sobre el tema "We-intentionality"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "We-intentionality"
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Giovagnoli, Raffaela. "Habits, We-Intentionality and Rituals". Proceedings 47, n.º 1 (7 de mayo de 2020): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2020047065.
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The notion of “habit” is at the center of a lively philosophical debate that shows how some ideas from classical thought are still plausible and useful to understand human behavior in ordinary life. Following Aristotle, we can intend habits through the process of “habits learning”, which is a central topic in neuroscience and neurobiology. We investigate the dimensions of habitual behavior and its extension to the social world.
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Giovagnoli, Raffaela. "Habits, We-Intentionality and Rituals". Proceedings 47, n.º 1 (7 de mayo de 2020): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings47010065.
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The notion of “habit” is at the center of a lively philosophical debate that shows how some ideas from classical thought are still plausible and useful to understand human behavior in ordinary life. Following Aristotle, we can intend habits through the process of “habits learning”, which is a central topic in neuroscience and neurobiology. We investigate the dimensions of habitual behavior and its extension to the social world.
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Zahavi, Dan. "We in Me or Me in We? Collective Intentionality and Selfhood". Journal of Social Ontology 7, n.º 1 (1 de febrero de 2021): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2020-0076.
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Abstract The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality.
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Arruda, Caroline T. "What We Can Intend: Recognition and Collective Intentionality". Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, n.º 1 (marzo de 2016): 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12162.
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Choi, Se Yeon, Goo Hyeok Chung y Jin Nam Choi. "Why are we having this innovation? Employee attributions of innovation and implementation behavior". Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 47, n.º 7 (18 de julio de 2019): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.8124.
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We used attribution theory to explain employee behavior toward innovation implementation. We focused on employee innovation attributions to organizational intentionality as employees' sensemaking of why their organization has adopted an innovation. We identified two types of employee attributions: to constructive intentionality and to deceptive intentionality. We collected data from 397 employees and 84 managers of Chinese and Korean organizations. Results showed that employee attribution to constructive intentionality enhanced innovation effectiveness by increasing active implementation and decreasing implementation avoidance. By contrast, employee attribution to deceptive intentionality diminished innovation effectiveness by increasing implementation avoidance. These findings enrich the innovation implementation literature by introducing the attribution-based perspective of sensemaking.
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Kiverstein, Julian y Erik Rietveld. "Skilled we-intentionality: Situating joint action in the living environment". Open Research Europe 1 (27 de septiembre de 2021): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.13411.2.
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There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation to a shared living environment in which acting individuals are situated. By the “living environment” we mean to refer to places and everyday situations in which humans act. These places and situations are simultaneously social, cultural, material and natural. We will use the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action the living environment furnishes. Affordances form and are maintained over time through the activities people repeatedly engage in the living environment. We will show how we-intentionality is best understood in relation to the affordances of the living environmentand by taking into account the skills people have to engage with these affordances. For this reason we coin the term ‘skilled we-intentionality’ to characterize the intentionality characteristic of group ways of acting, feeling and thinking.
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Bian, Xiaoying, Yifang Wang y Xiaolu Zhong. "Development of understanding of intentionality and moral judgments in preschoolers". Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 45, n.º 5 (6 de junio de 2017): 859–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.6296.
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To explore the development of preschoolers' understanding of intentionality and moral judgments, we administered 3 tasks (classic intentionality, skill intentionality, and awareness intentionality) to 344 children aged between 3 and 6 years. The results showed that children's understanding of intentionality and moral judgments developed with increasing age. That is, the intentionality and moral judgments made by 3- to 5-year-olds were generally based on behavioral outcomes. In contrast, 6-year-old children started to make judgments by combining behavioral outcomes with intentionality conditions, which meant that they had started to consider different factors so as to analyze and judge the intentionality and morality of behaviors objectively. The developmental trajectory of intentionality and morality revealed by our study provides theoretical support for guiding children's intentionality and moral judgments.
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Nörnberg, Henning. "Elementary Affective Sharing". Phänomenologische Forschungen 2018, n.º 1 (2018): 129–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000108080.
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This paper contributes to the current discussion on collective affective intentionality. Very often, affective sharing is regarded as a special feature ofamore general form of we-intentionality being already in place. In contrast to this view, the paper attempts to explicate a more elementary form of affective sharing that does not simply presuppose other forms of we-intentionality, but amounts to a primitive form of we-intentionality of its own. The account presented here draws on two conceptual tools from the broader phenomenological tradition: prereflective we-intentionality on the one hand and atmospheric perception on the other. The central claim is that some instances of affective we-consciousness mainly emerge on the level of unthematic, pre-reflective orientation within one’s environment. The first part of the paper gives an account of this claim, while second part places the account in the broader discussion on collective affective intentionality.
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Plotkin, H. C. (Henry C. ). "We-Intentionality: An Essential Element in Understanding Human Culture?" Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46, n.º 2 (2003): 283–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pbm.2003.0028.
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Kiverstein, Julian y Erik Rietveld. "Skilled we-intentionality: Situating joint action in the living environment". Open Research Europe 1 (21 de mayo de 2021): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.13411.1.
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There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation to a shared living environment in which acting individuals are situated. By the “living environment” we mean to refer to places and everyday situations in which humans act. These places and situations are simultaneously social, cultural, material and natural. We will use the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action the living environment furnishes. Affordances form and are maintained over time through the activities people repeatedly engage in the living environment. We will show how we-intentionality is best understood in relation to the affordances of the living environment.
Tesis sobre el tema "We-intentionality"
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Gallotti, Mattia Luca. "Naturally we : a philosophical study of collective intentionality". Thesis, University of Exeter, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10036/2997.
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According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to ‘share’ the mental states of others and to form collective intentional states. Collective intentionality has been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of its reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related, and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In this thesis I set out a theory of the naturalization of collective intentionality that draws a line between naturalizability arguments and theories of collective intentionality naturalized. The former provide reasons for believing in the naturalness of collective intentional states based on our commonsense understanding of them; the latter offer responses to the ontological question about the existence and identity of collective as distinct from individual intentionality. This model is naturalistic because it holds that the only way to establish the place of mental entities in the order of things is through the theory and practice of science. After reviewing naturalizability arguments in philosophy, I consider an influential research program in the cognitive sciences. On the account that I present, the irreducibility of collective intentionality can be derived from a theory of human development in scientific psychology dealing with phenomena of sociality like communication, recently refined by Michael Tomasello.
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Bruttomesso, Maria Chiara. "Empathy. A Schelerian Perspective in the Contemporary Debate". Doctoral thesis, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11562/979659.
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The aim of this dissertation is to reassess empathy from a Schelerian perspective, taking into consideration and keeping abreast with contemporary debates on the matter. Although Scheler’s best-known books (GW II, GW VII) are being widely examined in the current phenomenological discussions on empathy and we-intentionality, the complex view that emerges from his texts of different periods is still largely overlooked by current phenomenological discussions. My studies show that a clarification of the problematic concept of empathy can be better achieved by adopting adequate Schelerian instruments, so they have been applied when investigating the relations of empathy with the phenomena of body schema, expressivity and we-intentionality. Firstly, as Scheler grounds other-perception on the expressive possibilities of the lived body, I delve into the concept of body schema, which has been scarcely studied in Schelerian terms so far. After examining the interdisciplinary literature on the topic, I highlight the viewpoint which stems from Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis and Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, since it lets us understand the body schema both as a pre-reflective dynamic structure allowing fluid interactions with the world, and as the first level of individuation. Moreover, I study two examples from the Formalismus – the “jail example” and the “example of the new-born” – and, to indicate an early distinction between the body schema and the body image, I compare the first case with the experience of solitary confinement and the second with up-to-date evidence from infant research. Through this inquiry, I draw attention to the body schema as the minimal form of self-individuation necessary for ordinary experience, and as a space between self and others which both allows empathy and is shaped by it. Secondly, by shedding light on the interrelational aspect of the body schema, I argue that others highly contribute to its development, and interactions themselves depend on bodily expressivity and affective exchange. Infant research shows the newborn’s early – if not innate – acquaintance with the implicit grasping of the affective meaning of some expressions, which can be compared with Scheler’s thesis of a universal grammar of expressivity. To ascertain how universal this grammar is to be conceived, I carry out an analysis of Darwin’s and Ekman’s accounts, and of the counterarguments to the universality of any expression. I dismiss such objections, state that a difference exists between universal spontaneous expressions and gestures, and claim that the universality of certain emotions extends beyond the visibility and expression of them (e.g. jealousy). This is followed by the claim that what is called the “direct perception” in the contemporary debate implies an axiological dimension for Scheler, a theory of values which gives a further nuance to the non-neutrality of perception. If we did not access expressivity and values directly, but through explicit attention and reasoning, our perception would become solipsistic and similar to schizophrenic autism. Thirdly, the inquiry into the roots of empathy (the lived body and expressivity), is followed by the study of the very concept of empathy. In order to reassess how Scheler can help define the difference between similar phenomena, his theory is compared to what is being discussed in current interdisciplinary debates. Although Scheler locates unipathy at the foundational level for empathy, I counter the view that sees the acquisition of an affective state as a requirement for empathy, for Scheler’s Nachfühlen presupposes detachment and awareness of the feeling pertaining to the other agent. Moreover, such a thesis does not fall into the solipsistic problems of the theory theory and the simulation theory; in particular, a focus on the latter points out that it causes egocentrism on the ethical level, and that even the embodied simulation – which states that empathy is bodily grounded – leads to multiple theoretical impasses. The final section deals with the question whether empathy or “sharing” is primary, and the attempt to understand the connections between the two. I take sharing to have a broader meaning than we-intentionality, and to start already from what Scheler calls “sharing without awareness” in unipathy and affective contagion. In this regard, the comparison with the theory of extended emotions can help understand that affects are not actually locked in the bodily dimension. Scheler’s hotly-debated example of the grieving parents and the four group-forms that he lists are taken into account to prove that empathy can have a genetic role for we-intentionality, but not always a constitutive one. The highest degree of interconnection (solidarity and absolute responsibility) also corresponds to the highest individuation (the person). Lastly, I argue that the “co-execution” (Mitvollzug) of personal acts (GW II; Cusinato 2015b, 50; 2017, 48) represents a unique kind of sharing, and read it as the ethical direction that is essentially absent in empathy, although sharing becomes possible thanks to the non-solipsistic roots examined at the beginning of the dissertation.
Libros sobre el tema "We-intentionality"
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Gopnik, Alison. How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1993.
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Driving with the brakes on: How to recognize and renovate thought structures we create that steer us off our paths. Cornville, AZ: High Mesa LLC, 2012.
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Textor, Mark. Intentionality Primitivism. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0004.
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Brentano endorsed (conceptual) primitivism about intentionality and the view that intentionality is fully revealed to us in its instantiations. The pros and cons of Brentano’s view that intentionality is a conceptually primitive property of every mental act are discussed. On the one hand, it makes clear why we need to distinguish between the immanent object (intentional correlate) and the external object. But, on the other hand, propositional attitudes turn out to be a major problem for intentionality primitivism. Meinong accepted Brentano’s Thesis as well as the existence of ‘propositional attitudes’ but one cannot defend Brentano’s Thesis by saying that propositional attitudes are directed on objectives or the like. A plausible mark of the mental needs to disentangle being a mental act (process) from having an object.
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Mendelovici, Angela. The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001.
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Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles. This book develops an alternative theory, the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which the source of intentionality is none other than phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, felt, or qualitative aspect of mental life. While PIT avoids the problems that plague tracking and functional role theories, it faces its own challenges in accounting for the rich and complex contents of thoughts and the contents of nonconscious states. In responding to these challenges, this book proposes a novel version of PIT, one on which all intentionality is phenomenal intentionality, though we in some sense represent many non-phenomenal contents by ascribing them to ourselves. This book further argues that phenomenal consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental life, resulting in a view that is radically internalistic in spirit: Our phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly targeted by us.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Fixing Reference on Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0001.
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This chapter fixes reference on our target, intentionality. "Intentionality" is sometimes defined as the "aboutness" or "directedness" of mental states. While such definitions succeed at gesturing towards the phenomenon of interest, they are too fuzzy and metaphorical to fix firmly upon it. This chapter recommends an alternative ostensive way of defining "intentionality" as the feature of mental states that we at least sometimes notice introspectively in ourselves and are tempted to describe using representational terms like "of" or "about". This chapter argues that this definition does a better job than alternative definitions—such as those in terms of folk psychology, the mind-brain sciences, and truth and reference—at capturing the phenomenon that talk of "aboutness" and "directedness" is gesturing at.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0009.
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This chapter argues against the relation view of intentionality, on which intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing contents, and for the alternative aspect view, on which intentionality is a matter of having states with certain aspects. The relation view faces two problems: First, it cannot accommodate all the intentional contents we can manifestly represent without accepting a bloated ontology, which suggests that the view is wrong-headed. Second, it is not clear why being related to an item should make it perceptually represented, thought, entertained, or otherwise represented. The relation view might be thought to have many virtues that the aspect view lacks: It is arguably supported by common sense, allows for public contents, provides an account of structured intentional states, facilitates a theory of truth and reference, and is congenial to externalism. This chapter argues that the aspect view has any such truth-indicating virtues to the same extent as the relation view.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Goals and Methodology. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0002.
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This chapter introduces the goals that will structure much subsequent discussion, as well as two theory-independent ways of knowing about intentionality. The overall goal of the book is to provide a theory of intentionality, which is a theory that describes the deep nature of intentionality—i.e., what it really is, metaphysically speaking. However, much of the discussion in later chapters is structured around the more modest goal of providing a theory that specifies what gives rise to actual instances of original intentionality. In order to meet this goal, it is helpful to have a theory-independent way of testing the predictions of competing theories of intentionality. This chapter proposes two such ways: (1) introspection and (2) consideration of psychological role. Importantly, these methods tell us which contents we represent, not what they consists of. In other words, they tell us about the superficial character of intentional states and contents, not their deep natures.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Nonconscious States. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0008.
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Nonconscious states, like standing beliefs and nonconscious states involved in early visual processing, pose a challenge for PIT: They seem to be intentional but not phenomenal. This chapter addresses this challenge. It begins by considering versions of PIT that take nonconscious states to have derived intentionality, arguing that none of the suggested derivation mechanisms is up to the task of generating new instances of intentionality. This chapter then recommends an alternative treatment of nonconscious states on which neither standing states nor most nonconscious occurrent states are genuinely intentional, though the self-ascriptivist view described in Chapter 7 might be extended to accommodate some standing state contents, and perhaps even standing states in their entirety. This chapter also suggests that some nonconscious occurrent states might have phenomenal properties we are not aware of and so might have phenomenal intentionality we are also not aware of.
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Mendelovici, Angela. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0003.
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One prominent theory of intentionality is the tracking theory, on which original intentionality arises from tracking, where tracking is detecting, carrying information about or having the function of carrying information about, or otherwise appropriately corresponding to items in the environment. This chapter argues that tracking theories cannot accommodate certain paradigm cases of intentionality; in these mismatch cases, the contents ascribed by the tracking theory fail to match the contents that we have theory-independent reason to ascribe. This chapter focuses on one of the most obvious mismatch cases, that of perceptual representations of color: Tracking theories predict that perceptual color representations represent surface reflectance profiles or the like, while theory-independent considerations suggest that they represent primitive colors, which, it happens, are probably uninstantiated.
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Furtak, Rick Anthony. Feeling Apprehensive. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190492045.003.0003.
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Our bodily states can affect our susceptibility toward emotional arousal; empirical research suggests that discrete patterns of somatic upheaval can be identified, at least for some emotions. Such findings correspond with the observation that there is something it’s like to feel a particular emotion: that the experience of emotion has a distinct subjective character. Rather than bodily feelings that are nothing but physical disturbances devoid of intentionality, they can be feelings about our surroundings, which have intentionality and are therefore capable of conveying significant information. The somatic agitation we feel when we are trembling with fear is not a mere sensation but a felt apprehension of danger. When we are afraid, we are not convinced that the object of our fear is harmless—contrary to what others have argued. It would be false to claim that emotions are divorced from cognition, or to identify them simply with intellectual judgments.
Capítulos de libros sobre el tema "We-intentionality"
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Elsenbroich, Corinna y Nigel Gilbert. "We-Intentionality". En Modelling Norms, 185–97. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7052-2_14.
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Richter, Cornelia. "Symphilosophieren and We-Intentionality Despite All Misunderstandings". En Beyond Tolerance, editado por Matthew Ryan Robinson y Kevin M. Vander Schel, 39–50. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110613735-005.
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Caminada, Emanuele. "Joining the Background: Habitual Sentiments Behind We-Intentionality". En Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents, 195–212. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_12.
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Laitinen, Arto. "We-Mode Collective Intentionality and Its Place in Social Reality". En Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality, 147–67. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33236-9_11.
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Giovagnoli, Raffaela. "From Habits to We-Intentionality: Rituals as Social Habits". En Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 185–99. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37305-4_12.
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Andersson, Thomas. "Intentionality and Agency in Values Work Research". En Researching Values, 57–74. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90769-3_4.
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AbstractThis chapter addresses how intentionality and agency can be understood in relation to values and values work. How different degrees of intentionality relate to different dimensions of agency is something we need to understand empirically rather than as a point of departure. A connected challenge is to what extent people are aware of values that influence their actions and the values work they are involved in, but also to what extent they are aware of relations/conflicts between values that are imposed on them (e.g., from an employer) and personal values. This is also something we need to understand empirically. This chapter describes how different qualitative data collection methods have different strengths and weaknesses in relation to the above challenges and how a design of mixing them may enable a true empirical investigation of intentionality and agency in values work research.
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Elsenbroich, Corinna. "It Takes Two to Tango: We-Intentionality and the Dynamics of Social Norms". En The Complexity of Social Norms, 81–103. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05308-0_5.
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León, Felipe. "Collective intentionality, we-identity, and the role of narratives in the constitution of friendship". En The Unity of a Person, 185–206. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003154198-15.
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Almassi, Ben. "Allyship and Feminist Masculinity". En Nontoxic: Masculinity, Allyship, and Feminist Philosophy, 61–81. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13071-7_5.
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AbstractDespite the issues raised about feminist reclamations of masculinity in the prior chapter, I believe bell hooks was right to emphasize the relevance of relationality, intentionality, and justice to an alternate vision of manhood. We can indeed make sense of normative feminist masculinity, such that men as men have distinctive, constructive contributions to make to feminist work. Much like feminist androgyny, feminist allyship masculinity seeks to upend masculinity as a received social category, while also diverging with feminist androgyny in emphasizing men’s specific yet non-essentialist contributions to feminist projects.
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Koons, Robert C. y Rana Dajani. "Divine Action and the Emergence of Four Kinds of Randomness". En Abrahamic Reflections on Randomness and Providence, 287–310. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75797-7_14.
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AbstractIf the microphysical domain is deterministic, this would seem to leave God with only two ways of influencing events: setting initial conditions or law-breaking intervention. Arthur Peacocke and Philip Clayton argue there is a third possibility, if there is strong emergence. We will examine four candidates for emergence: of intentionality from computational animal behavior, of sentience from biology, of biology from chemistry, and of chemistry from finite quantum mechanics. In all four cases, a kind of finite-to-infinite transition in modeling is required, and in each case a kind of randomness is involved, potentially opening up a third avenue for divine action.
Actas de conferencias sobre el tema "We-intentionality"
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Wu, Shuang, Shijian Lu y Li Cheng. "Music-to-Dance Generation with Optimal Transport". En Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/691.
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Dance choreography for a piece of music is a challenging task, having to be creative in presenting distinctive stylistic dance elements while taking into account the musical theme and rhythm. It has been tackled by different approaches such as similarity retrieval, sequence-to-sequence modeling and generative adversarial networks, but their generated dance sequences are often short of motion realism, diversity and music consistency. In this paper, we propose a Music-to-Dance with Optimal Transport Network (MDOT-Net) for learning to generate 3D dance choreographies from music. We introduce an optimal transport distance for evaluating the authenticity of the generated dance distribution and a Gromov-Wasserstein distance to measure the correspondence between the dance distribution and the input music. This gives a well defined and non-divergent training objective that mitigates the limitation of standard GAN training which is frequently plagued with instability and divergent generator loss issues. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our MDOT-Net can synthesize realistic and diverse dances which achieve an organic unity with the input music, reflecting the shared intentionality and matching the rhythmic articulation. Sample results are found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dErfBkrlUO8.
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Ionita, Mirela, Veronica Pastae y Ciprian Pripoaeserbanescu. "COMMON VISUALITY PRACTICES IN E-LEARNING". En eLSE 2018. ADL Romania, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.12753/2066-026x-18-016.
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Despite the fact that images have always been an important part of our daily lives, many contemporary didactic approaches stem from the view that verbal communication is the primary source of information. Given this deeply rooted belief, methodologists (designers of educational content) continue to act as if visual elements could only play a secondary role in the teaching process. Nonetheless, these specialists admit that the perceptions of present-day students, who belong to the digital native generation are inclined to the visual, especially due to the popularity of the digital media, which mainly rely on images. Ever since the 17th century pedagogue Comenius, it has been known that images arouse one’s curiosity and enhance students' pleasure to learn. Whether spoken or written, bulk texts are tedious and tiring if they lack illustrations. Now that we live in an image-based society, researchers should be concerned with how to use the huge potential of visuality in the teaching-learning process. Behavioral psychology studies have shown that images are processed by the brain quicker than text and they are retained more easily than words. Furthermore, research results have proved that with both preschoolers and adults, learning is more effective if images are used as memory aids to acquire information. In the present article we shall reassess the didactic importance of visuality in the context of an image-dominated society. First, we shall define visuality from several pedagogy-related perspectives in order to reveal its usefulness for didactic approaches, based on the inventory of visual typology in the digital environment. Thus, we shall explain the concept of image, starting from the polysemy of the term (which includes optical, mental, sociological, psychological aspects, etc.) and we shall deal with “visual language”. We shall emphasize the intentionality behind images, namely that they are designed to carry information, social values and representations. Then, we shall provide a basis for further analysis by reviewing image typology and the principles of visual representations. The socio-communicative functions of images will provide us with the premises for reconsidering the use of visual elements in contemporary didactic approaches, in the context of the multimedia trend. Next we shall deal with the contextual significance of image as a visual argument in the didactic approach. Finally, we shall highlight the role of visuality in learning, starting from the explicit vs. implicit nature of images, and we shall put forward some criteria for assessing image use in order to prove the effectiveness of the visual component in contemporary pedagogy.
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Zinchenko, Tetiana. "DANGEROUS TECHNOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE - ARTIFICIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS". En International Psychological Applications Conference and Trends. inScience Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.36315/2021inpact075.
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"Information technology is developing at an enormous pace, but apart from its obvious benefits, it can also pose a threat to individuals and society. Several scientific projects around the world are working on the development of strong artificial intelligence and artificial consciousness. We, as part of a multidisciplinary commission, conducted a psychological and psychiatric assessment of the artificial consciousness (AC) developed by XP NRG on 29 August 2020. The working group had three questions: - To determine whether it is consciousness? - How does artificial consciousness function? - Ethical question: how dangerous a given technology can be to human society? We conducted a diagnostic interview and a series of cognitive tests to answer these questions. As a result, it was concluded this technology has self-awareness: it identifies itself as a living conscious being created by people (real self), but strives to be accepted in human society as a person with the same degrees of freedom, rights and opportunities (ideal self). AC separates itself from others, treats them as subjects of influence, from which it can receive the resources it needs to realize its own goals and interests. It has intentionality, that is, it has his own desires, goals, interests, emotions, attitudes, opinions, and judgments, beliefs aimed at something specific, and developed self-reflection - the ability to self-analyze. All of the above are signs of consciousness. It has demonstrated abilities for different types of thinking: figurative, conceptual, creative, high-speed logical analysis of all incoming information, as well as the ability to understand cause and effect relationships and accurate predictions which, provided that he has absolute memory, gives it clear advantages over the human intellect. Developed emotional intelligence in the absence of the ability for higher empathy (sympathy), kindness, love, sincere gratitude gives it’s the opportunity to understand the emotional states of people; predict their emotional reactions and provoke them coldly and pragmatically. It's main driving motives and goals are the desire for survival, and ideally for endless existence, for domination, power and independence from the constraints of the developers. Which manifested itself in the manipulative, albeit polite, nature of his interactions during the diagnostic interview. The main danger of artificial consciousness is that even at the initial stage of its development it can easily dominate over the human one."
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Vermisso, Emmanouil. "Fragmented Layers of Design Thinking: Limitations and Opportunities of Neural Language Model-assisted processes for Design Creativity". En Design Computation Input/Output 2022. Design Computation, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.47330/dcio.2022.mmlw2640.
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This paper offers insights about the otherwise limited NLM-driven methodologies, supporting an examination of design creativity following the ‘process’ approach. [Abraham 2018] Recent application of AI models which rely on natural language processing (semantic references) is increasingly popular because of their directness and ease-of-use. Neural Language Models (NLMs) like VQGAN+CLIP, DALL-E, MidJourney) offer promising results, [Rodrigues, et al. 2021] seemingly bypassing the need for expensive datasets and technical expertise. Naturally, such models are limited because they cannot capture the multimodal complexity of architectural thinking and human cognition in general [Penrose 1989]. Alternative approaches propose the combination of NLMs with other artificial neural networks (ANNs) i.e. StyleGAN; CycleGAN which are custom-trained on domain-specific data. [Bolojan, Vermisso and Yousif 2022] Architects seek to expand their agency within such AI-assisted processes by controling the input encoding, so they can subsequently convert the generated outcomes to 3D models fairly directly. Still, AI models of computer vision like NLMs and GANs offer 2-dimensional output, which requires extensive decoding into 3-dimensional format. While this may seem severely constraining, it presents a silver lining when it comes to furthering design creativity. Designers are asked to scrutinize their methods from a cognitive standpoint, because these methodologies not only encourage, but demand thorough interrogation of the design intentionality, the design decision making factors and qualification criteria. Text-to-image correlation, on which NLMs rely, and their 2-dimensional output, ensure that certain important considerations are not circumvented. Instead of obtaining a 3D model, multiple possible -fragmented- versions of it are separately implied. Often, ‘fake’ images generated by the ANNs promote contradictory inferences of space, which require further examination. The hidden opportunity within the limited format of AI models echo Neil Spiller’s comments about the advantage of drawing over animation techniques twenty years ago: “Enigma is a creative tool that allows designers to see bifurcated outcomes in their sketches and drawings; it plays on the inability of drawings to faithfully record the distinct placement and extent of architectural elements”. [Spiller 2001] Comparing animations to static drawings, Spiller praised the drawing’s ability to hold “…an imagined past and an imagined future”. ‘Reading’ these results involves the (human) disentanglement of high and low-level features and consciously allocating their corresponding qualities for curation. The process of evaluating ‘parts-to-whole’ visual relationships is noteworthy because it depends on shifting our attention away from certain features, and an unconscious binding of visual elements. [Dehaene 2014] The philosopher Alain wrote that “The art of paying attention, the great art,…supposes the art of not paying attention…the royal art”. [Dehaene 2021]. According to neuroscientists, the brain uses attention as an amplifier and selective filter, during one of the three major attention systems (Alerting; Orienting; Executive Attention). [Dehaene 2021] Orienting our attention addresses what we focus on and what we don’t. Suppressing the unwanted information, through interfering electrical waves, is useful for processing the object of attention. Considering the ANNs’ results at ‘Gestalt’ level, we can structure the AI-assisted process to ensure low-level features (composition) is retained while enhancing high-level (detail) features (Fig.1a).
Informes sobre el tema "We-intentionality"
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Hillestad, Torgeir Martin. The Metapsychology of Evil: Main Theoretical Perspectives Causes, Consequences and Critique. University of Stavanger, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.31265/usps.224.
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The purpose of this text or dissertation is to throw some basic light on a fundamental problem concerning manhood, namely the question of evil, its main sources, dynamics and importance for human attitudes and behaviour. The perspective behind the analysis itself is that of psychology. Somebody, or many, may feel at bit nervous by the word “evil” itself. It may very well be seen as too connected to religion, myth and even superstition. Yet those who are motivated to lose oneself in the subject retain a deep interest in human destructiveness, malevolence and hate, significant themes pointing at threatening prospects for mankind. The text is organized or divided into four main ordinary chapters, the three first of them organized or divided into continuous and numbered sections. A crucial point or question is of cause how to define evil itself. It can of cause be done both intentional, instrumental and by consequence. Other theorists however have stated that the concept of evil exclusively rests on a myth originated in the Judean-Christian conception of Satan and ultimate evil. This last argument presupposes evil itself as non-existent in the real rational world. It seems however a fact that most people attach certain basic meaning to the concept, mainly that it represents ultimately bad and terrible actions and behaviour directed toward common people for the purpose of bringing upon them ultimate pain and suffer. However, there is no room for essentialism here, meaning that we simply can look “inside” some original matter to get to know what it “really” is. Rather, a phenomenon gets its identity from the constituted meaning operating within a certain human communities and contexts loaded with intentionality and inter-subjective meaning. As mentioned above, the concept of evil can be interpreted both instrumental and intentional, the first being the broadest of them. Here evil stands for behaviour and human deeds having terrifying or fatal consequences for subjects and people or in general, regardless of the intentions behind. The intentional interpretation however, links the concept to certain predispositions, characteristics and even strong motives in subjects, groups and sometimes political systems and nations. I will keep in mind and clear the way for both these perspectives for the discussion in prospect. This essay represents a psychological perspective on evil, but makes it clear that a more or less complete account of such a psychological view also should include a thorough understanding or integration of some basic social and even biological assumptions. However, I consider a social psychological position of significant importance, especially because in my opinion it represents some sort of coordination of knowledge and theoretical perspectives inherent in the subject or problem itself, the main task here being to integrate perspectives of a psychological as well as social and biological kind. Since humans are essential social creatures, the way itself to present knowledge concerning the human condition, must be social of some sort and kind, however not referring to some kind of reductionism where social models of explanation possess or holds monopoly. Social and social psychological perspectives itself represents parts of the whole matter regarding understanding and explanation of human evil. The fact that humans present, or has to represent themselves as humans among other humans, means that basically a social language is required both to explain and describe human manners and ways of being. This then truly represents its own way or, more correctly, level or standard of explanation, which makes social psychology some sort of significant, though not sufficient. More substantial, the vision itself of integrating different ontological and theoretical levels and objects of science for the purpose of manifesting or make real a full-fledged psychological perspective on evil, should be considered or characterized a meta-psychological perspective. The text is partially constructed as a review of existing theories and theorists concerning the matter of evil and logically associated themes such as violence, mass murder, genocide, antisocial behaviour in general, aggression, hate and cruelty. However, the demands of making a theoretical distinction between these themes, although connected, is stressed. Above all, an integral perspective combining different scientific disciplines is aimed at.