Literatura académica sobre el tema "Private subjective rights"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Private subjective rights"
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Andreev, Yury N. "About judicial protection of subjective civil rights". Russian Journal of Legal Studies (Moscow) 7, n.º 1 (7 de agosto de 2020): 9–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/rjls34732.
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The article is devoted to the judicial protection of subjective civil rights. The author tries to formulate the concepts of subjective civil rights and the judicial protection of subjective civil rights to determine the ratio of subjective civil rights and the right to judicial protection as well as the judicial protection features of various subjective civil rights categories. The paper presents the authors conception of subjective rights, the various ways by which they are protected, and the features of the protection of certain types of subjective civil rights. The aim of the research is to find the most optimal ratio of the right of subjective rights owner to protection and the right of subjective right for protection, in order to determine the most typical ways to protect certain categories of subjective civil rights. The methodological basis of the research includes the well-known general and private scientific methods of scientific knowledge. The paper concludes by stating that subjective civil rights have general (universal) and specific ways of protection.
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Arestova, L. "THE CASE OF ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION: THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF LEGAL DISPUTES ARISING FROM PUBLIC-LEGAL RELATIONS". Scientific Notes Series Law 1, n.º 11 (noviembre de 2021): 97–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.36550/2522-9230-2021-11-97-102.
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The author determined that the conflict of interests is that in substantive or procedural legal relations, according to the non-governmental entity, violates his subjective public interest in the implementation of subjective public (eg, the right to vote, civil service) or private law (for example, the right to land), the satisfaction of public (for example, the desire to use the road surface in excellent condition) or private interest (for example, the desire to become a lawyer). It is determined that the administrative court, resolving the dispute between the parties, promotes the settlement of incompatible or conflicting interests of the parties, protection of the subjective public interest of the non-governmental entity, its both public and private subjective rights. At the same time, the court also contributes to the protection of the procedure for the exercise by the subject of its public authority, which ensures the legality and protection of public order. It is noted that a person uses subjective public law to satisfy his personal (for example, registration of land rights) or public interests, needs (for example, the use of space for a rally). It is noted that the direct subject of protection in the administrative court is the subjective public right of a person to apply to public administration bodies, if the realization of another subjective right of a person (public or private) is impossible without interaction with the subject of power, which is obliged promote such implementation. A public law dispute covers only disputes about public law, ie about the protection of only subjective public law. Whereas, a dispute arising from a public-law relationship is caused by a violation of subjective public law and provides for the protection of the rights and interests of the individual, regardless of their legal nature (both private and public). The subject of jurisdiction of administrative courts is not all disputes arising from public law relations. The distinction between disputes to be considered in different types of proceedings should take place at the legislative level, taking into account the reasoned positions of leading scholars on the removal from a code of those provisions that prevent the precise determination of the jurisdiction of the court.
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Chub, A. V. "System of subjective public rights of a private person". Legal Novels 2, n.º 10 (2020): 105–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.32847/ln.2020.10-2.14.
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Muzyczka, Karolina. "Protection of private property expropriation". ASEJ Scientific Journal of Bielsko-Biala School of Finance and Law 22, n.º 2 (3 de julio de 2018): 35–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.4668.
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The basic law related to real estate/property is the right of ownership. It is the basic institution of property law in Poland and together with property ownership and the right of inheritance, is constitutionally protected. The provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997, which set the standards for protection of property rights, are heterogeneous. This results both from their location in the basic law and from the wording. There are provisions in the form of constitutional principles, provisions expressing subjective rights, as well as provisions providing procedural guarantees for the implementation of the former. This multitude of forms creates some interpretative difficulties, the resolution of which is often dealt with by the Constitutional Tribunal. The considerations in the paper are based on various research methods, especially on the dogmatic and legal method. The author discusses achievements of jurisprudence and doctrine with respect to property rights, regulations of the Constitution, expropriation in civil law, judicature of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and other Polish courts as well as acts of international law e.g. the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
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Kruszewski, Tomasz y Leonard Górnicki. "Zasadnicze przejawy ingerencji w prawa podmiotowe prywatne jednostek przez III Rzeszę". Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem 39, n.º 1 (8 de septiembre de 2017): 45–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/2300-7249.39.1.3.
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ESSENTIAL MANIFESTATIONS OF INTERFERENCE IN SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS BY THE THIRD REICHThe article analyzes the most important manifestations of limitation of subjective rights of private individuals by the Third Reich. The authors begin the article by undermining by the national socialist regime one of the fundamental principles, which is equality before the law. Then, the authors analyze the violations of particulars individual rights of private individuals.The purpose of the authors is to demonstrate that the self-reliance of aperson Eigenständigkeit has ceased to be an essential element of private law in the national socialist legal order. The sphere in which the subject of law could freely regulate the legal situation created by acts of his will, became clearly restricted. But also, and even more specifically, the sphere of traditionally protected civil rights of private individuals has fallen. The interference of the national socialist regime in the sphere of human privacy followed by changes both in civil and in public law. The existence of a formal legal basis was supposed to exclude the unlawfulness of the behavior of the subjects of the law, especially the state, its organs and institutions, but in the light of the idea ofthe law of the civilized nations it was “statutory lawlessness”.
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Spanò, Michele. "Making the Multiple:". South Atlantic Quarterly 118, n.º 4 (1 de octubre de 2019): 839–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00382876-7825648.
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The essay argues for the compatibility between private law and the commons. In order to do so, it proposes an archeology of modern private law, which traces both the emergence of what will be called “modern topology” and the historical transformation of civil law into what we still know as private law. Private law is considered to be a product of modern legal theory which is radically tied with public law. The two are meant to have the very same logical form—individuality—which was the premise for the social relation of capital to be established. The pivot of this legal maneuver—which ended up with the exclusion of the commons from the realm of both private and public law—was the theory of subjective rights. To dismantle this construction, the essay proposes a critique of subjective rights as well as a trans-subjective approach to private law.
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Krahé, Justin Friedrich. "The Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law Relationships". European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 2, n.º 2 (7 de mayo de 2015): 124–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134514-00202002.
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This article examines the doctrinal foundation and potential for harmonisation of horizontal effect in German and English law against the common legal background of the echr and eu law. It compares direct horizontal effect with two models of indirect horizontal effect, based either on objective constitutional values (indirect Model A), or subjective public law rights (indirect Model B). It is contended that indirect horizontal effect based on subjective public law rights, particularly those corresponding to the state’s obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, provides a coherent and predictable solution to most problems arising in horizontal effect cases.
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TRETYAKOV, S. V. "THE CLASSICAL INTEREST THEORY OF RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW". Civil Law Review 20, n.º 4 (20 de octubre de 2020): 5–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.24031/1992-2043-2020-20-4-5-44.
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This is an attempt of rational reconstruction and critique of the Rudolph von Jherings theory of subjective right, commonly known as “the interest theory”. First, the basic shortcomings of the classical will theory (a major alternative to the interest theory) have been articulated, which I see as a reason of the elaboration of the alternative model by Jhering. Second, the structural analysis of the Jherings interest theory has been accomplished. From the structural standpoint, Jherings theory has two components: one, substantial (interest) and another, formal (legal remedy, granted by the law when the interest has been unlawfully attacked). This two-component model seems to be unstable and prone to self-contradictions. The major reasons for such a case are the indeterminacy of the concept of interest, an inherent trend within the interest theory to replace legal analysis with sociological enquiry, as well as coherence problem with some controversial instances of subjective rights. In a broader context, Jherings interest theory can be seen as an attempt to reconcile Kantian-based German private law theory with the elements of British utilitarianism.
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Fedchyshyn, Dmytro y Iryna Ignatenko. "About restrictions of land rights in Ukraine". Journal of Geography, Politics and Society 9, n.º 1 (31 de marzo de 2019): 23–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2019.1.03.
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The article deals with restrictions on the exercise of land rights. Attention is paid to the consideration of the content of the concept of “restriction of subjective right to land” and the views of domestic scientists regarding its definition are analyzed. The classification of restrictions on rights to land by different criteria is proposed. The peculiarities of reconciliation of public and private interests in the establishment of restrictions on the rights to land are explored.
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CHUB, A. V. "THEORIES OF ORIGIN OF SUBJECTIVE PUBLIC RIGHTS OF A PRIVATE PERSON". Law and Society, n.º 5 (2020): 104. http://dx.doi.org/10.32842/2078-3736/2020.5.15.
Texto completoTesis sobre el tema "Private subjective rights"
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Liquet, Bloy Marina. "Les droits privés subjectifs des personnes en contentieux administratif". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Bordeaux, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024BORD0244.
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Cette étude a pour objectif de mettre en évidence l’existence d’un contentieux administratif de droits privés subjectifs des personnes, et d’en mesurer ses implications. Le juge administratif connaît certes des notions de droit privé entendues au sens strict comme les droits attachés à l'individu, tels que le droit au respect à la vie privée, le droit à l'image, le droit à la présomption d'innocence, ou encore le droit à la dignité humaine, le droit à la vie,... Mais de manière classique, ces droits de la personne sont appréhendés comme des droits fondamentaux voire des droits publics subjectifs en contentieux administratif. Pourtant, il est possible de conserver la qualification privatiste de droits privés subjectifs depuis l’avènement d’une configuration récente et singulière de contentieux administratif, semblable à un contentieux judiciaire. Dans ce cas, il s’agit d’une confrontation entre les droits de la personne privée et un intérêt général, et non plus entre les droits d’un administré et un intérêt public. La personne privée, laquelle n’est alors plus envisagée en sa qualité d’administré, peut réclamer la protection de ses droits à une administration simple interlocutrice. En outre, le résultat de notre recherche révèle les implications multiples de l’émergence de problématiques de droit privé devant le juge administratif, qu’il s’agisse de l’adaptation de l’office du juge administratif mais aussi du rapprochement fonctionnel avec le juge judiciaireThe aim of this study is to highlight the existence of administrative litigation concerning the subjective private rights of individuals and to measure its impact. The administrative judge is undoubtedly familiar with concepts of private law understood strictly as individual rights, such as the right to privacy, the right to one's image, the right to the presumption of innocence, or even the right to human dignity, the right to life, and so on. Traditionally, however, these personal rights are understood as fundamental rights or even as subjective public rights in administrative disputes. However, it is possible to maintain the privatist qualification of subjective private rights since the advent of a recent and unique configuration of administrative litigation, similar to judicial litigation. In this case, it is a confrontation between the rights of the private individual and a general interest, and no longer between the rights of a constituent and a public interest. The private individual, who is then no longer considered in his capacity as a constituent, can demand the protection of his rights from an administration that is merely an interlocutor. In addition, the results of our research show the multiple implications of the emergence of private law issues before the administrative judge, whether in terms of adapting the office of the administrative judge or in terms of functional rapprochement with the judicial judge
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Chi, Young-hae. "By what right do we own things? : a justification of property ownership from an Augustinian tradition". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5555bb1d-9d5c-4260-b2bc-3c04c61ecb31.
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The justification of property ownership based on individual subjective rights is tightly bound to humanist moral perspectives. God is left out as irrelevant to the just grounds of ownership, which is established primarily on the basis of human self-referential, moral capacity. This thesis aims at developing an alternative justification, both for property as an institution and as a private holding, with a view to bringing God back into the centre stage and thereby placing property ownership on the objective concept of right. A tradition hitherto generally left unnoticed, yet uncovered here as the source of inspiration, vests the whole project with a moral-teleological tone. The tradition, enunciated by St. Augustine and developed by St. Bonaventure and John Wyclif, invites us to see property from the perspective of a moral end: it ought to be used for the love of God and neighbours, and as such it can be owned only by the just. In spite of important insights into the moral nature of property, the Augustinian thesis not only fails to spell out what ‘use for love’ means but also suffers from elitism. Nor does it offer an adequate justification of private property. Such weaknesses call for revision. When we reinterpret the Augustinian thesis through the concept of the divine imperative of service coupled with a proper understanding of human work, property acquires a distinctive justification. Property, as an institution, is justified as a requisite for carrying out God’s redemptive work towards the world. From this general justification ensues the particular justification. We hold property as specifically ‘mine,’ since each person’s ordained mission to participate in God’s work requires a uniquely personal material means, although the recognition and fulfilment of individual mission still demands communal efforts. The duty to carry out the God-commanded mission at first allows us to possess private property only in a non-proprietorial and non-exclusive manner. Yet in the prevailing condition of economic scarcity and human greed, civil jurisdiction must provide a structure of rights to enforce property institution. As God’s invitation for the transformation of the world is a universal command, everybody should have a minimum of property, and yet in differentiation of the scope and kinds commensurate with the particularities of individual mission.
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Alessandrello, Irene. "L'efficacité dans le droit des contrats". Thesis, Paris 1, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA01D045.
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L'efficacité caractérise tous les aspects du droit des contrats. De plus, elle semble avoir été toujours immanente à l'instrument contractuel, pouvant s'appréhender comme la véritable logique traversant toute l'évolution juridique du contrat pendant les siècles. Et notamment, d'après l'analyse des règles du Code Napoléon en matière de contrats, de la relative jurisprudence et également de la Réforme du droit des contrats du 2016, nous avons découvert deux formes de logique sous-entendues à l'efficacité, l'une subjective et l'autre objective. La théorie classique du contrat est dominée par une logique subjective de l'efficacité résultant de la volonté des parties. En effet, la magnificence de cette volonté règne presque sans partage, consacrée, d'ailleurs, par les principes fondamentaux d'intangibilité et de stabilité du contrat et glorifiée par le rôle très restreint du juge, qui est un simple et scrupuleux exécuteur de la volonté des parties. En revanche, l'affaiblissement du rôle de la volonté subjective a déterminé une recrudescence de l'efficacité objective, ouvrant la voie à une analyse plus globale du contrat qui intègre la subjectivité de la volonté dans l'objectivité de l'environnement socio-économique. Cette lecture nouvelle révèle une compréhension plus complexe et objective du contrat qui nous amène à l'étudier et à l'intégrer dans le milieu où il opère. Le contrat n'est donc plus tourné uniquement vers la subjectivité engendrée par les volontés puisqu'il considère également l'objectivité issue des enjeux extérieursThe effectiveness characterizes any and alI aspects of the law of contracts. Moreover, it seems to have been always so immanent in the contractual instrument that can be grasped as the real logic through all the legal evolution of the contract over many centuries. ln particular, from the analysis of the rules of the Code Napoléon on contracts, the related case law as welI as the Reforrn of the law of contracts enacted in 2016, we inferred two forms of logic underlying the contractual effectiveness, one subjective and the other objective. The classical theory of contract is dominated by a subjective logic of effectiveness resulting from the will of the parties. Indeed, the magnificence of this will reigns almost unfettered and, moreover, is sealed on the other band by the fundamental principles of the contract sanctity and stability and glorified by the very limited role of the judge, as a simple and scrupulous executor of the parties' will. Conversely, the weakening of the role of the subjective will has determined an increase of the objective effectiveness, paying the way for a more comprehensive analysis of the contract that incorporates the subjectivity of the parties' will into the objectivity of the socio-economic environrnent. This new line of interprelation reveals a more complex and objective understanding of the contract leading us to study and integrate it in the context where it operates. The con tract is then no longer turned only to subjectivity generated by the parties' will, since it also considers the objectivity deriving from environrnental eternal challenges
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Peyroux-Sissoko, Marie-Odile. "L'ordre public immatériel en droit public français". Thesis, Paris 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA01D064.
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Notion centrale des rapports entre l’État et les individus, l'ordre public mis en œuvre par la police administrative est traditionnellement identifié comme étant matériel. Essentiel à l'équilibre entre maintien de la paix sociale et garantie des droits et libertés individuels, il y est particulièrement fait recours lorsqu'est en cause la sécurité. La législation (lato sensu) récente en matière d'état d'urgence le rappelle. Mais l'ordre public n'est pas uniquement matériel, limité à la sécurité, à la tranquillité et à la salubrité publiques. Notion classique du droit public, l'ordre public ne cesse d'évoluer. Il est en effet possible de tirer de divers phénomènes épars l'existence d'un ordre public immatériel dont l'émergence et l'utilisation visent à répondre à des déséquilibres apparus dans l'État de droit. Permettant notamment la protection de valeurs objectives à partir desquelles la société est ordonnée, l'ordre public immatériel vise à rééquilibrer les rapports entre le collectif et l'individuel. Il est en ce sens une notion fonctionnelle. Il est ainsi possible de définir l'ordre public immatériel et de construire un régime juridique qui lui soit adapté. Impuissant à restreindre les libertés dans la vie privée, il s'exprime dans le cadre de l'espace public auquel il est cantonné, ce qui limite d'autant les risques d'intrusion de l'État. Il peut être vu comme une notion autonome. Cette formalisation permet d'identifier plus facilement l'ordre public immatériel. Surtout, elle laisse entendre qu'il pourrait s'imposer durablement dans l'ordre juridique françaisA key notion in the relationship between the State and individuals, public order implemented by the administrative authorities is normally considered as material. Essential to the balance between maintaining social peace and ensuring respect for individual rights and freedoms, public order is implemented especially where security is involved. Recent legislation (in the broad sense) introducing the state of emergency is a case in point. However, public order is not merely material or restricted to matters of public security, peace or health. Public order, a traditional notion in public law, continues to evolve. From the various different phenomena, it is indeed possible to deduce the existence of an immaterial public order, the emergence and implementation of which are intended to offset the disequilibrium arising from the rule of law. The purpose of immaterial public order, which ensures the protection of objective values around which society is organised, is to restore the balance between the public and the individual. In that sense, it is a functional notion. It is therefore possible to define immaterial public order and build a legal system adapted to it. Immaterial public order, which is powerless to restrict freedoms in private life, expresses itself in the public domain to which it is confined, thereby limiting the risks of State intervention. lt can be seen as a notion in its own right. As a result of this formalisation, immaterial public order can be more readily identified. Above all, formalisation suggests that it could become a permanent feature of the French legal system
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Arellano, Ortiz Pablo Andrés. "Universalisme et individualisme dans le droit chilien des retraites". Thesis, Paris 10, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA100179.
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Le système de retraite chilien a attiré, depuis les années 1980, l’attention des spécialistes de sécurité sociale. La récente réforme de 2008, portant sur une extension de la couverture de la retraite, oblige à repenser l’analyse de ce modèle. Si la protection de la retraite est toujours réalisée sur la base d’un modèle comportant une logique unique fondée sur la capacité contributive, la conformité du droit à pension au principe d’universalité subjective doit désormais être analysée. Les deux volets de protection du système chilien doivent en effet être étudiés dans le but d’apprécier leur capacité globale à couvrir la population chilienne. D’une part, le premier volet comprend un mécanisme non contributif octroyé par l’Etat, qui répond ainsi à ses obligations internationales et constitutionnelles de protection de sa population. D’autre part, le second volet consiste en des mécanismes contributifs, obligatoires et volontaires, mis à la disposition des personnes pour leur permettre de se procurer une protection contre le risque vieillesse. La réforme de 2008, par les nouveaux mécanismes non contributifs qu’elle a mis en place, renforce la protection du droit fondamental à la retraite et, par les corrections qu’elle a apportées aux mécanismes contributifs, en étend la couverture. L’universalité subjective doit donc être recherchée par l’analyse de l’ensemble des mécanismes du système de pensions chilien. C’est en effet la complémentarité de ces deux mécanismes qui confère au droit à pension son caractère universel. Le système de retraite devient un tout cohérent, qui associe Universalisme et Individualisme pour protéger l’ensemble de la populationSince the 1980s the Chilean pension scheme has drawn the attention of social security experts. The recent reform of 2008, which extended pension coverage, forced a rethink of the analysis of the Chilean model, from a different perspective. While the protection of old age risk is still realised on the basis of a single logic model based on contributory capacity, the compliance of the right to a pension with the principle of subjective universality must now be analyzed. The two components of the Chilean system should indeed be understood in order to assess their overall ability to cover the entire Chilean population. The first component includes a non contributory mechanism provided by the State, which responds to its international and constitutional obligations of protection of its population. The second component consists of mandatory and voluntary contributory mechanisms to enable people to obtain protection against the old age risk. With its new non-contributory mechanisms, the 2008 reform enhances the protection of the fundamental right to retirement, and through the corrections of the contributory mechanisms, extends the coverage of retirement’s contributory pensions. The subjective universality must therefore be found through the analysis of all the mechanisms of the pension system in Chile. It is indeed the complementarity of these two mechanisms which confers the right to pension its universal character. The retirement system has become a coherent whole, combining Universalism and Individualism to protect the entire population
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Silva, Percival Tavares da. "Bolsas de estudo no ensino fundamental privado, entre a universalidade de direito à educação e o clientelismo na educação: o caso de Nova Iguaçu/RJ". Universidade de São Paulo, 2010. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/48/48134/tde-02082010-093502/.
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A bolsa de estudo para o ensino fundamental privado, financiada com recursos da educação pública, está prevista na CF/88 e na LDB/96 em caráter excepcional para atender ao direito público subjetivo de acesso ao ensino fundamental. Trata-se de uma excepcionalidade, pois a Lei permite o uso deste instituto sob três condições: quando não houver vaga na escola pública próxima à residência da criança, quando a criança não possuir recursos para financiar o próprio estudo em escola privada, e como conseqüência, o poder público obrigado a investir prioritariamente na solução da falta de vagas na local de moradia do aluno bolsista. Em resumo a bolsa deve ser transitória. A pesquisa tomou o caso de Nova Iguaçu/RJ, centrandose nos anos de 1997 a 2008, no entanto, mostrou que esse Município tem concedido bolsas de estudo de forma recorrente desde, no mínimo 1990, e no mesmo lugar e a crianças não necessariamente carentes, pois a maior parte delas já estava na escola quando receberam bolsa. O que caracteriza a sua ilegalidade, a sua inconstitucionalidade. A pesquisa objetivou entender a natureza da política de concessão de bolsas no âmbito deste Município. A hipótese de que a concessão de bolsas, mais do que uma resposta ao direito público subjetivo, seria uma forma de desviar recursos públicos à escola privada, pautada pelo clientelismo e pela troca de favores foi corroborada pela pesquisa. Para tanto, recorreu-se a uma combinação de métodos de pesquisa, ao paradigma indiciário e ao materialismo histórico. Procedeu-se a consultas a documentos do Município e a entrevistas com gestores da educação pública, da escola privada, políticos, lideranças sindicato dos trabalhadores da educação do Município, conselheiros na área da educação e aos próprios bolsistas. Constatou-se, sobretudo até o final de 2004, devido à forma sub-reptícia e à falta de transparência pública na sua concessão, que, até a sua extinção em 2008 pelo Governo Municipal, a sociedade civil enfrentou imensas dificuldades para exercer o papel de cidadão no controle social sobre esta política pública.State-funded grants for private schools operating in the compulsory education sector (comprising 8 years) are provided for in the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the General Law of Education of 1996 as an exception to fulfill the public subjective right of access to the 8 years of compulsory education. This is an exception, for the law allows said grants under three conditions: when there is no place available in the State school near the child home, when the child has not funds to pay his own fees in a private school and, as a result, the State should prioritarily invest to solve the lack of places in the place of residence of the pupil with a grant. In short, the grant should be provisional. This research examined the case of the municipality of Nova Iguaçu, in the State of Rio de Janeiro, between 1997 and 2008. It found that the local government has consistently given grants since at least 1990, always in the same place and with the same schools for children not necessarily deprived, for most of them were already at school when they were given a grant, which indicates the illegal and nonconstitutional nature of the grants. The research sought to understand the nature of the grant awarding policy in this local government and confirmed the hypothesis that, the awarding of grants, far from being an answer to the subjective public right of access to education, would be a way of channelling public funds to private schools, based on clientelism and exchange of favours. To do this, the research employed a combination of research methods, the criticalhistorical approach and the index paradigm. Local government documents were examined and interviews were carried out with State education and private school administrators, politicians, leaders of the local government education workers\' union, education councillors and those legally responsible for the children who were given the grants. It was found, up to its extinction, in 2008, particularly until the end of 2004, owing to the subreptitious form and the lack of public transparency in the grant awarding, that civil society faced immense difficulties to perform the citizen role of social control over this public policy.
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Fragu, Estelle. "Des bonnes moeurs à l'autonomie personnelle : essai critique sur le rôle de la dignité humaine". Thesis, Paris 2, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA020066.
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La révolution de 1789 fit émerger, face à une société jusqu’alors conçue comme une entité, un nouvel individu désireux d’affirmer sa singularité. À la morale chrétienne qui se réfère à Dieu, les philosophes du XVIIIe siècle, et plus particulièrement Kant, ont voulu substituer une morale où l’homme serait, selon le mot de Protagoras, mesure de toutes choses. Cependant, l’individu devait encore se conformer à ce que Kant nomme l’impératif catégorique, et supporter une adhésion forcée à des valeurs communes. La morale a été progressivement ressentie comme autoritaire et illégitime ; certains ont voulu ne voir en elle que les valeurs d’une société bourgeoise. Les années 1960 donnèrent donc naissance à une morale individuelle, qui a pris le nom d’éthique. Ces bouleversements n’ont pas été sans répercussions profondes sur le droit des personnes et de la famille. Aussi les bonnes moeurs ont-elles disparu du droit de la famille pour laisser la place en droit des personnes à la dignité humaine : à la conception d’un droit-modèle succéda celle d’un droit-principe. La notion de dignité ne fut consacrée dans le Code civil français que fort tardivement, ce qui explique l’absence de consensus concernant sa définition. On peut regretter qu’une telle fragilité ait pu entraîner la dilution de ce principe, voire sa transformation en un droit subjectif ; elle n’oppose alors qu’une faible résistance à l’avènement de l’autonomie personnelle, construite en porte-à-faux par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur l’article 8 et le consentement de l’individu. Dans cette sphère européenne, l’individu a gagné le droit d’opérer des choix sur son corps, quelque dangereux qu’ils soient, et peut-être même la liberté de renoncer au bénéfice des droits énoncés dans la Convention. Il apparaît donc essentiel de redéfinir la dignité, rempart contre la réification de l’être humain, autour des concepts de liberté et d’égalité. Dès lors, d’une logique néfaste de concurrence entre la dignité et l’autonomie, pourra renaître un véritable rapport de complémentarité et de hiérarchieAfter the French revolution, in front of a holist society hitherto, the willingness of a new individual to affirm his singularity did emerge. Whilst the Christian morality referred to God, the XVIIIth century philosophers, especially Kant, wanted to substitute a morality where, according to the words of Protagoras, man would be the measure of anythings. The individual, however, still had to conform to what Kant names the categorical imperative, and to support for shared values. The morality became gradually felt as authoritative and illegitimate, the middle-class values. The 60’s let rise an individual morality, which took the name of ethics. These upheavals were not without major effects on law of persons and family law. Boni mores disappeared therefore from family law to give way to human dignity in law of persons: to the conception of a model law that of a principle law did succeed. The concept of dignity was only tardily devoted in the Civil code: that could explain the absence of consensus concerning its definition. One can consider it regrettable that such a fragility could involve the dilution of this principle, and even its transformation into a subjective right; it does not oppose whereas a low resistance to the advent of personal autonomy, awkwardly built by the European Court of the human rights on the article 8 and the individual consent. The individual gained the right to operate choices on his body, however dangerous they are, and perhaps even freedom to give up the benefit of rights stated in the Convention. It thus appears essential to redefine dignity, a rampart against the reification of human being,around the concepts of freedom and equality. Consequently, from a harmful logic of competition between dignity and autonomy, a true relation of complementarity and hierarchy between these two concepts will be able to reappear
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Bilyachenko, Alexey. "La circulation internationale des situations juridiques". Thesis, La Rochelle, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016LAROD001/document.
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La présente thèse part d’une tendance de la jurisprudence européenne, destinée à influencer la jurisprudence nationale de droit international privé, et se trouve dans le prolongement d’un grand débat doctrinal d’actualité. Il s’agit de la méthode de reconnaissance des situations juridiques, qui suppose l’abandon de la règle de conflit de lois. L’objectif est de conceptualiser cette nouvelle méthode et d’en définir le domaine et les conditions de mise en œuvre. Vu les particularités du sujet, la recherche passe nécessairement par plusieurs thèmes fondamentaux du droit international privé mais aussi du droit européen, du droit privé général et de la théorie du droitInspired by a trend in the European case law, which is meant to affect the national ones, the dissertation takes part to a topical debate among European academics on the putting aside the choice-of-law rules. It is about application of so-called recognition method to the foreign legal situations that haven’t been enacted in court. The purpose is to conceptualise this new method and to determine its scope and its modalities. Given the particularity of the task, the study necessarily bears on several pivotal topics of private international law but also of European law, general private law and jurisprudence
9
Fragu, Estelle. "Des bonnes moeurs à l'autonomie personnelle : essai critique sur le rôle de la dignité humaine". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 2, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA020066.
Texto completoResumen
La révolution de 1789 fit émerger, face à une société jusqu’alors conçue comme une entité, un nouvel individu désireux d’affirmer sa singularité. À la morale chrétienne qui se réfère à Dieu, les philosophes du XVIIIe siècle, et plus particulièrement Kant, ont voulu substituer une morale où l’homme serait, selon le mot de Protagoras, mesure de toutes choses. Cependant, l’individu devait encore se conformer à ce que Kant nomme l’impératif catégorique, et supporter une adhésion forcée à des valeurs communes. La morale a été progressivement ressentie comme autoritaire et illégitime ; certains ont voulu ne voir en elle que les valeurs d’une société bourgeoise. Les années 1960 donnèrent donc naissance à une morale individuelle, qui a pris le nom d’éthique. Ces bouleversements n’ont pas été sans répercussions profondes sur le droit des personnes et de la famille. Aussi les bonnes moeurs ont-elles disparu du droit de la famille pour laisser la place en droit des personnes à la dignité humaine : à la conception d’un droit-modèle succéda celle d’un droit-principe. La notion de dignité ne fut consacrée dans le Code civil français que fort tardivement, ce qui explique l’absence de consensus concernant sa définition. On peut regretter qu’une telle fragilité ait pu entraîner la dilution de ce principe, voire sa transformation en un droit subjectif ; elle n’oppose alors qu’une faible résistance à l’avènement de l’autonomie personnelle, construite en porte-à-faux par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur l’article 8 et le consentement de l’individu. Dans cette sphère européenne, l’individu a gagné le droit d’opérer des choix sur son corps, quelque dangereux qu’ils soient, et peut-être même la liberté de renoncer au bénéfice des droits énoncés dans la Convention. Il apparaît donc essentiel de redéfinir la dignité, rempart contre la réification de l’être humain, autour des concepts de liberté et d’égalité. Dès lors, d’une logique néfaste de concurrence entre la dignité et l’autonomie, pourra renaître un véritable rapport de complémentarité et de hiérarchieAfter the French revolution, in front of a holist society hitherto, the willingness of a new individual to affirm his singularity did emerge. Whilst the Christian morality referred to God, the XVIIIth century philosophers, especially Kant, wanted to substitute a morality where, according to the words of Protagoras, man would be the measure of anythings. The individual, however, still had to conform to what Kant names the categorical imperative, and to support for shared values. The morality became gradually felt as authoritative and illegitimate, the middle-class values. The 60’s let rise an individual morality, which took the name of ethics. These upheavals were not without major effects on law of persons and family law. Boni mores disappeared therefore from family law to give way to human dignity in law of persons: to the conception of a model law that of a principle law did succeed. The concept of dignity was only tardily devoted in the Civil code: that could explain the absence of consensus concerning its definition. One can consider it regrettable that such a fragility could involve the dilution of this principle, and even its transformation into a subjective right; it does not oppose whereas a low resistance to the advent of personal autonomy, awkwardly built by the European Court of the human rights on the article 8 and the individual consent. The individual gained the right to operate choices on his body, however dangerous they are, and perhaps even freedom to give up the benefit of rights stated in the Convention. It thus appears essential to redefine dignity, a rampart against the reification of human being,around the concepts of freedom and equality. Consequently, from a harmful logic of competition between dignity and autonomy, a true relation of complementarity and hierarchy between these two concepts will be able to reappear
10
Moya, Djoleen. "L'autorité des règles de conflit de lois : réflexion sur l'incidence des considérations substantielles". Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01D061.
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Les règles de conflit de lois n’ont pas toutes la même autorité. Les parties, et même le juge, peuvent être autorisés à passer outre à la désignation opérée par la règle de conflit. Les parties sont parfois libres d’écarter par convention la loi objectivement désignée (règles de conflit supplétives), parfois tenues par la désignation opérée, qui s’impose à elles (règles de conflit impératives). Le juge est tantôt tenu, tantôt libre de relever d’office l’internationalité du litige, et d’en déduire l’application de la règle de conflit. Le choix d’envisager ensemble des questions aussi variées peut étonner, mais c’est celui de la jurisprudence. L’autorité des règles de conflit y est définie de manière conjointe, à l’égard des parties comme du juge, à l’aune de considérations substantielles. Ainsi, parce qu’une demande en recherche de paternité relève, en droit substantiel, d’une matière d’ordre public, et qu’elle intéresse l’état des personnes, réputé indisponible, la règle de conflit qui lui est applicable sera impérative et mise en œuvre, au besoin d’office, par le juge. Inversement, si la prétention relève d’une matière largement supplétive ou vise des droits disponibles, la règle de conflit applicable sera supplétive, et le juge ne sera pas tenu de la relever d’office. Ce sont donc des considérations substantielles qui définissent, en jurisprudence, l’autorité des règles de conflit à l’égard des parties comme du juge.Cependant, ce régime n’est plus celui du droit international privé européen. D’abord, les règlements européens n’ont défini l’autorité des règles de conflit qu’à l’égard des parties, laissant à chaque Etat membre le soin de déterminer leur autorité à l’égard du juge. Ensuite, la définition européenne de l’impérativité des règles de conflit fait abstraction de toute considération substantielle, en retenant une supplétivité de principe pour l’ensemble des règles de conflit unifiées à l’échelle européenne. La jurisprudence a-t-elle raison de définir l’autorité des règles de conflits exclusivement à l’aune de considérations substantielles ? Non, car cela revient à nier que l’effet juridique des règles de conflit est imputé selon des considérations propres à la justice conflictuelle. Pour autant, on ne saurait, à l’instar du législateur européen, exclure toute considération substantielle. Le présupposé des règles de conflit vise des questions de droit substantiel. Les règles de conflit sont donc construites en contemplation de considérations substantielles. Dès lors, si ces dernières ne sauraient dicter à elles seules l’autorité des règles de conflit, on ne saurait, non plus, en faire totalement abstractionChoice-of-law rules do not all have the same authority. The parties, and even the judge, may be allowed to override the designation made by the conflict rule. The parties are sometimes free to depart, by convention, from the designated law (suppletory choice-of-law rules), sometimes bound by the designation made (imperative choice-of-law rules). The judge is sometimes obliged, sometimes free to raise ex officio the internationality of the dispute, and to deduce from it the application of the choice-of-law rule. Considering together such varied questions may be surprising, but it is the approach adopted by French case law. The authority of choice-of-law rules is defined jointly, according to substantive considerations. As a matter of example, an affiliation proceeding is, in French substantive law, a matter of public policy regarding someone’s family status, and deemed to concern an unwaivable right. Therefore, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be imperative and applied ex officio by the judge. Conversely, if the claim falls within a largely suppletory subject matter or relates to waivable rights, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be suppletory, and the judge will not be required to apply it ex officio. Therefore, the authority of choice-of-law rules is defined, with respect to both the parties and the judge, according to substantive considerations.However, this regime is no longer that of European private international law. Firstly, the European regulations have only defined the authority of their choice-of-law rules with respect to the parties, leaving it up to each Member State to determine their authority over the judge. Secondly, the European definition of their authority over the parties disregards any substantive consideration, and retains a whole set of suppletory choice-of-law rules, regardless of the subject-matter. Is case law justified in defining the authority of choice-of-law rules solely on the basis of substantive considerations ? No, because choice-of-law rules designate the applicable law according to choice-of-law considerations. However, one cannot, like the European legislator, exclude any substantive consideration. The supposition of choice-of-law rules concerns substantive law issues. Choice-of-law rules are, thus, devised according to substantive considerations. Therefore, if these alone cannot define the authority of choice-of-law rules, they cannot be totally ignored either
Capítulos de libros sobre el tema "Private subjective rights"
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Edlich-Muth, Miriam. "Dissolving Subjects in Medieval Reliquaries and Twentieth-Century Mass Graves". En Bioarchaeology and Social Theory, 189–209. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-03956-0_8.
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AbstractThe remains of the dead can impinge upon public consciousness in different ways, ranging from the shock of ‘uncovering’ human remains in unexpected places to the social effects that can unfold around human remains that remain unseen but are known to be present. In 2009, following a lengthy legal battle, an official court decree ordered the excavation of private land located on the grounds of a former concentration camp in Jamlitz, Brandenburg. The decision was based on extensive evidence that this land was the site of a mass grave containing the remains of Hungarian, Polish, and German Jews who had been murdered during the Holocaust. The dispute, in which the burial rights of the as-yet-undiscovered human remains had come head to head with the rights and wishes of the landowner, became the focus of intense public debate. This cross-period paper compares the assumptions and values underlying this dispute with late medieval responses to encounters with the many relics and reliquaries that were circulating at the time. In doing so, it invites reflection on how individual self-perception and social identities can be shaped and threatened by engaging with human remains and the shifting and subjective contexts that inform their meaning.
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Діденко, Лариса Василівна. "Глава 4. Доктринальні підходи до реалізаціїї цивільних процесуальних відносин у контексті вдосконалення законодавства про цивільне судочинство". En Серія «Процесуальні науки», 127–58. Київ, Україна: Видавництво "Алерта", 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.59835/978-617-566-770-5-1-4.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of doctrinal approaches to the implementation of civil procedural relations. The relevance of this issue is determined by the fact that many works were developed under significantly different conditions, which are significantly different from the current period, and some of the existing conclusions are ambiguous.It is noted that various problems of the functioning of civil procedural legal relations as a constituent element of the mechanism of civil procedural regulation are understudied.It is emphasized that the issue of legal relations is one of the fundamental ones in the theory of law, therefore there is a variety of concepts regarding its definition. It is proposed to understand civil procedural legal relations as dynamic and multi-stage individualized social relations, regulated by the norms of civil procedural law, arising between the court as a mandatory subject, persons participating in the case, and other participants in the civil process, and the connection between which are defined in their rights and obligations arising in civil proceedings for the purpose of ensuring justice in the protection of violated, unrecognized or disputed rights, freedoms or interests of natural persons, rights and interests of legal entities, interests of the state.The signs of legal relations as a special type of social relations are singled out: 1) emergence, termination or change only on the basis of legal norms that directly give rise to them; 2) the existence of mutual subjective rights and obligations of subjects of legal relations; 3) strong-willed character; 4) state protection; 5) individualization of subjects.The place and functions of civil procedural legal relations in the mechanism of civil procedural regulation are analyzed. It is indicated that the mechanism of civil procedural regulation is a system of complex, interconnected and united by a common goal of procedural and legal means, methods and forms that operate in a well-established manner and in constant connection and functioning of which is associated with the legal influence of the state on civil – legal relations aimed at satisfying the public and private interests of the participants and their regulation.It is proposed to divide the functions of civil procedural legal relations in the mechanism of civil procedural regulation into general theoretical functions of civil procedural legal relations and special sectoral functions of civil procedural legal relations.A conclusion was made regarding the optimization of the current civil procedural legislation by excluding from §3 Other participants in the legal process Chapter 4 Participants in the legal process of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine such a participant in the legal process as a witness.
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Joffe, Michael. "Advantages of the Proposed New Monitoring System". En Evaluating Economic Success, 75–93. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57671-3_4.
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AbstractThe IEO perspective based on economic outcomes and the universal meeting of basic needs has a clear purpose, and a concept that corresponds to it, a formulation appropriate to fulfilling this purpose, a well-specified domain of application and a clear relationship with other related items that are being monitored. It is responsive to relevant societal heterogeneity and to changes over time, and is practically useful in relation to possible interventions. Its metric is clearly related to its purpose, and based on an explicit value system. It combines the advantages of specific individual indicators and an aggregate index, with weighting based on a clear criterion. The real-life significance of its components is intuitively meaningful. In addition, most of the required measures are already available (although needing some development work), they are acceptable, and they could be produced at relatively low cost in timely fashion.The language of basic needs departs from traditional welfare economics, but some economists now argue that a rethink is needed, in view of the accumulating evidence on subjective wellbeing together with threats such as climate change, and pose the question, what exactly does “better” mean? The language of basic needs is also distinct from that of rights; it has the advantage of being more specific and arguably has a firmer conceptual justification. Compared with GDP, the IEO focus is superior in relation to harmful goods and activities, and more generally in emphasising the importance of the economy in enabling people to live long and fulfilling lives.Combining the IEO with other measures would provide valuable information. Dividing the IEO by real per capita GDP would generate an efficiency ratio, where high efficiency implies that people’s lives are more fulfilled at lower cost. Similarly, dividing the IEO by the ecological footprint and/or specifically by the carbon footprint would generate a sustainability ratio, which could be regarded as a measure of sustainable development. The IEO could also be used to monitor the effects of policies, and in policy development. For each of the objectives embodied in the constituent items of the IEO, many different policy options would generally exist. The choice of policies would depend on a combination of values-based debate and the evidence on effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.The IEO is intentionally based on a minimal value system that can command the support of all people of goodwill, whatever their particular political persuasion. It would play a major role in agenda setting, in planning for economic security at the national level and in fostering joined-up government. Action to improve the level of satisfaction of basic needs could involve governments (including regional and local) by means of direct provision, transfer payments, investments, fiscal policy and regulation; the private sector by reducing prices and introducing new products, and possibly by a more “stakeholder” orientation; and cultural change. A major contribution of a focus on the IEO could be to improve the tenor of public debate.
4
Ludovic, Hennebel y Tigroudja Hélène. "Part I State Obligations and Rights Protected, Ch.II Civil and Political Rights, Art.18: Right to a Name". En The American Convention on Human Rights. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780190222345.003.0018.
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This chapter examines Article 18 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), which protects the subjective right of each person to a name, and obliges the State to regulate the allocation of names and to ensure the implementation of the subjective right. Article 18 underlines the importance to ensure the exercise of the right by legislative or other provisions echoing the general obligation of the States Parties to adopt legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights, under Article 2 of the ACHR. Although Article 18 is an autonomous provision, the nexus between the right to a name and other rights explicitly or implicitly protected by the ACHR is obvious, in particular, with the right to recognition of legal personality (Article 3), the right to private life (Article 11), family rights (Article 17), the special protection of children (Article 19), the right to nationality (Article 20), and, more generally, the right to identity recognized by the Court's jurisprudence. Article 18 of the ACHR is not the subject of reservation or interpretative declaration by the States Parties under Article 75. Moreover, it is included in the list of rights that cannot be derogated from under Article 27-2.
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Weinrib, Ernest J. "Rights". En Reciprocal Freedom, 26—C2.P55. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198754183.003.0002.
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Abstract Corrective justice requires a content that matches its correlative structure; this content is found in the Kantian conception of rights. Such rights serve as the juridical conduits through which persons interact on terms of their equal reciprocal freedom. The point of a system of such rights is not to promote particular ends that favour one or the other of the parties to a private law relationship, but to provide the conditions for the rightful interplay of whatever ends a person might choose to have. The Kantian system of rights operates at three levels of specificity: most generally as a totality of conditions of equal reciprocal freedom, more specifically, as a set of subjective rights of particular persons, and yet more specifically as entitlements that specify what it means to enjoy the right and what the right-holder can do by virtue of having the right. After setting out these three levels, this chapter considers the relationship between the Kantian conception of rights and the two dominant issues of rights theory in contemporary scholarship: the significance of Hohfeld’s typology of rights, and the controversy between the interest theory of rights and the will theory of rights. On the former issue, Kant provides for the normative unity of the various Hohfeldian categories within a single relationship. On the latter issue, Kant is neither an interest theorist nor a will theorist; rather, his concern is with the moral power presupposed in the idea of reciprocal freedom.
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Kemabonta, Tam. "Establishing Property Rights and Private Ownership: The Solution to Malinvestment in the Energy Sector in Developing Countries". En Sustainable Energy Investment - Technical, Market and Policy Innovations to Address Risk. IntechOpen, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.91039.
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There are over 800 million people in the world without access to modern forms of energy services, like electricity, cooking gas, and LPG. This has been called energy poverty. Most studies in the field of energy poverty address the issue from an absence of technological or financial resources perspective. They address the problem as energy in itself having an objective inherent value, more or less addressing the symptoms of the problem and not the problem itself. In this chapter, a new paradigm that addresses the problem of energy poverty and malinvestment is introduced. This paradigm, utilizing the theory of economic calculation and the use and exchange value embodied in the subjective value theory, makes a case for the importance of private property rights in the factors or means of production for modern forms or energy such as electricity. The Nigerian energy sector is used as a case study for this.
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Cohen, Amy J. "CommentsADR and Public Values Again". En Discussions in Dispute Resolution, 351–54. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197513248.003.0072.
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This comment revisits a long-standing debate about alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and public values. In Against Settlement, Fiss argued that ADR would undermine popular commitments to “public values” (1984). For Fiss, public values are moral truths about rights, justice, and social cohesion that all who comprise “the public” should want to uphold, and which the state is obligated to enforce. Fiss distinguished public values from subjective preference, or what any one individual actually desires. He submitted that by resolving disputes according to individual preference, ADR would replace public values with individual interests and replace state power with private social ordering. Hence, Fiss declared himself against settlement....
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Ross, Alf. "[347]Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Natural Law". En On Law and Justice, 335–46. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0011.
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This chapter presents an analysis and critique of the philosophy of natural law. The chapter is divided into epistemological, psychological, political, and juridico-theoretical points of analysis and critique. Through examples of the historical variability of natural law systems, the epistemological section demonstrates the arbitrariness of the fundamental postulates of natural law concerning the nature of existence or of man; and of the legal-ethical ideas deduced from this foundation. This arbitrariness is due to the fact that the ultimate foundations of natural law are to be found in private ideas of justice; in intra-subjective self-evident contemplations, which raise the postulates of natural law above inter-subjective control. The psychological section supplements the principled critique by explaining why people find the ethical-metaphysical speculations of natural law attractive in spite of their emptiness. The political section argues that the function of natural law throughout history has primarily been a conservative one, although it has also been both evolutionary and revolutionary. The juridico-theoretical section argues that rationalism turned natural law from a moral into a genuinely legal discipline, conceiving of natural law as a set of natural rights located above, or behind, positive rights. This duplicating of the legal system had the effect of confusing the concepts and doing damage to juristic analysis and the treatment of juridico-political problems.
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Hildebrandt, Mireille. "Privacy and Data Protection". En Law for Computer Scientists and Other Folk, 99–162. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198860877.003.0005.
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This chapter covers privacy and data protection. This entails a series of legal requirements for development and design, for the default settings, and for the employment of computer architectures. In addition, the chapter defines the right to privacy as a subjective right, attributed by objective law, which may be national (constitutional) law, international human rights law, or supranational law (EU fundamental rights law). The chapter first confronts the landscape of human rights law at the global, national, and EU level. It then inquires into the right of privacy, as guaranteed under the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), and finally provides an extensive analysis of the new fundamental right to data protection, as guaranteed by the CFREU and protected by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
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Tucker-Abramson, Myka. "The Price of Salt Is the City: Patricia Highsmith and the Queer Frontiers of Neoliberalism". En Novel Shocks, 46–62. Fordham University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823282708.003.0003.
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Price of Salt begins in the tradition of the naturalist lesbian pulp novel before veering sharply into the genre of the Western mid-way through. But it is a Western with a difference. While Highsmith’s characters follow the Western’s arc, in which the neurasthenic urban subject goes West, encounters a danger that cures and strengthens her, and ultimately returns home prepared to do the work of urban (and metonymically national) renewal, Highsmith changes the protagonist from a professional man into a working class, homosexual woman, and she expands the Western’s scope from the urban core to the metropolitan region as a whole. This chapter argues that through the novel’s radical revision of the Western to include two queer characters, The Price of Salt cleaves apart the Lavender Scare from the Red Scare and constructs a Red Scare defense of lesbianism in which lesbianism becomes a tool for subjective, urban, and national renewal—and, in turn, the attainment of sexual rights and freedoms becomes linked with the construction of a thoroughly-capitalist subjectivity organized around individual freedom, private property, and entrepreneurialism.
Actas de conferencias sobre el tema "Private subjective rights"
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de Andreis, Federico y Federico Leopardi. "Make Flying Safe Again: An Undelayable Challenge for Aviation". En 7th International Scientific Conference ERAZ - Knowledge Based Sustainable Development. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/eraz.2021.347.
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Flag carriers are a particular part of the aviation industry, now dominated by either privately owned carriers or budget airlines. Their market share is being reduced, they are losing ground, giving it to their counter rivals, low-cost carriers. Based on the assumption that flag carrier airlines are different in their business model from low-cost airlines, both of them have to react in a Covid-19 situation, in case a similar event would occur again. Because it is not a matter of “if”, but a matter of “when”. This is modelling and as one it has to be put in the right context. In this research, we will discuss, also through the use of a study model of an Italian private company, how aviation must have short- and long-term strategies, striving for resilience during the early phases of the Covid-19 pandemic, after the outbreak from Wuhan, China. Thousands of flights were being cancelled and within weeks the passenger’s aviation was still, only cargo planes flew. When the cargo demand rose (45% of the cargo is carried by passenger flights in the belly of the planes), the dedicated global air cargo fleet could not satisfy the demand, airlines arranged passenger planes for emergency cargo flights. They came to this solution; this is part of an aggressive market strategy that comes in times of crisis as it is during the actual global pandemic. After analysing examples of strategies to be adopted quickly for survival, the focus of the study will be on those communication strategies towards potential travellers who - now more than ever - while waiting for recovery, need to perceive the flight as much as possible safe for their health. Thus, it is necessary to reflect on the individual perception of risk but also on what to do to bring the subjective dimension as close as possible to the objective one. Cargo flights were a mere means to curb the tragic effects of the pandemic, however, airlines (both low-cost carriers and flag carriers) need a solution that can lead to a better response.
Informes sobre el tema "Private subjective rights"
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van der Sloot, Bart. The Quality of Life: Protecting Non-personal Interests and Non-personal Data in the Age of Big Data. Universitätsbibliothek J. C. Senckenberg, Frankfurt am Main, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21248/gups.64579.
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Under the current legal paradigm, the rights to privacy and data protection provide natural persons with subjective rights to protect their private interests, such as related to human dignity, individual autonomy and personal freedom. In principle, when data processing is based on non-personal or aggregated data or when such data pro- cesses have an impact on societal, rather than individual interests, citizens cannot rely on these rights. Although this legal paradigm has worked well for decades, it is increasingly put under pressure because Big Data processes are typically based indis- criminate rather than targeted data collection, because the high volumes of data are processed on an aggregated rather than a personal level and because the policies and decisions based on the statistical correlations found through algorithmic analytics are mostly addressed at large groups or society as a whole rather than specific individuals. This means that large parts of the data-driven environment are currently left unregu- lated and that individuals are often unable to rely on their fundamental rights when addressing the more systemic effects of Big Data processes. This article will discuss how this tension might be relieved by turning to the notion ‘quality of life’, which has the potential of becoming the new standard for the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when dealing with privacy related cases.