Literatura académica sobre el tema "Nationalisme arabe – 1945-"
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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Nationalisme arabe – 1945-"
1
Bokhari, Imtiaz H. "Pakistan and West Asia". American Journal of Islam and Society 3, n.º 1 (1 de septiembre de 1986): 141–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v3i1.2761.
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State to state relations between Pakistan and Southwest Asian states dateback to the birth of Pakistan in 1947, but the ideological bonds are much older.In 1946, it was late king (then prince) Faisal who chaperoned the PakistanMovement delegation headed by Mr. Isphahani that visited the United Nationsand got sympathetic ears to its pleas? Again, the Saudi king was thefirst head of state to felicitate Mohammad Ali Jinnah after learning of theViceroy’s decision to grant independence to Pakistan and India. Equally warmand sincere support came from Iran.Pakistan and West Asia: Evolution of RelationsImmediately on achieving independence, Pakistan displayed notable enthusiasmin advocating the cause of Islam and Islamic states but soon learntto be more patient. Pakistan’s call for Islamic unity was seen by the Arabsas a move to stifle nascent Arab nationalism at the instigation of the West.These developments corresponded to the early 50s when Pakistan, under intensethreat from India, signed the Mutual Defense Aid pact with the UnitedStates and became a suspect in the eyes of the Arabs who thought of Pakistanas an instrument of the West. Pakistan's joining of the Baghdad Pact in 1954along with Iraq was also interpreted by the Arab nationalist leaders as a neocolonialmove to divide the Arab world. Saudis even called it a stab in theheart of the Arab and Muslim states. In 1956, Indian Prime Minister JawaharLal Nehru’s warm welcome in Saudi Arabia followed by the Suez Crisis putPakistan’s relations with those important Islamic states at their lowest level.During that period the Arabs viewed the region mostly in the Arab and non-Arab context ...
2
Heuman, Johannes. "The Challenge of Minority Nationalism". French Historical Studies 43, n.º 3 (1 de agosto de 2020): 483–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00161071-8278500.
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Abstract This article investigates how the French antiracist movement and its main organizations dealt with Zionism and the Middle East conflict from the liberation of France until the early 1970s. Their generally positive view of Israel and their concern for Arab interests at the end of the 1940s demonstrate these republican organizations' desire to recognize ethnic identities. During the 1950s an ideological split between left-wing antiracism and Zionism began to develop, and by the end of the 1960s a number of new antiracist associations questioned the very foundation of the Jewish state. Overall, the study argues that antiracist organizations' stances on and statements about Zionism and the Middle East conflict influenced Jewish-Arab relations during the postwar period and played an important role for both Jews and Arabs. Cet article examine comment le mouvement antiraciste français et ses principales organisations ont abordé le sionisme et le conflit au Moyen-Orient depuis la Libération jusqu'au début des années 1970. Leur opinion surtout positive d'Israël ainsi qu'un souci pour les intérêts arabes à la fin des années 1940 montrent un certain désir par ces organisations républicaines de reconnaître les identités ethniques. Pendant les années 1950, une fracture idéologique entre l'antiracisme de gauche et le sionisme commence à se développer, et dès la fin des années 1960 un activisme plus poussé a amené de nouvelles associations antiracistes à remettre en question les fondements mêmes de l'Etat juif. Dans l'ensemble, l'étude montre que les organisations antiracistes ont été impliquées dans l'élaboration des relations judéo-arabes après la guerre à travers leurs positions et déclarations sur le sionisme et le Moyen-Orient, des questions qui jouent un rôle important pour les Juifs et les Arabes.
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Adamczyk, Anita y Fuad Jomma. "Arab Nationalism in Syria". Polish Political Science Yearbook 52, n.º 1 (31 de diciembre de 2022): 55–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202251.
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Syria is one of many countries in the Middle East diverse in terms of religion, nationality, and ethnicity. Internal divisions emerged when Syria reclaimed independence in 1946, but the differences inside Syrian society have become a taboo. One of the reasons for that was Arab nationalism, which claimed that they were all Arabs. The Syrian authorities managed to maintain the appearance of national homogeneity owing to these claims. This article aims to show the uniqueness of Arab nationalism, which is not characteristic of one country but of numerous states sharing a common past, language, and their citizens belonging to the family of the Arab nation. As a case study for Syria, this article analyses the basic concepts relevant to the subject (nationalism, the nation from the perspective of Islam, and Arab thought), the roots of pan-Arabism in Syria and its presence in the public and legal space. It also attempts to demonstrate that Arab nationalism helped the Syrian authorities (represented by the Alawite minority) blur national, ethnic, and religious differences and thus preserve the unity of society and state.
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Baumgarten, Helga. "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948––2005". Journal of Palestine Studies 34, n.º 4 (1 de enero de 2005): 25–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2005.34.4.25.
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This article takes a comparative look at the three main manifestations of Palestinian nationalism since 1948: the Movement of Arab Nationalists, embodying its pan-Arab phase; Fatah, its specifically Palestinian form; and Hamas, its religious (Islamic) variant. Tracing the origins of the three movements reveals that each arose as a consequence of its immediate predecessor's perceived failure to achieve Palestinian goals. The differing ideologies and strategies of each group are explored, and the points of similarity and contrast highlighted. The place of armed struggle in each is given particular emphasis. Despite the considerable differences between the three movements, arising at approximately twenty-year intervals, each has followed a similar trajectory, beginning with maximalist goals and progressively scaling them back, explicitly or implicitly, under the impact of Israel's overwhelming power.
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Parsons, Laila. "Soldiering for Arab Nationalism: Fawzi al-Qawuqji in Palestine". Journal of Palestine Studies 36, n.º 4 (1 de enero de 2007): 33–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2007.36.4.33.
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Fawzi al-Qawuqji was a soldier and Arab nationalist who fought European colonialism all over the Middle East between World War I and 1948. He served as an officer in the 4th Brigade of the Ottoman Army, fighting the British advance north through Palestine; led the al-Hama sector of the Syrian Revolt against the French in 1925––1927; was one of the rebel leaders in the Arab revolt against the British in Palestine in 1936; participated in the Rashid ‘‘Ali al-Kaylani coup against the British-controlled government in Iraq in 1941; and served as field commander of the Arab Liberation Army in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. This essay, part of a larger study of Qawuqji’’s life and career, is based on his published memoirs as well as his private papers, stored in boxes at the back of a closet in the Beirut apartment where he lived after his retirement until his death in 1976.
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Bashkin, Orit. "The Barbarism from Within—Discourses about Fascism amongst Iraqi and Iraqi-Jewish Communists, 1942-1955". DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 52, n.º 3-4 (2012): 400–429. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700607-201200a7.
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This article looks at the changing significations of the word “fascist” within communist discourses in Iraq and in Israel. I do so in order to illustrate how fascism, a concept signifying a political theory conceptualized and practiced in Italy, Germany, and Spain, became a boarder frame of reference to many leftist intellectuals in the Middle East. The articles shows that communist discourses formulated in Iraq during the years 1941-1945 evoked the word “fascist” not only in order to discredit Germany and Italy but also, and more importantly, as a way of critiquing Iraq’s radical pan-Arab nationalists and Iraq’s conservative elites who proclaimed their loyalty to pan-Arabism as well. In other words, the article studies the ways in which Iraqi communist intellectuals, most notably the leader of the Iraqi Communist Party, Fahd, shifted the antifascist global battle to the Iraqi field and used the prodemocratic agenda of the Allies to criticize the absence of social justice and human rights in Iraq, and the Iraqi leadership’s submissive posture toward Britain. As it became clear to Iraqi communists that World War II was nearing its end, and that Iraq would be an important part of the American-British front, criticism of the Iraqi Premier Nūrī al-Saʿīd and his policies grew sharper, and such policies were increasingly identified as “fascist”. Within this context, Fahd equated chauvinist rightwing Iraqi nationalism in its anti-Jewish and anti- Kurdish manifestations with fascism and Nazi racism. I then look at the ways in which Iraqi Jewish communists internalized the party’s localized antifascist agenda. I argue that Iraqi Jewish communists identified rightwing Iraqi nationalism (especially the agenda espoused by a radical pan-Arab Party called al-Istiqlāl) as symptomatic of a fascist ideology. Finally, I demonstrate how Iraqi Jewish communists who migrated to Israel in the years 1950-1951 continued using the word “fascist” in their campaigns against rightwing Jewish nationalism and how this antifascist discourse influenced prominent Palestinian intellectuals
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Sanagan, Mark. "Teacher, Preacher, Soldier, Martyr". Welt des Islams 53, n.º 3-4 (2013): 315–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685152-5334p0002.
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When Shaykh ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Qassām died in a gunfight with the Palestine Police Force in November 1935, the Government of the British Mandate for Palestine was ill prepared for the public outpouring of popular support and inspiration the imām from Haifa’s death would give to Arab Palestinian political aspirations. Al-Qassām soon became a powerful symbol in the nationalist fight against the British colonial power and subsequently the State of Israel. Al-Qassām remains a potent figure in Arab nationalist, Palestinian nationalist, and modern “Islamist” circles. The purpose of this paper is thus twofold: first, to provide an overview of the current state of the historiography on al-Qassām; and second, to add to that historiography with a recontextualized narrative of al-Qassām’s life and death. This latter part of the paper aims to fill some of the gaps with additional sources and place the findings alongside contemporary historical scholarship on political identity and nationalist movements in Palestine and the wider Mashriq. This article contends that the claims made on al-Qassām by contemporary Palestinian, “Islamic” nationalists have silenced the multiple contexts available if one considers the entirety of al-Qassām’s life. Viewed in this light, it is possible that al-Qassām never considered himself a “Palestinian” at all.
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Afriani, Risna. "PENANAMAN NASIONALISME KETURUNAN ARAB DALAM LEMBAGA PENDIDIKAN AL-IRSYAD AL-ISLAMIYYAH PEKALONGAN TAHUN 1918-1942". Kebudayaan 13, n.º 2 (13 de febrero de 2019): 107–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.24832/jk.v13i2.200.
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AbstractThe establishment of Al-Irsyad as an organization and educational institution born of Arab descent, is expected to have a role in instilling Indonesian nationalism for Arab descendants. However, there is a presumption that Al-Irsyad education does not at all instill Indonesian nationalism homeland, but Hadramaut’s nationalism. The above problems become the basis of this research, especially about how the nationalism of Arabian descent in the Institute of Education Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah Pekalongan year 1918-1942. As for the purpose of this research to know; first how the education system in Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah Education Institution of Pekalongan in 1918-1942, second, the inculcation of nationalism into Arabic descendants by Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah Education Institution of Pekalongan in 1918-1942. The study employed the historical, by method the selection of the topic to study. the collection of sources (heuristic), verification or source criticism, and interpretation historiography or history writing. The results of the study were as follows; First, the education system in Al-Irsyad of Pekalongan was the modern Islamic education system that combined Islamic religion teaching and general knowledge, the Arabic language subject became a compulsory subject. Second, the inculcation of nationalism into Arabic descendant was done through the education system of Al-Irsyad of Pekalongan which had Indonesian characteristics such as the use of the Indonesian language as a medium of instruction in learning activities, the Indonesian language subject, and the admission of students from the indigenous community, which were capable of changing the orientation of Arabic descendants’ nationalism which was previously Hadramaut-like (the country of the ancestors of Arabic ethnic groups in Indonesia). Indonesian nationalism of Arab descent reinforced by the birth of the Sumpah Pemuda Arab Descendants of Indonesia in 1934. AbstrakDidirikannya Al-Irsyad sebagai organisasi dan lembaga pendidikan yang lahir dari keturunan Arab, diharapkan memiliki peran dalam menanamkan nasionalisme Indonesia untuk keturunan Arab pada masa pergerakan. Namun, ada anggapan bahwa pendidikan Al-Irsyad sama sekali tidak menanamkan nasionalisme Indonesia, melainkan nasionalisme ke-Hadramaut-an. Permasalahan tersebut menjadi dasar penelitian ini, terutama mengenai bagaimana penanaman nasionalisme Keturunan Arab dalam Lembaga Pendidikan Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah Pekalongan tahun 1918- 1942. Adapun tujuan dari penelitian ini untuk mengetahui: pertama, bagaimana sistem pendidikan Lembaga Pendidikan Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah Pekalongan tahun 1918-1942. Kedua, bagaimana penanaman nasionalisme keturunan Arab dalam Lembaga Pendidikan Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah Pekalongan tahun 1918-1942. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian sejarah pemilihan topik, pengumpulan sumber (heuristik), kritik sumber (verifikasi), dan historiografi atau penulisan sejarah. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan: pertama, sistem pendidikan Al-Irsyad Pekalongan adalah sistem pendidikan Islam modern, dengan memadukan pengajaran agama Islam dan pengetahuan umum, mata pelajaran Bahasa Arab menjadi pelajaran wajib. Kedua, penanaman nasionalisme keturunan Arab melalui sistem pendidikan Al-Irsyad Pekalongan yang memiliki sifat ke-Indonesia-an seperti: penggunaan Bahasa Melayu sebagai bahasa pengantar kegiatan pembelajaran; adanya pelajaran Bahasa Indonesia; dan diterimanya murid dari masyarakat pribumi mampu mengubah orientasi nasionalisme keturunan Arab yang sebelumnya masih bersifat ke-Hadramaut-an. Nasionalisme Indonesia keturunan Arab diperkuat dengan lahirnya Sumpah Pemuda Keturunan Arab Indonesia pada tahun 1934.Â
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Baron, Beth y Sara Pursley. "EDITORIAL FOREWORD". International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, n.º 4 (noviembre de 2011): 587–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743811001188.
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The first three articles in this issue, grouped under the subtitle “Insurgency, State Formation, Counterinsurgency,” all deal with historical aspects of nationalism and state-building in the 20th century and resonate with contemporary politics in the Arab world. Starting with Egypt, Omnia El Shakry looks at how student demonstrations in 1935 and 1936 helped usher in the “figure of youth as an insurgent subject of politics.” This discourse placed youth at the vanguard of nationalist struggle and social change in Egypt “but only insofar as they could enact a non-antagonistic conception of politics grounded in national unity.” It also foreshadowed the emergence of a discourse of adolescent psychology in the 1940s, in which adolescence was “reconfigured as a psychological stage of social adjustment, sexual repression, and existential anomie.” Given the emphasis on the role of youth in the 2011 uprisings in Arab states, the article has potential theoretical implications for analyses of current events and discourse.
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Mahzumi, Fikri. "Dualisme Identitas Peranakan Arab di Kampung Arab Gresik". TEOSOFI: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam 8, n.º 2 (15 de diciembre de 2018): 406–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2018.8.2.403-429.
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The article attempts to ethnographically describe struggle of identity among the Arabian offspring in Indonesia in the post Reformation Era. As the descendants of the Hadrami migrants who have born in Indonesia, the Arabian offspring deal with two interrelated identities; between their responsibility to preserve the traditions of their ancestors and becoming a wholly recognized citizen of Indonesia. The debate about nationalism among the Arabian-Hadrami people appeared prior to Indonesia’s independence revolution. Anti-colonialism movements in this period had raised solidarity and solidity among the Indonesian people. This situation indubitably urged the Arabian-Hadrami people to reformulate their concept of nationalism. As a part of their nationality commitments, the Arabian Hadrami people have subsequently founded two organizations, i.e. Jamiat Khair (est. 1901) and Jamiyat al-Islah wal-Irsyad al-Arabiyah (est. 1915). In 1934, Abdurrahman Baswedan also founded Persatuan Arab Indonesia, which played pivotal role in cultivating Indonesian nationalism among the Arabian-Hadrami people. In the post Reformation Era, however, the issue of nationalism of the Arabian offspring has never been re-discussed. Employing ethnographical approach this study observes the ways the Arabian offspring, in Kampung Arab (the Arabic Town) in Gresik, compromise and negotiate with two challenges they face at once; as the heirs of Hadrami traditions and as a part of Indonesian citizens.
Tesis sobre el tema "Nationalisme arabe – 1945-"
1
Saber, Dima. "De Nasser à Nasrallah : l’identité arabe à l’épreuve de ses récits médiatiques. Une analyse sémio-pragmatique de l’émergence de deux symboles de la nation. Nationalismes et propagandes, 1948-2006". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA020055.
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Notre récit commence dans l’Egypte nationaliste des années 1950. Le coup d’Etat mené par Gamal Abdel Nasser et le “Mouvement des Officiers Libres” ouvre la voie à une révolution politique, économique, et socioculturelle, au Caire et dans l’ensemble du monde arabe. Il met alors en place un puissant dispositif médiatique : il fonde la radio la Voix des Arabes, publie La Philosophie de la révolution, et fera très rapidement du journal Al-Ahram la langue de sa révolution. De la guerre de Suez en 1956, à l’union avec la Syrie en 1958, l’Egypte soutiendra alors tous les mouvements de libération nationale jusqu’à la “catastrophe” de 1967, qui signe l’arrêt de mort du nationalisme nassérien. Lorsque le nationalisme laïc n’a pas réussi à restituer la Palestine et la dignité arabe perdues, certains ont cru que c’est la religion qui le fera. Deux modèles antagonistes secouent alors le consensus des années 1960 : au “pétro-islam” saoudien s’oppose désormais un islam chiite inspiré par la Révolution islamique en Iran et prôné par le Hezbollah et son Secrétaire général Hassan Nasrallah. Les années 1980-1990 correspondent aussi à l’introduction des chaînes satellites dans le monde arabe ; au pouvoir mobilisateur de la radio des années 1950, se substitue la force de l’image de chaînes comme Al-Jazeera et Al-Manar. Ainsi, trois décennies après la dernière guerre israélo-arabe, la question de l’identité est exportée sur le front libanais : Nasrallah dit mener, en 2006, “la guerre de la nation contre l’ennemi sioniste”. Comment, à travers leur couverture de la révolution, de la guerre, de la défaite et de la victoire, les médias arabes ont-ils dit l’identité tout au long des soixante dernières années d’histoire ? Comment la radio, la presse écrite, la télévision satellitaire, mais aussi la chanson, les clips et les jeux vidéo ont-ils dit l’arabité? Qu’est-ce que “être arabe” dans le discours médiatique d’aujourd’hui et de quelles manières l’islam politique prôné par les médias contemporains reprend-t-il les anciennes thématiques du nationalisme nassérien ?Our story starts in the nationalist Egypt of the 1950s. The military coup undertaken by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the “Free Officers Movement” paved the way for a political, economic and socio-cultural revolution in Egypt and the entire Arab world. Soon after, Nasser established a powerful multifaceted media apparatus: he founded The Voices of the Arabs radio station, published The Philosophy of the Revolution, while Al-Ahram was slowly becoming the “tongue” of his revolution. From the Suez crisis in 1956, until the union with Syria in 1958, Nasser’s Egypt supported all anti-colonial liberation movements in the Arab world, until the 1967 defeat that signed the death sentence of pan-Arab nationalism. When secular nationalism couldn’t resuscitate Palestine and the tarnished Arab dignity, some thought that religion could. Two antagonistic models shook the fragile consensus of the 1960s: a Saudi “petro-Islam”, and the more recently emerging Shiite Islam, inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and mainly promoted by Hezbollah and its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. The 1980s also correspond to the introduction of the first satellite channels in the Arab world: the power of images on channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar began to substitute radio’s mobilizing discourse of the 1950s. Three decades after the last Arab-Israeli war, the question of Arab identity is exported to the Lebanese front: Hassan Nasrallah says he is leading, in 2006, “the nation’s war against the Zionist enemy”. How did Arab media, through their coverage of revolutions, wars, defeats and victories, take part in the mechanisms of construction of post-colonial identities? How did the radio, the print and the satellite media, the songs, the music clips and the video games all define what is being “an Arab” today? And in which ways, does today’s political Islam, promoted by contemporary media narratives, reclaim the old pan-Arab and nationalist themes?
2
Saber, Dima. "De Nasser à Nasrallah : l’identité arabe à l’épreuve de ses récits médiatiques. Une analyse sémio-pragmatique de l’émergence de deux symboles de la nation. Nationalismes et propagandes, 1948-2006". Thesis, Paris 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA020055/document.
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Notre récit commence dans l’Egypte nationaliste des années 1950. Le coup d’Etat mené par Gamal Abdel Nasser et le “Mouvement des Officiers Libres” ouvre la voie à une révolution politique, économique, et socioculturelle, au Caire et dans l’ensemble du monde arabe. Il met alors en place un puissant dispositif médiatique : il fonde la radio la Voix des Arabes, publie La Philosophie de la révolution, et fera très rapidement du journal Al-Ahram la langue de sa révolution. De la guerre de Suez en 1956, à l’union avec la Syrie en 1958, l’Egypte soutiendra alors tous les mouvements de libération nationale jusqu’à la “catastrophe” de 1967, qui signe l’arrêt de mort du nationalisme nassérien. Lorsque le nationalisme laïc n’a pas réussi à restituer la Palestine et la dignité arabe perdues, certains ont cru que c’est la religion qui le fera. Deux modèles antagonistes secouent alors le consensus des années 1960 : au “pétro-islam” saoudien s’oppose désormais un islam chiite inspiré par la Révolution islamique en Iran et prôné par le Hezbollah et son Secrétaire général Hassan Nasrallah. Les années 1980-1990 correspondent aussi à l’introduction des chaînes satellites dans le monde arabe ; au pouvoir mobilisateur de la radio des années 1950, se substitue la force de l’image de chaînes comme Al-Jazeera et Al-Manar. Ainsi, trois décennies après la dernière guerre israélo-arabe, la question de l’identité est exportée sur le front libanais : Nasrallah dit mener, en 2006, “la guerre de la nation contre l’ennemi sioniste”. Comment, à travers leur couverture de la révolution, de la guerre, de la défaite et de la victoire, les médias arabes ont-ils dit l’identité tout au long des soixante dernières années d’histoire ? Comment la radio, la presse écrite, la télévision satellitaire, mais aussi la chanson, les clips et les jeux vidéo ont-ils dit l’arabité? Qu’est-ce que “être arabe” dans le discours médiatique d’aujourd’hui et de quelles manières l’islam politique prôné par les médias contemporains reprend-t-il les anciennes thématiques du nationalisme nassérien ?Our story starts in the nationalist Egypt of the 1950s. The military coup undertaken by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the “Free Officers Movement” paved the way for a political, economic and socio-cultural revolution in Egypt and the entire Arab world. Soon after, Nasser established a powerful multifaceted media apparatus: he founded The Voices of the Arabs radio station, published The Philosophy of the Revolution, while Al-Ahram was slowly becoming the “tongue” of his revolution. From the Suez crisis in 1956, until the union with Syria in 1958, Nasser’s Egypt supported all anti-colonial liberation movements in the Arab world, until the 1967 defeat that signed the death sentence of pan-Arab nationalism. When secular nationalism couldn’t resuscitate Palestine and the tarnished Arab dignity, some thought that religion could. Two antagonistic models shook the fragile consensus of the 1960s: a Saudi “petro-Islam”, and the more recently emerging Shiite Islam, inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and mainly promoted by Hezbollah and its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. The 1980s also correspond to the introduction of the first satellite channels in the Arab world: the power of images on channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar began to substitute radio’s mobilizing discourse of the 1950s. Three decades after the last Arab-Israeli war, the question of Arab identity is exported to the Lebanese front: Hassan Nasrallah says he is leading, in 2006, “the nation’s war against the Zionist enemy”. How did Arab media, through their coverage of revolutions, wars, defeats and victories, take part in the mechanisms of construction of post-colonial identities? How did the radio, the print and the satellite media, the songs, the music clips and the video games all define what is being “an Arab” today? And in which ways, does today’s political Islam, promoted by contemporary media narratives, reclaim the old pan-Arab and nationalist themes?
3
Solh, R. "Lebanon and Arab nationalism : 1936-1945". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.376027.
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La, Nave Gaetano. "Héritages impériaux, tensions locales et conflits régionaux dans la Méditerranée de la Guerre froide (1966-1967)". Paris, EHESS, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012EHES0156.
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Pendant la Guerre Froide, la Méditerranée était le "flanc sud" de l'Alliance Atlantique, et aussi un lieu de circulation de marchandises, en particulier du pétrole provenant du Proche et Moyen Orient. Après la Guerre Civile Grecque, le témoin de puissance hégémone dans l'aire passe de Londres aux Etats-Unis. La recherche analyse les deux ans 1966-1967 comme tensions locales et conflicts régionaux de divers nature et intensité, comme ceux-là que impliquent : Gibrelterre, Malte, Chypre, Grèece et le Proche-Orient ; peuvent déstabiliser la Méditerranée et l'entire confrontation globale bipolaire, et comme ils sont font pour la production de décisions par les administrations devant aux crises en coursDuring the Cold War, the Mediterranean was the "southern flank" of the Atlantic Alliance and a space of circulation of goods, in particular of oil from Near and Middle East. After the Greek Civil War, the baton of the hegemon power in the area passed from Great Britain to United States. The research analyze the biennium 1966-1967 its local tensions and regional conflits of different nature and intensity, cases study as : Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Greece and the Near East destabilized not only the Mediterranean but the total global bipolar confrontation ; and as the foreign decision-making from different administrations in front of these crisis
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Alburaas, Theyab M. "The Anglo-Iraqi Relationship Between 1945 and 1948". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc9802/.
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This paper discuses the British Labour government's social, economic and military policies in Iraq between 1945 and 1948. The ability of the Iraqi monarchy to adapt to the British policies after World War II is discussed. The British were trying to put more social justice into the Iraqi regime in order to keep British influence and to increase the Iraqi regime's stability against the Arab nationalist movement.
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France, Hubert de. "Arabisme, panarabisme et pansyrianisme dans l'engagement palestinien de Darwaza et de ses amis". Bordeaux 3, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2006BOR3A001.
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Arabisme, panarabisme et pansyrianisme dans l’engagement palestinien de Darwaza et de ses amis 1908 – 1948 est le titre d’une thèse de doctorat en histoire consacrée à l’apparition d’un sentiment national palestinien de l’Empire ottoman à la fin du mandat britannique à une époque de luttes entre le mouvement sioniste et les nationalistes arabes à la recherche de l’unité. Durant cette période ont également eu lieu des conflits entre les Arabes et les pouvoirs français et britanniques, détenteurs de mandats de la Société des Nations pour administrer la Palestine et la Syrie. Et parmi les dirigeants nationalistes, qui ont combattu en Palestine contre le mandat et le mouvement sioniste encouragé par lord Balfour en 1917, Darwaza et ses amis ont joué un rôle très important, des dernières années de l’Empire ottoman jusqu’à la naissance d’Israël, contre le régime Jeune Turc, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et bien sûr contre le Foyer National Juif. Dès lors, cette thèse consacrée au nationalisme arabe en Palestine et en Syrie constitue une tentative de description de l’apparition d’un panarabisme sui generis en Palestine qui a essayé de libérer la vie politique locale du pouvoir des notables des villes en Syrie et en Palestine parmi lesquels l’on observe le Grand Mufti al Hâj Amîn al Husayni, Râgheb an Nachâchibi, Jamîm Mardam bey et d’autres dirigeants moins importantsArabism, panarabism and pansyrianism in the palestinian engagement of Darwaza and his friends 1908 – 1948 is the title of a P. H. D. Dissertation dedicated to the emergence of the Palestinian nationalism from the ottoman Empire to the end of the british mandate in times of struggles between the sionist movement and the Arab nationalists in search of arab unity. During this period took place also in the Middle East, conflicts between french power and british power with the Arab, who obtained mandate of the League of Nations to administrate Palestine and Syria. And among the nationalist leaders, who faught in Palestine against the mandate and the sionist movement heartened by Lord Balfour in 1917, Darwaza and his friends played a verty important part for the defense of the Arab’s cause from the last years of ottoman Empire, the first world war 10 Israël’s birth in 1948. And finally this dissertation, dedicated to the arab nationalism in Palestine and Syria is an attempt to describe the emergence of genuine panarabism in Palestine who tried to release the political life from the urban notable’s power in Syria and Palestine and among them : the Grand Mufti al Hâj ’Amîn al Husayni Râgheb an Nachâchibi, Jamî Mardam bey and others leaders less important
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HATMI, MOHAMMED. "Du bon usage d'une superpuissance le recours des nationalistes arabes a l'aide et au soutien sovietiques 1945-1961 nationalisme et communisme arabes, coexistence pacifique et jusqu'au boutisme occidental". Université Marc Bloch (Strasbourg) (1971-2008), 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995STR20044.
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Le sujet principal de ce travail en histoire contemporaine est l'evolution des relations entre les pays de l'orient arabe et l'union sovietique depuis la fin de la deuxieme guerre mondiale jusqu'en 1962. L'objectif consise a demontrer que les relations entre ces deux mondes repondaient a une logique historique qui compte des realites locales, regionales, internationales, ideologiques, sentimentales et autres. Compose de quatre parties plus une partie preliminaire, ce travail traite des divers aspects de l'entente entre la nationalisme arabe et le communisme sovietique, deux ideologies qui n'ont rien de commun sauf l'anti-occidentalisme. Plusieurs themes sont traites abondamment tels les projets d'encerclement de l'union sovietique par des chaines d'alliances multinationales, la rivalite interarabe, l'hegemonie de l'egypte au sein de la ligue arabe, la coexistence pacifique, le neutralisme afro-asiatique. . . Ce travail se base essentiellement sur des documents inedits, des temoignages capitaux et une vaste bibliographieThe aim of thids study is to discribe and analyse the substantial advances made by the arab nationalists to seek soviet aid and support since the end of the second world war. This study is divided into five parts. In the first a historical background of arabrussian relations since the earliest times until the first world war. In chapter two, the positive evolution of the image of the soviet union. Chapter tree is about the irrealistic policy of western powers in the middle east. In chapter for and five an analyse of the support of soviets to the struggle of nationalists regimes against western control of the area. In the first postwar years, western powers has been in search of policies in the arab world that would protect it own interests and serve the cazuse of the "free world". They totally feel in their first tentatives. Some of the difficulties stem from the stresses, shifts and eruptions wich have marked the local scene, especially among the arabs at a time when they were simultaneously taken up with the struggles of political emancipation and social changes and confronted with the fact of the state of israel. Drastic changes in the situation of the middle east allows a circonstantielle allainces and political comprehension between arabs and soviets
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Mechat, Samya el. "Le nationalisme tunisien et la ligue des etats arabes de 1945 a 1956". Nice, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1990NICE2024.
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L'annonce de la fondation de la ligue arabe en mars 1945 avait souleve un immense enthousiasme parmi les milieux nationalistes tunisiens. Le depart de nationalistes pour le caire entre 1945 et 1946 etait du a une double motivation : l'attrait grandissant pour les freres arabes emancipes mais surtout la recherche d'allies dans le but de contrer la france. Au caire, les nationalistes tunisiens fonderent le bureau du neo-destour en 1946, ils contribuerent pour une large part a la creation du bureau du maghreb arabe ainsi que du comite de liberation d'afrique du nord. L'action de ces deux organisations fut limitee et leurs rapports avec la ligue arabe ne furent pas aises. En effet, l'attitude de la ligue arabe etonne par moderation et ses hesitations. L'hesitation de la ligue arabe etait d'abord celle des etats membres. La ligue arabe tenait compte des suspectibilites de la france, des interets propres des etats membres, mais le facteur le plus determinant fut la question palestinienne. Ainsi, les decisions de la ligue arabe relatives a la question tunisienne dependaient de la conjoncture inter-arabe et internationale. Elle avait toutefois offert aux nationalistes tunisiens une tribune. De ce point de vue, elle marqua une etape importante dans l'histoire du nationalisme tunisien.
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Tristani, Philippe. "L’Iraq Petroleum Company de 1948 à 1975 : Stratégie et déclin d’un consortium pétrolier occidental pour le contrôle des ressources pétrolières en Irak et au Moyen-Orient". Thesis, Paris 4, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA040236/document.
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L’Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) est un consortium britannique formé le 30 mai 1929 et qui prend la suite de la Turkish Petroleum Company qui opérait sur l’ensemble de l’Empire ottoman. Sa mission est de trouver, exploiter et transporter du pétrole brut provenant de ses vastes concessions au profit de ses actionnaires. C’est l’Irak qui se trouve au cœur de l’entreprise pétrolière que les Majors comptent mener au Moyen-Orient, tout au moins à ses débuts. L’IPC exploite à partir de 1925 une concession qui s’étend à l’est du Tigre. En juillet 1938 et en mai 1939, deux de ses filiales, la Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) et la Mosul Petroleum company (MPC), gèrent respectivement les territoires situés au sud et au nord du 33e parallèle. À la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, c’est donc la presque totalité de l’Irak qui est aux mains du consortium britannique pour une durée de 75 ans. Entre 1948, date à laquelle les Majors américaines prennent le contrôle effectif du consortium, et la nationalisation de tous les avoirs de la compagnie en Irak en 1975, l’IPC doit faire face à de profondes mutations, tant en ce qui concerne l’industrie pétrolière que la situation géopolitique du Moyen-Orient. Tandis que le Moyen-Orient devient la première région exportatrice de pétrole au monde grâce aux efforts des Majors, l’affrontement entre le monde arabe et l’État d’Israël exacerbe le nationalisme des pays producteurs de pétrole. De simples pays hôtes percepteurs de redevances, ceux-ci réclament au nom de la souveraineté nationale et de la lutte contre l’impérialisme de contrôler l’action des Majors et de prendre activement part dans l’exploitation de leurs richesses nationales. Ainsi, l’IPC, avec d’autres consortium pétroliers internationaux opérant au Moyen-Orient, se trouve affectée, voire impliquée, dans les choix diplomatiques que les gouvernements occidentaux développent pour prévenir l’instabilité du Moyen-Orient, zone stratégique essentielle pour leur approvisionnement énergétique dans un contexte de guerre froideThe Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is a British company that, in July 1928, succeeded the Turkish Petroleum Company, which held a concession in Iraq. Since its creation, the IPC had been both an emanation of the major Western oil groups and the concrete expression of the oil policy pursued in the Middle East by the major Western powers, the United States, Great Britain and France. It was a petroleum production consortium whose activities were mainly in Iraq. From his creation in 1929 to his nationalization in 1975, IPC associated all of the Western Majors. In 1932 and in 1938, the Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC) and the Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC) rounded out this system in the southern part of Iraq. So, on the eve of World War II, the area of the concessions covered all Iraq.Until the 1970s, the concession system governed relationships between operating companies and producing countries. In those agreements, the producing countries did not control the amounts produced, the level of exports, or prices. But, as of the 1950s, the complex oil system implemented by the Majors was threatened by the de-colonization movement. The Soviet threat and the Israeli-Arab conflicts strengthened this increasing instability. So the battle for freeing the Arab nation incorporated the fight against IPC to return Arab oil to the Arabs. The revolution of 14 July 1958, which overthrew Nouri Saïd’s pro-Western government and brought General Abd el-Karim Kassem to power, intensified a constant political desire for re-appropriation of the Iraqi oil economy in the name of Iraq’s development and national sovereignty
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Wien, Peter. "Iraqi Arab nationalism : authoritarian, totalitarian and pro-fascist inclinations, 1932 - 1941 /". London ;New York : Routledge, 2008. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0518/2005025604.html.
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Univ., Diss. u.d.T. Wien, Peter: Discipline and Sacrifice: authoritarian, totalitarian and pro-fascist inclination in Iraqi Arab Nationalism, 1934-1941--Bonn, 2003.Includes bibliographical references and index. The historical framework -- Generational conflict -- The generational approach -- The sherifian generation -- The young effendiyya -- The debate of the Iraqi press -- The Iraqi press in its environment -- Direct references to Germany and fascism -- Fascist imagery? -- The debate on the youth.
Libros sobre el tema "Nationalisme arabe – 1945-"
1
Henry, Laurens. L' Orient arabe: Arabisme et islamisme de 1798 à 1945. Paris: A. Colin, 1993.
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2
Abdallah al-Tall, Arab Legion commander: Arab nationalism and opposition to the Hashemite regime. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
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3
al-Aʻmāl al-qawmīyah, 1957-1965. Bayrūt: al-Muʼassasah al-ʻArabīyah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 2002.
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4
Khoury, Philip S. Syria and the French mandate: The politics of Arab nationalism, 1920-1945. London: Tauris, 1987.
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5
Syria and the French mandate: The politics of Arab nationalism, 1920-1945. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987.
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6
Khoury, Philip S. Syria and the French mandate: The politics of Arab nationalism, 1920-1945. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1986.
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7
The birth of Israel, 1945-1949: Ben-Gurion and his critics. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000.
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8
Maḥmūdī, Aḥmad Khalīl. Lūbnān fī Jāmiʻat al-Duwal al-ʻArabīyah, 1945-1958: Dirāsah tārīkhīyah wa-siyāsīyah. Bayrūt: al-Markaz al-ʻArabī lil-Abḥāth wa-al-Tawthīq, 1994.
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9
Iraqi Arab nationalism: Authoritarian, totalitarian and pro-fascist inclinations, 1932-1941. New York: Routledge, 2006.
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10
Beʻsîzm u Kurd, 1947-1975: Twêjîneweyekî mêjûyî, siyasî ye. Silêmanî [Kurdistan, Iraq]: Mektebî Bîruhoşyarî (Y.N.K), 2007.
Buscar texto completoCapítulos de libros sobre el tema "Nationalisme arabe – 1945-"
1
Behbehani, Hashim S. H. "From observation to involvement, 1945-1948". En The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917-1966, 56–68. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003420606-4.
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Berman, Aaron. "Three Trips: 1920–1925". En America's Arab Nationalists, 116–36. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003268840-7.
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Greenstein, Ran. "Palestinian-Arab Nationalism before 1948". En Anti-Colonial Resistance in South Africa and Israel/Palestine, 79–99. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429020056-5.
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Behbehani, Hashim S. H. "The Interlude Period, 1921-1945". En The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917-1966, 49–55. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003420606-3.
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Behbehani, Hashim S. H. "The Soviet Union and Arab political development, 1948-1953". En The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917-1966, 87–111. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003420606-6.
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Behbehani, Hashim S. H. "The Soviet Union in the Arab world, 1953—1955". En The Soviet Union and Arab Nationalism, 1917-1966, 112–34. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003420606-7.
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Agsous, Sadia. "The Making Stage of the Modern Palestinian Arabic Novel in the Experiences of the udabāʾ Khalīl Baydas (1874–1949) and Iskandar al-Khūri al-BeitJāli (1890–1973)". En European Cultural Diplomacy and Arab Christians in Palestine, 1918–1948, 63–78. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55540-5_4.
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AbstractIn 1946, the first Palestinian book fair took place at the Arab Orthodox Union Club in Jerusalem. What lay behind this event was a process that paralleled the political life revolving around the formation of local nationalism, a complex process of cultural and literary development within the Arab Nahda (‘Awakening’ or Renaissance) movement in which the Palestinians left their imprint through the press, literature, translation and other cultural fields. This chapter discusses the cultural environment of Khalīl Baydas and Iskandar al-Khūrī al-BeitJālī who initiated the modern Palestinian Arabic novel, both publishing in 1920. It addresses the Palestinian Nahda and the Russian educational enterprise as the formative context of these two authors and propose that Khalīl Baydas should be recognised as the architect of Palestinian literary realism.
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Zipperstein, Steven E. "Legal Implications of the Palestinian Arab Rejection of the United Nations 1947 Offer of Statehood". En Zionism, Palestinian Nationalism and The Law, 407–30. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003225263-16.
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van Kessel, Tamara. "Cultural Affiliation and Identity Constructs Under the British Mandate for Palestine". En European Cultural Diplomacy and Arab Christians in Palestine, 1918–1948, 431–38. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55540-5_20.
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AbstractIn her conclusion, van Kessel reflects on the nature of cultural diplomacy, its success and failures in Palestine. She considers the different actors’ approaches to cultural diplomacy and the impact of those approaches on processes of identity formation. She also considers the shifting frameworks on cultural diplomacy arguing that both scholars and practitioners have blurred the lines between more orthodox readings that cultural relations were produced by private initiatives, while cultural diplomacy was the domain of government initiatives. She then compares the cases presented in this volume within a broader range of Mediterranean geography to consider the ways in which some of the actors behaved in other contexts. She concludes that the nature of cultural diplomacy in Palestine created overlaps, and sometimes conflicts, between confessional allegiances and nationalism for Christian Palestinians.
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Dawisha, Adeed. "Defining Arab Nationalism". En Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. Princeton University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691169156.003.0001.
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This introductory chapter provides an overview of Arab nationalism. Throughout his numerous writings on Arab nationalism, Sati‘ al-Husri—the foremost theoretician of Arab nationalism—never lost sight of the ultimate goal of the ideology he so vigorously propagated, namely the political unity of the Arabic-speaking people. He wrote that the happiest of nations were the ones in which political and national boundaries were fused into one another. In another one of his writings, Husri says that he is constantly asked how was it that the Arabs lost the 1948–1949 war over Palestine when they were seven states and Israel was only one? His answer is unequivocal: the Arabs lost the war precisely because they were seven states. Thus, to avoid losing future wars, the Arabs had to unite into one Arab state.