Bibliografías temáticas / Nash stability

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Literatura académica sobre el tema "Nash stability"

Autor: Grafiati
Publicado: 11 de marzo de 2023

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Artículos de revistas sobre el tema "Nash stability"

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Lensberg, Terje. "Stability and the Nash solution". Journal of Economic Theory 45, n.º 2 (agosto de 1988): 330–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90273-6.

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Osborne, Martin J. y Eric Van Damme. "Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria". Canadian Journal of Economics 22, n.º 2 (mayo de 1989): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/135684.

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MORGAN, JACQUELINE y VINCENZO SCALZO. "VARIATIONAL STABILITY OF SOCIAL NASH EQUILIBRIA". International Game Theory Review 10, n.º 01 (marzo de 2008): 17–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908001741.

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New results on the variational stability of social Nash equilibria are obtained using the class of sequentially pseudocontinuous functions. This class of functions strictly includes the class of sequentially continuous functions and finds a natural motivation in the framework of Choice and Economic Theory since it characterizes the continuity of the preference relations on first countable topological spaces. We investigate the connections with previous results and we show that it is not possible to improve our results further on.
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Wang, Lei, Cui Liu, Juan Xue y Hongwei Gao. "A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games". Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2018 (1 de noviembre de 2018): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/3293745.

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The problem of strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games is studied. The sufficient conditions related to discount factors are presented, which guarantee the existence of Nash or strong Nash equilibria in such games and therefore guarantee the strategic stability of cooperative solutions. The deviating payoffs of players are given directly, which are related closely to these conditions and avoid the loss of super-additivity of a class of general characteristic functions. As an illustration, Nash and strong Nash equilibria are found for the repeated infinite stage Prisoner’s dilemma game.
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Bhadury, J. y H. A. Eiselt. "Stability of Nash equilibria in locational games". RAIRO - Operations Research 29, n.º 1 (1995): 19–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/1995290100191.

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Alós-Ferrer, Carlos. "Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria". International Game Theory Review 05, n.º 03 (septiembre de 2003): 263–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001057.

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This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of symmetric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered under different assumptions on the speed of adjustment. It is found that two specific refinements of mixed Nash equilibria identify focal rest points of these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both concepts is studied. In the 2×2 case, both imitation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria.
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Liu, Chenwei, Shuwen Xiang y Yanlong Yang. "Existence and essential stability of Nash equilibria for biform games with Shapley allocation functions". AIMS Mathematics 7, n.º 5 (2022): 7706–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/math.2022432.

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<abstract> <p>We define the Shapley allocation function (SAF) based on the characteristic function on a set of strategy profiles composed of infinite strategies to establish an <italic>n</italic>-person biform game model. It is the extension of biform games with finite strategies and scalar strategies. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for this biform game with SAF, provided that the characteristic function satisfies the linear and semicontinuous conditions. We investigate the essential stability of Nash equilibria for biform games when characteristic functions are perturbed. We identify a residual dense subclass of the biform games whose Nash equilibria are all essential and deduce the existence of essential components of the Nash equilibrium set by proving the connectivity of its minimal essential set.</p> </abstract>
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OKUGUCHI, KOJI y TAKESHI YAMAZAKI. "GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES". International Game Theory Review 16, n.º 04 (diciembre de 2014): 1450014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198914500145.

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If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints.
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Yang, Guanghui y Hui Yang. "Stability of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibria and Pareto-Nash Equilibria for Multiobjective Population Games". Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 25, n.º 2 (12 de octubre de 2016): 427–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11228-016-0391-6.

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Calvó-Armengol, Antoni y Rahmi İlkılıç. "Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation". International Journal of Game Theory 38, n.º 1 (18 de septiembre de 2008): 51–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7.

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Tesis sobre el tema "Nash stability"

1

Badasyan, Narine. "Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access Providers". Diss., Virginia Tech, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11193.

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The Internet has a loosely hierarchical structure. At the top of the hierarchy are the backbones, also called Internet Access Providers (hereafter IAPs). The second layer of the hierarchy is comprised of Internet Service Providers (hereafter ISPs). At the bottom of the hierarchy are the end users, consumers, who browse the web, and websites. To provide access to the whole Internet, the providers must interconnect with each other and share their network infrastructure. Two main forms of interconnection have emerged â peering under which the providers carry each otherâ s traffic without any payments and transit under which the downstream provider pays the upstream provider a certain settlement payment for carrying its traffic. This dissertation develops three game theoretical models to describe the interconnection agreements among the providers, and analysis of those models from two alternative modeling perspectives: a purely non-cooperative game and a network perspective. There are two original contributions of the dissertation. First, we model the formation of peering/transit contracts explicitly as a decision variable in a non-cooperative game, while the current literature does not employ such modeling techniques. Second, we apply network analysis to examine interconnection decisions of the providers, which yields much realistic results. Chapter 1 provides a brief description of the Internet history, architecture and infrastructure as well as the economic literature. In Chapter 2 we develop a model, in which IAPs decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points (hereafter NAPs). The model is formulated as a multistage game. Private peering agreements reduce congestion in the Internet, and so improve the quality of IAPs. The results show that even though the profits are lower with private peerings, due to large investments, the network where all the providers privately peer is the stable network. Chapter 3 discusses the interconnection arrangements among ISPs. Intra-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to the same backbone, whereas inter-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to different backbones. We formulate the model as a two-stage game. Peering affects profits through two channels - reduction of backbone congestion and ability to send traffic circumventing congested backbones. The relative magnitude of these factors helps or hinders peering. In Chapter 4 we develop a game theoretic model to examine how providers decide who they want to peer with and who has to pay transit. There is no regulation with regard to interconnection policies of providers, though there is a general convention that the providers peer if they perceive equal benefits from peering, and have transit arrangements otherwise. The model discusses a set of conditions, which determine the formation of peering and transit agreements. We argue that market forces determine the terms of interconnection, and there is no need for regulation to encourage peering. Moreover, Pareto optimum is achieved under the transit arrangements.
Ph. D.
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Chakrabarti, Subhadip. "Network Formation and Economic Applications". Diss., Virginia Tech, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11256.

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Networks, generically, refer to any application of graph theory in economics. Consider an undirected graph where nodes represent players and links represent relationships between them. Players can both form and delete links by which we mean that they can both form new relationships and terminate existing ones. A stable network is one in which no incentives exist to change the network structure. There can be various forms of stability depending on how many links players are allowed to form or delete at a time. Under strong pairwise stability, each player is allowed to delete any number of links at a time while any pair of players can form one link at a time. We introduce a network-value function, which assigns to each possible network a certain value. The value is allocated according to the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule, which divides the value generated by a component equally among members of the component (where a component refers to a maximally connected subgraph). An efficient network is one that maximizes the network value function. We show that there is an underlying conflict between strong pairwise stability and efficiency. Efficient networks are not necessarily strongly pairwise stable. This conflict can be resolved only if value functions satisfy a certain property called "middlemen-security". We further find that there is a broad class of networks called "middlemen-free networks" for which the above condition is automatically satisfied under all possible value functions. We also look at three network applications. A peering contract is an arrangement between Internet Service Providers under which they exchange traffic with one another free of cost. We analyze incentives for peering contracts among Internet service providers using the notion of pairwise stability. A hierarchy is a directed graph with an explicit top-down structure where each pair of linked agents have a superior-subordinate relationship with each other. We apply the notion of conjunctive permission value to demonstrate the formation of hierarchical firms in a competitive labor market. Comparative or targeted advertising is defined as any form of advertising where a firm directly or indirectly names a competitor. We also examine a model of targeted advertising between oligopolistic firms using non-cooperative game theoretic tools.
Ph. D.
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3

Melo, Mateus Moreira de 1991. "Estabilidade de folheações via teorema da função inversa de Nash-Moser". [s.n.], 2015. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/306949.

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Orientador: Diego Sebastian Ledesma
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Matemática Estatística e Computação Científica
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Resumo: Neste trabalho, estudamos o conceito de estabilidade para folheações. Com este objetivo, usamos um complexo não-linear formado por mapas e variedades na categoria Fréchet Tame. Aplicamos uma variação do Teorema da Função Inversa de Nash-Moser ao complexo não-linear obtendo uma relação entre estabilidade e a exatidão tame da linearização do complexo não-linear. Além disso, o complexo linearizado é identificado com um trecho do complexo de Rham da folheação, ou seja, transforma-se o estudo de estabilidade em analisar a exatidão tame de um grupo de cohomologia da folheação. Assim descrevemos uma família de folheações estáveis, chamadas folheações infinitesimalmente estáveis. Esta família dá uma direção para o estudo de estabilidade de folheações
Abstract: In this work, we study the concept of stability for foliations. With this aim we use a non linear complex formed by maps and manifolds in Fréchet Tame category. We apply a variation of The Nash-Moser Inverse Function Theorem to non-linear complex obtaining a relation between the stability and the tame exactness of the linearized complex. Moreover, the linearized complex is identified with a piece of the complex de Rham of the foliation, i.e., we transformed the stability study into a analysis of tameness vanishing on the cohomology group of the foliation. Thus we describe a family of stable foliations, called infinitesimally stable foliations. This family gives a direction for the study of stability of foliations
Mestrado
Matematica
Mestre em Matemática
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4

VARRICCHIO, GIOVANNA. "Gathering Self-Interested People Together: a Strategic Perspective". Doctoral thesis, Gran Sasso Science Institute, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12571/23261.

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Over the past decades, the understanding of how individuals spontaneously gather together received particular attention leading to the definition of several variants of Coalition Formation Games, including the so-called Hedonic Games. In such games, the individuals (or agents) have to be split into disjoint coalitions and express preferences only on the coalition they belong to, and not on how the others aggregate. Subsequently, the more general class of the Group Activity Selection Problem, where agents’ preferences depend also on the activity they are performing, has been introduced. In both these classes of games, the study of the existence, the computability, and the efficiency of suitable stability solution concepts as well as the elicitation of agents’ preferences through strategyproof mechanisms have been addressed. In this work, we consider both the aforementioned research directions. In particular, we put our attention on classes of games in which agents’ preferences are expressed by a utility function and we evaluate the global agents’ satisfaction in a given outcome by means of the utilitarian social welfare. Moreover, we often compare the social welfare of the considered solutions with the social optimum, that is the maximum achievable value of the social welfare. We first introduce and study a new model in the Hedonic Games setting, called Distance Hedonic Games, and we focus on the computation and the efficiency of Nash stable outcomes, i.e. coalition structures in which no agent can unilaterally improve her gain by deviating to another coalition. We then turn our attention to the design of strategyproof mechanisms for two specific classes of games: namely, Friends and Enemies Games and the Additively Separable Group Activity Selection Problem. In both cases, we measure the performances of the proposed mechanisms by considering their approximation ratio with respect to the social optimum.
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Kim, Sunjin. "Essays on Network formation games". Diss., Virginia Tech, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/104598.

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This dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible Nash equilibrium configurations in a model of signed network formation as proposed by Hiller (2017). We specify the Nash equilibria in the case of heterogeneous agents. We find 3 possible Nash equilibrium configurations: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in a Nash equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework using the notion of pairwise Nash equilibrium. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: Rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players designate other rich players as their best friends. As a result, We present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because researchers tend to ask respondents to list only a few friends.
Doctor of Philosophy
This dissertation focuses on studying various network formation games in Economics. We explore a different model in each chapter to capture various aspects of networks. Chapter 1 provides an overview of this dissertation. Chapter 2 studies the possible singed network configurations in equilibrium. In the signed network, players can choose a positive (+) relationship or a negative (-) relationship toward each other player. We study the case that the players are heterogeneous. We find 3 possible categories of networks in equilibrium: Utopia network, positive assortative matching, and disassortative matching. We derive the specific conditions under which they arise in equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we study a generalized model of signed network formation game where the players can choose not only positive and negative links but also neutral links. We check whether the results of the signed network formation model in the literature still hold in our generalized framework. Chapter 4 studies inequality in a weighted network formation model using the notion of Nash equilibrium. In this weighted network model, each player can choose the level of relationship. As a factor of inequality, there are two types of players: rich players and poor players. We show that both rich and poor players choose other rich players as their best friends. As a result, we present that nested split graphs are drawn from survey data because these social network data are censored due to the limit of the number of responses.
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Delport, Jacques. "Critical Substation Risk Assessment and Mitigation". Diss., Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/83444.

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Substations are joints in the power system that represent nodes that are vital to stable and reliable operation of the power system. They contrast the rest of the power system in that they are a dense combination of critical components causing all of them to be simultaneously vulnerable to one isolated incident: weather, attack, or other common failure modes. Undoubtedly, the loss of these vital links will have a severe impact to the to the power grid to varying degrees. This work creates a cascading model based on protection system misoperations to estimate system risk from loss-of-substation events in order to assess each substation's criticality. A continuation power flow method is utilized for estimating voltage collapse during cascades. Transient stability is included through the use of a supervised machine learning algorithm called random forests. These forests allow for fast, robust and accurate prediction of transient stability during loss-of-substation initiated cascades. Substation risk indices are incorporated into a preventative optimal power flow (OPF) to reduce the risk of critical substations. This risk-based dispatch represents an easily scalable, robust algorithm for reducing risk associated with substation losses. This new dispatch allows operators to operate at a higher cost operating point for short periods in which substations may likely be lost, such as large weather events, likely attacks, etc. and significantly reduce system risk associated with those losses. System risk is then studied considering the interaction of a power grid utility trying to protect their critical substations under a constrained budget and a potential attacker with insider information on critical substations. This is studied under a zero-sum game theoretic framework in which the utility is trying to confuse the attacker. A model is then developed to analyze how a utility may create a robust strategy of protection that cannot be heavily exploited while taking advantage of any mistakes potential attackers may make.
Ph. D.
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Lustosa, Bernardo Carvalho. "Precificação em orquestradores de informação: maximizando redes estáveis". reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/11108.

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Em redes de inovação baseadas em trocas de informação, o agente orquestrador se apropria das informações dos atores periféricos, gera inovação e distribui em forma de valor agregado. É sua função promover a estabilidade na rede fazendo com que a mesma tenha taxas não negativas de crescimento. Nos mercados de análise de crédito e fraude, por exemplo, ou bureaus funcionam como agentes orquestradores, concentrando as informações históricas da população que são provenientes de seus clientes e fornecendo produtos que auxiliam na tomada de decisão. Assumindo todas as empresas do ecossistema como agentes racionais, a teoria dos jogos se torna uma ferramenta apropriada para o estudo da precificação dos produtos como mecanismo de promoção da estabilidade da rede. Este trabalho busca identificar a relação de diferentes estruturas de precificação promovidas pelo agente orquestrador com a estabilidade e eficiência da rede de inovação. Uma vez que o poder da rede se dá pela força conjunta de seus membros, a inovação por esta gerada varia de acordo com a decisão isolada de cada agente periférico de contratar o agente orquestrador ao preço por ele estipulado. Através da definição de um jogo teórico simplificado onde diferentes agentes decidem conectar-se ou não à rede nas diferentes estruturas de preços estipuladas pelo agente orquestrador, o estudo analisa as condições de equilíbrio conclui que o equilíbrio de Nash implica em um cenário de estabilidade da rede. Uma conclusão é que, para maximizar o poder de inovação da rede, o preço a ser pago por cada agente para fazer uso da rede deve ser diretamente proporcional ao benefício financeiro auferido pela inovação gerada pela mesma. O estudo apresenta ainda uma simulação computacional de um mercado fictício para demonstração numérica dos efeitos observados. Através das conclusões obtidas, o trabalho cobre uma lacuna da literatura de redes de inovação com agentes orquestradores monopolistas em termos de precificação do uso da rede, servindo de subsídio de tomadores de decisão quando da oferta ou demanda dos serviços da rede.
In innovation networks based on information exchange, the orchestrating actor, or hub, captures information from the peripherical actors, promotes innovation and then distributes it for the network in the form of added value. Orchestration comprises promoting the network’s stability in order to avoid negative growth rates. The credit and fraud agencies, for example, can be understood as orchestrating hubs, concentrating the historical information of the population generated by their clients and offering products that support decision making. Assuming all the companies of this ecosystem as rational agents, game theory emerges as an appropriate framework for the study of pricing as a mechanism to promote the network’s stability. The present work focuses on the identification of a relationship between the different pricing options that can be proposed by the orchestrating hub and the network’s stability and efficiency. Since the network power is given by the combined strength of its members, the innovation generated is a function of the isolated decision of each peripherical agent on whether to hire the orchestrating hub’s services for the price defined by the latter. Through the definition of a simplified theoretical game in which agents decide whether to connect or not to the network based on the pricing structure defined by the hub, the present study analyzes the equilibrium conditions and concludes that the Nash equilibrium entails the network’s stability. One of the conclusions is that in order to maximize the innovation power of the network, the agents should be charged a price that is proportional to the financial benefit obtained by the innovation generated by the net. The study presents as well a computer simulation of a fictitious market for a numerical demonstration of the observed effects. With these conclusions, the present study fills a gap in the literature on monopolistic orchestrated innovation in terms of the pricing structures of the network connection and its use. It can be used as a basis for decision making both on the supply and the demand sides of the services of the hub.
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Dhif, Mohamed Adel. "Renégociation, stabilité et équilibres d'oligopole". Toulouse 1, 1990. http://www.theses.fr/1990TOU10007.

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Ce travail étudie certains problèmes liés à la caractérisation du comportement rationnel dans les interactions stratégiques d'oligopole. La première partie traite de l'impact de la renégociation sur la robustesse des équilibres de Nash parfaits. Nous passons en revue les principaux résultats de la littérature sur ce sujet et nous examinons les conséquences de la renégociation sur les possibilités de collusion dans la répétition d'un oligopole de Cournot. Dans une deuxième partie, nous présentons le concept d'un ensemble stable suggéré par Kohlberg et Mertens, nous utilisons ce concept pour résoudre complètement un jeu de duopole à deux étapes et nous le confrontons a d'autres raffinements récents de l'équilibre de Nash
This work studies some problems related to the caracterization of the rational behaviour in oligopoly strategic interactions. The first part deals with the impact of renegotiation on the consistency of subgame perfect equilibria. We review the main results in the literture about this subject and we examine the possibilities of collusion in finite horizon repeated oligopoly games when players are able to renegociate their actions. In the second part we present the stable set concept suggested by Kohlberg and Mertens. We make use of it in the solution of a two step duopoly game and we compare this concept to other recent refinements of Nash equilibrium
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Rossin, Samuel. "Steiner Tree Games". Oberlin College Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oberlin1464700445.

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Masullo, Mariorosario. "Studies on the NADH oxidase from the thermophiles Sulfolobus acidcaldarius and solfataricus". Thesis, Cranfield University, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.309679.

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Libros sobre el tema "Nash stability"

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van Damme, Eric. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4.

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van Damme, Eric. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2.

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Damme, Eric van. Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria. 2a ed. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991.

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Wenger, Andreas. Herausforderung Sicherheitspolitik: Europas Suche nach Stabilität. Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich, 1999.

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Miele, Alberto. Final report on NASA grant no. NAG-1-516, optimal flight trajectories in the presence of windshear, 1984-86. [Houston, Tex.]: Rice University, 1987.

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Glenn, Lasseigne D., Hussaini M. Yousuff y Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering., eds. The effect of three-dimensional freestream disturbances on the supersonic flow past a wedge: NASA contract no. NAS1-19480. Hampton, VA: Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering, NASA Langley Research Center, 1997.

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Glenn, Lasseigne D., Hussaini M. Yousuff y Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering., eds. The effect of three-dimensional freestream disturbances on the supersonic flow past a wedge: NASA contract no. NAS1-19480. Hampton, VA: Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering, NASA Langley Research Center, 1997.

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Glenn, Lasseigne D., Hussaini M. Yousuff y Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering., eds. The effect of three-dimensional freestream disturbances on the supersonic flow past a wedge: NASA contract no. NAS1-19480. Hampton, VA: Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering, NASA Langley Research Center, 1997.

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Glenn, Lasseigne D., Hussaini M. Yousuff y Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering., eds. The effect of three-dimensional freestream disturbances on the supersonic flow past a wedge: NASA contract no. NAS1-19480. Hampton, VA: Institute for Computer Applications in Science and Engineering, NASA Langley Research Center, 1997.

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United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration., ed. Dynamic Stability Instrumentation System (DSIS)... NASA-TM-109156... Mar. 31, 1997. [S.l: s.n., 1998.

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Capítulos de libros sobre el tema "Nash stability"

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van Damme, Eric. "Strategic Stability and Applications". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 252–304. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2_10.

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van Damme, Eric. "10 Strategic Stability and Applications". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 259–317. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_10.

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Bilò, Vittorio, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco y Luca Moscardelli. "Nash Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games". En Web and Internet Economics, 486–91. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_44.

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van Damme, Eric. "1 Introduction". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 1–21. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_1.

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van Damme, Eric. "2 Games in Normal Form". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 22–45. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_2.

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van Damme, Eric. "3 Matrix and Bimatrix Games". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 46–62. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_3.

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van Damme, Eric. "4 Control Costs". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 63–79. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_4.

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van Damme, Eric. "5 Incomplete Information". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 80–100. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_5.

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van Damme, Eric. "6 Extensive Form Games". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 101–29. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_6.

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van Damme, Eric. "7 Bargaining and Fair Division". En Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, 130–65. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_7.

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Actas de conferencias sobre el tema "Nash stability"

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Ratliff, Lillian J., Samuel A. Burden y S. Shankar Sastry. "Genericity and structural stability of non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria". En 2014 American Control Conference - ACC 2014. IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acc.2014.6858848.

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Harks, Tobias y Konstantin Miller. "Efficiency and stability of Nash equilibria in resource allocation games". En 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137425.

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Khrustalev, M. M. y A. S. Khalina. "Nash equilibrium for quasi-linear stochastic systems operating on infinite time intervals". En 2018 14th International Conference "Stability and Oscillations of Nonlinear Control Systems" (Pyatnitskiy's Conference) (STAB). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/stab.2018.8408363.

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Wang, Bin, Silian Sui y Hongliang Zhao. "Nash Equilibrium Stability of Rent-seeking Competition And Its Game Analysis". En Eighth ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking, and Parallel/Distributed Computing (SNPD 2007). IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/snpd.2007.91.

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Drighes, Benjamin, Walid Krichene y Alexandre Bayen. "Stability of Nash equilibria in the congestion game under Replicator dynamics". En 2014 IEEE 53rd Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2014.7039679.

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Basu, Srinka, Debarka Sengupta, Ujjwal Maulik y Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay. "A strong Nash stability based approach to minimum quasi clique partitioning". En 2014 Sixth International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/comsnets.2014.6734943.

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Bilò, Vittorio, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco y Luca Moscardelli. "Optimality and Nash Stability in Additive Separable Generalized Group Activity Selection Problems". En Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/15.

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Resumen
The generalized group activity selection problem (GGASP) consists in assigning agents to activities according to their preferences, which depend on both the activity and the set of its participants. We consider additively separable GGASPs, where every agent has a separate valuation for each activity as well as for any other agent, and her overall utility is given by the sum of the valuations she has for the selected activity and its participants. Depending on the nature of the agents' valuations, nine different variants of the problem arise. We completely characterize the complexity of computing a social optimum and provide approximation algorithms for the NP-hard cases. We also focus on Nash stable outcomes, for which we give some complexity results and a full picture of the related performance by providing tights bounds on both the price of anarchy and the price of stability.
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Yan, Yuyue, Tomohisa Hayakawa y Nutthanun Thanomvajamun. "Stability Analysis of Nash Equilibrium in Loss-Aversion-Based Noncooperative Dynamical Systems". En 2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc40024.2019.9030066.

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Karafyllis, Iasson, Zhong-Ping Jiang y George Athanasiou. "Nash equilibrium and robust stability in dynamic games: A small-gain perspective". En 2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2010.5717808.

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Inohara, Takehiro. "Refinement of Nash stability using reflexive list functions for the expression of preferences". En 2006 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsmc.2006.385139.

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