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1
Rivera, Joseph. "Religious Reasons and Public Reason: Recalibrating Ireland’s Benevolent Secularism". Review of European Studies 12, n.º 1 (28 de febrero de 2020): 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/res.v12n1p75.
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Liberal regimes in the West are not homogeneous in their application of secular principles. What kind of “secular” state a particular government promotes depends in large part on the strength and influence of the majority religion in that region. This article acknowledges the heuristic value of a recent threefold taxonomy of secularism: passive, assertive, and benevolent forms of secularism. I take issue with and challenge certain institutional privileges granted to the majority religion in one benevolently secular regime, the Republic of Ireland. I consider how benevolent secularism, while remaining benevolent toward religion, can align its application of secularism in the arena of publicly-funded education (primary and secondary education). A politically liberal regime, defined by the idea of public reason, invokes the principle of publicity, namely, that discourse and public policy be intelligible (and acceptable to a large degree) not only to an individual’s religious or moral community but also to the broader collection of members who constitute a liberal state. Drawing on John Rawls’ conception of public reason, and using Ireland as a case study, I show how this particular state-religion interrelation can be recalibrated in order to increase the prospects of reconciliation with a secular space of public reason.
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Choudhury, Enamul H. "Culture, Religion and Inclusive Public Discourse". Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 13, n.º 1 (2001): 51–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jis2001131/24.
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Religion has an enduring presence in the moral discourse of the "civic culture," but is unwelcome in the governing discourse of the institutional order. This essay focuses on two underlying reasons for the disconnection: the secular episteme and the nature of religious convictions. The secular episteme brackets religion by defining away its presence, while religious faith maintains its integrity by relativizing the secular institutional order. Yet religious convictions can offer a more inclusive basis for public discourse than secular reason. Paradoxically, while religious convictions can value secular reason, secular reason cannot even acknowledge religious convictions except for what it outwardly sees as socially shared symbols or myths sustained in rituals or uncritical social conventions. Since religions differ in their truth-claims and demands on public conduct, an inclusive public discourse requires the democratic contestation of truth-claims and their exemplification in civic conduct.
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Freeman, Samuel. "Democracy, Religion & Public Reason". Daedalus 149, n.º 3 (julio de 2020): 37–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01802.
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A convention of democracy is that government should promote the common good. Citizens' common good is based in their shared civil interests, including security of themselves and their possessions, equal basic liberties, diverse opportunities, and an adequate social minimum. Citizens' civil interests ground what John Rawls calls “the political values of justice and public reason.” These political values determine the political legitimacy of laws and the political constitution, and provide the proper bases for voting, public discussion, and political justification. These political values similarly provide the terms to properly understand the separation of church and state, freedom of conscience, and free exercise of religion. It is not a proper role of government to promote religious doctrines or practices, or to enforce moral requirements of religion. For government to enforce or even endorse the imperatives or ends of religion violates individuals' freedom and equality: it encroaches upon their liberty of conscience and freedom to pursue their conceptions of the good; impairs their equal civic status; and undermines their equal political rights as free and equal citizens.
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McBride, Cillian. "Religion, respect and public reason". Ethnicities 17, n.º 2 (9 de marzo de 2017): 205–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468796817690781.
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Do the constraints of public reason unfairly exclude religious citizens? Two ways of framing the charge of exclusivity are examined: the burden of translation objection and the integrity objection. The first, it is argued, rests on a misapplication of the ‘distributive paradigm’ and fails to provide a convincing account of religious citizens’ relationship to their beliefs. The ‘integrity’ objection, it is argued, relies on a theologically questionable account of ‘wholeness’ and drastically overestimates the threat to personal integrity posed by the duty of civility. It is argued here that it is a mistake to interpret the ideal of public reason as inimical to recognising religious citizens as co-deliberators and that, on the contrary, only a public-reason-centred account of democratic citizenship can ensure that religious citizens will be appropriately recognised. A rival, convergence, account of public reason, which seeks to relax the constraint of public reason and eliminate the duty of civility is rejected on the grounds that it fails to underwrite the appropriate recognition of citizens.
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Waggoner, Michael D. "Religion, Education, and Public Reason". Religion & Education 39, n.º 1 (enero de 2012): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15507394.2012.648572.
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Vallier, Kevin. "Against Public Reason Liberalism's Accessibility Requirement". Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, n.º 3 (2011): 366–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552411x588991.
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AbstractPublic reason liberals typically defend an accessibility requirement for reasons offered in public political dialog. The accessibility requirement holds that public reasons must be amenable to criticism, evaluable by reasonable persons, and the like. Public reason liberals are therefore hostile to the public use of reasons that appear inaccessible, especially religious reasons. This hostility has provoked strong reactions from public reason liberalism's religion-friendly critics. But public reason liberals and their religion-friendly critics need not be at odds because the accessibility requirement is implausible. In fact, the accessibility requirement is ambiguous between two interpretations, one of which is too stringent and the other too loose. Depending upon the interpretation, accessibility either restricts the use of too many secular reasons or permits appeal to a wide range of religious reasons. The accessibility requirement should therefore be rejected.
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Hartley, Christie y Lori Watson. "Feminism, Religion, and Shared Reasons: A Defense of Exclusive Public Reason". Law and Philosophy 28, n.º 5 (24 de marzo de 2009): 493–536. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-009-9044-3.
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Bardon, Aurélia. "The Pope’s Public Reason". Migration and Society 4, n.º 1 (1 de junio de 2021): 137–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/arms.2021.040113.
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Since the beginning of Europe’s “refugee crisis,” Pope Francis has repeatedly argued that we should welcome refugees. This, he said, is an obligation for Christians who have “a duty of justice, of civility, and of solidarity.” This religious justification is a problem for liberal political philosophers who are committed to the idea of public reason: state action, they argue, must be justified to all citizens based on public, generally accessible reasons. In this article, I argue that the claim that liberal public reason fully excludes religion from the public sphere is misguided; not all religious reasons are incompatible with the demands of Rawlsian public reason. Understanding how a religious reason can be public requires looking into both what makes a reason religious and what makes a reason public. I show that the pope’s reason supporting the claim that we should welcome refugees is both religious and public.
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Steinmetz, Alicia. "Sanctuary and the Limits of Public Reason: A Deweyan Corrective". Politics and Religion 11, n.º 3 (8 de marzo de 2018): 498–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048317000682.
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AbstractThis article contributes to the debate over the appropriate place of religion in public reason by showing the limits of this framework for understanding and evaluating the real-world religious political activism of social movements. Using the 1980s Sanctuary Movement as a central case study, I show how public reason fails to appreciate the complex religious dynamics of this movement, the reasons actors employ religious reasoning, and, as a result, the very meaning of these acts. In response, I argue that a Deweyan perspective on the tasks and challenges of the democratic public offers a richer, more contextualized approach to evaluating the status of religion in the public sphere as well as other emerging publics whose modes of engagement defy prevailing notions of reasonableness and civility.
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Gamper, Daniel. "Public Reason and Religion in a Postsecular Context". Enrahonar. Quaderns de filosofia 43 (7 de julio de 2009): 111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.282.
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Colosi, Peter J. "Ratzinger, Habermas, and Pera on Public Reason and Religion". Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 19, n.º 3 (2016): 148–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/log.2016.0023.
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Layton, Richard A. "Shared Traditions and Public Reason: Religion in American Education". Reviews in American History 47, n.º 1 (2019): 64–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rah.2019.0010.
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Angle, Stephen C. "Does Confucian Public Reason Depend on Confucian Civil Religion?" Journal of Social Philosophy 50, n.º 2 (9 de mayo de 2019): 177–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/josp.12276.
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Awe, Brian M. "Religion in the EU: Using Modified Public Reason to Define European Human Rights". German Law Journal 10, n.º 11 (1 de noviembre de 2009): 1439–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200018320.
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At the current stage of its evolution, the European Union (“Union” or “EU”) has reached a juncture where many leaders and scholars believe that greater integration is both desirable and necessary. Presumably, a primary method by which greater solidarity and integration can be achieved within the EU is through the public inclusion of common value-laden concepts – as defined through a dialectical process – present within comprehensive doctrines such as religion. To date, however, an effective and inclusive means for utilizing religion in this manner has yet to be formulated. In response, this article takes two prominent paradigms – Jurgen Habermas' intersubjective discourse theory and John Rawls' liberalism – to approach the problem and draws from them a new solution that, while tied to their theoretical underpinnings, is nonetheless a novel approach to achieving greater integration within the Union. Under this new framework, the process of legislatively defining human rights allows the morality common to European comprehensive doctrines – including official and unofficial religions – to bolster the Union's solidarity, legitimacy, and democracy both procedurally and substantively.
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Billingham, Paul. "Consensus, Convergence, Restraint, and Religion". Journal of Moral Philosophy 15, n.º 3 (19 de junio de 2018): 345–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-01503001.
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This essay critically assesses the central claim of Kevin Vallier’s Liberal Politics and Public Faith: that public religious faith and public reason liberalism can be reconciled, because the values underlying public reason liberalism should lead us to endorse the ‘convergence view,’ rather than the mainstream consensus view. The convergence view is friendlier to religious faith, because it jettisons the consensus view’s much-criticised ‘duty of restraint’. I present several challenges to Vallier’s claim. First, if Vallier is right to reject the duty of restraint then consensus theorists can also do so, and on the same grounds. Second, the independent force of the objections to the duty of restraint is unclear. Third, Vallier has not successfully identified desiderata that unite all public reason liberals and favour convergence over consensus. Finally, even if convergence is in some ways friendlier to religious faith, this does not show that it will be attractive to religious citizens.
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Tyler, George. "The Reciprocal Translation Proviso: An Alternative Approach to Public Reason". Politics and Religion 11, n.º 4 (9 de mayo de 2018): 717–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048318000081.
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AbstractThe role of religion in politics is problematic for liberal legitimacy. Religion is often restrained by a public reason requirement, but this creates cognitive burdens that asymmetrically impact religious citizens creating unequal barriers to accessing the political system, which is itself problematic for liberal legitimacy. Habermas’ institutional translation proviso balances the competing concerns of liberal legitimacy, which aims to offset the asymmetry disadvantaging religious citizens. This paper analyzes the problem and Habermas’ solution. It concludes that Habermas does not alleviate the asymmetry created by the public reason requirement to the greatest extent possible and so does not equalize the barriers to accessing the political system as much as he might. The reciprocal translation proviso provides an alternative that balances the competing components of liberal legitimacy more fully and alleviates the asymmetry and inequality of barriers to political access to the greatest extent possible while preserving the public reason requirement.
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ENNS, PHIL. "HABERMAS, REASON, AND THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE". Heythrop Journal 48, n.º 6 (noviembre de 2007): 878–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2007.00347.x.
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Madung, Otto Gusti Ndegong. "Post-Secularism as a Basis of Dialogue between Philosophy and Religion". Jurnal Filsafat 31, n.º 2 (27 de agosto de 2021): 271. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jf.65189.
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This article tackles the problem of religious radicalism. Religious radicalism is here interpreted as a protest against the pathology of secularism characterized by the privatization of religion. The privatization of religion is a process in which religion is regarded as an irrational and personal element, so that it cannot play a public role. In order to meet the pathology of privatization, this article offers the paradigm of post-secularism as proposed by Juergen Habermas that opens up the possibility for religion to actively participate in the public sphere. Furthermore, this writing argues that in post-secular society characterized by the public role of religion, it is essential to build a democratic and rational dialogue between religion and philosophy, faith and reason. A bridge that connects both is public reason. This article also shows that the post-secular condition opens up opportunities for theology to promote tolerance in a pluralistic society and to strengthen the public engagement of religion. This can avoid reducing religion to private piety without public responsibility while promoting the public engagement in religion in order to liberate the marginalized and oppressed.
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Bonotti, Matteo y Jonathan Seglow. "Introduction: Religion and public life". Ethnicities 17, n.º 2 (9 de marzo de 2017): 141–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468796817692630.
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Political debate about the place of religion and religious identities in liberal democracies is as vigorous as ever, as evidenced by Christians' assertiveness against what they regard as secularising tendencies and the attempt to eliminate their established place in public life, as well as religious minorities seeking to combat their often marginalised position and the specific injustices to which they are subject (such as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia). The papers in this collection aim to address these and similar issues, and to offer novel and fresh perspectives on some of the key themes and debates on religion and public life in contemporary political theory. In this introductory essay, we illustrate, first, the key elements of four contemporary debates on religion and public life which are explored in the articles that follow. These are the conflict between secularism and religious establishment, public reason and the use of religious arguments in public deliberation, the accommodation of religious beliefs, and the relationship between freedom of speech and religion. After surveying these debates we end with an overview of the essays in this special issue.
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Weber, Eric Thomas. "Religion, Public Reason, and Humanism: Paul Kurtz on Fallibilism and Ethics". Contemporary Pragmatism 5, n.º 2 (21 de abril de 2008): 131–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-90000095.
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Billingham, Paul. "Public Reason and Religion: The Theo-Ethical Equilibrium Argument for Restraint". Law and Philosophy 36, n.º 6 (4 de mayo de 2017): 675–705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9303-7.
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Morrow, Eric V., Boleslaw Zbigniew Kabala y Christine Dalton Hartness. "Between Public Justification and Civil Religion: Shared Values in a Divided Time". Religions 14, n.º 2 (17 de enero de 2023): 133. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14020133.
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Civil religion as formulated in Robert Bellah’s seminal 1967 article, recalling Rousseau’s Social Contract, has recently been proposed to build shared values and bridge deep partisan divides. A competing approach to shared values, based on public reason, relies on overlapping consensus in the works of John Rawls. In this paper, we present an in-between strategy that recognizes the insuperable empirical and normative problems of civil religion while using university civic engagement programs to bring about a public square in which religious reasons are found alongside neutral ones, ultimately for the sake of public justification. Having documented recent polarization trends, we consider the last major attempt to defend civil religion from the perspective of democratic solidarity, Phil Gorski’s American Covenant, but believe it falls short: based on sociological work and Augustinian insights, we show the risk of domination that Gorski’s strategy still entails, not least because of the definitional indeterminacy of civil religion and its overlap with religious nationalism. Paradoxically, a late Rawlsian approach that allows for the initial use of religious reasons, with a generosity proviso of necessary translation into public reason at some point, can lead to a public square with more religious arguments than one theorized explicitly from the perspective of civil religion. This is especially important because, given the discussed polarization trends, universities have taken on an increasingly important civic engagement role even as some still rely on a civil religion approach. We insist on public justification in university civic engagement, and for the sake of doing so take as a starting point Ben Berger’s work in favoring civil engagement, which we define as combining moral, political, and social rather than exclusively political commitments. In proposing a novel university shared values mechanism, intended to expose learners to a maximum diversity of opinions and lived experiences, we offer a fresh approach to building trust in cohorts that increases the likelihood of true dialogue across difference.
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Helfand, Michael A. "A Liberalism of Sincerity: The Role of Religion in the Public Square". Journal of Law, Religion and State 1, n.º 3 (2012): 217–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22124810-00103001.
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This article considers the extent to which the liberal nation-state ought to accommodate religious practices that contravene state law and to incorporate religious discourse into public debate. To address these questions, the article develops a liberalism of sincerity based on John Locke’s theory of toleration. On such an account, liberalism imposes a duty of sincerity to prevent individuals from consenting to a regime that exercises control over matters of core concern such as faith, religion, and conscience. Liberal theory grounds the legitimacy of the state in the consent of the governed, but consenting to an intolerant regime is illegitimate because it empowers government to demand insincere conduct. Thus, demanding that citizens pursue sincerity ensures that they do not consent away their individual liberties in exchange for promises of security and orderliness. The focus on sincerity also reorients the value that liberalism places on religious pluralism. Although many liberal theorists have proposed that religious pluralism is valuable because it provides individuals with a range of choices on how to live the good life, such theories provide little reason to promote and protect any particular religion. Indeed, if religions are important only because of the range of choice they provide, then the only concern of liberalism is to maintain enough religions so as to provide a meaningful range of options for how to live the good life; conversely, there is no reason to provide accommodations for any particular religion to aid its survival. By contrast, a liberalism of sincerity impels the liberal nation-state to widen the protections afforded to the expressions of sincerity, such as religious conduct and religious discourse. Because religious conduct and religious arguments flow from an individual’s commitment to sincerity, liberalism should provide broad protection for such religious activity in order to enable citizens to pursue sincerity.
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Juni Erpida Nasution. "INTENSIFIKASI PENDIDIKAN ISLAM PADA MASYARAKAT PLURAL UNTUK MENGANTISIPASI POTENSI KONFLIK SOSIAL HORIZONTAL BERNUANSA SARA MELALUI JALUR NONFORMAL DI KABUPATEN INDRAGIRI HULU". Al-Ihda' : Jurnal Pendidikan dan Pemikiran 15, n.º 2 (22 de febrero de 2022): 539–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.55558/alihda.v15i2.44.
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Islam according to the majority of its adherents is a holistic religion. Islam is not only defined as a mere religion of monotheism, but teachings concerning all aspects of life, public religion, religious pluralism is not just a matter of accommodating religious truth claims in the private sphere, but also a matter of public policy where Muslim leaders must recognize and protect religious freedom. , not only intra-Muslims, but also between religions and religions that teach divinity and humanity, including the issue of pluralism. Pluralism is something that is born from the proposition of divine teachings. Reason concludes that if oneness only belongs to Allah, then other than Him is not worthy to bear it which means other than Allah is plurality. Plurality and diversity in terms of religion, tradition, art, culture, way of life, and the values held by ethnic groups of Indonesian society. On the one hand, this diversity and plurality for Indonesia can be a positive and constructive force. On the other hand, it will be a negative and destructive force if it is not directed positively
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van der Ven, Johannes A. "Religion’s Political Role in Rawlsian Key". Religion & Theology 19, n.º 1-2 (2012): 1–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157430112x650357.
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AbstractIn Political Liberalism, expanded edition, Rawls repeatedly wants religions to accept liberal democracy for intrinsic reasons from their own religious premises, not as a modus vivendi. This article is to be considered an exploration in that field. In the first part the narrative of the St. Paul’s speech before the Areopagus in Athens by Luke is hermeneutically analyzed, as it tries to find common ground with Hellenistic philosophy and to do so by using deliberative rhetoric. In the second part these two characteristics of the Lukean story are considered the building blocks for the intrinsic acceptance of liberal democracy, albeit not in a substantive, but a formal key. The common ground Luke explored then was religious in nature, whereas in our days, at least in North-Western Europe, religion belongs to a cognitive minority. Moreover philosophy does not provide a common ground either, as there is a pluralism of competing schools nowadays. But intercontextual hermeneutics metaphorically permits to draw the following quadratic equation: as Lukean Paul related the Christian message to his philosophical context in order to find common ground, so we are to relate it to our context, the common ground of which is not philosophical, but political, which refers to the context of public reason. This article argues for accepting Rawls’ concept of using a bilingual language game for religion to present its religious convictions into the public debate and in due course translate them in terms of public reason. Such a translation requires a deliberative argumentation, that corresponds to the rules of logics and epistemology in practical reason.
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Tan, Petrus. "Post-Sekularisme, Demokrasi, dan Peran Publik Agama". Jurnal Ledalero 20, n.º 1 (1 de septiembre de 2021): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.31385/jl.v20i1.228.35-50.
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<p><em>This article tries to elaborate the relationship between post-secularism, democracy and the public role of religion. The facts of religion’s global revival show the failure of secularization thesis about the disappearance of religion from the public sphere. In political philosophy and social sciences, this phenomenon is called post-secularism. In this article, post-secularism is understood as a phenomenon of religion’s revival in the public sphere or the legitimacy for public role of religion. This understanding is especially necessary to encourage religion in addressing political, social and humanitarian issues. However, this understanding does not ignore the fact that religion often becomes a scandal and terror for democracy. Therefore, in this article, post-secularism also needs another understanding, namely as "awareness of a reciprocal learning process" between religion and secularity, religious and secular citizens, faith and reason, religious doctrine and public reason. The last model of post-secularism is urgently needed in Indonesia.</em><strong><em></em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Key words</em></strong><em>: Post-secularism, secularization, religion, democracy.</em></p>
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Gentile, Valentina. "La religione, le religioni e il progetto politico di J. Rawls". Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Politica 1 (3 de diciembre de 2021): 267–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/rifp-1471.
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The essay explores the relationship between religion and Rawls from the perspective of some issues that are central to his political project: political autonomy, public reason and the implications of the fact of pluralism for the development of the idea of decent peoples. Religion has a dual dimension in political liberalism, plural and singular. The problem of the liberal political transition is to allow these two dimensions to coexist harmoniously within the liberal political project.
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Nissen, Peter. "Rationeel versus emotioneel geloven". NTT Journal for Theology and the Study of Religion 71, n.º 4 (18 de noviembre de 2017): 360–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/ntt2017.71.360.niss.
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Summary This essay critically reviews the opposition between believing in a rational way and believing in an emotional way, believing with reason or with the heart. Its objective is not to determine which way of believing has to be considered as being of a higher quality than the other. It rather wants to analyse the public discourse in which religion is opposed to spirituality, where the latter is considered to be a matter of the heart and of emotion. The heart is then seen as superior to reason, as it also is in evangelical and charismatic circles. As a matter of fact, reason and heart are metaphors in the public discourse on religion and spirituality, and both metaphors refer to a certain subsystem of cognition, the implicative (heart) and the propositional (reason). Both subsystems of cognition are at work in the practice of religion and spirituality. They can be compared to the traditional distinction between fides quae and fides qua. Religion needs both, as a bird needs two wings to be able to fly.
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Govind, Rahul. "Sovereignty, Religion and Law in the British Empire: Raja Rammohan Roy’s Public Hermeneutics in His Times". Studies in History 35, n.º 2 (agosto de 2019): 218–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0257643019864299.
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Raja Rammohan Roy has been called various things, from the first Indian liberal and a ‘maker of modern India’ to one who could bring about little more than a caricature of promised transformation. That Roy saw himself as a subject of the English King is much less analysed. The following essay takes this self-perception of Roy as a ‘British subject’ as a clue to develop a twofold problematic on the nature of religion and law in Roy’s lifetime, that is, between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. (a) We emphasize the importance of the King of England, and the importance of Kingship in which religion and law cannot be disentangled. This is established through an examination of the institutional arrangements in relationship to Kingship in the British Isles and the subcontinent, a study of S. T. Coleridge’s On the Constitution of the Church and State (London: Hurst, Chance and Co., 1830) and John Austin’s Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Delhi: Universal Publishers, 2012), amongst lesser known texts. (b) From an investigation into this religio-political constitution, we will explore the other dimensions opened up in Roy’s self-perception as a subject, that is, the relationship between religion, law and public reason in colonial India. By Roy’s ‘public hermeneutics’, we mean his arguing in the public medium of print as much as for a public (the colonial state and the reading public). But we also mean his use of reason in a sustained fashion so as to critique social and legal conditions. His arguments in structural and substantive terms, as we show, allow one to re-think the relationship between religion, law and universality.
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Popartan, Lucia Alexandra. "Ungureanu, Camil and Monti, Paolo (2018). Contemporary Political Philosophy and Religion: between Public Reason and Pluralism". Enrahonar. An international journal of theoretical and practical reason 67 (30 de noviembre de 2021): 275–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.1333.
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Biggar, Nigel. "‘God’ in Public Reason". Studies in Christian Ethics 19, n.º 1 (abril de 2006): 9–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0953946806062266.
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Sikka, Sonia. "Liberalism, Multiculturalism, and the Case for Public Religion". Politics and Religion 3, n.º 3 (10 de junio de 2010): 580–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048310000180.
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AbstractLiberalism, as a political paradigm, is committed to maintaining a stance of neutrality toward religion(s), along with other comprehensive systems of belief. Multiculturalism is premised on the view that the political policies of internally diverse nations should respect the beliefs and practices of the various cultural, ethnic, and religious groups of which those nations are composed. Sometimes synthesized, sometimes standing in tension, these two political frameworks share a common goal of minimizing conflict while respecting diversity. Although this goal is, in principle, laudable, I argue in this article that the operation of liberal and multiculturalist forms of public reasoning inadvertently diminishes critical reflection and revision in the area of religion, with potentially dangerous consequences both for the health of religion and for social stability. Measures to counter these dangers, I propose, include a relaxation of the restrictive rules that define liberal public reason, and education about religion in schools.
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Davies, Ann. "In Law More Than in Life? Liberalism, Reason, and Religion in Public Schools". Rhetoric & Public Affairs 9, n.º 3 (2006): 436–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/rap.2006.0068.
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Czobor-Lupp, Mihaela. "Herder on the Emancipatory Power of Religion and Religious Education". Review of Politics 79, n.º 2 (2017): 239–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670516001054.
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AbstractJohann Gottfried Herder was both a philosopher and an active Lutheran minister, who constantly faced the difficult task of negotiating in his own work and life, in his public speeches and activities, the relationship to be established between reason and religion, both their limits and the promises they carry for each other. This article examines Herder's writings on language and reason, religion, myth, and history with the intention of putting together an account of religion and reason along lines that emphasize their continuity with each other. I argue that, in Herder's view, religion and religious education can play an active role in forming the disposition of individuals to humanity, in cultivating both their freedom and their capacity to empathize with others and love them, thus helping to materialize the emancipatory project of the Enlightenment.
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Zucca, Lorenzo. "A Secular Manifesto for Europe". Law & Ethics of Human Rights 10, n.º 1 (1 de mayo de 2016): 157–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2016-0006.
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Abstract The article argues that secularism in Europe needs to be fundamentally reconsidered. Everywhere European secular states face a double threat: On one hand fundamentalist religion, on the other negative secularism. Firstly, the paper explains negative secularism and the reason it is a problem rather than an asset. It then elaborates a new conception of positive secularism that can be understood either as a political or as an ethical project. Either way, the point of positive secularism is to distance itself from religion in order to embrace diversity of all types, religious and non-religious. Political secularism, however, relies on an elusive hope of reaching overlapping consensus between religious and non-religious people. Ethical secularism aims instead to protect diversity by promoting the establishment of a marketplace of religions, which acknowledges a public role for religion while regulating it. The marketplace of religions promotes religious pluralism and helps to iron out the different treatments between religions. Ethical secularism aims to be a worldview of worldviews that creates the preconditions for all religious and non-religious people to live well together.
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Jakobsen, Jonas y Kjersti Fjørtoft. "In Defense of Moderate Inclusivism: Revisiting Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere". Etikk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, n.º 2 (17 de noviembre de 2018): 143–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5324/eip.v12i2.2267.
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The paper discusses Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of deliberative democracy, focusing on the question of religious reasons in political discourse. Whereas Rawls as well as Habermas defend a fully inclusivist position on the use of religious reasons in the ‘background culture’ (Rawls) or ‘informal public sphere’ (Habermas), we defend a moderately inclusivist position. Moderate inclusivism welcomes religiously inspired contributions to public debate, but it also makes normative demands on public argumentation beyond the ‘public forum’ (Rawls) or ‘formal public sphere’ (Habermas). In particular, moderate inclusivism implies what we call a ‘conversational translation proviso’ according to which citizens have a duty to supplement religious with proper political arguments if – but only if – they are asked to do so by their co-discussants. This position, we argue, is more in line with the deeper intuitions behind Rawls’ political liberalism and Habermas’ deliberative model than is the fully inclusivist alternative.
Keywords: conversational translation proviso, deliberative democracy, ethics of citizenship, Habermas, moderate inclusivism, public reason, Rawls
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Chaniago, Muhamad Iswardani. "Examining Pancasila’s Position in the Public Reason Scheme: A Critical Analysis". Jurnal Politik 4, n.º 2 (31 de marzo de 2019): 183. http://dx.doi.org/10.7454/jp.v4i2.203.
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This research tries to review a number of ideas of some Indonesian scholars such as Yudi Latif, Franz Magnis-Suseno, and Syamsul Ma'arif, who saw and described the relationship between Pancasila and public reason, one of the popular political concepts in political studies. Some Indonesian scholars have linked Pancasila to public reason, with a secular nuance, so that it could potentially be free of religious associations. The troubled derivatives of public reason include (1) the negation of the principle of majoritarianism, (2) the neutral state principle, and (3) substantial elements in religion, such as the principle of universalism. With a qualitative study referring to a number of philosophical and historical arguments, it can be shown that the arguments given by the three aforementioned scholars, and others who share similar ideas, were considered to have a number of issues. From this review, it can be concluded that the thinking that supports the relationship between Pancasila and public reason is weak in terms of the secular argument. Therefore, the relation between Pancasila and public reason can be reviewed with more approachable ideas regarding religious contributions.
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Kitcher, Philip. "Science, Religion, and Democracy". Episteme 5, n.º 1 (febrero de 2008): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360008000208.
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ABSTRACTDebates sometimes arise within democratic societies because of the fact that findings accepted in accordance with the standards of scientific research conflict with the beliefs of citizens. I use the example of the dispute about Darwinian evolutionary theory to explore what a commitment to democracy might require of us in circumstances of this kind. I argue that the existence of hybrid epistemologies – tendencies to acquiesce in scientific recommendations on some occasions and to defer to non-scientific authorities on others – poses a serious problem for democratic decision-making. We need a shared conception of public reason, and it can only be secular.
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HUNTER, IAN. "KANT'S RELIGION AND PRUSSIAN RELIGIOUS POLICY". Modern Intellectual History 2, n.º 1 (abril de 2005): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244304000307.
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Since Dilthey's template study of 1890, the Prussian state's attempt to censor Kant's religious writings has typically been seen as the work of a reactionary politics bent on imposing religious orthodoxy as a bulwark against the spread of Aufklärung. This essay offers a revisionist interpretation, arguing that the attempted censoring was a by-product of a set of a long-standing Religionspolitik designed to achieve religious toleration through a system of regulated public confessions. Reaffirmed in the Religious Edict (1788) and the Censorship Edict (1788), Prussian policy required acceptance of a plurality of public confessions whose stability was preserved through the restriction of public proselytizing and the acceptance of private religious freedom. In breaking with this religious settlement, through their public advocacy of a true “religion of reason”, the Protestant religious rationalists of the theological Aufklärung breached the embargo on public proselytizing, leading eventually to government's attempt to censor Kant's own “pure moral religion”.
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Leka, Agim. "Religion and the modern education". Academicus International Scientific Journal 27 (enero de 2023): 176–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.7336/academicus.2023.27.11.
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The purpose of the research is to solve the paradox of religion integration in education, by the new balance between religion, philosophy and science, during the post communism transition. In the field of thinking, the process is the transition from ideology to integral thinking. It is realized through the re-evaluation of the topics of the integration of religion, transitology and integral though, education, inclusiveness, solidarity, new laicity and new secularity. In the philosophical sense, integration is the objective process of being developed. This is understood as a return to identity towards a universal being. In the context of the social being, the process realizes the opening and cooperative development of all mental, spiritual-religious, scientific, creative-artistic, economic, cultural, material and non-material political fields. It includes the individual, the community, and all institutions of social life. The path of integration development is the transitive movement in a spiral form. In Albania, with the fall of communism, freedom of religion was legalized according to the standards of European democracy. The rehabilitation of religious figures that had been condemned and persecuted by the totalitarian regime began. The post-communist transition brought profound changes in the field of faith and religion such as the new dimension in the relationship of society with religion, new and unfamiliar attitudes of believers to religion, new relations between the state and religious institutions, new relations between education and religion in public institutions, opening of religious schools and increasing the influence of religion through the media and religious literature. What is considered tolerance in Europe, in the Albanian case is respect. Albanians are the best model for religious tolerance (respect). There has never been a religious clash in Albania for any reason. Respect for the religious affiliation and religious belief of the other in the Albanian case is modeled as the guiding value of their identity and appears in everyday life as the acceptance of the other. For this reason, they are the best model of respect and acceptance of the other, regardless of religious affiliation. This is an ontological value, built over the centuries and continues to this day. Albanians have not converted, but have adapted to a religious belief for economic and survival reasons. Marriages with different religions and keeping two names (Christian and Muslim) are natural phenomena among Albanians. In Albania, there are in the family and tribe people with Christian and Muslim religions individuals with two names, Christian and Muslim: Kristo and Muhamed. Albanians have lived in peaceful symbiosis with the Slavs in the centuries of the latter’s influx into Albanian lands. They have also lived peacefully with other neighbors, Greeks or Romans. This is even though the neighbors have not always been peaceful with the Albanians.
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Shabani, Omid Payrow. "The Role of Religion in Democratic Politics: Tolerance and the Boundary of Public Reason". Religious Education 106, n.º 3 (mayo de 2011): 332–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344087.2011.570188.
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Koch, Traugott. "Das Subjekt in Recht und Religion". Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik 46, n.º 1 (1 de febrero de 2002): 124–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.14315/zee-2002-0121.
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Abstract The right is founded in the freedom of the individual and cannot be considered as something collectively made up. It has no extemal reason. The positive law which enables the public realization of freedom and therefore can be understood as a gift of God is compulsory upon everybody. At the same time it depends on the consent of the individual. There is no right without consciousness of right and so without conscience.
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Amini, Majid. "Religious Identity: Reflections on Revelation and Rationality". International Journal of Public Theology 3, n.º 4 (2009): 443–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187251709x12474522834837.
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AbstractThere is a widespread assumption that ethnic origins substantially contribute, if not constitute, the identity of individuals. In particular, among the ethnic elements, it is claimed that religion takes precedence and people could be individuated in terms of their religious affiliations. Indeed, public theology as an attempt to expand on the public consequences of religious doctrines and beliefs is predicated on the legitimacy of the idea of religious identity. However, the purpose of this article is to show that strictly speaking identity cannot be constituted by religion. More precisely, it is argued that a phenomenological characterization of individual identity fails to do justice to the philosophical requirements of identity. The argument is obviously philosophical by nature and is developed through an analysis of the concept of revelation. The phenomenon of revelation plays a pivotal role in the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions, yet by its very nature owes its authenticity to something prior to itself; namely, reason. This entails the priority of reason over revelation and as such undermines claims that purport to define identity in terms of revelation/religion. This detachment of identity from religion would clearly have far reaching socio-political implications for issues such as religious diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism in particular and public theology in general.
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Lovin, Robin W. "Human Dignity and Public Reason". Political Theology 20, n.º 5 (18 de junio de 2019): 437–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1462317x.2019.1632529.
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Lovin, Robin W. "Lovin on Trigg, Religion in Public Life". Scottish Journal of Theology 62, n.º 2 (mayo de 2009): 175–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930608004250.
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The relationship between religion and public life is a universal problem, but discussions of it quickly become very local. They begin with the global reality of religious diversity, then the analysis descends into the particulars of the legal and constitutional system immediately in view, assuming always the sociological features of religious diversity most familiar to the audience at hand. French analysts typically take laïcité as the standard for modern solutions to the problem, while they view with alarm the cultural gap which separates older French citizens from recent Muslim immigrants. American writers, by contrast, usually have a more benign view of cultural diversity, which has grown up over generations of immigration. They turn quickly to the ambiguities of church–state law which govern religious expression in public space. Roger Trigg provides a thoughtful alternative to these parochial analyses. His Religion in Public Life explores a variety of national settings and he formulates his questions in terms which avoid legal or religious assumptions that are already in place where the question is asked. At the same time, he makes no premature claims to rational universality or global solutions. Religion in Public Life is primarily an investigation of European and North American contexts, or in other places which share a British legal and cultural heritage. In these places, religion and public life are shaped by the realities of modern law and the modern state and appeals to reason still mean something, even if they cannot mean quite as much as liberal theorists thought they meant only a few decades ago. But even among these nations, linked by culture, commerce and commitment to democracy, there is a surprising range of legal arrangements relating to religious expression and religious institutions and there are considerable differences in the social facts behind the legal differences. This, Trigg suggests, is a large enough world to allow us to discuss real differences without succumbing to the confusion which sometimes results from too much information. It is also a world in which we are acutely aware that public life has problems in need of solutions. Instead of hurrying to keep religion out of sight or under control, we are perhaps more willing to see what it has to contribute.
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Löffler, Winfried. "Secular Reasons for Confessional Religious Education in Public Schools". Daedalus 149, n.º 3 (julio de 2020): 119–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01807.
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The cultural importance of religion and its ambiguous potential effects on the stability of liberal democracy and the rule of law recommend including information about religions in public school curricula. In certain contexts, there are even good secular reasons to have this done by teachers approved by the religious communities for their respective groups of pupils, as is being practiced in various European states (with a possibility of opting out, with ethics as a substitute subject in some schools). Is this practice compatible with the religious neutrality of states? An illustrative analysis shows how suitable criteria for the admission of religious groups to offering religious education can block the objection of undue preference. Like any solution in this field, it is not immune to theoretical and practical problems.
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PABST, ADRIAN. "The secularism of post-secularity: religion, realism, and the revival of grand theory in IR". Review of International Studies 38, n.º 5 (diciembre de 2012): 995–1017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210512000447.
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AbstractHow to theorise religion in International Relations (IR)? Does the concept of post-secularity advance the debate on religion beyond the ‘return of religion’ and the crisis of secular reason? This article argues that the post-secular remains trapped in the logic of secularism. First, a new account is provided of the ‘secularist bias’ that characterises mainstream IR theory: (a) defining religion in either essentialist or epiphenomenal terms; (b) positing a series of ‘antagonistic binary opposites’ such as the secularversusthe religious; and (c) de-sacralising and re-sacralising the public square. The article then analyses post-secularity, showing that it subordinates faith under secular reason and sacralises the ‘other’ by elevating difference into the sole transcendental term. Theorists of the post-secular such as Jürgen Habermas or William Connolly also equate secular modernity with metaphysical universalism, which they seek to replace with post-metaphysical pluralism. In contrast, the alternative that this article outlines is an international theory that develops the Christian realism of the English School in the direction of a metaphysical-political realism. Such a realism binds together reason with faith and envisions a ‘corporate’ association of peoples and nations beyond the secularist settlement of Westphalia that is centred on national states and transnational markets. By linking immanent values to transcendent principles, this approach can rethink religion in international affairs and help revive grand theory in IR.
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Putra, Doly Andhika y Ni Made Sumaryani. "Terrorism and Jihad in Islamic Perspective". International Journal of Islamic Khazanah 11, n.º 2 (5 de julio de 2021): 78–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.15575/ijik.v11i2.12483.
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Being the most discussed issue in various parts of the world (including Indonesia), Terrorism is considered contrary to humanitarian understanding, which causes losses, both economically, politically, and psychologically. The issue of Terrorism has recently become a hot topic of public discussion. The reason is that terrorists massively use the word Jihad as a justification for their actions. This article uses a descriptive qualitative approach as the primary writing approach. In-depth search for various literature appropriate to the discussion of Jihad and Terrorism from an Islamic point of view. Religion is one of the motivations for a person to join a terror group. Religion is one reason that encourages the emergence of Terrorism due to the oppression that occurs in religion in a specific country. Call it Syria, which is famous for its wars; from there, terrorist groups spread to Indonesia by igniting the spirit of Jihad as citizens who share the same religion share the same fate. After a deeper investigation, the Jihad often campaigned by terror groups is not like Jihad from an Islamic point of view.
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McGravey, Kevin. "Religious Freedom: Public Conscience, Private Equality, and Public Reason". Journal of Church and State 62, n.º 4 (7 de octubre de 2019): 630–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csz081.
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Speck, Simon. "The Comedy of Reflexive Modernity: Reason, Religion and the Ambivalence of Humour". Cultural Sociology 13, n.º 2 (6 de mayo de 2019): 233–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1749975519841730.
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This article utilizes Ulrich Beck’s concept of ‘reflexive modernity’ to account for the ambivalent view of humour in the public sphere: its celebration as a form of criticism of irrationality and injustice and its censure as a vehicle for the denigration of subordinate or marginal groups and identities. The article argues that the power and ambivalence of humour in contemporary culture can be understood with reference to the two key features of reflexive modernization: the demand for the discursive justification of all claims to cognitive and normative authority and the obligation to respect the equal rights of all individuals. Drawing on Beck’s distinction between a ‘first’ and ‘second’ modernity, the article uses the example of the Danish ‘Muhammed Cartoons’ to show that critical-emancipatory joking cannot simply lay claim to an ‘Enlightenment’ view of secular-scientistic reason in conflict with an atavistic and backward ‘religion’ due to the transformation of reason by reflexive scientization and the transformation of religion resulting from the effects of globalization and cultural cosmopolitization. The article draws on accounts of the comic practice of Muslim comedians and a consideration of the British TV sit-com Rev to demonstrate the possibility of a ‘religious’ joking that is thereby eminently ‘modern’ whilst respecting the values of human universality and individual dignity. The article concludes by reiterating the centrality of Beck’s theory for the understanding of the enduring power of comic representation to constitute a cultural reflexivization endemic in contemporary society and argues for the relevance of ‘reflexive modernity’ to cultural sociology.