Literatura académica sobre el tema "Multilevel governance systems"

This chapter discusses governance dilemmas that are often overlooked in studies that do not encompass the ecology of organization in public governance. The chapter discusses how coordination structures may counteract each other in multilevel systems of government. The ambition of the chapter is twofold: Firstly, a coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct (interconnected) and sectorally specialized implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Secondly, the chapter discusses organizational arrangements that may enable governance systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice. This coordination dilemma seems to have been largely ignored in the literature on EU network governance and national ‘joined-up government’ respectively.

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.

Abstract Transforming World Trade and Investment Law for Sustainable Development explains why the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Agenda for ‘Transforming our World’—aimed at realizing ‘the human rights of all’ and seventeen agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—requires transforming the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organization (WTO) legal systems, as well as international investment law and adjudication. UN and WTO law protect regulatory competition between diverse neo-liberal, state capitalist, European ordo-liberal, and third-world conceptions of multilevel trade and investment regulation. However, geopolitical rivalries and trade wars increasingly undermine transnational rule of law and effective regulation of market failures, governance failures, and constitutional failures. For example, the intergovernmental negotiations in the context of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change have failed to prevent or considerably limit climate change. In order to prevent trade, investment, energy, and climate conflicts, sustainable development requires reforming trade, investment, and environmental rules and dispute settlement systems. The global health pandemics confirm the need for constitutional reforms of multilevel governance of global public goods. Investment law and adjudication must better reconcile governmental duties to protect human rights and decarbonize economies with the property rights of foreign investors. The constitutional, human rights, and environmental litigation in Europe enhances the legal accountability of democratic governments for protecting sustainable development, but European economic constitutionalism has been rejected by Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, China’s authoritarian state capitalism, and many third-world governments. The more that regional economic orders (like the China-led Belt and Road networks) reveal heterogeneity and power politics block UN and WTO reforms, the more the US-led neo-liberal world order risks disintegrating. UN and WTO law must promote private–public network governance, civil society participation, and stronger judicial accountability in order to stabilize and depoliticize multilevel governance of the SDGs.

The final chapter highlights the theoretical significance of the findings, reflects on their generalizability, and outlines supplementary explanations. By identifying systematic differences in the policy feedback processes triggered by market-enabling and market-restraining rules, the book bridges a gap between abstract theories of institutional change and more specific theories on the dynamics of capitalist development. Apart from self-reinforcing and self-undermining feedback effects, several other features of economic governance in advanced industrialized democracies also shape pathways to marketization. These features include eventfulness and periodicity, economic interdependence, multilevel governance, the influence of ideas on the content and intensity of public debates, and institutional structures that mediate interests and ideas, including electoral systems, legal systems, and the division of regulatory competences between levels of government as well as between elected and unelected rule-makers.

The global political economy is a multilevel system of economic activities and regulation in which the domestic level continues to predominate—in other words, it is a global system comprising national capitalist economies. Nations differ in terms of the regulations and institutions that govern economic activity, an observation that is embodied in the so-called “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) literature. Contemporary VoC approaches highlight the significance of social and political institutions in shaping national economies, in stark contrast to neoclassical economics which generally ignores institutions other than markets or sees them as hindrances to the functioning of free markets. Three analytical premises inform the diverse conceptual frameworks within the VoC literature: the firm-based approach, national business systems approach, and the governance or “social systems of production” approach. The VoC literature offers three important contributions to our understanding of the global political economy. The first is that different sources of competitive advantage for firms and nations are institutionally rooted and not easily changed. The second contribution is that these distinct national arrangements give rise to different interests/preferences in how the global economy is constructed and managed. Finally, the VoC approaches provide a framework for analyzing long-term institutional changes in capitalist systems and the persistence of diverse forms of capitalism, including the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 that may usher in yet another epochal change in the “battle of capitalisms.”