Literatura académica sobre el tema "Power tarification"

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to integrate into a general model of an open economy the study of optimal wedges on domestic and foreign transactions. While it has been customary in the literature to link the analysis of domestic taxes to the provision of public goods, the model presented here views the imposition of taxes and tariffs in the general context of internal and external monopolies. As such, the paper begins with the idea of a compromised optimality. This means essentially that a modern society, while maximizing the welfare of its members, is constrained by other internal objectives such as the fact that the State shares its monopoly power with several other economic entities (for instance employers' federations, trade-unions). Thus, the mere fact of levying taxes gives a State some monopoly power which, in a sense, is similar to that of a Cournot-type monopolist who "imposes" private taxes. On the other hand, given the possibility that a country with some monopoly power in international trade could improve its situation by imposing tariffs, the analysis lends itself to the study of tariffs and taxes in the broad context of optimal wedges. To allow for this characterization, the paper incorporates into the model of normalization. As a by-product of this, a) it establishes, in terms of generalized inverses of the Slutsky matrix, a link between domestic marginal relative revenues and foreign ones; b) it defines two concepts of optimal tariffs evaluated from f.o.b. prices and c.i.f. prices; c) it suggests some further extensions such as the analysis of transactions costs, the incorporation of market retaliations and cultural characteristics of goods.

This article assesses the relationship between market power and the credit pricing using a sample of 49 banks drawing from seven West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries for the period 2003-2014. Our empirical methodology relies on a panel data analysis and nonlinear estimation. We find that market power influences positively the credit pricing in the WAEMU. This is consistent with the market power hypothesis, which stipulates that concentrated markets encourages strong pricing of banking products (higher debtors rates and lower creditors rates, so more important interest margins), and limits access to financing. The nonlinear regression highlights the existence of a threshold that is not significant in ours sample because only the first or second percentile of our data verify the second regim. While the remaining 98% to 99% confirm the results of the linear model. These results have importantes implications for bank regulation policies in the WAEMU.

Cette thèse s’intéresse aux marchés spot de l’électricité et plus particulièrement à l’organisation et la conception de ces derniers. En effet, l’industrie électrique fait face à de nouveaux défis dues à l’augmentation de la capacité de production renouvelable mais également dues à des changements plus structurels liés aux comportements des acteurs. La régulation et les plateformes d’échange doivent s’adapter à ces changements afin de veiller à l’efficacité du marché dans son ensemble.Le premier chapitre de la thèse étudie en détails la formation de la liquidité sur le marché continu allemand. Il s’intéresse particulièrement à l’évolution de la fourchette bid-ask au cours d’une session d’échange et les facteurs qui l’influencent. Dans un second chapitre, j’évalue quantitativement l’effet de la création d’une enchère avant le début d’un marché continu sur la liquidité, la volatilité et la concentration du marché. La dernière partie de la thèse étudie théoriquement l’impact de l’intégration verticale dans des marchés séquentiels ainsi que l’impact de la tarification en temps réel pour les consommateurs finaux sur le comportement des acteurs du marché
The present thesis is interested in the power spot market, particularly its organization and design. The electricity industry faces new challenges due to the increasing intermittent renewable capacity but also due to the structural transformations linked to the changes of participants’ behaviors. Regulation and exchanges should adapt to those changes in order to ensure the efficiency of the market. The first chapter of the thesis extensively studies the liquidity formation on the German continuous market. It analyzes the evolution of the bid-ask spread along a trading session and the main drivers of it. In a second chapter, I quantitatively evaluate the effect of the introduction of a call auction before the start of a trading continuous session in terms of liquidity, volatility and competition. The last chapter of the thesis theoretically studies the impact of vertical integration in sequential markets as well as the impact of the real-time pricing on market participants’ behavior

L'intégration des énergies renouvelables produites par un bâtiment et les réseaux de fourniture, qui sont amenés à proposer des tarifications et des puissances disponibles variables au cours de la journée, entraînent une grande variabilité de la disponibilité de l'énergie. Mais les besoins des utilisateurs ne sont pas forcément en accord avec cette disponibilité. La gestion de l'énergie consiste alors à faire en sorte que les moments de consommation des installations coïncident avec les moments où celle-ci est disponible. Notre objectif a été de proposer une stratégie de commande prédictive, distribuée et hiérarchisée, pour gérer efficacement l'énergie de l'habitat. Les aspects prédictifs de notre approche permettent d'anticiper les besoins et les variations de la tarification énergétique. L'aspect distribué va permettre d'assurer la modularité de la structure de commande, pour pouvoir intégrer différents usages et différentes technologies de manière simple et sans faire exploser la combinatoire du problème d'optimisation résultant.

Dans cette thèse, les aspects théoriques et les applications en économie du modèle Principal-Agent sont étudiés.La première partie de la thèse présente deux applications du modèle. Dans la première, un fournisseur d’électricité détermine le tarif de consommation optimal pour ses clients. La population est hétérogène et le fournisseur observe parfaitement la consommation des clients. Cela conduit à une sélection adverse sans aléa moral. Le problème du Principal s’écrit commeun problème variationnel non standard, qui peut être résolu sous certaines formes particulières de l’utilité de réservation de la population. Les contrats optimaux obtenus sont linéaires ou polynomiaux par rapport à la consommation et le fournisseur d’électricité ne contracte que les consommateurs avec un faible ou un fort appétit pour l’électricité.Dans la deuxième application, une banque surveille un pool de prêts identiques soumis à une contagion Markovienne. La banque collecte des fonds auprès d’un investisseur, qui ne peut pas observer les actions de la banque et ne sait pas sa capacité à faire son travail. Ces travaux c’est une extension du modèle de Pagès et Possamaï [84] au cas du aléa moral avec sélection adverse. Suivant l’approche de Cvitanić, Wan et Yang [31] à ces problèmes, l’ensemble crédible est calculé explicitement et la fonction valeur de l’investisseur est obtenue au moyen de un système récursif d’inégalités variationnelles. Les propriétés des contrats optimaux sont discutées en détail.Dans la deuxième partie de la thèse, le problème d’un Agent contrôlant le drift d’un processus de diffusion sous incertitude de volatilité est étudié. On suppose que le Principal et l’Agent ont une approche pessimiste du problème et ils agissent comme si un troisième joueur, la Nature, choisissait la pire volatilité possible. Ce travail est une extension à Mastrolia et Possamaï [64] et Sung [125] à un cadre plus général. Il est prouvé que la fonction valeur de l’Agent peut être représentée comme la solution à un EDSR de second ordre, et aussi que la fonction valeur du Principal correspond à la solution de viscosité unique de l’équationassociée Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs, étant donné que celle-ci satisfait un résultat de comparaison
In this thesis, theoretical aspects and applications in economics of the Principal-Agent model are studied.The first part of the thesis presents two applications of the model. In the first one, an electricity provider determines the optimal tariff of consumption for its clients. Population is heterogeneous and the provider observes perfectly the consumption of the clients. This leads to a setting of adverse selection without moral hazard. The problem of the Principal writes as a non-standard variational problem, which can be solved under certain particular forms of the reservation utility of the population. The optimal contracts obtained are either linear or polynomial with respect to the consumption and the electricity provider contractsonly consumers with either low or high appetite for electricity.In the second application, a bank monitors a pool of identical loans subject to Markovian contagion. The bank raises funds from an investor, who cannot observe the actions of the bank and neither knows his ability to do the job. This is an extension of the model of Pagès and Possamaï [84] to the case of both moral hazard and adverse selection. Following the approach of Cvitanić, Wan and Yang [31] to these problems, the dynamic credible set is computed explicitly and the value function of the investor is obtained through a recursive system of variational inequalities. The properties of the optimal contracts are discussed in detail.In the second part of the thesis, the problem of an Agent controlling the drift of a diffusion process under volatility uncertainty is studied. It is assumed that the Principal and the Agent have a worst–case approach to the problem and they act as if a third player, the Nature, was choosing the worst possible volatility. This work is an extension to Mastrolia and Possamaï [64] and Sung [125] to a more general framework. It is proved that the value function of the agent can be represented as the solution to a second–order BSDE, and also that the value function of the Principal corresponds to the unique viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation, given that the latter satisfies a comparison result

Abstract This chapter shows that to regulate the integration of European gas markets from the late 1990s to the present date, common experimentalist structures—notably the Madrid Forum—were used to a different extent across different issue areas, namely, less in network access than in tarification. Further, it highlights that in the two issues, experimentalism followed diverse trajectories, gradually declining in the former while persisting in the latter. Distributions of legal power, which were identically multipolar, cannot explain this variation in processes and trajectories. Instead, the chapter emphasizes the explanatory value of functional and political factors, which, moreover, were far from antithetical to one another. In network tarification, re-emerging uncertainty and opposition placed major pressures to use experimentalist structures steadily. In network access, by contrast, by the mid-2000s, the European Commission had become convinced that it knew the best rules already and, thanks to the support of the Austrian and German authorities, could impose such rules on other recalcitrant actors. In the attempt to overcome gridlock, finally, the Commission threatened to impose both specific positive rules—as distinctive of the shadow of hierarchy—and negative prohibitions and fines—as characteristic of penalty defaults—instead.

Abstract This chapter analyses how and why experimentalist structures—notably the Florence Forum—were used extensively to regulate European electricity market integration (namely, network access and tarification) from the late 1990s to the present date. It shows that far from gradually declining, experimentalist processes persisted across multiple policy cycles. It argues that functional and legal as well as political factors—specifically, steadily multipolar distributions of power and recurring uncertainty as well as opposition—placed major pressures on key actors to use experimentalist structures actively and continuously. To deliver policy outcomes effectively despite the notoriously well-entrenched interests characterizing the domain, experimentalist governance did not exclusively rely on any single mechanism. Instead, its carriers threatened the imposition of both specific positive rules—as distinctive of the shadow of hierarchy—and negative prohibitions and fines—as characteristic of penalty defaults.