Tesis sobre el tema "Philosophy of the person"
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Rocha, Samuel D. "Education, Study, and the Person". The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1280945814.
Texto completo王云萍 y Yunping Wang. "The Confucian conception of a moral person". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2000. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31241165.
Texto completoWang, Yunping. "The Confucian conception of a moral person /". Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2000. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B22189440.
Texto completoHarcourt, Edward. "Sense and the first person : Frege and Wittgenstein". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295782.
Texto completoBailey, Jeannine Marie. "An argument against the person-affecting view of wrongness". Thesis, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=1565266.
Texto completoAn act is usually thought of as wrong only if it harms someone and to harm someone is, roughly speaking, to make her worse off. However, the view that an act is wrong only if it harms some particular individual restricts us to a person-affecting view about wrongness. If an act is wrong that does not make any individual worse off, this wrongness cannot be explained in terms of person-affecting consequences. I want to propose that an action can be wrong even if no particular individual is harmed by that act. It is the goal of this paper to show that not only is this a plausible view about wrongness, but it is the correct view. On this view, there can be wrongness in the harm caused by diminishing the overall value in the world or by making the world a worse place than it otherwise would have been.
Bamford, Desmond Nicholas. "Person, deification and re-cognition : a comparative study of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijna traditions". Thesis, University of Chichester, 2010. http://eprints.chi.ac.uk/810/.
Texto completoDuffey, Maura. "The Non-Identity Problem: Finding a Narrow-Person-Affecting Solution to a Narrow-Person-Affecting Problem". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/879.
Texto completoMcCall, Catherine C. "Concepts of person : an analysis of concepts of person, self and human being, and their relevance to theories of personal identity". Thesis, University of Manchester, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.254873.
Texto completoDi, Blasio Lina. "Rogers' concept of the fully functioning person: An adequate portrayal of human freedom?" Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/7637.
Texto completoBlower, Nathanial Shannon. "Expressivist theories of first-person privilege". Diss., University of Iowa, 2010. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/783.
Texto completoEguchi, Sumiko. "Being a Person: the Ethics of Watsuji Tetsurō and Immanuel Kant". The Ohio State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1245306862.
Texto completoSalazar, Jose. "The Demandingness of Morality: The Person Confined". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1498.
Texto completoSchleifer, Aliah. "A modified phenomenological approach to the concept and person of Maryam in Islam". Thesis, University of Exeter, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.292956.
Texto completoZezulkova, Marketa. "Whole person hermeneutic media learning in the primary classroom : an intercultural grounded philosophy". Thesis, Bournemouth University, 2015. http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/24520/.
Texto completoNicolaus, Georg. "The understanding of the person in C.G. Jung's psychology and N. Berdyaev's philosophy". Thesis, University of Essex, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.486577.
Texto completoGibson, Alice. "Can a good manager be a good person?" Thesis, Linköping University, Centre for Applied Ethics, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-6970.
Texto completoIn this paper I explore the question ‘can a good manager be a good person?’ the answer is yes, no, or to a greater or lesser degree. Ultimately it depends on the ends at which the business, in which the manager works, aims towards. For these ends underpin what is ‘rational’ for how a manager should behalf. If a business’ end goal is purely profit maximisation then there is no room for a manager to take moral considerations into account, and therefore be a good person. If a business sees itself as a ‘practice’, consciously aiming to promote the social good the answer is yes, a good manager can be a good person. There are those businesses, and their managers, that fall somewhere in between these two ideal-types.
Fust, Jens. "Förstapersonsbeskrivningar och förstapersonsmetoder i Francisco Varelas neurofenomenologiska forskningsprogram". Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för kultur och lärande, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-33582.
Texto completoMonk, Ryan W. "W. Norris Clarke's Thomistic metaphysics of the human person". Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2003. http://www.tren.com.
Texto completoSpitz, Roland. "Subject and person : an essay on self-reference and personal identity". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:52fc98df-408e-4c2e-b3b1-43edaa37cfd3.
Texto completoSharam, Earle Scott. "Person and community : the corporate identity of Christ in the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Wolfhart Pannenberg". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.296255.
Texto completoKing, Owen Christopher. "Three Kinds of Goodness for a Person". The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1461257876.
Texto completoPowell, Rhonda L. "Security and the right to security of person". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:26e81a46-54d5-44f5-a3cd-c74a5798ea0d.
Texto completoSouillac, Geneviève. "Universal human rights: philosophy of the person and social vision in the work of two contemporary Frenchintellectuals". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2000. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31240975.
Texto completoBärring, Philip. "The Engineering Person : Arendt and an Anthropology of Engineering Ethics". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för kulturantropologi och etnologi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-432432.
Texto completoKim, Chae Young. "A comparative study of psyche and person in the works of C. G. Jung and W. C. Smith". Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/7748.
Texto completoNdlovu, Sanelisiwe Primrose. "A critical exploration of the ideas of person and community in traditional Zulu thought". University of the Western Cape, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/8346.
Texto completoThe issue of personhood has long been of concern to many philosophers. The primary concern has been about determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for an entity to be a person at a particular point in time. The most common answer in Western terms is that to be a person at a time is to have certain special mental properties such as psychological connectedness. On the other hand, others argue that we can only ever understand the ascription of mental characteristics as part of a necessarily joint set of physically instantiated properties. Most recent contributions to the topic have however cast doubt on these earlier attempts to understand personhood solely in terms of bodily and psychological features. Not only do they suggest a model of personhood that is individualistic, they also fail to make reference to communal and social elements. In particular, many non-Western, specifically African, cultures foreground these communal and social aspects. This is true of the Akan, Yoruba and Igbo cultures. As Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye; Dismas Masolo; Segun Gbadegesin; and Ifeanyi Menkiti have shown respectively. However, there is a lack of comparable philosophical inquiry in the Southern African context. The primary aim of this study is to critically explore the metaphysical, cultural, linguistic and normative resources of the Zulu people in understanding what it means to be a person. The approach is predominantly conceptual and analytic, but it also draws on some empirical data with a view to extending the results of the literature-based study. Not only does this extend the field of cultural inquiry to personhood, it also opens up new opportunities to tackle old problems in the debate, including the question of what should be the proper relationship between the individual and the community. Specifically, I argue that rather than focus attention on the priority of the individual or community in relation to each other, consideration of the notion of personhood in Zulu culture reveals that notwithstanding significant communal constraints forms of agency are available to individuals. http://
Price, Daniel John. "Karl Barth's anthropology in light of modern thought : the dynamic concept of the person in Trinitarian theology and object relations psychology". Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1990. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=128445.
Texto completoMilne, Douglas J. W. y res cand@acu edu au. "A Religious, Ethical and Philosophical Study of the Human Person in the Context of Biomedical Practices". Australian Catholic University. School of Philosophy, 2006. http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp148.26072007.
Texto completoAssy, Rabeea. "The right to litigate in person". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:718698cd-9177-49fb-8fbb-336d809aa0ad.
Texto completoMcIntosh, Esther. "The concept of the person as holistic and relational : a study of the religious philosophy of John Macmurray". Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.310644.
Texto completoSouillac, Geneviève. "Universal human rights : philosophy of the person and social vision in the work of two contemporary French intellectuals /". Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2000. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B22142708.
Texto completoBexten, Raphael E. [Verfasser]. "Exposé: Untersuchung zur ontologischen Wahrheit der menschlichen Person: Gutsein als Berufung der menschlichen Person / Raphael E. Bexten". Rheda-Wiedenbrück : Raphael E. Bexten, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1018665439/34.
Texto completoSheffler, Daniel T. "The Metaphysics of Personhood in Plato's Dialogues". UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/16.
Texto completoBoczek, Macon W. "The Methodology of Phenomenological Realism in The Acting Person by Karol Wojtyla". Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1353964294.
Texto completoMingo, Alicia de. "Vivir en público y paideía privada en las Cartas a Lucilio de L.A. Séneca". Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2011. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112959.
Texto completoEs difícil pensar tanto la vida moral como la vida comunitaria fuera dela tensión entre los Otros y el sí-mismo. Por una parte, de cara a la cohesión dela sociedad y a que la persona singular encuentre su dimensión comunitaria, sehace necesaria una suerte de vida transparente, sin secretos, a fuer de honesta.Sin embargo, por otra parte, cuando el entorno social es moralmente cuestionable,se hace imprescindible una paideía privada que permita la orientación moral delsujeto personal, por más que ello le reporte soledad e incomprensión por parte desus conciudadanos, debiendo, entonces, construir un espacio de privacidad.
Bexten, Raphael E. [Verfasser]. "Exposé: Untersuchung zur ontologischen Wahrheit der menschlichen Person: Gutsein als Berufung der menschlichen Person / Raphael E. Bexten. Universität Wien - Institut für Philosophie". Rheda-Wiedenbrück : Raphael E. Bexten, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0288-2011042787.
Texto completoPurves, James G. M. "An examination of the person and function of the Holy Spirit within a Trinitarian framework with special reference to developments in theology and the reception of the Charismatic movement within the Scottish context". Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1993. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk/R?func=search-advanced-go&find_code1=WSN&request1=AAIU059923.
Texto completoТеліженко, Людмила Вікторівна, Людмила Викторовна Телиженко, Liudmyla Viktorivna Telizhenko y Н. С. Андрійченко. "Людина як предмет і основа філософії права". Thesis, Сумський державний університет, 2016. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/45907.
Texto completoZwonlinski, Matt. "The separateness of persons". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/298730.
Texto completoLucas, Robert H. "The whole Christ for the whole person : a comparative and critical study of the doctrine of personhood in Hans Urs von Balthasar and the doctrine of sanctification in T.F. Torrance in light of their Trinitarian theology". Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1997. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk/R?func=search-advanced-go&find_code1=WSN&request1=AAIU093068.
Texto completoWilliams, Graham Andrew. "Persons, property and morality : a defence of political libertarianism". Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17058.
Texto completoThis dissertation adopts as its starting point the beliefs that moral truths can be known and that political philosophy is a branch of ethics. The author identifies three variants of libertarianism on the basis of their different treatments of the right to private property, which all three consider to be the cornerstone of political libertarianism. The author evaluates the arguments of Robert Nozick, Murray Rothbard, John Hospers and Ayn Rand for the moral foundations of libertarianism and finds them to be methodologically inadequate. None is able to furnish libertarianism with the moral foundations it requires. Following the example of Jan Narveson in his recent defence of the libertarian idea, the author adopts as the correct metaphysic of morality the method of hypothetical contract. The contractarian method is capable of determining both the nature and the extent of moral obligation. From application of the method of hypothetical contract, the author concurs with the above-mentioned authors that morality is a system of rights and duties, i.e. deontological in character, and that persons are indeed bearers of moral, non-conventional rights. One of these rights is the negative right to equal social liberty. The author differs, however, in finding that contractarianism favours also a positive right to basic, standard welfare. Recognition of this latter right commits the author to a form of moderate or Lockean libertarianism that endorses the in-principle justice of coercive redistribution to meet persons' basic welfare. Consequently, the orthodox libertarianism advocated by Nozick, Rothbard, Hospers, Rand and Narveson which recognises only negative moral rights is rejected by the author. All of the libertarians cited accept in one form or another John Locke's labour theory of appropriation. However, the author eschews the standard reading of Locke they are wedded to. The standard reading premises the labour theory on a person's ownership of himself. This reading is rejected on the grounds that the idea of self-ownership is insufficiently determinate to act as a sure basis for establishing property rights in things one has mixed one's labour with. A reconstructed defence of the moral right to private property through labouring which avoids this difficulty is given. That defence is premised not on self-ownership but on the right to equal social liberty. Save for the requirement to meet basic welfare there are no limits to the extent of acquisition. The author argues that, despite his avowals to the contrary, Nozick in fact endorses a positive right to welfare, and that this positive right is one that is co-extensive with the right to basic welfare established by the method of hypothetical contract. Two arguments are given. The first argument draws on Nozick's Lockean proviso that an act of appropriation not worsen the position of others. The second is based upon the application to an envisaged society of libertarian-rights bearers of Nozick's clause that permits the violation of rights in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror. This latter argument the author believes to be successful against any libertarianism that is wedded to absolute property rights. Redistribution to meet the demands of basic welfare necessitates taxation. Taxation is to be levied proportionately and not progressively, and is to be coupled with a system of private social insurance. None of the three variants of libertarianism identified, and which the author maintains sustain redistribution as a matter of justice, is ostensibly committed to redistribution more extensive than required to meet persons' basic welfare~ Ernest Loevinsohn's argument to the effect that libertarians are - by the very principle they defend as libertarians - committed to more far-reaching welfare and redistribution is examined and rejected. Because Loevinsohn's argument is directed against a consequentialist defence of libertarianism and not a deontological version it is misplaced. Furthermore, it fails to establish the conclusion Loevinsohn supposes it.
DOLCE, CHIARA. "Principi di una antropologia della persona nell'opera di Ernesto De Martino". Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Cagliari, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11584/266691.
Texto completoGallagher, Christine Marie. "Consciousness and the Demands of Personhood: Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Ethics". University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1333695927.
Texto completoWinges-Yanez, Nick. "A Foucaultian Discourse Analysis of Person-Centered Practice Using a Genealogical Framework of Intellectual Disability". PDXScholar, 2018. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4505.
Texto completoSander, Angelika. "Mensch - Subjekt - Person : die Dezentrierung des Subjekts in der Philosophie Max Schelers /". Bonn : Bouvier Verl, 1996. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37183733s.
Texto completoReichel, Hanna. "Personlig identitet och moraliskt ansvar : Psykologisk kontinuitet eller äganderelation, vilket är nödvändigt för att kunna hålla en person moraliskt ansvarig för sina tidigare handlingar?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-358350.
Texto completoForcher, Gerd. "Bedingungen der Personalität Daniel C. Dennett und sein naturalistischer Personenbegriff". Taunusstein Driesen, 2004. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2922510&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
Texto completoSaldarriaga, Madrigal Andrés Eduardo. "Person und Gerechtigkeit der systematische Zusammenhang von Personenkonzeption und Gerechtigkeitsphilosophie". Frankfurt, M. Berlin Bern Bruxelles New York, NY Oxford Wien Lang, 2008. http://d-nb.info/997662964/04.
Texto completoPréfontaine, Nicolas Vinot. "Metaphysik der Innerlichkeit die innere Einheit des Menschen nach der Philosophie Edith Steins". St. Ottilien EOS, 2007. http://d-nb.info/98823078X/04.
Texto completoPodobryaev, Alexander. "Persons, imposters, and monsters". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87498.
Texto completoCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 115-120).
This dissertation is about person features, their representation and interpretation in natural language. I will argue that there are several ways in which person features can be represented and interpreted. Most importantly, I will provide evidence for a kind of person features that are parts of referential indices of pronouns, constraining possible values that the assignment function maps the indices to (cf. Minor 2011, Sudo 2012). It is this particular way of representing person features that allows to postulate operators that manipulate the assignment in way that all pronouns with certain person features are affected. Such operators, as I will demonstrate, do exist. They come in at least two varieties, imposter operators and monster operators. Imposter operators manipulate the assignment by making all free 1st person indices (or all 2nd person indices) undefined in their scope, and when 1st or 2nd person indices are undefined 3rd person indices can be used instead. Building on the observations from Collins and Postal 2012, I will argue that we can interpret the 3rd person pronoun in sentences like Yours truly's dissertation wasfiled a week before his birthday as referring to the speaker because there is a silent imposter operator that suppresses 1st person indices in the domain that includes the imposter yours truly and the pronoun. Furthermore, it is due to the presence of the same operator that the 1st person pronoun and the 3rd person pronoun in sentences like Yours truly filed his dissertation before my birthday cannot be understood as coreferential. Another likely candidate for a person-sensitive assignment-manipulating operator is the monster operator in Mishar Tatar (strictly speaking, it is not a Kaplanian monster, but I will use the term anyway). This operator is responsible for the fact that a subclass of indexical pronouns in this language may shift to denote the coordinates of the context embedded under an attitude predicate. Thus, the dissertation contains two case studies: one on imposters in English (Chapter 1) and one on indexical shifting in Mishar Tatar (Chapter 2). The overall hope is to build a case in which possible interpretations of person pronouns can inform us about their syntactic representation.
by Alexander Podobryaev.
Ph. D.