Artículos de revistas: "Truth"

1

Haack, Susan. "truth, truths, "truth", and "truths" in the law". Journal of Philosophy, Science & Law 3, n.º 7 (2003): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpsl20033711.

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2

Stuhr. "Truth, Truths, and Pluralism". Journal of Speculative Philosophy 34, n.º 4 (2020): 526. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.34.4.0526.

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3

Michell, A. R. "Home truths about scientific truth". Veterinary Journal 173, n.º 3 (mayo de 2007): 467–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tvjl.2006.08.006.

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4

Romero, Gustavo E. "Truth and Relevancy". Metatheoria – Revista de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia 7, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2017): 25–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.48160/18532330me7.150.

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There are several types of truths. In this paper I focus on semantic truths, and within these on factual truths. These truths are attributed to statements. I review the theory of the truth proposed by Bunge and discuss some problems that it presents. I suggest that a theory of truth of factual statements should be complemented by a theory of relevance, and propose the basic tenets of it. Finally, I briefly discuss the nature of propositions and the problem of scientific truth in the light of the presented semantic theory.

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5

Smyth, Marie. "Truth, partial truth, and irreconcilable truths: Reflections on the prospects for truth recovery in Northern Ireland". Smith College Studies in Social Work 73, n.º 2 (marzo de 2003): 205–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00377310309517682.

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6

Capps, John. "Pragmatism about Truth-Makers". Contemporary Pragmatism 19, n.º 4 (14 de noviembre de 2022): 350–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10052.

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Abstract Truth-makers are the dark matter of metaphysics. On the one hand, truth-makers seem obvious and necessary: if there are truths then there must be something that makes these truths true. On the other hand, it’s proven difficult to say exactly what these truth-makers are. Even defenders disagree about what sort of entity truth-makers are or whether all truths have truth-makers. Skeptics have questioned whether truth-makers are actually so obvious and necessary, or even whether they exist at all. Here I offer an account of this unhappy state of affairs and a modest proposal. First, I argue that not only are there no good arguments for truth-makers but it’s unlikely that there ever will be. Second I point to how much can be done without resorting to truth-makers in the first place: they are not as essential as often assumed. Finally, I conclude that we needn’t jettison the concept of truth-makers entirely. Understood in a modest and pragmatic spirit we can hold on to truth-makers while recognizing their inherent limitations.

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7

Levin, Sergei M. "Intellectually Virtuous Inquirer and the Practical Value of Truth". Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, n.º 4 (2021): 54–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158459.

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Veritism is the thesis that the truth is the fundamental epistemic good. According to Duncan Pritchard, the most pressing objections to veritism are the trivial truths objection and the trivial inquiry problem. The former states that veritism entails that trivial truths are as important as deep and important truths. The latter is a problem that a veritist must prefer trivial inquiry that generates many trivial truths to the serious inquiry with the hope but no guarantee to discover some deep and important truth. Both objections arise from the inability of veritism prima facie to properly rate the different types of truths. Pritchard's solution is to approach the truth from the perspective of the intellectually virtuous inquirer who would prefer weighty truth over trivial truth. In my commentary, I criticise the proposed solution as circular reasoning. The necessary virtue for an intellectually virtuous inquirer is that they would prefer the weighty truth over the trivial one and at the same time, the weighty truth is superior because it is the goal for intellectually virtuous inquirer. I suggest another path to substantiate veritism in the face of the two sibling objections. I argue that truth is the fundamental epistemic good as it makes the epistemic realm practically valuable more than any other epistemic good. The weighty truths are preferable to the trivial ones because the practical value of the deep and important truths is usually higher. The suggested path goes away from the attempts to prove the epistemic value of truth only within the epistemic realm, yet I argue it does not compel the intellectually virtuous inquirer to seek the truth only for the sake of practical reasons.

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8

Allan, Keith. "Truth is what the context makes of it". Claridades. Revista de Filosofía 14, n.º 2 (14 de noviembre de 2022): 15–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.24310/claridadescrf.v14i2.13620.

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This essay shows that truth cannot be divorced from human experience and an individual’s world view, his or her weltanschauung. There exist different weltanschauungen that favour alternative truths. Thus, loosely speaking, truth is determined by context. It may be socially acceptable to prefer one among the alternative truths as truly true, but this goal necessarily involves taking an ideological perspective on what is perceived and accepted as the sole truth. In other words, it is prejudiced. The truth value assigned to the proposition God exists starkly illustrates this claim, but in the course of this essay I demonstrate that alternative truths are widespread and that conflicting truths can co-exist within a community even when they create dissension. A hegemonic group will assert a preference for one truth over its alternatives, but that does not eliminate the existence of alternative truths. Alternative weltanschauungen need to be managed somehow, and the recognition that alternative truths exist is one step in their management.

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9

van der Zee, Florian. "Scepticism and the Modern State in the Thought of Georg W. F. Hegel". Međunarodne studije 22, n.º 1 (24 de junio de 2022): 41–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.46672/ms.22.1.2.

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Both the concept of “post-truth” and ancient scepticism link a plurality of irreconcilable “truths” to a certain disregard for truth. Post-truth phenomena are often deemed politically detrimental. This paper discusses how Georg W. F. Hegel rethinks ancient scepticism to avert similar detrimental effects, shows that Hegel’s thought suggests that a plurality of irreconcilable “truths” needs not exclude faith in truth, and that the modern state rests on both.

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10

Gready, Paul. "NOVEL TRUTHS: LITERATURE AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS". Comparative Literature Studies 46, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 2009): 156–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25659704.

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11

Gready, Paul. "Novel Truths: Literature And Truth Commissions". Comparative Literature Studies 46, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 2009): 156–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/complitstudies.46.1.0156.

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12

Paul Gready. "Novel Truths: Literature and Truth Commissions". Comparative Literature Studies 46, n.º 1 (2008): 156–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cls.0.0067.

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13

Forster, Daniel. "Wahrheit in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie". Wittgenstein-Studien 14, n.º 1 (21 de junio de 2023): 59–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/witt-2023-0005.

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Abstract Truth in Wittgenstein′s Later Philosophy. In this paper I attempt to examine Wittgenstein′s understanding of truth in his later period. In doing so, I orient myself primarily on the remarks published as Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. My primary aim in the destructive part is to show that his later philosophy neither espouses a redundancy and deflationary, nor an epistemic and anti-realist conception of truth. Both strands of interpretation are strongly represented in the debate. An examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the correspondence theory of truth will also shed some light on his thoughts about truth. Furthermore, in the preceding constructive part of this paper, I will try to demonstrate that (1) for Wittgenstein there is a strong link between truths that we accept based on our certainties and our use of the term “truth” and (2) that skepticism about truth, which claims that all accepted truths in our Weltbild (“world-view”) could be actually false, fails to give any meaning to its use of “truth”. This culminates in Wittgenstein′s insight, that the question of what truth is can only be answered relative to the Weltbild. Therefore, talking about truths that transcend our Weltbild becomes nonsense.

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14

McLeod, Stephen K. "Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism". Philosophy 83, n.º 2 (abril de 2008): 179–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819108000454.

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AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive.

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15

Caso, Ramiro. "Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth". Daimon, n.º 89 (1 de mayo de 2023): 149–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.480391.

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Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed. Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed.

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16

Allan, Keith. "Why truth is necessarily pragmatic". Intercultural Pragmatics 20, n.º 3 (1 de junio de 2023): 251–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ip-2023-3003.

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Abstract This essay presents an array of arguments demonstrating that truth is necessarily pragmatic. Evaluations of truth derive from human experience, from the individual’s weltanschauung which molds their point of view and ideological perspective. Consequently, within any community, there exist alternative truths. Traditional takes on truth are reviewed. The fuzziness of many truths is examined. The existence within the community of alternative, sometimes contradictory, truths is explicated and shown to be fairly common in practice, even though it can occasionally lead to social dissension. The essay expatiates on the alleged incontrovertibility of logical, mathematical, and scientific truths (supposedly true in all possible worlds) showing that they are necessarily subject to specific conditions which render the assessment pragmatic. In sum, Φ is true resolves into Φ functions as true under specific conditions a 1…n . Certainly, a hegemonic group within the community will often assert a preference for one truth over its alternatives, but that does not eliminate the existence of alternative truths within that community. The only way to manage this state of affairs is to admit that truth does not exist independent of human beings but is necessarily evaluated according to the set of perceptions, conceptions, and beliefs that constitute the individual’s weltanschauung at the time the judgment is made, such that different weltanschauungen often give rise to different judgments about what functions as true.

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17

Tandyanto, Yulius. "Membaca 'Kebenaran' Nietzsche". MELINTAS 31, n.º 2 (23 de noviembre de 2015): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.26593/mel.v31i2.1622.130-153.

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Nietzsche’s early work that gives wide exploration of the idea of truth is his unpublished essay entitled Wahrheit und Lüge in Ausermoralischen Sinne (1872). His controversial statement in this essay was “Truths are illusions”, opening many interpretations among scholars in understanding his position on truth. Sarah Kofman argues that it is useless to speak about truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy, for values are neither true nor false. Referring values to truth means forgetting to place oneself “beyond good and evil.” Unlike Kofman, Maudemarie Clark separates sharply Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics and his denial of truth. Clark argues that Nietzsche rejects metaphysics and eventually overcomes it in his own work, but also that he ultimately affirms the existence of truths and therefore does not undermine his own theory when he claims truth for his own position. Clark’s strategy in defending her theses tries to explain that there is a turning (Kehre) in Nietzsche’s position. This article wants to offer an interpretation that Nietzsche does not make a new theory of truth in WL, but rather examines and constates truths that hold true. With his subtile and metaphoric style, Nietzsche might want to vivify the symbolic and figurative elements in language before the truth or reality that already escapes languages.

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18

Woolf, Raphael. "Truth as a Value in Plato's Republic". Phronesis 54, n.º 1 (2009): 9–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852808x375237.

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AbstractTo what extent is possession of truth considered a good thing in the Republic? Certain passages of the dialogue appear to regard truth as a universal good, but others are more circumspect about its value, recommending that truth be withheld on occasion and falsehood disseminated. I seek to resolve this tension by distinguishing two kinds of truths, which I label 'philosophical' and 'non-philosophical'. Philosophical truths, I argue, are considered unqualifiedly good to possess, whereas non-philosophical truths are regarded as worth possessing only to the extent that possession conduces to good behaviour in those who possess them. In the non-philosophical arena it is an open question, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, whether falsehood is more efficacious in furthering this practical aim than truth.

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19

Wang, Sijia y Huanhuan He. "Paramārtha’s Ultimate Truth and the Development of Chinese Buddhism’s Ultimate Truth". Religions 13, n.º 1 (24 de diciembre de 2021): 17. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel13010017.

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This paper discusses the development of ideas of the ultimate in the thought of Chinese Buddhism in the Northern and Southern Dynasties. The concept of ultimate truth is, along with that of conventional truth, a core concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism. During the Sui Dynasty, Chinese Buddhism developed the unique perspective of the Three Truths, the foundation for which was formed during the Southern and Northern Dynasties. This begins with Jie jie Jing 解節經 (in full, Foshuo Jiejie Jing 佛說解節經) by Paramārtha (499–569), which is a partial translation of Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and presents the theory of ultimate truth (paramārtha) to Chinese Buddhists. Through a comparison of Jiejie Jing with other Chinese and Tibetan translations of Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, we establish Paramārtha’s thoughts on the ultimate. The relationship between Paramārtha’s thought on the ultimate and the development of the Three Truths is evaluated in a comparison of Paramārtha’s thoughts on ultimate truth with the thinking of nearly contemporary Chinese monks.

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20

Sankey, Howard. "Truth about Artifacts". Symposion 10, n.º 1 (2023): 149–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposion20231016.

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Truth in a correspondence sense is objective in two ways. It is objective because the relation of correspondence is objective and because the facts to which truths correspond are objective. Truth about artifacts is problematic because artifacts are intentionally designed to perform certain functions, and so are not entirely mind independent. Against this, it is argued in this paper that truth about artifacts is perfectly objective despite the role played by intention and purpose in the production of artifacts.

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21

Nekhaev, Andrei V. "The truth about "truth"". Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, n.º 45 (1 de octubre de 2018): 34–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/45/4.

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22

Tebou, Johnny. "The Truth about Truth". Questions: Philosophy for Young People 18 (2018): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/questions2018188.

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23

Plumer, Gilbert. "Truth and Collective Truth". Dialectica 50, n.º 1 (23 de mayo de 2005): 3–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00116.x.

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24

Dodd, J. "Truth and Truth-Making". Analysis 70, n.º 3 (26 de febrero de 2010): 567–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq003.

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25

Pritchard, Duncan. "The truth about truth". Philosophers' Magazine, n.º 30 (2005): 86–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm20053092.

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26

Novák, Zsolt. "Truth and Truth‐making". International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24, n.º 3 (septiembre de 2010): 323–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2010.522414.

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27

Guerrini, Anita. "The Truth About Truth". Early Science and Medicine 3, n.º 1 (1998): 66–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157338298x00031.

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28

Sullins, D. Paul. "Truth and Anti-Truth". Catholic Social Science Review 21 (2016): 207–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cssr20162130.

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29

Hyttinen, Tapani y Gabriel Sandu. "Truth and definite truth". Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126, n.º 1-3 (abril de 2004): 49–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2003.10.007.

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30

Cavassane, Ricardo Peraça y Itala Maria Loffredo D’Ottaviano. "Big Data: truth, quasi-truth or post-truth?" Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 42, n.º 3 (15 de diciembre de 2020): e56201. http://dx.doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v42i3.56201.

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In this paper we investigate if sentences presented as the result of the application of statistical models and artificial intelligence to large volumes of data – the so-called ‘Big Data’ – can be characterized as semantically true, or as quasi-true, or even if such sentences can only be characterized as probably quasi-false and, in a certain way, post-true; that is, if, in the context of Big Data, the representation of a data domain can be configured as a total structure, or as a partial structure provided with a set of sentences assumed to be true, or if such representation cannot be configured as a partial structure provided with a set of sentences assumed to be true.

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31

Spoelstra, Sverre. "The truths and falsehoods of post-truth leaders". Leadership 16, n.º 6 (9 de julio de 2020): 757–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1742715020937886.

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Over the last three years, the idea of a ‘post-truth society’ has become a common talking point. Politicians from around the world, from Europe to South America to the United States, have been labelled as ‘post-truth leaders’, with Donald Trump being portrayed as the standard bearer for this new kind of political discourse. This article suggests that post-truth leadership is nothing new. Ever since Max Weber developed his notion of charismatic leadership in the early 20th century, Western societies have been infatuated with the idea that leaders ought not concern themselves too much with factual reality. In a sense, leadership has been post-truth all along.

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32

Chwałczyk, Franciszek. "Techniczna konstrukcja/odkrywanie prawd (1): odkrycie Talesa i miary średniowieczne". Humaniora. Czasopismo Internetowe 26, n.º 2 (15 de junio de 2019): 37–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/h.2019.2.4.

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Writing about the relationship between Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and Marxist philosophy, Jean Beaufret states (after Hegel) that it was in Descartes philospohy that the very essence of truth was resolved in a new way. I interpret it as follows: it is not statement mainly about the fact that its content – what is considered to be true – has changed. This has been changing many times, depending on time and place. What has changed is the truth itself; what (and why) is considered true; by what means truth spreads and reproduces. So I am less interested in what the Truth is - in itself, in its essence (especially that it seems to be historically changeable) - or (making distinction) what are those different truths (modern or not; that what is currently true or considered as such). I am going to focus here on this very resolution: how Truth was (re-)constructed, how one discovers/constructs truths and what conditions they must fulfill according to given Truth. It is a two-part text, and this is first part.

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33

McGuire, Matt. "The Trouble(s) with Transitional Justice: David Park's The Truth Commissioner". Irish University Review 47, supplement (noviembre de 2017): 515–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/iur.2017.0307.

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David Park's The Truth Commissioner (2008) tells the story of a fictional truth commission, established in the wake of the Northern Irish Troubles. To date, one of the most striking things about Northern Ireland has been its reluctance to engage in any wide-ranging, public process for dealing with the legacy of the Troubles. The Truth Commissioner diagnoses this specific moment in Northern Irish history. This article examines Park's engagement with three key issues, often overlooked by advocates of truth telling initiatives: the emergence of multiple (often incompatible) truths, the ambiguous nature of victimhood, and the gender bias of traditional truth recovery mechanisms.

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34

Shoemaker, Jessica. "The Truth About Property". Michigan Law Review, n.º 120.6 (2022): 1143. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.6.truth.

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35

Shoemaker, Jessica. "The Truth About Property". Michigan Law Review, n.º 120.6 (2022): 1143. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.6.truth.

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36

Shoemaker, Jessica. "The Truth About Property". Michigan Law Review, n.º 120.6 (2022): 1143. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.6.truth.

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37

Clavier, Paul. "God as Ultimate Truthmaker". European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, n.º 1 (11 de marzo de 2018): 67–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.1908.

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Theories of truthmaking have been introduced quite recently in epistemology. Having little to do with truth serums, or truths drugs, their concern is to define truth in terms of a certain relation between truthbearers and truthmakers. Those theories make an attempt to remedy what is supposed to be lacking in classical theories of truth, especially in Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory.

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38

Bhunia, Aloke. "Theories of Truth". Indian Journal of Applied Research 4, n.º 6 (1 de octubre de 2011): 455–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.15373/2249555x/june2014/142.

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39

Dorter, Kenneth. "Conceptual Truth and Aesthetic Truth". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48, n.º 1 (1990): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/431198.

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40

Yablo, Stephen. "Truth, Definite Truth, and Paradox". Journal of Philosophy 86, n.º 10 (1989): 539–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil1989861025.

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41

OPENSHAW, S. "The truth about Ground Truth". Transactions in GIS 2, n.º 1 (octubre de 1997): 7–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9671.1997.tb00002.x.

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42

Booy, Robert y Dominic E. Dwyer. "Truth, double truth and statistics". New South Wales Public Health Bulletin 21, n.º 2 (2010): 30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/nb09048.

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43

Cleve, James Van y Crispin Wright. "Minimal Truth Is Realist Truth". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, n.º 4 (diciembre de 1996): 869. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108287.

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44

Dima, Teodor. "Probable Truth Versus Partial Truth". Logos & Episteme 1, n.º 1 (2010): 31–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20101119.

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45

O Waring, George y Jorge L Alió. "Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty". Journal of Refractive Surgery 21, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 2005): 11–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3928/1081-597x-20050101-05.

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46

PATTERSON, DOUGLAS. "Truth-definitions and Definitional Truth". Midwest Studies In Philosophy 32, n.º 1 (septiembre de 2008): 313–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2008.00177.x.

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47

Eaton, Lynn. "Beauty is truth, truth beauty". BMJ 335, n.º 7626 (1 de noviembre de 2007): 906.2–906. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.39381.738947.db.

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48

Harth, Manfred. "Is Relative Truth Really Truth?" Dialectica 68, n.º 3 (septiembre de 2014): 409–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12074.

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49

Donohue, Mark y Bhojraj Gautam. "Truth, person, and personal truth". Usage-based and Typological Approaches to Linguistic Units 43, n.º 2 (13 de noviembre de 2019): 444–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/sl.17027.don.

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Abstract In this paper we present data on the copula system of Kuke, a language of the lower Nubri valley, in northern Nepal. We present data showing that the system of copulas cannot easily be categorised in terms of the different descriptive categories that are frequently used in discussion of languages of the Himalayan region (evidentiality, egophoricity, conjunct/disjunct). Further, the different contrasts encoded in the morphologically simple copula system shows a range of semantics (loosely associated with first person interpretations) that has rarely been described as occurring in one system.

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50

DORTER, KENNETH. "Conceptual Truth and Aesthetic Truth". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48, n.º 1 (1 de diciembre de 1990): 37–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540_6245.jaac48.1.0037.

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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Truth"

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