Literatura académica sobre el tema "United states - espionage"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "United states - espionage"
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Arindiya, Ghina, and Dewi Triwahyuni. "CHINESE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES MILITARY INDUSTRY." Proceeding of International Conference on Business, Economics, Social Sciences, and Humanities 7, no. 1 (2024): 1108–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.34010/icobest.v7i.624.
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This research aims to analyze China's espionage activities against the United States, especially in the military industry. In analyzing the case the author uses the concepts of the Action-Reaction Model and Information War. The espionage conflict between the US and China is influenced by the proximity and complexity of political, technological and strategic factors. The collection technique was carried out through literature study and then analyzed using qualitative methods. The results of this research show that espionage has a major influence on the complexity of cyber security. Final conclusions about Chinese espionage against America will depend largely on the actual evidence available, and these assessments are often carried out in great secrecy. However, espionage conflict is a serious problem that requires a coordinated and strategic response from the government and related institutions
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Clarke, Duncan L. "Israel's Economic Espionage in the United States." Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 4 (1998): 20–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538128.
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Israel has conducted an aggressive campaign of economic espionage in the United States since 1948. This campaign has been critical to sustaining and modernizing Israel's nuclear weapons program and an array of its most advanced conventional weapons even while it has caused American firms to lose valuable proprietary information and unfairly advantaged Israeli companies in the international arms market. While other countries conduct economic espionage against the United States, Israel is the only major recipient of U.S. foreign aid to do so.
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Clarke, Duncan L. "Israel's Economic Espionage in the United States." Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 4 (1998): 20–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.1998.27.4.00p00037.
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Klehr, Harvey. "REFLECTIONS ON ESPIONAGE." Social Philosophy and Policy 21, no. 1 (2004): 141–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052504211074.
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In 1995 the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made public the story of a forty-year American intelligence operation code-named Venona. Shortly after the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, American military intelligence had ordered companies that were sending and receiving coded cables overseas, such as Western Union, to turn over copies to the U.S. government. Hundreds of thousands of cables were sent or received by Soviet government bodies. Beginning in 1943, spurred by rumors and concerns that Stalin might conclude a separate peace with Hitler, the U.S. Army's cryptographic section began work trying to read these Russian cables. It had very limited success until 1946, by which time the Cold War was already underway. Some twenty-nine hundred cables dealing with Russian intelligence activities from 1942 to 1946 eventually were decrypted successfully in whole or in part as a result of Soviet technical errors in constructing and using “one-time pads” that American code-breakers were able to exploit. These cables implicated more than three hundred Americans as having been involved with Soviet intelligence services during World War II, a time when the United States and the USSR were allies.
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Smith, Michael M. "The Mexican Secret Service in the United States, 1910-1920." Americas 59, no. 1 (2002): 65–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tam.2002.0091.
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Throughout the era of the Mexican Revolution, the United States provided sanctuary for thousands of political exiles who opposed the regimes of Porfirio Díaz, Francisco Madero, Victoriano Huerta, and Venustiano Carranza. Persecuted enemies of Don Porfirio and losers in the bloody war of factions that followed the ouster of the old regime continued their struggle for power from bases of operation north of the international boundary in such places as San Francisco, Los Angeles, El Paso, San Antonio, New Orleans, and New York. As a consequence, Mexican regimes were compelled not only to combat their enemies on domestic battlefields but also to wage more subtle campaigns against their adversaries north of the Río Bravo. The weapons in this shadowy war included general intelligence gathering, surveillance, espionage, counter-espionage, and propaganda; the agency most responsible for these activities was the Mexican Secret Service.
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Terry, Patrick C. R. "“Don't Do as I Do”—The US Response to Russian and Chinese Cyber Espionage and Public International Law." German Law Journal 19, no. 3 (2018): 613–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s207183220002280x.
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The Russian government is accused of hacking emails circulating among senior members of Hilary Clinton's campaign team to support President Trump's election in 2016. This was not the first time the United States was the target of massive cyber espionage: The Chinese government is believed to have gained sensitive information on 22.1 million US government employees through “cyber intrusions” in 2014. This Article will examine whether cyber espionage of this kind is unlawful under public international law and will conclude that it is. Specifically, such espionage can result in a violation of territorial sovereignty and will likely violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Yet, based on the controversial “clean-hands-doctrine,” past US actions in the realms of cyber espionage and intervention may well invalidate any claims it asserts against Russia or China.
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Smith, Lieutenant Commander Ursula, and Colonel Daniel J. Lecce. "Litigating National Security Cases under The United States Uniform Code of Military Justice." Journal of International Peacekeeping 20, no. 3-4 (2016): 250–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18754112-02003007.
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This paper will discuss classified litigation procedures in United States Military Courts-Martial, governed by Military Rule of Evidence 505 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The differences between United States Federal Court procedures and United States Military Commissions, governed by the Classified Information Privilege Act (cipa) and Military Commissions Rule of Evidence 505, are also discussed. Finally, best practices and selected military cases regarding espionage are presented.
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Amusan, Lere, and Siphiwe Mchunu. "Adventure into Peacetime Intra-Alliance Espionage: Assessment of the America-Germany Saga." Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 33, no. 1 (2015): 64–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/lfpr-2016-0010.
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Abstract Peacetime espionage is often employed by states as a means of acquiring information about competitor states in the international system. However the practice is not limited to competitor states. In a world where security concerns are an ever-present consideration for state action, acts of espionage normally reserved for use against enemies are also used against ally states. The basic premise is that while alliances are able to foster mutual trust and cooperation, they do not conclude that an ally will always be trust-worthy and faithful, most especially, when it involves issues of national interest. The international system and a need to safeguard one’s own interests and population mean that espionage, even against an ally, will remain a necessary state function and all states should therefore remain vigilant against attempts at infiltration of their state secrets. The question of peacetime intra-alliance espionage and the consequences thereof has yet to be answered and it is the purpose of this research to fill that intellectual gap. This research will look at traditionally allied countries, with a long record of cooperation, and not competing states. To achieve this, the case from 2013 of two North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, Germany and the United States (US), are our main focus. Lessons worth drawing from this, by NATO small states members, shall be discussed.
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WRÓBLEWSKA, Angelika. "SELECTED ADVANCED CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS." Cybersecurity & Cybercrime 1, no. 1 (2021): 149–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0053.8016.
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The article presents examples of highly advanced cyber espionage operations aimed atthe structures of states and non-state entities with high impact on the economic activity.The attacks took place between 2003 and 2017. The article presents the steps ofOperation Titan Rain and Operation Gh0stNet and also one of the longest espionageoperations revealed to the public, which is Operation The Night Dragon. Anotheroperation is a series of cyber attacks identified by McAfee - Operation Shady RAT. Theyears 2009-2010 belong to Operation Aurora, whose victims were dozens oforganizations, including Google. One of the described attacks is Operation Nitro,targeting entities mostly located in the United States, Bangladesh and Great Britain. Thecourse of Project Raven was based on a Reuters investigation. The spy campaigntargeting various victims around the world, monitored by a team of BlackBerryResearch and Intelligence specialists, was named as CostaRicto.
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Terry, Patrick C. R. "“ABSOLUTE FRIENDS”: UNITED STATES ESPIONAGE AGAINST GERMANY AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW." Revue québécoise de droit international 28, no. 2 (2015): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1067720ar.
Texto completoTesis sobre el tema "United states - espionage"
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Ritchey, David (David Benjamin. "George Washington's Development as an Espionage Chief." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1993. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc500803/.
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The American Revolution was a war of movement over great distances. Timely intelligence regarding the strength and location of the enemy was vital to the commanders on both sides. Washington gained his early experience in intelligence gathering in the wilderness during the French and Indian War. By the end of the American Revolution, Washington had become a skilled manager of intelligence. He sent agents behind enemy lines, recruited tory intelligence sources, questioned travelers for information, and initiated numerous espionage missions. Many heroic patriots gathered the intelligence that helped win the War for Independence. Their duties required many of them to pose as one of the enemy, and often incur the hatred of friends and neighbors. Some gave their lives in helping to establish the new American nation. It is possible that without Washington's intelligence service, American independence might not have been won.
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Mayo-Bobee, Dinah. "Espionage and Treason in the Early Republic." Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2016. https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu-works/739.
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Searle, Nicola C. "The economics of trade secrets : evidence from the Economic Espionage Act." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1632.
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This thesis reports on the economic analysis of trade secrets via data collected from prosecutions under the U.S. Economic Espionage Act (EEA.) Ratified in 1996, the EEA increases protection for trade secrets by criminalizing the theft of trade secrets. The empirical basis of the thesis is a unique database constructed using EEA prosecutions from 1996 to 2008. A critical and empirical analysis of these cases provides insight into the use of trade secrets. The increase in the criminal culpability of trade secret theft has important impacts on the use of trade secrets and the incentives for would-be thieves. A statistical analysis of the EEA data suggest that trade secrets are used primarily in manufacturing and construction. A cluster analysis suggests three broad categories of EEA cases based on the type of trade secret and the sector of the owner. A series of illustrative case studies demonstrates these clusters. A critical analysis of the damages valuations methods in trade secrets cases demonstrates the highly variable estimates of trade secrets. Given the criminal context of EEA cases, these valuation methods play an important role in sentencing and affect the incentives of the owners of trade secrets. The analysis of the lognormal distribution of the observed values is furthered by a statistical analysis of the EEA valuations, which suggests that the methods can result in very different estimates for the same trade secret. A regression analysis examines the determinants of trade secret intensity at the firm level. This econometric analysis suggests that trade secret intensity is negatively related to firm size. Collectively, this thesis presents an empirical analysis of trade secrets.
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Prather, Michael S. "George Washington, America's first director of military intelligence." Thesis, Springfield, Va. : Available from National Technical Information Service, 2002. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA407555.
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Thesis (master's)--United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2002. Thesis--George Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army led this nation to victory and independence in the American War for Independence. Victory was facilitated by his direct and effective use of intelligence sources and methods. Discussion: During the American War for Independence, intelligence information regarding location, movement, and disposition of British forces allowed the Continental Army to fight on its own terms and stymie British efforts to quell the revolution. General George Washington, as Commanding General of the Continental Army, was aware of the value of intelligence in the proper conduct of military operations. Washington literally became America's first director of military intelligence. He directed the intelligence operations that were conducted, and performed his own analysis. The Continental Army's effectiveness in intelligence includes examples of the proper use of espionage, counterintelligence, communications security, codebreaking, deception, operational security, surveillance, reconnaissance, reporting and analysis. Time after time, the Americans were properly prepared with good intelligence ultimately resulting in independence from the British. These intelligence successes can be directly attributed to the direction of General George Washington and the actions of his operatives.<br>Mentor(s): John B. Matthews, David A. Kelley. Includes bibliographical references (p. 52-54). Also available online.
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Gaspard, Jules. "The origins and expansion of counter-espionage in America : from the Revolutionary War to the Progressive Era." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/93142/.
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From the initial emergence of Intelligence Studies as a recognised academic discipline in the 1980s to the present day, official voices have been preeminent. This is especially true of counter-espionage. Only a few histories on the evolution of American counter-espionage have developed entirely exogenously from those who have worked within the country’s intelligence community. Unsurprisingly, this has had a rather distorting effect on our understanding of the context and nature of American counter-espionage. This thesis considers how America changed from a nation that partly defined itself at the outset by constricting the state apparatus of domestic spying to creating one of the largest domestic security systems. Meanwhile counterespionage changed from being used only during states of exception, to a state of permanence. In exploring the rise of American counter-espionage, this thesis makes three important claims of three key eras – the Revolutionary, the Gilded and the Progressive. First, it argues that the framers of the United States Constitution endeavoured to counteract the creation of a centralised security service. Second, it argues that this framework for limited counter-espionage, established by the framers, began to unravel following the Homestead Strike in 1892 and the passing of the ‘Anti-Pinkerton Act’. Lastly, it critically assesses the Progressive Era, where the foundation for the modern surveillance state was laid, with the creation of the Bureau of Investigation, the 1917 Espionage Act and a new state interventionist spirit. Along with progressivism, this thesis argues that the other dominant influences on the expansion of American counter-espionage were Britain and the private sector. More broadly, this thesis argues that Intelligence Studies has taken a wrong turn. In seeking to restore the ‘missing dimension’, it has at the same time created a separate field of study that often fails to connect to wider ideas of constitutional history, labour history and civil rights. Therefore, whilst analysing the origins, expansion and influences on America’s domestic security apparatus, the thesis continually connects the use of counterespionage to the political events that initiated its use. I do this so as to provide a critical revisionist account of American counter-espionage that challenges the existing narrative on the rise of spying in America.
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Amundson, Ryan Lo Clarence Y. H. "The ethical resister's last resort news coverage over the allegations of a national security whistleblower /." Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri--Columbia, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6583.
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The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on October 14, 2009). Thesis advisor: Dr. Clarence Lo. Includes bibliographical references.
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Rossodivito, Anthony M. "The Struggle Against Bandits: The Cuban Revolution and Responses to CIA-Sponsored Counter-Revolutionary Activity, 1959-1963." UNF Digital Commons, 2014. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/508.
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Following the 1959 victory of the Cuban revolution, the United States government along with the CIA and their Cuban émigré allies immediately undertook a campaign of subversion and terrorism against the Cuban revolution. From 1959 until 1963 a clandestine war was waged between supporters of the revolution and the counter-revolutionary organizations backed by Washington. This project is a new synthesis of this little-known story. It is an attempt to shed light on a little known aspect of the conflict between the United States government and the Cuban revolution by bringing together never-before seen primary sources, and utilizing the two distinct and separate historiographies from the U.S. and Cuba, concerning the clandestine struggle. This is the story of Cuba’s resistance to intervention, the organization of the counter- revolution, and finally how the constant defeat of CIA plots by the Cubans forced changes in U.S. strategy concerning intervention in Cuba and in other parts of the developing world that would have far-reaching and long-last effects.
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Uram, Derek Andrew. "Covert action : a useful tool for United States foreign policy?" 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/781.
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Squadrans, Lyvia Spregacinere. "O Estado de Vigilância de Exceção dos Estados Unidos: a espionagem aos aliados." Master's thesis, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10316/82464.
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Dissertação de Mestrado em Relações Internacionais apresentada à Faculdade de Economia<br>O presente trabalho tem como objetivo mostrar o porquê dos Estados Unidos investigar e interceptar ligações, e-mails e mensagens, de seus próprios aliados, uma vez que eles não apresentariam ameaça direta à segurança do país, através de uma política de vigilância fortalecida no pós-11 de setembro e pós-criação do Ato Patriota, em que a Agência de Segurança Nacional (NSA) teve suas capacidades aumentadas e legitimadas pelo Congresso estadunidense. Para isso, o trabalho examina os conceitos de inimigo e medo, usando para tal, a abordagem da Escola de Copenhague e o seu conceito de securitização, que tem suas origens no construtivismo, e concorda que as ameaças são socialmente construídas através do chamado Ato de Fala, que consiste em discursos e documentos de líderes. Sendo assim, a linguagem é algo fundamental no processo de securitização, bem como a aceitação da audiência, em que os receptores dessa mensagem aceitam que medidas emergenciais sejam tomadas em casos de uma ameaça eminente. É nesse sentido que o trabalho estuda a construção do inimigo, o terrorismo, no pós-11 de setembro, realizada pelo governo dos EUA, que justifica suas ações exepcionais, que em muitos casos vão contra os direitos dos cidadãos, em detrimento da segurança. O Ato Patriota se configura como uma dessas medidas excepcionais, que levou, junto com outros dispositivos legais, à um aumento das capacidades de inteligência do governo estadunidense e, em consequência, a uma vigilância em massa, exposta em 2013 por Edward Snowden, ex-agente da NSA. O trabalho analisa minuciosamente tais documentos confidenciais da política de inteligência dos EUA no pós-11 de setembro, bem como a história da NSA, desde sua criação durante a Guerra Fria, apresentando as estruturas e leis associadas, para mostrar a evolução da agência e da importância dada à Comunidade de Inteligência estadunidense. Por fim, debate a ambiguidade da política de vigilância dos Estados Unidos, que espionam os próprios aliados, principalmente os europeus, que ajudam na inteligência contra o terrorismo e, através do conceito de securitização, nos leva a conclusão de que através do discurso da segurança os EUA tratam os aliados como se fossem ‘inimigos’, numa cultura do medo construída após os atentados terroristas.<br>The present paper aims to present why the United States investigates and intercepts telephone calls, e-mails and messages from its own allies, since they do not present a direct threat to the security of the country, through a policy of surveillance strengthened in the post September 11 and post-creation of the Patriot Act, in which the National Security Agency (NSA) had its capabilities increased and legitimized by the US Congress. So, the paper examines the concepts of enemy and fear using the approach of the Copenhagen School and its concept of securitization, which has its origins in constructivism, and agrees that threats are socially constructed through the so-called Act of Speech, which consists of speeches and documents of leaders. Thus, language is fundamental to the securitization process, as well as the acceptance of the audience, in which the recipients of this message accept that emergency measures are taken in cases of eminent threat. In this sense, the paper studies the construction of the enemy, the terrorism, in the post-September 11, executed by the US government, which justifies its exceptional actions, which in many cases goes against the rule of law, to the detriment of security. The Patriot Act is one of these exceptional measures, which led, along with other legal provisions, to an increase in US government intelligence capabilities and, consequently, to mass surveillance, exposed in 2013 by Edward Snowden, Agent of the NSA. The paper thoroughly analyzes such confidential US intelligence policy documents post-9/11, as well as the history of the NSA since its inception during the Cold War, presenting the structures and associated laws, to show the evolution of the agency and the Importance to the American Intelligence Community. Finally, it discusses the ambiguity of US surveillance policy, which spies on their allies, specially the Europeans, who help in intelligence against terrorism and, through the concept of securitization, leads us to the conclusion that through the speech of Security the United States treat their allies as “enemies”, on a culture of scare built after the terrorist’s attacks.
Libros sobre el tema "United states - espionage"
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Rositzke, Harry August. The CIA's secret operations: Espionage, counterespionage, and covert action. Westview Press, 1988.
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F, Wiskoff Martin, Riedel James A, and Defense Personnel Security Research Center (U.S.), eds. Espionage against the United States by American citizens, 1947-2001. Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2002.
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CIA, Inc.: Espionage and the craft of business intelligence. Brassey's, 2002.
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Haapiseva-Hunter, Jane. Israeli techno crimes in the United States. Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada, 1988.
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Intelligence, United States Congress House Permanent Select Committee on. Report of investigation: The Aldrich Ames espionage case. U.S. G.P.O., 1994.
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Sontag, Sherry. Blind man's bluff: The untold story of American submarine espionage. HarperPaperbacks, 1999.
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Wright, Claudia. Spy, steal, and smuggle: Israel's special relationship with the United States. AAUG Press, 1986.
Buscar texto completoCapítulos de libros sobre el tema "United states - espionage"
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Richelson, Jeffrey T. "Superpower Espionage." In A Century of Spies. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195073911.003.0016.
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Abstract On March 4, 1953, Joseph Stalin’s life and reign as Soviet dictator came to an end. But Stalin’s death did not end the Cold War. Throughout the 1950s the superpowers continued to bolster their military forces and engage in a multitude of diplomatic offensives to support their positions. Less visibly, the superpowers continued their espionage war. The United States would not only continue its peripheral reconnaissance operations, but it would begin to establish a network of SIGINT stations around the Soviet Union. The United States would also explore various methods for conducting reconnaissance over Soviet territory. The So viets, with no close allies located near the United States, lacked the options of setting up ground stations or staging reconnaissance flights from bases near the United States. Thus, at least with respect to events in the United States, the Soviet Union had to depend heavily on human sources.
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Gaddis, John Lewis. "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War History." In The United States and the End Of the Cold War. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195052015.003.0005.
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Abstract We have learned a great deal over the past two decades about the impact of the “intelligence revolution” on World War II strategy.’ That knowledge has led, in turn, to a reassessment of the role of intelligence in earlier periods, and to the emergence of intelligence “studies” as a distinct sub-discipline, complete with its own newsletters, journals, organizations, scholarly meetings, and university courses. But this proliferation of scholarship thins out with the conclusion of the war. It is as if the possibilities for serious research on intelligence end with September, 1945, in a manner almost as decisive as President Harry S. Truman’s when in that same month he abolished with the stroke of a pen the first full-scale intelligence organization the United States had ever had, the Office of Strategic Services. The two phenomena are not, of course, unrelated: the very fact that OSS did not survive into the postwar era has made possible the declassification of most of its records. There is little reason to expect comparable openness anytime soon for the records of the Central Intelligence Group, which Truman created only four months after dismantling OSS, or for those of its more famous successor, the Central Intelligence Agency, whose official existence dates from July, 1947.4 Nor does documentation on code breaking activity in Great Britain and the United States-documentation that for the wartime years has largely sparked scholarly interest in intelligence matters-seem likely to be made available soon for the early postwar era.
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Lewis, Margaret K. "HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES PROTECT ITS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM CHINA’S ESPIONAGE?" In The China Questions 2. Harvard University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv2vr9cg3.32.
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Struthers, David M. "The Contours of Repression." In The World in a City. University of Illinois Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252042478.003.0009.
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This chapter examines the World War One period in which the federal, state, and local governments in the United States, in addition to non-state actors, created one of the most severe eras of political repression in United States history. The Espionage Act, the Sedition Act, changes to immigration law at the federal level, and state criminal syndicalism laws served as the legal basis for repression. The Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and other anarchists took different paths in this era. Some faced lengthy prison sentences, some went underground, while others crossed international borders to flee repression and continue organizing. This chapter examines the repression of radical movements and organizing continuities that sustained the movement into the 1920s.
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Lewis, Margaret K. "29. How Can the United States Protect Its Intellectual Property from China’s Espionage?" In The China Questions 2. Harvard University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4159/9780674287495-030.
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Engelman, Ralph, and Carey Shenkman. "“A Firm Hand Of Stern Repression”." In A Century of Repression. University of Illinois Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252044557.003.0002.
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This chapter discusses the creation of the Espionage Act of 1917. The act, rooted in the political culture of Woodrow Wilson's Progressivism, is revealed as a political weapon arrayed against opposition to US entry in World War I. That opposition is led by the Socialist Party of America and the International Workers of the World (IWW), whose entire leadership was imprisoned by 1918. Socialist leader and presidential candidate Eugene Debs is also imprisoned under the act. The Espionage Act is central to a major shift in American history, as the United States fights the first modern information war and enters the world stage as an active force in twentieth-century world affairs.
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Engelman, Ralph, and Carey Shenkman. "Enter Hoover and Baldwin." In A Century of Repression. University of Illinois Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252044557.003.0003.
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This chapter argues that the Espionage Act is critical in triggering both the repressive apparatus of what became the FBI and the modern civil liberties movement in the United States. J. Edgar Hoover and Roger Baldwin were virtual by products of the Espionage Act. Hoover would go on to shape the FBI for half a century. Baldwin would do as much for the American Civil Liberties Union as its founder. Their thinking crystallizes at the time when Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. is pressed to strike a middle ground protecting First Amendment rights in his historic dissent in Abrams v. U.S. This sets the stage for the battles that Hoover's FBI and Baldwin's ACLU would wage over freedom of expression throughout the twentieth century.
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Macdonnell, Francis. "The Opening Alarm." In Insidious Foes. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195092684.003.0004.
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Abstract In 1938 the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered an extensive Nazi spy ring centered in New York City. A shocked public learned that Germany had planted agents within America’s armed forces and defense industries. The FBI presented conclusive evidence linking German government officials to the espionage network. Though the situation caused grave concern, it did not set off a national panic in and of itself. Experts informed the public that the ring had acquired little intelligence of real value and that the captured Nazi spies had operated in a reassuringly clumsy manner. Nonetheless, the case recalled the years immediately before United States entry into World War I, when agents for the Kaiser had engaged in hostile operations against America. The Chicago Tribune noted that the indictment of eighteen individuals for espionage was the “greatest expose of spy activities since the world war.”1 Newsweek similarly observed that “not since the World War has there been such feverish activity in rooting out alleged German spies.”2 It was clear that the quiet days of the interwar era were over. Now America had become a target for the Nazis. The New York spy case was key to the emergence of a Fifth Column scare. The elaborate web of intrigue which the government unmasked in 1938 seemed to prove Hitler’s commitment to offensive action against the United States.
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Lonergan, Erica D., and Shawn W. Lonergan. "Patterns of Escalation in Cyberspace." In Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197550885.003.0005.
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Abstract Chapter 5 evaluates the extent to which the observable implications of the book’s theory match with the empirical reality, leveraging a comprehensive, multi-year dataset of cyber incidents from several different repositories to explore patterns of behavior over time between pairs of rival states, especially cases where escalation would be most likely. At its core is a series of extensive case studies tracing the strategic interactions between the United States and four rival states—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—which are overwhelmingly consistent with the expectations set out in Chapter 3. The chapter shows that the evidence, from both a decade of U.S.-China rivalry in cyberspace and cyber operations led by Russia and the United States against each other, provides little support for the argument that espionage campaigns create security dilemmas or cause escalation. The chapter also assesses interactions between the United States and its less capable rivals, Iran and North Korea, where a clear advantage might suggest that United States would be more willing to escalate in contests. While the evidence here does suggest that the United States was more willing to employ cyber capabilities in response to or as part of its strategic interactions with those states, none of the activity could reasonably be characterized as escalatory. Interactions between the U.S. and Iran, in particular, illuminate the challenges associated with planning and conducting strategic offensive cyber operations.
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Fahrenthold, Stacy D. "Former Ottomans in the Ranks." In Between the Ottomans and the Entente. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190872137.003.0004.
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This chapter examines the clandestine recruitment of ten thousand Syrian migrants into the militaries of the Entente powers. As conditions deteriorated in Ottoman Syria and Mount Lebanon, Syrian migrant organizations shifted from providing humanitarian relief toward military resistance against the Ottoman state. Activists from competing Syrianist, Lebanist, and Arab nationalist movements produced propaganda in support of the war against Istanbul, conducted espionage for the Entente powers, and recruited Arab men from across the mahjar into Entente military service. The chapter tracks migrant networks between Syrians in Brazil, Argentina, and the United States who worked to deliver migrant troops to the army, where the US government granted recruits passports and a post-Ottoman nationality status to facilitate their service. Syrians joined up under a patriotic rhetoric promising the war would deliver Syria’s liberation, but they also resented nationalists’ attempts to claim them as symbols for competing homeland projects.
Actas de conferencias sobre el tema "United states - espionage"
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Sinichenko, Vladimir. "Sewing Company “Singer” in Russia and Eastern Siberia During the First World War." In Irkutsk Historical and Economic Yearbook 2021. Baikal State University, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/978-5-7253-3040-3.19.
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The article considers issues related to the liquidation company of the Russian state in relation to enterprises of “subjects of hostile powers” during the First World War. As part of this company, the American company Singer and K. fell under sanctions. Since no information was established about the espionage of the company’s leadership, the company reopened its branches in early 1916. After that, the conflict between Russia and the United States was eliminated over the actions of the Russian authorities against the American company.
Informes sobre el tema "United states - espionage"
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Herbig, Katherine L., and Martin F. Wiskoff. Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001. Defense Technical Information Center, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada411004.
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Miller, Joan. Spies in America : German espionage in the United States, 1935-1945. Portland State University Library, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.15760/etd.5463.
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