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1
Kumar, Pranav. "Sino-Bhutanese Relations". China Report 46, n.º 3 (agosto de 2010): 243–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000944551104600306.
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Historically the interaction between Bhutan and China was through Tibet. The annexation of Tibet by China and the later uprising in Tibet instilled a sense of fear in Bhutan causing it to close its northern border in 1960. However, Bhutan adopted a more open policy in the 1970s gradually increasing the contacts between the two neighbours. Border talks which started in 1984 resulted in an agreement in 1998 on maintaining peace and tranquility along border areas. While China and Bhutan neither have diplomatic relations nor any legal trade, growing Chinese interests in South Asia encompass Bhutan as well. Bhutan, therefore, faces the dilemma of not hurting the interests and sentiments of its traditional friend India while at the same time needing to respond to Chinese overtures and to solve the border problem peacefully and urgently; in the Sino-Bhutanese relationship, the Indian element remains the most important variable. The dynamics of the Sino-Indian relationship and Indian and Chinese strategic interests and activities in the Himalayas will be crucial in shaping Bhutan’s policies towards China.
2
Verisova, Anna D. "The Tibet Issue in China–United States Relations, 2009−2012". Vestnik of Northern (Arctic) Federal University. Series Humanitarian and Social Sciences 22, n.º 5 (15 de diciembre de 2022): 5–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.37482/2687-1505-v221.
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The paper analyses the Sino-American contacts of 2009–2012 on the Tibet issue, which had occupied an important place in China–US relations since the 1980s. With Barack Obama moving into the White House, the US adopted a softer policy aimed at strengthening the relations with China. However, the Tibet issue remained a source of conflict and disagreement between Beijing and Washington. US leaders believed that China was pursuing a tough policy towards the peoples of Tibet and suggested some ways to settle the issue. Beijing, in its turn, saw this as an interference in China’s internal affairs. Having examined the works of Russian and foreign researchers, the author comes to the conclusion that for the United States the issue of human rights in Tibet was not of strategic importance, but, primarily, an opportunity to discredit China on the international arena, as any decision taken by the country would be deemed insufficient. Understanding this, Beijing reacted quite sharply to Washington’s comments, closing the door to further discussion. The paper’s chronological framework spans from the beginning of Barack Obama’s (2009) to the end of Hu Jintao’s (2012) term in office. The author turns to various sources in English and Chinese, which gives the article a significant element of novelty.
3
McGranahan, Carole y Elliot Sperling. "Introduction: Tibet, India, and China". India Review 7, n.º 3 (29 de agosto de 2008): 161–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14736480802261368.
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Zhai, Qiang. "Tibet and Chinese-British-American Relations in the Early 1950s". Journal of Cold War Studies 8, n.º 3 (julio de 2006): 34–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2006.8.3.34.
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The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who seized power in Beijing in 1949 viewed Tibet as Chinese territory. In this respect, they were no different from previous rulers of China. The chairman of the CCP, Mao Zedong, carefully devised a plan to re-annex Tibet, which had been effectively independent of China since 1911. The CCP's recent victory in the Chinese civil war gave Mao high confidence that he could reclaim Tibet without provoking outside intervention. Such a move not only would bring international political benefits but would also carry a symbolic meaning at home and thereby legitimize the rule of the CCP. Although Mao sent troops to Tibet, he also planned to rely on negotiations and coercive diplomacy. This article highlights the complicated relationships that emerged on the international scene as a result of China's actions in the early 1950s.
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Thejalhoukho. "The Sikkim–Tibet Convention of 1890 and the Younghusband Mission of 1904". China Report 57, n.º 4 (14 de octubre de 2021): 451–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00094455211047078.
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The controversy surrounding the Simla Conference of 1913–1914 and the legality of the McMahon line, which was produced by the Conference, has been at the centre of the boundary dispute between India and China. Amidst the diverging opinions amongst scholars and political commentators, the main issue rest on the unresolved question of Tibet’s political status. Was Lhasa authorised to sign treaties for Tibet? Was China the sovereign over Tibet? The answers to such questions are murky and complicated, made more so by the politics and conflicts in the post colonial period. This study attempts to highlight the complicated nature of political authority in Tibet through a study of British policy in Tibet towards the end of 19th and early 20th centuries. The signing of the 1890 Convention with China and the 1904 Convention with Tibet represents two extremes in British foreign policy which attest to the confounding situation presented before the British and the diverging opinions within the British official circles. The period between these two conventions provides a glimpse of the historical background in which the relations between British India, China and Tibet developed subsequently.
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Yang, Yun-yuan. "Controversies over Tibet: China versus India,1947-49". China Quarterly 111 (septiembre de 1987): 407–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000050979.
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To the present Beijing Government, Tibet constitutes an integral part of China, officially known as the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The 20th anniversary of its founding was celebrated on 1 September 1985. However, to the 14th Dalai Lama (the former spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet), who has been living in exile in India since 1959, and to thousands of Tibetans living as refugees in India and other parts of the world, the current status of Tibet is open to contention, and as such remains an unresolved issue.
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McMahon, Robert J. "U.S. Policy toward South Asia and Tibet during the Early Cold War". Journal of Cold War Studies 8, n.º 3 (julio de 2006): 131–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2006.8.3.131.
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Events in South Asia in the 1950s and early 1960s had a long-term impact on the Cold War and on relations among the countries involved—China, India, Pakistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This article provides an overview of U.S. relations with South Asian countries during the early Cold War. It highlights the connections between U.S. policy priorities and commitments in South Asia on the one hand and developments in Tibet on the other. The article considers how U.S. policy priorities and actions in South Asia shaped, and were shaped by, China's reassertion of control over Tibet in the early 1950s and by the frictions that emerged between India and China in 1959 as a result of Beijing's brutal crackdown in Tibet.
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Koirala, Bhaskar. "Sino-Nepalese Relations". China Report 46, n.º 3 (agosto de 2010): 231–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000944551104600305.
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This article argues that the intensity of Sino-Nepal relations over the past decade has witnessed a lack of consistency, attributable to shifting political conditions in Nepal. From 2000 to 2010, Nepal has experienced different political systems such as constitutional monarchy, absolute monarchy and currently a republican framework. However, Nepal’s espousal of the ‘one China’ policy, particularly as it concerns Tibet, has been steady and enduring, as has the logic that Sino-Nepal relations are not strictly ‘bilateral’ in nature but also potentially serve as a channel for Nepal to connect to a wider canvas including Central Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. It is also argued that to a large extent, Sino-Nepal relations are poised to be significantly affected by an evolving China–Nepal–India triangular relationship on account of Nepal’s geographic position. Effective consolidation of this triangular relationship is vital to ensure political stability in Nepal and therefore security for both China and India.
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Lau, Hon-Shiang. "The Political Status of Tibet During the Ming Dynasty: An Analysis of Some Historical Evidence". China Report 55, n.º 2 (mayo de 2019): 154–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0009445519834701.
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This study analyses two authoritative texts and a map from the Ming and Qing eras to examine the political relationship between China and Tibet in the Ming period. It finds that in these documents Tibet was not classified as being a part of the realm governed by the Ming Empire. This casts doubt on the claim advanced by the People’s Republic of China that Tibet has been a part of China ‘since antiquity’. An important conclusion of this study is that, when taking recourse to historical texts to justify or refute territorial claims, the structure and content of the text as a whole, and not just isolated phrases or formulations, should be taken into account.
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Jian, Chen. "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union". Journal of Cold War Studies 8, n.º 3 (julio de 2006): 54–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2006.8.3.54.
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Tibet, which had enjoyed de facto independence from 1911 to 1950, was resubordinated to China in late 1950 and 1951 through a combination of political pressure and military force. On 10 March 1959 a mass revolt broke out in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. Amid growing turmoil, the 14th Dalai Lama fled the capital. After Chinese troops moved into Lhasa on 20 March to crush the rebellion, the Tibetan leader took refuge in neighboring India. The Chinese People's Liberation Army quelled the unrest and disbanded the local government. This article looks back at those events in order to determine how the rebellion was perceived in China and what effect it had on relations with India.
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PYAKUREL, UDDHAB PRASAD. "The BRI, Nepal’s Expectations, and Limitations on Nepal–China Border Relations". Issues & Studies 55, n.º 03 (septiembre de 2019): 1940006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s101325111940006x.
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Many Nepalese perceive China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a useful means for the India-locked country to connect to other countries. However, this paper analyzes the weakening connectivity within the border areas of Nepal and Tibet since falling under Chinese control, concluding that China is unready to increase cross-border movement and trade facilities with Nepal due to perceived security concerns.
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Murton, Galen. "Roads to China and infrastructural relations in Nepal". Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 38, n.º 5 (agosto de 2020): 840–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2399654420911410g.
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Across the Himalaya region, infrastructure development constitutes an array of material practices that produce space for both Nepali and Chinese state making efforts in historically roadless places. In northern Nepal, the production of large-scale transportation infrastructure has reached unprecedented levels, and Chinese interventions under the Belt and Road Initiative continue to fuel Kathmandu’s development imaginary. Examining the anticipation, articulation and implementation of road networks between northern Nepal and Chinese Tibet, I analyse the incorporation of a small development project into larger international transportation systems to argue that infrastructure is a symbolic project of national development imaginaries, a process and practice of state making, and a vector for the spatial operations of geopolitical power. Putting infrastructure studies into closer conversation with political geography, I propose infrastructural relationality as a heuristic that illuminates how trans-national road construction advances regional development objectives, visible specifically through inter-related projects, practices and processes between China and Nepal.
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Topgyal, Tsering. "Charting the Tibet Issue in the Sino–Indian Border Dispute". China Report 47, n.º 2 (mayo de 2011): 115–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000944551104700205.
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In official quarters in Beijing and New Delhi, the Tibet issue figures only as a bargaining chip to ‘regulate’ their bilateral relations, not as an issue that has an independent bearing on the intractability or resolution of the Sino–Indian border dispute. Scholars of the Sino–Indian border dispute either dismiss the relevance of the Tibet issue or treat it as only a prop in their framing of the dispute in terms of security, nationalism and great power rivalry. This article argues that the Tibet issue is more central to the border dispute than official and scholarly circles have recognised so far. The article demonstrates this through an examination of the historical roots of the border row, the centrality of Tibet and Tibetans in the boundary claims of both Beijing and New Delhi and the revelation of concurrent historical developments in the border dispute and the Sino–Tibetan conflict. On the place of Tibet in broader Sino–Indian relations, the article posits that while Tibet was a victim of India’s moralistic–idealist policies toward China in the 1950s, it has now become a victim of the new realism pervading India’s policy of engaging and emulating China in the post-Cold War era.
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Mehra, Parshotam. "The Elusive Triangle: Tibet in India-China Relations—A Brief Conspectus". China Report 26, n.º 2 (mayo de 1990): 145–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000944559002600203.
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Hoffmann, Steven A. "Rethinking the Linkage between Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach". Journal of Cold War Studies 8, n.º 3 (julio de 2006): 165–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2006.8.3.165.
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This article assesses the dynamic political and military relationships among Tibet, China, and India in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By examining the three governments' calculations and security interests, the article shows that the relationships among the three are best understood from a realist perspective. The focus in the article is on the Sino-Indian dispute over the territory known as “Assam Himalaya,” located on the far eastern end of the Sino-Indian border, between southeastern Tibet and northeast India. The article covers a relatively lengthy period, from 1913 to 1962, but in doing so it shows that territorial claims and the desire for secure borders were the key concern of all the countries involved—Tibet, China, India under British imperial rule, post-1947 India, and the United States.
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Nambiar, Vijay. "Book review: A S Bhasin, Nehru Tibet and China". China Report 58, n.º 1 (febrero de 2022): 114–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00094455221074298.
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Crowe, David M. "The “Tibet question”: Tibetan, Chinese and Western perspectives". Nationalities Papers 41, n.º 6 (noviembre de 2013): 1100–1135. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2013.801946.
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The historical conflict between Tibet and China goes back almost a thousand years. Both sides use history to argue their point about the core issues in this dispute – Tibet's claim of independence and autonomy, and China's of suzerainty. This article looks at the historical roots of this conflict, particularly since 1949, when China began its gradual takeover of Tibet. Chinese policies toward Tibet, which have been driven by a desire to communize and sinicize Tibet, has been met by stiff resistance from the Tibetans, who see Han Chinese dominance as a force that will, over time, destroy Tibet's unique religion, language, culture, and history. This resistance has drawn the attention of the West, who see Chinese policies in Tibet as a symbol of the failings of Beijing's rulers to embrace a strong commitment to human rights at the same time that China is becoming a global economic power. The 14th Dalai Lama, a key figure in this conflict, and his government-in-exile have served as bridges to Western efforts to try to force Beijing to embrace more open, humane policies toward Tibetans throughout China. His retirement as political head of the exile government in 2011, coupled with China's growing economic and strategic power globally, raises serious questions about the willingness of the USA, and other democratic powers to risk their relationships with Beijing to continue to promote true human rights and autonomy throughout the Tibetan Plateau.
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Sharma, Rajesh. "China-India FTA: Is the Future Imperfect?" Journal of World Trade 48, Issue 4 (1 de agosto de 2014): 729–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2014023.
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The China-India bilateral relationship has always been influenced by three Ts: Territory, Tibet, and Trade. Although the political relationship due to border dispute and Tibet has been on the edge, the trading relationship between China and India has been moving forward steady. As the political relationship between China and India is becoming more strong and strategic, it is most likely that China and India to drive their economic relationship at higher level. In that respect, an Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between China and India is inevitable. The benefits of FTA such as free flow of goods, services, investments, technology, capital which can be beneficial for the development, stability, and growth of the countries as well as the region can be locked in by adopting a dispute settlement system with fair and efficient procedures and practices. Moreover, an inefficient dispute settlement mechanism can be an effective non-tariff trade barrier. In other words, it might be accurate to say that dispute settlement mechanisms which are inefficient and ineffective actually block trade. Therefore, the FTA between China and India, in addition to liberalization of economy and reducing the tariff; it should also contain a comprehensive rules of dispute settlement which is practical, efficient and effective.
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Ali, Asghar, Nazim Rahim y Ghulam Hussain Abid Sipra. "AN ANALYSIS OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: MODUS OPERANDI OR MODUS VIVENDI". Global Political Review 3, n.º 1 (30 de junio de 2018): 24–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2018(iii-i).03.
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China and India celebrated their embryonic relations with a documented modus vivendi i.e. “The Panchsheel Agreement”. This concord highlighted five principles of peaceful coexistence between India and China. The Tibet region was the nucleus of this agreement. Nevertheless, after four years of its celebration, eyebrows raised from both sides in 1959 when China started its unification process and India welcomed the Dalai Lama, a separatist leader of the Tibetan region. This caused bitterness between India and China and both the states reversed to their retrospective modus operandi, which later on graduated into a full-fledged war between the two countries in 1962. Despite their limited modus vivendi in the 21st century, both the states tend more towards their intrinsic modus operandi. This analytical study is discussing the Sino-Indian relations through the lenses of Modus vivendi and Modus operandi and its implication for Pakistan.
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Bartmann, Barry. "Between De Jure and De Facto Statehood: Revisiting the Status Issue for Taiwan". Island Studies Journal 3, n.º 1 (2008): 113–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.24043/isj.218.
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This paper revisits the status prospects for Taiwan in light of recent events in Kosovo and Tibet. In both cases, and certainly in Taiwan itself, the long standing contest between claims for self determination and the tenacious defence of the principle of the territorial integrity of states has emerged once again to dominate the analysis of these cases. This contest is particularly dramatic in the divided international response to the independence of Kosovo. In the case of Tibet, widespread international support for Tibet is in sharp contrast to the furious and determined resistance of China. Taiwan’s anomalous status remains that of a legal sovereign state, the Republic of China, enjoying some measure of recognition and formal diplomacy and a de facto state whose international relations are confined to paradiplomatic channels, extensive though they are. The paper considers the prospects for changes in the current anomalous status of the island state.
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Munir, Fakhr Ul, SanaUllah y Anila. "Issues in Sino-Indian Relations: Implications for Competition". Global Political Review IV, n.º II (30 de junio de 2019): 56–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2019(iv-ii).06.
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India and China are the world's fast mounting economies influencing global politics affecting 2.5 billion of their subjects via their policies. Both states account for one-fifth of the total populace of the globe. Asia's overall progress, peace, prosperity and stability is directly influenced by the relations of these two Asian competitors. It is anticipated that by 2025, these states would be world's economies. However, bilateral disputes and enmity wield greater regional and global implications, which are intensely required to be resolved for the best and prosperous future. One of the most crucial aspects aggravating Sino-Indian relations is the asylum given to Dalai Lama and the status of Tibet. China has been assisting Pakistan economically and technically to build Gwadar Port, supporting Sri Lankan northern Hambantota Port, extending sustenance to Bangladesh's Chittagong Port, and furthering support to the Myanmar Port lying at the coastal region of the Indian Ocean. However, the strained relations for decades between India and China had given little space for healthy trade, increasing from 3 billion $ in 2000 to 20 billion $ in 2010.
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Denisov, Igor, Ivan Safranchuk y Danil Bochkov. "China–India relations in Eurasia: Historical legacy and the changing global context". Human Affairs 30, n.º 2 (28 de abril de 2020): 224–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2020-0021.
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AbstractThe relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India has traditionally been seen in terms of the interaction of two different trends—cooperation and competition. At the same time, the positive or negative dynamics of China–Indian contacts have mostly been shaped by the extent to which the political leadership of China and India have been prepared at various times to be guided by pragmatic interests and the desire to overcome the legacy of the past. This set of problems includes long-standing territorial disputes, New Delhi’s suspicions of the “all-weather strategic partnership” between Beijing and Islamabad, as well as the sensitive issues of Tibet and the Dalai Lama. Although the idea of ChIndia, as a condominium of the global interests of the two Asian giants and a manifestation of their growing interdependence, is no longer relevant, this article argues that cooperation or confrontation between China and India should not be linked solely to historical matters, but should be viewed from a broader regional and international perspective.
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Garver, John. "The Unresolved Sino–Indian Border Dispute". China Report 47, n.º 2 (mayo de 2011): 99–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000944551104700204.
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This paper posits that China’s insistence on the ‘return’ to China of the territory constituting Arunachal Pradesh, and even China’s insistence on Indian cession of a salient of territory in the Tawang area of that region, is a form of Chinese deterrence of what Beijing takes to be potentially dangerous ‘anti-China’ behaviour by India. Deep divergence of Chinese and Indian perceptions of Tibet, plus the history of Indian support for unarmed and armed Tibetan resistance to Chinese Communist rule of Tibet, makes Beijing fearful that India might again, someday, work to undermine Chinese rule in Tibet. An open territorial dispute serves as a standing threat to ‘teach India a lesson’, underlining for New Delhi the need for great circumspection in dealing with China. Indian strategic alignment with the United States exacerbates Chinese fears. The intensity of China’s implicit threat can be turned up or down by Beijing as the perversity of Indian policy indicates. Keeping the border issue open dovetails with China’s continuing entente with Pakistan and may even be based on an understanding between Beijing and Islamabad. A premise of this argument is that mainstream Indian opinion is willing to translate the line of actual control into an international border.
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Surie, Nalin. "China’s India Policy: The Importance of Bilateralism— An Appraisal". India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 75, n.º 2 (junio de 2019): 125–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974928419841768.
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Given the essential positive history of China’s relations with India, China’s world view and the fact of geographical contiguity, the essential approach that China follows vis-à-vis India post 1949 is based on bilateralism. The bilateral approach has defined China’s negotiations over the border as well as economic relations between the two. In the past bilateralism has allowed China to consolidate its control over Tibet and follow a mercantilist economic policy vis- a- vis India. But the change in the geopolitical status of both nations indicates that bilateral relations, after Wuhan, have been reset to represent those between two ‘major powers’ who have broader regional and global interests as well. Although bilateralism will continue to underline their policies towards each other in matters of common development, regional development or the building of a community with a shared future for humanity, China will need to redefine its approach to bilateralism by broadening and deepening it to create a truly mutual relationship.
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Dreyer, June Teufel. "Economic Development in Tibet under the People's Republic of China". Journal of Contemporary China 12, n.º 36 (agosto de 2003): 411–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670560305470.
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Yu, Na, Han Lie Hong, Zhao Hui Li, Ke Xin Zhang y Rong Biao Li. "Relations between Paleoclimatological Conditions and Mineralogical Characteristics of Clays in Miocene Sediments at Linxia Basin, China". Applied Mechanics and Materials 580-583 (julio de 2014): 912–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.580-583.912.
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Linxia basin is a late Cenozoic fault-block basin along the border between the Tibet plateau and the Loess plateau in Northwestern China. Its formation and sediments’ record may be directly affected by the structural dynamics and the uplift of the Tibet Plateau. For this reason, we studied the mineral characteristics of the Maogou formation of Miocene sediments using X-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy (SEM). The XRD results showed that quartz, chlorite, illite, calcite, plagioclase, orthoclase, kaolinite, and trace palygorskite are present throughout the sequence of the cross-section in Linxia basin. In contrast, gypsum and ankerite occur occasionally in the upper portion of the Miocene deposits. The content of calcite varied with layers in the profile and was relatively concentrated in mudstone. Chlorite and illite were observed transforming into palygorskite under SEM observation. Based on the mineral characteristics and the change of mineral composition, especially the clay minerals, it could be inferred that an arid environment prevailed in the region with warm and cold intervals during Miocene time.
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Kohli, Manorama. "Bhutan's Strategic Environment: Changing Perceptions". India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 42, n.º 2 (enero de 1986): 142–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/097492848604200203.
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For about a decade now one has been noticing some changes and shifts in the land-locked dragon kingdom of Bhutan's perceptions of its strategic neighbourhood—India and China. The two Asian giants situated in the south and north of Bhutan are so vital in geo-political terms that their attitudes towards this buffer state as also their relative capability distribution in the Himalayan region and in South Asia will always determine practically all foreign policy considerations of Bhutan. It need hardly be stressed that Bhutan is strategically important for both its big neighbours because of its location. This is the most compelling reason for both India and China to strive for special and friendly relationships with this Buddhist theocratic state. The tri-junction of the Chumbi Valley (Tibet), Sikkim (India) and Bhutan in the eastern Himalayas is of key importance for the security of the sprawling continental mass of India as well as that of China Being only about six miles from the Chumbi Valley, the passes in Bhutan. as also Nathu La are perceived by the Chinese as likely routes for invasion from the south. Evidently a very friendly, and if possible, a dependent Bhutan will give additional security to Tibet and hence to the Chinese mainland.1
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Grunfeld, A. Tom. "Developments in Tibetan Studies in China Today". China Quarterly 115 (septiembre de 1988): 462–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000027521.
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In July and August 1987 I spent several weeks in Beijing engaged in lengthy discussions with scholars and officials whose work concerns Tibet.The most prominent of these people were Wang Furen, chairman of the Department of Ethnology at the Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN); Wang Xiaoyi, associate research fellow at CIN; Huang Hao, associate research fellow at the Institute of Nationalities of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); Liu Shengqi, research fellow at the Institute of Nationalities of CASS; Yao Zhaolin, chief of the Tibetan Section of the Ethnology Department of CIN; Pan Naigu, chairman of the Department of Sociology at Beijing University; and Dorji Tseten, former head of the Tibet Autonomous Region and currently the chairman of the China Tibetology Research Centre.
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Hsiao-ting, Lin. "War or Stratagem? Reassessing China's Military Advance towards Tibet, 1942–1943". China Quarterly 186 (junio de 2006): 446–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741006000233.
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This article re-evaluates an important yet usually ignored episode in modern Chinese ethnopolitical history. It seeks to argue that, in the midst of the Second World War, Chiang Kai-shek manoeuvred towards a possible war with Tibet in order to serve other military, strategic and political purposes, namely, to insert his direct control into China's south-western border provinces that were still in the firm grip of obstinate warlords. Chiang Kai-shek's careful manipulation of the Sino-Tibetan border crisis in 1942–43 also reveals how he and his top military advisors perceived wartime China's territoriality and border defence in south-west China. With considerations of regime security and national survival foremost in their minds, top KMT leaders took a pragmatic stance towards the intractable issue of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In addition, at the diplomatic level, the Sino-Tibetan border crisis brought discord among the Allied Nations. The Chinese regarded Tibet as part of China whereas the British had long considered it within their sphere of influence. Eventually the Chinese won the sympathy of the US government. Facing Sino-British disagreement over Tibet's political status, the State Department continued to recognize Nationalist Chinese authority in Tibet, however fictitious that authority was. In retrospect, this episode, along with the US government's official stance towards China's sovereignty over Tibet, although a only a minor disagreement between the Allied Nations during the war, led to the problematic Tibetan issue that still haunts the international community today.
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Walsh, Michael J. "States of Exception: The Violence of Territoriality, Sacrality, and Religion in China-Tibet Relations". Journal of Religion and Violence 1, n.º 1 (2013): 71–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jrv20131120.
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Mukherjee, Kunal. "China–Tibet Relations from 1950 untill 2008: the interaction between religion, nationalism, and reform". Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 22, n.º 4 (diciembre de 2010): 467–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10163271.2010.519932.
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ZHU, Yuan Yi. "Suzerainty, Semi-Sovereignty, and International Legal Hierarchies on China's Borderlands". Asian Journal of International Law 10, n.º 2 (julio de 2020): 293–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s204425132000020x.
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AbstractThe concept of semi-sovereignty, a now obsolete category of international entities possessing limited sovereignty, remains hazily understood. However, the historical examination of how semi-sovereignty was defined and practised during the long nineteenth century can provide insights on the interplay between authority and control within the hierarchies of international relations. This paper examines one specific type of semi-sovereignty—namely, suzerainty—which is often used to describe China's traditional authority in Tibet and Mongolia. By examining the events that led to the acceptance of suzerainty as the legal framing for the China-Tibet and China-Mongolia relationships, I argue that suzerainty was a deliberately vague concept that could be used to create liminal international legal spaces to the advantage of Western states, and to mediate between competing claims of political authority. Finally, I point to the importance of semi-sovereignty as an arena of legal contestation between the Western and non-Western members of the “Family of Nations”.
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Sheng, Michael M. "Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War". Journal of Cold War Studies 8, n.º 3 (julio de 2006): 15–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2006.8.3.15.
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In October 1950 the Chinese leader Mao Zedong embarked on a two-front war. He sent troops to Korea and invaded Tibet at a time when the People's Republic of China was burdened with many domestic problems. The logic behind Mao's risky policy has baffled historians ever since. By drawing on newly available Chinese and Western documents and memoirs, this article explains what happened in October 1950 and why Mao acted as he did. The release of key documents such as telegrams between Mao and his subordinates enables scholars to understand Chinese policymaking vis-à-vis Tibet much more fully than in the past. The article shows that Mao skillfully used the conflicts for his own purposes and consolidated his hold over the Chinese Communist Party.
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Yan, Qiwen. "Dietary patterns and lifestyles in Tibet and southeastern China in relation to the prevalence of certain chronic diseases". Highlights in Science, Engineering and Technology 2 (22 de junio de 2022): 46–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/hset.v2i.554.
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The prevalence of diseases such as hypertension, overweight, and obesity, type 2 diabetes and dyslipidaemia has increased in China. Studies have found that many chronic diseases are related to lifestyle and dietary habits. However, China is a vast country with a complex topography and 56 ethnic groups. These factors lead to significant differences in diet and lifestyle habits among different populations in China. This paper compares the dietary structure and the incidence of chronic diseases between Tibet and southeastern China and finds that differences in dietary habits between ethnic groups and their geographical factors can affect the prevalence of specific chronic diseases. Therefore, the prevention and control of chronic diseases in China should not be generalized. It is recommendable to consider particular factors such as different cultures and habits among regions and ethnic groups to provide adequate nutrition education.
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Pye, Lucian W. y Lincoln Kaye. "Cousin Felix Meets the Buddha: And Other Encounters in China and Tibet". Foreign Affairs 82, n.º 3 (2003): 163. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20033629.
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Pye, Lucian W. y Mabel H. Cabot. "Vanished Kingdoms: A Woman Explorer in Tibet, China, and Mongolia, 1921-1925". Foreign Affairs 83, n.º 2 (2004): 174. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20033956.
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Kapur, Ashok. "Can the two Asian giants reach a political settlement?" Asian Education and Development Studies 5, n.º 1 (4 de enero de 2016): 94–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aeds-06-2015-0023.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to outline the history of the Sino-Indian conflict and to evaluate recent changes as reflected in the high level meetings between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It explores the evolving relationship in terms of three types of bargaining: elusive, tacit and convergent. Design/methodology/approach – By adopting a historical approach one gets a better sense of the evolving pattern of relations between China and India and the circumstances in which the evolution is occurring. Findings – China-India relations are similar to a journey where the progress is measured in terms of small steps rather than a final peace settlement. Relations have changed slowly towards a positive direction in economic relations, and there is a pattern of stability in border talks but the issue is complicated by the linkages between the Tibet question and border issues. Research limitations/implications – This topic requires considerable research because it is important for the future of Asian international relations and it is under-researched. Perhaps there could be an edited volume which brings together researchers from different backgrounds and expertise. The suggested work must be empirical but with a theoretical framework related to different types of bargaining cultures and experiences in Asia. Originality/value – As China and India evolve in their diplomatic practices and thinking, as Asian powers are readjusting their policies in the light of new circumstances, there are insights for policy analysts and practitioners in China and India among other Asian countries.
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Jacob, Jabin T. "For a New Kind of ‘Forward Policy’". China Report 47, n.º 2 (mayo de 2011): 133–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000944551104700206.
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This paper argues that more than their boundary dispute, it is the place of Tibet in the Sino–Indian relationship that is at the core of the continuing mistrust between the two countries. For China, pushing economic development as a panacea to ethnic grievances has been an insufficient strategy. To ensure sustainable political stability in Tibet, it is necessary to give India greater space in Tibet in the form of improved economic, tourist and religious exchanges as a way of relieving the sense of cultural siege that ethnic Tibetans suffer from. India meanwhile, having accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, will have to reciprocate with a new ‘forward policy’ of its own allowing for greater Chinese access to its own markets and the removal of other discriminatory restrictions on Chinese travelling to India. The way ahead lies in converting Tibet’s political centrality into an economic centrality in the Sino–Indian bilateral relationship.
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Roy, Kaushik. "Focusing on India’s Look East Policy: India–China relationship from 1947 to 2020". International Area Studies Review 24, n.º 2 (30 de mayo de 2021): 79–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/22338659211018324.
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Before the onset of the industrial revolution, China and India were the two biggest powers in Eurasia. Their total population comprised almost half of the world’s population. And the GNP of premodern China was half of the combined GNP of the world. Before circa 1600 CE, most of the textiles and iron in the world were manufactured in these two countries. China and India suffered a temporary eclipse during the age of colonialism. However, with the rise of the economic and military power of China and India from the late 20th century, it seems that these two countries are bound to reclaim their traditional positions as big powers in the international system. However, there is a caveat. In the premodern era, the Himalayas prevented any intimate contact between the ‘dragon’ and the ‘elephant’. But, from the mid-20th century, advances in technology, economic competition and the annexation of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) among other factors resulted in China and India coming into direct contact with each other. The result has been cooperation–competition–conflict. And this has had consequences not only for these two countries but for the whole world. The present article attempts to trace the troubled trajectory of India’s China policy from the late 1940s (when these two countries became independent) up to the present day.
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Borgland, Jens Wilhelm. "Mahādeva in Dunhuang". Indo-Iranian Journal 59, n.º 1 (2016): 1–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15728536-05901001.
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Mahādeva, the “Indian Oedipus”, is in some sources blamed for the initial schism between the two main branches of the early Buddhist sects, the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras. In this paper I examine a version of the story of Mahādeva found in the Tibetan Dunhuang manuscript labelled IOL Tib J 26, showing that it contains evidence supporting the hypothesis that this story reached Tibet through China. I further show that this Dunhuang manuscript contains an older version of the corresponding section in an early Tibetan history of Buddhism, Mkhas pa lde’u’s Rgya bod kyi chos ’byuṅ rgyas pa (“Extensive history of Buddhism in India and Tibet”).
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Mahmudur, Mahmudur. "India-Bhutan Relations: A Small State’s Quest for Freedom". Research in Economics and Management 7, n.º 2 (18 de junio de 2022): p29. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/rem.v7n2p29.
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Bhutan is located on the eastern ridges of the Himalayas between the Assam-Bengal Plain of India to the south and the Plateau of Tibet of southwestern China to the north. In British India the colonial administration established a classical hegemonic relationship with the remote kingdom. In the Treaty of Punakha (1910) the sovereignty of the Bhutanese Royal government was recognized in exchange for submitting control of foreign relations to the British. In independent India, the Himalayan Kingdoms were sandwiched between India and China, facing an uncertain future about their political sovereignty. India concluded a new Treaty with Bhutan (the India-Bhutan Treaty of Peace and Friendship) in 1949, which was designed to remain in force “in perpetuity,” consolidating the essence of the British hegemonic policy of controlling smaller neighbors, with India being the new imperial power. Bhutan became a member state of the UN in 1971 after India finally agreed to sponsor its application, but the small state has limited authority to conduct foreign relations without prior consent from India, and it does not even enjoy formal diplomatic relationship with any of the five permanent members in the United Nations. Bhutan’s quest to wield control over its own affairs free of the influence of India remains unfulfilled.
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Wang, Dong. "China's Trade Relations with the United States in Perspective". Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 39, n.º 3 (septiembre de 2010): 165–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261003900307.
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China's trade relations with the United States over the past four decades is a topic that has not been fully dealt with in scholarly works. This paper charts the course of US-China economic relations since 1971, explains the principal forces stimulating growth and encouraging change and, finally, discusses how these two economic giants fit into an interlocking Asian and world economy. In reaction to the post-2008 financial downturn, advocates for a new world economic order have suggested a rebalancing of global demand, which will arguably become a major, politically charged issue in the US and in China in the years to come. Growing economic interdependence has quickly presented new challenges and opportunities, with issues such as human rights, Most-Favoured-Nation status, the Taiwan and Tibet question, and the huge American trade deficit threatening to cloud the relationship at times. With China's emergence as a major power and America's hegemonic ambitions tested in successive wars, the contradiction between a booming commercial relationship and conflict associated with geopolitical and ideological differences will continue to constitute a serious challenge. The long-term goal for each side will be to forge economic ties strong enough to create a stable political relationship, rather than to be held hostage by geopolitical constraints.
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Shih, Victor. "Development, the Second Time Around: The Political Logic of Developing Western China". Journal of East Asian Studies 4, n.º 3 (diciembre de 2004): 427–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800006032.
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The Great Development of the West is no more than grand conferences held in the west (Xibu Dakaifa zhishi xibu dakaihui).—State Council officials in charge of developing the westOn the surface, the Great Development of the West (GDW, Xibu Dakaifa) campaign seems like a classic maneuver by a developmental state to bolster the growth of an underdeveloped region. Even in 2002, GDP per capita in western China, which includes the provinces of Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Qinghai, Yunnan, and Guizhou, remained at U.S.$666, or just more than half of the national average (see Table 1). The poorest province in China, Guizhou, had a GDP per capita of only U.S.$375, roughly equivalent to Haiti's GDP per capita in 1999. The effort to develop western China, according to the official rhetoric, was aimed at shifting western China's developmental trajectory closer to that of the rest of China, thus decreasing regional inequality and bolstering overall growth.
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GARVER, JOHN. "India, China, The United States, Tibet, and The Origins of the 1962 War". India Review 3, n.º 2 (abril de 2004): 9–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14736480490465054.
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Lorenzen, D. N. "Gentile Religion in South India, China, and Tibet: Studies by Three Jesuit Missionaries". Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, n.º 1 (1 de enero de 2007): 203–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-2006-053.
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Han, Enze y Christopher Paik. "Dynamics of Political Resistance in Tibet: Religious Repression and Controversies of Demographic Change". China Quarterly 217 (26 de noviembre de 2013): 69–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741013001392.
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AbstractIn a novel approach to studying political mobilization among ethnic Tibetans in China, this article addresses two key questions. First, considering the Chinese state's repressive policies towards Tibetan Buddhism, what role does religion play in fomenting Tibetan political resistance? Second, what implications can be drawn from the changing ethnic demography in Tibet about the conflict behaviour of Tibetans? Using various GIS-referenced data, this article specifically examines the 2008 Tibetan protest movements in China. The main results of our analysis indicate that the spread and frequency of protests in ethnic Tibetan areas are significantly associated with the number of officially registered Tibetan Buddhist sites, as well as the historical dominance of particular types of Tibetan religious sects. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the effect of Han Chinese settlement on Tibetan political activism is more controversial than previously thought.
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Wellens, Koen. "Negotiable Rights? China's Ethnic Minorities and the Right to Freedom of Religion". International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 16, n.º 3 (2009): 433–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/138819009x12474964197755.
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AbstractIn order to get a fuller picture of the conditions for religious freedom for ethnic minorities in China, we must both look beyond laws and central policies as well as beyond the more publicised cases of religious suppression in Tibet and Xinjiang, both hot-spots of party-state concerns of ethnic separatism. The province of Yunnan – where one-third of the population are members of one of 26 different recognised ethnic minorities – presents a more nuanced picture of the conditions for practicing religion in the People's Republic of China. This article argues that in the case of China we need to expand the concept of implementation by taking into account the public discourse that accompanies the laws and policies on both religion and ethnic minorities. Local officials and intellectuals belonging to ethnic minorities in Yunnan have been successful in exploiting public discourse on 'religious freedom' and 'cultural rights of ethnic minorities' in order to revive or reinvent traditional religious practice.
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Raymond, Alex. "The Origins of the 17-Point Agreement of 23 May 1951 between the Chinese Central Government and the Tibetan “Local Government”". China Quarterly 241 (22 de mayo de 2019): 236–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741019000419.
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AbstractImmediately following the Battle of Chamdo in October 1950, during the period between November 1950 and April 1951, the leaders of the new People's Republic of China (PRC) had two priorities in regard to Tibet. The first was to persuade the Tibetan government to send delegates to Beijing as soon as possible in order to start “negotiations,” and the second was to prevent the Dalai Lama from fleeing Tibet. Using Chinese documents that offer a new version of the process that led to these “negotiations,” this study, without addressing the international issues in detail, illustrates how the leaders of the PRC, either with promises, threats or even by bluff, were able to attain their goals.
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(Kabzung), Gaerrang. "Development as Entangled Knot: The Case of the Slaughter Renunciation Movement in Tibet, China". Journal of Asian Studies 74, n.º 4 (noviembre de 2015): 927–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911815001175.
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A common conceptualization of development as a binary relationship between trustees and target groups is inadequate. This article proposes the metaphor of development as an entangled cultural knot, constituted by multiple power relations. It uses this concept to analyze a recent slaughter renunciation movement, in which some leading Tibetan Nyingma masters from Larung Gar have suggested that Tibetan herders give up selling their livestock to the slaughter market for religious reasons. The movement reflects an alternative form of development articulated by several leading Tibetan Buddhist teachers, particularly Khenpo Tsultrim Lodroe, yet it goes against the state project of developing the yak meat industry. This movement has been criticized not only by state officials, but also by secular Tibetan intellectuals, as well as by herders. This article argues that the complex relationships among Tibetan Nyingma teachers, state officials, Tibetan secularists, and herders; their shared and competing interests; and the apparently contradictory positions they take on various issues require a much more sophisticated conceptual tool than the simple dichotomous conceptualization of development.
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Khishigt, N., L. V. Kuras y B. D. Tsybenov. "Autonomous Mongolia and Revolutionary Russia: On the Policy of Soviet Russia Towards Mongolia in 1917–1920 (To the 100th Anniversary of the Mongolian Revolution of 1921)". Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series History 37 (2021): 76–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/2222-9124.2021.37.76.
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The article is devoted to the evolution of the policy of the Soviet Russia on the issue of Mongolia. The period under study begins with the attempts of Soviet Russia to establish relations with Mongolia in 1917–1918. The authors analyzed in detail the revolutionary aspect of Russian politics in Mongolia. In particular, the article studied the activities of the Section of Eastern Peoples of the Siberian Bureau of the RCP (b) and its structural unit – the Mongol- Tibetan department in 1919–1920. The Communist International in 1919–1920 gave preference to the development of the revolutionary movement in China and therefore the People's Revolutionary Party of Mongolia had to establish a close connection with the political trend in China. Thus, the documents of the Communist International emphasized the motive of the unity of interests of the working masses of China and Mongolia. The activity of the Mongol- Tibetan department was directed only to Mongolia, Tibet was not considered as the nearest object of the world socialist revolution.