Libros sobre el tema "Russian strategic thought"

The monograph contains the results of research concerning, firstly, the specifics of the formation of the strategy and policy of personnel diversity, the specifics of youth as an object of diversified personnel management; issues of discrimination of employees in the workplace. Secondly, the promotion of scientific thought in the development of a productive model of hybrid employment, solving the problems of motivational HR diversity of public civil servants; determining the prospects for a rational balance of freedom and security in the modern world; presenting a new paradigm for combining work and private life through the combination of professional and parental work. Thirdly, new interdisciplinary approaches to the knowledge of the professional success of older workers, including in inclusive employment conditions. Fourth, solving the problems of diversity of personnel from the standpoint of interdisciplinary experience and applied aspects, including through organizational design, the formation of integrated reporting taking into account human capital, providing conditions for self-realization of the individual, the development of the employer's brand, the formation of a modern office space. For a wide range of readers interested in personnel management issues. It can be useful for students, postgraduates and teachers of economic universities.

In recent years, Western experts have generally portrayed the Kremlin's actions as either strategic or tactical. Yet this proposition raises a very important question: how closely does the West's interpretation of Russian strategy reflect the country's own definitions? While many military historians have sought to interpret Russian strategy, Strategiya takes a different approach. It brings together, in English, the classic works of the Russian art of strategy, which were rediscovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of explaining his analysis of Russia's contemporary strategy, Ofer Fridman offers his translation of and commentary upon the founding texts of Russia's own Clausewitzes, Baron Jominis and Liddell Harts, who have been inspiring Russian strategic thinking – both its conceptualization and its implementation – from the moment Moscow rejected the exclusive role of Marxism-Leninism in strategic affairs. Russian contemporary strategists draw their inspiration from three main schools of thought. While works by Soviet military thinkers have already been translated into English, those by both Imperial strategists and military thinkers in exile have remained almost inaccessible to the Western reader. Filling this lacuna, Strategiya offers a fascinating glimpse inside the foundations of Russian strategic thought and practice.

The monograph presents the results of sociological research on the project “The political culture of the Russian society in the transition to a new technological structure and implementation Of the strategy of scientific and technological development of the Russian Federation and the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation from 07.05.2018 № 204 «On national goals and strategic objectives of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2024»”. The all-Russian survey was conducted in May-June 2019 in 22 regions of the Russian Federation. The study of the structure and nature of citizens’ opinions on national development goals and digital society shows that the Russian society has formed the initial elements of the fundamental components of an innovative political culture: knowledge, beliefs and attitudes for the actual behavior of citizens in terms of the introduction and use of information and communication technologies and the implementation of national projects. The problematic situation is identified and described in the monograph, according to the author, requires a thought-out and verified program of political actions, both on the part of the Government of the Russian Federation and on the part of civil society institutions in order to create a high cognitive, labor motivation in this strategically decisive area of life of the Russian society. The urgency, scale and complexity of the tasks require the unification of the efforts of civil society with a leading role and strategic coordination of state actions. The monograph summarizes the results of sociological research on topical issues on the agenda of Russian society and the state, and can be useful for management personnel of state and municipal administration, production organizers, managers of social and educational institutions, researchers, University teachers, graduate students and students.

The Admiralty had been confident in the Navy’s ability to prevent a French invasion prior to 1903. Thereafter, however, it quickly became apparent that Germany posed a fundamentally different challenge from the Franco-Russian threat Britain had faced in the 1890s and early 1900s. For a series of geographical, infrastructural, and military reasons, a German invasion of the British Isles came to be viewed with a great deal more apprehension at the Admiralty than had ever been generated by the years of tension with France. This chapter examines how and why Britain’s naval leadership came to fear a German attempt to land in the United Kingdom. Building on the appreciation of contemporary naval thought developed in Chapter 1, it recounts how the Admiralty identified a challenge that came to define its strategic agenda between 1907 and 1914.

Lenin began and Stalin completed the organizational structures and the repertoire of strategies and tactics that would be used as a model by almost all subsequent communist movements for suppressing religion. This model was primarily constructed to overcome the challenges posed to the revolution by a powerful Russian Orthodox Church. As such it did not fit the religious circumstances of other communist countries. It was poorly adapted to the decentralized patterns of religious practice in Asia, and it was unable to eliminate resistance from the Roman Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, especially when that church was connected with nationalism. Even though the Stalinist model initially seemed successful in eliminating political opposition from religion in the Soviet Union, it was in the long run a failure on its own terms.

The United Front’s relationship with India was anything but that of ‘dependency’. In limited in capacity and separated by geography, India was arguably the least important cog in the Iran-Russia-India triumvirate that gave covert military support to the UF. Even though the India-UF relationship withstood various Taliban and Pakistani military onslaughts, its long-term sustainability was in doubt among Indian policymakers. One incident that gave an impetus to this relationship — but also underlined its limitations — however, was the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 in December 1999. The incident further strengthened partisans who wanted to wage an active proxy war against Pakistan and theTaliban. Occurring in the wake of nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, the India-Pakistan conflict in Kargil in 1999, and Pakistani military presence in Afghanistan, Indian diplomacy on Afghanistan in the second half of 1990s is highly indicative both of its strategic resolve and limits of influence.

With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States’ long war on communism was replaced by a perpetual war on terror. The authors posit that this neo-imperialistic phase is but the latest development in a line of thought and action established after World War II. But, they say, 2005 is not 1945. Today, they argue, the United States uses its power to deplete the resources of the developing world, and to compel the rest of the world to remain dependent on American management of the global economy. Contending that this situation is ultimately untenable, they assert that the United States is entering a period of deep crisis. The best thing for American neo-imperialists to do to avert their worst nightmare—a strategic and economic alliance among Europe, Russia, China, and OPEC—would be to arrange for the orderly withdrawal of American power before it is too late for the human and environmental security of the world. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Cold War slowly gave way to a new world order in which the United States was left as the lone superpower. But the organizing principle that would characterize the early 21st century was as yet unclear, until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Now it is clear that the long war on Communism has been replaced by a perpetual war on terror. Regardless of how long American troops remain in Iraq, and irrespective of further military actions, George W. Bush will continue to be a wartime president whose foreign policy is dominated by the Pentagon. And yet, the authors argue, this neo-imperialistic phase, with its emphasis on Eurasian oil supplies, is but the latest development in a line of thinking and acting in the world that was established by such men as Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze after World War II. But 2005 is not 1945, and the United States, despite Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney’s assertions, is not liberating Iraq and Afghanistan in the same way that U.S. forces liberated Germany and Japan; it is not reconstructing Iraq or the former Yugoslavia as it did when it rebuilt war torn western Europe with the Marshall Plan. The United States, with its thinly stretched military and deficit-laden economy, does not possess the means to do so today. Instead, the authors maintain, the United States is simply depleting the developing world’s natural resources, compelling the rest of the developed world to remain dependent on American management of the global economy. This situation is ultimately untenable, the authors argue, and as a result, the United States is entering a period of deep crisis. The best thing for American neo-imperialists to do to avert their worst nightmare—a strategic and economic alliance among Europe, Russia, China, and OPEC—would be to arrange for the orderly withdrawal of American power before it is too late for the human and environmental security of the world as a whole.