Literatura académica sobre el tema "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"

Crea una cita precisa en los estilos APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard y otros

Elija tipo de fuente:

Consulte las listas temáticas de artículos, libros, tesis, actas de conferencias y otras fuentes académicas sobre el tema "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions".

Junto a cada fuente en la lista de referencias hay un botón "Agregar a la bibliografía". Pulsa este botón, y generaremos automáticamente la referencia bibliográfica para la obra elegida en el estilo de cita que necesites: APA, MLA, Harvard, Vancouver, Chicago, etc.

También puede descargar el texto completo de la publicación académica en formato pdf y leer en línea su resumen siempre que esté disponible en los metadatos.

Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"

1

FÜLLBRUNN, SASCHA. "COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA." International Game Theory Review 13, no. 01 (2011): 75–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100285x.

Texto completo
Resumen
In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoner's dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria do not longer exist, even for only two bidders. Hence, we introduce a further reason for sniping behavior in Hard Close auctions, i.e. to appear to collude early in the auction and to defect at the very last moment.
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
2

Rosa, Benjamin V. "Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 132 (March 2022): 189–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.009.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
3

Kagel, John H., Yuanchuan Lien, and Paul Milgrom. "Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, no. 3 (2010): 160–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.3.160.

Texto completo
Resumen
We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their limits, then the auction leads to efficient or core allocations. We study the theoretically relevant behaviors and hypothesize that subjects will make only a few significant bids, and that certain simulations with auto-bidders will predict variations in performance across different environments. Testing the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) design,
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
4

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, and Charles M. Kahn. "Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions." Management Science 51, no. 3 (2005): 508–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
5

Fox, Jeremy T., and Patrick Bajari. "Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 1 (2013): 100–146. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.100.

Texto completo
Resumen
We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995–1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocat
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
6

Brusco, Sandro, and Giuseppe Lopomo. "Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints." Economic Theory 38, no. 1 (2007): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
7

Zheng, Charles Z. "Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 76, no. 2 (2012): 648–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.002.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
8

BRUSCO, SANDRO, and GIUSEPPE LOPOMO. "BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS." Journal of Industrial Economics 56, no. 1 (2008): 113–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00335.x.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
9

Riedel, Frank, and Elmar Wolfstetter. "Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result." Economic Theory 29, no. 3 (2005): 721–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0039-5.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
10

Sherstyuk, Katerina, and Jeremy Dulatre. "Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment." International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, no. 2 (2008): 557–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.005.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

Tesis sobre el tema "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"

1

Pacaud, Alexandre. "Bidding efficiently in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions using Monte Carlo Tree Search." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024IPPAT003.

Texto completo
Resumen
Depuis son introduction en 1994 aux Etats-Unis, l’enchère ascendante simultanée (SAA) est devenue le mécanisme privilégié pour les enchères du spectre licencié. Avec des investissements dépassant parfois le milliard d’euros, une stratégie d’enchérissement performante devient cruciale pour les opérateurs mobiles. Malgré son importance, il existe un manque de recherche dédiée à la création d’une stratégie d’enchérissement performante dans le cadre du SAA. La complexité intrinsèque du jeu associé à l’enchère SAA rend son analyse ardue pour la théorie des enchères et les méthodes exactes de résolu
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

Libros sobre el tema "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"

1

Milgrom, Paul R. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. World Bank, 1998.

Buscar texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
2

Milgrom, Paul. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction. The World Bank, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-1986.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

Capítulos de libros sobre el tema "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"

1

Bousquet, Nicolas, Yang Cai, and Adrian Vetta. "Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction." In Web and Internet Economics. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_16.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
2

Cramton, Peter. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions." In Combinatorial Auctions. The MIT Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0005.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.

Actas de conferencias sobre el tema "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"

1

Pacaud, Alexandre, Marceau Coupechoux, and Aurelien Bechler. "Monte Carlo Tree Search Bidding Strategy for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions." In 2022 20th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/wiopt56218.2022.9930539.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
2

Du, Li, Qian Chen, and Na Bian. "An Empirical Analysis of Bidding Behavior in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions." In 2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icee.2010.70.

Texto completo
Los estilos APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, etc.
Ofrecemos descuentos en todos los planes premium para autores cuyas obras están incluidas en selecciones literarias temáticas. ¡Contáctenos para obtener un código promocional único!