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1
Bull, Martin J. "The PDS, the Progressive Alliance and the Crisis." Modern Italy 1, no. 1 (1995): 30–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13532949508454756.
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From the perspective of the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and the left generally, the 1989-1994 period can be viewed as a political failure in as far as there was a right-wing outcome (albeit ephemeral) to Italy's transition. Yet, it is a failure which has to be viewed in the context of the deep undercurrents of change at work in Italy in this period and the constraints within which the PDS and its leader, Achille Occhetto, were operating
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Saresella, Daniela. "Christianity and Socialism in Italy in the Early Twentieth Century." Church History 84, no. 3 (September 2015): 585–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009640715000517.
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Though a Catholic country, Italy has been distinguished by the presence of a deeply-rooted Socialist Party. At the beginning of the twentieth century, encouraged by the economic and social changes taking place as well as by a new and growing awareness, a number of Catholics decided to open up to a dialogue with the socialist world. Some, such as Don Murri, identified Turati's party as a possible political interlocutor, in the conviction that the programmes of the democratic Catholics and those of the left had many elements in common. Others sensitive to modernist issues, particularly in intellectual circles, believed that Christianity at its origins and the early forms of socialism shared the same basic identity. Thus some scholars (including Father Ernesto Buonaiuti) chose to focus on the origins of the church, convinced that examples could be found there of how the world could be changed according to Christian ethics. The response of left-wing culture to these ideas was varied. Some, such as Camillo Prampolini, an exponent of “evangelical socialism,” appeared to be interested in a dialogue, like those socialists who were ready to accept idealist inspiration. The party leadership, instead, barred any suggestion of debate, convinced that Marxism was an alternative to Christianity.
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Drake, Richard. "Terrorism and the Decline of Italian Communism: Domestic and International Dimensions." Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 2 (April 2010): 110–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2010.12.2.110.
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This essay looks at two recent Italian books about the evolution of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Drawing on archival materials, the books trace the conflict between the radicals and the reformers within the PCI's ranks, a conflict that gave way to violent splinter groups that regarded the PCI as too staid and conciliatory. As the far left took a violent turn in Italy in the late 1960s, it paved the way for the spasm of grisly far-left and far-right terrorism in Italy in the 1970s and early 1980s. The books lend weight to the view that the PCI, through its exaltation of Communist revolution and its demonization of the Christian Democratic establishment, facilitated the emergence of extremist groups that perpetrated more than 8,400 terrorist attacks in the latter half of the 1970s.
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Maslova, Elena. "PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ITALY 2022: LEADERS AND IDEAS." Scientific and Analytical Herald of IE RAS 29, no. 5 (October 31, 2022): 55–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran520225562.
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The paper attempts to give an idea of the Italian political scene on the eve and after the extraordinary parliamentary elections in September 2022. The causes of the political crisis are analyzed and it is pointed out that by the level of political tension and intensity the elections in 2022 can be compared with the first parliamentary elections in the country in 1948. In the course of the election campaign political opponents of the centre-right coalition used the tools of labeling, the main of which were «friends of Putin», «populist», «neofascist». The article analyses these discursive techniques, and concludes that the left-wing forces in modern Italy, first of all the Democratic Party, are in a crisis, both in terms of ideology and leadership. The programme of the centre-right coalition and its ideas are considered separately; it is pointed out that the document contains a lot of «left» proposals related to the social support of citizens. The author analyses the reasons for the victory of the centre-right coalition and, in particular, of G. Meloni, highlighting the high social demand for change as the main factor behind the victory of the «Brothers of Italy».
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Maslova, Elena. "PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ITALY 2022: LEADERS AND IDEAS." Scientific and Analytical Herald of IE RAS 29, no. 5 (October 31, 2022): 55–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran520225563.
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The paper attempts to give an idea of the Italian political scene on the eve and after the extraordinary parliamentary elections in September 2022. The causes of the political crisis are analyzed and it is pointed out that by the level of political tension and intensity the elections in 2022 can be compared with the first parliamentary elections in the country in 1948. In the course of the election campaign political opponents of the centre-right coalition used the tools of labeling, the main of which were «friends of Putin», «populist», «neofascist». The article analyses these discursive techniques, and concludes that the left-wing forces in modern Italy, first of all the Democratic Party, are in a crisis, both in terms of ideology and leadership. The programme of the centre-right coalition and its ideas are considered separately; it is pointed out that the document contains a lot of «left» proposals related to the social support of citizens. The author analyses the reasons for the victory of the centre-right coalition and, in particular, of G. Meloni, highlighting the high social demand for change as the main factor behind the victory of the «Brothers of Italy».
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Chiarini, Rosalba. "The Government Contract between the League and the Five Star Movement in Italy:." Revista Euro latinoamericana de Análisis Social y Político (RELASP) 1, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 129–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.35305/rr.v1i2.55.
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The coalition government of Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte was born after the parliamentary elections of March 2018 as an outcome not of ideological proximity, but of rational choice, a strategic exchange between the two parties. The rightist League accepted some increase of the public expenditure requested by its populist partner, and the 5 Star movement accepted some limits to immigration flows, promoted by its xenophobic partner. The Italian political system, which since the 1990’s had been characterized by moderate pluri-partitism and a centripetal competition, after 2018 has suffered a push towards radicalization. The experiment ended in the summer of 2019, when League decided to break the previous contract with 5 Star Movement, and a mainstream government between moderate (Democratic Party) and radical (5 Star Movement) left was formed.
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Alekseenkova, E. S. "Transformation of Right-Wing Populism in Italy in 2018−2022: From Sovereignism to Patriotism." Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, S7 (December 2022): S667—S674. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1019331622130123.
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Abstract The transformation of the discourse of right-wing populist parties in Italy from 2018 to 2022 is considered. Based on analysis of the discourse of the programs and electoral rhetoric of the parties the Brothers of Italy, the League, and Forward Italy, the author concludes that Italian right-wing populism is becoming more moderate, replacing the concepts of sovereignism with “patriotism and conservatism” and rejecting Euroscepticism. Although nationalism is still characteristic of the right-wing parties in Italy, it is changing: a legalist approach to migrants is gradually replacing the ethnocultural and socioeconomic approaches. Populism remains the basic strategy of the right-wing parties, but the role of the main “enemy” of the Italian people is shifting from the European bureaucracy to the domestic mainstream Center–Left (i.e., the Democratic Party). The authoritarianism of the right-wing populists has undergone the least change in terms of ideological content between 2018 and 2022, but its importance has increased with the growing public demand for political stability and the increasing personalization of politics. This article contributes to the study of the phenomenon of right-wing populism.
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Fasone, Cristina. "Catalysing Marginalisation? The Effect of Populist Governments on the Legislative and Scrutiny Functions of the Italian Parliament." Parliamentary Affairs 74, no. 4 (June 7, 2021): 802–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsab009.
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Abstract The article analyses whether and how the activity of populist governments in Italy has affected the performance of parliament’s legislative and scrutiny functions. The analysis covers the government of Five Star Movement (5SM) and the Lega as well as the coalition government made up of the 5SM, the Democratic Party and centre-left junior allies up to the COVID-19 outbreak. The article uses selected bills and decree-laws to investigate the impact on the legislative function, while question time sessions and committees of inquiry are examined as case studies on the scrutiny function. The analysis demonstrates that although ‘subversive’ constitutional and parliamentary conduct was already in place beforehand, when populists entered government in the 18th legislative term there was a worsening of a trend towards eroding representative democracy.
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Fava, Terenzio. "Le elezioni comunali del 2016." Quaderni dell'Osservatorio elettorale. QOE - IJES 77, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): 21–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/qoe-8540.
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Local elections held on June 2016 in Italy asked voters to appoint more than 1,300 among mayors and municipal councilors, some of them in big cities like Rome, Milan, Turin. This article aims at assessing who is the real winner of this election. At first sight, the Five Stars Movement won this election. Nevertheless, some doubts arise because of its limited coverage of the territories, internal conflicts and the lack of homogeneity of its electoral results at the local level. Among the losers, Forza Italia and minor parties like NCD and extreme-left parties are to be counted, while the Northern League secured its previous elections' percentage. The Democratic Party reported huge losses but remained the leading party in half of the voting municipalities. A more in-depth analysis shows however that local lists (civic lists) strongly improved their results and voters' support. From this perspective it is the territory that won 2016 local election. The article claims that this may negatively affect the national political system and political establishment. Civic lists bring in fact together different political actors (such as notabilities, patrons and relevant clienteles) with populist local movements, and often show weak political capabilities in local government.l
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Hill, Dave. "Marxist education and teacher education against capitalism in neoliberal/ neoconservative/ neofascist/ times." Cadernos do GPOSSHE On-line 2, no. 1 (August 14, 2019): 91–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.33241/cadernosdogposshe.v2i1.1524.
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In this article I analyse global and national neoliberalisms- economic and social class war from above- neoconservatisms which are leading to and connected with NeoFascisms- with their scapegoating, racism, xenophobia, misogyny, heterophobia, militarism and the attacks on dissent- whether electoral, media, or from academics/ universities and workers’ organisations and actions. Six prime examples are Erdogan in Turkey, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Trump in the USA, Orban in Hungary, the Law and Justice government in Poland, and the racist government in Italy, in effect led by Salvini. Across Europe Far-right anti-immigrant, xenophobic and ultra nationalist authoritarian parties are recruiting and becoming electorally significant- and, in some cases, significant on the streets. Critique social democratic reformist parties and governments for adopting neoliberal austerity policies and thereby becoming delegitimised, together with the too-often `accomodationist' trade union and party leaderships. and critically examine prospects for left social democracy as represented, for example, by the Jeremy Corbyn led Labour Party in the UK. Much of the article is devoted to the resistant and the revolutionary role of teachers, academics and education/ cultural workers in different arenas, from national and local electoral and direct action politics/ Focusing on Critical Education, Critical Educators, Marxist Education, Marxist Educators, I seek to address four aspects of education: pedagogy, the curriculum, resistance in the classroom and the hidden curriculum, and the structure of schooling nationally and locally (within-school). I conclude by setting out what is specifically Marxist about the proposals set out. These are: (1) Class Analysis: the Capital-Labour Relation; (2) Capitalism must be replaced by Socialism and that change is Revolutionary; and (3) Revolutionary Transformation of Economy and Society needs to be preceded by and accompanied by a Class Programme, Organisation, and Activism. Regarding capitalism, our task is to replace it with democratic Marxism, to lead, firstly, into socialism, and ultimately, into communism. As teachers, as educators, as cultural workers, as educational, union and party activists, as intellectuals, we have a role to play.
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Maccaferri, Marzia. "Intellettuali italiani fra societŕ opulenta e democrazia del benessere: il caso de "Il Mulino" (1958-1968)." MONDO CONTEMPORANEO, no. 1 (May 2009): 45–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/mon2009-001002.
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- By the 1950s the process of economic reconstruction in Italy was widely considered as accomplished with the welfare consumerist society starting to take hold, albeit not without its contradictions. Shifting the perspective of the analysis from the economic aspects to the socio-political ones of consumption, this essay seeks to reconstruct the debate that was developed by the group of intellectuals of the journal Il Mulino over the challenges posed by the transformation of lifestyles and culture as a consequence of the establishment of the so-called affluent society in the years spanning between the publication of John Kenneth Galbraith's work and 1968. By analysing political works and archival materials the article sheds light on the key issues of the debate as well as on the connection between, on the one hand, the issue of welfare and the consumer revolution, and space and political legitimation, on the other. It is focused on the analytical process that, starting from the reception of Anglo- American sociology and political science, would then conceptualise the standard of living and access to consumption and leisure time as an element of political legitimacy and a redefinition of the relations between citizens and government. The article then analyses the democratisation of affluence and what intellectuals like Giorgio Galli, Luigi Pedrazzi, Nicola Matteucci identified as the political formula capable of providing adequate answers to this new aspect of the modernisation process: the Centre-Left DCPsi alliance. In conclusion, the author deepens the hypothesis drafted by the Il Mulino group concerning the superseding of the "sclerosis of the Italian party system, that is the imperfect two-party system, interpreted as being the diagnosis of the Italian political stalemate and a solution to" the political issue of affluence. Key words: welfare society, affluent society, political issue of welfare, consumer society, the Sixties in Italy, intellectuals of the Il Mulino, DC-Psi Centre-Left coalition, imperfect two-party system DC-Pc
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Mehring, Franz. "On Hauptmann's ‘The Weavers’ (1893)." New Theatre Quarterly 11, no. 42 (May 1995): 184–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266464x00001202.
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Born in 1846, Franz Mehring as a young man was a follower of Ferdinand Lassalle, who in 1863 had organized Germany's first socialist party. As well as establishing a reputation as a journalist with his contributions to many liberal and democratic newspapers, Mehring was awarded his doctorate at Leipzig University in 1881 for his dissertation on the history and teachings of German social democracy. In his mid-forties he embraced Marxism and in 1891 joined the German Social Democratic Party, soon emerging as the intellectual leader of its left wing. He became editor of the Leipziger Volkszeitung and wrote prolifically for Die Neue Zeit and other radical journals on history, politics, philosophy, and literature. His book The Lessing Legend, published in 1893, is regarded as the first sustained attempt at Marxist literary criticism. His major biography of Karl Marx appeared in 1918, the year before his death. Completed in 1891, The Weavers was accepted for performance by the Deutsches Theater but was rejected by the Berlin censor as ‘a portrayal which specifically instils class hatred’. The first production of the play, discussed by Mehring below, was possible only because the Freie Bühne was a subscription society. In October 1893 a further private performance was given at the Neue Freie Volksbühne, followed by seven more in December at the Freie Volksbühne, where Franz Mehring was chairman. By now, the Prussian State censor had overruled his Berlin subordinate and The Weavers received its public premiere at the Deutsches Theater on 25 September 1894. On each occasion Hauptmann's play was greeted with great enthusiasm by the public, but found no favour with the Imperial family who indignantly cancelled their regular box at the Deutsches Theater. Subsequently The Weavers was banned from public performance in France, Austria, Italy, and Russia. Mehring's article appeared originally in Die Neue Zeit, XI, No. I (1893). Its translation in NTQ forms part of an occasional series on early Marxist dramatic criticism, which already includes Trotsky on Wedekind (NTQ28) and Lunacharsky on Ibsen (NTQ39). EDWARD BRAUN
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Guizzi, Vincenzo. "Craxi’s Italy." Government and Opposition 20, no. 2 (April 1, 1985): 166–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1985.tb01076.x.
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IT IS NOT EASY TO EXPLAIN THE REASONS THAT LED TO THE appointment of Bettino Craxi as Prime Minister. First of all, there was certainly the political fatigue of the Christian Democratic Party which had held the premiership for 35 years. AIdo Moro, a great man and leader, had tried to mediate between the various currents within the party, as well as between the party and other allied parties (the Republicans, the Social Democrats, the Socialists). But what Moro really dreamt of was a possible alliance with the Communist Party to solve at least the most serious issues, such as terrorism and economic decline. He thought of repeating with the Communists the experience the DC had had in the early 1960s with the Socialists: widening the democratic area with the view of transforming the PCI into a social democratic trend. In order to obtain this he even considered letting the PCI take part in the majority at least if not in the government itself. His disappearance had serious repercussions, especially in the Christian Democratic Party where internal friction grew even stronger than in the past. This resulted in a great drop in the party's power and ability to manage the country politically even if, at least in part, it regained in the 1979 and 1983 elections the votes lost in the 1976 elections.
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Warner, Carolyn M. "Christian Democracy in Italy." Party Politics 19, no. 2 (November 15, 2012): 256–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462934.
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This article argues that historical context can be a strong force for the origins of an ideologically and behaviourally moderate religious political party. It explores the origins of Italian Christian Democracy, following the trajectory of the Partito Popolare Italiano and Democrazia Cristiana in order to highlight a path to religious party moderation that excludes extremism and violence at all stages. That path includes the development of a moderate ideology prior to inclusion in the democratic system, influenced by efforts to reconcile Catholicism with democracy. Extremist alternatives are eliminated not through the moderating tendencies of a democratic political system but by historical events and by efforts of the moderate religious party to ensure that the democratic system does not collapse. Ideological and behavioural moderation are understood as acceptance of democracy and promotion of civil liberties, not as the notion that a party becomes in some way less religious.
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Kınıklıog˘lu, Suat. "The Democratic Left Party: Kapikulu PoliticsPar Excellence." Turkish Studies 3, no. 1 (March 2002): 4–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714005696.
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Krason, Stephen M. "What the Democratic Party Has Become." Catholic Social Science Review 27 (2022): 189–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cssr2022272.
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This was one of SCSS President Stephen M. Krason’s “Neither Left nor Right, but Catholic” columns in The Wanderer in 2021. In it, he writes that the Democratic party has increasingly embraced the agenda of the left, been tolerant of violence by radical organizations, been willing to compromise the principle of the rule of law, and shown increasing intolerance of opposing perspectives and a tendency to political repression. This article is reprinted with permission.
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Gaunder, Alisa, and Sarah Wiliarty. "Conservative Women in Germany and Japan: Chancellors versus Madonnas." Politics & Gender 16, no. 1 (January 31, 2019): 99–122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x18000867.
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AbstractDespite many similarities between them, the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have represented women in parliament at different rates. This article argues that differences in party organization, electoral system rules, and left party strength interact to explain the varying levels of representation of conservative women in parliament. The CDU's corporatist structure allowed it to represent diverse interests and successfully respond to challenges for female support from the left. As a result of a weaker left party challenge and a classic catch-all party organization, the LDP's attempts to incorporate women have been less extensive and largely symbolic.
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Gwiazda, Anna. "Party Patronage in Poland." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 22, no. 4 (September 8, 2008): 802–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325408316534.
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Patronage is central to Polish party politics. The power of a governing party to appoint its supporters to positions in public and semi-public spheres will be examined in this paper. The two governments under investigation are: the center—left coalition government of the Democratic Left Alliance, the Labour Union, and the Polish Peasant Party formed in October 2001 and the center—right minority government of the Law and Justice party formed in October 2005. A significant extent of party patronage was expected in the case of the Democratic Left Alliance, which confirmed a dominant party thesis. However, in the case of Law and Justice, party patronage was expected to be hindered by party competition. This has not been the case, which challenges two arguments put forward by Grzymała-Busse that the dispersion of parliamentary power constrains party patronage and that in Poland the general pattern is that of decreasing rent-seeking.
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Rybář, Marek, and Kevin Deegan-Krause. "Slovakia’s Communist successor parties in comparative perspective." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41, no. 4 (November 17, 2008): 497–519. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2008.09.008.
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The contrast between Slovakia’s primary Communist successor party—the Party of the Democratic Left—and its own successor—Smer—offers considerable insight into the interaction between party ideology, organization and electoral success in post-Communist Europe. The Party of the Democratic Left and Smer offered relatively similar programmatic positions, but Smer managed to replace—and far outpace—its predecessor by offering a more charismatic public face, a smaller and more tightly centralized organization and an ideological flexibility that permitted it to take advantage of a shifting electoral environment.
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Silvia, Stephen J. "Left behind: The social democratic party in Eastern Germany." West European Politics 16, no. 2 (April 1993): 24–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402389308424959.
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McClean, Ciaran. "Northern Ireland and the Democratic Left Party, 1989-1999." New Hibernia Review 7, no. 3 (2003): 23–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nhr.2003.0064.
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Stevenson, H. Michael. "Ideology and Unstable Party Identification in Canada: Limited Rationality in a Brokerage Party System." Canadian Journal of Political Science 20, no. 4 (December 1987): 813–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900050423.
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AbstractThis article examines changes in individuals' identification with Canadian federal political parties in the period 1977 to 1981. The analysis suggests that differences in class and ideology have a significant, if not very large effect on shifts in partisan identity. There was a slight bias toward more upper-class identification with the Progressive Conservative party and more lower-class identification with the Liberal party. Unstable partisans were at least as ideologically constrained as stable partisans, and partisan instability was more pronounced amongst the more left-wing individuals. Changes in partisanship were more likely among younger respondents, particularly lower-class and more left-wing youth. The largest bloc of unstable partisans was closest ideologically to the more left-wing stable New Democratic party partisans, and shifted only between the New Democratic and Liberal parties. A smaller bloc moved to the Progressive Conservative party and was ideologically closest to its more right-wing stable partisans.
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Hickson, Kevin, and Jasper Miles. "Social democratic Euroscepticism: Labour’s neglected tradition." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 4 (July 20, 2018): 864–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148118787148.
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The referendum result of 2016 creates a timely opportunity to reappraise Euroscepticism in British politics. This article examines the Eurosceptic tradition within the Labour Party, specifically its moderate wing. During the referendum campaign, Euroscepticism within the Labour Party was presented as a temporary phenomenon limited to the ‘hard left’ of the Party in the early 1980s. However, this view neglects a much longer tradition of Euroscepticism on the moderate wing of the Labour Party dating back to the earliest post–Second World War attempts to foster European unity. This article seeks to restore that tradition and concludes that it is built on a clear conceptualisation of social democratic ideology.
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Lazar, Marc. "The French Left, François Mitterrand and the Socialist Party." Contemporary European History 9, no. 1 (March 2000): 157–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777300001077.
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Eric Duhamel, François Mitterrand. L'unité d'un homme (Paris: Flammarion, 1998), 260 pp., FF 104, ISBN 2-0807 29 40. Bruce D. Graham, Choice and Democratic Order: the French Socialist Party, 1937-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 430 pp., ISBN 0-521-41402-4 hardback. Robert Ladrech and Philippe Marlière, eds., Social Democratic Parties in the European Union. History, Organization, Policies. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 234 pp., ISBN 0-333-68940-2. Mairi Maclean, ed., The Mitterrand Years. Legacy and Evaluation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 336 pp., ISBN 0-333-67167-8. Joseph P. Morray, Grand Disillusion. François Mitterrand and the French Left (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 168 pp., £46, ISBN 0-275-95735-7. Frédéric Sawicki, Les réseaux du Parti socialiste. Sociologie d'un milieu partisan (Paris: Belin, 1997), 335 pp. ISBN 2-7011-2078-0.
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Daly, Tom Gerald, and Brian Christopher Jones. "Parties versus democracy: Addressing today’s political party threats to democratic rule." International Journal of Constitutional Law 18, no. 2 (July 2020): 509–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moaa025.
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Abstract The growing threat to liberal democracy worldwide is, in many ways, a political party threat. Recent years have witnessed the rise of a range of authoritarian populist, illiberal, far-right, nativist, and extremist parties. Some have entered government in countries including Hungary, Poland, Austria, and Italy. Germany’s Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) is now the main parliamentary opposition. Beyond Europe we see democratic structures threatened or incrementally dismantled through the subversion of an established democratic party by an outsider (e.g. Donald Trump in the United States or Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines) or ascendance of the extremist wing of a right-wing party (e.g. India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)). Parties and party leaders occupying an ill-defined space on the political spectrum—a form of “far-right lite”—today generally present a much greater threat to democratic governance than overtly antidemocratic fringe outfits, such as Germany’s National Democratic Party (NPD). The ambiguity of such parties, their growing size, their entry into government, the subversion of “good” democratic parties by a “bad” leadership, and the rise of the “shadow party” and intensifying external control mean that contemporary political party threats seriously frustrate the possibility of remedial action afforded by existing public law and policy mechanisms. They also require us to reflect anew on crafting novel remedies and to revisit our deep assumptions about parties as creatures of central constitutional importance.
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Ward, Hugh, Lawrence Ezrow, and Han Dorussen. "Globalization, Party Positions, and the Median Voter." World Politics 63, no. 3 (July 2011): 509–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s004388711100013x.
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The authors argue that the effects of economic globalization on social democratic parties in Western Europe are conditional on the position of the median voter. If the median is far enough to the right, such parties will adopt business-friendly policies because they are required to win office. Only when the median is relatively far to the left will globalization constrain social democratic parties, forcing them to adopt policies further to the right in order to retain credibility. It is on this basis the authors argue that empirical studies are misspecified unless they include an interaction between measures of globalization and the position of the median. In addition to presenting formal theoretical arguments, the article reports empirical findings from fifteen countries in the period from 1973 to 2002 that support the conclusion that the effects of globalization are indeed contingent on the median. The authors find that the effects of globalization are significant for social democratic parties only in circumstances in which the median is relatively far to the left.
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Ladrech, Robert. "The Party of European Socialists: Networking Europe's Social Democrats." Journal of Policy History 15, no. 1 (January 2003): 113–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jph.2003.0007.
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Most discussions regarding the fate of the democratic left in Europe focus on individual parties in national political systems. Beyond this level, individual political figures have strode across the (West) European stage symbolizing the principles and values of social democracy; one thinks, for example, of Willy Brandt or Olaf Palme. By and large, though, when the health of the democratic left is assessed, it is done so by counting the number of parties in European governments. This “counting game” does not evaluate the ideological attraction of these parties, but rests solely on the outcomes of competitive elections, which does not necessarily attest to the popularity of the winning party, and in many cases reflects on the deeds of the incumbent party. Nevertheless, the main point is that measuring the prospects for the democratic left has always implied a focus on the individual national political system. At the beginning of the twentieth-first century, it is now possible to speak of an emerging European left, that is, a political presence representing a common set of issue preferences actively trying to influence the decision-making process of the European Union. One of the organizational nodes of this political presence is the Party of European Socialists (PES). This essay aims to explore the PES—its background, organizational development, and capability to influence the challenges to social democracy. The attempt to form a European-level social democracy represents one of the possible futures for the democratic left in Europe. This is because the intensity of the European integration process has permeated so many areas of national policymaking. Indeed, “more so than at any point in history the fate of social democracy and European integration have become interlinked.”
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Charalambous, Giorgos, and Iasonas Lamprianou. "The (non) particularities of West European radical left party supporters: comparing left party families." European Political Science Review 9, no. 3 (December 21, 2015): 375–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773915000429.
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So far little has been done to explore similarities and differences between radical left parties and other traditionally perceived party families of the left at the societal level. A noticeable gap thus remains in the study of the European radical left: whether and in what ways social divides form the basis of radical left party support. Using data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008), for five West European countries, we investigate radical left party supporters’ socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics, juxtaposing them with those of social democratic party supporters and green party supporters. Our approach departs from related studies by distinguishing three cognitional operations within the economic left-right axis, that are based on the distinction between ideals and their effects on reality; and by testing for intra-left divides revolving around trust. Based on insights from cleavage research, we devise a number of hypotheses, most of which test positively. Our findings suggest left party families across Western Europe do reflect certain lines of division in society, albeit with qualifications. While structural divides are not found to be significant, there appears to be correspondence between political and attitudinal divides on a three-dimensional space. These concern the cognitive divisions within the economic left-right axis, issues of political trust, and attitudes towards the environment. Our findings have conceptual and empirical implications both for the left and for investigations into cleavage politics.
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Fofanova, Anna R. "United States Democratic Party and the 2020 Presidential Election: The Main Candidates, Topics and Features of the Election Rhetoric." REGIONOLOGY 27, no. 3 (September 30, 2019): 398–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.15507/2413-1407.107.027.201903.398-412.
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Introduction. The article is of relevance due to the beginning of the active phase of the race for the right to become the Democratic Party’s nominee for the 2020 United States presidential election. The range of issues, topics and features of the election rhetoric of the Democrats will largely determine the outcome of the 2020 election and therefore will influence the subsequent development of the United States. The objective of the study is to analyze the political rhetoric of the major Democratic Party presidential candidates and the political trends among the ranks of the Democrats, taking place against the backdrop of the election campaign. Materials and Methods. The study was based on the methods of empirical analysis, such as description, synthesis, analogy, classification, and comparison, which made it possible to consider the main characteristics and topics of the political rhetoric of members of the United States Democratic Party. Publications in the media, recordings of public speeches of the Democratic Party members, statistics, sociological polls, and research by Russian and foreign scientists were used as the materials for the study. Results. The author has identified the main topics and features of the election rhetoric of the Democratic Party presidential candidates. Issues of public health, education, and ecology have become central topics for the potential Democratic presidential candidates, which is largely due to a significant shift to the left and the role of the left-wing Democrats in the electoral process. The study has revealed a significant degree of political disintegration in the Democratic Party. The major challenge the Democrats are faced with today is to nominate a candidate who will be able to fight back the energetic rhetoric of Donald Trump, retain the traditional electorate of the Democratic Party, and attract new supporters. Discussion and Conclusion. The research results provide an insight into the processes taking place in the Democratic Party at the stage of nominating the Democratic presidential candidate. The data presented in the article will be useful to researchers interested in the history and politics of the United States. The study conducted makes it possible to better understand the current trends in American domestic policies, which largely determine the state of affairs in international relations.
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McDonald, Michael D., Ian Budge, and Robin E. Best. "Electoral Majorities, Political Parties, and Collective Representation." Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 9 (January 24, 2012): 1104–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414011434008.
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In practice, democracies privilege plurality parties. Theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice. Abstract social choice theory wonders whether an electoral majority even exists. A more optimistic line of argument, prominent in research on collective representation, assumes that the policy position of the median voter embodies the majority electoral preference. The conflict between what democracies actually do and what two leading theories of the democratic process say calls for a comparative inquiry into electoral majoritarianism. For each of a dozen countries, the authors ask whether any political party commands a predominant majoritarian position among voters—that is, is a Condorcet winner—and, if so, which party it is. They find that a Condorcet winning party exists in all 12 countries and that the plurality party can lay more claim to representing the popular majority than the left—right median party. These findings have important implications for the study of democratic representation, which the authors consider in their conclusions.
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Posner, Paul W. "Popular Representation and Political Dissatisfaction in Chile's New Democracy." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 41, no. 1 (1999): 59–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/166227.
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The constraints imposed on Chile’s democratic transition by the military regime, plus the impact of structural reform and the political renovation of the dominant parties of the center and left, have made the traditional party allies of the popular sectors unable or unwiIIing to represent those constituents in the political arena. This argument is substantiated through an overview of pacted democratic transitions, an analysis of the evolution of party-base relations in Chile, and a consideration of the institutional impediments to further democratic reform.
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FORLENZA, ROSARIO. "A Party for the Mezzogiorno: The Christian Democratic Party, Agrarian Reform and the Government of Italy." Contemporary European History 19, no. 4 (September 29, 2010): 331–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777310000263.
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AbstractIn the 1950s the Christian Democratic party turned its attention to agrarian reform projects and development funding for southern Italy. Its social and economic objectives were the destruction of latifundia, the creation of a class of small landowners, industrial and commercial development and the reduction of territorial inequalities. The ultimate goal, however, was political: to gain loyalty, allegiance and electoral consensus. To manage the economy and direct change, the party had to strengthen the organisation, form a ruling class, lay down territorial roots and widen the scope of its propaganda beyond anti-communism. Elections became the testing ground for the party's new reform strategies.
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Khan, Arif, Saiful Islam, and Muhammad Alam. "The role of political opposition: A pre-requisite for democracy." Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JHSMS) 2, no. 1 (August 24, 2021): 63–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.1.6.
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No doubt for a democracy to be triumphant, multi-party system or, at least two party systems is obligatory. A country where there is one party system and lack observant and efficient opposition there are every chances for the incumbent party to become autocratic and domineering. One party system is most of the times susceptible to transform into dictatorship. Most of the times where there is one party system, the opposition is stifled and trampled and the dictatorship of the single party is established. Germany during Hitler’s rule and Italy during Mussoloni rule are the cases in point. One cannot imagine of a democratic set up without a healthy and watchful opposition. For the success of any parliamentary democracy, an effective opposition is must to carry out its functions courageously and effectively. The paper analyses the rights, responsibilities and obligations of opposition in a democratic system. For this purpose, the techniques adopted by the researcher for data collection include a detailed survey of the available literature covering different aspects of the topic. The internationally reputed authors and experts have been quoted. It is for the government to allow the opposition to fulfil their functions, which indicates a sign of democratic maturity on the part of government. The opposition has to focus on its democratic functions and if it fails to do so, it will be a sign of dysfunctional democracy.
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Dahal, Kapilmani. "Parties' Polarization and their Impact on Democracy." Journal of Political Science 18 (June 29, 2018): 62–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/jps.v18i0.20441.
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Political parties are the major agents of a political process. In the democratic system of governance, political parties are thought to be the inevitable factors. Political parties are said to be as the lubricant oil of democracy, engine of democracy, fuel of democracy, life line of democracy and energy of democracy in the democratic system. Democracy is the political system which is regulated and performed by the political parties. For the well functioning of a democratic system, the political parties should follow perform the democratic values and norms properly. All the parties but mainly the ruling party or parties should be always committed towards the achievement of democratic values. Party may be polarized but they should not be polarized for and against the democratic norms and values. When political get parties polarized going for and against constitutional guidelines then it may be proved disastrous for democracy. Now in Nepal political parties have been polarized making their own alliance during the election time. Left alliance has declared that they will make the unified single communist party for political stability and economic prosperity. Democratic alliance mainly Nepali congress has claimed that left alliance is not for nation but for imposing totalitarianism and authoritarianism in the country. Polarization of political party will bring both the positive and negative impacts in the democratic polity. To make success the democratic system of governance, party may be polarized and unified but they must not to be polarized to make weaken the democracy. The major objectives of this article are to show the major values of democracy, to show the patterns of polarization of political parties and to analyze the impacts of polarization of political parties. To meet these objectives descriptive-analytical methodology of study has been applied. To draw the conclusion, both qualitative and quantitative information have been taken from secondary method.Journal of Political Science, Volume XVIII, 2018, page: 62-81
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Mansbridge, Jane, and Stephen Macedo. "Populism and Democratic Theory." Annual Review of Law and Social Science 15, no. 1 (October 13, 2019): 59–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-101518-042843.
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Commentators routinely describe “populism” as vague. Some argue that the early US populists, who coined the modern usage, were not populists. We disagree and identify this common conceptual core: the “people” in a moral battle against “elites.” The core definition fits all cases of populism: those on the left and right, those in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. In addition to this minimal common core, we identify strongly suggested and frequently correlated non-core characteristics. These include the people's homogeneity and exclusivity, direct rule, and nationalism, as well as a single leader, vilification of vulnerable out-groups, and impatience with deliberation. The US Populist Party and Spain's Podemos Party fit the core definition but have few of the other characteristics. The core can be good for democracy, we argue, while the associated characteristics are often dangerous. Populism in opposition can be good for democracy, while populism in power carries great risks.
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Van Dyck, Brandon. "External Appeal, Internal Dominance: How Party Leaders Contribute to Successful Party Building." Latin American Politics and Society 60, no. 1 (January 15, 2018): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lap.2017.3.
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AbstractMany successful political parties depend for their initial popularity and cohesion, and even for their long-term brand strength, on a leader. Nevertheless, literature on successful party building downplays the role of leaders. Thus, the question, what type of leader is good for party building?, remains undertheorized. This article presents and provides initial evidence for a leadership-centered theory of successful party building. It argues that externally appealing, internally dominant leaders facilitate party building by lifting new parties to electoral prominence and helping to prevent debilitating schisms. The article provides evidence for this argument through a most similar cases comparison of three new left parties in Latin America: two that took root (Brazil’s Workers’ Party, Mexico’s Party of the Democratic Revolution), and one that collapsed (Peru’s United Left).
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BERGER, STEFAN, and DARREN G. LILLEKER. "THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC DURING THE ERA OF NON-RECOGNITION, 1949–1973." Historical Journal 45, no. 2 (June 2002): 433–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x02002443.
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The German Democratic Republic (GDR) became the focus of a recurrent and sometimes heated debate within the British Labour party before 1973. The official stance of the party followed an all-party consensus within parliament about the non-recognition of the second German state. Yet many on the left wing of the Labour party came, for various reasons, to perceive such an inflexible stance as governed not by reason but dictated by the West German government. Such ambivalence towards West Germany and the Adenauer government in particular led to ambiguities within the party's policy as a considerable minority, including some key figures within the party, offered alternative strategies for maintaining or improving relations with the GDR. The most radical alternative, official recognition of the GDR as a legal, political entity, was only propounded by a core of hard left campaigners both within and outside the party. This article examines why sections of the Labour left came to sympathize with the GDR and how successful it was in influencing official party policy during the whole period of non-recognition of the GDR between 1949 and 1973.
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Holmes, Michael. "Democratic Left: The Life and Death of an Irish Political Party." Irish Political Studies 27, no. 1 (February 2012): 159–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2012.636192.
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Celep, Ödül. "The moderation of Turkey’s Kurdish left: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)." Turkish Studies 19, no. 5 (June 18, 2018): 723–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2018.1483195.
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Navia, Patricio, and Rodrigo Osorio. "It's the Christian Democrats' Fault: Declining Political Identification in Chile, 1957–2012." Canadian Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (December 2015): 815–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423915001067.
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AbstractFor different reasons, identification with political parties has been on the decline everywhere. Using polling data, we show that political identification in Chile increased in times of polarization before 1973 and in the transition to democracy in 1990 and fell under democratic consolidation. The decline comes primarily from falling identification with the largest party, the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Assessing the determinants of party identification, we report that while in the 1960s the PDC had a wide appeal as it attracted voters identified with the left, centre and right, in recent years the PDC attracts support from centrists and older people.
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Kopeček, Lubomír. "Opoziční smlouvy „za kopečky“ II.: Byl pakt ČSSD a ODS z let 1998-2002 demokratickou deviací?" Středoevropské politické studie Central European Political Studies Review 15, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 284–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cepsr.2013.4.284.
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This is the second part of a two–part paper, the first one having been published in the previous volume of this journal. After the 1998 general elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic, the largest party, the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), formed a minority government. The origin and existence of this government was enabled by an agreement with the second largest formation, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). What was then known as the Opposition Agreement became the subject of considerable debate. The first part of the paper provided analysis of government practice in similar circumstances in Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand, and Italy at the time of the Historic Compromise. Here I focus specifically on the Czech case. The present paper points out not only the Opposition Agreement between the Social Democrats and the Civic Democratic Party and the later Toleration Patent, which even deepened the cooperation between these two parties, but also the frequent ad hoc legislative coalitions which the minority government was able to form.
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Shestov, Nikolay I. "The “left” future of Russia: Reflections of party theorists and the electorate." Izvestiya of Saratov University. Sociology. Politology 22, no. 2 (May 23, 2022): 189–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1818-9601-2022-22-2-189-198.
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In their minds, subjects of democratic politics constantly form and optimize images of future changes in functioning of the state and society, use them as a tool in the struggle for political influence and leadership. The article provides a comparative analysis of how this creative process is going on within Russian civil society today, in the minds of ordinary citizens and party elites committed to left-wing political values. The author focuses on identifying differences in the results to which the work of party elites and ordinary citizens’ consciousness on the specific contours of the non-liberal (socialist) future of Russia leads. The article contains a forecast of risks for the further development of the democratic process in our country, arising from these differences.
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Bentancur, Nicolás, and José Miguel Busquets. "The Governing Left in Uruguay (2005–2015): A Participatory Democratic Experiment." Latin American Perspectives 46, no. 1 (October 29, 2018): 137–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094582x18807488.
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An account of the first 10 years of government of a leftist party in Uruguay—the Frente Amplio—focusing on a mode of designing public policies that prioritized participation by civil society organizations suggests that this strategy distinguishes it from the preceding traditional party administrations and challenges the “liberal-democratic” label assigned to it by some of the high-profile specialized literature. Este análisis de los primeros diez años de gobierno de un partido de izquierda—el Frente Amplio—en Uruguay, hace foco en una modalidad de construcción de las políticas públicas que incorporó de manera jerarquizada la participación de la sociedad civil. Se argumenta que representa una estrategia alternativa a la desarrollada por los gobiernos de centro-derecha que le precedieron, que no encaja bien en la categoría “liberal democrática” en la que la sitúa parte de la literatura especializada.
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Jones, Rhian E. "Levelling up versus democratic localism." Soundings 80, no. 80 (May 1, 2022): 22–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3898/soun.80.02.2022.
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The Johnson government's pledge to 'level up' in response to regional inequality has been derided for its continuing lack of political substance. Responses from the Labour Party leadership have tended to ignore the development in several parts of the UK of approaches focusing on democratic localism or 'community wealth building', in which local leaders, groups and communities in neglected or 'left behind' areas are not only achieving central aspects of what 'levelling up' promises, but doing so with more progressive principles and intentions than those that underpin the Tory-led project. The obvious example of this is the 'Preston Model', a project brought in over the past decade by a Labour-led city council. While some criticisms of the Preston Model and community wealth building are misconceived, others are valid areas of question or concern for the left, in particular those that centre on the democratic nature of these economic experiments, and the risk that their focus on the spending policies of local or regional authorities ignores the potential for genuinely democratic community decision-making. This article looks at the extent to which community wealth building has integrated or accommodated these concerns; the potential for doing so in future iterations of the strategy; and how a focus on these alternative strategies could offer a path to renewal for the Labour Party nationally.
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Saito, Jun. "Infrastructure as the Magnet of Power: Explaining Why Japanese Legislators Left and Returned to the LDP." Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (December 2009): 467–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800006743.
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By examining party-switching decisions among members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), this article shows how distributive policy programs exclusively available to the governing party attract incumbents to the party in power. In a stable electoral environment where the government party is likely to stay in power, legislators elected from infrastructure-poor constituencies are effectively tied to the party. However, when the party's electoral prospects are uncertain, legislators behave more sincerely and switch parties to match their policy preferences. It is also found that defectors elected from infrastructure-poor constituencies tended to return to the LDP once the party installed a stable surplus coalition.
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Damiani, Marco, and Marino De Luca. "From the Communist Party to the Front de gauche. The French radical left from 1989 to 2014." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49, no. 4 (October 6, 2016): 313–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2016.09.001.
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This article examines the political transformations experienced by the Communist Party and the evolution of the radical left in France in the twenty-five years after 1989. Interpreting the Communist Party and Left Front as anti-establishment, that is, opposed to the political elite, but pro-system parties that are not interested in changing the nature of democratic governance. The peculiarities of French communism and its political philosophy are illustrated. Finally, this study considers the constituent process of the Front. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Front plays the role of a political federation to the left of the Socialist Party with positive electoral results.
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Fiorino, Nadia, and Umberto Triacca. "Government Spending and Coalition Parties in Italy (1960–1993): A Cointegration-Based Approach." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 21, no. 2 (October 1, 2003): 193–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569203x15668905422054.
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Abstract This note attempts to test the relation between the parties that take part in coalition governments and specific spending programs in Italy from 1960 to 1993. In doing so, we: 1) build a voting power index to describe the relative position of political parties in government and 2) analyze the long-term relationship between expenditure by functions and political parties. Data indicate that the Christian Democratic party was the leading party. It adopted long run policies; nevertheless, it did not refer to specific items of public expenditure. T h e three smaller parties (the Liberal, the Republican and the Social Democratic) did not have enough strength to pursue spending programs in the long run. Finally, the analysis shows that the Socialists tried to find a key role in the political framework by swinging from a long-term opposition to the policy formation in the Senate to short-term agreements on spending policies in the Chamber of Deputies.
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Hough, Dan, and Michael Koß. "Populism Personified or Reinvigorated Reformers? The German Left Party in 2009 and Beyond." German Politics and Society 27, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 76–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2009.270206.
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Despite its recent electoral successes, the Left Party's position in the German party system is more fragile that it may at first appear. The Left Party gained support in 2005 largely on account of dissatisfaction with other parties and not because masses of voters were flocking to its (nominally socialist) cause. Not even a majority from within its own supporter base thought it possessed "significant problem solving competences." Rather, much of the Left Party's political discourse is based on negative dismissals of much that it sees—in policy terms—before it. We discuss the Left Party's political development through the prism of populist politics. After outlining what we understand populism to mean, we analyze the Left Party's programmatic stances and political strategy within the context of this framework. Although populism is certainly not the sole preserve of the Left Party, it clearly excels in using populist tools to make political headway. We conclude by discussing the ramifications that this has for German party politics in general and for the Social Democratic Party in particular.
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Gianfreda, Stella. "Politicization of the refugee crisis?: a content analysis of parliamentary debates in Italy, the UK, and the EU." Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 48, no. 1 (October 17, 2017): 85–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2017.20.
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This paper draws on the literature on party competition and issue ownership to assess whether political membership on the right-left dimension explains party stances on migration. While some scholars argue that on this issue a clear distinction between left and right exists, some more recent quantitative and fine-grained analyses show a more nuanced picture. According to them, a clear difference in narratives exists only when the salience of the issue is high, under pressure of the electoral success of a far-right party or about specific policy issues. This paper further investigates this aspect in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis. It looks at the positions held by the main centre-left, centre-right, Radical Right, and Populist Parties in the Italian, British, and European Parliaments. The content analysis shows that centre-left parties frame the refugee crisis mainly as a humanitarian emergency and held pro-European Union (EU) positions, while centre-right parties differ substantially between Italy and the United Kingdom. Both radical right and Populist Parties exploit the political-opportunity offered by the refugee crisis to foster their anti-establishment claims. Moreover, Radical Right Populist Parties stress the need to secure external borders and restore national sovereignty, against further integration. At the EU level, left- and right-wing groups (Socialist and Democrats Party, European Conservatives and Reformists Party, and European People’s Party) are cohesive, while the populist group (European Freedom and Direct Democracy Party) is not. This paper adds on the academic debate on the refugee crisis, showing how the immigration issue can impact on domestic and European party politics, challenging party identities and alliances.
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BELL, JONATHAN. "SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN CALIFORNIA, 1950–1964." Historical Journal 49, no. 2 (June 2006): 497–524. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x06005309.
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In the 1950s the Democratic Party in California grew from a struggling, rump organization into the major political party in the state. This was in large part due to the activities of a network of liberal activists in the California Democratic Council, a group formed in 1953 to encourage the creation of local Democratic ‘clubs’ across California in which those interested in left-of-centre politics could debate issues of the day and campaign for Democratic candidates in elections. This article argues that the rise of the Democrats in the Golden State was predicated on the espousal by both amateur activists and party politicians of an explicitly social democratic ideology that provided a bridge between the policies of the New Deal in the 1930s and the more ambitious goals of the Great Society at the national level in the 1960s. The article examines the ideas embraced by liberal politicians in the 1950s and looks at how those ideas underpinned a massive expansion of California's welfare state in the early 1960s.