Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Recruiting and enlistment – drama"

Army recruiting, initial entry training, and retention enterprises consume tremendous manpower resources and become disproportionately more expensive and challenging as the size of the Army increases. Fortunately, empirical evidence suggests that the Army could readily improve enlisted continuation rates by changing enlistment contracts from its present form, requiring soldiers to reenlist or opt-in to continue service, to open-ended enlistment contracts that require soldiers to opt-out of service upon fulfilling their service obligations. Changing enlistment contracts to an opt-out paradigm—similar to how officer populations are currently managed—could greatly increase the number of soldiers who continue service past their initial enlistment obligation. Improved continuation rates could save the Army hundreds of millions in recruiting and reenlistment incentives, as well as freeing thousands of Non-Commissioned Officers serving as recruiters, drill sergeants, and retention specialist to support other operational requirements.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate an improved method for forecasting the US Army recruiting. Design/methodology/approach Time series methods, regression modeling, principle components and marketing research are included in this paper. Findings This paper found the unique ability of multiple statistical methods applied to a forecasting context to consider the effects of inputs that are controlled to some degree by a decision maker. Research limitations/implications This work will successfully inform the US Army recruiting leadership on how this improved methodology will improve their recruitment process. Practical implications Improved US Army analytical technique for forecasting recruiting goals.. Originality/value This work culls data from open sources, using a zip-code-based classification method to develop more comprehensive forecasting methods with which US Army recruiting leaders can better establish recruiting goals.

The U.S. military spends millions of dollars and substantial institutional effort to understand enlistment motives and appropriately target incentives, recruiting effort, and marketing to prospective members. Similarly, researchers have worked for decades to identify, understand, and conceptualize enlistment motives. Much less effort has been made to understand the effect enlistment motives/goals have on individuals after they join. This research uses well-established enlistment motives/goals to identify and understand their effects on soldiers’ value to the military in terms of organizational identification and critical discretionary behaviors. Using multicohort cross-sectional data from future, initial training, and currently serving soldiers, this research finds that intrinsic enlistment motives/goals, such as altruistic service and self-enhancement, create greater relational and behavioral value than most extrinsic/economic enlistment motives/goals such as pay, gaining skills for future employment, and educational funding. Intrinsic enlistment motives/goals have a strong positive effect on perceptions of the organization, social satisfaction, organizational identification, and discretionary pro-organizational behaviors. Conversely, economic enlistment goals tend to be associated with higher levels of economic satisfaction but decreased organizational identification and pro-organizational behavior. Importantly, these effects tend to persist among soldiers who have been in the military for years. Contrary to the institutional–occupational framework, self-focused enlistment goals, both intrinsic and extrinsic, can creative substantial value for the military when they are aligned with organizational interests. Based on these findings, the practice of using enlistment motives/goals to maximizing enlistment without considering their long-term impact on relationship quality and behavior appears myopic and may fail to maximize long-term value for the military.

Abstract In British colonial Nigeria, the military was more heterogeneous than previously thought and British ideas about “martial races” changed depending on local reactions to recruiting. In the early twentieth century British officers saw the northern Hausa and southwestern Yoruba, who dominated the ranks, as civilized “martial races.” The Yoruba stopped enlisting given new prospects and protest, and southeasterners like the Igbo rejected recruiting given language difficulties and resistance. The British then perceived all southern Nigerians as lacking martial qualities. Although Hausa enlistment also declined with opportunities and religious objections, the inter-war army developed a northern ethos through Hausa language and the northern location of military institutions. The rank-and-file became increasingly diverse including northern and Middle Belt minorities, seen by the British as primitive warriors and as insurance against Muslim revolt, enlisting because of poverty. From 1930, military identities in Nigeria polarized with uneducated northern/Middle Belt infantry and literate southern technicians.

Abstract Established towards the end of the Great War, the Irish Recruiting Council was responsible for one of the largest military recruitment campaigns ever waged on Irish soil. Tasked with raising 50,000 volunteers, it produced a wide array of promotional material which included posters, newspaper advertisements and a fortnightly magazine entitled The Irish Soldier. Its work has attracted a measure of scholarly attention, but little is known about its origins, its dealings with authorities in Westminster and Dublin Castle, and the operational difficulties it encountered when attempting to mobilise the public. Even less is known about its newspaper campaign and the reasons behind the continuation of the body in peacetime, when the need for recruits had apparently subsided. This paper addresses these shortcomings by examining the IRC in more detail than has hitherto been achieved in the historiography. In so doing, it calls for a revision of existing understandings of the Council, suggesting that it was not just a recruiting body per se, but a major propaganda agency which portrayed enlistment as a means of uniting a divided country and encouraged Irishmen to mobilise to help resolve long-standing tensions between nationalists and unionists.

Throughout the history of the United States, the South has had higher levels of military service than other regions of the country. Scholars regularly refer to this phenomenon as a “Southern military tradition.” The reasons behind this overrepresentation are not completely understood. Do Southern sociodemographic characteristics make it a preferred recruiting area or is there something distinctive about the cultural legacy of Southern history that encourages and supports military service? Using a unique data set that includes county-level active duty army enlistments and sociodemographic information, we show that Southern counties have significantly higher enlistment rates than counties in the Northeast and Midwest. These differences disappear when sociodemographic factors, such as fewer college graduates and a prominent presence of Evangelical Christians, are taken into account. These findings suggest that population characteristics may be a stronger driver of current regional disparities in military service than an inherited Southern military tradition.

On 14 March 2012, the Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) delivered its first judgment in the first completed trial in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Lubanga was found guilty as a co-perpetrator in the conscription and enlistment of children under the age of fifteen years and of using them to participate actively in hostilities. This article comments on the significance of the ICC judgment in the Lubanga case. It argues that the judgment contributes to the development and improvement of the normative value of international criminal law. It is also argued that the Lubanga judgment may offer interesting insights on the socio-pedagogical role of international criminal justice. Indeed, it is observed that it contributes to strengthening the sense of accountability for recruiting and using child soldiers, by stigmatising such acts as contrary to the fundamental values of the international community.

On the outbreak of war, men from the Dominions were scattered across the British Empire. As each Dominion began recruiting their expeditionary forces at home, the issue arose whether these expatriates, especially those resident in the United Kingdom, should join the British Army or be able to enlist in their Dominion's force. Canada and New Zealand allowed recruiting for the CEF and NZEF in the UK. Many Anglophone White South Africans joined a “colonial” battalion of the Royal Fusiliers. The Australian Government refused to allow Australians in the UK to join the AIF, despite the repeated requests of the Australian expatriate community. This paper examines the questions of British and sub-Imperial Dominion identities as well as the practical policy considerations raised by this issue. It argues that there is some evidence of nascent Dominion nationalism—the Canadian High Commission in London issued what became known as “a Certificate of Canadian Citizenship” to expatriates— but that Dominion Governments generally based their decisions on this issue based on cost and domestic political considerations.

Abstract When faced with the problem of setting up their colonial troops in Somalia, the Italians adopted a rigid quota system. According to the Regulations of the Royal Colonial Corps of Somalia of 1906, only 10 percent of the available positions were reserved for Somalis. Another 20 percent of the troops was reserved for “people of other races,” whereas the remaining 70 percent had to be made up of “Arab” soldiers from Yemen and the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. When other colonial armies, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were unable to reach such percentages, they filled the gaps in their ranks with a large number of “foreigners.” This article looks at why this situation arose and how these men were recruited, investigating the world of transnational enlistment in an area stretching from Benadir to the southern Red Sea. The phenomenon is analyzed through the prism of labor and mobility history, two approaches that allow us to grasp aspects and characteristics that military history alone would be hard-pressed to bring to light. The article argues that for many men, being a soldier was not a life-long choice but rather a form of stopgap employment in a system that suffered from a chronic labor shortage. This strong labor shortage sparked fierce competition among the colonial powers, which, to secure the required manpower, inevitably had to compete with other colonial powers by offering more desirable contracts. Taking advantage of the greater ease of movement and the high demand for work, some inhabitants of this region had an edge in negotiating their terms of service.

This article examines John Hirsch's attempts to bring Canadian theatre artists and stage plays to television during his tenure, as Head of CBC English Language Television Drama in the 1970s. When the CBC appointed John Hirsch, they gave him a strong mandate to strengthen the drama department's relationship with Canadian theatre by bringing some of the best plays and performances to television, and by recruiting new talent from the theatre. To fulfill this mandate, Hirsch initiated a bold, comprehensive strategy; yet a series of historical forces, ranging from financial and economic to cultural and aesthetic, made the full realization of his strategy very difficult. By examining the problems that confronted Hirsch's theatre projects, this article will show how historical circumstances specific to the 1970s impeded the success of the projects, and will further suggest that more recent technological, structural and cultural developments related to television production and reception may have generated an environment more conducive to the achievement of successful collaborations between theatre and television.

Traditional doctors have been largely ignored in HIV prevention, particularly primary prevention. As part of a structural intervention programme to reduce HIV risk among young women in Botswana, we trained 147 traditional doctors in four districts as well as government health education assistants (HEAs) and teachers to run discussion groups in the community and schools, using an evidence-based eight-episode audio-drama, covering gender roles, gender violence, and how these are related to HIV risk. One year later, we contacted 43 of the 87 trained traditional doctors in two districts. Most (32) were running discussion groups with men and women, with links to the local HEAs and teachers. They were adept at recruiting men to their groups, often a challenge with community interventions, and reported positive changes in attitudes and behaviour of group participants. Traditional doctors can play an important role in primary prevention of gender violence and HIV.

Carroll Aikins founded the Home Theatre in Naramata on Lake Okanagan in British Columbia in November 1920. Having just had his play The God of Gods produced at the Birmingham Repertory Theatre in England, Aikins, adhering to the 'Art Theatre' principles of Gordon Craig and Maurice Browne, began the Canadian Players, a training company intended to mount and tour indigenous drama on a national scale. Recruiting instructors from the Neighborhood Playhouse in New York, he commenced work in his theatre building which was designed in collaboration with Lee Simonson of the Theatre Guild. The company produced a regular season of new works by such authors as Synge, Gilbert Murray, and Anatol France. When the venture closed, Aikins went on to direct for several seasons at Hart House Theatre in Toronto in the late 1920s. This paper includes a brief biography of Aikins, a survey of the Canadian Players, a discussion of Aikins' ideals, as well as a consideration of the practical problems and eventual closure. There is also a chronological listing of the plays produced by the Home Theatre.

Science museums not only function as collection, exhibition, research, and leisure locations, but are also important sites for education. Thus, science museums often organize various activities to educate the public and deliver various key concepts. Museums organize diverse activities, such as exhibitions, lectures, hands-on activities, tours, demonstrations, and drama. Subsequently, to highlight issues related to energy saving and carbon reduction (ESCR), the National Science and Technology Museum (NSTM) organized a 3-day workshop, recruiting 60 students from 2 high schools to participate in diverse promotional activities. For high school students, this diverse educational promotion method is seldom experienced in formal education; thus, presenting an extremely rare opportunity. For museums, designing activities specifically for high school students is also uncommon. Therefore, the effectiveness of using a high school-specific multi-approach activity design to promote education objectives has yet to be determined. This study analyzes the participants' level of acceptance and learning effectiveness regarding the various ESCR activities. Data were collected using questionnaire surveys, activity feedback, interviews, and observation records. Subsequently, these data were qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed to determine the students' acceptance levels and learning effectiveness regarding the various activities.

The article examines the folklore intertext of the novel "Elnet" by the classic of Mari literature Sergey Grigoryevich Chavain at the level of folk songs, reveals their place in the artistic structure of the novel text, analyzes their role in revealing the people's perception of the world and the nature of the creative personality of the intellectual-Mari, in the expression of the author's ideas. The song texts of the novel, directly borrowed from folklore or reworked by the author, as well as created by Chavain himself in the likeness of the content and stylistics of folk-poetic works, give the artistic narrative romantic sublimity, poetry, drama and national specificity, strengthen the author's concept of the world and character. The methodology of the research is determined by the structural and semantic analysis of the works. The article for the first time identifies and describes in detail the semantic and typological components of the folklore-song intertext of Chavain's novel "Elnet", its significance for the expression of its artistic content. It is proved that the song texts of the novel mostly reveal the traditional cultural way of life of the Mari people, their natural existence, orientation to myths and ideals (labor songs; ritual songs: wedding, including lamentation songs; lyrical, mainly love and orphan songs). They are directly related to the national issues of the novel and the author's concept based on the uniqueness of the Mari people and their culture. A lot of space is occupied by songs that highlight the difficulties of the pre–revolutionary social life of the Mari people, the inequality of ethnonational existence, which became the reason for the formation of revolutionary predilections in the popular environment (recruiting - about seeing off to war, orphans, lamentations). This folklore intertext helps to clarify the ideological and moral quest of Mari in the pre-revolutionary era, the search for ways of social and national liberation brewing in the depths of the people.

IntroductionThe UK is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council that has a policy of recruiting 16 and 17 year old individuals into its regular Armed Forces. Little is known about the consequences of enlisting as a Junior Entrant (JE), although concerns have been expressed. We compare the mental health, deployment history, and pre-enlistment and post-enlistment experiences of personnel who had enlisted as JEs with personnel who joined as Standard Entrants (SEs).MethodParticipants from a large UK military cohort study completed a self-report questionnaire between 2014 and 2016 that included symptoms of probable post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), common mental disorders, alcohol consumption, physical symptoms and lifetime self-harm. Data from regular non-officer participants (n=4447) from all service branches were used in the analysis. JEs were defined as having enlisted before the age of 17.5 years. A subgroup analysis of participants who had joined or commenced adult service after April 2003 was carried out.ResultsJEs were not more likely to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan but were more likely to hold a combat role when they did (OR 1.25, 95% CI 1.00 to 1.56). There was no evidence of an increase in symptoms of common mental disorders, PTSD, multiple somatic symptoms (MSS), alcohol misuse or self-harm in JEs in the full sample, but there was an increase in alcohol misuse (OR 1.84, 95% CI 1.18 to 2.87), MSS (OR 1.51, 95% CI 1.04 to 2.20) and self-harm (OR 2.13, 95% CI 1.15 to 3.95) in JEs who had commenced adult service after April 2003. JEs remain in adult service for longer and do not have more difficulties when they leave service.ConclusionsJEs do not have worse mental health than SEs, but there is uncertainty in relation to alcohol misuse, MSS and self-harm in more recent joiners. Monitoring these concerns is advisable.

Abstract This study employs Erwin Panofsky’s iconographic analysis to decode the 2021 US Army recruiting campaign ‘The Calling’, situating it against the historical backdrop of military recruitment since the all-volunteer force’s inception. Panofsky’s framework allows for a dissection of the campaign’s layered narrative and its animated aesthetics, which notably diverge from prior campaign’s emphasis on the warrior archetype. The analysis progresses from a description of visual and narrative element’s (pre-iconography), to an investigation of symbolic meanings (iconography), culminating in an interpretation of underlying societal attitudes (iconology). ‘The Calling’ reimagines military enlistment as a heroic pursuit, echoing the superhero genre’s origin stories, and emerges as a response to waning interest in military careers. The campaign targets the zeitgeist of the young American population, offering a sense of heroism as compensation in a challenging recruitment climate marked by a robust economy and low unemployment. By presenting service as a ‘calling’, the Army navigates the complex terrain of contemporary cultural values, seeking to resonate with potential recruits on an ideological level, particularly within race and gender minority communities.

This article considers the genesis of contractual relations between the Russian state and individuals, more particularly, international specialists. The author traces the similarities, interconnections, and differences between bilateral contracts with reciprocal rights and obligations and other acts totally or partially devoid of synallagmatic features (i. e. legal attributes of reciprocal agreements). The sources referred to include contracts concluded with foreign nationals, “capitulations” (“conditions of service”, which were not full contracts in terms of form yet), and various acts created in the process of recruitment or presented by foreigners during the enlistment procedure, such as patents, charters (Rus. zastupitel’nyye “intercessions”, confirming qualification, and Rus. proyezzhiye “passing” charters, etc.), and certificates (Rus. svidetel’stvovannye pasy, “certificate passes”, Rus. svidetel’stvovannye pis’ma “certificate letters”). Chronologically, the paper covers the epoch of Peter the Great, because contracts became the key form of hiring international specialists at the time, though their form was still unstable. The author reveals the characteristics of patents granted to international specialists, determines their differences from traditional “rank patents”, and shows the features that make foreigners’ patents similar to service contracts. In general, this type of source represents a rank granted by the sovereign, not a bilateral contract. At the same time, patents contain an indirect synallagmatic bond realised through structural elements about Russian obligations to foreigners (for example, concerning the amount of money to be paid). Source study analysis of the charters and certificates granted by European monarchs and presented by foreigners in the Ambassadorial Prikaz demonstrate that such acts were used by Russian administrators as examples for drawing up contracts and documents while recruiting international personnel. On the one hand, the synallagmatic bond, which usually determines the essence of a contract, was absent or insufficiently developed in some letters of grant. However, a number of texts do have features indicating the reciprocity of rights and obligations, which allows us to consider them possible prototypes of contracts. The Russian contract incorporated the properties and features of various acts of Russian and, to a greater extent, Western European origin.

We examine the relationship between media use motivations and attitudes toward female politicians by proposing a conceptual model explaining the role of key mediating variables such as identification, narrative transportation, enjoyment, and political self-efficacy in influencing the attitude of the viewers of international TV drama towards female role models (politicians). We investigated the direct and indirect effects between media use motivations and attitudes toward female politicians by recruiting 359 students from two large public universities in the Southeastern United States. The hypothesized model supported the evidence presented in extant scholarship, suggesting that a meaningful entertainment experience could foster an appreciation of the fictional televisual entertainment and positively change attitudes toward female lead characters playing the role of a viable and competent politician. This study resonates with politicians, academics, and activists’ concerns that a positive media portrayal could promote the acceptability of female leaders in powerful positions. Our study clarifies the direct and indirect effects between media use motivations and attitudes toward female politicians and the role of crucial mediating variables such as identification, narrative transportation, enjoyment, and political self-efficacy in influencing the attitude of the viewers of international TV drama towards female politicians.

I kid you not. This is a time in Pacific regional history where as a middle-aged Tongan woman with European, Maori, and Samoan ancestries who was born and raised in New Zealand, I teach students taking my undergraduate papers how not to go about making stereotypical assumptions. The students in my classes are mostly Maori and Pakeha (white, European) New Zealanders. They learn to interrogate typecasts produced by state policy, media, and academia classifying the suburbs of South Auckland as overcrowded with brown people, meaning Pacific Islanders; overburdened by non-communicable diseases, like obesity and diabetes; and overdone in dismal youth statistics for crime and high school drop-outs. And then some well-meaning but incredibly uninformed staff members at the university where I am a senior lecturer have a bright idea to give away portions of roast pig on a spit to Pacific Islanders at the South Auckland campus open day. Who asked the university to give us free roast pig? Who asked us if this is what we want from a university that was planted out South in 2010 to sell degrees to a South Auckland market predicted to grow to half a million people, largely young people, in the next two decades? (AUT University, 2014). Who makes decisions about what gets dished up to Pacific Islanders in South Auckland, compared to what their hopes might be for university education prospects? To rephrase Julie Landsman’s essay, how about “confronting the racism of low expectations” that frames and bounds Pacific Islanders in South Auckland when a New Zealand university of predominantly Palangi (white, European) lecturers and researchers on academic staff contemplate “closing achievement gaps?” (Landsman, 2004). Tackling “the soft bigotry of low expectations” set upon Pacific Islanders getting into and through the university system has prompted discussion around introducing two sets of ideas at Auckland University of Technology (The Patriot Post, 2014). First, a summer school foundation course for literacy and numeracy on the South campus, recruiting Pacific Islander school leavers wanting to go on to study Bachelor’s degrees. Previously, the University of Auckland had provided bridging paths designed for young Pacific peoples to step up to degree programmes (Anae et al, 2002). Second, the possibility of performing arts undergraduate papers recognising a diverse and youthful ethnoscape party to an Auckland context of theatre, drama, dance, music, Maori and Pacific cultural performance, storytelling, and slam poetry (Appadurai, 1996). Although this discussion is in its infancy and has not been feasibility scoped or formally initiated in the university system, it is a suggestion worth considering here. My inquiry is frank: Why conflate performance and South Auckland Pacific Islanders? Does this not lend to a clichéd mould that supposes young Pacific Islanders growing up in the ill-famed suburbs of the poor South are naturally gifted at singing, dancing, and performing theatrics? This is a characterisation fitted to inner-city Black American youth that has gone global and is wielded to tag, label, and brand urban Pacific Islanders of South Auckland. Therefore, how are the aspirational interests of this niche market reflected in the content and context of initiatives with South Auckland Pacific Islander communities in mind?

Introduction Many people interpret the word ‘cult’ through specific connotations, including, but not limited to, a community of like-minded people on the edge of civilization, often led by a charismatic leader, with beliefs that are ‘other’ to societal ‘norms’. Cults are often perceived as deviant, regularly incorporating elements of crime, especially physical and sexual violence. The adoption by some cults of a special uniform or dress code has been readily picked up by popular culture and has become a key ‘defining’ characteristic of the nature of a cult. In this article, we use the semiotic framework of myth, as discussed by Barthes, to demonstrate how cult uniforms become semiotic myths of popular culture. Narratively, the myth of the cult communicates violence, deviance, manipulation, and brainwashing. The myth of on-screen cults has derived itself from a reflexive pop culture foundation. From popular culture inspiring cults to cults inspiring popular culture and back again, society generates its cult myth through three key mechanisms: medicalisation, deviance amplification, and convergence. This means we are at risk of misrepresenting the true nature of cults, creating a definition incongruent with reality. This article traces the history of cults, the expectations of cult behaviour, and the semiotics of uniforms to start the discussion on why society is primed to accept a confusion between nature and the semiotic messaging of “what-goes-without-saying” (Barthes Mythologies 11). Semiotics and Myth Following the basic groundwork of de Saussure in the early 1900s, semiotics is the study of signs and how we use signs to derive meaning from the external world (de Saussure). Barthes expanded on this with his series of essays in Mythologies, adding a layer of connotation that leads to myth (Barthes Mythologies). Connotation, as described by Barthes, is the interaction between signs, feelings, and values. The connotations assigned to objects and concepts become a system of communication that is a message, the message becomes myth. The myth is not defined by the object or concept, but by the way society collectively understands it and all its connotations (Barthes Elements of Semiology 89-91). For scholars like Barthes, languages and cultural artifacts lend themselves to myth because many of our concepts are vague and abstract. Because the concept is vague, it is easy to impose our own values and ideologies upon it. This also means different people can interpret the same concept in different ways (Barthes Mythologies 132). The concept of a cult is no exception. Cults mean different things to different people and the boundaries between cults and religious or commercial organisations are often contested. As a pop culture artifact, the meaning of cults has been generated through repeated exposure in different media and genres. Similarly, pop culture (tv, films, news, etc.) often has the benefit of fiction, which separates itself from the true nature of cults (sensu Barthes Mythologies). Yet, through repeated exposure, we begin to share a universal meaning for the term and all the behaviours understood within the myth. Our repeated exposure to the signs of cults in pop culture is the combined effect of news media and fiction slowly building upon itself in a reflexive manner. We hear news reports of cults behaving in obscure ways, followed by a drama, parody, critique, or satire in a fictitious story. The audience then begins to see the repeated narrative as evidence to the true nature of cults. Over time the myth of the cult naturalises into the zeitgeist as concretely as any other sign, word, or symbol. Once the myth is naturalised, it is better used as a narrative device when affixed to a universally recognised symbol, such as the uniform. The uniform becomes an efficient device for communicating meaning in a short space of time. We argue that the concept of cult as myth has entered a collective understanding, and so, it is necessary to reflect on the mechanisms that drove the correlations which ultimately created the myth. Barthes’s purpose for analysing myth was “to track down, in the decorative display of what-goes-without-saying, the ideological abuse which, in my view, is hidden there” (Barthes Mythologies 11). For this reason, we must briefly look at the history of cults and their relationship with crime. A Brief History of Cults ‘Cult’ derives from the Latin root, cultus, or cultivation, and initially referred to forms of religious worship involving special rituals and ceremonies directed towards specific figures, objects, and/or divine beings. Early to mid-twentieth century sociologists adopted and adapted the term to classify a kind of religious organisation and later to signal new forms of religious expression not previously of primary or singular interest to the scholar of religion (Campbell; Jackson and Jobling; Nelson). The consequences were such that ‘cult’ came to carry new weight in terms of its meaning and reception, and much like other analytical concepts developed an intellectual significance regarding religious innovation it had not previously possessed. Unfortunately, this was not to last. By the early 1990s, ‘cult’ had become a term eschewed by scholars as pejorative, value-laden, and disparaging of its supposed subject matter; a term denuded of technical and descriptive meaning and replaced by more value-neutral alternatives (Dillon and Richardson; Richardson; Chryssides and Zeller). Results from well-published surveys (Pfeifer; Olson) and our own experience in teaching related subject matter revealed predominantly negative attitudes towards the term ‘cult’, with the inverse true for the alternative descriptors. Perhaps more importantly, the surveys revealed that for the public majority, knowledge of ‘cults’ came via media reportage of particularly the sensational few, rather than from direct experience of new religions or their members more generally (Pfeifer). For example, the Peoples Temple, Branch Davidian, and Heaven’s Gate groups featured heavily in news and mass media. Importantly, reporting of each of the tragic events marking their demise (in 1978, 1993, and 1997 respectively) reinforced a burgeoning stereotype and escalated fears about cults in our midst. The events in Jonestown, Guyana (Peoples Temple), especially, bolstered an anticult movement of purported cult experts and deprogrammers offering to save errant family members from the same fate as those who died [there]. The anticult movement portrayed all alleged cults as inherently dangerous and subject only to internal influences. They figured the charismatic leader as so powerful that he could take captive the minds of his followers and make them do whatever he wanted. (Crockford 95) While the term ‘new religious movement’ (NRM) has been used in place of cults within the academic sphere, ‘cult’ is still used within popular culture contexts precisely because of the connotations it inspires, with features including charismatic leaders, deprogrammers, coercion and mind-control, deception, perversion, exploitation, deviance, religious zealotry, abuse, violence, and death. For this reason, we still use the word cult to mean the myth of the cult as represented by popular culture. Representations of Cults and Expectations of Crime Violence and crime can be common features of some cults. Most NRMs “stay within the boundaries of the law” and practice their religion peacefully (Szubin, Jensen III, and Gregg 17). Unfortunately, it is usually those cults that are engaged in violence and crime that become newsworthy, and thus shape public ‘knowledge’ about the nature of cults and drive public expectations. Two of America’s most publicised cults, Charles Manson and the Manson Family and the Peoples Temple, are synonymous with violence and crime. Prior to committing mass suicide by poison in Jonestown, the Peoples Temple accumulated many guns as well as killing Congressman Leo Ryan and members of his party. Similarly, Charles Manson and the Manson Family stockpiled weapons, participated in illegal drug use, and murdered seven people, including Hollywood actor Sharon Tate. The high-profile victims of both groups ensured ongoing widespread media attention and continuous popular culture interest in both groups. Other cults are more specifically criminal in nature: for example, the Constanzo group in Matamoros, while presenting as a cult, are also a drug gang, leading to many calling these groups narco-cults (Kail 56). Sexual assault and abuse are commonly associated with cults. There have been numerous media reports worldwide on the sexual abuse of (usually) women and/or children. For example, a fourteen-year-old in the Children of God group alleged that she was raped when she disobeyed a leader (Rudin 28). In 2021, the regional city of Armidale, Australia, became national news when a former soldier was arrested on charges of “manipulating a woman for a ‘cult’ like purpose” (McKinnell). The man, James Davis, styles himself as the patriarch of a group known as the ‘House of Cadifor’. Police evidence includes six signed “slavery contracts”, as well as 70 witnesses to support the allegation that Mr Davis subjected a woman to “ongoing physical, sexual and psychological abuse and degradation” as well as unpaid prostitution and enslavement (McKinnell). Cults and Popular Culture The depiction of cults in popular culture is attracting growing attention. Scholars Lynn Neal (2011) and Joseph Laycock (2013) have initiated this research and identified consistent stereotypes of 'cults’ being portrayed throughout popular media. Neal found that cults began to be featured in television shows as early as the 1950s and 1960s, continually escalating until the 1990s before dropping slightly between 2000 and 2008 (the time the research was concluded). Specifically, there were 10 episodes between 1958-1969; 19 in the 1970s, which Neal attributes to the “rise of the cult scare and intense media scrutiny of NRMs” (97); 25 in the 1980s; 72 in the 1990s; and 59 between 2000 and 2008. Such academic research has identified that popular culture is important in the formation of the public perception, and social definition, of acceptable and deviant religions (Laycock 81). Laycock argues that representations of cults in popular culture reinforces public narratives about cults in three important ways: medicalisation, deviance amplification, and convergence. Medicalisation refers to the depiction of individuals becoming brainwashed and deprogrammed. The medicalisation of cults can be exacerbated by the cult uniform and clinical, ritualistic behaviours. Deviance amplification, a term coined by Leslie Wilkins in the 1960s, is the phenomenon of ‘media hype’, where the media selects specific examples of deviant behaviour, distorting them (Wilkins), such that a handful of peripheral cases appears representative of a larger social problem (Laycock 84). Following the deviance amplification, there is then often a 'moral panic' (a term coined by Stanley Cohen in 1972) where the problem is distorted and heightened within the media. Cults are often subject to deviance amplification within the media, leading to moral panics about the ‘depraved’, sexual, criminal, and violent activities of cults preying on and brainwashing innocents. Convergence “is a rhetorical device associated with deviance amplification in which two or more activities are linked so as to implicitly draw a parallel between them” (Laycock 85). An example of convergence occurred when the Branch Davidians were compared to the Peoples Temple, ultimately leading the FBI “to end the siege through an aggressive ‘dynamic entry’ in part because they feared such a mass suicide” (Laycock 85). The FBI transferred responsibility for the deaths to ‘mass suicide’, which has become the common narrative of events at Waco. Each of the three mechanisms have an important role to play in the popular culture presentation of cults to audiences. Popular media sources, fictional or not, are incentivised to present the most diabolical cult to the audience – and this often includes the medicalised elements of brainwashing and manipulation. This presentation reinforces existing deviance amplification and moral panics around the depraved activities of cults, and in particular sexual and criminal activities. And finally, convergence acts as a 'cultural script’ where the portrayal of these types of characteristics (brainwashing, criminal or violent behaviour, etc.) is automatically associated with cults. As Laycock argues, “in this way, popular culture has a unique ability to promote convergence and, by extension, deviance amplification” (85). The mechanisms of medicalisation, deviance amplification and convergence are important to the semiotic linking of concepts, signs, and signifiers in the process of myth generation. In efficiently understanding the message of the myth, the viewer must have a sign they can affix to it. In the case of visual mediums this must be immediate and certain. As many of the convergent properties of cults are behavioural (acts of violence and depravity, charismatic leaders, etc.), we need a symbol that audiences can understand immediately. Uniforms achieve this with remarkable efficiency. Upon seeing a still, two-dimensional image of people wearing matching garb it can be made easily apparent that they are part of a cult. Religious uniforms are one of the first visual images one conjures upon hearing the word cult: “for most people the word ‘cult’ conjures up ‘60s images of college students wearing flowing robes, chanting rhythmically and spouting Eastern philosophy” (Salvatore cited in Petherick 577; italics in original). The impact is especially pronounced if the clothes are atypical, anachronistic, or otherwise different to the expected clothes of the context. This interpretation then becomes cemented through the actions of the characters. In Rick and Morty, season 1, episode 10, Morty is imprisoned with interdimensional versions of himself. Despite some morphological differences, each Morty is wearing his recognisable yellow top and blue pants. While our Morty’s back is turned, five hooded, robed figures in atypical garb with matching facial markings approach Morty. The audience is immediately aware that this is a cult. The comparison between the uniform of Morty and the Morty cult exemplifies the use of cult uniform in the myth of Cults. The cult is then cemented through chanting and a belief in the “One true Morty” (Harmon et al.). Semiotics, Clothes, and Uniforms The semiotics of clothes includes implicit, explicit, and subliminal signs. The reasons we choose to wear what we wear is governed by multiple factors both within our control and outside of it: for instance, our body shape, social networks and economic status, access to fashion and choice (Barthes The Fashion System; Hackett). We often choose to communicate aspects of our identity through what we wear or what we choose not to wear. Our choice of clothing communicates aspects of who we are, but also who we want to be (Hackett; Simmel; Veblen) Uniforms are an effective and efficient communicative device. Calefato’s classification of uniforms is not only as those used by military and working groups, but also including the strictly coded dress of subcultures. Unlike other clothes which can be weakly coded, uniforms differentiate themselves through their purposeful coded signalling system (Calefato). To scholars such as Jennifer Craik, uniforms intrigue us because they combine evident statements as well as implied and subliminal communications (Craik). Theories about identity predict that processes similar to the defining of an individual are also important to group life, whereby an individual group member's conceptualisation of their group is derived from the collective identity (Horowitz; Lauger). Collective identities are regularly emphasised as a key component in understanding how groups gain meaning and purpose (Polletta and Jasper). The identity is generally constructed and reinforced through routine socialisation and collective action. Uniforms are a well-known means of creating collective identities. They restrict one’s clothing choices and use boundary-setting rituals to ensure commitment to the group. In general, the more obvious the restriction, the easier it is to enforce. Demanding obvious behaviours from members, unique to the community, simultaneously generates a differentiation between the members and non-members, while enabling self-enforcement and peer-to-peer judgments of commitment. Leaders of religious movements like cults and NRMs will sometimes step back from the punitive aspects of nonconformity. Instead, it falls to the members to maintain the discipline of the collective (Kelley 109). This further leads to a sense of ownership and therefore belonging to the community. Uniforms are an easy outward-facing signal that allows for ready discrimination of error. Because they are often obvious and distinctive dress, they constrain and often stigmatise members. In other collective situations such as with American gangs, even dedicated members will deny their gang affiliation if it is advantageous to do so (Lauger Real Gangstas). While in uniform, individuals cannot hide their membership, making the sacrifice more costly. Members are forced to take one hundred percent of the ownership and participate wholly, or not at all. Through this mechanism, cults demonstrate the medicalisation of the members. Leaders may want their members to be unable to escape or deny affiliation. Similarly, their external appearances might invite persecution and therefore breed resilience, courage, and solidarity. It is, in essence, a form of manipulation (see for instance Iannaccone). Alternatively, as Melton argues, members may want to be open and proud of their organisation, as displayed through them adopting their uniforms (15). The uniform of cults in popular media is a principal component of medicalisation, deviance amplification, and convergence. The uniform, often robes, offers credence to the medicalisation aspect: members of cults are receiving ‘treatment’ — initially, negative treatment while being brainwashed, and then later helpful/saving treatment when being deprogrammed, providing they survive a mass suicide attempt and/or, criminal, sexual, or violent escapades. Through portraying cult members in a distinctive uniform, there is no doubt for the audience who is receiving or in need of treatment. Many of the cults portrayed on screen can easily communicate the joining of a cult by changing the characters' dress. Similarly, by simply re-dressing the character, it is communicated that the character has returned to normal, they have been saved, they are a survivor. In Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt, while three of the four ‘Mole women’ integrate back into society, Gretchen Chalker continues to believe in their cult; as such she never takes of her cult uniform. In addition, the employment of uniforms for cult members in popular culture enables an instant visual recognition of ‘us’ and ‘them’, or ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’, and reinforces stereotypical notions of social order and marginalised, deviant (religious) groups (Neal 83). The clothing differences are obvious in The Simpsons season 9, episode 13, “Joy of Sect”: ‘Movementarian’ members, including the Simpsons, don long flowing robes. The use of cult uniform visualises their fanatical commitment to the group. It sets them apart from the rest of Springfield and society (Neal 88-89). The connection between uniforms and cults derives two seemingly paradoxical meanings. Firstly, it reduces the chances of the audience believing that the cult employed ‘deceptive recruiting’ techniques. As Melton argues, because of the association our society has with uniforms and cults, “it is very hard for someone to join most new religions, given their peculiar dress and worship practices, without knowing immediately its religious nature” (14). As such, within popular media, the presence of the uniform increases the culpability of those who join the cult. Contrarily, the character in uniform is a sign that the person has been manipulated and/or brainwashed. This reduces the culpability of the cult member. However, the two understandings are not necessarily exclusive. It is possible to view the cult member as a naïve victim, someone who approached the cult as an escape from their life but was subsequently manipulated into behaving criminally. This interpretation is particularly powerful because it indicates cults can prey on anyone, and that anyone could become a victim of a cult. This, in turn, heightens the moral panic surrounding cults and NRMs. The on-screen myth of the cult as represented by its uniform has a basis in the real-life history of NRMs. Heaven’s Gate members famously died after they imbibed fatal doses of alcohol and barbiturates to achieve their ‘final exit’. Most members were found laid out on beds covered in purple shrouds, all wearing matching black shirts, black pants, and black and white Nike shoes. The famous photos of Warren Jeffs’s polygamous Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the subject of Netflix’s Keep Sweet: Pray and Obey, depict multiple women in matching conservative dresses with matching hairstyles gathered around a photo of Jeffs. The image and uniform are a clear influence on the design of Unbreakable’s ‘Mole women’. A prime example of the stereotype of cult uniforms is provided by the Canadian comedy program The Red Green Show when the character Red tells Harold “cults are full of followers, they have no independent thought, they go to these pointless meetings ... they all dress the same” (episode 165). The statement is made while the two main characters Red and Harold are standing in matching outfits. Blurring Nature and Myth Importantly, the success of these shows very much relies on audiences having a shared conception of NRMs and the myth of the cult. This is a curious combination of real and fictional knowledge of the well-publicised controversial events in history. Fictional cults frequently take widely held perspectives of actual religious movements and render them either more absurd or more frightening (Laycock 81). Moreover, the blurring of fictional and non-fictional groups serves to reinforce the sense that all popular culture cults and their real-world counterparts are the same; that they all follow a common script. In this, there is convergence between the fictional and the real. The myth of the cult bleeds from the screen into real life. The Simpsons’ “The Joy of Sect” was televised in the year following the suicide of the 39 members of the Heaven’s Gate group, and the storyline in part was influenced by it. Importantly, as a piercing, satirical critique of middle-class America, the “Joy of Sect” not only parodied traditional and non-traditional religion generally (as well as the ‘cult-like’ following of mass media such as Fox); scholars have shown that it also parodied the ‘cult’ stereotype itself (Feltmate). While Heaven’s Gate influenced to a greater or lesser extent each of the TV shows highlighted thus far, it was also the case that the group incorporated into its eschatology aspects of popular culture linked primarily to science fiction. For example, group members were known to have regularly watched and discussed episodes of Star Trek (Hoffmann and Burke; Sconce), adopting aspects of the show’s vernacular in “attempts to relate to the public” (Gate 163). Words such as ‘away-team’, ‘prime-directive’, ‘hologram’, ‘Captain’, ‘Admiral’, and importantly ‘Red-Alert’ were adopted; the latter, often signalling code-red situations in Star Trek episodes, appeared on the Heaven’s Gate Website in the days just prior to their demise. Importantly, allusions to science fiction and Star Trek were incorporated into the group’s self-styled ‘uniform’ worn during their tragic ritual-suicide. Stitched into the shoulders of each of their uniforms were triangular, Star Trek-inspired patches featuring various celestial bodies along with a tagline signalling the common bond uniting each member: “Heaven’s Gate Away Team” (Sconce). Ironically, with replica patches readily for sale online, and T-shirts and hoodies featuring modified though similar Heaven’s Gate symbolism, this ‘common bond’ has been commodified in such a way as to subvert its original meaning – at least as it concerned ‘cult’ membership in the religious context. The re-integration of cult symbols into popular culture typifies the way we as a society detachedly view the behaviours of cults. The behaviour of cults is anecdotally viewed through a voyeuristic lens, potentially exacerbated by the regular portrayals of cults through parody. Scholars have demonstrated how popular culture has internationally impacted on criminological aspects of society. For instance, there was a noted, international increase in unrealistic expectations of jurors wanting forensic evidence during court cases after the popularity of forensic science in crime dramas (Franzen; Wise). After the arrest of James Davis in Armidale, NSW, Australia, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Davis was the patriarch of the “House of Cadifor” and he was part of a “cult” (both reported in inverted commas). The article also includes an assumption from Davis's lawyer that, in discussing the women of the group, “the Crown might say ‘they’ve been brainwashed’”. Similarly, the article references the use of matching collars by the women (Mitchell). Nine News reported that the “ex-soldier allegedly forced tattooed, collared sex slave into prostitution”, bringing attention to the clothing as part of the coercive techniques of Davis. While the article does not designate the House of Cadifor as a cult, they include a quote from the Assistant Commissioner Justine Gough, “Mr Davis' group has cult-like qualities”, and included the keyword ‘cults’ for the article. Regrettably, the myth of cults and real-world behaviours of NRMs do not always align, and a false convergence is drawn between the two. Furthermore, the consistent parodying and voyeuristic nature of on-screen cults means we might be at fault of euphemising the crimes and behaviours of those deemed to be part of a ‘cult’. Anecdotally, the way Armidale locals discussed Davis was through a lens of excitement and titillation, as if watching a fictional story unfold in their own backyard. The conversations and news reporting focussed on the cult-like aspects of Davis and not the abhorrence of the alleged crimes. We must remain mindful that the cinematic semiology of cults and the myth as represented by their uniform dress and behaviours is incongruent with the nature of NRMs. However, more work needs to be done to better understand the impact of on-screen cults on real-world attitudes and beliefs. Conclusion The myth of the cult has entered a shared understanding within today’s zeitgeist, and the uniform of the cult stands at its heart as a key sign of the myth. Popular culture plays a key role in shaping this shared understanding by following the cultural script, slowly layering fact with fiction, just as fact begins to incorporate the fiction. The language of the cult as communicated through their uniforms is, we would argue, universally understood and purposeful. The ubiquitous representation of cults portrays a deviant group, often medicalised, and subject to deviance amplification and convergence. When a group of characters is presented to the audience in the same cult dress, we know what is being communicated to us. Fictional cults in popular culture continue to mirror the common list of negative features attributed to many new religious movements. Such fictional framing has come to inform media-consumer attitudes in much the same way as news media, reflecting as they do the cultural stock of knowledge from which our understandings are drawn, and which has little grounding in the direct or immediate experience of the phenomena in question. In short, the nature of NRMs has become confused with the myth of the cult. More research is needed to understand the impact of the myth of the cult. However, it is important to ensure “what-goes-without-saying” is not obfuscating, euphemising, or otherwise misrepresenting nature. References Barthes, Roland. Elements of Semiology. London: Jonathon Cape, 1967. ———. The Fashion System. U of California P, 1990. ———. Mythologies. Trans. 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